This is a series of reading responses I wrote from September 2012 to December 2012 while at CUNY for a labor studies course led by Professor Ian MacDonald, currently at University of Montreal. I am posting them in one document as a set of concept pieces. I may eventually publish a revised version with a full list of bibliographic sources. New articles based on these concept pieces may also follow.

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LABR 601: Labor and Globalization
Professor Ian Thomas MacDonald
Autumn 2012 semester (CUNY Labor Studies)
Stephen Cheng
Reading response for September 4, 2012
The papers by William K. Tabb, Hugo Radice, and David Harvey all engage with
globalization from left-wing perspectives grounded in an understanding of issues related
to political economy. Tabb, Radice, and Harvey all discuss the relationship between
globalization and capitalism – more precisely, they discuss globalization in relation to the
developments of capitalism. Concerning the latter sort of discussion, Tabb locates the
conditions for the current era of globalization in specific political and economic processes
that initially unfolded within the framework of nation-states before leading to a more
“global” system of capitalism (strictly speaking the capitalist system has tended to be a
global one from the beginning but in recent decades it has taken on a more global
appearance). Radice, for instance, points to the transition from the Keynesian and social
democratic modes of capitalism and the onset of the neoliberal variant in statements such
as this one,
“Indeed, the leaders of international business and international finance have almost without
exception lauded and sustained the abandonment of welfare-state Keynesianism in favour of what
we now call ‘neoliberalism’. Since 1970, we have seen the shift from Keynesianism to
monetarism; the breakdown of Bretton Woods; the Reagan/Thatcher assault on labour, the
welfare state,and public ownership; and more recently the apparent resurgence of ‘flexible,’
‘Anglo-Saxon’ capitalism as against ‘Eurosclerosis’ and East Asian ‘croneyism’. All of these
may be experienced, from a national perspective within each country, as victories of right over
left, market over state,capital over labour; but it is the practices of international business, the core
economics and politics of globalization, that have transmitted, reproduced and refined these
shifts.” (p. 2)
Tabb, Radice, and Harvey set forth the general argument that the development of
globalization is anything but “natural” or “predetermined” – instead, and to recapitulate
again, globalization (and also capitalism) grew out of historically specific and concrete
social, political and economic conditions. Radice traces those conditions back to the
economic “stagflation” crisis of the 1970s. Likewise, Tabb writes about similar trends,
noting the abandonment of nationalist political economy in favor of an increasingly
multinational or international model. The developments which Radice and Tabb point to
vis-à-vis the increasingly apparent global form of contemporary capitalism (i.e.,
capitalism since the 1970’s) reflect Harvey’s own insights on the structural tendencies of
capitalist accumulation to be dynamic and ever-expanding (in his words, “inevitably
expansionary”). Such dynamism and expansion necessarily means that the accumulation
of capital will likely entail the surpassing of most boundaries, including the borders of
nation-states. In a more abstract and theoretical way, Harvey underscores Radice and
Tabb’s points.

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The perspectives of the authors are indicative of the apparent and actual link
between globalization and capitalism. These authors certainly argue in favor of the
existence of such a link. One cannot discuss globalization without discussing capitalism,
and vice versa. Thus, what are the implications? The implications are that the decades-old
and contemporary form of global capitalism, or capitalist globalization, is a continually
unfolding process that is informed by the constantly dynamic logic of capitalist
accumulation. In concrete geographic terms, the inexorable march of an ever-globalizing
capitalism meant the abandonment of the boundaries of nation-states and, before that, the
boundaries of the countryside, the towns, the cities, et cetera. To be sure, limits exist such
as ecological boundaries (as can be seen by increasingly serious environmental problems
such as global warming).
Yet with the constant development of capitalism, the existence of limits can only
mean the inevitability of a clash between capitalist growth on one hand and the limits for
the expansion of capitalism on the other. The results include anything but a stable
existence for capitalism. Instead, one can only expect a systemic tendency for capitalist
socioeconomic crisis to occur (the ongoing world economic crisis which began five years
ago is a stark and current example), to say nothing of burgeoning rich-poor divisions
(which make up a concrete example of the general law of capitalist accumulation at
work) and class struggles. Given the global contours of contemporary capitalism, these
problems exist not merely at the level of nation-states but also on a world level.
Note: Leaving aside the extensive quotation of Hugo Radice’s paper, my own writing for
this response amounts to 558 words.
Reading response for September 11, 2012
William Robinson, David Harvey, and Stephen Gill tackle the development of
capitalism since the 1970’s in different but complementary terms. While Robinson writes
about a global or transnational form of capitalism that had established itself, Harvey and
Gill write about the ascendancy of a neo-liberal mode of capitalism. Adjectives such as
“global,” “transnational,” and “neo-liberal” are certainly more helpful for understanding
the historical, recent, and current developments of capitalism as opposed to more
nebulous and vague terms such as “globalization” (the previous class discussion on Sept.
4 leads us to ask, whenever we confront the word “globalization,” “What does
globalization mean? The globalization of what?”). Concrete examples such as
downsizing, deregulation, privatization, financialization, pro-wealthy tax reductions, and
the casualization of employment are all examples of how the global and neo-liberal
variant of capitalism works. Additionally, the global and neo-liberal characteristics of
contemporary capitalism come together when economic policies aimed at deregulation
(and thus the enabling of “free markets” to exist and operate) such as the dismantling
protectionist measures contribute to the increase in the level of international trade
(whether in commodities or in fictitious capital such as stocks, bonds, foreign exchange,
etc.).

