Trapped in Qatar

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“Trappedin Qatar”: A Case Study of the Human Rights ViolationsFacingMigrants in Qatar.
Abstract:
In the run-up to the 2022 World Cup being held in Qatar, the small Gulf nation has required a large
number of migrants to work in the construction industry in order to complete the mammoth task of
providing immense new infrastructural projects. This dissertation will revolve around the human
rights situation of migrants from South and South-East Asia, specifically Nepal, in Qatar providing the
workforce needed to build this infrastructure. The human rights of these workers have been
subjected to a variety of abuses ranging from dangerous working conditions, the confiscation of
passports and the subsequent inability to leave the country (Amnesty International, 2013). The
kafala system present in Qatar has been seen as central to this exploitation by many international
organizations whom argue this legislation is in need of desperate need of reform to prevent further
suffering (ITUC, 2014). By exploring the situation in Qatar and the ways in which migrant’s rights are
being violated, larger issues surrounding migration and human rights will be examined in more
detail. This dissertation will also aim to expose the role of the international community, including
FIFA, with regards to human rights violations and disputes. The national and international
mechanisms and bodies in place for migrants to use as a source of redress will also be critically
discussed to shed further light on the situation in Qatar. Through looking at these issues, this
dissertation will explore the recommendations provided by international bodies to offer a set of
concrete changes needed to create a more successful platform for migrants to claim their rights and
solve their abuses. The over-emphasis on state-actors responsibilities has overshadowed the role of
international organizations whom ought to take a more active stance towards issues of human
rights. It is estimated an additional 500,000 workers will be needed to finish the country’s
developmental plans before the World Cup kick off which is raising further concern for those
trappedin Qatar (ITUC, 2014: 6).

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1. Introduction
When FIFA announced that Qatar had won their bid to host the 2022 World Cup, a wave of
allegations and debate soon followed placing the small Gulf nation into the international spotlight
(Kelly, 2015). Accusations that millions of dollars had found its way into the hands of FIFA officials
have dominated the discussions surrounding Qatar’s bid, often leading to other problem areas like
the treatment of migrant workers to be overlooked (Lloyd-Roberts, 2014). The focus of this
dissertation will revolve around the case of migrants from South and South-East Asia, specifically
Nepal, moving into Qatar to provide the workforce needed to build the infrastructure required in the
lead up to the World Cup. The rapid increase of large numbers of migrants coming into Qatar to
work in the construction industry, as well as domestic and other sectors, has been largely unnoticed
until more recently when the violations of these workers’ human rights was made clear through
several different reports from the media and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) (See:
Amnesty International, 2013: Gibson & Pattisson, 2014 ). The abuses these workers are facing range
from deception and broken promises in terms of pay, the confiscation of their passports, the
inability to leave the country, unacceptable accommodation, dangerous working conditions and
even death (Amnesty International, 2013). Qatar’s kafala system in particular has been at the centre
of these violations and is the major concern for many NGOs who have called for the reformation of
this legislation to prevent further suffering of migrants (See: ITUC, 2014). By exploring the context in
which these violations are occurring as well as looking specifically at the exploitations themselves,
widerissuesregardingmigrationandhumanrightscanbe identifiedandaddressed.
While migrants make up the majority of the workforce and indeed the population in Qatar, they are
very much at the bottom of social hierarchy, while a few wealthy Qatari families hold all the power
(Donini et al., 2013: 34). Therefore, the concept of structural violence which suggests “violence is
exerted systematically – that is, indirectly - by everyone who belong to a certain social order”
(Farmer, 2004: 307) has been applied to the human rights situation in Qatar as a way of explaining
the current circumstances. Alongside this, the issue of state sovereignty will be brought into the
framework to examine the role of state and non-state actors present in Qatar. The recent global
panic and investment in matters of trafficking, particularly sex trafficking (Mahdavi, 2012), will be
discussed in terms of the effect this increased international attention has had on notions of
migration. The position and duty of the international community and large transnational
organizations, specifically focusing on FIFA in this case, will also be discussedin relation to this issue.
The current emphasis on the responsibilities on state-actors in relation to strengthening human

