1. THE EURASIAN PIPELINE POLITICS: RESURGENT TURKEY
AND THE SYRIAN CRISIS
* Ramu C.M
Introduction
The prolonged turmoil in Syria has several overtones, interpreted through varying dimensions
that are mutually overlapping – but also disparate. What is often less discussed is the relevance
of pipeline geopolitics, in conflagrating a conflict that sparked up as a mere civil war, just like
any other anti-establishment protest across the rest of the Arab world. Notably, the argument
over two major proposed pipeline projects is reflected in the continuing carnage engulfing Syria.
These are the proposed Iran-Iraq-Syria gas pipeline and the Qatar-Saudi Arabia-Jordan-Syria gas
pipeline respectively. The former is often called the Islamic Pipeline.
Iran and Qatar jointly holds ownership over the South Pars/North Dome gas field. The gas field,
located beneath the Persian Gulf seabed, is the single largest of its kind in the world. Iran owns
one-third of the gas field (the South Pars portion) while Qatar holds the rest of it; i.e. the North
Dome section. It has been Qatar‟s long held dream to export its natural gas to Europe, via a
pipeline transiting Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria and Turkey. This would succinctly complement
its booming LNG exports, upon which its economy thrives. Qatar had floated the idea of the
pipeline back in 2009. However, in a setback for Qatar, the pipeline went into the doldrums
when Syrian President Bashar-al-Assad decided to reject the proposal.
In contravention to Qatar‟s designs, Assad instead signed a memorandum of understanding with
Iran and Iraq, for a USD 10 billion pipeline deal. This was touted to be the Islamic pipeline, the
construction of which was supposed to begin in 2016. Assad‟s preference for the Islamic
Pipeline over the Qatar-Saudi Arabia Pipeline, had reasons that deserve no discounting. As a
whole, Syria stood to gain from either pipeline because of its inevitable location as a common
transit. But pressure from two important Syrian allies influenced Assad‟s decision. These are
Iran and Russia. Assad and a majority of his ruling contingency hail from the Alawite clan,
which is a sub-sect of Shia Islam. Iran has time and again offered patronage and support to the
incumbent Syrian leadership, since the latter constitutes the larger Shia-crescent, comprising
Iran, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. Moreover, Assad‟s Syria serves as a conduit for Iran‟s supply of
arms and assistance to its protégé, Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Notwithstanding the quid pro quo between Iran and Assad‟s Syria over helping to maintain the
former‟s sphere of influence, the Islamic pipeline speaks volumes about Iran‟s ambition to
become a prospective exporter of natural gas to the hungry markets of Europe. Surprisingly,
being the world‟s second largest holder of natural gas reserves (and the largest in terms of proven

2. reserves), Iran has for long been able to exploit only a fraction of its immense potential; courtesy
the sanctions regime. Owing to the sanctions on transfer of technology and incompetent
international investment, Iran‟s oil and gas infrastructure, particularly refineries and terminals
(both oil and LNG) remains disproportionately crippled. Under such circumstances, the Islamic
pipeline would have resuscitated the ailing hydrocarbon sector. On top of that, Europe could
slowly substitute its heavy dependence on Russian gas with Iranian gas from the South Pars
field.
Russia also had its own strategic reasons to support the Islamic pipeline. Although it is not a
direct beneficiary of Iranian gas flowing into European markets – insofar as to invite competition
to its monopoly over the European gas corridor, Russia risks losing lesser from the Iranian
pipeline than it would from the Qatari counterpart. For one, Iran is a significant market for the
Russian defense industry and both countries have also gone to the extent of discussing oil and
gas swap deals amongst each other. All the more, post-Soviet Russia has been a strategic ally of
Iran, with Iran‟s first nuclear reactor (Bushehr-1) having constructed with Russian assistance. In
fact, Russia has even offered to construct the second nuclear reactor in the Bushehr Atomic
Energy Complex. In the case of Syria, Russia holds a key ally in the Assad regime. Syria houses
Russia‟s only warm water naval base outside the old Soviet space, namely the Tartus base near
the strategic city of Homs. And Assad has vowed to lease it out to the Russians, as long as he
stays in power.
Pipelines and External Meddling in Syria
Just before the beginning of the anti-regime protests in Syria (in early 2011), the then Saudi
Intelligence Chief, Bandar bin Sultan had visited Russian President Vladimir Putin, in Moscow.
