Insider's View of Early Policing Development

William G. Doerner
Florida State University
AN INSIDER’S VIEW
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To my best friend and buddy—my wife Judy.
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10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
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iv
chapter
1
earlY effortS at polIcInG
Sir Robert Peel and the Bobbies
Law Enforcement in Developing America
Law and Order on the Frontier
Vigilante Policing
The Rise of Private Security
Summary
Review Questions

Discussion Questions
Selected Internet Sites
References
chapter outlIne
Key Terms
Learning Objectives
Introduction
Maintaining Social Order
Standards of Behavior
Controlling Social Behavior
Types of Society
Societal Development
Early English Law Enforcement
The Challenge of Urban Growth
A Step toward Paid Police Protection
3
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4 Part 1 the context of law enforcement
informal social control
mores
mutual pledge system
night watch system
norm
primary relationship
reeve

secondary relationship
shire
shire-reeve
Sir Robert Peel
social control
thief taker
tithing
tun
vigilantism
KeY termS
anomie
assize of arms
Bow Street Runners
chief tithingman
common value system
conflict perspective
consensus viewpoint
constable

deviant behavior
entrepreneurial avocational policing
folkway
formal social control
gemeinschaft
gesellschaft
hue and cry
hundred
• sketch the early development of
social control practices;
• comment on how the mutual
pledge system was no match for
urban development;
• explore the implications of entrepre-
neurial avocational policing;
• acknowledge the principles that Sir
Robert Peel formulated;
• appreciate the fears that Sir Robert
Peel had to address;
• recognize two models of vigilantism;
and,
• explain the rise of the private security

industry.
learnInG objectIveS
The study of this chapter will enable
you to:
• explain how social order is possible;
• compare and contrast the consen-
sus and conflict perspectives;
• discuss how folkways and mores
guide social behavior;
• illustrate how informal social control
devices work;
• understand the importance of pri-
mary and secondary relations;
• talk about how society develops
and the problems associated with
growth;
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Chapter 1 earlyefforts at policing 5
Introduction
If one could turn back time, we would find that the police
institution as we know it today
did not exist in early times. People still had their fair share of
arguments and disagree-
ments, but they handled their disputes informally. Social
disapproval was a weight that
most people preferred to avoid. However, newer ways replaced
the older traditions as
society developed and became more complex. The shame once
associated with misdeeds
vanished as cities grew more impersonal. People became mere
strangers to one another.
The need for formal social control was more apparent than ever.
This chapter traces some of the important developments
pertaining to early polic-
ing. Because the roots of the American criminal justice system
owe much to our English
heritage, some attention focuses upon how law enforcement
grew there. In fact, the early

American settlers simply borrowed many English practices and
adapted them for use
in this country. But the American experience had its
differences. Cities grew quickly.
The frontier beckoned with adventure. The “Wild West” carried
an image of lawless-
ness; however, the truth of the matter is that many good people
moved there. All these
settlers wanted was to build a town and have a life that
resembled what they had left
behind. Justice, while swift and harsh, characterized the no-
nonsense attitude of the
townspeople.
It was not until the beginning of the twentieth century that law
enforcement became
a formalized bureaucratic entity in this country. As a result, this
chapter will concentrate
on how policing was achieved prior to that time and the
following chapter will examine
policing after 1900.
maintaining Social order
The Hobbesian question of how society is possible has intrigued
social scientists and
philosophers dating as far back as Plato. How is it that people
come to place the interests
of the larger social group above their own individual pursuits?
What mechanisms keep
social relationships operating smoothly so that people can move
about and accomplish
their business? What keeps chaos and disorder from breaking
out and havoc from run-
ning rampant?
Two major competing explanations have emerged from the

debate over how social
order is possible. They are the consensus viewpoint and the
conflict perspective. As one
writer (Paternoster, 1985, p. 512) explains,
A central theme of this great debate was whether social order
was best described
as emerging from a commonly held set of values and beliefs
(the consensus posi-
tion) or is, instead, due to power and coercion (the conflict
position).
Theorists who adopt the consensus viewpoint emphasize the
degree to which people
agree about what is right and what is wrong. They would
explain that widely held beliefs
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or community standards guide the way in which everybody
behaves. On the other hand,
adherents to the conflict perspective believe that a small
minority of powerful persons
manipulate the legal system in order to preserve their
advantage. Special interests con-
trol the types of activities that the law prohibits and the way in
which the law is adminis-
tered. As we shall see, both views have been influential in
criminological thought.
Standards of behavior
Every culture contains a series of rules or norms that govern
what people do, how they
should act, and how others expect them to conduct themselves.
Norms, then, are the
standards for how people should behave. They make social
interaction routine and pre-
dictable. Generally speaking, there are two major types of
norms: folkways and mores.
Folkways pertain to behavioral expectations that deal with
minor norms. A violation of
a folkway generally results in a very mild sanction. One
example of a folkway would be
the various rules of etiquette. For instance, if a host or hostess
places the silverware on
the wrong side of a plate, people may scoff and make snide
remarks. However, it would
be inappropriate for a guest to call the police and report that

this behavior has strayed
from what one normally would expect at a dinner party. While it
may be unconventional,
a folkway violation is not a major affront to the social order.
Another example of a folkway is the courteous practice of
holding a door open for
someone else. Suppose, for a moment, that you open a door to
exit a building. You notice
that an elderly person is four or five steps behind you and is
walking in your direction
towards the exit. A common courtesy would be for you to stop
momentarily and keep
the door propped open rather than letting it slam on the person
behind you. Suppose,
though, that you failed to do just that and let the door close.
You have broken a folkway.
The other person might feel justified in making a sarcastic
remark about your lack of
manners. Once again, though, a call to the police station would
hardly be necessary in
this instance.
A second type of rule or norm is mores. Mores are normative
standards that evoke
strong reactions if violated. Mores are important because people
consider them to be
vital or essential to society’s welfare. As a result, violators
receive harsh treatment for not
observing a more. For instance, one strong taboo in American
society is the prohibition
against cannibalism. Other examples of disapproved actions
include incest, murder, and
infanticide. All these behaviors invite extreme reaction from
other members of society.

One thing to be aware of is that mores sometimes change over
time. Not so long ago,
a common practice in this country was to put witches to death.
Today, a person profess-
ing to be a witch would not receive such harsh treatment.
As one can imagine, there are a large number of folkways and
mores in American
society. In addition, the American population contains many
ethnic and demographic
groups. Despite this heterogeneity, if one could put these
differences aside and find out
which norms people generally agree upon, then one would have
identified the norma-
tive structure or the common value system in which people
believe. In other words, there
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would be consensus about what actions constitute conformity
and what people consider
to be deviant behavior. Deviant behavior, then, is any action
that exceeds social tolerance
levels or oversteps the boundaries established by the folkways
and mores.
controlling Social behavior
The responses to norm violations, or what we now are calling
deviant behavior, and any
subsequent punishments or sanctions fall under the rubric of
social control. Social con-
trol devices can take one of two forms. They can be either
informal or formal devices.
Informal social control devices are actions taken by people to
sanction behavior. A
positive informal social control rewards people for certain
behavior. Making the Dean’s
List for outstanding accomplishments in the classroom or
having one’s picture printed in
the newspaper after making a heroic rescue fall into this
category.
A negative informal social control device adversely affects the
person whose behav-
ior is not in compliance. Gossip, which is the spreading of
rumors, can influence how
people react to an individual. Ostracism is another powerful

technique. Here the group
isolates the transgressor and refuses to involve that person in
social activities. Children
resort to this technique when they respond with “I’m not talking
to you” or “Leave me
alone; I’m mad at you.” Vigilantism occurs whenever people
band together to provide
greater security than that which the criminal justice system
provides. The justification
for this type of action usually takes the form of “appealing to a
natural right of self-
defense and self-preservation and pointing to the obvious
impotence of official police”
(Klockars, 1985, p. 30). The Guardian Angels, a youthful group
who began patrolling
New York subways to keep thugs from victimizing riders, fit
this description.
The most obvious formal social control device is the law and
the criminal justice
system. Law, in this sense, refers to the criminal statutes that
the legislative branch of
government enacts. Generally speaking, a law describes
behavior that is proscribed or
forbidden and specifies the penalty attached to a violation of
that law.
The consensus viewpoint introduced earlier suggests that law
reflects the common
value system. In other words, the law upholds social norms,
especially mores, that peo-
ple regard as important for the smooth functioning of society. In
this context, crime is
any act that people think should be prohibited. It would be very
difficult to argue that
murder, robbery, and sexual battery do not violate the collective

social conscience.
The conflict perspective, in contrast, would argue that persons
who occupy power-
ful positions use the law to coerce and regulate behavior that
threatens the status quo.
There are several theoretical camps within the conflict
perspective. Despite their differ-
ences, all would agree that legislating and enforcing laws
reflect the biases of a small,
but very powerful, segment of the population. Thus, law does
not necessarily reflect a
broad agreement about which acts are right or wrong. Instead, it
is crafted to protect very
special interests.
Despite differences between these two perspectives that will
become more appar-
ent later in this chapter, both schools agree that the criminal
justice system represents a
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formal social control mechanism. The issue that we need to
explore next is why there is
a need for formal social control devices. In other words, what
took place that rendered
informal social control practices so impractical or ineffective
that formal social control
techniques replaced them?
types of Society
When sociologists entertain the topic of societal change, a
helpful distinction is the con-
trast between “gemeinschaft” and “gesellschaft.” The German
theoretician Ferdinand
Toennies (1957) used these terms to describe two polar types of
societies. These two
words refer to very different and distinctive styles of living.
The word gemeinschaft describes a small network of persons
who interact with each
other in primary relationships. A primary relationship refers to
the ability of people to
behave in a close and intimate way. Each person knows the
other party very well and
has an emotional attachment to that individual. This closeness
permits substantial face-