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Yet, turning to the implicit questions from the previous class discussion which I
mentioned in parentheses, what does globalization mean? More precisely, what does the
globalization of capitalism mean? How and why does it work? Robinson provides
answers to the question of how in his work on the theory of global capitalism (not to
mention “critical globalization studies”) by examining the history of capitalism’s
development from its competitive form to its corporate and Keynesian variant to its
present-day global and neo-liberal version and the integration of Latin America into the
world capitalist system via economic restructuring (i.e. loans from the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank, privatization, deregulation, etc.). One historical
example from the Latin American political-economic context is the Uruguay Round of
the negotiations for the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade during the 1980’s,
which included among its contractual provisions “freedom of investment and capital
movements,” “liberalization of services, including banks,” and “free movement of goods”
(p. 18). The globalization of capitalism works through neo-liberalization. But why?
Harvey, citing one anecdotal example, writes, “When US Steel changed its name to USX
(purchasing strong stakes in insurance) the chairman of the board, James Roderick,
replied to the question ‘What is X?’ with the simple answer ‘X stands for money.’” (p.
32)
Roderick’s rhetorical question and answer are worth noting because his words
point to the fundamental goal behind the various processes (i.e. deregulation, tax
reduction, privatization, “free trade,” financialization, employment casualization, etc.)
that contribute to the existence and functioning of global, neo-liberal capitalism. The
accumulation of money, which is an abstract form of wealth (obviously not my original
idea, although I will certainly cite the source for my research paper in this course), is the
main priority for all of these processes that anybody would deem to be part and parcel,
rather common, of capitalism today. To say the least, the accumulation of money, or
capital accumulation, does not factor into neoclassical and neo-liberal theoretical
understandings of political economy given that money itself has no essential role to play.
However, Keynesian and Marxian theoretical perspectives, despite their major
differences (Keynesian and neoclassical economics ultimately share the same
fundamental premises), do place importance on the role of money. Although I have
shifted the topic and I am concluding my response all too soon, clearly an understanding
of money, its functions, and its purposes is important for understanding how and why the
neo-liberal “globalization” of capitalism began.
Reading response for October 2, 2012
The writings by Ronaldo Munck and Beverly J. Silver deal with the growing
capitalization and commodification (both processes which are complementary and
mutually reciprocal. Indeed, perhaps it can be said that commodification is a process that
occurs within capitalism) of society. Munck focuses on the work of Karl Polanyi and its
theoretical significance. Silver touches on the trends and developments of capitalism
from the mid-twentieth century to the present day, thus tracking the processes (or fixes)
that facilitated the transition from a Keynesian form of capitalism to a neo-liberal form.
Both of their discussions complement each other since the globalization of capitalism has

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been and still is associated with the ascendancy of neo-liberalism. Putting one and one
together, it becomes evident that global neo-liberal capitalism includes, indeed entails
and needs, the “marketization” of many aspects of society and thus people’s lives and
relationships. Commodification is therefore a global process as well – a process that
affects myriad societies.
But how and why did the above processes (i.e. capitalization, commodification,
etc.) take on global dimensions? In previous reading responses, I wrote about the
transition from a state-led form of capitalism (i.e. Keynesianism, Third World Stalinism,
social democracy, etc.) to the neo-liberal variant during the 1970s. Silver also touches on
that transition and in so doing she writes about the “golden age” that was the United
States’ economic boom – a period that began from the 1950s, continued through the
1960s, and ended because of the combined stagnation and inflation crisis and the
resultant neo-liberal economic policies (policies meant to be solutions) that were the
prominent products of that crisis. Additionally, she underscores that, in fact, the policies
toward neo-liberalization were actually in the works since the 1950s and 1960s (p. 158).
The preparations for a transformation within capitalism were already set in place ahead of
time.
None of the above is meant to promote a “conspiracy theory” (or “conspiracist”)
perspective. Rather, it is meant to underscore the core imperative of capitalism, which is
the realization of surplus value in monetary form. To use a briefer term that is being used
in the “Labor and Globalization” class, capital accumulation. Contra what mainstream
economists think, capitalism is not a more advanced system of barter but instead a system
aimed at valorization (or self-valorization). Valorization is only possibly through the
realization of more value (hence surplus value), which can only take place with money.
In more concrete historical terms (terms which are also present-day conditions), the state-
led capitalism that lasted from the 1950s to the 1970s and the neo-liberal version of
capitalism that became prominent and dominant from the 1970s to the present day were
all aimed at fulfilling the key imperative that informs the purpose and operations of any
capitalist system: the monetary realization of value and surplus value, thus allowing for
successful commodity exchange, legitimating and enabling commodity production
(commodity production does not primarily exist to produce commodities, but rather to
make valorization via commodity exchange possible. Commodities, in an important way,
are a means to an end), and necessitating the simultaneous existence of a consumer base
(i.e. consumer culture, advertising, marketing, etc.) and a wage labor force. The former
has existed under both state-led and neo-liberal capitalism (the Keynesian social compact,
in the case of the former, helped create a consumer base via high wages and generous
state and private benefits whereas in the latter case, one always witnesses the constant
hand-wringing by concerned critics as to the deluge of advertising and marketing that
people face in everyday life). Finally, of course, working classes have existed in both
forms of capitalism.
By way of a brief concluding sentence, Polanyi’s paradigm, as defined by this
statement, “A market economy can exist only in a market society” (cited in Munck’s
article, p. 177), thus holds true. As a matter of fact, it is a fundamental concept.

