1. TEN YEARS OF TURKISH ENGAGEMENT WITH AFRICA:
DISCOURSE, IMPLEMENTATION AND PERCEPTION IN SOMALIA
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the MSc in African Studies
UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD
5 June 2015
Yusuf Kenan KÜÇÜK
Word Count: 15.001

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Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION 7
a. Abstract 7
b. Aims and relevance of the study 8
c. Why is Somalia in focus? 10
d. Theoretical framework 10
Realism 10
Idealism 11
e. Research methodology 12
f. Literature review 14
g. Limitations of the study 15
CHAPTER ONE: POLICY 17
a. Historical background 17
Ottoman era 17
Republican Era 17
b. Why Africa? 20
Change in global political-economy 21
Transformation in domestic politics and new foreign policy 22
The Economy 23
The Role of the Private Sector 24
c. Engagement discourse 25
Historical ties 26
Anti-colonialism 27
Religion 28
Humanitarianism 30
d. Conclusion 31
CHAPTER TWO: PRACTICE 33
a. Diplomatic engagement 33
b. Economy and trade 37
c. Development Assistance 41
Comparing Turkey with other new actors in Africa 43
Turkey’s development engagement in Somalia 44

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CHAPTER THREE: PERCEPTION 49
a. Motives 50
b. Strengths and weaknesses 52
c. Progress 55
d. Sustainability 56
CHAPTER FOUR: SOMALIA 59
a. Motives 60
b. Strength and weaknesses 61
c. Progress 63
d. Sustainability 63
CONCLUSION 65
BIBLIOGRAPHY 69
APPENDIX 81

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Abbreviations
AKP The Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi)
AU The African Union
COMESA The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
DAC The Development Assistance Committee
DEIK The Foreign Economic Relations Board of Turkey
DRC The Democratic Republic of Congo
EAC The East African Community
ECCAS The Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS the Economic Community Of West African States
EU The European Union
EXIMBANK Export-Import Bank
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FOCAC The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
GDP Gross Domestic Product
ICG The International Crisis Group
IGAD The Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IHH The Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian
Relief
ISHAD The Business Life Solidarity Association
MFA The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey
MUSIAD The Independent Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association
NAM The Non-Allied Movement
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
ODA Official Development Assistance
OECD The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OOF Other official Flows
PKK Kurdistan Workers Party
SSA The Sub-Saharan Africa
TICAD Tokyo International Conference on African Development
TIKA Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency
TUSKON Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists
UK The United Kingdom
UN The United Nations
ZANU The Zimbabwe African National Union
ZAPU The Zimbabwe African People's Union

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Ten Years of Turkish Engagement with Africa: Discourse,
Implementation and Perception in Somalia
INTRODUCTION
a. Abstract
Despite the fact that the Ottoman Empire ruled either directly or indirectly North Africa
and some parts of the Sahel for centuries, Turkey was almost absent from the continent
until the late 20th
century. There were a few half-hearted and unexecuted attempts to
improve relations with the African countries during and after the Cold War era. However,
these attempts did not fully develop as a full-fledged policy due to not only the policy
choices of Turkish governments but also the nature of international system, which was
putting constraints on foreign policy of Turkey. As a result, Turkey was able to set up in
late 1990s an opening-up policy to Africa1
, which was to be put in practice in the mid-
2000s.
At the state level, Africa means for Turkey diversifying its economic partners and
acquiring an essential foothold in global politics in line with its new multi-dimensional
foreign policy discourse. In this regard, Turkey, since 2005, has been trying to establish
a significant diplomatic presence and create a contractual basis for its bilateral relations
with African countries. It is also making good use of its development assistance programs
to appeal to the decision-makers in the continent. At the non-state actors’ level, Turkey’s
dynamic private sector and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have been playing
a vital role in strengthening Turkey’s ties particularly with the countries of Sub-Saharan
1
Fort he purposes of this study, Africa refers to Sub-Saharan Africa.

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Africa and contributing to its ‘soft power’2
. Furthermore, we are witnessing the massive
engagement of Turkey with Somalia since 2011 aimed at helping the country stand on its
own feet and alleviate poverty and suffering, as articulated by the Turkish authorities
(Erdoğan, 2011).
Within this framework, this study is an attempt to provide a concise understanding on
Turkey’s motives on overall Africa engagement in the last 10 years. Secondly, the
practice of this policy will be examined in brief comparisons with other non-traditional
partners of African development namely China, India, Brazil, Japan and South Korea.
There will be a particular emphasis on development aid since it is one of the major
components of Turkey’s endeavours. Finally and most importantly, the perceptions of the
people on the receiving end, towards Turkey’s engagement, are going to be analysed.
This is the most distinctive feature of the study, given the fact that the opinions of the
African people on Turkey’s engagement with the continent will be studied for the first
time. In this regard, Somalia will be examined in detail through interviews. The
dissertation will conclude with a discussion and a comparison on the findings of the
research with the declared policy of Turkey on Africa and specifically on Somalia.
b. Aims and relevance of the study
Having made rapid inroads into Africa, it is now clear that Turkey has been able to portray
and position itself as one of the leading development partners of the continent. There has
been a significant increase in the trade volume between Africa and Turkey. Furthermore,
Turkey is now among the strategic partners of the African Union (AU, 2015). On the
2
Soft power is defined by Nye (2011;20-21) as “the ability of a state to affect others through
the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attraction in order
to obtain preferred outcomes”.

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other hand, Turkey’s engagement in the continent has not been studied thoroughly
compared to that of China, India and Brazil. While there are many books published
especially on China-Africa relations (Alden, 2007; King, 2013), there is a very limited
number of books or theses in English on Turkey-Africa relations (see literature review).
In this regard, the research is designed to provide general knowledge on the issue to fill
the mentioned gap. The objective is to elaborate on the official policy and discourse,
highlight the practice on the ground and analyse the perceptions of people who have
knowledge and expertise in the Turkish engagement in Africa. Studying and further
analysing Turkey-Africa relations is not only essential, but also necessary, given the fact
that it has important repercussions for the both sides. The findings of the research might
well be useful for policy makers and scholars in Turkey and Africa, as well as for the
official or non-governmental donor community.
It should be noted here that the research doesn’t aim to provide any policy
recommendations for either Turkey or African countries. In addition, it is not the intention
of this research to repeat the previous well-appreciated analyses on Turkey-Africa
relations. Instead, the study adds to these concepts and further reviews the subject in
question, by identifying the importance of African perceptions, which is a fundamental
component of the policy but which has not been explored.

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c. Why is Somalia in focus?
Turkey’s engagement in Somalia is unique in many aspects. First of all, Turkish officials
consider Somalia as the best practice of public-private partnership in Turkey’s Africa
engagement policy. Secondly, the main components of Turkey’s engagement tools
towards Africa in Somalia namely; diplomacy, trade, transportation networks and
particularly development assistance, are the most visible in Somalia. Last but not least,
with this new and wide-ranging commitment, Turkey sent a signal to the outside world
that it is willing to take on with the problems of the African countries in a multi-faceted
manner. Therefore, a special emphasis will be given to Somalia in the big picture.
d. Theoretical framework
The scope of this study is mostly grounded on the fields of international relations.
Therefore, realism and idealism will be taken as a basis explaining the behaviours of the
actors, especially Turkish decision makers.
Realism
Realists consider the principal actors in the international arena to be states, which are
concerned with their own security, act in pursuit of national interests and struggle for
power (Korab-Karpowicz, 2013). In such an environment, the success as survival, is
defined as preserving and strengthening the state (Waltz, 1979;117). The states are
considered to be acting in line with their national interests (Strohmer, 2015). According
to the realist theory, Turkey, akin to all others, is a power pursuing its own interests.
Turkey’s engagement in Africa, to this end, can be explained by realist approach as an
attempt to realise its national interests by taking advantage of Africa’s economic and
politic assets.

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On the other hand, Morgenthau (1973; 9) argues that the national interest is defined within
the current “political and cultural context” of foreign policy formulation. Despite the fact
that transformation is a continuous process related to the past developments, the
leadership of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi-AKP)
government has been able to reformulate the foreign policy of Turkey in accordance with
its ambitions for making it a “regional” (Erdoğan, 2003) and “global” (Erdoğan, 2007)
power. However, to qualify as national interest, as argued by Krasner (1978;53),
preferences of central decision-makers “must be persistent over time and related to
general objectives, not to the requirements of any particular group, class or the private
power drives of individuals”. Since it has not been long enough for Turkey’s Africa
engagement, particularly Somalia, this policy might be analysed by future studies against
this approach. Nevertheless, realism is one of the useful tools for explaining and analysing
Turkey’s foreign policy behaviours on Africa.
Idealism
Developed as a reaction to the realist policies, idealism advocates conducting global
relations according to the principles such as cooperation, morality and democracy
(Rourke, 2007;20). Idealism, to this end, does not see foreign policy as strictly controlled
by the perceptions of anarchy and national interests, instead, it assumes that most actors
value and want individual freedoms, the common good of human beings Strohmer (2015).
In this framework, it can be suggested that Turkey’s foreign policy is of equally idealist
nature as much as it has a realist character. The idealist approach in Turkish foreign policy
can be seen in Turkey’s official discourse on Africa, which emphasises “common

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destiny”, “peace”, “democracy” and “human rights” (Gül, 2007; 170-484). However,
Şener (2011) claims that the line between realism and idealism in Turkey’s foreign policy
is not clear. The former Foreign Minister of Turkey, Ahmet Davutoğlu (2012a) argued
that Turkish foreign policy is a combination of idealist and realist dimensions. Just a year
later, Davutoğlu (2013a) suggested focusing on “human-centred diplomacy” by putting
an end to the “realist/idealist dilemma”.
Davutoğlu’s remarks are the starkly demonstrate how difficult it is to make a clear
division between realism and idealism when analysing the foreign policy approaches.
Some policies, despite appearing to be idealist, might be aiming purely realist outcomes.
Therefore, it is necessary to acknowledge that there is interplay and dynamism between
idealism and realism in foreign policy. Turkey’s conduct of foreign affairs is no
exemption to this impasse. This needs to be kept in mind when analysing Turkey’s Africa
engagement policy.
e. Research methodology
Overall being a qualitative and exploratory research, the study is a quest for disclosing
the motives, practices and perceptions on Turkey’s Africa engagement policy. Since the
study contains both theoretical and practical sections, the methods employed are also
diverse. In this respect, each chapter is distinctive in terms of the methodology utilized,
yet serving the same goal.
The first chapter, explanatory for the most part, will elaborate on the foundation and
historical background of the policy by analysing the official narrative, in an attempt to
reveal the intention of Turkish state apparatus and political elite. In addition, Existing