to-face interaction. That is, both parties can reveal their true
feelings to each other in a
warm and trusting atmosphere. Some common examples of
primary relationships are
the bonds between parent and child, husband and wife, or two
best friends.
The term gesellschaft describes the opposite condition. It
signifies that social interac-
tion takes place within secondary relationships. A secondary
relationship describes social
discourse between strangers or people who do not share a very
close bond. One simply
does not reveal his or her innermost feelings or personal secrets
to people in this category.
Instead, a person maintains a certain degree of social distance
and lets roles and expecta-
tions guide interaction. For example, a taxicab driver who asks
how you are is engaging in
a mere pleasantry. It would be appropriate to respond concisely
and politely. On the other
hand, it would not be appropriate to launch into a recital of all
your problems. To do so cat-
apults a secondary relationship into territory usually reserved
for a primary relationship.
When sociologists use the word “gemeinschaft,” a special image
is conveyed.
Gemeinschaft describes a small community in which everyone
knows everybody else.
People stop and talk to each other in a very informal
atmosphere. The adults know which
children belong to whom and can delineate family trees very
quickly and with very little
effort. The word “gesellschaft” carries the opposite imagery.
Gesellschaft refers to mod-

ern society with all its hustle and bustle. People act and react on
the basis of social roles
and not to the person. The overwhelming number of social
relationships is of a second-
ary nature. Just about everyone is a stranger.
Let us return now to the earlier discussion of informal and
formal social control.
Devices that work well in a gemeinschaft society will not have
the same impact in a gesell-
schaft society, and vice versa. For example, gossip and
ostracism are not as foreboding
when the group consists of strangers. However, these techniques
work quite well when
people engage in primary relationships. When placed in this
context, it appears that infor-
mal social control techniques are more appropriate under
gemeinschaft conditions, while
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formal social control is necessary under gesellschaft conditions.
As a result, there is a need
to examine societal development as a backdrop to the history of
law enforcement.
Societal Development
One question that flows from the last section involves societal
growth. How does society
move from a gemeinschaft to a gesellschaft orientation? What
processes take place dur-
ing this transition?
Some sociologists link societal expansion to population
characteristics. Durkheim
(1964), for example, explains societal development in terms of
population size and den-
sity. He argues that a large number of people occupying a
limited area results in more
complexity. This increased diversity is evident in an expanded
division of labor. The
division of labor means that jobs become more specialized.
Rather than be a jack-of-
all-trades, people work at a single task and acquire greater
proficiency. In the old days,
for example, farmers grew their own corn, baked their own
bread, fashioned tools, and
sewed their own clothes. These people were virtually self-

sufficient. Today, however,
those tasks are spread among several persons and each makes a
living from that one
specialized task.
This developmental process also spells the demise of
gemeinschaft society. As the
population size grows and physical density increases, a larger
number of people cram
into limited space. People are less likely to know one another.
This loss of a gemein-
schaft flavor means that most people must interact within the
context of social roles.
The proliferation of secondary relationships invites
impersonality and a sense of loneli-
ness. This estrangement is what Durkheim calls “anomie.”
Anomie refers to a state of
normlessness. It means that people no longer feel attached to
the common conscience or
accountable to others.
One consequence of this entire process is a greater amount of
crime and deviant
behavior. Webb (1972, p. 644) explains,
as a community grows in complexity, size, and density . . . the
processes expected
to occur concomitant with these changes were the collective
conscience becom-
ing more abstract; law, morality, and civilization generally
becoming more ratio-
nal; a decrease in normative consensus; and an increase in
deviant behavior.
Durkheim’s emphasis upon societal development intriqued other
sociologists. One

of the more famous formulations was an essay by Wirth (1938).
Tracking Durkheim’s
lead, Wirth predicted that city life would deteriorate primary
relationships, encourage
deviance, and would produce higher crime rates. Other theorists
(Blau, 1977; Hauser,
1969) found promise in this line of thinking, although not
always for the same reasons.
They also reached the conclusion that ecological processes,
such as urbanization, could
alter the social structure.
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earlyenglish law enforcement
The law enforcement mission in early England fell squarely on
the shoulders of the local
people. The mutual pledge system came into being during the
reign of Alfred the Great
(870–901 a.d.). England was very much a rural country at that
time. People farmed the
countryside and lived in little villages or tuns. Each tun was
subdivided further into tith-
ings or units consisting of ten families. Every male over the age
of twelve belonged to a
tithing. The tithing was responsible for the behavior of all its
members. If one member
committed a crime, the entire tithing was held accountable for
that person’s actions.
Tithings usually elected one member to serve as the head of the
group. This person
was the chief tithingman. If a member became errant, it was the
duty of the chief tithing-
man to raise the hue and cry. In other words, the chief
tithingman rounded up all the
other tithing members and this posse would begin searching for
the wayward individual.
When the tithing located the violator, the members took this
person into custody and
either punished the crook or confined the deviant member until
the authorities reached
the tun.
As villages and tuns grew in size, the need for greater
coordination culminated in
the formation of a hundred. A hundred consisted of ten tithings
and was led by a mem-

ber who assumed the role of the reeve. The reeve was in charge
of conducting meetings
where members aired various disputes and arguments that arose
between neighbors.
Besides acting as a mediator, the reeve also appointed a
constable. The constable’s job
was to take care of all the weapons, equipment, and belongings
of the hundred.
With the population expanding, hundreds became grouped into a
shire or a county.
The person in charge of this geographical area was given the
title shire-reeve. This term,
as well as the office and its duties, was the forerunner of the
sheriff. Even today, the
sheriff remains the highest ranking law enforcement officer in
the county.
The rise of urban areas in medieval times created a need for a
different type of con-
trol structure. Most cities resembled fortresses. Some urban
centers were surrounded
by deep moats. Others had huge sturdy walls lining the
perimeter to provide safety and
security for the inhabitants. Anybody entering or leaving the
city during daylight hours
had to pass through the city gates. These massive gates closed
at dusk, sealing the dwell-
ers inside and protecting them against unwanted intruders.
Pre-industrial city life was very cramped and congested
(Sjoberg, 1955, 1965).
The streets were little more than mere alleys. These
passageways were wide enough
for a horse to pass through, but too narrow to let in much
sunshine. Houses stood right

next door to each other since space was at a premium. Most
buildings were made of
stone, clay, or wood and were topped off with thatch roofs.
These materials were quite
primitive in comparison with today’s building codes,
construction standards, and fire
safety requirements.
One constant fear that lingered in the back of everyone’s minds
was the threat of
fire. A tiny blaze in one corner of the city, especially if fanned
by a gusty wind, could
ignite into a major catastrophe. The lack of electricity and
central heating made this
worry a genuine concern. Homes were lit by candle, cooking
was done at the hearth, and
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Chapter 1 earlyefforts at policing
11
fireplaces warmed the interiors. Few chimneys were equipped
with spark arresters. As a
result, fire was a major urban consideration.
These conditions prompted the early urbanites to establish a
voluntary surveillance
mechanism known as the night watch system. All the
townspeople took turns watch-
ing over the city and guarding the gates against unwanted
intruders. If a fire broke out,
the person on watch would sound an alarm to awaken the
citizenry and mobilize them
against the threat.
While the Statute of Winchester in 1285 addressed several
concerns, it also formal-
ized this arrangement. This royal decree established the office
of the parish constable.
A volunteer would assume the position for one year. This
person was responsible for
coordinating the night watch system and making sure that all
able-bodied men took their
turn standing watch.
Another interesting feature of the Statute of Winchester was
the assize of arms.
The Crown mandated that all adult males shared responsibility
for maintaining law and

order. They also had to keep at least one weapon in their houses
for this purpose. In
addition, the law required all citizens to seek out and capture
criminals. Whenever the
constable needed help, all he had to do was to raise the “hue
and cry.” Every man had to
stop whatever he was doing and assist the constable. If a crime
had taken place, the men
would form a posse and set out to capture the culprit. Failure to
respond to the hue and
cry resulted in social disapproval and a hefty fine.
the challenge of urban Growth
As time went on, not many people welcomed the unscheduled
intrusions thrust upon
them by the practice of hue and cry. Too much time and energy
was being diverted from
their work. At the same time, massive migration into the cities
was beginning to take
place. Urban areas suddenly experienced unprecedented growth.
Unemployment and
poverty, as well as other social problems, accompanied this
spurt and delivered their toll
upon the social fabric. The transition from a gemeinschaft to a
gesellschaft type of soci-
ety was taking place. This meant that “what was everybody’s
business became nobody’s
duty” (President’s Commission, 1967, p. 4).
The watch system was no match for this rapid social
development. Merchants
and businessmen had their own economic ventures to pursue. If
a shopkeeper tended to
his business all day and then went on watch that night, he would
have to close his store
the next day to sleep. Not being open during normal hours

