a. Identify all NE (throughout #3 you are only required to provide pure strategy equilibria). b. Identify all (SPE) subgame perfect NE, if any. c. Identify all (NFTHPE) normal form trembling hand perfect NE, if any. d. Identify all (WPBE) weak perfect Bayesian NE, if any. e. Identify the (SE) sequential NE, if any. For part f below, consider the same game but now P1 has two information sets. At the first he decides to play Out or In. If he plays Out the game ends immediately and the payoffs are (2,4). If nd he plays In, then he immediately reaches his 2 information set, where he must choose to play R or U, with continued play as in the extensive form game above. f. Repeat parts a-e for the new extensive form game..