Partnerships for Fulfilling Arctic Responsibilities
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Authors: Hon. Sean O’Keefe, Dr. David M. Van Slyke, Mr. Zachary S. Huitink – Syracuse University, and Dr. Trevor L. Brown – The Ohio State University
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Partnerships for Fulfilling Arctic Responsibilities
- 1. Partnerships for Fulfilling Arctic Responsibilities PREPARED FOR THE ARTIC CIRCLE SHIPPING TASK FORCE AND THE UNIVERSITY OF ALASKA Authors: Hon. Sean O’Keefe, Dr. David M. Van Slyke, Mr. Zachary S. Huitink – Syracuse University, and Dr. Trevor L. Brown – The Ohio State University
- 2. US Interests in the Arctic • Protecting and promoting US interests in the Arctic is a matter of national security - President’s National Security Strategy, 2015 • US interests in the Arctic: - Sovereign - Strategic - Economic & Commercial - Environmental & Scientific
- 3. National Security Concerns • The President’s 2015 National Security Strategy emphasizes three key challenges relevant to the Arctic: 1. Access to Shared Spaces 2. Energy Security 3. Climate Change * See the President’s National Security Strategy, 2015
- 4. Economic Imperatives • Economic imperatives in the Arctic: - 30% of the world’s undiscovered natural gas - 13% of the world’s undiscovered oil - $1 trillion in minerals - 118 percent increase in maritime transit from 2008-2012 - 1 million tons of cargo shipped in 2012 *Figures from the Coast Guard’s 2013 Arctic Strategy document
- 5. US Arctic Policy • US policy calls for a comprehensive national strategy toward the Arctic, along three lines of effort: 1. Advance US security interests 2. Pursue responsible Arctic region stewardship 3. Promote international cooperation *See the US National Strategy for the Arctic Region, 2013
- 6. Need for Icebreaker Capabilities • Icebreaking capabilities are essential for fulfilling Arctic responsibilities • Icebreakers offer: - Mobility - Interoperability - Resilience to harsh conditions
- 7. Icebreaker Capability Gap *Source: US Coast Guard, Office of Waterways and Ocean Policy, 2014 40 7 6 6 5 4 1 Russia Finland Sweden Canada USA Denmark China Size of Icebreaker Fleet (Currently Operational)
- 8. Current Acquisition Strategy • The current strategy involves a 10-year, $1B program to buy a new icebreaker with USCG appropriations • Drawbacks to a “traditional procurement” strategy: - Considerable time for development and production - Unresponsive to changes in the operating environment - Cost prohibitive given demands on USCG acquisition budget - Potentially more expensive than an alternative approach, esp. if USCG procured, crewed, and maintained
- 9. Alternative Acquisition Strategies • Several examples demonstrate the feasibility and potential advantages of alternative strategies to acquire maritime assets • Potential advantages of an alternative acquisition strategy: - Faster fielding time - More responsive to a changing operating environment - Potentially less expensive than a traditional procurement
- 10. Example Alternative Strategies Canadian Coast Guard The Canadian Coast Guard uses lease chartering to to acquire buoy tending and channel clearing services in the St. Lawrence Seaway. National Science Foundation NSF used a lease charter arrangement to acquire an ice-capable research vessel constructed to a detailed set of requirements and performance specifications.
- 11. Example Alternative Strategies Military Sealift Command/OPDS The Military Sealift Command (MSC) used a lease charter in to acquire a new offshore petroleum discharge system (OPDS) tanker built off a commercial platform. SOCOM/Military Sealift Command The US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) uses lease charters to acquire privately owned vessels that support highly demanding maritime security and defense missions.