meant the loss of income and
the possibility that customers would buy from competitors. A
more practical alternative
to serving on the watch was to pay somebody else to take one’s
place.
If economics were the top priority, then the price of this
substitution became a major
concern. The old, the poor, and the lame surfaced as prime
sources of cheap labor. Of
course, these people were not fit to deal with the rogues and
scoundrels who roamed
the streets. As a result, the quality of protective services rapidly
deteriorated. Klockars
(1985, p. 29) sums up this situation quite nicely:
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The deterioration and demise of the parish constable system
illustrates the cen-
tral fl aw in all systems of obligatory avocational police. As the
work becomes
more diffi cult, demanding, or time-consuming, obligatory
avocational policing
takes on the characteristics of forced labor. Unpaid, it has to
compete with earn-
ing a living. Motivated only by the threat of punishment, it
becomes unwilling
and resistant. Offering no one any reason to learn or cultivate
the skills neces-
sary to do it well, it becomes undependable, uneconomic, and of
poor quality.
In short, the more we expect a police to do, the less we can
expect obligatory
avocational police to do it.
a Step toward paid police protection
An obvious way to attract more people into the law enforcement
function would be to
increase the fi nancial incentives. One avenue for achieving this
goal was to encourage
entrepreneurial avocational policing (Klockars, 1985, p. 34).
What this phrase means
is that private civilians perform law enforcement tasks on a
part-time basis and get paid
for their productivity.
The English Parliament passed the “Highwayman Act” in 1692

as an incentive for
increasing citizen involvement in police work. Anyone who
captured a criminal was
entitled to a reward. The exact amount of the payment depended
upon the gravity of
the offense. In addition, the person who took the criminal into
custody could keep that
individual’s belongings. These assets included any money,
property, weapons, jewelry,
or anything else that belonged to the crook. Finally, any
convicted felon who squealed
on other criminals could become eligible for a pardon.
While the original intentions behind this legislation were noble,
the idea quickly
backfi red. These bounty hunters, or thief takers as they came to
be called, soon lost sight
of the lofty ideals of justice. They readily learned how to reap
handsome sums of reward
money through various combinations of lying and framing
innocent persons. One thing
was evident. Crime certainly did pay!
Crime continued to fl ourish in the urban environment.
Prostitutes lined the streets,
pickpockets worked furiously, and a general air of lawlessness
prevailed. Parliament
responded by attaching hefty penalties to all sorts of misdeeds.
Just about every seri-
ous offense carried the death penalty. Sunday afternoon public
hangings became a
common spectacle.
The growing crime problem necessitated a more systematic and
formal response. Sir
Henry Fielding attempted to fi ll this gap by introducing the

Bow Street Runners around
1750. The Bow Street Runners were a specially chosen group of
men who worked as
paid detectives in London. These investigators would travel to a
major crime scene,
examine the evidence, and launch an intensive search for the
violator. The success this
squad had in capturing criminals won much public respect. As a
result, this group even-
tually expanded its mission by actively patrolling the streets
and other local areas.
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Sir robert peel and the bobbies
This early success in crime fi ghting led many reformers to call
for greater governmental
intervention. In 1829, Parliament passed the “London
Metropolitan Police Act,” which
authorized the establishment of a government-subsidized police
force. This new police
force had a standing strength of a thousand men serving under
the direction of Sir Robert
Peel. Because of his sensitivity and fi ne leadership, some
researchers refer to Sir Robert
Peel as the “father of modern policing.”
Although crime was soaring, many people feared that this new
police force would
deteriorate into a militaristic tool for political oppression and
the denial of freedom.
Peel tried to alleviate these concerns in several ways. First, this
new police force was
not armed. Although these offi cers did carry short truncheons
or batons, they concealed
these tools underneath their coats from public view. The subtle
emphasis here was on
authority as opposed to brute force. Police work by its very
nature involves coercion.
That is, the objective or goal is to get people to do what they
might not wish to do
fIGure 1.1
Sir robert peel’s principles
for policing.
1. The police must be stable, effi cient, and organized along
military lines.

2. The police must be under governmental control.
3. The absence of crime will best prove the effi ciency of the
police.
4. The distribution of crime news is essential.
5. The deployment of police strength by time and area is
essential.
6. No quality is more indispensable to a policeman than a
perfect command of
temper; a quiet, determined manner has more effect than violent
action.
7. Good appearance commands respect.
8. The securing and training of proper persons is at the root of
effi ciency.
9. Public security demands that every police offi cer be given a
number.
10. Police headquarters should be centrally located and easily
accessible to the
people.
11. Policemen should be hired on a probationary basis.
12. Police records are necessary to the correct distribution of
police strength.
Source: Germann, A. C., Day, F. D., & Gallati, R. R. J. (1968).
Introduction to Law Enforcement and Criminal
Justice (6th Edition). Springfi eld, IL: Charles C. Thomas

Publisher, pp. 60–61. Courtesy of Charles C. Thomas
Publisher, Ltd., Springfi eld, Illinois.
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originally. Armed officers can intimidate people and,
ultimately, resort to physical force,
if necessary, to gain compliance. Peel wished to avoid angry
confrontations between the
public and his officers. As a result, the administrative decision
not to arm the police set
the tone for police-civilian encounters.

A second concern centered upon the issue of whether the police
should wear a dis-
tinctive uniform. On the one hand, uniforms symbolize a
military presence. On the other
hand, they are distinctive and make the wearer’s identity
immediately known, thereby
increasing public trust and accountability. What crystallized
this issue was the discovery
that a member of this new police force had infiltrated a radical
political organization by
assuming an undercover role. The public outcry surrounding the
insertion of the police
as political spies convinced Peel to outfit his officers in a
distinctive and easily recogniz-
able garb (Klockars, 1985, pp. 50–51).
A third worry dealt with the activities that would occupy the
attention of these new
officers. Peel wanted these unarmed and uniformed men to be
out and about in public
view. The sheer visibility of officers on patrol would diminish
the ability of the crimi-
nal element to prey upon innocent citizens. Besides this
deterrence or crime preven-
tion function, the appearance of officers in public would help
establish a bond of trust
between them and the citizenry.
Sir Robert Peel made a concerted effort to impress upon his
“Bobbies” (nicknamed
after him) the notion that they were to serve and protect the
public. His accomplishments
were so notable that Parliament soon passed a series of reform
legislation developing
police forces throughout the country (President’s Commission,

1967, p. 5). Even today,
the British police continue to exemplify many of the Peelian
reforms.
law enforcement in Developing america
When the early settlers came to this country, they brought the
customs and practices
of the old world with them. Since England governed the
colonies, a simple transfer of
many institutions took place. Constables took care of matters
that came to their atten-
tion. The night watch system became the first line of defense
against fire. However, the
unprecedented transition from gemeinschaft to gesellschaft
communities in this coun-
try necessitated a more reliable and effective social control
system. As we saw earlier,
informal techniques proved to be less efficient social control
devices in an expanding
urban atmosphere. Instead, there was a greater need for formal
social control. A local-
ized police force represented one immediate solution to the
problem of maintaining
social order (Bordua & Reiss, 1967; Parks, 1970).
Many cities followed the English actions and responded by
establishing metropolitan
police forces. Philadelphia started a 24-man daytime police
force to augment its 120 night
watchmen in 1833. Boston supplemented the night watch by
beginning a daytime police
force in 1838. Soon other cities began following suit. By 1870,
just about every major
American city had a full-time police force in place (President’s
Commission, 1967, p. 5).

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15
While this new urban police force had its roots in the English
tradition, American
officers differed considerably from the English Bobbies.
Although American police
started out being unarmed, many officers soon found themselves
confronting armed
criminals. Several officers were slain in the line of duty. These
deaths provoked much
concern. Although departmental regulations outlawed carrying a

firearm on duty, many
police officers disregarded this rule (Klockars, 1985, pp. 48–49;
Miller, 1975).
Another notable difference between the early American and
English police was the
infusion of politics. The British system steadfastly resisted
attempts to inject favor-
itism into the police selection process. Such was not the case in
the United States.
For example, in 1844 New York City required that anyone
appointed by the mayor to
serve as a police officer had to live in the area where he would
patrol (Klockars, 1985,
p. 41). This political patronage system courted much abuse and
instability. When one
politician ousted an incumbent in an election, new appointees
replaced current police
officers. The lack of any selection standards beyond party
affiliation invited corruption
and a lack of public respect. Interestingly, these themes persist
today as areas ripe for
administrative reform.
Policing in America faced challenges on several fronts. Many
cities were experienc-
ing massive urban unrest. Inflation and unemployment sparked
worker riots throughout
the country (Flinn, 1887; Lane, 1967; Silver, 1967). The
enforcement of blue laws, vice
statutes, and alcohol regulations promoted great resentment
because raids and sweeps
appeared to be directed at distinct ethnic groups. Selective
enforcement, as opposed to
full enforcement, led critics to raise charges of corruption,
insensitivity, and ineffective-

ness. Clearly, this was not the police service that Peel had
envisioned.
law and order on the frontier
While America was developing its urban environment on the
east coast, the frontier was
expanding this country’s borders simultaneously to the south
and to the west. Formal
social control devices were primitive or nonexistent in these
newly settled areas. Most
newcomers to these territories wanted to put down roots and
imitate the life they had
left behind. These settlers built towns and churches in order to
re-establish the bonds
they had grown to appreciate. Moreover, they relied upon
traditional religious values
and notions of morality to guide the prevailing opinion about
what was right and what
was wrong. It is easy to see how homogeneous communities
would arrive at a common
value system.
These frontier people soon came to realize that they were
merely prey to be victim-
ized by the unsavory elements. As one historian explained,
frontier society consisted of
three layers of people (Brown, 1969). The upper level was
constituted by the local elite.
Business leaders, bankers, large farmers, and other prominent
people formed this social
crust. The next layer represented the bulk of the community’s
moral fiber. It contained
the workers, the tradesmen, the teachers, and other upstanding
citizens who formed the
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core or backbone of the community. The final strata represented
the poorer elements.
While these persons were not outright criminals, they had little
stake in the commu-
nity. Members of this group labored for a living and enjoyed the
small luxuries of life
whenever they could afford them. They were basically good
people who relished a night
of carousing, drinking, and fighting whenever possible. While
these people were not
criminals themselves, they often consorted with outlaws and