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secondary literature, including books, journals and articles of scholars, which are most
ground-breaking and well-researched work on the subject, will be brought into the
account as well when attempting to interpret the motives of the Turkish policy makers’
interest in Africa.
The second chapter will provide a detailed account and assessment of Turkey’s political,
economic and developmental engagement in Africa in the last 10 years. In this chapter,
the existing databases of relevant Turkish ministries and agencies, as well as the records
of the UN, the AU, the OECD, and the World Bank will be used to give a concise account
of the practice on the ground in Africa. This data will be assessed critically in relation to
Turkey’s declared policy intentions.
The last two chapters will be based on semi-structured/focused interviews that aimed at
shedding light on the perceptions of African side on Turkey’s engagement. The
interviewees are selected among the ambassadors of African countries who are based in
Ankara. In addition, to put a special focus on Turkey’s engagement in Somalia; additional
interviews were be carried out with the government officials, NGO officers and civil
society representatives from Somalia and Somali diaspora in the UK. The group of
people, to be interviewed, do not necessarily represent all African countries or Somalia
society. However, they are presumed to have a comprehensive knowledge and expertise,
which can give us an idea on the overall approach to Turkish engagement. Due to the
potential political sensitivity and the positions of participants, the interviews conducted
under anonymity principle.

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f. Literature review
Turkey’s political, economic and development engagement in Africa draws a growing
interest both among scholars and politicians across the globe. However, the interest has
yet to be reflected in published academic analyses. The existing literature predominantly
consists of articles and essays of Turkish researchers. The interest for the Turkey’s Africa
strategy is even fewer among the non-Turkish scholars. The consequence is arguably that
it is inward-looking and does not therefore adequately address the broader context in
which its impacts are received.
Besides, the existing and accessible literature is mostly descriptive records of the subject
in question. In other words, the previously mentioned scholarly work typically defines
the subject, gives brief historical background and provides an overview analysis of
Turkey’s actions in Africa. It is also notable that the existing literature to a large extent is
a record of commendation, such as the work of Özkan (2010a) and Haşimi (2014). The
critical approaches are relatively rare. In this regard, Afacan (2013) states “Africa … is
still considered secondary to Turkey’s foreign policy priorities”. On Somalia, while the
ICG (2012) cautions Turkey on its unilateral approach and lack of cooperation with the
other actors; Özkan, stresses (2014a;122) that “Turkey still seems to be either far from
understanding the regional balances or just ignoring them.”
The major part of the literature focuses in general on the four factors that are deemed to
be the main drivers behind the engagement strategy; change the global political economy,
transformation of Turkey’s internal political environment and reformulation of foreign
policy, the new-found economic power and finally the agency of certain individuals.
Those are considered to be instrumental in directing Turkey’s foreign policy towards

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Africa. However, the role of already globalized Turkish business interests mostly
disregarded in paving the way for the gradual development of a strategy for Africa.
On the other hand, there is limited number of comparative analyses dealing with the
differences between Turkey and other emerging partners’ approaches. Even the
comparisons, made so far, by Tepeciklioğlu (2012) and Habiyaremye & Oğuzlu (2014),
are brief and related to global politics, rather than focusing on policy implementations on
the ground. To this end, most important aspects of Turkey’s Africa policy; trade,
diplomatic presence, investment and development assistance have yet to be compared in
detail with the other partners of the continent.
The main shortcoming of the existing literature is the failure to bring the perception of
African side into the picture in term of Turkey’s engagement in the continent. Although
there are a few references to this in the studies of Tepedelen (2008), Kaya & Warner
(2012) and Bilgiç & Nascimento (2014), those viewpoints are based on the authors’
personal interpretations rather than arising from field research. Taking this into
consideration, the current study is a significant contribution to filling this critical gap.
g. Limitations of the study
Choosing Ankara as the site of fieldwork, might be considered as a limitation in finding
out the perception of African side. However, Ankara, as the capital of Turkey, hosts the
ambassadors of African countries who are considered to have extensive knowledge on
the subject. They are also presumed to have significant experience in Turkey’s
engagement policy since they are assigned to cover and analyse it.

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The researcher’s identity as government official of Turkey, albeit on a sabbatical leave,
might be regarded as an imperfection that might affect the objectivity of the study.
Consequently, the respondents might give answers, which they deem “desirable” by the
Turkish government, rather than providing their genuine viewpoints. To overcome or
limit the impact of this issue, the interviewees are ensured that every aspect of the research
is subject to confidentiality and anonymity along with their informed consent. It is also
notified that the data gathered in the interviews are to be used solely for academic
purposes.
It should be mentioned here that the initial intention of the researcher was to conduct
extensive interviews in Mogadishu as well with the relevant parties to provide a more
comprehensive picture on Turkish engagement in Somalia. However, my travel plans to
Mogadishu was not approved by the relevant authorities of the University of Oxford, due
to security conditions in Somalia. This imposed restrictions on the number of Somalis
interviewed. Nevertheless, including diaspora members to the study and conducting
email, telephone/Skype interviews provided quite substantial data for the analyses.

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CHAPTER ONE: POLICY
a. Historical background
Ottoman era
Turkic communities in Africa can be dated back to 9th
century AD. Ottoman Empire, on
the other hand, by arriving in the continent in early 16th
century, controlled big swaths of
areas in Sub-Saharan Africa. Ottomans had five provinces in Africa; Algeria, Absyntia,
Egypt, Trablusgarb (Libya) and Tunisia, governors of which were appointed directly from
Istanbul (Kavas, 2006). Ottoman Empire established diplomatic links, signed alliance and
non-aggression pacts with the African Kingdoms. Moreover, Ottomans expanded their
borders to include present day Sudan, Chad, Niger (ibid) and Uganda in the 19th
century
(Stanley, 1891). Hazar (2000) argues that by controlling East and North Africa, Ottoman
Empire prevented colonial powers penetrating into the continent from these directions.
However, there is an on-going academic debate on whether the Ottoman Empire was also
a colonial power in the sense of 19th
and 20th
century colonialism (Deringil, 2003).
Despite this fact, there is no doubt that Ottoman Empire was an African state. It also
provided a historical background on which Turkey seems to be building, at least partly,
its own Africa strategy after a century.
Republican Era
The Republic of Turkey was established after the collapse of Ottoman Empire. It initially
concentrated on ensuring internal stability and security of the newly drawn borders. This
somewhat inward-looking policy made Turkey’s presence almost non-existent in Africa
between the two World Wars. Joining the Western Bloc after WWII, Turkey became a

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staunch member of the alliance almost to the extent that it seemed to have no particular
policy, other than supporting its allies’ positions towards Africa. In this period, Turkey
considered Algeria and Tunisia’s independence as internal affairs of France
(Tepeciklioğlu, 2012), sided with the Western powers in Suez crisis and abstained from
a vote at the UN on conducting free elections in Rwanda and Burundi (Ataöv, as cited in
Tepeciklioğlu, 2012). However, the most striking example for this radical alignment is
the Turkish position expressed in the Bandung Conference, which was an important
milestone toward the Non-Aligned Movement. In this memorable event, Turkey
condemned the NAM’s impartiality, highlighted the communism threat and advocated
affiliation to the Western Bloc. As a result, participant states, mostly in favour of non-
alignment, were disturbed by Turkey’s standpoint and regarded it as the “spokesman” of
the West (Sofuoğlu; 2014). This excessive dependency to the Western bloc, not only
circumvented Turkey ability to develop a multifaceted foreign policy but also deeply
tarnished Turkey’s image in the eyes of the newly independent African states.
A policy of opening up towards Africa was put into words in 1965, not as a change in
West-aligned foreign policy approach, but to seek support at the UN on the Cyprus issue3
(Fırat, 2009). Following the embargo imposed in 1974, due to its intervention in Cyprus
as a guarantor state, Turkey realized that it had to improve its relations with other parts
of the world, rather than committing all attention to its immediate neighbourhood and
trying to navigate in the political milieu of super powers’ struggle. To this end, Turkey
signed the declarations on supporting Mozambique’s liberation and provided military
3
For more information on Cyprus issue: Hakki, M., Cyprus Issue: A Documentary History,
1878-2006, London, I.B. Tauris, 2007

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assistance to Zimbabwean independence fighters in 1974 by delivering US $300 thousand
each to ZANU and ZAPU (Oran, 2000). However, such attempts proved to be almost
ineffective due to, among other factors, earlier negative perception of Turkey and the one-
time-reactionary nature of the initiative.
In the 1980s, Prime Minister Turgut Özal, mastermind of the economic liberalization
policies which replaced import substitution industrialization, wanted to engage more with
the African countries to diversify Turkey’s limited export markets. Despite the fact that
his desire to engage with Africa was not realized at that time, his policies, having created
an environment for economic growth and integrating country with global markets,
generated an outward-looking businessmen group and navigated Turkey out of its
previous Cold War settings into current position (Wheeler, 2011).
Consequently, economic crises of 1990s and the Customs Union with the European
Community in 1996, further pushed the Turkish private sector to broaden their sphere of
interest to include Sub-Saharan Africa. Political pressure on conservative businessmen,
particularly after the Turkish military’s intervention to politics in 1997, “motivated” them
more to open up to Africa. As Çavdar (2013) highlights, alienated in Turkey, conservative
businessmen turned their faces to new markets and improved their operational abilities
globally.
There was another attempt to open up to Africa in 1998 due to the setback experienced
in Turkish foreign policy when its name was not mentioned among the EU candidate
countries at the 1997 Luxemburg Summit (Boztaş, 2011). The “Opening up to Africa
Policy”, formulated in 1998 was the most comprehensive, covering many aspects of