Although not much publicised, the intention of the visit was to dissuade Russia from supporting
the Islamic pipeline; but at the same time, garner its support for the Qatar-Saudi pipeline – by
offering to forge a weapons deal with Russia. Bandar‟s bargaining chip with Putin was the
indirect threat of unleashing Saudi-controlled Sunni Wahabbi extremist elements in Chechnya.
The threat, however, did not exclude the use of Saudi proxies to destabilise Russia‟s most
important ally in the Levant. The meeting ended on a somber note, with Putin refusing to budge
to Saudi pressure.i
Incidentally, the protests in Syria took an altogether different trajectory, after the initial anti-
regime uprisings that were spearheaded by a section of the disaffected class. In name and
designation, though there was a Syrian opposition (the so-called Syrian National Council) and a
Free Syrian Army (mainly comprising defectors from Assad‟s armed forces), the opposition soon
began getting infiltrated with Saudi, Qatari and Turkey-supported proxy groups (mostly radical
elements). Eventually, the opposition was fractured and different Sunni extremist groups started
waging their own violent campaigns against the Assad regime. Prominent among these fringe

3. elements were the Ahrar-al-Sham (supported and funded by the Saudis) and the Al-Qaeda
affiliate, Jabhat-al-Nusra (aided by Turkey). These groups, among others, were clubbed together
under the umbrella organisation calling itself the Army of Conquest (Jaish-al-Fatah). It is to be
understood that the Turkish government of Erdogan also stood to lose its prospective role as
transit provider, if the Islamic pipeline fared over the Qatari one. Interestingly, the West (the
United States and its European allies), along with its regional Arab allies and Israel, for a long
time, covertly and overtly supported the Syrian opposition, in the hope of bringing down Assad –
and thereby curtailing Russian and Iranian influence in the region.
However, the situation in Syria deteriorated after the mushrooming of the Islamic State (IS), as
early as the spring of 2014. Its exact origin, although not very certain, the group is arguably a
byproduct of the chaos created after the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. IS started gathering leeway
and strength after the withdrawal of the US forces from Iraq. To add to the woes, the nepotistic
practices of the Nouri-al-Maliki government created discontent among the subjugated Sunni
minorities of Northern Iraq. As a consequence, several young men from the disaffected Iraqi
Sunni populace joined the IS army. Going on to establish an „Islamic Caliphate‟ by controlling
large swathes of Iraq and Syria, the radical group has waged a violent campaign against Assad‟s
forces, and a brutal pogrom against all regional sects that it considers apostates. The group has
publicly threatened and antagonised almost all the stakeholders (both regional and external) in
the Syrian conflict, including the backers and even the opponents of Assad. Just as it is difficult
to identify any form of clandestine assistance to the IS from either a state or a non-state player,
the group has nevertheless been selling huge quantities of oil (from fields under its control) in the
black market; insofar as to say that the organisation‟s balance sheets are a discernible indicator
of its enviable wealth.ii
Even on the pretext of IS being a common enemy of all, the rise of the extremist group,
complemented by the continuing turmoil in Syria and Iraq, has temporarily put paid to the
construction of the Islamic Pipeline. As obvious as the fact that a large chunk of the pipeline‟s
supposed-to-be transit territory (within Iraq and Syria) comes under IS control, the Battle of
Homs has ostensibly been one of the most striking evidences to the pipeline politics that lay
entrenched in the Syrian conflict. Homs, a strategic Syrian city, would have been an important
conduit for the Islamic Pipeline. More importantly, the city, with its well equipped energy
generation and supply infrastructure, would have served as a significant distributor of gas
generated electricity to other major cities like Damascus and the long-besieged Aleppo. This is
the reason why the regime forces and the opposition fought over the city for almost three years,
with the former finally emerging victorious.