- 12. Analysis of Alternatives Baseline Approach: Traditional Procurement Strategy Alternative #1: Retrofit Existing Asset Alternative #2: Lease Charter Alternative #3: Broader Intergovernmental Partnership Alternative #4: Bi-National Partnership
- 14. Evaluation Criteria - Technical feasibility - Agility - Mission scope/trade-offs - Life cycle cost - User efficacy - Budgetary considerations - Interoperability - Statutory permissibility - Value for money
- 15. Traditional Procurement Potential Pros ◦ - Mission scope and trade-offs ◦ - User efficacy ◦ - Interoperability ◦ - Statutory permissibility ◦ - Value for money Potential Cons ◦ - Technical feasibility ◦ - Agility ◦ - Life cycle cost ◦ - Budgetary considerations USCGC Polar Star Number of Acquirers: One — USCG Type of Process: Traditional – Buy New Asset Asset Mix: Single Asset with Multi- Mission Functionality
- 16. Retrofit Existing Asset Potential Pros ◦ - Technical feasibility ◦ - Life cycle cost ◦ - Budgetary considerations ◦ - Statutory permissibility Potential Cons ◦ - Mission scope and trade-offs ◦ - User efficacy ◦ - Interoperability ◦ - Agility ◦ - Value for money Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) Fast Response Cutter (OPC) Number of Acquirers: One — USCG Type of Process: Traditional – Buy Retrofit Asset Asset Mix: Single Asset with Multi- Mission Functionality (as permitted by a “parent craft” design) OR Multi-Asset Mix
- 17. Lease Charter Potential Pros ◦ - Technical feasibility ◦ - User efficacy ◦ - Agility ◦ - Life cycle cost ◦ - Value for money Potential Cons ◦ - Mission scope and trade-offs ◦ - Interoperability ◦ - Budgetary considerations (OMB scoring rules?) ◦ - Statutory permissibility (restrictions on leasing?) Nathaniel B. Palmer Number of Acquirers: One – USCG Type of Process: Non-Traditional – Lease Charter Asset Mix: Single Asset with Multi- Mission Functionality OR Multi-Asset Mix
- 18. Bi-National Partnership Potential Pros ◦ - Technical feasibility ◦ - User efficacy ◦ - Budgetary considerations ◦ - Statutory permissibility ◦ - Value for money Potential Cons ◦ - Mission scope and trade-offs ◦ - Interoperability ◦ - Agility ◦ - Life cycle cost CCGS John G. Diefenbaker Number of Acquirers: One – USCG Type of Process: Traditional – Buy Asset based on Foreign Design Asset Mix: Single Asset with Multi- Mission Functionality
- 19. Broader Intra- governmental Partnership Potential Pros ◦ - Mission scope and trade- offs ◦ - Interoperability ◦ - Agility ◦ - Life cycle cost ◦ - Value for money Potential Cons ◦ - Technical feasibility ◦ - User efficacy ◦ - Budgetary considerations ◦ - Statutory permissibility Number of Acquirers: One – USCG OR Multiple – USCG, NSF, NOAA, USN, etc. Type of Process: Non-traditional – Intra-Governmental PPP Asset Mix: Single Asset with Multi- mission Functionality (as permitted by a “parent craft” design) OR Multi- Asset Mix
- 20. Analytical Summary Procurement Retrofit Lease Charter Broader PPP Bi-National Partnership Technical Feasibility X X Mission Scope/Trade-Offs X X X User Efficacy X X Interoperability X X X Agility X X X Life Cycle Cost X X Budgetary Considerations X X X Statutory Permissibility X X Value for Money X
- 21. Conclusion • Acquiring icebreakers to support US Arctic missions is increasingly a matter of national security • Traditional procurement takes too long—alternative strategies are faster and may be less expensive (esp. given gov’t costs to crew, homeport, maintain, etc.) • Not all Arctic missions—including ice operations—are inherently governmental • Depending on mission priorities, there are several alternative ways to fulfill responsibilities in the Arctic
Editor's Notes
- American interests in the Arctic include basic sovereign imperatives to preserve territorial integrity and maintain the welfare of the Arctic-based US population, as well as interests stemming from historically unprecedented environmental, economic, and geopolitical trends. Artic ice continues to recede at a record pace, expanding opportunities for commerce, tourism, scientific inquiry, and access to a significant volume of the world’s natural resources. Combined, these opportunities make the Arctic strategically important for several major powers – the United States included.
- As laid out in the President’s 2015 National Security Strategy, the Arctic region figures importantly into US national security policy, and is especially relevant to three national security challenges: - First, Access to Shared Spaces—ensuring free traverse of Arctic waters and skies - Second, Energy Security—harnessing the Arctic’s energy potential while preventing energy-related conflict - Third, Climate Change—addressing the security challenges posed by the Arctic’s changing climate patterns
- The Arctic is home to a significant volume of the world’s natural resources and, as the above figures suggest, it is an increasingly active region in terms of maritime traffic and commerce.