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Reading response for October 9, 2012
The class session for October 9 deals with the relationship between globalization
(more exactly, the neo-liberal globalization of capitalism). On this topic, the readings by
Michael Goldfield and Kim Moody are relevant because they describe the process in
which the US labor movement became weaker. The basic, general question is: What were
the conditions that led to the weakening of the labor movement (and not just in the US
but also in other advanced capitalist nation-states)?
The direct answer is: the cheapening of labor power despite the power of the
unions and the Keynesian and social democratic measures which had kept capital in
check (or allowed for “labor-capital” peace). How did this cheapening take place? It took
place through concrete means such as the introduction of new technologies and methods
of organizing work (i.e. “just-in-time” and “lean production”), to say nothing of
“deindustrialization” and outsourcing. Moody, to cite one source, writes about the
introduction of novel technologies and work organization methods (more abstractly
referred to, in Marxian terms, as “means of producing relative surplus value”). Goldfield,
on the other hand, touches on specific institutional aspects of neo-liberal capitalism (such
as the Washington consensus which include some of the core neo-liberal capitalist
tenets). These institutional aspects (i.e. trade liberalization, “openness to outside
investment of all capital markets,” protection of foreign investors’ property rights and
intellectual property rights, etc.) are the foundations for ideologically loaded terms such
as “free trade” and “globalization” and the realities that these terms describe (albeit and
certainly in a slanted way that favorably portrays and benefits the capitalist ruling
classes).
So how precisely do neo-liberal capitalist globalization and its associated
characteristics, norms, and institutions cheapen the cost of labor power as a whole? The
introduction of new technologies and methods of work organization cheapened (and still
cheapens) labor power by reducing necessary labor time (the amount of the work day that
the capitalist, in other words the employer, pays for in the form of wages) and thus
increasing the surplus labor time (which means that the capitalist can potentially realize a
greater amount of surplus value, which is more concretely divided and categorized as
profits, interest, rent, dividends, etc.). Moving from abstract theoretical terms to concrete
historical and contemporary terms, this means the casualization of the workforce, which
translates into growing structural unemployment and underemployment, the promotion of
economic policies aimed at austerity, the re-direction of economic regulation so as to
benefit the corporate and FIRE (finance, insurance, real estate) sectors, and the increasing
gap between rich and poor. Likewise, concurrent phenomena such as free trade
agreements and outsourcing have contributed to the overall cheapening of labor power.
Just in terms of outsourcing, the capitalist ruling classes have been able to move
factories from the advanced capitalist nation-states to nation-states which have recently,
in relative terms, joined the capitalist world-system (the latter group of nation-states is
otherwise identified as “newly industrializing countries”). The decision to outsource was

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to lower the amount of compensation paid to workers (i.e. wages, benefits, etc.). The
effects include lower compensation and less stable employment. To be sure, however,
“deindustrialization” was not a uniform phenomenon given that the advanced “core”
capitalist nation-states (i.e. the US, Germany, etc.) still retained some machine industry.
Nonetheless, the process was still inexorable enough so as to lower the monetary costs of
labor power and thus weaken the labor movement.
Reading response for October 16, 2012
What is the role of the state in the development and workings of international
capitalism? Leo Panitch, Linda Weiss, and William Robinson all answer the same
question. Their efforts have garnered illuminating insights and observations for the
upcoming class discussion. Their points of view, all grounded in different terms and
contexts, also provide different avenues for discussion. These authors make the important
and valid point that the state has had an active role to play in the globalization of capital
since the 1970s. This point certainly runs contrary to popularly ingrained conceptions of
capitalism and the role of the state (or the government) – popularly internalized
assumptions that have become “common sense” in the media and the general public and
articles of faith in mainstream politics. Although concrete policies such as deregulation,
tax cuts, austerity, privatization and others historically trace back to the Reagan and
Thatcher administrations in the United States and the United Kingdom, respectively, they
continue to resonate with credibility in the present day (especially so with regard to
Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Ireland). Nonetheless, the inconvenient fact remains.
Panitch, Weiss, and Robinson tackle the aforementioned question as to the state’s
role in a globalizing capitalism in different ways. Panitch deals with how the
internationalization of the state, a concept that Robert Cox introduces in his 1987 volume
Production, Power and World Order, coincided with the unfolding of “globalization” as
a whole. Here, Robinson also weighs in with an argument about the rise of a transnational
state (apparently in tandem with a transnational capitalist ruling class, in light of other
work by Robinson and the work of other social scientists such as Leslie Sklair). In
general, then, we can infer that capitalist accumulation now occurs on a transnational
scale and therefore this phase of transnational accumulation of capital presupposes and
needs the existence of a transnational (or internationalized) state and a transnational
capitalist class. Yet what are the functions of the state in this transnational capitalism?
Certainly, the state implements aforementioned economic policies such as
privatization, tax reductions, austerity and deregulation. All these policies basically allow
capital to be “set free” (to reference Karl Marx’s Grundrisse) – as it happens, neo-
classical economics, neo-liberal political-economic policies, and the consequences of
both all revolve around the “setting free” of capital. Just to take into consideration tax
cuts and austerity, both measures allow the capitalist class to raise money that in turn can
become money capital for commodity production. Yet capital is also “set free” across
national borders, and in this case the state has a role to play as well. Along with policies
aimed at austerity, tax decreases, deregulation, and privatization, the state can also
approve free trade agreements and other policies aimed at becoming more and more