However, with IS emerging as the new boogeyman of terror, and making forays into Homs
province, the regime is doing all it can to beat back the IS offensive. This, indisputably, is bad
news for Iran and Russia. This is evident in Putin‟s concomitant reaction to the crisis, by sending
Russian jetfighters to Syria – both to defend the Assad regime (thereby protecting Russian
interests) and to nip IS in its bud; before the repercussions are felt on Russian soil, presumably

4. through their brethren in Chechnya. The Iranian Revolutionary Guards have nonetheless been
assisting the Assad forces, either directly, or through its protégés, Hezbollah and other Shiite
militias based in Iraq and Syria. Therefore, in order to safeguard common interests in Syria, the
Russians are coordinating with the Iranians, in a battle of manifold interests. On the flipside, with
the Obama administration‟s “better late than never” realisation that American weapons were
ending up in the wrong hands, the United States has not only toned down its anti-Assad rhetoric
but also shifted its priority towards combating IS terrorism. As a rule, this has resulted in some
form of friction between the US and its Arab Gulf allies, as the latter still fervently support
selected factions in the Syrian opposition. The IS-masterminded terror attacks in Paris (on 13
November) only reinforced the West‟s vigour in exacerbating its bombings on the terror group‟s
turfs within Syria. With France also joining the offensive, the West is slowly delinking the anti-
IS campaign from the anti-Assad fight. Simply put, excluding the Turks and the Sunni Arab
nations (the most explicit being Saudi Arabia and Qatar), the opposition against Assad is
gradually getting confined to a smaller circle.
Meanwhile, Erdogan‟s Turkey is displaying a sort of strange ambivalence in its approach
towards IS. Erdogan‟s uncanny way of channeling the anti-IS campaign, to deliver blows to both
Assad and successive Turkish governments‟ longtime foe, PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) --
ought to be taken into attention. With his consent to offering the Incirlik Airbase to the US
Forces fighting IS, Erdogan has been able to successfully strong-arm the US into not criticising
Turkey‟s deliberate targeting of the PKK in the shroud of the anti-IS campaign. This comes after
the PKK, along with the Syrian Kurds and the US air raids, successfully pushed back the IS
offensive over the Syrian border town (with Turkey) of Kobani.iii
As a matter of fact, Erdogan‟s
real intention in creating a buffer zone along its border with Syria is not so much as to ward off
IS from its territory, than to draw a wedge between the Turkish Kurds and their Syrian
counterparts. No less suspicious is the Turkish border authorities‟ allegedly illicit involvement in
the facilitation of hassle-free trade for the IS. Turkey‟s alleged complicity comes as no surprise,
considering the likely loss of transit rights in the event of the Islamic pipeline attaining fruition.
So, looking at the way things stand, with the unfolding of such a complex scenario along Syria‟s
fault lines, the dynamics of the pipeline geopolitics in Eurasia has subsequently taken on varying
proportions.
European Energy Security and the Dependence on Russian Gas
Energy security has arguably been at the forefront of the European Union‟s endeavours into the
much discussed Eurasian hydrocarbon corridor. Having said that, the expansion/enlargement of
the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) towards Eastern Europe and Eurasia is justified
in terms of not only gaining access to the vast oil and gas deposits, but also for the control of the
strategic transit corridors. Russia, on the other hand, is apprehensive about the West‟s overtures
into its traditional backyard. Anticipating this long brewing tension between Russia and the West

5. for asserting suzerainty over the post-Soviet republics, China engineered the SCO (Shanghai
Cooperation Agreement) as a counterweight to the NATO‟s inroads into the Central Asian
region. With the active participation of Russia and all CIS (Commonwealth of Independent
States) nations, sans Tajikistan, the SCO also facilitates China‟s active foraying into the Central
Asian hydrocarbon sector. But so far, the heavy European demand for natural gas has been a
source of contention, specifically between the EU and Russia; and not directly involving China.
For that matter, it is pertinent to understand the geopolitics of pipelines between Russia and the
EU; rather than dissecting it entirely from the perspective of a NATO-Russia or NATO-SCO
rivalry.
By early 2014, almost 40 percent of Europe‟s gas imports were met by Russia. This has
remained a cause of serious concern for the EU, especially after some untoward incidents that
ensued over the last decade. The temporary suspension of Russian gas flows, respectively in
2006 and 2009, had created paranoid reactions in Europe. On both instances, the Russian gas
giant Gazprom had accused its Ukrainian counterpart Naftohaz Ukrayiny, of diverting gas
(meant for Russia‟s other European customers) for domestic usage. The disputes also covered
contentious issues related to supplies, pricing and debts.iv
Although the flow of gas through the
Ukraine-traversing pipelines (the most prominent being the Yamal pipeline) continued, Russia
was also considering alternative routes to the supply of gas to its more western European
customers, particularly Germany. Meanwhile, the European Union was simultaneously devising
new energy policies aimed at scuttling down the Russian/Gazprom gas monopoly over the
European market. Fanning the flames of anti-Russian sentiments were the Russian interventions
in the 2008 Georgian crisis and the 2014 Ukrainian crisis respectively.