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rights systems is useful, however it often seems to overshadow the role of non-state bodies and
theirhumanrightsobligations.
By establishing the human rights mechanisms available both nationally and internationally for
redress by migrants, wider debates regarding the success and failures of the human rights system in
general will be considered. The suggestion of creating a more engaged and tangible role for the
international community to encourage states to make changes and implement immediate remedies
in the form of legislation will be considered. Through examining the issues with the human rights
system both on a local and international level, the kind of changes which could be implemented to
create a more concrete human rights structure can also be discussed. Recommendations from
international organizations shall be explored to suggest ways in which migrants’ rights could be
strengthened. The key changes involve the reformation of the current legal frameworks and the
adoption of a more active role by the international community. Despite outcry for such
recommendations to be applied to allow for an improvement of migrant’s rights from certain
international bodies, there has yet to be any real signs of change (ITUC, 2014). An estimated 500,000
extra labourers will be required to finish the infrastructural development before the World Cup kick
off according to ITUC (2014: 6). While outside efforts are still being made to improve the human
rights situation in the Gulf region, this has raised further concern over the position of those
becomingtrappedinQatar(ITUC, 2014: 6).
2. Context: The SituationinQatar
Since its independence in 1971, Qatar has quickly become one of the wealthiest countries in the
world due to its natural gas and oil reserves which have led to it having the highest per capita
income on the globe (DLA Piper, 2014: 22). Qatar is part of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) which
is made up of several nations within the Gulf region whom have created a unique setting for
enormous labour migration through their small national populations and large array of wealth and
resources (Mednicoff, 2012: 187). This newly-wealthy country has faced growing international
pressure since its bid to hold the World Cup was accepted by FIFA in 2010 resulting in increasing
need for migrant labour (DLA Piper, 2014). As well as building 9 new stadia and renovating the
existing 3, Qatar is spending billions on roads, railways, ports, skyscrapers, hotels and whole new
cities as part of its massive infrastructural development (ITCU, 2014: 11). Due to the national
population being so small, a massive flow of foreign labourers into the country has been needed to
construct these projects on time resulting in 94% of the total workforce in Qatar being made up of

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migrant workers (DLA Piper, 2014: 22). This migration flow has dramatically affected the make-up of
Qatari society, leading to the population of just over 2 million being dominated by foreign workers,
withan estimated1.4millionmigrantscurrently livinginthe country(ITCU,2014: 14).
The migrant workforce in Qatar is largely exported from South and South-East Asia, notably India, Sri
Lanka, Nepal and the Philippines (Amnesty International, 2013). During this dissertation there will be
a focus on Nepali migrants working in the construction sector as many of the recent reports
surrounding the human rights situation in Qatar have centred on the growing number of fatalities
occurring within this national group (See: Gibbon & Pattisson, 2014). Nepali workers have been
increasingly entering into Qatar and other GCC countries since the beginning of the 21st
century due
to their desirable qualities of providing cheap and reliable labour (Bruslé, 2010: 4). This national
group is one of the largest present in Qatar, with a projected 400,000 Nepali workers currently
residing in the country and more expected to arrive in the near future (Donini et al., 2013: 34). These
migrants and hundreds of thousands of others have travelled far distances away from their families
in the hope to earn money in the Gulf to pay off their debts and provide an income for those back
home (ITCU, 2014). Their dreams are often quickly shattered when they arrive to discover a very
differentfuture isaheadof theminQatar.
The Brokerage and KafalaSystemin Qatar
When the opportunity arises to work in a wealthy, oil-rich, cosmopolitan country with the promise
of a good wage and added benefits of housing and food allowances, many foreign workers would
jump at the chance. Very often such prospects arise from brokers whom are located in many Asian
countries in order to seek out new recruits to send to the Gulf (Gardner, 2012). Recruitment systems
such as these may be registered with the state or may be unofficial and illegally moving migrants
into GCC countries (Gardner, 2012). Migrants are required to pay fees to these middle-men in order
to be sent to their host countries, this paymentis oftenlarge requiring individuals to take out further
loans thus increasing their debt (Donini et al., 2013). The hope that their new jobswill help them out
of their economic troubles and provide remittance to their families back home is the driving force
behindmanymigrant’sdecisionstorelocate (Gardner,2012).
To be able to work in most GCC countries, including Qatar, migrants must obtain residency permits
which can only be granted through entering into the kafala or sponsorship system which bonds
workers to a particular employer (Ahmad, 2012: 26). This system allows sponsors to closely control
the movement of migrants through the practice of passport confiscation which countless migrants
become subjected to upon arrival (ITUC, 2014: 18). The sponsorship system empowers employers by