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involved in the world market (the capitalist classes can always realize surplus value
abroad via exports. The world market is neither irrelevant nor unimportant.). In terms of
the latter set of policies, the state becomes internationalized in the process. In short, it
becomes transnational.
The state’s role in setting and enforcing new parameters for capitalist
accumulation in the transnational and neo-liberal form of capitalism is thus anything but
passive – this role is very much an active one. Concrete examples include contemporary
processes of primitive accumulation (and Polanyi-type “Great Transformation” struggles)
in newly industrializing countries and/or countries that are parties to free trade
agreements (i.e. the plight of the peasants in China and Mexico). As Weiss points out, the
state is anything but powerless in contemporary capitalism, and in previous forms of
capitalism for that matter.
Reading response for October 23, 2012
Edna Bonacich and Ellen David Friedman write about the effects of capital
becoming global on labor – Bonacich writes more generally on the relationship between
labor and the global supply chain whereas Friedman writes about the changing
socioeconomic conditions that US and Chinese workers alike face in the “global
neoliberal economy.” Ha-Joon Chang challenges popular notions associated with “free
trade” and neo-liberal and neoclassical economics and argues that the development of
domestic capital, or national capital, cannot be a product of the unrestricted movement of
foreign capital (i.e. foreign direct investment). All of them are probably in fundamental
agreement as to the contemporary and theoretical political-economic issues that are at
stake, although Bonacich and Friedman come from similar starting points (both write
about the cheapening, among other processes, of human labor power, with Bonacich
writing in more general terms and Friedman writing in more geographically specific
terms) whereas Chang’s starting point (criticizing neo-liberal and neo-classical articles of
faith on the benefits that free trade supposedly bestows on national economic
development) is entirely different.
Bonacich and Friedman write about the various ways in which labor has become
cheapened (and here I am more or less picking up on an issue that I touched upon in my
reading response for October 9th) through means such as “supply chain management”
and the casualization of the labor force (Bonacich, page 1 of 6 in the ProQuest format of
the article; Friedman, 222-225). Here and again, the Marxian concept of relative surplus
value is relevant since labor casualization and supply chain management methods aimed
at connecting supply with demand so as to “produce only those goods that consumers are
actually buying” (Bonacich, page 1 of 6) reduce necessary labor time (as I wrote in the
previous reading response, paid out by the capitalist class in wages) so as to increase
surplus labor time (which, again, the capitalist class can realize and claim as surplus
value, more concretely divided and categorized as profits, interest, dividends, rent, etc.).
Concretely, examples of the introduction of contemporary means of producing and
realizing relative surplus value include the socioeconomic phenomena that Bonacich,
Friedman and other writers (i.e. Kim Moody) discuss. But aside from a retread of my

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previous response and a very brief discussion on how Bonacich and Friedman write about
contemporary examples of Marx’s idea of relative surplus value, what else can be said?
Of interest is that these means of producing and realizing relative surplus value
became prominently and widely used since the 1970s “stagflation” crisis so as to aid in
the general re-constitution of capitalism and the transition from Keynesianism to neo-
liberalism. At roughly the same time, and also during an opportune time for that matter,
“free trade” became an article of faith in the form of “common sense” and the foundation
for neo-liberal socioeconomic policies (with the theoretical support of neoclassical
economics too). “Free trade” (or “free markets” or capital “set free”) also became the
assumed requisite for modern economic development (i.e. absolute and comparative
advantages). Needless to write here, the confluence of new means of producing and
realizing surplus value and the globalization of capital (i.e. outsourcing to countries with
cheaper labor power costs) were and still are aimed at realizing more surplus value in
monetary form.
Yet Ha-Joon Chang provides a skeptical point of view on the relationship between
free trade and development, pointing out the necessary role that the state plays in
developing “domestic” national capital through policies aimed at protectionism, autarchy,
etc. (p. 78-79) Additionally, he points out that foreign direct investment does not
necessarily contribute to a nation-state’s economic development (p. 75). Apparently, a
recently established nation-state will have to undergo a period of autarchic, state-led
economic development (state capitalism, in a manner of speaking) before being able to
enact a neo-liberal agenda in order to become involved in the world market on its own
terms.
Reading response for October 30, 2012
In North America (Canada, the United States, Mexico), a key institutional feature
associated with the onset of neo-liberal capitalism since the early-to-mid 1990s is the
North American Free Trade Agreement (passed, specifically, in 1994). Likewise,
NAFTA can also be hailed as an example of capitalist globalization in the North
American continent. Not surprisingly, then, NAFTA has been touted as a foundation for a
newfound continental economic prosperity. This foundation, of course, consists of free
market or laissez-faire economics (otherwise known as neo-liberal or neo-classical
economics). The standard public justification, not surprisingly, was that this specific free-
market-based form of continental economic policy would bring forth prosperity at equal,
equitable and uniform levels to the populations of all three countries encompassed by
NAFTA. But has that truly been the case after NAFTA went into effect?
An Economic Policy Institute report from 2006 by Robert E. Scott, Carlos Salas,
and Bruce Campbell (with an introduction by Jeff Faux) indicates that in fact the
economic changes which NAFTA has brought forth since 1994 led to, among other
consequences, widening divisions between the wealthy and the poor in Canada, the US,
and Mexico. Jeff Faux writes, “In each nation, workers’ share of the gains from rising
productivity fell and the proportion of income and wealth going to those at the very top of