The Third Energy Package was one such mechanism targeted at Gazprom. Apparently, Gazprom
owns and operates a major share of the Russian pipelines going to Europe. As per the clauses of
the Third Energy Package, no natural gas company shall own, or have full operating rights over
pipelines within the territory of the European Union. The European Commission‟s adoption of
the package was met with sharp reprisal from Russia. Subsequently, the latter filed a lawsuit with
the WTO (World Trade Organisation) against the EU for its stringent regulations. Another such
development happened in Ukraine. In a scathing rebuke to Russian military intervention in
Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, the incumbent Ukrainian government of Petro Poroshenko decided
to divest 49 percent stakes in the Ukrainian gas transportation system (pipelines) to European
Union and US-based energy companies. This was not only a dig at Gazprom but also a clear sign
of the post-Yanukovich Ukraine‟s attempt to move closer to the EU and US. In both the above
cases, a major pile of anti-Russian policy responses came from the Central and Eastern
(including the Baltic States) European region. For example, the brainchild of the Third Energy
Package was Donald Tusk, who is the incumbent Chairman of the European Council, and also a
former Polish Prime Minister. However, none of these measures or developments stopped
Germany from continuing to maintain its healthy economic relation with Russia; driven
exclusively by a sharp sense of pragmatism.

6. Germany is the largest consumer of Russian gas, in Europe. A profound testimony to this is the
Nord Stream pipeline. The natural gas pipeline, an engineering marvel of its kind, connects
Russian gas fields with Germany, traversing under the Baltic Sea. Being the strongest and most
influential player in the EU, Germany has piggybacked on Chancellor Angela Merkel‟s rapport
with her Russian counterpart Putin; so far as to completely delink Russo-German energy ties
from the EU‟s energy policies. Having commissioned the first phase of the Nord Stream pipeline
in 2011, both countries, in September 2015, signed a shareholder‟s agreement for the
construction of the second phase, due to be commissioned in 2019. In this way, Russia will be
able to completely circumvent the volatile and trouble-prone Ukrainian transit corridor,
essentially handing it more bargaining power over the Ukrainians in any future negotiations over
gas supplies. Furthermore, Germany could rewrite the geopolitical equations of European energy
security, by being a prospective distributor of Russian gas to Western and Central Europe.v
The South Stream was intended to be the Russian answer to Southern Europe‟s burgeoning
energy needs. However, the project was shelved before it even began. The pipeline was touted to
take Russian and Caspian gas from the Russian Black Sea shores to the Balkan countries and the
rest of Southern Europe through Bulgaria. Nevertheless, construction of this challenging
undersea pipeline would have incurred a huge expense, on a never-before seen scale. The
extension of the off-shore segment of the South Stream pipeline was supposedly a Trans-Balkan
pipeline, taking the gas from Burgas terminal in Bulgaria to Alexandroupoli, off the Adriatic
coast of Greece. The South Stream would have bypassed Turkey and also the heavily-clogged
Turkish straits of Bosporus and Dardanelles – thereby being able to tone down the long-
reiterated complaints from Turkey, pointing to the dangers of heavy shipping and pipeline traffic
through its sensitive choke point (adjoining the densely populated city of Istanbul).
Russia‟s decision to proceed with the South Stream was also in partial terms, a retaliatory gesture
to Turkey‟s decision to be party to the rival Western-backed Nabucco pipeline. The Nabucco
project was supposed to link the Shah Deniz gas fields of Azerbaijan to Central Europe, via
Turkey. It would have basically comprised the already existing BTE (Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum)
pipeline, which would be extended to Europe through the Trans-Anatolian pipeline from
Erzurum (traversing the Turkish central country and then passing under the Straits of Bosporus
and Dardanelles). In Europe, the pipeline was to be extended till Austria through Bulgaria,
Romania and Hungary. However, till the latter half of 2014, the South Stream project appeared
more feasible in comparison to the Nabucco project. Nonetheless, Russia was quite confident
about the materialization of the South Stream project, all the more after the project bagged the
requisite environmental clearances -- and Gazprom and Eni (of Italy) jointly negotiated with the
Turkish government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan for usage rights in the Turkish territorial waters.