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relations with Africa (Tepedelen, 2008). However, the policy did not bear immediate
fruits because of more pressing internal and external issues on Turkey’s agenda at that
time.
After coming to power November 2002, AKP, a “conservative democrat” party (Erdoğan,
2004), had to concentrate on integration with the EU and pressing issues such as the
foreign intervention in Iraq. Meanwhile, the strategy, prepared by the Undersecretariat
for Foreign Trade in 2003 on “the development of the economic relations with African
countries” (MFA source a), was not sufficient to create a momentum in relations with
Africa. In this regard, AKP government declared the year 2005 as the “Year of Africa”
in Turkey (Özkan, 2008), apparently right after the release of Commission for Africa
report (also known as Blair report) (Besenyo & Olah, 2012), which was making such a
call in this direction in March 2005. Finding out the connection, if there is any, between
the work of Commission for Africa and Turkey’s declaration of 2005 as the “Year of
Africa”, requires further research in the official archives when they become available to
public. Nonetheless, this new engagement with Africa in 2005, as Afacan (2013)
indicates, is self-driven compared to previous ones and arose from the AKP’s intention
to pursue multi-dimensional foreign policy.
b. Why Africa?
In order to understand the reasons behind Turkey’s active official engagement with
Africa, especially since 2005, we need to analyse the changes in global political economy
in the last two decades and transformation in Turkey’s domestic political and economic
environment. On the other hand, we also need to look into the Turkish private sector’s

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engagement with the continent as one of the main factors, perhaps the driving force, of
adopting this strategy.
Change in global political-economy
As indicated above the Cold War era restricted the foreign policy choices of countries
significantly. The end of this global rivalry meant two things for Turkey. First, it lost the
assurance that it would not be left to fail devastatingly either in economic or political
foras. Second, parallel to the first, Turkey gained more freedom in setting up new foreign
policy priorities. In this regard, it started engaging with the regions that were almost
uncharted for Turkey in the last century.
Technologic developments, which led to globalisation of capital, investment and trade,
as well as increased mobility across the borders in the last decades, created a new setting,
which no country, including Turkey, can ignore. Even at this backdrop, Africa was largely
neglected until the late 1990s. It might be attributed to the lack of a visionary approach
and absence of necessary economic and political capabilities to engage effectively with
Africa.
One other reason, for Turkey’s engagement with the continent, is the new “scramble for
Africa” especially by non-traditional powers. This controversial term is used for defining
significant economic engagement of the rising powers in Africa, either for their self-
interest (Carmody, 2011) or for mutual benefit (Ellis, 2011). China, significantly
increasing its trade with the continent in the last two decades, institutionalized its
engagement with Africa by establishing Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)
in 2000. India, taking advantage of its amicable relations with African states arising from

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the Non-Allied Movement, invigorated its relations with the continent starting from 2003
(Large, 2013;29) and established regular dialogue mechanism by the India-Africa Forum
Summit. Brazil too, with its historical kinship relations, has spread its footprint in Africa
since the early 2000s (Alves, 2013). Having seen these developments, Turkey apparently
decided engaging more seriously with Africa in order not to lag behind in this new rush
towards Africa’s presumed potentials.
Transformation in domestic politics and new foreign policy
The 1990s were turbulent in Turkey due to the weak coalition governments and increased
security risks arising from the PKK terrorist attacks, consecutive economic crises in
1990s, along with a military intervention (Elmas & Kurban, 2011) into the politics in
1997. As a result, Turkish voters brought the newly established AKP to power in
November 2002 as a single party majority government. This enabled the AKP to
formulate domestic and foreign policies without any meaningful obstacle and challenge
from other political power centres.
On the other hand, consecutive AKP governments have successfully utilised foreign
policy to appeal to voters’ support in the ballot boxes (Christie-Miller; 2012). AKP, in
essence, was providing the public with the image of a powerful and competent state,
which the public has been longing for since the demise of Ottoman Empire. In this regard,
Africa was a convenient area where engagement policy would be more attractive to the
voters, since Turkey would seem to be matching global powers on an equal basis (Bacık
& Afacan; 2013). Africa was also considered the least risky region in terms of domestic
and foreign policy practices compared particularly to the Middle East.

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In addition, AKP governments, since 2003, have sought to realise their ambition to turn
Turkey into a regional power (Erdoğan, 2003) within its own region. While Turkey does
not rule out the same ambition in Africa, by defining itself as an “Afro-Eurasian” country
(MFA source a), becoming a regional power refers more to the immediate
neighbourhood. In this regard, Turkey has been seeking to enhance its presence across
the globe by enhancing its relations with Africa and other regions. Davutoğlu (2001;562)
explains this engagement by an analogy; the more Turkey draws back its bow into the
regions of the global south, the further the arrow will go into the West which he argues is
the strategic goal of the country. In other words, to attain more effective influence in the
West and to be taken seriously by it, Turkey needs first to achieve influence in wider
world. Opening up to Africa is where this strategy has been put in practice since 2005.
The Economy
Economic interests, in accordance with the realist approach, have been a major impetus
behind Turkey’s engagement with Africa. This can easily be detected from the economic
and trade agreements offered to African countries for consideration. Hence, Turkey, by
engaging more with Africa, apparently wants to diversify its economic partners and
markets. As argued by Kirişçi (2009), Turkey is in the process of becoming, what
Roscrane terms, a “trading state”. In this regard, economic considerations are increasingly
shaping the foreign policy choices, as well as changing the actors who take part in policy
formulation.
Turkey’s recent economic development has also played a significant role in both official
and unofficial engagement with Africa. Budget surpluses (after interest payments) and
steady growth in GDP since 2002 has enabled Turkish governments to allocate more

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resources into development assistance, which has been the main tool for Turkey to gain
a foothold in African countries. In addition, the economic development and stability of
Turkey, has increased both income levels and size of the country’s middle class, which is
the main source of voluntary donations to the Turkish NGOs. As a result, those NGOs
generated more resources from the Turkish public which flowed to African countries as
a complement to official development assistance.
The Role of the Private Sector
The existing literature focuses on the last ten years when analysing the engagement of
Turkish businessmen in Africa. Thus, their crucial role in inspiring the government to
adopt such policy has gone unnoticed. In fact, individual entrepreneurs and businessmen
associations started engaging with the continent well before 2005. Turkish businessmen
associations such as “Independent Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association”
(MUSIAD) had already been organizing business trips to African countries before 2005
and preparing reports to encourage its members to invest in the continent (Yarar, 1994)
(MUSIAD; 1996). “Business Life Solidarity Association” (ISHAD), in addition to
business visits to the continent, was holding meetings with the Commercial Councillors
of the African Embassies in Ankara in the 1990s (Wheeler, 2005). Those efforts yielded
fruits by increasing Turkey’s export volume to Sub-Saharan African countries by seven
fold from 1996 to 2004 (gtb.gov.tr). It should also be acknowledged that the facilitation
and support of AKP government enhanced the autonomous development of Turkish
businesses in Africa significantly.
Along with business circles, Turkish non-governmental organizations also started
engaging with Africa in the mid-1990s. Istanbul-based “The Foundation for Human

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Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief (IHH) has been conducting humanitarian
relief projects and activities in Africa since 1996 (Özkan, 2010b). The Gülen Group, led
by Turkish preacher Fethullah Gülen, a religious conglomerate of NGOs, businessmen
associations, schools, etc., started establishing private schools in Africa in 1997. By the
end of 2004, it had opened 18 schools (İpek, 2013) in 18 African countries. Additionally,
the group is known to encourage businesses to engage economically with the country
where such schools are opened. To this end, private and non-profit/NGO sectors, which
are linked in some of their activities, partly inspired and paved the way for the government
to unleash a charm offensive with the continent.
c. Engagement discourse
It is possible to identify an evolution in the characterisation of Turkey relations with
Africa. The first Africa policy, promulgated in 1998, was called “Opening up to Africa”.
A decade later, the first Turkey-Africa Summit was held under the title, the “Turkey-
Africa Cooperation Summit”. In April 2010, the Turkish government adopted its “Africa
Strategy Document” (Official Gazette, 2010). Since then, as argued by the Turkish
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this engagement is termed the “Turkey-Africa Partnership”
as reflected in the title of the last Turkey-Africa summit (see Chapter II). This indicates
the finalisation of the opening phase and the development at a more varied and deeper
relationship.
Beyond these broad characterisations, we need to look into the specific narratives
developed and employed with regard to Africa. During the AKP era, Turkish foreign
policy discourse considerably transformed while inheriting the language and concepts of
the past (Yeşiltaş & Balcı, 2013). However, Turkey’s foreign policy discourse towards

26. 26
Africa is based on claims regarding historical ties, anti-colonialism (Bilgiç &
Nascimento, 2014), as well as humanitarianism and religious links.
Historical ties
It is noteworthy that Turkey has highlighted historical ties, especially the Ottoman legacy,
in its discourse on Africa. This is more explicit in relation to North Africa and the Sahel
region, as well as East Africa, where the Ottoman Empire once had a limited presence.
Based on this legacy, Turkey calls itself an “Afro-Eurasian state” (MFA source a) in order
to emphasize that its current engagement does not arise from temporary political and
economic expectations but is rooted in a shared past.
In some cases, the Ottoman past and the Republic of Turkey’s present engagement are
presented as a continuum. In this regard, Davutoğlu, (2009) told the press; “We have an
Ottoman legacy … Yes, we are the new Ottomans. We have to pay attention to the
countries in our region. We are opening up to Africa”. Despite the common acceptance
that relations were limited in the republican era, Turkish leaders occasionally refer to the
engagement in that period. The then Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül, in 2005, claimed
that “Turkey had been in solidarity with African peoples in their quest for freedom and
national independence” (Gül, 2005). India, as an emerging partner of the continent,
underlines the historical ties, special solidarity and the support given to African countries
in their struggle for liberation (mea.gov.in). China too, makes use of its solidarity with
African states in 1960s and 1970s in its narrative with reference to “history of common
struggle and common destiny” (Keqiang, 2014a). Despite the solidarity of Turkey with
the African countries might be regarded as slight, compared to aforementioned other

