1. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF WOMEN IN DETERMINING THE
CONSUMPTION PATTERN IN THE HOUSEHOLD- THE STUDY OF
UTTAR PRADESH
Ms. Amita Marwha*
INTRODUCTION
The processes by which resources are allocated among individuals and the outcomes of those
processes are commonly referred to as "intrahousehold resource allocation."
Development projects often focus on improving the welfare of vulnerable individuals by
providing resources to their household .The distribution of benefits derived from these resources
however cannot always be assumed to confirm to the priorities of the project designer .Many
important decision that affect economic development outcomes takes place at household level
including fertility decision ,education of children ,labor force participation and production
activities at various agricultural and non –agricultural household enterprises. Naturally ,many
empirical studies in development economics use household as the unit of analysis .Most of those
studies ,albeit with a growing number of exceptions ,treat the internal decision making process
inside the household as “ black box”; that is relatively little attention has been paid to how
decisions are made and how resources are allocated in the household. A growing body of
literature points to serious errors in estimating the level of inequality and poverty when the
intrahousehold resource allocation is overlooked ( Hadad and Kanbur ,1990 ; Apps And Savage
1989) Gender refers to the socially constructed roles, behaviour, activities and attributes that a
*
Lecturer, Department of Economics,Isabella Thoburn College,
E-mail –ladys3074@gmail.com

2. particular society considers appropriate for men and women.The distinct roles and behaviour
may give rise to gender inequalities, i.e. differences between men and women that systematically
favour one group.. At the turn of the millennium and after over half a century of independence,
the world’s largest democracy is expected to stop and consider the state of women in its country.
IT was more than a century ago, in 1870 that Queen Victoria wrote to Sir Theodore Martin
complaining about “this mad, wicked folly of ‘Woman’s Rights’ the formidable empress
certainly did not herself need any protection that the acknowledgment of women's rights might
offer. Even at the age of eighty, in 1899, she could write to A.J. Balfour, "We are not interested
in the possibilities of defeat; they do not exist." That, however, is not the way most people's lives
go - reduced and defeated as they frequently are by adversities. And within each community,
nationality and class, the burden of hardship often falls disproportionately on women.
On the surface, one sees increasing international exposure, urbanization and a growing industrial
sector, rising male and female literacy, and relatively low inflation—aggregate indicators that tell
stories of progress and development, but also hide volumes behind their numbers. Women and
men, upper castes and dalits, urban workers and rural workers; none share alike. Many women
have risen to positions of power within the government at the centre and state levels; others head
businesses, hold high-salary jobs, outperform boys in school examinations and are, generally,
more visible than they have been at anytime outside the freedom struggle. Yet, seeing the Indian
scenario a decade after reforms, it seems that for every woman that gains in power, several more
silently recede further into the depths of poverty.
II
MODELS

3. Unitary Approaches to Intrahousehold Allocation
The idea that the household represents a locus of economic activity dates back at least to
Chayanov's study of Russian peasants, first published in 1926 (Chayanov 1986). However, the
economics of the family and the household was fully brought into the mainstream by Gary
Becker, the 1992 Nobel Prize winner in economics, in the mid-1960s. The essence of Becker's
approach was that, in accordance with a single set of preferences, the household combines
time, goods purchased in the market, and goods produced at home to produce commodities that
generate utility for the household (Becker 1965).It is known as “Unitary Model, Common
Preferences Model, The Altrusim Model or the Benevolent Dictator Model.The Unitary model
is so named because this label describes how the household acts as one ,where as other such label
tend to reflect the means by which the household is hypothesized to act as one.
Collective Approaches to Intrahousehold Allocation
Fundamental to the unitary model is the assumption that there exists a parental, or household,
welfare function and that all resources—capital, labor, land, and information—are pooled.
Unitary model of Household behavior has been criticized on the ground that its assumptions are
not the good descriptions of the reality especially the Incoming Pooling outcome (Brawing et al
1914; Haddded and Schultz 1990)As a consequence various alternative theoretical models has
been developed that relax the key assumption of the unitary model. Those more general models
are loosely called “collective Models”
Collective models typically assumes that different household members have different preferences
and / or different “Bargaining Power” and Intrahousehold resources outcome emerge as a result
of interactions among those elements.Although most researchers acknowledge that the problem
of how the common actions come about is not solved, many argue that the unitary model is a