But later on, the South Stream project started to go through stormy waters. The initial blow came
with the backing out of the Bulgarian government (in 2011) from the Trans-Balkan pipeline,
citing environmental ramifications and financial constraints. Later on, under a covert agreement,
Iran was arm-twisted by the US and the EU into getting its support for the Nabucco pipeline (and

7. also for rerouting Iranian gas to Europe through it), as against the South Stream pipeline. This
had featured as one of the conditions put forward by the West in exchange for slackening down
some of the sanctions and releasing a sizeable share of Iran‟s frozen assets (oil revenues) – as
part of the November 2013 interim nuclear agreement between Iran and P5+1. The final blow
was delivered by the Ukraine crisis, following which Russia came under punitive Western
sanctions – resulting in the much-anticipated devaluation of the Russian Ruble. All the more,
falling crude oil prices came at a no better time for Russia. Wilting under the combined pressure
of all these factors, the decision to cancel the South Stream project was made by Putin himself
(in December 2014), citing Gazprom‟s inability to finance the project. However, the nail in the
coffin for the South Stream project was EU‟s stringent energy policies, particularly the Third
Energy Package, aimed at curtailing the Russian gas monopoly over the European energy
market.vi
The cancellation of the South Stream pipeline did not close the door on Russia‟s gas overtures to
Southern Europe. The alternative that is being foreseen is the Turkish Stream. This idea was
floated to Erdogan by Putin himself, during the latter‟s visit to Turkey in December 2014. As
expected, the announcement followed the decision to forego the South Stream project. Putin
deliberately christened the proposed project Turkish Stream; this was to appease Turkey, whose
indispensability in the Eurasian energy conduit seems to be only growing with the increasing
turmoil in Syria. However, before speculating about the feasibility of the Turkish Stream, it is
imperative to understand the already existing energy ties between Russia and Turkey. The seeds
of this emerging bilateral energy cooperation were sowed with the Blue Stream project.
Blue Stream was planned to proceed in two phases. The first phase of Blue Stream connects the
Russian Black sea terminal of Beregovaya to the Turkish counterpart in Samsun – traversing
under the Black Sea. From Samsun, the pipeline then extends all the way to the Turkish capital
city of Ankara. It was commissioned in 2003 and was a joint collaborative effort of Gazprom and
Eni (of Italy), under the auspices of the joint agreement entered into between Gazprom and
BOTAS (of Turkey). This pipeline was a win-win for both Russia and Turkey as well – since
Turkey benefited from not having to pay for the extra burden of re-importing Russian gas
through Ukraine, Moldova, and the Balkan states of Romania and Bulgaria.vii
The idea of a
second phase of Blue Stream was first conceived in 2002. This would be another pipeline
parallel to Blue Stream-1, but projected to be further extended to the Turkish Mediterranean port
city of Ceyhan – from where the gas would be shipped to the Levantine states of Cyprus, Israel,
Lebanon and Syria. However, of late, with the crisis in Syria becoming intractable, and also with
the discovery of offshore natural gas reserves off Israel, Blue Stream-2 has been irrevocably put
in the backburner. Given the underlying circumstances, Russia is placing its bets on the Turkish
Stream.

8. Indispensible Turkey and the Three Sources of Gas
The chaos in Syria has had its own set of beneficiaries. But the clear winner is none other than
Turkey. Due to the protracted warfare, not only has the Iran-Iraq-Syria Islamic pipeline been
sidelined, but the same fate has befallen the Qatar-Saudi-Jordan-Syria-Turkey pipeline too. With
the above two pipelines falling out of contention, the Eurasian pipeline geopolitics is undergoing
a transitional shift. In the current scenario, there are three potential sources of gas for Europe,
from Eurasia. These are Russia, Azerbaijan (the Caspian Basin) and Iran (the South Pars, in the
Persian Gulf). Interestingly, for all these sources of gas, Turkey dons the role of the common
unavoidable transit provider. So far, Norway and Russia meet a lion‟s share of the European
energy demand. However, apart from the Nord Stream, there is currently no other pipeline
network linking the Russian gas fields to Europe, bypassing Ukraine. Same way, the cancellation
of the South Stream (which would have bypassed both Ukraine as well as Turkey) has forced
Russia to rely on Turkey, for transporting its gas to Southern Europe. Moreover, Turkey being a
non-EU member state, does not have to abide by the rules of the Third Energy Package.