- Safeguarding and promoting US interests in the Arctic requires a comprehensive national policy that ensures ongoing American access to the Arctic region; that incorporates the Arctic into American national and homeland security strategies; that provides for responsible stewardship of the Arctic ecosystem; and that otherwise promotes international cooperation and keeps the Arctic free from conflict. Current US policy toward the Arctic is appropriately centered on a comprehensive approach that combines the diplomatic, security, regulatory, and scientific capabilities of the federal government with capabilities of partners in state government, local government, and the private sector. US Missions in the Arctic include 9 of the 11 Coast Guard statutory missions: - Ice Operations - Search and Rescue - Marine Safety - Marine Environmental Protection - Ports, Waterways, & Coastal Security - Marine Resource Protection - Defense Readiness - Aids to Navigation - Other Law Enforcement The other two missions—Drug Interdiction and Migrant interdiction—could arise in transit to or from the Arctic
- Unpredictable demand for a range of services make icebreakers one of the most important instruments for implementing US Arctic policy. Icebreakers afford the US year-round, as needed regional access to the Arctic. Icebreakers allow for unimpeded mobility in an ice-laden environment, and can operate in conjunction with other assets (e.g., helicopters) to perform a variety of missions in harsh, remote conditions for which it is otherwise too difficult and too cost prohibitive to maintain a large shore-based infrastructure. That said, not all Arctic missions—including ice operations—are inherently governmental. Depending on mission priorities, there are alternative ways to meet icebreaking requirements. Given its current icebreaking capabilities, the US will be increasingly strained to fulfill even a narrow set of mission responsibilities
- This chart compares the size of US and select foreign icebreaker fleets. Total fleet numbers count only existing vessels (i.e., the totals exclude counts of ships currently under construction or in the planning phase), but for comparison purposes the counts include existing vessels from both the public and private sectors. Except for the US, each country in the chart is a party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The US fleet count includes five vessels owned or operated by the federal government (Polar Star, Healy, Palmer, and Gould) plus one vessel operated by a private sector entity (Aiviq—leased by the Royal Dutch Shell Corporation). In the next several years, some multi-national energy companies expect to have more icebreakers than the USCG. The US icebreaker fleet includes the same or fewer ships than the fleets of other Arctic nations with smaller territorial claims (e.g., Finland). Overall, this small fleet lacks the versatility to support the US strategy. Potential geopolitical rivals are more adequately providing capabilities needed to realize their aspirations in the Arctic. The Russian government owns all six of its country’s highest powered icebreakers (BHP ≥ 45,000)—each nuclear powered. The US is currently the only other country possessing the highest powered ships according to the criteria used in US government classification tables (i.e., ships with BHP ≥ 45,000, which in the US includes the Polar Star and Polar Sea, each of which is government owned and the latter of which is currently inactive). The Canadian government owns all six of its country’s ships, the Chinese government owns its country’s single existing ship (and will own a second ship currently under construction), and the Finnish and Swedish governments own four of the ships in their fleets. Denmark’s fleet is entirely privately owned.
- The current strategy to upgrade US icebreaker capabilities involves a 10-year program to buy a new, multi-mission vessel at an estimated per unit procurement cost of $1 billion (based on calculations in the USCG’s Polar Platform Business Case Analysis; note: this is a per unit procurement cost figure based on a program to buy 1 ship). The new ship would likely be similar in size and capability to one of the Coast Guard’s existing icebreakers, Polar Star. CRS reports that the Coast Guard initiated efforts to acquire the ship in FY 2013, indicating at that time that it planned to award a construction contract within five years, and to take delivery of the ship within 10 years. In ensuing budgets (FY 15 and FY 16), however, the Coast Guard made no indication as to when it would award a construction contract or take delivery of a ship, and both current and projected future year funding requests tapered off considerably (or are not available) in the FY 15 and FY 16 budget submissions. Thus, according to CRS, the timing and execution of the modernization program are “increasingly uncertain.” The current strategy – centered on designing, building, and buying a new asset through the traditional acquisition process – has four major drawbacks. - First, a traditional procurement takes considerable time (in this case, a decade from start to finish), but the exigencies of the situation demand a more rapid response. The US will be seriously challenged to realize its policy objectives in the Arctic – and will be forced to continue relying on tenuous stop-gap measures – unless it can more quickly field an icebreaker capability. - Second, a traditional procurement may not give the US the kind of flexibility it needs to respond to changes in the operating environment. The Coast Guard envisions using a newly acquired vessel for decades, during which conditions in the Arctic could change in ways that make the ship’s capabilities less relevant. - Third, a traditional procurement is cost prohibitive given current demands on USCG acquisition funding. - Fourth, a traditional procurement could be more expensive than alternative strategies given its relatively high total ownership costs (i.e., costs stemming not only from procurement, but also from factors such as having to hold a de-commissioned ship)
- Several examples illustrate the feasibility and the potential advantages of a non-traditional approach to acquiring icebreaker capabilities for use in the Arctic. Advantages of an alternative approach are at least three. - First, an alternative strategy may involve much shorter fielding times – especially if executed outside the confines of federal acquisition regulations. Thus, it may more quickly deliver a needed capability to end users. - Second, an alternative strategy may be more agile given an unpredictable operating environment. Thus, it may better ensure that end users have access to a capability with ongoing relevance to the mission requirements. - Third, an alternative strategy may prove less expensive than a traditional procurement, especially after accounting for the total ownership costs associated with a purchase. Thus, it may free up resources for other priorities.