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the economic pyramid grew.” This consequence was and still is common to all three
treaty countries. Other economic consequences exist as well such as, for instance, Robert
E. Scott’s observation on the jobs situation in the US context since NAFTA’s passage,
“Growing trade deficits with Mexico and Canada have pushed more than 1 million
workers out of higher-wage jobs and into lower-wage positions in non-trade related
industries.” One concrete trend within the US has been “deindustrialization.” Likewise,
as Carlos Salas lists among the economic consequences, low-wage and precarious
employment grew in Mexico after NAFTA went into force. Furthermore and finally,
Bruce Campbell noted that so far as NAFTA and Canada were and are concerned, “The
most striking feature of this growing inequality has been the massive gains of the richest
1% of income earners at the expense of most of the population. The growth of precarious
employment, the undermining of unions as a countervailing power to transnational
capital, the erosion of the Canadian social state, and heightened economic dependence on
the United States are the hallmarks of the free trade era in Canada.”
Reading response for November 13, 2012
Within the advanced capitalist nation-states, how can the labor movement
revitalize itself in a long and ongoing period of trends associated with neo-liberal
capitalism such as de-industrialization, privatization, casualization, etc.? Although I pose
the question in fairly straightforward terms, in actual practice this question is a difficult
one to answer. Needless for me to write here, the labor movements in North America and
Western Europe (where most of the “advanced capitalist nation-states” are located,
historically and currently) have been “backed into the corner” due to the aforementioned
concrete measures (and examples) that are commonly associated (certainly not wrongly)
with the neo-liberal type of capitalism. Thanks to one such concrete neo-liberal capitalist
process like de-industrialization, the sphere of production, at least in its industrial factory
form, has, within the confines of many an advanced capitalist nation-state, shrunk. Given
the longstanding, historically-grounded association of the sphere of production in its
industrial veneer with a factory-based working class, one can easily and understandably
assume that any serious and capable labor movement to speak of is, for all intents and
purposes, dead. Not surprisingly, then, there is the generally held assumption that,
because labor unions have been “backed into the corner,” they are therefore irrelevant in
political, social, and economic life. The arrival of the New Economy paradigm (i.e. the
“creative” class, etc.) has also nurtured that assumption along with other related
assumptions such as the notion that “free markets” are the end-all and be-all in society.
But the reduction of a production-based working class does not necessarily mean that an
active labor movement has become a mere memory.
Ian MacDonald writes on the transit union workers’ strikes in New York City,
2005, and Toronto, 2008, and touches on the crucial point that as more and more workers
are located in the spheres of circulation, urbanization, and social reproduction (page 3),
strike actions and other examples of class struggle will more likely (necessarily, even)
transpire in those spheres. Cases in point include, of course, the former two strikes. How
effective can those strikes be? Certainly in terms of consequences, of end results, the
strike can turn out to be highly effective. Fairly recent strikes such as the ones that

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MacDonald writes about are highly relevant examples, since these strike actions were
launched by public transit employees, “[…] [Y]et because of the conjoined use-
value/exchange-value nature of the service they produce, any withdrawal of labour power
interrupts not only the process of capital circulation, but also everyday life” (page 4). The
ability to disrupt, via a strike or multiple strikes, not just the workings of the economy but
everyday life itself is an immense power indeed, and, needless to say, such power needs
to be exercised carefully and wisely. If the general public of the city is not up in arms,
then a public transit workers’ strike can result in an antagonistic relationship between the
general public on one hand and the transit workers and their union on the other hand. In
the case of the 2005 public transit workers’ strike in New York City, the mayoral
administration and the politically right-oriented press machine owned by Rupert Murdoch
were able to turn public opinion against the transit workers’ union through racism and
accusations of terrorism (pages 21 and 22). Yet if the general public is already in revolt
due to dire political, social and economic conditions (i.e. the occupation of Tahrir Square,
Egypt, in the early days of the Arab Spring; the occupation of public spaces in opposition
to austerity by the indignados in Spain; the anti-austerity street battles in Greece), then
transit strikes will not carry the risk of self-isolation. Under such circumstances, the labor
movement’s strength can be tremendously revitalized.
NAFTA operates in a specific political-economic context and that context is also
NAFTA’s reason for being. Yet there is also the issue of socioeconomic class and the
agency of the people who are in these specific class positions (i.e. capitalist class,
working class, etc.). The passage and enforcement of NAFTA were part of conscious
capitalist class strategies aimed at increasing the rate of valorization (and thus amount of
surplus value realized) by way of lowering the costs of labor power, to say nothing of
threatening unions with plant closings and relocations (as noted by Kate Bronfenbrenner).
Did NAFTA bring prosperity? Yes. But the real question to ask is, prosperity for whom?
For the capitalist classes.
Reading response for November 20, 2012
The article by Kim Scipes and the chapter by Bill Fletcher, Jr. and Fernando
Gapasin touch on similar positions from different starting points. While Scipes writes
about the sociopolitical phenomenon of labor imperialism in the politics and history of
the United States, Fletcher, Jr. and Gapasin make the case for “social justice” unionism
(probably not dissimilar to “solidarity” unionism, a term I read about in a pamphlet from
the Industrial Workers of the World) and in the process they also argue that a progressive
form of labor internationalism will need to replace the longstanding labor imperialism of
the mainstream US trade union movement. Otherwise, there can be no “social justice”
unionism to speak of, a form of unionism that can challenge capital on a global scale
instead of a divisive sort of unionism such as labor imperialism.
Scipes charts the history of labor imperialism within the US union movement and
notes the connection between labor imperialism and business unionism in the leadership
and political stances of George Meany of the AFL-CIO from the late 1940s to the early
1970s. The same applies to Lane Kirkland. Both leaders were supportive of US-supported