identified more closely
with these hooligans.
Unfortunately, outlaws banded together to interfere with the
calm and orderly devel-
opment of these new settlements. Since most of these newly
established areas lacked
the formal arrangement of publicly endowed police officers,
law-abiding citizens found
themselves at a distinct disadvantage. In order to make the odds
more even, many com-
munities resorted to the traditional practice of vigilante
policing.
vigilante policing
Vigilantism means that people take the law into their own hands
in order to regain con-
trol and to secure values that they think are appropriate (Brown,
1969, p. 144). These
groups are more than just unruly crowds. They usually have
some type of formal social
organization and they exist for a definite period of time. There
are two general types of
vigilante policing. The first is the “good” kind, which people
call the socially construc-
tive model. The “bad” form is the socially destructive model.
Both styles have important
social ramifications.
The socially constructive model of vigilantism arises from a
genuine concern over
social tranquility. Prominent and respectable community leaders
often head these types
of groups. Their goal is to wrestle control away from the grips
of the outlaws and to
establish an orderly existence free from terrorism and fear of

crime.
Perhaps one of the earliest American vigilante movements was
the South Carolina
Regulators, which lasted from 1767 until 1769. When the early
pioneers expanded into
the Piedmont region of South Carolina, they encountered roving
bands of outlaws and
marauders. These lawless drifters did nothing more than wreak
havoc upon the settlers.
They stole cattle and horses, plundered the colony at will, and
attacked anyone who
stood in their way.
The local people soon tired of these victimizations. They
decided to organize them-
selves and hunt down these intruders. This South Carolina
Regulator movement, as it
came to be known, worked hard to rid the surrounding area of
these nuisances. Members
searched high and low for recalcitrant desperadoes with the
mandate to bring these
people to justice. When violators were taken into custody,
justice was dispensed in a
summary fashion. A jury would be sworn in and a trial of sorts
would ensue. Anyone
found guilty would be sentenced to a whipping or a hanging.
Punishment was quite
swift. There was no room for legal appeals or other
dillydallying. As one representative
(Smiley, 1901, p. 116 as quoted in Brown, 1969, p. 144)
explained:
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17
We never hanged on circumstantial evidence. I have known a
great many such
executions, but I don’t believe one of them was ever unjust. But
when they were
proved guilty, they were always hanged. There was no getting
out of it. No, there
were no appeals in those days; no writs of errors; no attorneys’
fees; no pardon
in six months. Punishment was swift, sure and certain.
As you can imagine, the South Carolina Regulators met with
considerable success

in ridding their communities of these undesirable elements.
More important, though,
the ability of these early settlers to combat criminals in this
fashion spawned imitation
in other areas of the country. Many western pioneers carried
this innovation with them.
For example, horse thieves and cattle rustlers received
immediate attention in order to
minimize these problems. In short, the socially constructive
model of vigilantism merely
reaffirmed community values. Remnants of this tradition still
exist in such groups as
the Guardian Angel movement, which began in order to protect
New York City subway
riders at night.
The less desirable alternative, the socially destructive model, is
what has given vigi-
lantism a bad name. These groups were nothing more than
elevated instances of lynch
mobs. These factions generally championed unfavored causes.
While they inflicted
terror into the hearts of those whom they chastised, these groups
advocated unpopu-
lar positions. Sometimes these organizations represented an
outgrowth of the more
respectable vigilante groups. In these instances, some
individuals took a sadistic pride
or pleasure in torturing or inflicting excessive punishment upon
wayward persons. In
other cases, the very basis for the formation of such a group was
counterproductive to
the maintenance of law and order. The Ku Klux Klan and other
similar radical groups
fall into this category.

the rise of private Security
Despite intensive social control efforts through vigilantism,
lawlessness and rowdiness
continued to plague the plains. Images of the “Wild West” soon
became popular. The
California gold rush around the middle of the nineteenth century
lured thousands of for-
tune seekers from the east. This sudden population influx
stretched available resources.
Boom towns sprang up almost overnight. Railroad tracks had to
be laid in order to
transport goods from one side of the country to the other.
Telegraph lines were erected to
facilitate communication, and mail service was in demand. The
vast uncharted wilder-
ness required taming and public resources were already
strained.
The private security sector began to develop and thrive during
this period. The
unavailability of effective law enforcement created a demand
for specialized protec-
tive services. Stage coach companies hired guards to prevent
losses. The Wells Fargo
Company, Brinks, the Pony Express, and other private
enterprises began business and
filled an important gap in security. In short, public safety had
become a lucrative pri-
vate enterprise.
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Summary
The job of social control in modern society has changed
considerably from the prac-
tices used in earlier days. While most people subscribe to the
norms that characterize
the common value system, informal social control devices no
longer work efficiently
in a complex society. Urban development necessitates a change
from a gemeinschaft
society to a gesellschaft society. The corresponding reduction in
primary relationships
and their replacement by more impersonal role behavior creates
a sense of isolation. As a
result, formal social control devices must take over the niche
once occupied by informal
social mechanisms.

Early English law enforcement practices also reflect this
development. The mutual
pledge system organized people into tithes. Tithes were
responsible for the behavior of
their members. Under this system, whenever someone needed
help or protection, all that
person had to do was raise the “hue and cry.” Everyone within
earshot would drop what
they were doing and come to the aid of the person needing help.
Eventually this system proved too cumbersome to meet the
demands of an expand-
ing society. The offices of the constable and the shire-reeve
came into being. The night
watch system, once a voluntary effort, became a job for one
person. Despite this devel-
opment, crime was rampant and there was a need for a more
formal institution. The solu-
tion was to establish a distinct organization that bore
responsibility for crime control.
The American police developed in a similar fashion. However,
local law enforce-
ment was a puppet controlled by those in political power.
Appointments to the police
force served as rewards for campaign support. Police chiefs
came and went after every
election. This favoritism invited corruption and blatant misuse
of the badge for personal
gains. As a result, most common people had a difficult time
distinguishing the police
from the criminal element. Clearly, it was time for a change.
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revIew QueStIonS
1. Why is social order important?
2. What is the consensus viewpoint and how does it relate to
maintaining social order?
3. What is the confl ict perspective and how does it relate to
maintaining social order?
4. Explain what a norm is?

5. What is a folkway? A more?
6. What is deviant behavior?
7. Give an example of an informal social control device. Why
is this device so
powerful?
8. Given an example of a formal social control device.
9. Distinguish a gemeinschaft from a gesellschaft society.
10. What does the term primary relationship mean?
11. What does the term secondary relationship mean?
12. What is anomie?
13. What benefi ts accompany the transition from a
gemeinschaft to a gesellschaft
society?
14. What is a tithing? Was it an informal or formal social
control technique?
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15. What does the hue and cry mean?
16. Connect the terms shire and reeve and explain what they
mean.
17. Describe the night watch system.
18. What did the Statute of Winchester in 1285 accomplish?
19. What is entrepreneurial avocation policing?
20. Why were the thief takers an imperfect solution in the
effort to control deviant
behavior?
21. Who was Sir Robert Peel?
22. Select any three of the principles that appear in Figure 1.1
and explain what they
mean.

23. What three major concerns did Sir Robert Peel have to
resolve when forming the
Bobbies?
24. What is vigilantism mean and why did the early frontier
people resort to it?
25. What is the difference between social constructive and
destructive vigilante policing?
26. What accounted for the rise of private security?
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DIScuSSIon QueStIonS
1. Suppose that either the local police department or your
university police depart-
ment is interested in writing a history of that agency. What
kinds of materials,
topics, and information should go into that account? Where
would you go to
gather these things?
2. Most colleges and universities have established an honor
code that deals with
items like academic honesty. Get a copy of the provisions that
are in effect at your
institution. Does the document rely upon informal or formal
social control devices
to achieve conformity? Why? Does this expectation work? Why
or why not?
3. Continuing with the previous question, does your
institution’s academic honesty
code stem from a common value system or does it attempt to
impose norms and
other regulations? How does this document relate to the
consensus and confl ict
viewpoints discussed in the beginning of the chapter?
4. What other areas of behavior are mentioned in the student
handbook at your insti-
tution? How do these provisions refl ect the discussion about
the transition from a
gemeinschaft to a gesellschaft existence?
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SelecteD Internet SIteS
The Alliance of Guardian Angels
http://www.guardianangels.org
Émile Durkheim
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emile_Durkheim#Theories_and_ide
as
Ferdinand Toennies
http://www.bolender.com/Sociological%20Theory/Toennies,%2

0Ferdinand/
toennies,_ferdinand.htm
New York City Police Museum
http://www.nycpolicemuseum.org
Pinkerton
http://www.securitas.com/pinkerton/en
Pony Express
http://www.ponyexpress.org
Sir Robert Peel
http://www.met.police.uk/history/peel.htm
Texas Ranger Hall of Fame and Museum
http://www.texasranger.org/index.htm
The London Metropolitan Police
http://www.victorianweb.org/history/police.html
Wells Fargo Bank
https://www.wellsfargo.com/about/history
referenceS
Blau, P.M. (1977). Inequality and heterogeneity: A primitive
theory of social structure.
New York: Free Press.
Bordua, D.J., & Reiss, A.J., Jr. (1967). Law enforcement. In
P.F. Lazarsfeld, W. H. Sewell,
& H.L. Wilensky (eds.), The uses of sociology (pp. 275–303).
New York: Basic Books.
Brown, R.M. (1969). The American vigilante tradition. In H.D.
Graham & T.R. Gurr