4. useful approximation and that an exploration of the underlying decision-making process yields
no additional useful information.
Others are more troubled by this assertion. These concerns have spawned a set of approaches—
the "collective" approaches (Alderman et al. 1995)
III
POLICY
Even if policymakers are agnostic about the usefulness of any specific household model, unitary
or collective, they neglect patterns of intrahousehold inequalities at their peril. Consider a
common policy situation: a government attempts to target a program to individuals by age or
gender, rather than to households. Many examples exist in which governments assume either (1)
that amelioration of household poverty is sufficient for the alleviation of individual poverty or
(2) that individual poverty can be alleviated without regard to the actions of other household
members. These assumptions will lead to policy failure, irrespective of the choice of resource
allocation model.
Consider a nonwelfarist approach to raising the food consumption of undernourished individuals
through an in-kind transfer to undernourished households. Haddad and Kanbur (1990)
demonstrate that the undernourishment rankings of various socioeconomic and geographic
household groups can change when individual-level food consumption information is used
instead of household-level information. For example, although individual-level data may indicate
that individuals from certain households are an important food poverty group, a reliance on
household-level data might imply that they are not an important group. This result occurs when
patterns of intrahousehold inequality differ between different household groups. If inequality
were similar in all groups, food poverty rankings would be identical, whether or not individual

5. level data were used to target the transfer.. A welfanst approach to poverty assumes that the level
of income indicates the welfare of the individual or household in question, regardless of how that
income is spent. A nonwelfarist approach focuses on the consumption of one or more goods or
services without direct invocation of the household's own assessment of the utility of consuming
that commodityPrograms that do rely on individual-level data for targeting purposes are prone to
another type of error of neglect of household decisionmaking. These programs often confuse the
need to isolate the individual outcome with the assumption that the food allocation mechanism
within the household can be ignored. Suppose there is concern regarding the nutrition of
children. A possible policy response is the implementation of a school meals program in which
children who are recorded as being particularly undernourished receive extra food. The success
of this intervention cannot be ascertained in the absence of information on the pattern of food
allocation among household members. Households might respond to this program by reducing
the amount of food the targeted child receives at home (and increasing the amount of food
consumed by other household members). Indeed this was the conclusion of Beaton and
Ghassemi's (1982) review of international experience with supplementary feeding programs (see
also Kennedy and Alderman 1987). Ironically, the naive approach to targeting individuals in
isolation from the household is an extreme version of a child as a "separate sphere" and thus is
inconsistent with the unitary model, among others.
Recent research has shown that improving women’s decision making power relative to men’s
within households leads to improvements in a variety of well-being outcomes for children. In
South Asia, where the influence of women’s power is particularly strong, these outcomes include
children’s nutritional status and the quality of feeding and health care practices. Focusing on
nutritional status, this paper presents the results of a study investigating whether increases in

6. women’s power have a stronger positive influence on the nutritional status of their daughters
than their sons. If so, then increasing women’s power not only improves the well-being of
children as a group, but also serves as a force to reduce long-standing discrimination that
undermines female capabilities in many important areas of life as well as human and economic
development in general. South Asia is the region with the most severe anti-female gender
discrimination in the world. Among adults, it is manifested in strong gender differences in
education levels, employment, and earnings (World Bank 2001). The region’s high rates of
maternal mortality (Adamson 1996) indicate a neglect of women’s health care.
While not all studies agree, many find that males are favored in the allocation of food within
households, especially when it comes to diet quality (Haddad et al. 1996; Chen, Huq, and
D’Souza 1981; Bouis and Novenario-Reese 1997; Del Ninno et al. 2001; DeRose, Messer, and
Millman 1998; Miller 1992).
Gender-based discrimination in the region is not limited to adults. Among children, boys are
treated for illness more often than girls, and immunization rates are higher for boys, indicating a
relative neglect of girls’ health needs (Haddad et al. 1996;Filmer, King, and Pritchett 1998;
Arnold 1997; Ryland and Raggers 1998; Hazarika 2000). The most extreme son preference in
the world is found in South Asian countries. It stems from economic considerations such as the
greater ability of sons to provide old age economic support to parents, and from deeply engrained
traditions, such as dowry, which make it costly to marry off daughters (Arnold 1997; Alderman
and Gertler 1997;Rosenzweig and Schultz 1982). Perhaps the most disturbing manifestations of
son preference are female infanticide (relatively rare) and an increasingly common
“hightech”form of discrimination, sex-selective abortion, leading to “natality inequality
“between the genders (Sen 2001; Miller 2001). With these practices, girl children’s rights are