27. 27
emerging partners, it’s interesting to see how similar the engagement narratives are in
terms of Africa.
Anti-colonialism
In relation to historical ties, Turkish leaders seem to be employing an anti-colonial
narrative extensively in terms of Africa. This narrative appears to be predominantly, but
not exclusively, deployed since 2011. Before this particular year, Turkish leaders were
focusing more on the mutual side of the relations. In this regard, Gül, during his
presidential visit to Ghana in early 2011, compared the “Turks” and the “Europeans” by
stating that “We are striving for mutual benefit. We are following a method in which we
do not extract raw materials out of Africa but invest in the continent which leads to
information and technology transfer” (Gül, quoted in Dikbaş, 2011).
Anti-colonialism in Turkey’s foreign policy discourse was further deployed the same year
by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (2011) at the UN General Assembly. Erdoğan
devoted a good portion of his speech to Somalia and argued that “the situation in Somalia
has … revealed the deep wounds inflicted by the colonialist mentality”. In addition,
Erdoğan (2014) in late 2014 claimed that “former colonial powers started discrediting
Turkey in the aftermath of its Africa opening initiative”. While pointing a finger at a
colonial mind-set they reject, Turkish authorities distinguish Turkey’s approach to Africa
as a partnership based on equality, fraternity, mutual respect and benefit rather than give-
and-take (Aydın, 2014).

28. 28
Expressions such as “Fighting shoulder to shoulder against imperialism”, “colonial
oppression”, “the old path of Western colonialists”, and “friendship between anticolonial
forces” can also be found in the official discourses of China and India in terms of their
relations with Africa. In this regard, Turkey’s narrative on anti-colonialism and
differentiating itself from the former colonial powers is quite similar to the narratives of
other emerging powers.
Anti-colonial discourse of the Turkish leaders receives criticism from both in and outside
Turkey. According to Özkan (2012a) Turkish perception towards Africa is largely
sloganic and based on anti-Western, anti-colonial and accusatory discourse. This open
criticism in turn, as suggested by International Crisis Group (2012), irritated traditional
external actors. ICG also implies that this approach might also be a hindrance in ensuring
cooperation of traditional actors, who are still the biggest donors of the continent.
Religion
Religion, despite being relatively understated, is one of the main underlying components
of Turkey’s foreign policy discourse on Africa. This approach, according to Bacık &
Afacan (2013), is due to the fact that “Turkish political actors are very much under the
influence of their political identities”. One can notice the religious aspect in the statements
of Turkish leaders when they meet their African counterparts. For instance, President Gül
(2010a & 2010b), in his meeting with Nigerian and Zambian counterparts respectively in
2010, stressed the religious ties with Africa. The role of religion becomes more evident
when taking a closer look into the activities of Turkish official agencies. The Presidency
for Religious Affairs (Diyanet), which is a state organization in charge of regulating
religious matters, organized two African Muslim religious leaders’ summits in Turkey in

29. 29
2006 and 2011. The stated purpose of the summits4
was to explore potential religious ties
and cooperation between Turkey and African Muslim communities (diyanet.gov.tr).
Diyanet has been providing full scholarships to higher education in Turkish universities
and high school studies of African students who enrol in Turkish religious schools (Imam-
Hatip) in Turkey. The total number of students provided with Diyanet scholarship had
reached over 3000 by early 2015 (aa.com.tr). Diyanet is reported to have plans for
establishing religious schools in Africa, in addition to existing ones in Somalia. TIKA,
on the other hand, in providing development assistance, arguably focuses in mainly
Muslim countries of the east, west and Sahelian Africa (Wheeler 2011) in order to
increase Turkey’s soft power in those countries. It established most of its coordination
offices5
in predominantly Muslim countries of Africa.
There is no consensus on the cost and benefits of religious approach for Turkey in Africa.
Özkan (2013a) also argues that religion is a highly important element of Turkey-Africa
relations and it may have a legitimising role. Çavdar (2013) indicates that Turkey’s
policies in the sense of religious emphasis has not been tested yet since other possible
competitor states, both Muslim and Christian, have not taken a counter stance, at least not
openly. On the other hand, Hazar (2013) and Karagül & Arslan (2013) respectively assert
that despite the advantages it might bring, religious discourse might be a mistake and
bears the risk of deteriorating the relations with some African countries and external
4 At the first summit, there were 33 participants from 19 African countries. The second summit
was more comprehensive in terms of participation and geographical reach, it involved 125
participants from 46 African countries (diyanet.gov.tr).
5 Egypt, Algeria, Libya, Mauritaina, Niger, Chad, Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, Cameroon,
Namibia

30. 30
actors. At this point, arises the importance of the African side’s perception, which will be
analysed in the following chapter.
Humanitarianism
Turkish foreign policy discourse on humanitarianism has been on the rise since AKP
came to power in 2002, but particularly after 2011. Humanitarian narrative is more
pronounced in terms of Africa. By adopting such a discourse, Turkey aims to portray
itself as an altruistic, responsible, trustworthy actor. The essence of Turkey’s
humanitarian approach can be found in Davutoğlu’s article (2013a). The then Foreign
Minister Davutoğlu, referring to the realist-idealist divide, argues that “the realities of our
era require the rise of a human-oriented diplomacy and Turkey, in that sense, does not
differentiate between Turkish citizens and the people with whom Turkey shares a
common history”.
In this regard, Turkish leaders see themselves as voicing the “sufferings” and “acute
problems” of Africa. The former President Gül, during his visit to Cameroon and DRC
in 2010, reportedly said that Turkey had come … with “a clean slate” and a “humanist
approach” (The Economist, 2010). Incumbent President Erdoğan (2015a) in one of his
recent speeches declared that “we have responsibilities for our hundreds of millions of
brothers from the Balkans to Africa, who have set their hopes, dreams and hearts on us”.
The resonance of this discourse in African side will be discussed in Chapter III.

31. 31
d. Conclusion
Changes in global political economy and Turkey’s internal transformation, both
economically and politically, have paved the way for a remarkable increase in
engagement with Africa. The engagement is in line with Turkey’s “national interests”
(Davutoğlu, 2012b) in terms of seeking new economic partners and diversifying its
import and export markets. In addition, the overall engagement with Africa, has
contributed to Turkey’s soft power perception both in and outside the continent.
However, there seems to be no consensus among scholars on the benefits of the specific
elements of foreign policy discourse for Africa. While the implementation of the policy,
which will be examined in detail in the following chapter, is moving ahead on the ground,
effects of the engagement discourse, which this research is set to explore, have not been
resolved yet.

32. 32

33. 33
CHAPTER TWO: PRACTICE
As has been indicated in the introduction, Turkey can be understood as putting its Africa
partnership policy into practice within an overlapping framework of realism and idealism.
Realist policies are reflected most in economic relations. Idealism, on the other hand, is
pronounced more in the provision of significant development and humanitarian
assistance.
Central aspects of Turkey’s policy practices, in relation to Africa, are explained in this
section in order to provide a broad understanding of the implementation of its strategy.
To do so, diplomatic engagement, economic cooperation and development assistance are
identified as the main components of the practical side of the theoretical framework.
However, it should be kept in mind that it is hard to make a clear distinction between the
mentioned policies since they are closely intertwined and there is always interplay
between them.
a. Diplomatic engagement
Despite previous attempts (see Chapter I), Turkey’s discernible official engagement with
the continent started in 2005 with the declaration of that year as the “Year of Africa” in
Turkey. In the following three years, Turkey-Africa relations gained substantial
momentum; manifested in high level visits, opening of numerous embassies and TIKA
offices, the launch of Turkish Airlines flights to African capitals and increased bilateral
trade volumes. The momentum peaked in 2008 with the AU’s declaration of Turkey as a
strategic partner of the continent and the organisation of the First Turkey-Africa Summit
in Istanbul.

34. 34
The first summit, attracted high level representation from two-thirds of the continent was
significant, especially in defiance of the AU’s Banjul Formula 6
, which was also
disregarded previously by China in 2006 and France in 2007 (Willsher, 2007). Despite
the summit being considered successful, summit diplomacy, in general, with African
countries is not an innovative form of engagement. France, for example, has been holding
France-Afrique summits since the early 1970s. Even the other emerging partners of the
continent – Japan (in 1993), China (2000), South Korea and India both in 2008 held such
gatherings. The emerging partners of the continent seems to be using the summit
diplomacy not only as profile-raising opportunity, but meeting with the leaders of African
states in one occasion, rather than visiting them one by one.
Following the summit, Turkey intensified its diplomatic engagements with the continent
and opened 27 new embassies in Sub-Saharan Africa, along with a Consulate General in
Hargeisa (Somalia), by mid-2014 (MFA source a). Turkey now has 34 Embassies and 1
Consulate Generals in Sub-Saharan Africa. The number of Sub-Saharan African
embassies in Ankara increased as well from ten to 30 by the end of 2014 (ibid). Turkey’s
initiative, in this regard, is particularly noteworthy because most European countries had
shrunk their diplomatic representation in Africa since the global economic crisis of 2008.
However, Brazil took a similar action and opened 19 new diplomatic missions in Africa
since 2003 (Alves, 2013).
Along with establishing bilateral official channels, Turkey embarked on initiating or
improving its relations with the continental and regional organizations of Africa. To this
6 Banjul Formula was introduced in July 2006 to ensure a common stance on “country-to-
continent” partnerships (Vickers, 2013). It requires limited participation from the African side
(Eriksen et al, 2012) if the counterpart is a single country.