Russia has two options on the table for transporting its gas through Turkey. As a first measure,
Russian gas shipments through the Blue Stream pipeline can be rerouted to Europe through the
Trans Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP). TANAP is the proposed extension of the BTE pipeline (also
known as the South Caucasus Pipeline), which brings gas from the Shah Deniz gas-2 field in the
Caspian waters of Azerbaijan. The construction of the pipeline is already underway. TANAP
starts from Erzurum terminal (where the BTE pipeline terminates), and cuts through the Turkish
central corridor, till the Turkish-Greek border. The possibility of complementing the Azerbaijani
gas with Russian gas, through the TANAP, is already considered in the fray. Putin‟s promise to
increase the capacity of the Blue Stream by laying an additional parallel pipeline (using
resources earmarked for the annulled South Stream project), only adds tenacity to the argument.
Nevertheless, the Azerbaijani gas, earmarked for the TANAP is not sufficient for shipment, all
the way to Europe. So, complementing it with Russian gas seems like an open suggestion.
The second option for Russia is the Turkish Stream. The proposed pipeline would take Russian
gas, under the Black Sea, and would terminate at the Turkish-Greek border. From there onwards,
Russia is further considering two options. As an initial possibility, Russia is considering linking
the Turkish Stream with the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP). TAP is part of the Southern Gas
Corridor, an ambitious project initiated by the West; especially the European Union and the US –
to reduce Europe‟s dependence on Russian gas. Both the TANAP and TAP are part of the
Southern Gas Corridor. TAP would extend from the Turkish-Greek border, traversing Albania
and then under the Adriatic Sea, to reach Italy. From Italy, the pipeline system may be extended
to connect with other distributary pipelines, going to various South/South-Central European
countries. However, due to the disagreements between Russia and the EU over the latter‟s energy
policies, particularly the Third Energy Package, Russia is also considering other alternatives.
One such proposed idea is to build an extension to the Turkish Stream, from Greece, through

9. Macedonia, Serbia and Hungary.viii
One reason behind this is that Macedonia and Serbia are not
EU member states; and hence, the Third Energy Package and its jurisdictions do not apply to
them. However, despite the aura of optimism, the Turkish Stream would still cost Russia a
fortune; and it remains to be seen how Russia would go ahead with the project, in the light of its
involvement in Syria. Notwithstanding the limitations of speculating, things can work either way
for Russia.
On the other hand, the European Union is fervently figuring out all possible ways of reducing its
dependence on Russian gas. This has been a continuing trend ever since the Ukrainian imbroglio.
The relatively well-progressing Southern Gas Corridor was born out of the ashes of the much-
anticipated Nabucco pipeline. Encompassing the South Caucasus (BTE) pipeline and the
TANAP, the Nabucco-West pipeline was poised to be the European leg of the Nabucco project.
The Nabucco-West pipeline would have continued on from Western Turkey, traversing Bulgaria,
Romania, Hungary and Austria. Putting paid to this project was the failure of consensus within
the participating EU nations. Hungary specifically, had disagreements regarding the nation-wise
allocation of funds for the project. In addition to the budgetary constraints, there were also
impediments to the supply of gas to the pipelines, so as to meet the target capacity requirements.
Egypt, Iraq and Turkmenistan backed out of the project, which in turn substantially brought
down the required quantity of gas to be fed into the pipeline. While Egypt‟s reason was that it
needed the gas to meet domestic demand, Iraqi (including from the Kurdish Autonomous
Region) shipments were crippled by the IS insurgency and the Turkish government-PKK rivalry.
As for Turkmenistani gas, the most convenient way of linking the Turkmen gas fields with the
Nabucco project, would be through a Trans Caspian pipeline. This pipeline, which would go
under the Caspian waters, seems to be hardly feasible due to possible environmental degradation
and the huge expenses that need to be incurred. Moreover, Turkmenistan, like its CIS counterpart
Kazakhstan, has found a more favourable and lucrative customer, towards the east in China.
Hence, for all the above reasons, the Nabucco project failed to get off the mark; and was
officially shunned in 2013.ix
The Southern Gas Corridor, the successor to the shelved Nabucco project, has a better chance of
seeing the light of the day; insofar as to say that this is possible even without having to depend
on Russian gas, to make up for the insufficient Azerbaijani gas. The solution to the European
Union‟s desire for a Russian gas-free Southern Gas Corridor lies in Iran. In place of the
indefinitely called-off Islamic pipeline project, discussions are being held about the possibility of
linking the South Pars gas field to the TANAP, bypassing conflict-infested Syria. This idea had
been floated back in 2007, in the form of a Persian Gas Pipeline, taking Iranian gas from the
South Pars, through Turkey, and all the way to Europe.x
As mentioned previously, Iranian
consent to provide its gas for the Nabucco pipeline, was one of the preconditions for the 2013
interim nuclear agreement with the P5+1 nations. However, with a final nuclear deal having been
sealed between the parties, the Iran-targeted sanctions await to be lifted in a phased manner.