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allowing them to refuse “no objection” certificates or exit permits which are needed to change jobs
or leave the country (HRC, 2014: 7). This leaves migrant workers vulnerable to situations of human
rights abuses and bonded labour (Amnesty International, 2013), which has led to this system being
widely criticised by many international bodies. The Special Rapporteur for the Human Rights
Committee (2014) and organizations such as the International Trade Union Confederation and
Amnesty International have discussed the abuse such legislation allows and contributes to. The
desire for this system to be reformed will be discussed later; however it is worth noting that this
system is seen as the main obstacle in the protection of migrant worker’s rights by many of Qatar’s
international peers (Amnesty International, 2013). Many of the measures taken by sponsors,
including the confiscation of passports, are illegal yet they remain widespread due to the lack of
effective law enforcement, leading to the UN Special Rapporteur to suggest the kafala system “can
amountto forced labour”(HRC,2014: 7).
The sponsorship system breaks several international conventions revolving around involuntary and
bonded labour, including the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention 1957 (ILO, no. 159) and the
Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour 1930 (ILO, no. 29), both of which have been
ratified by Qatar (HRC, 2014: 44). The breaching of many human rights including Articles 4 and 5 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN General Assembly, 1948) can also be observed here
in the form of modern slave labour and the mistreatment of migrant workers’ which this produces.
The system as a whole was seen as “inherently abusive” by the DLA Piper (2014: 44-5) investigation
into Qatar as it broke many national and international laws leaving migrant’s “trapped” in the
country. The various human rights violations which the recruitment process and kafala system have
allowed inQatarshall nowbe discussedinmore detail.
Broken Promises andBroken Bones
On arrival, the mirage of the cosmopolitan super-city of Doha, the capital of Qatar, is soon shattered
when migrants realise they have been misinformed by the agencies they have paid in order to work
in one of the richest countries in the world. Many arrive finding the terms and conditions of their
contracts have been changed and their salaries are much lower than originally promised (Amnesty
International, 2013: 6). As well as wage levels being cut, working hours are often much longer than
previously promised and the type of employment may even be different to that which was
advertised by recruiters (Gardner, 2012: 49). When investigating the situation of migrants in Qatar,
Amnesty International (2013) and the ITUC (2014) found that many migrants had been forced to
continue to work while their wages were frozen by employers for an indefinite period. This left many
workers with no money and no choices except to continue with their jobs in the hope that their pay

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will return in the future (Amnesty International, 2013: 42). Essentially trapped by their employers to
continue working for nothing and with no means of escape due to their passports being seized by
their sponsors, these migrants have found themselves bonded in a form of modern slavery (ITUC,
2014). Alongside being stuck in a sponsorship agreement, many individuals find themselves being
confined to work camps with as many as 16 men to one small room and a bathroom (ITUC, 2014: 7).
While accommodation experiences vary from person to person, the living conditions provided for
foreign workers were largely overcrowded and unsanitary when investigated by the UN Special
Rapporteur, subsequently violating Qatari law and many basic human rights (HRC, 2014: 11). Not
only are these living conditions in violation of workers’ rights,in particular Article 25 (no.1) regarding
adequate standards of living (UN General Assembly, 1948), but the construction sites which they
spendtheirworkingdaysare also potentiallydeadlyenvironments.
One of the controversies that Qatar originally faced during their approval to host the World Cup was
how the stadia and surrounding commercial areas would be cooled (Kelly, 2015). The average high
temperatures in Doha during June are 41C, which a FIFA appointed taskforce concluded would be a
health risk (Kelly, 2015). This led to the suggestion that the World Cup should be held during the
winter, despite claims by Qatari authorities of revolutionary cooling technologies being created
specifically to tackle this problem (Kelly, 2015). These discussions have been dominating the recent
rhetoric surrounding the event with emphasis on the health of the players and attendants,
consequently ignoring the well-being of the workers building these stadia in such temperatures.
When speaking to Amnesty International (2013: 44), Nepali workers stated that they worked 12 to
14 hour per days in their construction jobs, which risked both their own and others well-being. The
long hours paired with the dangerous working conditions, lack of effective health and safety
procedures and the blistering heat has led to many severe injuries and deaths among migrant
workers (Amnesty International, 2013). Since Qatar won their World Cup bid in 2010, an estimated
1200 workers have died (ITUC, 2014: 15). However this information only accounts for Indian and
Nepali workers as data has not been released by other embassies leading to the realistic body-count
undoubtedly being much higher (ITUC, 2014: 15). The ITUC (2014: 15) have suggested that the death
toll could be as high as 4000 by the 2022 kick off which raises many questions as to what is being
done about these figures by the Qatari government and international bodies. For those who have
survived injuries, their employers would often refuse to pay for their healthcare, fine workers for
taking sick-days, force injured labourers to continue and even deport those who were no longer fit
for work according to workers (Amnesty International, 2013: 43-4). It is clear that a range of both
civil and political (UN General Assembly, 1966a) and economic, social and cultural rights (UN General