- The analytical framework classifies alternative acquisition strategies along three dimensions: - First, number of acquirers: does the strategy involve one acquirer, such as the US Coast Guard, or does it involve multiple acquirers, as in a partnership approach that includes the Coast Guard and other federal agencies and departments with mission responsibilities in the Arctic (e.g., the NSF, NOOA, and/or the Navy)? - Second, type of process: does the strategy involve a traditional process – one that must accord with the full suite of rules and regulations governing federal acquisition (e.g., procurement of a new or retrofit asset, or an asset designed by a partner nation) – or a non-traditional process that can proceed largely outside these rules (e.g., a lease charter or another type of public-private partnership)? - Third, asset mix: does the strategy involve acquiring one asset with multi-mission functionality, or acquiring an asset focused more solely on breaking ice and coupling it with other ice-capable assets to perform substantive missions (defense readiness, freedom of navigation, marine environmental protection, etc.)?
- Technical feasibility: does the strategy entail relatively high technology development risks and production challenges? Mission scope/trade-offs: does the strategy support the full set of expected Arctic mission requirements? To the extent it supports fewer rather than more requirements, does it compensate by offering benefits such as lower expense or a faster fielding time? User efficacy: does the strategy incorporate or respond to user needs better than other alternatives (i.e., holding mission scope constant, does the strategy produce assets that (i) actually do the missions better than other alternatives, and/or (ii) get assets into the end user’s hands faster)? Interoperability: does the strategy produce vessels that are interoperable with other assets (e.g., helicopters)? Agility: does the strategy permit the Coast Guard (or another end user) to quickly and flexibly adapt to variation in mission demands, or risk lock-in to a solution that cannot be easily modified to reflect new operational circumstances? Life cycle cost: does the strategy entail relatively high life cycle costs? Budgetary considerations: does the strategy allow for spreading expenses over multiple budget cycles, or must its full cost be accounted for in a shorter time window (e.g., in a single budget submission, as current OMB rules require for capital leasing)? Statutory permissibility: does the strategy accord with existing laws and regulations governing federal acquisition, or does it currently lack the enabling legislation necessary to make it a workable alternative? Value for money: relative to its expense, does the strategy offer taxpayers good value in terms of efficiency and effectiveness of mission performance? For example, while a traditional procurement is costly on the schedule side (current estimate is 10 years/$1bn for one heavy ice breaker), at the end of ten years the USCG would have one ice breaker that it owns. Under a traditional 10-year lease charter, the USCG would not have any ownership rights to a leased ice breaking vessel. One alternative is the extent to which a PPP would have some USCG ownership equity.
- A traditional procurement—the “baseline approach”—involves one acquirer (USCG) using a traditional process to buy a single asset with multi-mission functionality. The current plan is to buy a heavy icebreaker similar to the Polar Star. Potential Pros: A traditional procurement would give the Coast Guard (or another federal entity, like the Navy) a high degree of control over a new icebreaker’s capabilities and design. Accordingly, relative to at least some of the alternatives, this strategy permits a broad mission scope and limits the need to make trade-offs among different mission capabilities, implying (or at least increasing the likelihood of) higher user efficacy. Greater ability to define the asset’s capabilities and control its design also means it can be more readily configured to operate with other assets (e.g., helicopters, planes, other ships). Insofar as this strategy would be executed through DHS’s existing acquisition process, it does not present any significant legal impediments or lack enabling legislation. While this strategy could prove more expensive than others, it would arguably offer taxpayers good value for money given the new ship’s capability to perform a broad scope of missions. In addition, given the USCG’s reputation for extending and maximizing the life of its assets, they could potentially leverage 30-40 years of operations from this owned vessel. Potential Cons: As with most complex products, acquiring a new, multi-mission icebreaker asset would likely involve incurring a significant degree of technology development and production risk (i.e., risk stemming from “product uncertainty”), as well as risk stemming from lock-in to a particular vendor or team of vendors tasked with building the asset (i.e., risk from “asset specificity,” which may be especially likely if the asset includes proprietary technology). A traditional procurement strategy could also risk lock-in to a solution that may become less effective at achieving missions given changes in the operating environment, or that cannot feasibly or cost effectively accommodate a highly diverse mission set. In other words, an asset acquired through a traditional procurement process could prove less agile than assets acquired through other approaches, including approaches that may permit the government to transfer some of this risk to the private sector (e.g., lease charters). Finally, a traditional procurement may entail higher life cycle costs (i.e., procurement costs + costs driven by factors like crewing, maintenance, and holding a decommissioned ship) than alternative strategies, and is cost prohibitive given the current state of the USCG’s acquisition budget.