35. 35
end, Turkey became a non-regional member of the African Development Bank in 2008
and accredited its relevant Embassies by 2013 to regional economic committees such as;
ECOWAS, IGAD, EAC, COMESA and ECCAS (MFA source a). These steps not only
boosted Turkey’s presence, but also enabled Turkish diplomatic offices to gain access to
and follow more closely the regional trends and developments.
High-level official visits were also utilized by Turkey to advance bilateral and multilateral
relations with African countries. This type of engagement was almost entirely new for
Turkey, judging from the fact that in the whole republican era, there had been only two
major high level visits to Sub-Saharan African countries before 2005. Brazil and China
as well use high-level visits to solidify bilateral ties. However, such visits to African
countries may be closely tied to the personal styles of leaders, particularly in Turkey and
Brazil. After Lula da Silva left office in 2011, there has been a sharp drop in visits to
Africa by his successor (Alves, 2013). It is still yet to be seen this would be the case for
the Turkish engagement, when Erdoğan leaves the political arena of Turkey, since he is
the key individual and a dynamic leader pushing the engagement forward.
As a follow-up mechanism and overall evaluation of bilateral relations, Turkey holds
regular political consultations with 15 Sub-Saharan African countries including South
Africa, Nigeria and Ethiopia (MFA source b). On the other hand, Turkey has launched
dialogue meetings with the EU, the USA, Spain and Italy on Africa. This clearly indicates
that Turkey has successfully established itself as a prominent actor and counterpart whose
perceptions on Africa matters are valued by leading western powers. However, it is
noteworthy that Turkey does not have such dialogue mechanisms (with the exception of
Brazil) with the non-traditional partners of the continent.

36. 36
Turkey exploits conference diplomacy as well within the context of its Africa strategy.
Hence, it co-organized the “International Donor’s Conference for the Reconstruction and
Development of Darfur” in March 2010. Turkey also hosted in 2011 the 4th UN
Conference on Least Developed Countries, 33 of which are African states. In addition,
Turkey organised two International Somalia Conferences in 2010 and 2012. By virtue of
such initiatives, Turkey claims “acting as the voice of Africa in regional and international
platforms” (MFA source c). Interestingly, it seems that it’s only Turkey, among the other
emerging partners of the continent, claiming to be “the voice of Africa”. As a justification
to this, conference diplomacy is almost unique to Turkey, compared to other emergent
partners of the continent, thanks to its geographically central position, along with the
Turkish Airlines’ flights to the majority of African capitals. This evidently indicates that
Turkey’s diplomatic initiatives are closely tied to its development and commercial
initiatives.
In terms of summit diplomacy however, things did not develop as smoothly for the second
summit. First, the summit was delayed for over a year before its realisation in Malabo in
November 2014. Secondly, the summit was organised in accordance with the Banjul
Formula, despite the fact that the system was disregarded by individual African countries
in the Fifth FOCAC (July 2012) and the US-Africa Leaders Summit (August 2014).
Therefore, the scope and level of participation was limited compared to the first summit.
Last but not least, the Chairperson of the AU Commission Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma
(2014), in her speech at the summit, openly criticized the lack of realisation of the
mutually agreed “Implementation Plan 2010-2014”. These developments raise the
question whether Turkey is losing momentum with Africa at the multilateral level.

37. 37
b. Economy and trade
The economic relations and trade has been one of the major aspects of Turkey’s
engagement with Africa. To this end, Turkish Airlines flights have been a great asset, not
only for overall engagement policy but also increasing trade volumes. Turkish Airlines
now has scheduled flights to 26 countries and 37 destinations in Sub-Saharan Africa
(Turkish Airlines, 2014). As of December 2014, Turkish government is the biggest
(49.12%) shareholder in the company (ibid). Due to this share composition, the decision
made by Turkish Airlines might be prioritising the “national interests” over commercial
sustainability. Nevertheless, direct flights certainly facilitate further contacts between
businessmen and contribute to the better understanding of the peoples on both sides. The
other emerging partners have, if any, a small number of flights, which are hardly
comparable to Turkish Airlines.
Turkey’s trade volume with Sub-Saharan Africa in the year 2000 was US $742 million.
It reached to US $6.5 billion in 2014 (gtb.gov.tr). While the nominal increase in trade
volume is almost nine-fold, the share of Sub-Saharan Africa in Turkey’s total trade
volume increased only doubled. On the other hand, Turkey’s trade volume with Sub-
Saharan African countries has almost been at a standstill since 2011.

38. 38
Chart-1: Turkey's trade numbers with Sub-Saharan Africa (US $ in millions)
Source: Ministry of Customs and Trade of the Republic of Turkey
These figures raise an important point: even though Turkey is considered among the
emergent partners of the continent, the statistics on international trade with Africa tell a
different story. According to The Economist (2015) data, Turkey is not ranked in the top
ten countries with the largest trade volume with Africa (based on 2013 figures). As shown
in the chart below, despite increasing its share between 2000-2005, Turkey has not been
able to ensure a meaningful upward trend in its trade volume with Sub-Saharan Africa.
During this period, Turkey’s share in the Sub-Saharan Africa’s trade has been just around
1%, the lowest among the emerging partners.
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
2000 2002 2005 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Import
Export
Volume

39. 39
Chart-2: Trade Volume between Sub-Saharan and its Rising Partners (%)
Source: Worldbank
In order to stimulate the economic side of the relationship, Turkey opened 14 new
Commercial Counsellor Offices in Sub-Saharan Africa in the last five years, increasing
the total number to 22 by March 2015 (ekonomi.gov.tr). However, this increase in human
resources did not automatically boost trade volumes. The reasons for this, first of all,
policy choices of Turkey can only make a partial difference to pre-existing structural
issues, such as tariffs and non-tariff barriers plus wider market conditions. Secondly, the
Commercial Counsellor’s Offices were established in the countries where a contractual
basis for economic relations has yet to be created.
Aside from the official aspect, the private sector significantly boosted its already existing
interest and activities towards Africa. In this regard, the Foreign Economic Relations
Board of Turkey (DEIK), which is responsible for “leading the Turkish private sector’s
foreign economic relations” (deik.org.tr), established business councils with 18 Sub-
Saharan African countries. With the exception of South Africa, Sudan and Ethiopia, all
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
2000 2005 2010 2013
Brazil
China
India
Japan
South Korea
Turkey

40. 40
these councils were created since 2010. However, while their effectiveness is still to be
tested, DEIK itself, was recently brought under the effective control of (Hurriyet Daily,
2014) the Ministry of Economy. In the relevant law, adopted on 10 September 2014, it is
stated that DEIK now operates under the “guidance” and “supervision” of the Ministry.
In addition, DEIK is also obliged to take the “government programs” and “development
plans” when deciding on foreign economic matters (Official Gazette, 2014). This step
may increase the effectiveness of the DEIK management; however, the nature of Turkey’s
economic relations with Africa, which has been predominantly private-sector-led, is
likely to see changes. For instance, DEIK business councils might have hard time
explaining their “new status” to African counterparts, which are the private sector
representatives in their respective countries.
Along with DEIK, the “Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists”
(TUSKON), which is an umbrella businessmen organization, conducts intensive
economic activities on the continent. TUSKON, with the endorsement and facilitation of
the government, has been the most effective representative of the Turkish private sector
vis-a-vis Africa It organized seven “Turkey–Africa Foreign Trade Bridge” gatherings
since 2005 (TUSKON, 2011). As is the general perception, the government, for almost a
decade, had largely delegated the economic aspect of its Africa partnership policy to
TUSKON. However, due to its perceived affiliation with the Gülen group, TUSKON has
not been receiving the same backing recently. Özkan (2014b) suggests that this domestic
political infighting will prove beneficial and overall Turkey-Africa relations will
eventually deepen. Even if this may be the long-term outcome, the conflict bears the risk
of causing confusion in the minds of African side, at least in the short term, when
recalibrating their economic ties accordingly with Turkey. It also goes without saying that

41. 41
this new setting will have reflections in political and social realms of the Turkish
engagement in Africa.
The abovementioned two developments are potentially significant for the nature of
Turkey’s developing engagement with Africa. As in the statement of Davutoğlu (2011),
Turkey has been proudly asserting the private sector led engagement with Africa. This
much-praised private sector is however now seems to be either facing constraints of
striving to adjust to the new settings. As a consequence, Turkey might lose its
comparative advantage against China in terms of private-led business dealings and fall
behind its competitors such as Brazil and India.
c. Development Assistance
Official development assistance (ODA) is traditionally defined as “government aid,
including grants and concessional loans, designed to promote the economic development
and welfare of developing countries (OECD, 2013a). Although this definition might not
be accepted by all, development assistance is commonly used as an economic, as well as
a foreign policy tool by both members and non-members of the OECD Development
Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC)7
. This suggests that the official and private aid to
Africa is one of the major elements of Turkey’s recent engagement in the continent.
In this regard, starting from 2004, Turkey increased its development Sub-Saharan Africa.
While the development assistance (including ODA, Other Official Flows (OOF) and
private flows; which includes NGO grants, FDI, portfolio equity) provided in 2000 to
7 DAC was established in 1961 to define and monitor global standards in key areas of
development, promote and enhance co-operation and coordination among the OECD member
states so as to contribute to sustainable development (OECD source b).