11. 11
right-wing military dictatorships and undoubtedly both were staunch “Cold Warriors”
and anti-Communists. The labor imperialism of the AFL-CIO would continue under John
Sweeney during the 1990s and 2000s. Presumably, matters have barely improved in the
early 2010s. At such a point, Fletcher, Jr. and Gapasin come in to argue for such an
improvement. They aptly quote a trade unionist from Colombia, “The most important
thing that North American activists seeking to support trade unions in Colombia can do is
to work to change U.S. policy towards Colombia, especially its emphasis on military and
police aid” (p. 196).
Fletcher, Jr. and Gapasin also touch on some crucial historical issues such as the
movements for national independence and national liberation that arose during the 1950s,
1960s, and 1970s which, after institutionalizing themselves as governments ruling
independently of the influence and control of leading Western capitalist nation-states,
entered into a coexistent relationship with neo-liberal capitalism (p. 188-189). Leaving
aside the question of whether these movements were, to begin with, bourgeois
revolutionary movements in their own right (not an irrelevant point, but it does lead to a
very different tangent), there is the issue of theories of imperialism and their relationship
with US labor imperialism. Although Scipes argues that Jan Nederveen Pieterse’s theory
of imperialism is more developed than Vladimir Lenin’s theory of imperialism
(Nederveen Pieterse takes a more diverse approach compared to Lenin’s “economistic”
approach), it is a fair question to ask if leftist thinkers and writers grounded in the
Leninist theory of imperialism would argue that labor imperialism and business unionism
are, however superficially, political, social, and economic consequences of the rise of a
labor aristocracy within the US working class due to “super-profits” realized and received
by the US capitalist class from the export of capital (i.e. foreign direct investment is one
concrete and contemporary example).
Reading response for November 27, 2012
How can workers and unions organize on a transnational basis, given that
capitalist commodity production and exchange already take place across borders? The
political economy of North America is relevant to this question since treaties such as the
North American Free Trade Agreement have resulted in greater and less-abated cross-
borders commerce and production. But what about workers and unions? Both groups
stand, and have stood, the very real risk of marginalization and abandonment due to
NAFTA’s policies and effects. How can they ably respond to NAFTA in particular and
global capitalism in general? One plausible and estimable approach is transnational labor
organizing. Tamara Kay and Lance Compa write about the possibilities of such an
approach.
Kay writes about the importance of an anti-racist dimension in transnational labor
organizing in North America, as exemplified by the experiences and efforts of Canadian
trade unionists. Canadian labor organizers developed an economic nationalist platform
that did not involve any sort of chauvinist tropes (i.e. white supremacy, claims that
immigrants and newly industrializing countries in the “Third World” are “taking away”
jobs from workers in the “First World” nation-states such as Canada and the United

12. 12
States of America, etc.). This specific form of economic nationalist ideology in the
Canadian labor movement stood in sharp contrast with some of the views and positions of
the US labor movement in relation to NAFTA. Sam Gindin of the Canadian Auto
Workers, for instance, pointed out the key differences between the Canadian and US
forms of economic nationalism (p. 78 in Kay’s chapter). Rather aptly and rightly, Gindin
also implicitly points out how the likes of Ross Perot and Patrick Buchanan give the
economic nationalist and protectionist positions of the mainstream fractions of the US
labor movement (to say nothing of the “paleoconservative” fraction of the US right wing)
an essentially chauvinist character. Just to take one easy example, Perot talks about the
“giant sucking sound” as, thanks to NAFTA, US companies begin outsourcing to Mexico
due to lower wages (p. 76 in Kay). Labor activists and organizers in Mexico were hardly
oblivious of Perot’s statement and its racist and nativist implications. Additionally,
Canadian labor movement attempts to cross borders was not merely rhetorical, given that
“Canadian unions began to send rank-and-file workers to Mexico on trinational
exchanges and delegations” in order to “educate rank-and-file workers about the situation
of Mexican workers” (p. 79 in Kay). Compa writes about other forms of transnational
solidarity and action in favor of workers.
Compa notes that, so far as concrete progress is concerned, advocacy for labor
rights across borders tends to lag behind advocacy for intellectual property rights,
investment guarantees, and “free trade” as such. Indeed, he begins his article with this
statement, “For most of the 20th century, demands to incorporate labor rights and
standards like freedom to organize and child labor laws into international trade and
investment agreements made policy experts grimace” (p. 451 in Compa) Nonetheless,
transnational labor advocacy is still possible. According to Compa, the North American
Agreement on Labor Cooperation allowed for “transnational coalitions of unions and
allied human rights and community groups” to file cases thanks to the NAALC’s
institutional mechanisms (p. 459 in Compa). The NAALC’s mechanisms allow for
transnational labor advocacy coalitions to lobby in favor of labor rights. Compa writes,
“The new NAALC platforms allow transnational social actors to demand investigations,
public hearings, and government consultations on workers’ rights violations” (p. 459 in
Compa). Whether such an approach is “reformist” and “system-immanent” and therefore
part of an “inside game” (as methods such as legal work, media advocacy, and lobbying
would imply) is an open question. For Compa, who soberly notes that “Workers are not
now in a position to vanquish the capitalist class or the capitalist state” (p. 460 in
Compa), clearly “inside game” moves are among the few viable options in light of the
few “spaces” for worker action that remain available. Fighting “within the system,” then,
is the remaining choice for labor movement activists and organizers. The same question
applies to “left” and “progressive” economic nationalist ideologies (ideologies which
give bourgeois-democratic revolutions a “leftist” orientation) that play key roles in
transnational labor organizing.
Reading response for December 4, 2012
How can we frame labor solidarity in a world that has undergone and is still
undergoing a period of “globalization”? Also, what are the possible theoretical references

