Serena Essapour, a motivational speaker has shared a PPT having information regarding Criminal Law III Week 3 Summer 2010.

1. Criminal Law III
Week 3 Summer 2010
John C. Schick
209.235.2937
jschick@humphreys.edu
jcschick@earthlink.net

2. People v. Foster
• Foster speaks to another about a plan to do a
robbery.
• The person to whom he proposes the idea goes to
the police, and has no intent to agree to the plan.
• If only one person has a plan to do a crime, is there a
conspiracy?

3. Foster, cont.
• The court looks to the changes in the law on
conspiracy that Illinois has undertaken.
• The new statute states that a person commits a
conspiracy when he agrees with another.
• The statute deleted the words “two or more
persons.”

4. Foster, concluded
• Illinois does have a solicitation statute, with
penalties very similar to those for conspiracy.
• So it would make little sense for the changes
made to reflect a legislative intent to adopt
the “unilateral” theory of conspiracy.
• Since a defendant gets the benefit of
uncertain language, the court affirms the
dismissal of the charges.
• Foster will still face the possibility of
prosecution under the solicitation section.

5. Foster definition
A person commits conspiracy when, with intent
that an offense be committed, he agrees with
another to the commission of the offense.

6. Kilgore v. State
• Kilgore is convicted of murdering Roger Norman.
• Evidence at the trial showed a conspiracy to kill
Norman.
• In fact, there were three separate agreements
involving different parties, all geared to
accomplish this crime.

7. Kilgore, cont.
• The first effort involved Carden, Benton, and
Oldaker.
• The second effort involved Carden, Kilgore, and
Berry.
• The third effort involved Carden, Kilgore and
Price.

8. Kilgore, cont.
• The conspiracy involved here is often called a
wheel conspiracy.
• There is one central figure who is the hub, here
the person who wanted Norman killed.
• The participants in separate conspiracies may not
know each other or have a part in the separate
agreements. They are spokes which are not
connected.

9. Kilgore, concluded
• Because the conspiracy involving Kilgore did not
involve the earlier ones that involved others, the
evidence admitted regarding B was improper
• Thus the conviction for murder must be reversed.
• Note that Georgia law merges the conspiracy and
the completed crime so there can only be a
charge of murder and not one of conspiracy.

10. Braverman v. US
• Although there is only one actual conspiracy, there
are many goals attached to that one.
• Government wanted to punish for each separate act
that was done.
• Court concludes that with only one goal, there can
only be one punishment.

11. Braverman definition
The gist of the crime of conspiracy as defined by
the statute is the agreement or confederation of
the conspirators to commit one or more unlawful
acts.

12. Ianelli v. US
• The charges involved conspiring to violate a federal
gambling statute.
• The statute said that it was a crime for more than
five persons to conduct a gambling business.
• Defendants were convicted and sentenced BOTH for
the substantive offense and for the conspiracy.

13. Ianelli, cont.
• Does Wharton’s rule apply, which would limit the
offense to merely the substantive offense?
• Wharton’s rule suggests that in order to show a
conspiracy there must be MORE than the
minimum number needed to commit the
substantive crime.
• What the rule does is to make one crime out of the
otherwise separate crime of conspiracy and the
substantive offense.

14. Ianelli, continued
• The theory is that since conspiracy law exists
because of the danger of many persons being
involved in crime, there must be more than the
minimum number for the substantive offense, or
else the danger does not really exist.
• This law’s effects go beyond the participants and
there is a reason to allow both offenses to be
punished.

15. Ianelli, concluded
• The purpose of this particular law was to go after
organized crime and the effects this had on
interstate commerce
• The dangers presented by a combination of
people in gambling is legislatively noted and thus
an exception to Wharton’s rule is noted in
upholding the conviction

16. Gebardi v. US
• This case involves an indictment against two people.
• The offense is a violation of the Mann act, which made
it a crime to take a woman across interstate lines for
immoral purposes.
• The purpose of the law is to protect the woman, yet
she appears to be a co-conspirator in the charges.

17. Gebardi, concluded
• Since the woman cannot be convicted under the
Mann act, can there be a conspiracy violation of the
act?
• If she is not a party to anything illegal, the man cannot
by himself commit conspiracy.
• Thus the case must be dismissed.

18. People v. Sconce
• A conspiracy to commit murder involves Sconce,
Estephan, Garcia and Dutton.
• Before the substantive crime occurs, Sconce
decides he wants out.
• Trial court dismissed the conspiracy count.
• The people contend this is error.