42. 42
Sub-Saharan Africa was less than US$ 500.000, the figure increased to US$ 3.4 million
in 2005 and US$ 193.5 million in 2013 (OECD, 2013b). As a percentage of overall
Turkish aid, Sub-Saharan Africa’s share has risen from 0.4% in 2000 to 4.7% in 2013.
Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Niger and Senegal are the countries in Sub-Saharan
Africa that receive most Turkish development assistance.
Hausmann (2014) argues that Turkey’s geostrategic interest in Sub-Saharan Africa is
insignificant. Moreover, judging from the past and current records, securing natural
resources is not a major driver behind Turkey’s engagement. Why then has Turkey
increased its development assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa? The Turkish government
explains the purpose of its development assistance programme as an integral part of its
proactive foreign policy approach (MFA source d). To this end, Turkey seems to be
utilizing development assistance to improve its image in and relations with Africa. It
appears, Turkey, despite providing one-eighteenth of the UK, one-tenth of Japan and even
less than South Korea to Sub-Saharan Africa (OECD, 2013b), has been successful in
creating a perception that it has become a genuine development partner of the continent.
What is it again that makes Turkish development aid attractive to African eyes? First of
all, Turkey is seen to deliver swift and effective aid bilaterally on the ground. Secondly,
Turkish aid, predominantly delivered as grants, is free of conditionality and focuses on
direct engagement with locals (Murphy & Woods; 2014) through quick impact projects.
Last but not least, almost sui generis to Turkey among emerging African development
partners, predominantly Muslim Turkish NGOs have a significant role in providing
humanitarian and development assistance in Africa. TIKA annual reports confirm this by
showing that Turkish NGOs provide almost as much aid as the official agencies. As a

43. 43
result of these various factors, Turkey has been able to present itself as a distinct and
reliable partner in development.
Comparing Turkey with other new actors in Africa
The absence of conditionality is the main feature shared by the aid policies of most
emerging partners of the continent. However, Turkey is the largest humanitarian aid
provider among them in terms of share (around 50%) in its total aid. Chinese
humanitarian assistance to Africa was only 0.5% of its total aid between 2010-2012
(Xinhua, 2014). Other emerging partners of Africa have different approaches to
development assistance compared to that of Turkey. While not as transparent, China’s
development assistance consists of three types of aid: grants, interest-free loans and
concessional loans. The most common way of China providing assistance to African
countries is by carrying out large economic infrastructure projects with the support of its
EXIMBANK. In return, China secures rights to extract natural resources or buy shares of
the national company (Marques & Spanakos, 2014). India has a similar aid policy towards
Africa, focusing on areas that “coincide with the efficiency and profitability of its own
investments in the continent” (McCarthy, 2011). According to Tjønneland (2015),
concessional loans and lines of credit are the largest components of Indian aid to Africa.
Turkey, on the other hand, has made very limited use of loans for Sub-Saharan African
countries. Until 2013, Sudan was the only Sub-Saharan African country granted
(US$74.3 million) Turkish EXIMBANK loans. Presumably, charging higher interest
rates and imposing ceilings for countries makes Turkish loans less attractive compared to
Chinese and Indian loans. Even though there has been a substantial increase in Turkish
EXIMBANK loans in the last two years (US$ 646 million) for Sub-Saharan African

44. 44
countries (eximbank.gov.tr), loans provided by Turkish EXIMBANK is less than slim
compared to China.
Foreign direct investment (FDI) can be considered an area where Turkey is lagging
behind other non-traditional actors. According to Taraporevala & Mullen (2014), China
and India are among the biggest investors in the continent. Brazil, Japan and South Korea
also invest substantially in Africa (Broich & Szirmai; 2014). However, Turkey is not
among the 15 countries with the biggest percentage of FDI in Sub-Saharan Africa
between 2003 and 2011. This deficiency can be attributed to a dearth in large Turkish
businesses in sectors such as energy, automotive and extractive industries.
Turkey’s development engagement in Somalia
In terms of Turkish development aid to Sub-Saharan Africa, Somalia has to be analysed
separately because of Turkey’s disproportionate engagement there in the last five years.
Turkey’s engagement with Somalia has been shaped by a bold development assistance
undertaking, initiated in 2011. This engagement has been the most acclaimed as well as
discussed aspect of Turkey’s surge in Africa.
According to Bekar (2014, cited in Murphy & Woods), Turkey’s aid program to Somalia
has five complementary pillars: breaking the political and economic isolation; providing
humanitarian aid; reviving the infrastructure; assisting political reconciliation; and
supporting security sector reform. Along with this ostensibly integrated approach,
numerous aspects of Turkish assistance to Somalia are unique.

45. 45
First of all, Turkey and its leaders, above all Erdoğan, took a risk in initiating an all-out
engagement in a country, which was (and still is) largely a no-go zone. Turkey has been
on the ground in Somalia, outside the secure zone, with its official agencies and NGOs.
This courageous approach resonated across the globe and was widely welcomed by
Somalis in and outside the country. This was based on the perception that a fellow Muslim
country, with which Somalia shares historical and cultural ties, had come to their
assistance when their need was dire.
Secondly, the extensive engagement of and cooperation with Turkish NGOs in Somalia,
makes Turkey exceptional in the entire donor community. According to TIKA (2013a)
records, along with official agencies8
16 Turkish NGOs were operating on the ground in
Somalia in 2013. Thirdly, delivering aid directly in social services and infrastructure has
led to swift improvement in the daily life of the local population, marking out Turkish
aid.
Last but not least, this contrasts with other international donors, mainly of the OECD,
which have been abstaining from providing assistance to Somalia due to the fact that strict
“anti-terror laws criminalise the transfer of resources to terrorist groups or individuals,
irrespective of the humanitarian character of such actions or the absence of any intention
to support terrorist acts” (Pantuliano et al; 2011). Turkey, on the other hand, has tried
engaging with Al-Shabaab (Murphy & Woods; 2014) for reconciliation and to implement
humanitarian projects in Al-Shabaab controlled areas.
8 TIKA, the Turkish Housing Development Administration and the Diyanet

46. 46
Chart-3: Major donors of Somalia in 2013 (US$, millions)
Source: OECD
In this context, Turkey has been delivering significant amount of resources in Somalia in
the implementation of its engagement strategy. While Turkey was providing to Somalia
around US$ 5 millions in 2010, just before the engagement, the aid allocated to Somalia
reached US$ 115 millions, which is 60% of Turkish aid delivered to Sub-Saharan Africa,
in 2013. To this end, almost 11% of TIKA’s total budget in 2013 was allocated to Somalia
(TIKA, 2013b). On the other hand, 26 other Sub-Saharan African countries received less
than a million dollars apiece in the same year.
0
25
50
75
100
125
150
175
200
225
250
2010 2011 2012 2013
USA
UK
Turkey
Norway
Japan
Germany
France
UAE

47. 47
Chart 4: Somalia’s share of Turkish aid to Sub-Saharan Africa (US$ millions).
Source: OECD
***
Turkish development assistance to Africa, and Somalia in particular, should be
understood as effective in creating and bolstering a positive image of Turkey. Along with
Embassies and Turkish Airlines flights, development assistance is one of the most visible
elements of Turkey’s engagement. It has also ensured the high visibility and involvement
of Turkey in development matters in terms of fragile and/or developing states. On the
other hand, it has yet to bear fruits for Turkey in terms of strengthening economic and
trade relations with the continent.
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
2000 2004 2007 2010 2011 2012 2013
Somalia
Rest of Sub-Saharan
Africa

48. 48

49. 49
CHAPTER THREE: PERCEPTION
In the previous chapters, Turkey’s official policies towards Africa and implementation of
that policy have been examined, primarily by analysing the existing literature on the
subject. This chapter however, focuses on the perception of the African side on the
Turkish engagement with the continent over the last ten years. The primary motive and
aim of this research, as indicated in the introduction, is to discover how Africans
understand Turkish engagement, in other words, to tell the African side of the story.
To this end, interviews were conducted in Turkey with representatives of eight African
states: six ambassadors and two Deputy Heads of Embassies, all of whom are based in
Ankara. The ambassadors of African countries in Turkey are considered to be most
suitable for the purpose of this study since they have the broadest experience and expertise
on the issue. Half of the interviewees were selected from East Africa, not only because
this is the region with the greatest Turkish engagement, but also for their proximity to
Somalia, to which (as the previous chapter showed) Turkey attaches particular
importance. Apart from this, four other countries from north, west, central and south
Africa, were included in this study to identify if African perceptions differed between
regions. Equal numbers of Embassies from Anglophone and Francophone Africa were
represented. Out of eight countries, three have majority Muslim populations whilst the
remaining five have Muslim minorities.
It should be acknowledged that, despite striving to conduct this research with as
representative as possible a sample of countries (within the time constraints and other
confines of this research), each and every state in Africa has its own characteristics.
However, the regional groupings, backgrounds and cultural peculiarities of the countries

50. 50
and communities have always facilitated finding common trends and tendencies. In that
sense, the sampling conducted is considered to be appropriate for the aims of this study.
The interviews were conducted under the principle of anonymity, and participants were
asked to provide their personal views rather than official standpoints of their respective
countries. The interviewees were asked about the following: the motivations of Turkey’s
relations with sub-Saharan Africa; the strengths and weaknesses of its engagement, how
Turkey compared with other emerging partners; the progress Turkey had made; and the
sustainability of the engagement. The responses are analysed in the following sections.
a. Motives
“[The] declaration of Turkey on organizing a summit with Africa, as the
African countries were getting ready for TICAD IV in 2008, raised in the
African side the questions of; ‘what is going on?’, ‘Why now Turkey is
interested in a summit with Africa?’ The initial response to those questions
was ‘why not!’. Many others are doing the same. Following the summit in
Istanbul, we found out that the issues discussed are the same as the ones we
have been negotiating with others. Then we said, ‘that is good; Turkey can
bring a fresh breath for us and there are things it can do in Africa that others
can’t. It’s better for us to have as many partners as possible.”
The comment above may be regarded as a representative picture of Africa’s response to
Turkish engagement in Africa. Since the current international system is based on a
community of ostensibly equal nation-states, any country can take initiatives to engage
peacefully with others to satisfy its predetermined objectives. While the engaged

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countries initially focus on their own interests, it is essential for them to know the main
motives of their counterpart, in this case Turkey, in order to then determine their present-
day and future positions in return.
When asked about the principal intentions of Turkey in launching its new Africa strategy,
the interviewees overwhelmingly suggested that it is motivated by Turkey’s economic
interests. According to them, in the context of the country’s economic development in the
last three decades, Turkey started looking for markets for its finished products. In
addition, Turkey is making inroads by its development assistance for its future needs for
natural resources and raw materials. In the context of a new ‘scramble’ for African riches,
especially by southern rising powers, Turkey doesn’t want to miss the train again.
This perception of economic concern is at least partly consistent with Turkey’s earlier
policy documents on Africa, as well as with secondary analysis Kirişçi (2009), Boztaş
(2011)]. Turkey is, in that sense, considered to have the ambition to become a regional
and global power, reflected in the paradigm shift in Turkish foreign policy since early
2000s. One interviewee, in referring to its Ottoman heritage, notably stated that "to
become global is in the DNA of Turkey". This aspiration requires resources and therefore
"Turkey decided to go where those guys (other global players) have been fishing” i.e.
Africa.
Turkey’s recent interest is also attributed to the difficulties it has faced in joining the EU.
As a result of its exclusion, it is claimed that that Turkey sought new openings, including
in Africa. This argument is also shared by Uchehara (2008) and Kaya & Warner (2012).
This explanation seems convincing if we take into consideration the deteriorating