Once that materialises, Europe expects to benefit from natural gas shipments from the largest gas

10. field in the world. The Persian Gas Pipeline is likely to be integrated with the Southern Gas
Corridor (TANAP and TAP); and the combined shipments of Iranian and Azerbaijani gas are
likely to pose a formidable challenge to the Russian gas monopoly through the Eurasian gas
corridor. On the brighter side, Europe will be able to diversify its energy sources. But despite the
hullabaloo, Russian gas is more or less likely to retain its strong footing in Europe, given its well
established energy ties with Europe‟s biggest economy; and lest one forgets that it is Germany
which calls the shots in the European Union. Having said that, the USD 400 billion Russia-China
gas deal (signed in May 2014); a breakthrough in Sino-Russian ties, only consolidates Russia‟s
overtures into the East Asian energy market.
Conclusion
Summing up, it may be surmised that the intermittent events of the past few years over the
Eurasian geopolitical realm, have a direct correlation to the overt as well as covert geopolitics of
pipelines across the region. From the Syrian debacle, to the Ukrainian imbroglio and the Iran
nuclear deal, the direct as well as indirect implications of these are being felt across the changing
dynamics of Eurasian hydrocarbon transit, dictated by the overlying equations of European
energy security. Nonetheless, it may be implied, with some certainty, that the migrant crisis that
Europe is being confronted with is an extended byproduct of a crisis which was fuelled by a
pipeline war between two adversarial factions. It is therefore no surprise that Saudi Arabia and
Qatar have refused to offer asylum to the strife-torn refugees from Syria and Iraq. After all, the
two hydrocarbon powerhouses are complicit in the humanitarian tragedy in Syria. Analysing the
Syrian crisis through the prism of pipeline politics, it may not be wrong to assume that the
migrant influx, for the European Union, is an indirect slap from Saudi Arabia and Qatar – a sort
of payback for failing to vouch for the Qatar-Saudi pipeline and backtracking on its official
position on Syria.
On another note, the continuing oil glut and the reluctance of the Saudis to cut oil production
levels (to constrain the surplus supplies), may be indirectly targeted at the hydrocarbon sales-
dependent economies of Russia and Iran – the two major stakeholders in the pro-Assad coalition.
Put aside the direct and indirect horn-locking between the contending factions in Syria; Turkey‟s
phenomenal rise to prominence in the Eurasian energy conduit is one of the most conspicuous
upshots of the Syrian crisis. Proving itself as an effective practitioner of pragmatic regionalism,
Erdogan‟s Turkey is slowly stealing the show and dictating terms in the chessboard of Eurasian
energy affairs. Strictly speaking, Turkey went with the prize, as Syria descended into chaos.
Having said that, it will be interesting to see how the country translates this economic advantage
into political leverage.

11. About the Author
* Ramu C.M is an independent strategic analyst with a primary research focus in the field of
hydrocarbon politics. He completed a Master‟s Degree in Geopolitics and International Relations
at the Department of Geopolitics and International Relations, Manipal University.
End Notes
i
Pipeline Politics and the Syrian War - Pepe Escobar on GRTV. Directed by GlobalResearchTV. Performed by Pepe
Escobar. 2013.
ii
Abdul-Zahra, Hamza Hendawi and Qassim. "ISIS is making up to $50 million a month from oil sales." Business
Insider. October 23, 2015. http://www.businessinsider.com/isis-making-50-million-a-month-from-oil-sales-2015-
10?IR=T (accessed November 21, 2015).
iii
Pandey, Avaneesh. "Battle For Kobani: Kurdish Forces 'Regain Full Control' Of Border Town." International
Business Times. June 27, 2015. http://www.ibtimes.com/battle-kobani-kurdish-forces-regain-full-control-border-
town-1986730 (accessed November 14, 2015).
iv
Elder, Miriam. "Behind the Russia-Ukraine Gas Conflict." Bloomberg Business. January 3, 2009.
http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/jan2009/gb2009013_045451.htm (accessed November 15,
2015).
v
"Germany says ditch politics over Nord Stream-2." RT. October 29, 2015. https://www.rt.com/business/320029-
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