(eds.), Violence in America: Historical and comparative
perspectives (pp. 144–218).
New York: Signet Books.
Durkheim, E. (1964). The division of labor in society, trans.
George Simpson. New York:
The Free Press.
Flinn, J.J. (1887). History of the Chicago police. Chicago:
Police Book Fund.
Germann, A.C., Day, F.D., & Gallati, R.R.J. (1968).
Introduction to law enforcement and
criminal justice (6th edition). Springfield, IL: Charles C.
Thomas Publisher.
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23
Hauser, P.M. (1969). The chaotic society: Product of the social
morphological revolu-
tion. American Sociological Review, 34, 1–19.
Klockars, C.B. (1985). The idea of police. Beverly Hills, CA:
Sage.
Lane, R. (1967). Policing the city: Boston 1882–1885.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Miller, W.R. (1975). Police authority in London and New York
City: 1830–1870. Journal
of Social History, 8(2), 81–101.
Parks, E.L. (1970). From constabulary to police society:
Implications for social control.
Catalyst, 6(5), 76–97.
Paternoster, R. (1985). Book review: The consensus-conflict
debate by Thomas J.
Bernard. Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology, 76, 512–519.
President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice (1967).
Task force report: The police. Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office.
Silver, A. (1967). The demand for order in civil society: A

review of some themes in the
history of urban crime, police, and riot. In D.J. Bordua (ed.),
The police: Six socio-
logical essays (pp. 1–24). New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Sjoberg, G. (1955). The preindustrial city. American Journal of
Sociology, 60, 438–445.
Sjoberg, G. (1965). The preindustrial city: Past and present.
New York: Free Press.
Smiley, J.C. (1901). History of Denver. Denver: Denver
Times/Times-Sun Publishing
Company, p. 116. As quoted in R.M. Brown (1969), The
American vigilante tradition
(p. 167) in H.D. Graham and T.R. Gurr (Eds.), Violence in
America: Historical and
comparative perspectives. New York: Signet Books.
Toennies, F. (1957). Community and society, trans. C.P.
Loomis. East Lansing: Michigan
State University. (Original work published 1887).
Webb, S.D. (1972). Crime and the division of labor: Testing a
Durkheimian model.
American Journal of Sociology, 78, 643–656.
Wirth, L. (1938). Urbanism as a way of life. American Journal
of Sociology, 44, 1–24.
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iv
c h a p t e r
2
crItIcaL ISSUeS OVer
the LaSt ceNtUrY
The Mollen Report
The Christopher Report
The Sequel to the Christopher Report
Hurricane Katrina
Summary
Review Questions
Discussion Questions
Selected Internet Sites
References
c h a p t e r O U t L I N e
Key Terms

Learning Objectives
Introduction
The Wickersham Commission
The 1967 President’s Commission
The Kerner Report
Standards and Goals
The Knapp Commission
Contemporary Critical Incidents
25
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26 Part 1 the context of Law enforcement
police officer
police riot
pretextual stop
racial profiling
rat
rotten apple theory
shake down
third-degree
K e Y t e r m S
booming doors
civilianization
code of silence
community service officer
crew

grass-eater
meat-eater
police agent
• Recognize how racial tensions were
adversely affecting police-community
relations;
• Talk about plans to use education as
one way to upgrade the quality of
police personnel;
• Debate whether police corruption is
an individual aberration or an orga-
nizational concern;
• Suggest ways to control police mis-
behavior; and,
• Talk about other nationally recog-
nized problems in law enforcement.
L e a r N I N g O b j e c t I V e S
The study of this chapter will enable
you to:
• See how law enforcement lacked
adequate personnel standards and
training over the years;
• Appreciate the obstacles that hin-
dered the police force from devel-

oping into the police service;
• Understand how issues like the
third-degree would give rise to later
reforms;
• Explain why some people were
afraid of their own police;
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Chapter 2 critical Issues Over the Last Decade 27
Introduction

It was not until the beginning of the 20th century that law
enforcement became institu-
tionalized in this country. In those days, police practices could
be harsh, brutal, and quite
crude. Prisoners suffered from mishandling. The public viewed
the police with contempt
and regarded them as second-class citizens. Political
interference and corruption were
rampant. Bullies, hooligans, and ruffians disgraced the uniform.
No respectable person
would ever dream of making law enforcement a career.
Alarmed by this state of affairs, influential community leaders
set the wheels of change
into motion. Task forces, commissions, and blue-ribbon
committees began reviewing law
enforcement activities. Recommendation after recommendation
advocated reform. Slowly,
but surely, law enforcement was starting to change and
beginning to mature.
This chapter visits some of the more prominent inquiries that
launched investiga-
tions into law enforcement activities. Each of these panels
reviewed police practices at
the time and then made a series of recommendations aimed at
upgrading law enforce-
ment operations. More importantly for our purposes, though, is
that many of the topics
discussed throughout this text will echo these very same
concerns over and over again.
To borrow a phrase from Dorothy Guyot (1979), sometimes
reforming the police is like
“bending granite.”
the Wickersham commission

A federal fact-finding body was appointed in the first part of
this century to survey exist-
ing practices within the American criminal justice system. This
oversight committee,
known as the Wickersham Commission, issued a series of
reports in 1931. Although the
Commission found the entire criminal justice system to be in
dire need of improvement,
our discussion will confine itself to the police sector.
One common practice that occupied the Wickersham
Commission’s attention was
the widespread reliance upon coercive tactics to extract
confessions from suspects. The
Commission documented many instances all over the country
during which interroga-
tors used torture, beatings, sleep deprivation, withholding of
food, and psychological
trickery to get arrested persons to confess to a crime (U.S.
National Commission on
Law Observance and Enforcement, 1931a). This use of coercive
techniques was known
as the third-degree. The goal was to force unwilling people to
make self-incriminatory
remarks involuntarily.
The Wickersham Commission decried the use of third-degree
practices. As we shall
see later in Chapter 8 when we deal with constitutional law and
interrogation standards,
these concerns foreshadowed the famous 1966 federal Supreme
Court decision, com-
monly known as Miranda, and a string of clarifying rulings.
Today, officers must advise
in-custody suspects of their constitutional rights prior to any
questioning. In addition,

there is an embargo against using coerced statements as
evidence in court.
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Another major deficiency that the Wickersham Commission
denounced vehemently
was the political manipulation of rank-and-file employees.
Patrol officers often received
their jobs in exchange for political favors. Entrance
qualifications, which would guaran-
tee that a person would be a good police officer, were

nonexistent.
Some men who wore police uniforms had criminal histories.
Background investiga-
tions were cursory and fingerprint checks were rare. Computers,
of course, were nonex-
istent. The transition from brawn to brains had not materialized
yet. As the Wickersham
Commission (1931b, p. 57) wryly noted:
many police administrators still seem to be obsessed by the idea
that brawn
fully compensates for low intelligence and the lack of other
desirable personal-
ity traits.
Many police officers had barely finished grammar school. In
fact, the Wickersham
Commission (1931b, p. 61) lamented that “over 75 per cent of
the members of the police
force of this country are not mentally endowed to perform the
duty assigned.” Dismayed
by the lack of occupational standards, the Wickersham
Commission recommended that
all agencies tighten up entrance requirements and screen
applicants more thoroughly.
The Wickersham Commission soon learned that upgrading
entrance standards
would not be enough. New employees hardly ever received any
job orientation. Half of
the 383 cities surveyed by the Commission replied that they
placed new officers out on
the streets without any training and without partners. Over half
the agencies never even
asked if the rookie knew how to shoot a gun, although they

issued a service weapon
(U.S. National Commission on Law Observance and
Enforcement, 1931b, p. 70). This
state of affairs flabbergasted committee members. Agencies
needed to take job training
much more seriously.
The Wickersham Commission found that the lack of an adequate
communications
system seriously hampered field units. Most towns used a light
or siren system to notify
patrol officers when to contact headquarters. For instance, if a
citizen contacted the
police station and reported that a burglary had taken place, the
desk sergeant would turn
on the light switch. Lights were located in such strategic points
as on top of water tow-
ers, city hall, or other tall structures. When officers noticed this
signal, they would return
to the police station or call the desk sergeant and get the
information. Then the officer
would be en route to the complainant. As one might imagine,
response times and clear-
ance rates were not very impressive under these conditions.
This lack of communication paralyzed most agencies. A crime
could be taking place
a block away and officers in the area would be unaware of the
event. If an officer did
happen to stumble upon an ongoing crime and observed the
criminal making an escape,
he was not able to contact other officers to assist in the capture.
Thus, in one sense, the
emphasis on brawn as opposed to brains is understandable under
these conditions.