19. Sconce, concluded
• California law says withdrawal is effective only if
done BEFORE an overt act is done.
• Once an agreement comes into place AND an
overt act is done, the crime is complete
• In this case, there had been an overt act.
• Thus the withdrawal is too late and the crime of
conspiracy has been committed.

20. State v. Ward
The common law had four categories of
criminal wrongdoers.
•The actual perpetrator(Principal 1st
degree)
•Aider and abettor at the scene (Principal in 2d
degree)
•Accessory before the fact- Aider who is NOT
present at crime
•Accessory after the fact-aider after the crime is
done

21. Basis of Accomplice Liability
• When analyzing the liability of the accomplice, it
is important to remember that the liability is
based on the act of the principal.
• That is why we call the liability of the accomplice
DERIVATIVE LIABILITY.

22. Elements
• An aider and abettor must have knowledge of the
criminal purpose of the perpetrator.
• And with an intent or purpose either of
committing or of encouraging or facilitating
commission of the offense the perpetrator
intends to commit.

23. State v. Hoselton
• Kevin was convicted based on his role as a lookout
to a group of kids who did a burglary.
• The basis for his conviction is his own voluntary
statement.
• Kevin did not see his accomplices and did not know
what they were doing.
• A true lookout who is acting to alert his
confederates so they may do the crimes that he
knows are taking place is an ACCOMPLICE.

24. Hoselton, cont.
• What evidence is there of his awareness of the
intent of his confederates?
• He was never told what they were to do and he
got none of the proceeds of the crime.
• This does NOT make him either a lookout or an
ACCOMPLICE.

25. What sort of intent is needed?
• There must be an intent to aid the party who does
the crime.
• There must also be an intent that this aid result in
the successful completion of the crime—that is
there must be the mens rea or intent to aid the
crime that the perpetrators are accomplishing.

26. People v. Lauria, again
• This time we look at the facts to see if Lauria was an
accomplice.
• The acts done were an ongoing business of
prostitution.
• Lauria knew of the operation and in fact used the
services of one of the women.
• Is his knowledge enough to make him an
accomplice?

27. Riley v. State
• Riley and Portalla opened fire on some folks and
the victims were injured.
• The charge filed was first-degree assault.
• The evidence was unclear which of the two was the
actual shooter who caused the injuries.
• Riley was convicted as an accomplice and not as a
principal (shooter).

28. Riley, cont.
• Riley says the jury instruction given was in error.
• The instruction did not correctly state the mental
state for an accomplice.
• First degree assault required proof that the actor
was reckless in regard to the resulting criminal act.
• A prior case suggested that the state had to prove
the act of an accomplice was intentional.

29. Riley, concluded
• This means that the accomplice would seemingly
want the result of the act by his principal to occur.
• Riley would not fit that mold since he did not do the
injurious act.
• The court decides that the prior case was error and
assesses liability.
• Based on MPC 2.06(4) the court concludes that
even if the result is NOT intended, the person who
acts with the same mental state as the principal will
be deemed an accomplice.

30. The meaning of Riley case
• Put in its simplest terms, the case means that a
person CAN be an accomplice to an unintended
crime.
• The mental state of recklessness is present for
both the actor and the accomplice.
• Thus both can be guilty based on derivative
liability.

31. State v. Linscott
• Linscott is convicted of one count of murder and one
count of robbery.
• He went with others who were planning on robbing a
drug dealer.
• He knew of the plan and was to receive a portion of
what they thought they would get.

32. Linscott, cont.
• Fuller, a fellow robber, shot at and killed Grenier.
• Linscott argues that he had no intent to kill, which
Fuller did.
• He was merely aiding in a robbery.
• State did NOT pursue this on a felony murder rule
theory since the statute that spelled out accomplice
liability carried a longer sentence, which the state
wanted from Linscott.

33. Linscott, concluded
• The robbery contemplated that a foreseeable
consequence could be a killing.
• This rule requires the application of an objective
standard.
• The subjective belief of Linscott is not as
important as the objective analysis.
• This means that objectively viewed, Linscott was
liable since he wanted the robbery, which was the
precursor of the murder.

34. Meaning of natural and
probable consequence rule
• Did the primary party (perpetrator) commit the
target offense?
• Did the jury decide that the other party was an
accomplice in the target offense?
• Did the primary party commit another crime
beyond the target crime?
• Was that later crime one that was a natural and
probable consequence of the first act?

35. ThankYou