52. 52
relations between Turkey and the EU due to the decisions made by France and one other
member state, in 2007 and 2009 respectively, on preventing the opening of certain
chapters to the negotiations. However, Turkey initiated its Africa engagement in early
2005 when EU relations were very strong. Therefore, it can be suggested that Turkey’s
initiative towards Africa was not immediately sparked by disappointment in failing to
join the EU. Nevertheless, this engagement increased Turkey’s leverage not only in
communications with the EU but also in other international foras.
b. Strengths and weaknesses
Former Foreign Minister Davutoğlu (2013a) emphasises focusing on human-oriented
diplomacy, which targets the areas related to the future of whole of humankind:
environment, food and energy. He further claims that “Turkey is determined to be a leader
in the establishment of such an understanding on a global scale”. This policy of Turkey,
including development and humanitarian assistance, has been broadly put into practice in
Africa, where it seems to have been greatly appreciated. Almost all interviewees
commended that humanitarian diplomacy and development assistance is the primary
strength of Turkish engagement. Concentrating not only on emergency needs but also on
the long-term stability issues such as peace, security, social and economic infrastructure,
“Turkey is making [a] difference in people’s lives on the ground”.
An equally important strength of Turkey appears to be its reputation. Almost all
interviewees emphasised that they can regard Turkey’s engagement as sincere and
genuine. Furthermore, Turkey is perceived as being open-minded, transparent, having
goodwill and listening to its African partners. Along with their initial comments on the
honesty of Turkey regarding its motives, some ambassadors did not hesitate to compare

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Turkey favourably with both emerging and traditional partners of Africa. They claimed
that Turkey is not as self-interested as traditional partners and that Africans have, as a
result, “more money in their pockets” when making deals with Turkey. In terms of
emerging partners, one of the ambassadors made an important comment that he would
prefer negotiating with Turkey rather than China or India because the latter two “may
lead you in an undesired direction rather than where you were expecting to go”. While
identifying the absence of a colonial legacy as an asset for Turkey, one of the interviewees
pointed out an alternative reading of it. He argued that, being geographically closer to
former colonisers, to Europe, makes Turkey closer to economic and political aspects of
“African psyche”.
One other finding of the interviews is that, in terms of economic relations, Turkey has
established a good name for itself. Most interviewees pointed out that Turkish products
and services are good quality. The Turkish private sector is considered the “flag of Turkey
in Africa” and “vital for the whole policy”. Furthermore, Turkish businessmen and
investors have a reputation of being risk-takers, more adaptable to African environment
and culture. This explains the substantial interest in both sides doing business together,
as well as the nominal increase in the trade volume between Turkey and Sub-Saharan
Africa.
When it comes to the weaknesses of the engagement, a lack of direct investment from
Turkey was the main grievance expressed by the interviewees. Turkish entrepreneurs are
perceived to be trying to sell their finished goods to Africa, rather than investing on the
continent. One even stated that “we have just businessmen from Turkey not investors”.
In relation to this, an absence of big infrastructure projects undertaken by Turkish

54. 54
businessmen, is also specified as a shortcoming. It is suggested that this type of landmark
projects would contribute to the prestige of the source country.
In this respect, Turkey was unfavourably compared to China, a comparison that, despite
the gulf between Chinese and Turkish engagement, is commonly made. China is cited as
having built symbolic and visible infrastructure in almost all Sub-Saharan African
countries. Some interviewees did accept that Turkey does not have the means to compete
against China. Turkish investment on the other hand seems to be developing at the SMEs
level, which is promising for the future of relations.
When asked how relevant religion and religious ties were to Turkey’s engagement in
Africa, the interviewees provided varied responses. The ambassadors of the two majority
Muslim populated countries sampled said that they consider religion as an asset for
Turkey’s engagement. One of the ambassadors from a mostly Christian populated country
mentioned that the activities of religious Turkish NGOs contribute positively to the image
of Turkey. However, the majority of interviewees claimed that Turkey engages more with
the Muslim countries and communities of the Sub-Saharan Africa. This inclined
approach, as noted by some of the interviewees, is considered to be more evident in
TIKA’s engagements and Turkish government scholarships. In this regard, one remark
of an interviewee, which needs to be taken note of, suggested that the “blurred aspect of
religion is a weakness for the policy. Therefore Turkey's policy needs to be above
suspicion of Islamisation of the continent”.
Some of the interviewees, while justifying this approach as a tool of engagement with
countries of common history and religion, they noted that such attitude estranges the rest

55. 55
of Sub-Saharan Africa from Turkey. In addition, interviewees variously suggested that
“African people do not prioritize religion” and that “religion is not a defining aspect of
people’s choices in the continent”. Therefore, interviews generally concluded that a
“secular approach” is best “when engaging with Sub-Saharan Africa”.
Another weakness mentioned by most interviewees, along with language, is the lack of
knowledge in Turkey about Africa. This deficiency is also commonly mentioned in the
existing literature Uchehara (2008), Wheeler (2011), Özkan (2014;72-125). In contrast,
other emerging partners of Africa are considered to either have the knowledge required
or to be eager to learn. This gap is critical for Turkey’s private sector-based engagement
in Africa. Particularly compared with China, Turkish private businesses are not perceived
as having the expertise and “not interested to learn about the continent”. As the main
reason for this shortfall, interviewees indicated, the absence of adequate academic studies
and departments at Turkish universities. One of the interviewees notably mentioned the
dispute that had arisen at the oldest African Studies Centre9
in Turkey over censorship,
which led to suspension of the Centre’s journal (as cited in İpek & Biltekin, 2013).
c. Progress
Even though the interviewees candidly pointed out the strengths and weaknesses of the
policy, almost all of them consider the engagement as successful so far. They commended
the significantly improved relations between Turkey and Sub-Saharan African countries,
in the areas of development, the establishment of permanent diplomatic presence on both
sides, increased transportation links and more importantly, mutual interest towards one
9
Ankara University Centre for African Studies was established in 2008.

56. 56
another. It was suggested that “Turkey managed successfully bringing in a new breath to
Africa” and that it “has become an alternative engagement for Africans”.
On the other hand, almost all of the interviewees consider the relations are just beginning,
and that both sides are at the “stage of enquiry”. “First steps” have been taken in this
“initial phase” of the partnership and there is still a “long way to go”.
d. Sustainability
When it comes to sustainability, the most important question is whether the engagement
is mutually beneficial as it is portrayed in the official Turkish narrative Babacan (2008),
Gül (2011), Erdoğan (2015). The majority of the interviewees were hesitant to give a
straightforward “yes” as a response when asked if a win-win situation is possible. While
a couple of ambassadors ruled out the prospect of win-win, some suggested that the
engagement would be mutually beneficial if Turkey invests in and establishes factories
in Africa, rather than selling its domestically produced goods. Others argued that it
depends on the negotiation powers of each party, not excluding the possibility of
individual self-interest amongst the African negotiators. This obvious reluctance to
commit to a specific position may be the outcome of past experiences with other partners,
but also attests to the general feeling that Turkey is minding its own economic interests,
same as others.
When the interviewees were reminded of AU representative Dlamini-Zuma’s exceptional
criticism (see page 31) and asked whether Turkey’s engagement policy is running out of
steam, the responses varied. Almost half of the interviewees did not think that there was
a slow down, yet a couple of them emphasized the importance of implementation “to

57. 57
avoid possible future obstacles”. On the other hand, some questioned the effectiveness of
the summit diplomacy by claiming that “it is not always representative, as it was the case
in the last summit, and the relations are essentially carried out at the bilateral level”.
One of the interviewees, ascribed the criticism particularly to a split in the AU and
accused Dlamini-Zuma of being “an agent of [an] outside power, [aiming] to derail [the]
Turkey-Africa partnership”.
In terms of sustainability, the current conflict between the AKP government and Gülen
group (see Chapter II) was raised with the participants, in order to find out whether they
think the dispute would, one way or another, affect Turkey’s Africa engagement policy.
The majority of the interviewees stated that although it was apparently a domestic and
temporary matter, it would create repercussions. Some of them acknowledged that former
President Gül “himself personally recommended them to get in touch with TUSKON”.
While one of the interviewees interestingly made an analogy between the current situation
and destroying the strongest card (with regards to Africa) in a poker game, one other
ambassador mentioned:
“90% of the Turkish investors in Sub-Saharan Africa are related to
TUSKON. Our honorary consuls were members of TUSKON. Those people
have assisted us to attract Turkish investors. After years of official backing,
one day we received a message renouncing our honorary consuls. We had
appointed them after receiving [a] green light from the government. It is
really [a] very difficult situation.”

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Some interviewees pointed out that distinctive and most successful aspect of the Turkish
approach in Africa was its public-private collaboration, but now “this strength has
become a weakness". The dispute is perceived as “risking the achievements so far” and
“it will affect the partnership policy negatively” since replacing it will be hard to do.
While commenting on Turkey, some interviewees also raised criticisms regarding the
African commitment to sustainability. They indicated that, although Turkey doing its best
to engage, the “African side is not clear what to expect from Turkey”. African countries
are perceived as “not coming forward to ask Turkey what they want”. In that sense it was
suggested that the sustainability of the relationship would depend on “how Africa engages
with Turkey”.
Taking into consideration the overall responses of the interviewees, one can suggest that
African states are making realistic inferences regarding the motivations of Turkey for
engaging with Africa. Even so, they don’t seem to have a problem that Turkey’s
engagement is informed by its perceived self-interest and accept it as the rules of the
game. Nevertheless, ‘soft power’ elements of Turkey’s engagement i.e. humanitarian and
development assistance, private sector and NGOs engagement and Turkish Airlines
flights are very well received. On the other hand, Turkey’s lack of capacity to offer
concessional loans that can compete with other emerging partners, limited FDI from
Turkey to Africa, the nature of its religious engagement and Turkey’s ‘knowledge gap’
on Africa are identified as weaknesses. Coherence among Turkish actors is mentioned as
essential to the relationship. The interviewees recognised as well that African countries
have responsibilities for making the partnership work effectively.