The invention of the wireless radio had the potential of
elevating police communi-
cations systems from primitive to state-of-the-art status. Placing
radios in patrol cars
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provided supervisors with instant access to street units.
Response time became an oper-
able concept, and the police had a new tool in their arsenal. Of
course, it would be many
years before officers would have the luxury of a portable radio

system.
In short, the Wickersham Commission uncovered many
deplorable conditions within
the police world. As we shall see in a moment, subsequent task
forces would revisit
some of these same basic themes and still find the need for a
remedy. Even more ironic,
though, is that seventy years later, law enforcement continues to
struggle with some of
these very same concerns. As we will see in Chapters 4 and 5,
personnel selection today
is still imprecise. Even though police training has made
considerable progress, some
basic issues continue to wait for resolution.
the 1967 president’s commission
The 1960s were a time of unrest and turbulence. Inner city
residents rioted in sev-
eral major cities. Protestors carried placards denouncing the
military involvement in
Vietnam. A dissident assassinated President Kennedy and, in
turn, another killer mur-
dered the assassin. The Reverend Martin Luther King. Jr. died
from a sniper’s bullet in
Memphis, Tennessee. The country was in the midst of much
upheaval and racial discord.
President Johnson convened a group of scholars, political
leaders, and criminal jus-
tice system representatives to form the President’s Commission
on Law Enforcement
and Administration of Justice. As Figure 2.1 explains, he
charged this body with the
task of finding solutions to America’s internal crime problems.
Besides looking for the

root causes of crime and delinquency, the President’s
Commission also investigated the
inner workings of the criminal justice system. Once again, law
enforcement came under
watchful eyes.
One area that occupied the Commission’s attention was the
hostile and antagonistic
relations that characterized much of the contact between police
and civilians. Many of
these tensions stemmed from poor relationships between the
police and members of
minority groups. One way to soothe this animosity, according to
the Commission, would
be to involve more citizens in an advisory capacity to law
enforcement agencies.
Regularly scheduled meetings open to the public would provide
citizens with a
forum in which to air complaints. Police officials could explain
their stance on these
matters and become involved in a beneficial dialogue with the
community. Another
way to improve police-community relations would be to hire
more minority members
as law enforcement officers. However, the President’s
Commission cautioned that such
efforts must be taken carefully and in good faith. Assigning
black officers to patrol
ghetto areas only and failing to promote deserving minority
officers would only high-
light a double standard.
Another personnel issue dealt with upgrading the quality of
police officers. While
the Commission recognized that there was not an overabundance

of police officers in
this country, it pressed the issue of personnel quality over
quantity. Quality, as far as the
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f I g U r e 2 . 1
excerpts from the presidential executive order
establishing the president’s commission on law
enforcement and administration of justice.
By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the

United States, it is ordered
as follows:
SECTION 1. Establishment of Commission.
(a) There is hereby established the President’s Commission on
Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice (hereafter referred to as the
“Commission”).
(b) The Commission shall be composed of such members, not to
exceed twenty,
as the President shall appoint, one of whom shall be designated
by the President
as the chairman. The members and chairman of the Commission
shall serve at the
pleasure of the President.
Sec. 2. Functions of Commission. The Commission shall:
(1) Inquire into the causes of crime and delinquency, measures
for their prevention,
the adequacy of law enforcement and administration of justice,
and the factors
encountering respect or disrespect for law, at the national,
State, and local levels,
and make such studies, conduct such hearings, and request such
information as it
deems appropriate for this purpose.
(2) Develop standards and make recommendations for actions
which can be
taken by the Federal, State, and local governments, and by
private persons and
organizations, to prevent, reduce, and control crime and
increase respect for law,

including, but not limited to, improvements in training and
qualifi cations of person-
nel engaged in law enforcement and related activities,
improvements in tech-
niques, organization, and administration of justice,
improvements in correction and
rehabilitation of convicted offenders and juvenile delinquents,
promotion of better
understanding between law enforcement offi cials and other
members of the com-
munity, and promotion of greater respect for law throughout the
community.
Sec. 8. Reports to the President and Termination. The
Commission shall make reports
and recommendations to the President from time to time as it
deems suitable and
shall present a fi nal report and recommendations no later than
eighteen months
from the date of this order. The Commission shall terminate not
later than ninety
days after presenting such fi nal report and recommendations.
Signed: Lyndon B. Johnson
The White House
July 23, 1965
Source: Executive Order 11236, Federal Register, Vol. 30, pp.
9349–9350.
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Commission was concerned, meant better educated officers and
officers who were more
representative of the communities they served (President’s
Finally, the emphasis was switching from brawn to brains.
Besides the pitch for higher starting salaries and better job
conditions that would
attract college graduates, one proposal called for an alternative
entrance structure. Part
of the reasoning behind this new device was the recognition that
“recruitment from
minority groups will be all but impossible in the immediate
future if rigid higher educa-
tion standards are instituted for all police jobs” (President’s

In order to attract minority members and still advocate higher
entrance standards,
the President’s Commission recommended a three-tiered system.
The police agent occu-
pied the top notch of the career ladder. The agent would have at
least two years of college
study. This person would coordinate a police team and conduct
criminal investigations.
The middle rung would be the police officer. Routine patrol,
emergency response, and
traffic enforcement would constitute the main responsibilities of
this position.
The final rank, where the innovation came into this scheme, was
the community
service officer (CSO). The CSO would be a youthful person,
between the ages of 17
and 21. While not operating in a sworn capacity, people in these
spots would assist with
many of the social services provided by police agencies. This
incumbent would establish
a liaison with juveniles, could be assigned to a neighborhood
center, or would perform
other miscellaneous duties that would promote a more positive
community image for the
department. These people would continue their education and
receive scholarship aid.
These so-called work-study opportunities would help CSOs
launch their police careers
and work their way up through the ranks.
As we will see later, the President’s Commission emphasized
the need for new
officers and supervisory personnel to complete a college
education prior to promotion.

Better applicant screening was essential, as was intensive pre-
service training, before
patrol duties were assumed. The hope that flickered here was
that a higher caliber of
recruits would raise police service delivery, promote tranquility
within the community,
and relegate police corruption to a thing of the past.
the Kerner report
Racial disturbances inundated American cities throughout the
1960s. Confrontations
arose between blacks and whites during civil rights
demonstrations. Protestors would
gather and march upon city hall in the aftermath of incidents
alleging police brutality.
Some of these assemblies became violent. Agitators would
shout insults and curses to
goad participants into fights. In other instances, demonstrators
or counter-demonstrators
hurled rocks and bottles towards onlookers. Store windows were
shattered and unruly
crowds took advantage of the melee by scattering and
embarking on looting sprees.
Arsonists torched buildings while dissidents pelted responding
firefighters with bricks.
Mob violence reigned over calm collective responses.
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These civil disorders, along with projections of more incidents
of even greater inten-
sity and further losses, worried President Johnson. As a result,
the President signed an
Executive Order on July 27, 1967, authorizing the appointment
of a Commission on
Civil Disorders. The directive placed Illinois Governor Otto
Kerner at the helm of the
Commission. The President instructed Kerner and his associates
to investigate urban
riots to determine what had happened, why it had happened, and
what should be done to
prevent similar outbreaks in the future.
The Kerner Commission (1968, pp. 112–113) estimated that 164
disorders took
place during the first nine months of 1967. All these incidents
had a racial overtone
in that they “involved action within Negro neighborhoods

against symbols of white
American society” (Kerner Commission, 1968, p. 110). In other
words, participants
were reacting to social injustices that included discrimination,
impoverished living con-
ditions, and blocked aspirations.
The largest insight that the National Advisory Commission
gained was the deep-
seated hostility and antagonism between the police and minority
members. Since
the police are the most visible arm of the criminal justice
system, changes in police
operations would benefit the entire legal machinery. As a result,
the National Advisory
Commission focused upon several areas in need of
improvement.
First, community surveys consistently revealed that ghetto
residents resented what
they believed to be police brutality and harassment. Verbal
discourtesy, exemplified by
the tone of voice and a lack of patience when explaining how to
resolve a matter, created
an immediate chasm between the police and the policed. As a
result, the Kerner Report
recommended greater care in assigning officers to these areas
and more sensitivity to the
frustrations and problems of ghetto life.
Second, many residents complained that the police had a more
tolerant posture
towards crime in underprivileged areas. Officers were less
likely to wage a conscious
war against prostitution, drugs, and street violence in these
locations. Little priority was

given to patrolling ghetto areas and reducing response time. To
counteract these feelings,
agencies needed to instill a sense of equal protection for both
black and white citizens.
One way to accomplish this goal would be to deploy a sufficient
police presence within
the poorer areas.
A third factor contributing to the gulf between the police and
citizenry was the lack
of an adequate grievance mechanism. Many residents were
skeptical that agencies would
investigate complaints against their own members. Civilians
believed that officers would
stick together and find ways to circumvent allegations of
misconduct. In order to build
public trust, the Kerner Commission felt it was necessary to
establish a review board
that was independent of the police agency. This way, any person
who wished to lodge a
complaint or criticism against a police officer could do so and
feel that an impartial and
fair review would follow.
The final series of recommendations focused on police
personnel. The Kerner
Commission found that most law enforcement agencies had
hired only a few minority
members. In order to reduce community tensions, the Report
proposed that police depart-
ments expend greater energies recruiting, hiring, and promoting
minority officers. After
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hearing about the community service officer (CSO) plan
developed by the President’s
Commission, the Kerner Commission enthusiastically threw its
support behind this idea.
Although many of its conclusions drew popular approval, the
Kerner Report did
not receive a favorable reception from all quarters. Critics
assailed the document as
simply another political whitewash (Kopkind, 1969; Lipsky &
Olson, 1977). At least
one researcher thought it was important to take another look at
the police response to

crowd control.
Television viewers watching the evening news saw Chicago
police officers dis-
persing peaceful demonstrators outside the national Democratic
Party convention with
batons and tear gas. Reporters and bystanders found themselves
absorbing blows from
the police. Why were the police chasing people, striking them,
taunting and jeering, and
throwing rocks at fleeing subjects?
What people were seeing was a police riot in progress.
According to Stark (1972,
p. 17), a police riot occurs
when roving bands of policemen set upon nonprovocative
persons and/or prop-
erty in an excessively violent manner. When only one small
group of policemen
sets upon citizens and/or property in a single location it may be
useful to call
this a police attack. A police riot is any such event involving
two or more attacks.
There are two ways of determining if a police riot is taking
place. The first test is
whether the police arrest the people against whom they have
exerted force. The attempt
to subdue a person through the use of force and then abandon
that person without arrest
or medical care implies that there was no lawful charge
initially. The second indicator
is whether the police file a report after destroying or damaging
property in the line of
duty. Not writing an official account is tantamount to admitting

that the destruction
was not warranted.
In any event, both the Kerner Report and the reaction to its
findings sensitized peo-
ple to the diverse problems confronting law enforcement. While
better selection and
training might diminish police abuse, the solution did not lie
within individual police
officers. As the Knapp Commission discovered, there was a
tremendous need to revamp
the police organization itself.
Standards and goals
The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice
Standards and Goals came into
existence in the fall of 1971. The purpose of this board was “to
formulate for the first
time national criminal justice standards and goals for crime
reduction and prevention at
the state and local levels” (National Advisory Commission,
1973, p. i). Once again, the
law enforcement sector came under scrutiny.
The basic purpose that guided the Commission was the desire to
reduce high-fear
stranger-to-stranger crime. The specific target crimes included
homicide, sexual battery,
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aggravated assault, robbery, and burglary. These crimes were
chosen because of their
high economic impact, as well as for the paralyzing effects
associated with the aftermath
of victimization and the fear of crime. In addition, these
offenses showed no signs of
abatement. Trend analyses revealed that this country was in the
throes of a massive crime
wave. Crime was rising at a rate that was outpacing criminal
justice system resources. As
a result, the Commission zeroed in on four major priorities: (1)
the prevention of juve-
nile delinquency, (2) improved delivery of social services, (3)
streamlining the criminal
justice process, and (4) increasing citizen participation in crime
control strategies.