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Assembly, 1966b) are being violated in this case, but the question turns to why migrants continue to
come to the Gulf whenthe deathtoll isincreasingeachday.
So Whydo they Keep Coming?
With numerous workers being put into dangerous environments, being denied the freedom to leave
the country and even dying, the level of insecurity which migrants face through their entrapment in
the kafala system is clear. The right to life, liberty and security in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights(1948: Article 3) alongside many other fundamental freedoms are noticeably not being upheld
for many workers within Qatar. If this is the case then the question turns to why migrants keep
coming to work in these GCC countries. Gardner (2012) discusses this question in relation to low-
income migrants and in Qatar and their families in Nepal, India and Sri Lanka. As previously
mentioned, migrant’s seek economic opportunities in countries like Qatar to be able to clear their
families’ debts and provide them with an income (Donini et al., 2013). Facing the realities of their
decisions, many decide not to inform their families of their terrible conditions and instead engage in
the system of deception in order to keep their loved ones from worrying (Gardner, 2012: 53). One of
the ways migrants perpetuate the myths surrounding the Gulf regions is by sending home
misleading photographs (Gardner, 2012). These often depict workers looking professional and
respectable while in reality they are working at the bottom of the social hierarchy (Gardner, 2012:
53). This edited version of their time in Qatar which is presented to their family and in turn the wider
community, is one of the many reasons people continue to migrate to the country according to
Gardner (2012: 54-6). The system of misinformation encompasses a range of different actors
including migrants themselves whom feed back into this cycle of deception which recruits more
workersthroughtheirfalse testimonies(Gardner,2012: 57).
While the adverse circumstances which many workers face in Qatar and other GCC countries are an
obvious abuse of their human rights, the process which surrounds these workers is complex. By
trying to keep their families happy, migrants contribute to and continue the cycle of misinformation
which put them in this position in the first place. As well as this, workers are trapped in a
sponsorship system which favours their employers and leaves them vulnerable to an array of
exploitations (ITUC, 2014). Workers may want to complain, however inefficient national bodies and
laws discourage them and make it hard to claim their human rights (ITCU, 2014). In the next section,
this dissertation will proceed to focus on the general debates regarding migration and human rights
as well as looking at some of the obstacles faced when dealing with these issues. The concepts of
structural violence, state sovereignty and trafficking will be studied and problematized in relation to
thiscase to lookat the broaderissuesfacingthe contemporaryhumanrightssystem.

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3. Migrationand Human Rights:Theoretical andPractical Obstacles
MigrationandHuman Rights
A complex network of actors and legal systems from the ground-level workers up to the state
officials has created a web of exploitation in Qatar. Considering that migration is such a widespread
and global phenomenon, with an estimated 232 million people living outside their home countries
(UN, 2013), it is surprising that it has been largely neglected within human rights discourse until
more recently (Taran, 2002: 9). Due to the massive scale in which migration flows take place and the
ways these affect various social, economic and political structures across the globe, there is a clear
need for such phenomenon to be seriously investigated. Human rights are hard to implement and
protect at the best of times but for those holding the ambiguous position as a marginal and low
status migrant worker, they become even more vulnerable to abuse and harder to safeguard (Taran,
2002: 13). The migration process for many travelling into Qatar and indeed elsewhere around the
globe is largely undocumented and while international laws surrounding foreign employment exist
theyare often unsuccessfully implemented(Sangroula,2008: 2).
The first major step regarding human rights and migration was the implementation of the
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of
Their Familiesin 1990 by the UN General Assembly (1990). This convention sets out a range of social,
political, civil and economic rights which are applied to both legal and illegal migrants and their
families creating the basis for contemporary discussions surrounding human rights and migration
(Ruhs, 2013: 1). The recognition that migrants and their families are unprotected and highly
vulnerable to human rights abuses is acknowledged throughout this document which also aims to
eliminate such exploitative situations (Taran, 2002: 17). While this convention has set a president for
protecting the rights of migrants across the globe, it was not put into force until 2003 and
disappointingly it has been ratified by less than 50 countries (UN, 2015). The majority of countries
which have ratified this convention are sending countries rather than host states, which raises
questions regarding the ways in which host states view and protect guest migrants (Ruhs, 2013: 1).
Taran (2002:18) blames the small number of ratifications on the lack of active promotion of this
convention within the UN system coupled with the resistance of certain states to apply and expand
human rights frameworks to include migrants. Ruh (2013: 13) argues this shows that the majority of
countries around the world do not see migrant rights as human rights which should be protected by