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for this framing of working-class solidarity? Sam Gindin and Ronaldo Munck pose some
answers to these two questions. Gindin provides information on the first question in an
aptly titled presentation, “Internationalism Beyond Slogans: Concretizing Working Class
Solidarity.” He documents the cooperative activist and organizing relationships among
auto workers across Canada, Mexico, and the United States of America. Munck, on the
other hand, emphasizes the ongoing relevance of the “Polanyi Problem” for
understanding and resisting the new form of liberal economic policies that are in force
today, that is, neo-liberal economic policies based on neo-classical economic theories.
Needless for me to write here, the questions raised in the beginning and the premises of
Gindin and Munck’s treatments cannot be any more relevant given the difficulties of the
labor movement in the global and neo-liberal capitalist era.
In his account, Gindin deals with the nuts and bolts concrete working-class
solidarity across borders and in the process he touches on important and core objectives
(which turn out to be key means to the ultimate end of constructing a dynamic and
capable form of transnational labor solidarity) such as, namely, the necessity for an
independent orientation, the truth that internationalism begins at home (somehow, this
notion is an echo of Karl Liebknecht’s declaration, “The main enemy is at home.”),
thinking “big” (i.e. taking on major opponents, working on organizing projects that can
potentially or actually involve many workers, etc.), and avoiding the trade union
organizing equivalent of tunnel vision (as Gindin writes, “Even if our goal is only to
affect auto, we can’t be successful unless we place any auto strategy in a broader social
context.”[my emphasis]) That broader social context consists, of course, austerity, “de-
industrialization” (in fact the movement of factories and other industrial plants to other
regions where costs for labor power are cheaper and few if any labor regulations exist,
much less enforced), a weakened and divided labor movement, continuing and growing
divisions between wealthy and poor (the concrete results of the general law of capitalist
accumulation at work), etc. It would be interesting, additionally, if Gindin can be brought
into conversation with Tamara Kay (transnational labor solidarity and the anti-racist
dimension of anti-imperialist and nationalist Canadian labor resistance, along with
Canadian labor solidarity with workers in Mexico, to neo-liberalism) and Lance Compa
(the use of “inside game” maneuvers to complement transnational coalition-building in
favor of labor rights).
At a more abstract level, Munck presents the “Polanyi Problem,” which deals
with the corrosive effects of “free” markets (“marketization,” in a sense) on the social
fabric. Munck writes, “During the 1970s and 1980s there was a concerted bid by the
transnational capitalist class to create a ‘disembedded liberalism’ that led to the triumph
of ‘globalization’ as discourse and practice in the 1990s. This was Polanyi’s ‘double
movement’ in reverse as it were, with the market successfully defending its prerogatives
against what it saw as the encroachments of society and politics” (p. 252). Space and
word count prevent me from writing more about the “stark utopia,” “double movement,”
and “compromise state” (good examples, I think, include Keynesianism and social
democracy) – all concepts that are worth tackling. Likewise, Munck’s criticisms of Marx
and the regard for Marx as shown by the writings of the Monthly Review school and the
Socialist Workers’ Party are worth considering as well (p. 257). In short, the “Polanyi