The Commission looked for ways to make law enforcement
operate more effi ciently
and effectively. It recognized that inroads against crime had to
come at the patrol level.
As a result, the Commission sought to enhance this police role
by issuing a series of rec-
ommendations that would make the police function more
productive. Figure 2.2 displays
some of those major recommendations.
f I g U r e 2 . 2
Selected recommendations issued by the National
advisory commission On criminal justice Standards
and goals.
• Active crime prevention efforts by the police working with the
community.
• Diversion of juveniles, drunks, and mental patients from the
criminal justice system.
• Use of the patrolman as the primary investigator for crimes
which come to his
attention.
• Consolidation or elimination of police departments with fewer
than 10 full-time
police offi cers.
• Increased use of civilians.
• College education entrance requirements for employment of
police offi cers.
• Legislation authorizing police offi cers to obtain search
warrants by telephone.

• Continuing analysis of crime trends and deployment of special
units to react to
developing crime trends.
• Establishment of different classifi cations and pay levels
within the basic patrol-
man category.
• Development of units within police departments to work with
prosecutors, courts,
and corrections offi cials and to follow specifi c cases and
individuals through the
criminal justice system.
Source: National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice
Standards and Goals (1973). A national strategy
to reduce crime. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Offi ce, pp. 71–72.
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A major thrust behind the Commission’s views was that police
officer salaries
account for approximately 80% of any agency’s budget. If
police administrators wished
to maximize the returns on these personnel expenditure, several
courses of action would
be necessary. One primary concern was police-community
relations. It is mandatory
for agencies to inspire public confidence in them. Agencies
should encourage officer
participation in the educational system and in youth programs to
promote good will. A
second prong to enhance the police image would be to involve
neighborhoods in crime
prevention programs and safety groups.
Since effective use of police officers would go far in
suppressing the criminal ele-
ment, there needed to be a greater emphasis on assignments.
Agencies should plan and
allocate officers on the basis of calls for service and activity
patterns within areas. Hiring
civilians to replace officers in clerical and other support
positions, or what is known
as civilianization, would put more police on the streets.
Similarly, diverting juveniles

and persons needing rehabilitation or counseling services into
the mental health system
would benefit the entire criminal justice system.
Another way to upgrade law enforcement is to recruit college-
educated applicants.
The blunt reality is that “an undergraduate degree today is
equivalent in prestige to a
high school diploma at the turn of the century” (National
Advisory Commission, 1973,
p. 81). By refusing to raise personnel entrance standards,
departments were encouraging
the public to view police work as a second-class occupation.
Another push was made in the area of increased and improved
training. The
Commission (1973, p. 83) noted that the “average barber
receives 4,000 hours of train-
ing. The average policeman receives less than 200 hours.”
Given the multiple tasks and
the importance of the law enforcement mission, better training
is imperative.
Technology was addressed in a way that was reminiscent of the
past. If you recall,
the Wickersham Commission was fascinated with the promise
wireless radio technol-
ogy held for law enforcement. Advances over the years now
make it possible for offi-
cers to carry portable radios. This innovation allows officers to
be in constant touch
with dispatch even if they are some distance from their patrol
vehicles. As a result, the
Commission (1973, p. 88) recommended that “all patrol cars
should be equipped with
two-way radios, and every police agency should equip all on-

duty uniformed officers
with a portable two-way radio.” Today, light-weight models that
officers wear wherever
they go while on duty are standard issue.
Work continued after the National Advisory Commission issued
its findings. A
National Advisory Committee, in conjunction with the
International Association of Chiefs
of Police, carried on by conducting a series of studies. One area
of focus was the develop-
ment of police leadership, particularly chiefs and sheriffs. A
survey of police executives
around the country produced some startling results. For
example, the National Advisory
Committee (1976, p. 7) noted “16 percent of the police chief
executives indicated that they
had not completed their first year in office, an additional 11
percent had not completed
their second year, and yet another 13 percent had fewer than 3
years in the top position.” In
addition, over half the chiefs and sheriffs had been in office less
than four years.
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The Committee agreed that it would be extremely diffi cult to
reform law enforce-
ment with such instability at the helm. Consequently, it drew up
a blueprint to guide
local offi cials in the selection of police executives. This plan
begins with an assessment
of agency needs, a decision as to what the evaluation criteria
should be, a delineation of
the minimum qualifi cations the new leader should have, a
discussion of whether can-
didates should come from within or outside the agency, and
deciding what input the
selection board should have on the fi nal outcome. As one can
see, each standard aims to
remove the leader from political infl uence and to render the
selection process as objec-
tive as possible.
the Knapp commission
Newspaper reporters working for The New York Times broke a
chilling story in early
1970 about corruption within the New York City Police

Department (NYPD). The exis-
tence of corruption was not as shocking as the way in which
police offi cials ignored
reports that had come to their attention. In any event, a major
scandal that would tarnish
the badge was brewing.
Soon after receiving a transfer assignment to a plainclothes
division in a new pre-
cinct, an offi cer gave Offi cer Frank Serpico an envelope
containing $300 in cash. The
envelope represented Serpico’s monthly share of the protection
money that a local gam-
bler routinely paid the police. Serpico immediately notifi ed
Captain Foran, who was the
head of the Department of Investigation. After hearing the
story, Captain Foran advised
Offi cer Serpico to turn the envelope and money over to his
supervisor. Nothing else
became of this incident.
Shortly thereafter, Serpico transferred to another division. Once
again, another offi -
cer offered him a $100 payment. Serpico notifi ed his superiors,
who then contacted the
First Deputy Commissioner, John Walsh. Walsh was the second-
highest ranking mem-
ber of the police department. After several months had gone by,
the police administra-
tion still had not taken any action. Communication with other
city offi cials produced
similar inactivity. Thus, it seemed that the brass would sweep
Serpico’s allegations of
corruption and collusion under the carpet.
The appearance of a front-page newspaper story altered the

situation dramatically.
Mayor John Lindsay empaneled a blue-ribbon committee, which
came to be known as
the Knapp Commission, to examine local police corruption. The
Knapp Commission
found a widespread “strikingly standardized pattern of
corruption” (Commission to
Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption, 1972, p. 1).
Gamblers, pimps, and narcot-
ics dealers made regular monthly payments to police offi cers
who patrolled the area.
This sum was called the “pad.” Usually, one offi cer would
collect the “pad” and later
divide it into several “nuts,” the share owed to each offi cer
involved in the scheme. Some
shakedowns netted as much as $3,500 a month per business.
This fi gure translated into
a $300 to $400 supplement to an offi cer’s monthly paycheck.
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The structure behind these activities was deeply ingrained.
Supervisors typically
received one-and-a-half shares, while offi cers on the bottom
got a single share. An offi -
cer new to a precinct would be watched while others checked
out his or her past. If the
new offi cer could be trusted, he or she started to collect a
share. In order to make up for
losses during the background check, departing offi cers received
two month’s severance
pay when they transferred to another precinct.
Not all offi cers participated in these shakedowns. One
distinction that did emerge
was the difference between “meat-eaters” and “grass-eaters.” A
meat-eater describes the
offi cer who actively looks for opportunities to extort money
from participants of illegal
f I g U r e 2 . 3
an example of a bribery statute.
Unlawful compensation or reward for offi cial behavior.
(1) It is unlawful for any person corruptly to give, offer, or
promise to any public ser-
vant, or, if a public servant, corruptly to request, solicit, accept,

or agree to accept,
any pecuniary or other benefi t not authorized by law, for the
past, present, or future
performance, nonperformance, or violation of any act or
omission which the per-
son believes to have been, or the public servant represents as
having been, either
within the offi cial discretion of the public servant, in violation
of a public duty, or
in performance of a public duty. Nothing herein shall be
construed to preclude
a public servant from accepting rewards for services performed
in apprehending
any criminal.
(2) It is unlawful for any person corruptly to give, offer, or
promise to any public ser-
vant, or, if a public servant, corruptly to request, solicit, accept,
or agree to accept,
any pecuniary or other benefi t not authorized by law for the
past, present, or future
exertion of any infl uence upon or with any other public servant
regarding any act
or omission which the person believes to have been, or which is
represented to him
or her as having been, either within the offi cial discretion of
the other public servant,
in violation of a public duty, or in performance of a public duty.
(3) Prosecution under this section shall not require that the
exercise of infl uence or
offi cial discretion, or violation of a public duty or performance
of a public duty,
for which a pecuniary or other benefi t was given, offered,
promised, requested, or
solicited was accomplished or was within the infl uence, offi