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law. This proves highly problematic for both activists trying to gain awareness and protection for
migrantrightsas well the migrantsthemselveswhowanttoclaimtheirrightsandresolve abuses.
Structural violenceandState Sovereignty
Due to the magnitude of migrant abuses in Qatar there is no surprise why the notion of structural
violence has been applied to this case. As defined in the introduction, structural violence as a
concept attempts to deal with and study the extreme inequalities and suffering which are produced
through the structures of society (Farmer, 1996). This idea has been applied to the case in Qatar to
explain the widespread human rights violations of migrants in the country through structural
mechanisms and forces. Donini et al. (2013: 11) have used this concept as a way to explain the
systematic exclusion and marginalization of the Nepali population within Qatar. The levels of abuse
which encompass actors on the ground up to transnational corporations means that it is hard to
pinpoint one particular cause of human rights violations as there are multiple and often invisible
perpetrators (Ho, 2007: 13). Despite this theory being useful in showing the different degrees of
violence which inflict everyone within a particular social structure, it deflects from the agency of
these migrants and their families to make the choice to move to Qatar for work (Gardner, 2012:
Gartaula et al., 2012). While the structure surrounding migrants in Qatar has certainly created a
situation of structural inequality there are obvious violators in this case as well. The recruitment and
sponsorship systems tying migrants to a single employer provides a clear basis for migrants to
become stuck in a situation of poverty and dependence (Amnesty International, 2013). Although this
concept is beneficial in theorizing issues regarding global inequalities and oppression, this should not
be used solely to explain the situation in Qatar as it is clear that there are obvious violators as well as
hiddenones.
As a recently independent nation, Qatar no doubt does not want other states and international
bodies interfering with its domestic affairs. Like Qatar, many other countries have shown a desire to
keep their sovereignty over their own territory when it comes to matters of human rights (Reisman,
1990). The notion of state sovereignty assumes that international law cannot interfere with state
affairs or “enforce” changes but can only persuade countries to honour their obligations for the sake
of national interests (Henkin, 1995/1996: 32). The potential over-emphasis of the state in the
protection of human rights and the previous insufficiency of the international organizations in such
matters suggests a more active stance is needed within the international community. While this idea
will be discussed further later, the issue of state sovereignty has hindered the ability of international
organisations to intervene in such matters. While international bodies, such as the International
Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the International Labour Organisation (ILO) put a certain

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amount of pressure on states to commit to their obligations, they are cautious not to encroach too
far into their affairs in the fear that they will stop cooperating (P, 2005: PAGE NO). States reluctance
to expand their present legislation to cover human rights is particularly problematic and illustrates
wider flaws regarding the human rights system as a whole (Taran, 2002: 36). The “price” of rights
has often been used as a way for states to avoid adopting human rights legislation into their
domestic laws, however this is not an acceptable justification for not allowing migrants their human
rights (Ruhs, 2013: 4). This makes it difficult to see how exactly international law is supposed to help
those who have faced rights abuses when the issue of state sovereignty still hangs over
contemporary debates. In Qatar, the government is willing to discuss matters of migration with
other states but the practical establishment of corresponding policies or institutions to aid migrants
is largely off-limits (Martin, 2012: 223). Qatar have used similar tactics to promote its willingness to
engage in international politics, including the hosting of the Qatar Law Forum in 2009 to show itself
as an international player within the field of law (Mednicoff, 2012: 194). Yet when it comes to actual
legislative reforms, Qatar has ignored international pressure and broken its own promises to reform
the kafala system (ITUC, 2014). State sovereignty then is clearly still an issue within contemporary
human rights discourse as states continue to want total control over their territories which prevents
certainmechanismsandlawsfrombeingproperlyimplemented.
Sex Trafficking
There is another key issue which has led to the rights of migrants being neglected from the
mainstream rhetoric surrounding human rights. The international attention placed on trafficking and
in particular sex trafficking as a global issue in recent years, while having some positive effects, has
also overshadowed other concepts of migration and forced labour (Mahdavi, 2012). Trafficking as a
phenomenon is complex and involves movement of men, women and children, voluntarily and
forced, for many different purposes and employment positions (Piotrowicz, 2004). This focus on sex
trafficking has produced a heavily gendered narrative centring on female experiences which has led
to other individuals that do not fit this criteria to be left out of the picture (Mahdavi, 2012: 91).
While the forcible trafficking of women for the sex industry is a serious issue which needs to be
addressed, the majority of polices which have been locally established around this problem have
forced many individuals further into the informal economy rather than helping them out (Mahdavi,
2012: 95). The tightening of borders and the subsequent restrictions this has had on migrants’
movements may have had the opposite effect to that which was intended by forcing trafficking
further underground (Taran, 2002). This issue has directly affected migrants in the Gulf region as in
2005 the authorities of the UAE were reviewing the proposed reforms to the kafala system with