- A retrofit involves one acquirer using a traditional process to acquire either (i) a single asset with multi-mission functionality or (ii) an asset dedicated more exclusively to icebreaking, coupled with other ice-capable assets to perform substantive missions (e.g., defense readiness, marine environmental protection, etc.). Potential Pros: Compared to procuring a new asset, a retrofit strategy may entail less technology development and production risk. Facilities would likely already be in place, and the relevant vendor(s) would have knowledge of and experience with the underlying technology and production process. Thus, while this approach probably entails lock-in to a given industry partner, the risks stemming from this relationship may be less than in a situation where the government tried to buy something new (since, in that case, product uncertainty would be higher). A retrofit might also entail lower life cycle costs (i.e., procurement costs + costs driven by factors like crewing, maintenance, and holding a decommissioned ship) than a program to buy a new asset. Insofar as the government would buy a retrofit asset within the confines of federal acquisition regulations, this alternative does not confront any significant statutory impediments. Potential Cons: Since this alternative contemplates modifying an asset already sold to commercial customers or to a government customer representing a different program, it may entail more restrictions on mission scope, less ability to operate in conjunction with other assets, and less agility in the face of a changing operating environment. If pursued, this alternative would likely require end users and their representatives to make more trade-offs with respect to mission capabilities, forgo a degree of interoperability, and accept risks stemming from lesser agility. To the extent the alternative involves converting an asset ultimately suited for a different mission, it may deliver less value for taxpayers
- A lease charter involves one acquirer using a non-traditional process (here, a leasing arrangement) to acquire either (i) a single multi-mission asset or (ii) an asset dedicated more exclusively to icebreaking, coupled with other ice-capable assets to perform substantive missions (e.g., defense readiness, marine environmental protection, etc.). Potential Pros: Depending on the exact nature of the arrangement, a lease charter could entail less technology development and production risk—especially if it involves an existing asset. Insofar as a leasing arrangement could be executed outside federal acquisition rules, it would likely entail a significantly shorter fielding time—a plus for user efficacy. Lease chartering might also permit a degree of agility the government would not benefit from if it were to buy a new or a retrofit asset. Insofar as the government can more readily enter and exit relationships with different lessors (and, accordingly, can mix and match both assets and crewing models to meet its needs), risks stemming from unforeseen changes in the operating environment may be borne more by industry. Market forces could, in fact, compel vendors to make agility and responsiveness to variable or extreme operating conditions a part of their value proposition. For a variety of reasons (such as the absence of legacy costs incurred through an outright purchase), a lease charter might also prove less expensive than buying either a new or a retrofit asset. A lease charter could also provide better value for taxpayers dollars, especially if it frees up Coast Guard personnel and other resources that can be devoted to more inherently governmental functions Potential Cons: Compared to a traditional procurement, especially of a new asset, a lease charter could involve more restrictions on mission scope, a greater need to make trade-offs among competing missions, and less interoperability with other air and sea assets. These drawbacks, however, would likely vary depending on the identity of the lessor, the nature of the asset being leased, and other aspects of the arrangement (e.g., a commercial lessor could build and lease a new asset that accommodates a number of the government’s mission requirements; leasing an existing vessel from a foreign government, on the other hand, would probably mean much greater restrictions on mission scope). Current rules require scoring the full expense of a lease up front, and limit lease terms to 5 yrs. However, Congress has recently expressed more interest in USCG pursuing leasing arrangements, and other federal entities (e.g., NSF, USN) have managed to work around the term restriction rule. With a lease charter, the government does not have any ownership equity rights at the conclusion of a lease.