cial discretion, or public
duty of the public servant whose action or omission was sought
to be rewarded or
compensated.
(4) Whoever violates the provisions of this section shall be
guilty of a felony of the
second degree . . . .
Source: Florida Statutes 2011, § 838.016.
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enterprises. A grass-eater, on the other hand, does not search
out payoffs. However, this
offi cer would not pass up a chance to “score” if the opportunity
presented itself. Despite
this line between heavy and occasional involvement in bribery,
one must bear in mind
that neither type is engaging in proper actions. As Figure 2.3
demonstrates, this behavior
constitutes a serious criminal charge.
One concern that perplexes many people is the question of how
police corruption
can fl ourish. A common argument that has the effect of
shielding the police organization
from derision is the rotten apple theory. Police administrators
routinely denounce tainted
offi cers as a few bad apples in a barrel of mostly good apples.
The implications behind
this analogy are quite simple. Once the administration removes
these few disgraceful
offi cers from the police service, the organization can reassure
the public that the remain-
ing members are upstanding workers who continue to do good
work.
An important distinction emerges here. According to Sherman
(1978, p. 4), there
is a difference between deviant behavior committed by an
organization compared with
deviant behavior committed within the organization. Corrupt
organizations permit mem-
bers to embark upon widespread collective rule breaking. Such
abuse requires sustained
support, either tacitly or directly, from ranking offi cials within
the organization.

Many agencies have instituted reform measures to prevent such
undesirable activity
from occurring in the fi rst place. Most departments have
created internal units to investi-
gate allegations of offi cer misconduct. First-line supervision of
fi eld units has increased.
Some agencies even encourage citizen initiation of complaints.
Others have tightened
entrance and training requirements. Many policy manuals now
include prohibitions such
as the directives appearing in Figure 2.4, forbidding employees
from accepting gratuities
or discounts that are not also available to the public.
contemporary critical Incidents
Law enforcement has weathered a number of critical incidents
over the past quarter of
a century. Rather than elaborate on each and every one of these
events, this section of
the chapter selectively highlights a handful of these episodes.
What is interesting about
these choices is that they are not isolated occurrences. In other
words, despite earlier
attention to these matters, certain systematic diffi culties still
continue to persist.
the mollen report
Several members of the New York City Police Department were
arrested on narcot-
ics violations in May of 1992. One of these offi cers had
compiled an extensive inter-
nal affairs history of allegations regarding his participation in
criminal activities. Yet,
despite an impressive body of accumulating evidence, the
agency had failed to take any

investigative, let alone disciplinary, actions against this offi
cer.
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Because this situation bore such an uncanny resemblance to
earlier police misbe-
havior uncovered by the Knapp Commission, the mayor
appointed a committee headed
by Milton Mollen to look further into these matters. The
Committee had three charges.
It was instructed to explore the nature and extent of corruption

within the NYPD, to
assess whether organizational efforts to combat corruption were
suitable, and to make
recommendations to strengthen anti-corruption measures
(Commission to Investigate
Allegations of Police Corruption, 1994, p. 1).
The Commission revealed a startling pattern of bold and brazen
criminal activ-
ity by both on-duty and off-duty offi cers. Organized groups of
offi cers, called a crew,
would raid drug dealers under the pretense of a lawful police
investigation, steal the
contraband, and then resell the narcotics to other dealers. These
rogue bands of offi cers
would split any cash or other valuables they looted from crime
scenes. In addition, some
crooked cops provided protection to select dealers and would
harass other entrepreneurs
who were in competition with these operators. The services also
included roughing up
people and covering up these covert activities by perjury and
falsifi cation of offi cial
police records. In at least one instance, an off-duty offi cer
robbed a liquor store and used
his department-issued service weapon to kill the owner.
f I g U r e 2 . 4
an example of an agency policy prohibiting
employee acceptance of gratuities.
A. All personnel shall not, under any circumstances, solicit or
request a gratuity from
any person for private use.
B. All personal shall not accept, use, or retain any gratuity

where:
1. The person offering the gratuity is in any way involved with
the employee’s
performance of his/her duties.
2. The employee has performed, or is expected to perform, any
special service
for the person offering the gratuity.
3. Discounts on food, merchandise, services, etc., that are not
open to the gen-
eral public shall not be accepted while in the performance of
duty.
4. The full price for any food item is to be paid or a tip at least
the equivalent to
the full price shall be left.
C. The Chief of Police may authorize a gift when it is only for
the benefi t of, or use
by, the entire department.
Source: Olin, W.R. (2006). Chapter 3, section 3.12:
Gratuities/discounts. Lawrence, Kansas, Police Depart-
ment’s policy manual. Lawrence, KS: Lawrence Police
Department. Retrieved on January 20, 2012 from
http://lawrenceks.org/police/pdfs/LKPD-Policy.pdf
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A host of clandestine activities lined police pockets. Officers
would “shake down”
street dealers, relieve them of their wares, and keep these items.
On-duty patrol officers
would monitor the radio for what sounded like lucrative calls
for service. They would
then race to the scene, pre-empt any assigned units, and ransack
the premises. “Booming
doors” referred to the practice of crews breaking into locations,
without a search warrant,
and taking whatever they found. Not listing on the impound
sheet an item seized during
the course of a lawful search was another popular, but illegal,
enrichment procedure.
Business was so good that an enterprising officer could net in
the neighborhood of

$1,500 to $2,500 a week (Commission to Investigate
Allegations of Police Corruption,
1994, p. 22). That illegal supplement could easily amount to an
extra $100,000 on an
annual basis. In fact, one participant boasted that this outside
income was so profitable
he often forgot to pick up his regular city-issued paycheck.
Given the lessons imparted by the Knapp Commission some 20
years earlier, how
could such pervasive corruption worm its way back and persist?
Were these practices
firmly entrenched within the organization? The Mollen
Commission placed the blame
squarely on the police subculture and the collapse of the
agency’s corruption controls.
Just like the Knapp Commission, the Mollen Commission
lamented the code of
silence rooted among the rank and file. Otherwise honest and
law-abiding officers
tolerated unscrupulous coworkers and tacitly endorsed their
misdeeds by adhering to
“the unwritten rule that an officer never incriminates a fellow
officer” (Commission to
Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption, 1994, p. 51). The
alternative, reporting a
corrupt officer, is just not palatable. However, as Figure 2.5
shows, many agencies have
installed policy guidelines which demand that officers cooperate
fully and completely
with an internal affairs investigation. Failure to do so could
result in disciplinary action,
including the loss of one’s job.
Ostracism, an informal social control technique mentioned in

the last chapter, means
that other officers would not trust the rat or informant. The
other officers, even those
who were not involved in corrupt activities, would avoid having
anything to do with the
tattler at all costs. Ostracism is an extremely potent device in a
setting where members
must depend upon each other in a life-or-death situation.
Even more astonishing was the organization’s failure to monitor
wrongdoing by its
members, especially in the wake of the Knapp Commission. The
brass were reluctant to
uncover corruption because they wished to avoid any
embarrassment whatsoever to the
department. Their goal was to avoid all negative publicity at
any cost. Fear that proactive
uprooting of misconduct would stymie career advancement
paralyzed many supervisors
and produced inaction. For example, one officer revealed that
when he “was using drugs
and drinking on the job daily, had not made a single arrest in
one of the most crime-
ridden precincts in the City, was driving a red Corvette and
living an openly lavish life-
style from his illicit drug profits, his supervisor gave him a
‘meets standards’ evaluation”
(Commission to Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption,
1994, p. 81). Essentially,
the NYPD had abandoned its corruption controls.
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In light of its fi ndings, the Mollen Commission (1994, p. 7)
issued a number of rec-
ommendations aimed at reducing police corruption. These
reforms targeted a number of
areas. The following list highlights some of these concerns:
• improving screening and recruitment;
• improving recruit education and in-service integrity training;
• strengthening fi rst-line supervision;
• reinventing the enforcement of command accountability;
• challenging other aspects of police culture and conditions that

breed corruption and
brutality;
• enhancing sanctions and disincentives for corruption and
brutality;
• strengthening intelligence-gathering efforts;
• preventing and detecting drug abuse;
• soliciting police union support for anti-corruption efforts;
• minimizing the corruption hazards of community policing;
and,
• legislative reforms.
f I g U r e 2 . 5
an example of an agency policy requiring full and
complete testimonial disclosure from offi cers during
an internal affairs investigation.
III. Individual Employee Responsibilities
F. Employees shall cooperate in a Department internal
investigation of an alle-
gation of misconduct when so directed by the Department, and
shall truthfully
answer questions and render complete, material and relevant
statements,
including all facts and circumstances surrounding the subject
matter of the
investigation, which may be known by the employee.
Omissions of material
fact shall be classifi ed as failure to cooperate in an internal
investigation.

H. No employee shall retaliate against any person who
initiates or provides infor-
mation pursuant to any citizen or internal complaint, or against
any person
who provides information or testimony at a Department hearing,
because of
such person’s participation in the complaint process. Such
retaliation may be
a criminal act and/or constitute separate grounds for discipline.
Source: Diaz, J. (2011). Chapter 11.001—public and internal
complaint process. Seattle Police Department
policy and procedure manual. Seattle, WA: Seattle Police
Department. Retrieved on January 20, 2012 from
http://seattle.gov/police/publications/policy/SPD_Manual.pdf
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