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migrants rights groups until a Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report was released by the US Government
which diverted attention to the issue sex trafficking (Mahdavi, 2012: 97). Mahdavi (2012:97) argues
that by directing focus away from the broader context of migrants’ rights through concentrating on
one small areaof migration,otherindividualsthatare equallyimportantare subsequently ignored.
Rather than creating opportunities for reform and protective instruments to favour migrants, these
worldwide polices surrounding trafficking often provide increased challenges to migrants and forced
labourers (Mahdavi, 2012: 91). It is clear that while protocol has been put in place in an attempt to
protect these individuals, they are not working effectively to actualise their goals due to the lack of
promotion and international support (Newland, 2005). Migration as a global phenomenon has
created a multicultural world in which virtually all states are increasingly becoming more diverse
(Taran, 2002). This requires political, legal, social and economic mechanisms to be formed to allow
for mediation in an ever-changing society (Taran, 2002: 9). The national and international
mechanisms in place for migrants will now be discussed to place these individuals into a wider
human rights framework. The successes and failures of these bodies will be considered to bring out
furtherissues regardingmigrationandhumanrightsaswell asthe humanrightssystemasa whole.
4. Redressandresolution:humanrightsandnational andinternational mechanisms
Having briefly discussed the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Members of Their Families (UN General Assembly, 1990), it is clear that while
legislation such as this has been put in place in order to protect migrants it has often failed to do so.
In this particular case, there are several sources of redress which migrant workers in Qatar can seek
on a national level. While international bodies are also in place the successfulness of these
mechanismsare oftenlimitedasthisdissertationwill explore.
National
The first and perhaps most commonly used route taken for resolution is through migrants’ national
embassies. The Nepali embassy in Qatar has limited powers and resources as well as being under-
staffed and over-worked, which makes their influence over cases of abuse limited and largely
ineffective (Donini et al., 2013: 38). While embassy staff try to set up meetings, write to Qatari
authorities and provide help, these attempts are often unsuccessful and with dozens of Nepali
migrants arriving at their doors everyday they are only becoming more strained (Donini et al., 2013:
38). In some cases, workers may be refereed to or seek help from the Qatar Labour Department and
Court, however this process is lengthy and expensive if things proceed to a court level (ITUC, 2014).

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Workers themselves believe there is a bias towards sponsors which further discourages people from
using this mechanism (ITUC, 2014: 9). Migrants that have used this service to complain have been
threatened, blacklisted and even deported by employers according to the ITUC (2014: 9) report.
While complaints over rights abuses can be made to these services, sponsors often ignore the
subsequent decisions made by the department and without a creditable enforcement mechanism
this system is generally unsuccessful (ITUC, 2014). The final major body in place to specifically
address human rights violations is the National Human Rights Committee in Qatar which seeks to
promote and provide protection of human rights for those within the state, including citizens,
residents and transit travellers (NHRC, 2015). The aims of this Committee includes assisting and
empowering those who have faced rights violations alongside advocating increased regional and
international cooperation (Access, 2015). Despite having good intentions, this mechanism has been
largely ineffective in helping migrant labourers whom have used it as a source of redress (ITCU,
2014: 19). ITCU (2014: 19) noted that workers hadlittle faith in this system to resolve their problems
as they saw this body as an extension of the corrupt government which meant many migrants were
too scared to go there. Unfortunately for the migrant workers seeking to solve their human rights
abuses, the National Human Rights Committee and other national bodies in Qatar are working
within a fragmented system with ineffective laws and courts which frequently give impunity for
exploitativeemployers(ITUC,2014: 19).
International
Alongside these national bodies, there are several international organizations which work in relation
with the UN and focus specifically on issues of migration and labour. IOM was established in 1951 to
promote a more humane migration process by providing services and advice to governments and
migrants alike (IOM, 2015a). IOM has 157 member states which are subject to the IOM Constitution
and 10 states, including Qatar, holding observer status (IOM, 2015a). Acting as part of the UN
system, they are given responsibility for many ad hoc activities but lack the resources and budget to
successfully carry out their global task(Newland, 2005: 9). While IOMare concerned specifically with
issues of migration, there are several other international bodies which centre themselves around
global labour rights and so directly and indirectly involve migration. ILO became a specialized agency
of the UN in 1946 with the aim of promoting rights revolving around work to encourage fair
employment opportunities and strengthen international dialogue surrounding labour-related issues
(ILO, 2015). This organization sets up and oversees international labour standards through
conventions, recommendations and their annual International Labour Conference which acts as a
platform for ILO state members to express their thoughts and negotiate (Newland, 2005: 9). Other

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work-related mechanisms exist like the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the ITUC which behave
insimilarwaysto promote the rightsandfreedomsof laboursincludingmigrantworkers.
Together with these international bodies, the UN assembly and the Human Rights Commission (HRC)
can be utilised more generally in the case of human rights abuses. Established in 1947, this body is
used as an instrument to monitor state compliance with international human rights law and to
investigate any allegations of violations (Newland, 2005: 12). While dealing more broadly with
human rights on an international scale, the HRC set up a working group on migrants in 1997 with the
goal to gather information on the obstacles preventing migrants’ human rights and to provide
recommendations (Newland, 2005: 12). The UN Special Rapporteur implemented by the UN in 1999
to investigate human rights issues surrounding migration is another tool created to tackle such
issues (OHCHR, 2015). This position has the jurisdiction to supervise all countries on the globe,
regardless of if they have signed the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (1990) (OHCHR, 2015). In 2013, the current Special
Rapporteur, Francois Crepeau, visited Qatar and, as previously mentioned, observed an array of
abuses present in the country (HRC, 2014). This visit not only verified many of the exploitative
systems in place in Qatar, like the paying of recruitment fees and the kafala system, but has also
helpedtobringthe case of Qatar intothe centre of internationalhumanrightsdiscussions.
While these UN bodies have had success in some avenues, these systems are mostly ineffective and
provide limited opportunity for advocacy (Donini et al., 2013: 44). None of these international
organizations have enough funding or resources to be able to monitor or promote the protection of
human rights properly (Taran, 2002: 33). The exception to thisis the field of trafficking as this area of
migration has received considerable attention and funding from international bodies and
governments as previously discussed (Taran, 2002: 34). While such international mechanisms exist
to protect migrants such as those residing in Qatar, these bodies have done little in the way of
concretely safeguarding workers. While reports can create awareness of the issue which can
indirectly put pressure on states to make changes, these international mechanisms lack resources
and a sense of authority which often renders them inadequate to deal with such widespread human
rightsabuses.
5. Discussionof recommendationsandchangestoimprove the situationinQatar:
Through the discussion of the human rights situation among workers in Qatar it is clear that the
current social and legal structure surrounding these migrants is allowing a space for exploitation and