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CHAPTER FOUR: SOMALIA
Turkey’s development assistance to Somalia has attracted great attention due to its size,
timing and most importantly its boldness. As detailed in Chapter II, Turkey has allocated
a significant share of its aid budget to Somalia at a time when Al-Shabaab continues to
undermine the fragile stability and limited authority of its government, as well as
threatening any foreign presence in the country. Succeeding in this engagement is
considered to be more important for Turkey, compared to its other bilateral engagements
in Sub-Saharan Africa, since it is arguably using this engagement to elevate itself as an
important political actor (Özkan, 2013b) in the continent. While some analysts explain
this engagement by referring to humanitarian concerns (Erdoğan, 2011) and the virtuous
power paradigm (Harte, 2012), others (Akpınar, 2013) suggest that it was due to the
requirement of adjusting Turkey’s foreign policies that were no longer valid. It is also
claimed that engagement with Somalia targets gaining the votes of conservative-minded
Turkish citizens (Kaya & Warner, 2012). All that makes Somalia exceptional and an
atypical case in the big picture.
In that sense, while it is not a typical case study of Turkish engagement in Africa, its
singular importance means that Turkish engagement in Somalia needs to be analysed
separately. To do so, six interviews were conducted with the Somalis, specifically high-
ranking officials, NGO representatives and academics from both Somalia and the Somali
diaspora community in the UK. They were asked questions about the drivers of Turkish
engagement, its strength and weaknesses, and its sustainability. The same questions were
also posed to the four ambassadors to Turkey from East African countries interviewed,
and their responses are included in the analysis below.

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a. Motives
Turkey’s engagement in Somalia, at least in its initial phase, is perceived by most
interviewees as reflecting a “genuine desire to help”, motivated by humanitarian and
religious concerns. Others however claimed that the policy is driven by “primarily
pragmatic and economic” concerns. To this end, Turkey is seen as trying to create strong
bonds with this strategically important country to improve its business interest in Africa.
Humanitarian and development assistance are said to be “gaining access to raw materials
for its growing industrialization”. On the political side, some interviewees notably
suggested that the “EU’s disinterest on Turkey’s membership on political grounds,
made Turkey want to prove the West, through Somalia, that it can be a key player even
without EU membership.” This corresponds to Davutoğlu’s remarks (2013a) on the
presence of Turkey in Somalia as demonstrating “its capacity for global diplomacy”.
Furthermore, the engagement is seen as an effort by Turkey to increase its soft power
amongst “Muslim/developing and African countries”.
On the other hand, the ambassadors who responded this question mostly claimed that the
engagement is for political rather than economic ends. Turkey is regarded as a “caring
country” for engaging when nobody else has done, and investing in Somalia is not
assumed to bring regional or global power for Turkey. However, two of the ambassadors
mentioned external factors as stimulations to Turkey’s involvement. First, it was claimed
that “IGAD10
approached China, the UK and Turkey and asked them for engaging in
Somalia. While others hesitated, Turkey expressed interest in helping”. Second claim was
10
Established in 1996 among the East African countries, Intergovernmental Authority on
Development focuses on regional development, peace and stability. It has been the key
international organization in producing tangible outcomes in Somalia reconciliation and peace
process (igad.int).

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that, former UN Special Envoy for Somalia (2007-2010) Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah
apparently wanted engaging Muslim countries in Somalia: “He met with the political
leadership in Turkey in 2010. Right after that, Turkish Government decided to host [a]
Somalia conference in Istanbul”. Even though it requires further research to confirm and
determine the impact of the cited dynamics, it seems that various political and economic
drivers, as well as outside factors, have a role in Turkish engagement in the country.
b. Strength and weaknesses
The most common strength, identified by the interviewees, is Turkey’s impartiality and
non-interference in local politics as well as disputes among clans. One of the interviewees
pointed out: “Managing impartiality in Somalia for over four years is no small feat”.
Secondly, and contrary to its overall Africa policy (as discussed in Chapter III), religion
is considered as an asset for Turkish involvement in Somalia. Islam is said to create trust
between the two sides and appeals to the hearts and minds of Somalis. Thirdly, Turkish
development assistance to Somalia has the reputation of being “focused, efficient,
effective and timely”. Presence on the ground enables Turkish agencies to reach out to
many sections of society and its projects are perceived to be solving the everyday
problems of people in the country.
However, the concentration of Turkish assistance in Mogadishu is the main weakness
mentioned by the interviewees, reinforcing the findings of the literature ICG, (2012),
Murphy&Woods, (2014). Due to Mogadishu allegedly being home mainly to one clan
Muthuma, (2007), Musau, (2013), Turkey’s sizable presence in the capital is
experienced as an “unintentional bias” towards one segment of the society. As a result,
other regions outside Mogadishu feel that they are excluded.

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Judging from responses, one may suggest that there is a growing discontent towards the
transparency of Turkey’s dealings with the central government, as well as its motives for
the future. The interviewees questioned the fairness of contracts issued to Turkish
companies for the management of Mogadishu Airport and the Port of Mogadishu. In
addition, while former Foreign Minister Davutoğlu (2013a) talked proudly of the “signs
of Turkey’s presence” in Somalia, the excessive presence of Turkish flags seems to be
creating discomfort among the population. Related to this, “Land plots acquired by
Turkish official and NGO agencies at the most valuable and strategic spots of the city”
are also mentioned to be causing grievances and leading to the “questioning of Turkey's
sincerity”.
In parallel with the previous Chapter, interviewees also raised the lack of knowledge of
Turkey towards Somalia. Turkey is perceived as “not understanding local power
politics”. This confirms the evidences provided by Barrow (cited in Akpınar; 2013) and
Özkan (2014a;80). On the other hand, more than half of the respondents identified
language as a barrier to deepening relations. Few Turkish people on the ground appear to
know English and observers say they are unwilling to learn either Somali or English. This
deficiency was most evident during former Prime Minister Erdoğan’s visit to the country
in August 2011. The speech he delivered in Mogadishu was (consecutively) translated
into Arabic, rather than Somali (kdk.gov.tr). Based on the responses of the interviewees
and existing literature (Hamza; 2014), Arabic is spoken and adequately understood by
only 5% of the population. This hints at a wider issue that Turkey faces in Somalia, that
of communicating its aims to the wider population.

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c. Progress
Regardless of its intention, Turkish engagement is considered to be “very successful”. It
is indicated that Turkey is “ahead of others in the game” and a “win-win situation is
already developing”. Turkey is regarded as an alternative source of development
assistance, which has given Somalia new negotiating power with its traditional donors.
Along with such general satisfaction, one of the participants suggested that Turkey’s
involvement is “helping in Somalia, returning the nationhood”, thanks to the improved
stability in which clan-based warlords are losing power and the grassroots is gaining
strength.
d. Sustainability
In terms of sustainability, both the ambassadors and Somalis predominantly identified the
role of external powers, more than the change in political will of Turkey or the
deterioration of security in Somalia, will define the future of Turkish-Somali relations.
Those powers, it is argued, feel that Turkey is “stealing their show”. They are also seen
as capable of and willing to slow down or even block the partnership. According to
Somalis interviewed, both the UK and the UAE are regarded as “not happy with the
Turkish engagement”. Relations with Ethiopia are also seen as something to keep an eye
on. Ankara-based interviewees also underlined the cooperation with external powers for
sustainability of the engagement.
To conclude, Turkey’s massive involvement in Somalia is considered as a daring attempt
to increase its soft power. Religious and altruistic narratives, without questioning the
sincerity of Turkish decision makers, seem to be the most effective both in gaining the
hearts and minds of Somalis and ensuring public support for the policy in Turkey.

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Although Turkey has effectively managed to stay impartial to clan politics, it has not been
seen to meet the expectations of Somalis outside Mogadishu. On the other hand,
overdoing the extent of its visible public relations appears to be raising concerns in the
Somali community, which has strong nationalist sentiments.
Turkey’s success so far has been broadly acclaimed. However, it seems critical that
Turkey addresses the perceived shortcomings in the policy. In addition, Turkey’s
disproportionate allocation of resources to Somalia, in terms of its GDP, compared to
other donors and influential actors in the country’s politics, means that it may be harder
for Turkey to maintain the level of assistance as other pressures on both its national and
aid budget are increasing.

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CONCLUSION
This research has focused on the motivations and practices of Turkey’s engagement with
Africa, as well as how African actors perceive this policy. The initial impetus for this
engagement can be attributed to global political and economic changes, such as the end
of the bipolar international system and the extensive globalisation of trade and capital
flows. Above all, the engagement should be understood as arising from Turkey’s
domestic political and social transformation, in line with the AKP governments’ proactive
and multi-faceted foreign policy approach. As a result, Turkey initiated an enthusiastic
Africa engagement policy, which was mostly free from any reaction to or setbacks at
other fronts.
Turkey has presented this engagement in win-win terms, rooted in notion of non-colonial,
non-exploitative shared interests. However, one of the most critical findings of the
research is that, according to the most interviewees who took part in this research, Turkey
has engaged with Africa to further its national interests, namely the economic gains and
the political support for advancing its ambitions to become a regional and global power.
Contrary to the official Turkish narrative, a win-win situation is not accepted as given or
probable outcome of the engagement. Nevertheless, the realist African observers
apparently assume self-interest and therefore are not put off by what they perceive as
pragmatism.
Secondly, significant increase in Turkish humanitarian and development assistance to
individual Sub-Saharan African countries, as well as Turkish private sector engagement
and flights to Africa by Turkish Airlines, seem to have provided Turkey with a reputation
as a trustworthy and open-minded partner. To this end, despite the fact that Turkish