7. violated before they are even born or shortly after, times when they are most vulnerable and
innocent.
The end result of gender discrimination among both adults and children in South Asia is a high
rate of excess female mortality, unnaturally low life expectancies for females relative to males,
and population sex ratios skewed disproportionately in favor ofmales. At an aggregate level,
these skewed ratios document that millions of women are missing from the region’s population
(Sen 1992; Klasen and Wink 2001).
Poor health among girls and women leads to low birth weight in babies and continued health
problems for both men and women, including increased incidence of cardiovascular disease later
in life. Further, gender inequalities slow the pace of development by stalling economic growth
and poverty reduction (Sen 2001; World Bank 2001). Reducing gender discrimination would not
only improve equity, it would benefit the regions’ overall social and economic development in
many ways. While women’s decision-making power within households, where most of the
decisions about care for children take place, is known to be lower than that of their husbands,
women are the main caretakers of children in South Asia, as in most of the developing world.
Past studies have demonstrated that when their power is increased, women use it to direct
household resources toward improving their caring practices and, therefore, the health and
nutritional status of their children (see, for example, Smith et al.2003; Thomas 1997; Doss 1997;
Kishor 2000; Mencher 1988).
This study asks if there is an association between women’s power and discrimination against girl
children in South Asia. The results will help assess whether women would use increased power
to direct household resources toward equalizing the well-being of girls and boys. Nutritional
status is the outcome of a child’s nutrient intakes and health status, both of which are strongly

8. influenced by the quality of the care children receive(UNICEF 1998). The objective of the paper
is to determine whether increases in women’s decision-making power relative to their husbands
will lead to greater improvements in girl children’s nutritional well-being than boy children’s,
evidence that increasing women’s power would serve to reduce gender inequalities not only
among adults but in the next generation as well.
Most of the studies look at the consumption patterns of health and education resources between
boy and girl children.
Indeed, relative to studies on the intrahousehold allocation of food, the results of studies
examining the consumption of health inputs appear to have stronger and more consistent results.
Reasons cited for the pro-boy bias are duration of breast-feeding, quantity and quality of health
care, and survival probabilities after diarrhea episodes all of which are reported to favor boys.
Indeed,in India and Pakistan, breast-feeding duration is longer for boys partly because there is
less urgency to have another child after a boy (Miller 1981). DasGupta's study on the Indian
Punjab (1987) found that wider sex differentials existed for medical care than for food allocation.
And in Nepal, mothers were more frequently concerned about the adequacy of their milk for
boys (Levine 1987).
In Pakistan, lower income households, sought care more often for boys than for girls, and were
likely to use higher quality providers for boys although this difference in frequency and quality
of care disappeared as income increased (Alderman & Gertler 1996.Below given are the key
indicators of the National Family Health Survey held in India in 2005-06.In Uttar Pradesh .There
is a complete neglect of questions related to household decisions making, intrahousehold
equalities across gender, earning potential or expected future benefits etc which highlight the
gender bias in Indian household consumption pattern in the data collection Results of the

9. household and individual interviews (as asked in the fact sheet of NFHS-3, 2005-06) . Neglect
in data collecting could be harming an optimum result itself as benefit may not be reaching to the
right kind of potential target in poverty alleviation schemes and other social benefits schemes.
Table: FINDINGS OF THE NATIONAL HEALTH FAMILYSURVEY -3 HELD IN THE STATE
OF UTTAR PRADESH.
2005-06
Source: National Rural Health Mission -3
IV
WOMEN’S EMPOWERMENT- Employment and earnings
Thirty-four percent of currently married women age 15-49 were employed in the last year,
compared with 98 percent of currently married men in the same age group; one-fifth of these
women received no payment for their work, and a little more than one-third were paid only in
kind (35%). Overall, only 45 percent of employed women earn cash, compared with 95 percent
NFHS-3 RESIDENCE EDUCATION
URBAN RURAL NO
EDUCATION
< 8 YEAR
COMPLETE
10 YEAR
COMPLETE
A) MARRIAGEAND FERTILITY
1) WOMEN AGE 20-24 MARRIED BY
AGE18(%)
53.0 30.0 61.1 72.9 55.8 17.6
2)MARRIED WOMEN WITH TWO
MORE CHILDREN WANTING NO
MORE CHILDREN
64.2 76.3 58.6 52.7 59.2 82.7
2(a) TWO SONS 73.7 78.3 71.4 66.9 67.4 84.6
2(b)ONESON ONEDAUGHTER 72.2 84.2 66.5 57.4 78.0 90.2
2(c)TWO DAUGHTER 30.8 51.9 21.3 23.8 22.2 52.2
(B) WOMEN EMPOWERMENT
3) CUURENTLY MARRIED WOMEN
WHO USUALLY PARTICIPATE IN
HOUSEHOLD DECISION
48.2 59.0 44.9 50.4 44.6 47.9