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14
inequality. Several international bodies, including Amnesty International, DLA Piper and the ITUC,
have produced recommendations for Qatar in the hope that these will be considered and integrated
into forthcoming reformation plans. Together with these, the Special Rapporteur’s report and list of
recommendations regarding Qatar’s current legislation shall be discussed here alongside the role of
FIFA and the widerinternational communityinsuchreformationdebates.
The most widely encouraged change put forward by national and international mechanisms as well
as members of the international community is the reformation of the kafala system. The ITUC (2014,
16) have stated that the only way to ensure that migrants’ rights can be actualised and protected is
through the serious improvement or abolishment of this exploitative legislation. Likewise, the DLA
Piper (2014:56) report calls for a careful reviewing of this system to allow improvements to
strengthen migrants’ rights as part of Qatar’s international obligations. Amnesty International (2013:
124) has repeatedly called on the Qatari government for the removal of the sponsorship law to allow
migrants to move between jobs and borders more freely without the permission from their
sponsors. Alongside these campaigns from international bodies and NGOs to seriously reform this
legislation, Francois Crepeau argued in his Special Rapporteur report, for the abolishment of the
kafalasystemonthe groundsthat it isan avenue of abuse andexploitation(HRC,2014:1).
Although FIFA have largely failed to address or tackle the issue of migrants’ rights in Qatar (Amnesty
International, 2013), they have stated that they are working closely with Qatari officials to make
concrete steps towards improving the welfare of migrant workers (FIFA, 2014a). FIFA (2014a) also
claim they have set up meetings to enable discussions on such issues with human rights
organizations, football stakeholders and other international and national bodies. It seems that FIFA
are trying to act as mediators in this particular case when in actuality they hold a level of
responsibility for the widespread exploitation which many migrants have fallen victim to. I shall
discuss this idea furtherlater, however itis important to point out here that the Qatar governmentis
much more likely to submit to such requests for reformation if the internationally powerful
corporations, like FIFA, push for it. While international NGOS and human rights mechanisms can
apply a certain amount of pressure onto States, this has largely been ignored as Qatar have yet to
reformtheirkafalasystemdespitepromisesmade todoso (ITCU,2014).
While the sponsorship system remains the most harmful piece of legislation, the recruitment
process is also in serious need of reform due to its exploitative nature. The ITUC (2014: 6) have
argued that the brokerage scheme which surrounds migrants entry into the country needs to be
subjected to change and responsibility needs to be placed onto these recruitment agencies. The
abolishment of recruitment fees which leave workers in mounting debt has been recommended by