14. 14
Problem” raises the questions as to how the labor movement should regard itself and how
it can use social, political and economic theories to its advantage. So far as capital is
concerned, of course, the ability to work is a commodity (hence, wage labor). But should
that be the case? Likewise, how can the labor movement develop theoretical rejoinders to
neo-liberal economics?
Reading response for December 11, 2012
Can there be international labor standards? Surely, given that there are cross-
borders supply chains and thus transnational commodity exchange and production, there
can also be transnational standards for labor? Concretely speaking, such standards
translate into global labor organizing, international framework agreements (IFAs),
collective bargaining within multinational companies, and, as such, global industrial
relations. Such an idea is not implausible. Furthermore, there can be much worse
proposals. The three articles for tomorrow’s class session all touch in the above questions
in important ways.
There is definitely nothing new about labor solidarity across borders. Just to take
one easy example, the Industrial Workers of the World preached and practiced
international working-class solidarity during its historical heyday, the early twentieth
century from 1905 to the late 1910s and early 1920s. Likewise, the contemporary IWW
continues to adhere to the principle of transnational proletarian solidarity (the
International Solidarity Commission is active today, for instance). However and of
course, the IWW exemplified cross-borders labor solidarity in a non-institutional form.
As a matter of fact, perhaps one can describe it as labor solidarity in an alternate, counter-
, or even anti- institutional form, in light of the IWW’s historical tradition of repudiating
legislative approaches and advocating direct democracy, especially direct worker
democracy in the form of workers’ councils. On the other hand, the present readings deal
with global industrial and labor relationships in an institutionalized context. Likewise, the
writings of Tamara Kay and Lance Compa, assigned for a previous class meeting, touch
on the institutionalized form of global industrial relations. Compa, in particular, argues
for the use of “inside game” tactics (i.e. lobbying, coalition-building, etc.) as the
remaining viable option for the workers’ movement. The effective use of “inside game”
approaches can probably lead to the establishment of meaningful and sturdy transnational
labor standards, thus making global labor organizing into a true challenge against specific
forms of transnational capital (i.e. multinational corporations). Global collective
bargaining by way of international framework agreements (IFAs) also allows for
cooperation, compromise, and/or collaboration between transnational labor movements
and multinational corporations.
Two examples of global labor organizing include the efforts among Nestle and
Coca Cola workers to unionize. Given that Nestle and Coca Cola are both multinational
companies, any attempt at worker organizing would necessarily be a transnational effort.
In the case of Nestle, workers organized in Korea and Russia. As for Coca Cola, the
unionization effort took place in Guatemala and Russia. Additionally, as somebody who
has more than a passing familiarity with the Killer Coke campaign, I can also add that

15. 15
unionization efforts among Coca Cola workers in Colombia have gone on since the
1990s. And the results? Paul Garver, Kirill Buketov, Hyewon Chong and Beatriz Sosa
Martinez, all staff members from the International Union of Foodworkers (IUF), write
that in the case of the Coca Cola corporation and its workers, partial recognition was
achieved with the signing of an agreement in April 2005 between the IUF and Coca Cola
that “consolidated the regular semiannual meetings to review human rights and other
issues related to unions throughout the Coca-Cola system” (249). However and
unfortunately, the Nestle campaign has not been as successful. Nonetheless, the fact that
there can be actual attempts and efforts at transnational labor organizing as demonstrated
by the Nestle and Coca Cola workers’ campaigns (and, likewise, the transnational
campaigns of United Students Against Sweatshops and the campaign against Nike) is an
encouraging sign.
Reading response for December 18, 2012
How should the labor movement deal with environmental issues? How can the
labor and environmental movements cooperate and surpass any hurdles that may prevent
cooperation? Both are fair questions given that there are perceptions that labor and
environmentalism were and/or are at odds with each other. One of the popular
perceptions goes like this: While unions seek to preserve secure, well-compensated, and
safe occupations for their member workers, environmentalists make work harder to find
by closing off natural resources from use (i.e. the preservation of forests and mountains,
which may cost the timber and mining industries millions). Depending on how
widespread such a perception may be, an article such as the one by Sean Sweeney may
appear to “go against the grain.” The premise of Sweeney’s article is clear enough since
he makes the case for labor to take environmental issues seriously and thus act
accordingly. To take two examples, Sweeney writes, “Unions need to reconsider their
commitment to a future based on coal, because nothing is cooking the climate faster than
coal use” and therefore “More unions need to be fully engaged in the fight against global
warming in order to develop and then mobilize around a bold approach that champions
social justice both at home and internationally” (page 53 of New Labor Forum, Fall 2009;
page 1 of 7 in the PDF file). The core of Sweeney’s argument is that unions need to
develop a stronger and more-unified approach toward climate change, or more precisely
the restriction and prevention of climate change.
As one can imply from the two above quotations that I’ve taken, according to
Sweeney, the bulk of the labor movement has not really “modernized” its thinking vis-à-
vis environmental issues. Despite the “green jobs” initiatives which have involved
building trades unions and the Teamsters, the voices of unions have, again, been fairly
and relatively small so far as climate policy goes (p. 55 of NLF, Fall 2009; p. 3 of 7 in
PDF). Sweeney makes the case for a greater commitment to environmentalism on the part
of unions, a commitment that can “pay off” in terms of realizing a greater “green jobs”
plan, to say nothing of developing a truly progressive labor movement – a labor
movement that is scientifically serious and therefore serious about climate change (p. 57-
58 of NLF, Fall 2009; p. 5-6 of 7 in PDF).

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The reasons for and implications of Sweeney’s argumentation are attractive for
labor and environmental organizers – a meaningful and lasting alliance between the labor
and environmentalist movements can help rejuvenate left politics and protect the
environment. At the same time, the potentially (and perhaps actually) growing number of
green jobs will point to the existence of a green capitalism, an eco-capitalism, in rhetoric
and in fact. Mainstream media commentators such as Thomas L. Friedman have already
begun beating the drum for such an ecologically friendly capitalism (whereas left
political formations such as the contemporary Monthly Review school have been
promoting eco-socialism), and there is no doubt that an ecological capitalism will entail
the existence of green jobs (not to mention green businesses). Of course, so far as the
likes of Friedman are concerned, a neo-liberal green capitalism would be ideal – climate
change is too much of a threat for capitalist accumulation and therefore for capitalism’s
own good there needs to be an adaptation to environmental conditions. This only begs the
question as to whether Sweeney is more or less calling for a social democratic green
capitalism, supported by vigorous unions and environmentalist organizations.