- A bi-national partnership involves the US and an ally entering an agreement through which the US would buy a new icebreaker built off a foreign vessel design Potential Pros: This strategy involves buying a ship based on a mature, established design, making it more technically feasible than strategies where the USCG and its industry partners would “start from scratch” (e.g., as in a “traditional procurement”) Working with an established design would significantly reduce the time needed for requirements generation, meaning the ship could be fielded faster (a plus for user efficacy). Since the strategy involves a purchase rather than a lease, there is no need to score the full expense upfront The Coast Guard has previously purchased ships based on foreign designs (e.g., the Sentinel Class Fast Response Cutter—built off a design used to construct patrol boats for the South African Coast Guard), implying that this strategy is well within the bounds of statutory permissibility. The Canadian Coast Guard’s Polar-Class Ice Breaker, the Diefenbaker, is designed by VARD Marine, Inc., the same firm which the USCG has contracted for the design of its Off-Shore Patrol Cutter. The Royal Canadian Navy has also moved toward procuring 6-8 icebreaking vessels as part of its Harry DeWolf-class offshore patrol vessel which is thought to be based on a Norwegian Svalbard class design (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harry_DeWolf-class_offshore_patrol_vessel). Combined, the relatively lower technical risk and faster fielding time may make this strategy especially attractive from a taxpayer value perspective Potential Cons: To the extent a foreign design does not support all the requirements the US needs in its icebreakers, this strategy could impose some restrictions on mission scope A ship based on a foreign design could also prove more challenging to operate in conjunction with other air and sea assets As with a purchase of a newly designed asset, buying a ship based on a foreign design may make the Coast Guard less agile in the face of a changing operating environment. As with a purchase of a newly designed asset, buying a ship based on a foreign design may also entail relatively high life cycle costs.
- A broader partnership approach involves either one acquirer or multiple acquirers using a non-traditional process (here, some broader type of public-private partnership arrangement) to acquire either (i) a single asset with multi-mission functionality or (ii) an asset dedicated more exclusively to icebreaking, coupled with other ice-capable assets to perform substantive missions (e.g., defense readiness, marine environmental protection, etc.). Potential Pros: On account of involving multiple partners, this alternative would most likely involve an asset (or, potentially, multiple assets) with broad mission scope and relatively little need to make trade-offs among different mission capabilities. Likewise, the asset or assets in question would necessarily have a significant degree of interoperability. Depending on how the arrangement is structured (e.g., through a lease charter), it could also provide a degree of agility not available in either a traditional procurement or a retrofit approach. This approach may also prove less expensive than buying an asset and, insofar as it could still accommodate a broad mission scope, could offer strong value for taxpayer resources. The USCG could retain an equity stake or require asset transfer after the concession period ends (i.e., 25-30 years). Potential Cons: Even if structured using a lease or some other approach that does not involve an outright purchase, this alternative could involve building one or more new assets rather than making use of existing assets. Especially if multiple parties are involved, the new asset or assets (even if planned mostly for icebreaking purposes, as in a multi-asset mix scenario) could succumb to requirements creep—thus creating problems with technical feasibility. There may also be a fair amount of uncertainty as to how this alternative would be treated from a budgetary or scorekeeping standpoint. Most types of public-private partnership arrangements are either subject to very strict statutory control, or simply lack the enabling legislation necessary for implementation. Again, however, to the extent Congress has recently shown more interest in leasing arrangements, statutory permissibility need not be viewed as an insurmountable hurdle.
- For the purposes of this exercise, alternative strategies were only classified positively or negatively with respect to the evaluation criteria. No scale (e.g., 1-5) underlies the criteria, and one criterion did not receive more weight than others. Thus, the analysis arrives at no explicit or implicit recommendation for one approach versus another. It only offers an analytical framework and set of factors to consider in vetting different strategies, and applies the framework and the factors to a preliminary set of strategies. For the sake of furthering differentiating and comparing the alternatives, it may prove useful to (i) score each alternative on a 1-5 scale corresponding to each evaluation criterion (e.g., assign traditional procurement a technical feasibility score of “1” or “2”, a mission scope/trade-offs score of “4” or “5”, and so on), then (ii) calculate a total score for each alternative. An alternative’s total score could be calculated by simply adding the individual 1-5 scores for each criterion—implying that the criteria are weighted equally—or the score could be calculated after assigning differential weights to each criterion according to which is considered more vs. less important. Using this latter method, an alternative’s total score would be calculated by first multiplying each individual 1-5 score by its corresponding weight, then adding the resulting products (i.e., adding together the numbers that result from multiplying the individual scores by their respective weights).