10. of employed men. Among married women who work and are paid in cash, 90 percent decide
how their earnings will be used, either alone or together with their husbands; only 7 percent have
no say in how their earnings are used (data not shown in tables). Twenty-one percent of women
who work for cash earn about the same or more than their husbands.
Decision making
Married women were asked who makes decisions about their own health care, making large
household purchases, making household purchases for daily household needs, and visiting
their own family or relatives. More than half of currently married women (50-64%) participate
in making each of these decisions. However, only 34 percent participate in making all four of
these decisions and 22 percent do not participate in making any of the four decisions. Women
in nuclear households and women who are employed for cash are more likely to participate in
these household decisions. Other groups of women who are more likely to participate in all
four decisions are women in urban areas, those with more years of education, scheduled-tribe
women, and those who are 30-49 years old.
Other indicators of women’s empowerment
Sixty percent of women have some money that they can decide how to use. The proportion of
women with money which they control is highest for women in the highest wealth
quintile,scheduled-tribe women, and women with at least 10 years of education. Only 13 percent
of women have a bank or savings account that they themselves use.
Women’s knowledge and use of microcredit programmes is very limited. Only 14 percent of
women have heard of any microcredit programme in the area and about one-half of one percent
have ever used one. Only about 40 percent of women are allowed to go by themselves to the
market and to a health facility and only one-quarter of women have freedom to travel outside
their own village or community.

11. National Family Health Survey 2005-06
Uttar Pradesh

12. V
To reach to the more substantive conclusion I conducted a primary survey(sample of which
attached in the Appendix 1) in which questionnaire was prepared,some of the main parameters
which were used are highlighted below.survey tried to find an answers to questions like
1. Does gender difference has significant impact on expenditure patterns ?
2. Does social and economic status of women affect expenditure patterns in the household?
3. Which factors affect the variations in expenditure in children?
4. Does variation in economic and social staus of women significantly impact expenditure
for children (in favour of female child)
Table 2:Highlights of the survey
Challenges
Faced by
women
Opportunities
For women
Maximum
income spent
on male/ female
Role of civil society Expectations
From The Law
Makers In The
Country
98% of the
respondent
said Gender
inequality,
safety and
security
75% feels More
opportunities are
available to younger
generation than older
generation,credit
given to technology.
80-85%
respondents feel
Still in todays
time male gets
larger share in
the income of
the family.
we can make people
educated by opening
night schools for poor
families ,we can make
them understand the
benefits of educating
girls and making them
aware about the
necessity of giving
equal rights to girls
properlaw for the
safety of women
,giving more
equality to
women in which
menenjoygreater
powers
Source:conducted by author

13. VI
CONCLUSION
Developments projects often focus on improving the welfare of vulnerable individuals by
providing resources to the househld .The distribution of benefits derived from these resources
however can not be always be assumed to confirm to the priorities of the project designer which
raises the significicance of the study intra household allocation issue.findings of the above given
survey and various other surveys conducted by National Sample Survey organization and various
others have to include Intra household resourse allocation as a key indicator in their survey
which will help thwe identifiy most vulnerable group instead treating family as a
group.Empowerment of women and especialy married women have the capacity to reduce
gender bias and change consumption pattern in favour of children.
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Countries,Lessons ,Challenges And Opportunities ;July 2008; Woodrow Wilson International
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Appendex1
Gender Challenges/Inequalities and New Opportunities for Women
QUESTIONNAIRE
1. Name of the respondent---------------------------------------------------------
2. Housemaker/school going/college going/profesional--------------------------------------------------------
3. If professional ,mentionprofession---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. Define genderequality(whatrespondentthinkingenerall)--------------------------------------------------
5. Challengesfacedbywomenintoday’ssociety ------------------------------------------------------------------
6. Are there generationhavingmore opportunitiesthanoldergeneration----------------------------------

15. 7. Will theyallowthere girl childtochoose careerof herchoice-------------------------------------------
8. Who getsthe biggershare of spendinginthe familymalechildorfemale childandwhy ------------
9. Is investmentongirlseducationa burdenorcosideredrightof a childwithoutdiscrimination-----
10. How as a mothertheyare differrentfromoldergenerationingivingopportunitiestogirl child-----
11. Do theythinkif motherearnsgirl childgetsadequate andequal opportunitiesasamale child
thenwhenmotherisnonerningmember-------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. Who isthe final decisionmakerinthe family- father/fatherandmother/mother
13. What are the newopportunitiesforwomenavailableinthe fieldof career
14. What can we as a civil societydotoreduce genderineuality-------------------------------------------------
15. What are yourexpectationsfromthe law makersinthe country-------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Declaration
This article submitted by me is original, has not been published
earlier, and has not been submitted /or accepted for publication
elsewhere.
Ms Amita Marwh
Faculty, Department of Economics,
Isabella Thoburn College