LLL project

Student ID 05011035 Language, Logic and Law LL3P11C Autumn 2007/8
Student No: 05011035
Module Code: LL3P11C
Module Name: Law Project
Title: Language, Logic and Law: The
Application of IT techniques to the
process of statutory drafting
Supervisor: David Barraclough
Date Submitted:
Word Count: 4000 words exactly
DECLARATION
I declare that the material contained in this thesis has not been used in any
other submission for an academic award and was produced solely by me
other than where explicitly and clearly attributed to other sources
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Acknowledgements:
I am grateful to Francis Bennion (Author of “Bennion on Statute Law”) for his time,
encouragement and unstintingly polite criticism of some of my more radical (and
legally naïve) ideas which underlie this thesis.
I am also grateful to the following Police personnel for their willing assistance in my
research project:
• PS Paul Sanderson, MPS Enfield
• PC Karen Neale, Cambridgeshire Constabulary
• Insp. John McNally, MPS Recruit Training School, Hendon
• Supt. Mark Terry, MPS Recruit Training School, Hendon
Finally, thanks are also due to the numerous police “bloggers” who allowed me to
link from their blogs to my personal research website, and the many individuals who
responded to my research question.
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Contents:
Page
Introduction 3
History 4
Parallels between Law and IT – 1. Code is Law 5
“Vices that block Comprehension” – 1. Boolean Ambiguity 5
“Vices that block Comprehension” – 2. “Aesop’s camel” 9
Parallels - 2: The development cycle / feedback mechanisms 14
Parallels - 3: Standardisation 17
Conclusion 20
Bibliography 21
Appendix 1: Research Plan / Field Research Methodology 23
Page 3 of 24

“When Edward VI grumbled, ‘I would wish that the superfluous and tedious statutes
were made more plain and short to the intent that me might better understand them’,
he could not have foreseen a delay of 450 years”1
Introduction
The fundamental dichotomy in statutory interpretation seems to be between language
intended for an audience of lawyers, and that which can be understood by laymen. In
essence, one is asking “who is the law for?”. Support for the lawyers comes from
writers such as Bennion: “it should be a prime axiom of legislation that, unless there
are overriding reasons to the contrary, language which is destined to form part of the
law, should be framed solely with that end in view”2
. Support for the lay view is found
in national pressure groups such as “Plain English Campaign” and the “Plain
Language Commission”3
, the former stating: “The law is the most important example
of how words affect people's lives. If we cannot understand our rights, we have no
rights”4
. There is also support for the lay view from within the field of law: “Lucid
Law” is commended in its second by Professor Michael Zander QC5
. There is similar
support in the USA, notably by Professor Joseph Kimble6
. This essay examines
technological advances in those intervening 450 years, culminating in modern IT
techniques and looks at the parallels between law and IT which may provide some
answers to Edward VI’s problem.
1
Cutts, M – “Less Taxing Law” http://www.clearest.co.uk/files/LessTaxingLaw.pdf 20/10/2007
2
Bennion, F – “Bennion on Statute Law” 3rd
Ed, (Longmans, 1990) p38
3
http://www.clearest.co.uk/?id=1 20/10/2007
4
http://www.plainenglish.co.uk/drafting.htm 20/10/2007
5
Cutts, M – “Lucid Law” 2nd
Ed http://www.clearest.co.uk/files/LucidLawA-T.pdf 20/10/2007
6
Kimble, J – “Answering the critics of Plain Language”
http://www.plainlanguagenetwork.org/kimble/Anwering2.pdf 20/10/2007
Page 4 of 24