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15
the Special Rapporteur (HRC, 2014: 17) and DLA Piper (2014: 42). DLA Piper (2014: 42) has also
suggested increased governmental power is needed to blacklist recruitment agents whom have
misinformed and exploited migrant workers through this system. Alongside these reformations, the
desire for new legislation to allow increased freedoms for migrant workers has been advocated by
many NGOs and members of the international community (ITUC, 2014). The Special Rapporteur
(HRC, 2014: 17) noted that Qatar’s current legislation is not adequate and is ineffectively enforced
when it is in place which has led to several human rights abuses in the country. Other suggestions
include putting effective grievance procedures in place (ITCU, 2014), increasing regulation by the
authorities to prevent the confiscation of passports (HRC, 2014: 18), and widespread improvements
of wage levelsandworkingconditions(DLA Piper,2014: 11-2).
The list of recommendations for change is endless in this case and while certaininternational groups,
including FIFA, seem optimistic that the human rights situation for migrants in the Gulf will improve,
others are slightly more pessimistic. The abolishment of the kafala system is central to enabling
migrant rights to be realised, however many other structural improvements throughout Qatari
society need to be recognised also to allow workers to properly claim their rights. After previously
discussing the relatively unsuccessful National Human Rights Committee in Qatar, I believe that this
body should be strengthen to provide more effect redress by violated migrants in the case of human
rights abuses (See: DLA Piper, 2014). Bonds between this organization and wider international
human rights bodies could also be reinforced through increased cooperation and the sharing of
information and resources. By sharing information about the human rights situation in Qatar which
has previously been hard to gather (See: ITUC, 2014), the abuses of migrants can be better
understood by both national and international human rights bodies. This increased cooperation
would hopefully encourage the strengthening of human rights in the country through subtly
integrating Qatar into the wider international human rights system. The role of the international
community is also essential in this instance as due to the economic and political nature of this
particular case, it seems that large transnational companies are more likely to have influence over
the Qatari authorities than human rights bodies. While FIFA and other international companies with
stakes in the 2022 World Cup have to some extent advocated for increased welfare for migrant
workers (FIFA, 2013: FIFA, 2014b), there is little accountability of these groups for the violations
occurring under their watch. FIFA is a highly influential and powerful organization which should take
a more active role in overlooking how its events are created and organized including the companies
and workers involved in this process. Rather than state actors putting pressure on Qatar to achieve
long-term developmental goals surrounding human rights, non-state actors may be more effective in
pushing for immediate changes through legislation. Although Qatar has repeatedly promised to

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16
improve the situation of migrant workers and reform their current sponsorship system under the
suggestion of concerned international bodies, there is little evidence of any significant progress
beingmade (ITUC,2014: 6).
6. Conclusion:
The case of Qatar provides an example of a complex human rights situation which places migrants
and their rightsin an ambiguous and vulnerable position. From the recruitment process to the kafala
system, migrants’ are subjected to a range exploitative practices which keeps them trapped in their
marginal locations within this ultra-rich society (Amnesty International, 2013). National mechanisms
remain restricted in their ability to protect migrants through their location within a fragmented
system, while international bodies have similar problems due to a lack of resources and funding. In
this particular case there is a need to strengthen the bonds between these national and
international mechanisms to enable a flow of information to help create more immediate and
concrete changes in terms of legislation and redress methods for migrants. While it is clear that
changes cannot and will not happen over-night (FIFA, 2014b), certain immediate mechanisms can be
put in place to help aid reformation. The kafala system is in urgent need of reform as this legislation
is at the centre of abuse in Qatar and will remain to be until it is replaced with more human rights
and migrant friendly legislation. The argument from states that such legislation costs too much to
implement, as discussed, is not an acceptable excuse (Ruhs, 2013: 4), particularly from one of the
richestcountriesinthe world.
As well as illustrating some of the major human rights obstacles present in the Gulf region, this case
study has brought wider issues surrounding structural violence, state sovereignty, trafficking and the
roles of state and non-state actors to the surface. Through this study of the human rights violations
occurring within Qatar, wider issues highlighting the flaws of human rights system can be observed.
While legislation exists in the form of conventions and other legal documentation, there is a lack of
awareness and implementation among states as well as no concrete enforcement mechanisms to
ensure such international standards are being upheld (Ruhs, 2013). The reluctance of states to
implement this international law into their domestic legislation is also problematic, illustrating the
need for the human rights system to review their enforcement methods. While the role of the state
is vital in the promotion and protection of human rights, particularly through the implementation of
legislation and creation and strengthen of national human rights mechanisms, the duties of the
international community have been largely overlooked. Members of the global community including

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non-state bodies and transnational organizations should adopt a more engaged and active role in
the promotion and protection of human rights. In this particular case, FIFA need to push Qatari
officials to make changes to their laws regarding migrant workers as it is their duty as an
international organisation to ensure their events are upholding universal international and human
rights laws. FIFA are well-aware of the human rights abuses migrants are facing on a daily basis (FIFA
2013: 2014a) yet they and other companies are failing to uphold their obligations and remain silent
while those building the stadia in which these groups will profit are dying on a daily basis (ITUC,
2014: 20). It is alsoimportant that these non-governmental organizations provide increased help and
resources to states in which violations are occurring to resolve human rights violations more
effectively and promptly. Increased accountability and pressure within the international community
for corporations and other non-state actors to uphold humanitarian duties regarding the protection
of humanrightsisalsoessential.
The current vulnerability of migrants needs to be addressed and tackled promptly as the number of
those moving around the globe for work is increasing on an annual basis (Taran, 2002). If, as the
ITUC (2014) have predicted, 50,000 more workers will be required to construct the rest of the
infrastructure in Qatar before the World Cup begins then this issue needs to be taken more
seriously. As hundreds of thousands of migrants from Nepal and elsewhere are struggling to escape
the country which has subjected them to a range of human rights violations, the world watches onin
fascinationof howthe tinycountrywill cope withthe pressuresof the WorldCup.

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