The document summarizes the prospects for a comprehensive Palestinian-Israeli peace deal in the next three years based on research from three teams representing Hamas, Fatah, and Israel. It finds such a deal is highly unlikely due to Hamas's inability to be an accountable political entity, the West's view of Hamas as a terrorist organization, and Israel's reluctance to negotiate on Jerusalem. Areas of compromise and disagreement during negotiations are likely to include Palestinian demands for 1967 borders versus Israeli settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah is also seen as unlikely without Hamas gaining political legitimacy or guaranteed parliamentary seats. Egypt and the UN are identified as geopolitically influential actors that could impact negotiations.

1. Team Palestinian-Israeli Conflict 1

3. What are the likely conditions in order for Hamas and Fatah to reconcile?

4. How will select geopolitically relevant countries influence negotiations?

5. What are the likely areas of leverage in the negotiations? 2

6. Methodology Three-Way Red Team Three Teams: Hamas, Fatah and Israel Two members per team, adopting the perspective Preparation: In-depth research and analysis on topics for eight weeks Recorded as Key Findings A political emblem designates team slides 3

7. Key Findings Highly unlikely there will be a comprehensive Palestinian-Israeli peace deal in the next three years due primarily to: Hamas’s inability to be an accountable political entity West’s view of Hamas as a terrorist organization Israel’s reluctance to negotiate on Jerusalem 4

8. Hamas’s inability to be an accountable political entity Operation Cast Lead Hamas failure to sign reconciliation treaty Hamas oversees a black-market economy Public support decreases; considered terrorist organization by the West 5

9. West’s view of Hamas as a terrorist organization Rockets Israel Israel quote and pic of whoever 6

10. Israel’s reluctance to negotiate on Jerusalem Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu refuses to freeze settlements Palestinian Authority President MahmoudAbbas refuses to negotiate without settlement freeze 7

11. 8

12. Negotiations and Compromises Palestinian demands return of 1967 borders Disagreement on settlements in Jerusalem and West Bank East Jerusalem as the Palestinian capital 9

13. 10

14. Palestinian Reconciliation Increase in Hamas’s political popularity by roughly 30% Negotiated permanent party status or percentage of parliamentary seats guaranteed 11

15. Geopolitically Relevant Countries/Entities Egypt and the United Nations 12

17. Continues to destroy Gaza tunnels

18. Hesitance to anger the Bedouins compromises security of Gaza border13

19. 14

21. Highly likely to continue pressing for dialogue on the Goldstone Report15

23. Settlement issue main component to negotiations with Fatah

24. Jerusalem key to peace with Fatah16

25. Leverage Points for Hamas over Fatah Hamas supporters in the West Bank have potential to instigate violence and destabilize Palestinian autonomy Palestinian President MahmoudAbbas is the weak link for Fatah as he is declining in popularity Hamas has legitimate ideological grounds to bash Abbas individually, but not Fatah as a political whole 17

27. Fatah and Hamas must share governing power, undermining Hamas’s control of Gaza

28. Fatah’s economic leverage over Hamas

29. Hamas will likely return to terrorist tactics to maintain influence

30. In the unlikely event Fatah and Israel make a separate peace deal excluding Hamas, it is highly likely Hamas will become a less significant political entity18

31. Leverage Point for Israel over Fatah It is highly likely Israel's best interest to keep Fatah and Hamas separate and to have no legitimate reconciliatory elections The expansion of settlements and destruction of Palestinian homes are highly likely to be used by Israel in negotiations Roadblocks and checkpoints give Israel the physical ability to influence the West Bank economy and Palestinian movement at will 19

33. Abbas’s retirement as the President of the Palestinian Authority is likely to negatively impact Israel’s ability to negotiate with Fatah

34. As the likelihood of an autonomous Palestinian State become less conceivable, the PASF becomes increasingly demoralized and militant

35. If the West Bank becomes a sovereign entity, it is highly likely Israel will have to negotiate an agreement on shared control of Jerusalem20

37. The Al-Aqsa Mosque incident

38. Israeli settlement expansion into West Bank21

40. Elections scheduled for January 24 2010 will highly be likely manipulated by Israel in favor of Fatah

41. Lack of political legitimacy for Hamas will likely result in Hamas’s loss of parliamentary seats

42. With the political option closed, Hamas is likely to resume full terrorist activities 22

44. Tunnel investment lost from Gazans exceeds USD 500 million and is rising due to Israeli airstrikes on tunnels; it is likely the loss of funds makes Hamas’s administration look incompetent

45. It is likely Israel will manipulate Hamas's domestic environment. Israel is likely to publicize Hamas’s infighting with internal factions

46. Israeli covert operations in Gaza could instigate violence between factions23

47. Threats from Hamas to Hamas Highly unlikely Gaza will undergo reconstruction while Hamas is in control of the Gaza strip Gazans lost USD 500 million in investment in the Hamas-operated tunnels It is highly likely Hamas can influence factions within Gaza, but not fully control their militant activities and political power 24

49. It is highly likely Hamas’s monopolization of the flow of goods and income into Gaza will lead to Hamas’s further domination of Gaza

50. It is highly likely the international community will label Israel as oppressors for the continuation of the Gaza blockade, which is creating an international incident

51. Hamas capability to kidnap additional Israeli soldiers will likely hurt Israel’s internal domestic politics and damage internal moral

52. Israel is vulnerable to rocket attacks and suicide attacks25

53. Additional Opportunity It is likely in Israel, Hamas and Fatah's self interests to implement a three state solutionIt is likely Fatah would negotiate Gazan territory for joint ideological and physical control of Jerusalem It is highly unlikely Hamas will peacefully give up physical control of the Gaza strip It is an absolute certainty Israel will not recognize any unified Palestinian government that involves Hamas because Israel considers it a terrorist organization based on historical and current political developments Fatah, controlling the West Bank independently as a sovereign state, presents a workable situation for Israel 26

54. Thank You Questions? 27