History
Elimination of human error was the starting point in the history of modern IT. The
invention of logarithms by Napier (1550-1617) greatly improved marine navigation
by reducing the multiple calculations to a series of simple additions. This necessitated
the printing of tables – which were peppered with errors due the tedious manual
nature of the task. Despite subsequent improvements in timekeeping (notably
Harrison (1693-1776) and his “H4” chronometer) navigation was still often inaccurate
due to the numerous errors propagated through the many “improved” versions of
Napier’s original tables.
It was frustration with these errors that led Babbage (1791-1871) to build his
“difference engine” – the precursor of modern computers. His aim was to
mechanically calculate Napier’s tables. Modern global positioning systems are now
accurate to within a few feet as a result of the confluence of engineering, mathematics
and computers.
The utopian answer would be a “legal engine” into which societal “mischief” is fed
and out of which emerges a logical, readable and simple statutory instrument. While
this pipedream is facile, in overview it can be likened to the process of producing a
computer system from an initial requirement. Something akin to the pipedream is
indeed possible, as the seminal work of Turing (1912-1954) shows in the breaking of
the WWII “Enigma” code. It is, at least an example of machinery and mathematics
deriving meaning from cryptic language.
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Parallels between Law and IT – 1. Code is Law.
The end-product of an IT system is “program code”. The code prescribes the system’s
behaviour analogously with that in which law prescribes desired social behaviour.
This analogy has been explored in depth by Lessig7
. He considers the “policing” of
email in cyberspace: if it were generally decided that email should require unique user
identification (perhaps to prevent “spam”) then the underlying code would be the
vector of change, hence the code, in effect IS the law.
“Vices that block Comprehension”8
– 1. Boolean Ambiguity
Early technology drew on the work of Boole (1815-1864), who formulated an algebra
for dealing with logic, and that of DeMorgan (1806-1871) whose eponymous theorem
is still used to reduce complexity of digital logic circuits. In this algebra, “1”
represents “TRUE” while “0” represents “FALSE”. Human-readable instructions such
as “SALES_AMOUNT=QUANTITY x PRICE” are translated into a machine-
readable pattern of 1s and 0s and this is fed to the logic “gates” which perform
Boolean algebra upon the pattern.
Boole states if A is true, and B is true, then the compound statement “A AND B” is
true. One might say algebraically that THEFT = another’s property AND
appropriation AND dishonesty AND permanent deprivation. Only if ALL the
subclauses are true is the sum of them also true. Additionally, there is the “OR”
clause: any of the conditions being true renders the whole true. Thus one may state
7
Lessig, L – “Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace” (Basic Books, 1999)
8
Bennion, supra
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LAWFUL AUTHORITY=tool of trade OR religious artefact OR folding pocket knife.
Finally there is negation or complement: INNOCENT=NOT GUILTY. All digital
logic gates can be built from only these three possibilities: AND, OR and NOT.
For example:
IF suspect_is_in_public_place AND (has_pointed_article OR has_bladed_article)
AND NOT (folding_pocket_knife OR good_reason) THEN guilty=’TRUE’ ELSE
guilty=’FALSE’
might implement the logic of s139 Criminal Justice Act 1988.
The use of parentheses is to prevent logic errors or “bugs”. They “bind” the logical
operations to their subjects and dictate the correct order (or “precedence”) of
operations. A simple example can be seen in the question: “what is the result of 2 + 3
x 4 ?” Is it 20 or 14? The “correct” answer depends upon the order in which the + and
x operations are performed. Mathematicians would say that (2+3) x 4 =20 and 2 + (3
x 4) =14. The operation in the parentheses is performed first, in IT parlance, it has
“higher precedence”.
A common bug is to write “IF NOT A OR B”, without parentheses. DeMorgan’s
theorem states (inter alia):
not (A or B) = (not A) and (not B)
Thus if one defines a litigant in person (LIP) as one who is “not a solicitor or a
barrister”, DeMorgan’s theorem states that correct logical construction is “LIP=(NOT
a solicitor) AND (NOT a barrister)” Ignoring DeMorgan, and using the original text, a
Page 7 of 24

QC could be classed erroneously as LIP since the text is ambiguous, in the same way
as the earlier arithmetic example. The original clause could be read to mean “is not a
solicitor or [is] a barrister”, the implied second occurrence of “is” being omitted from
the original in what Bennion calls “compression” of language9
, to achieve brevity.
This error is so common in programming that many authors of works on good
programming style or “defensive programming” caution against it:
“Conditional expressions that include negations are always hard to understand”10
“Parenthesize to resolve ambiguity”11
“Not a few people don't have not any trouble understanding a nonshort string of
nonpositives—that is, most people have trouble understanding a lot of negatives”12
“Apply DeMorgan's Theorems to simplify boolean tests with negatives DeMorgan's
Theorems let you exploit the logical relationship between an expression and a version
of the expression that means the same thing because it's doubly negated”13
A legal example can be found in s2(2)(b) Animals Act 1971 as described by Beckwith
and Gilliker: “the second limb…has been described by the House of Lords itself as
‘ambiguous’ and ‘opaque’. It contains a double negative…The House of Lords in the
9
Bennion, supra p217. He cites is a one of the “Vices that block comprehension”
10
Kernighan, B and Pike R, “The practice of programming” (Addison-Wesley, Reading, Mass, USA)
1999 p6
11
Ibid.
12
McConnell, S – “Code Complete” 2nd
Ed. (Microsoft Press, Seattle, USA) 2004, p19.1
13
Ibid.
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leading case of Mirvahedy v Henley14
by a slim majority (3:2) chose the former
explanation”15
The Law has some sympathy with this technique: Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe said:
“it could have been more simply expressed by a parenthesis”16
.
While modern judicial use of such a device appears fine in theory, it appears absent
frequently enough in practice for Bennion to have cited such clauses as “Vice that
block comprehension”17
, two decades before Mirvahedy. There appears to be a lack of
“feedback” from legal academia to the drafting process. The one avenue open to their
Lordships in Mirvahedy was a “Pepper v Hart” reference to Hansard but in that case
it was of little assistance. Lord Walker again “The passage provides some support for
my conclusion, but I do not place much weight on it.”18
Even without parentheses, English has an elegant solution: one might redraft an LIP
as one who is “neither a solicitor nor a barrister”. This phraseology complies with
DeMorgan in that the negatory connotation of both “Neither” and “Nor”19
is “bound
to” the clause to which it logically relates. In effect, one is reverting to the logically
correct “not A and not B”, thus avoiding potential ambiguities.
14
[2003] 2 All ER 401
15
Giliker, P and Beckwith, S – “Tort” (Sweet & Maxwell, London) 2004
16
Mirvahedy v Henley, supra at 436
17
Bennion, supra p217
18
19
Literally “Not OR”, a phrase also adopted in the IT world with the exact same result: NOR=NOT OR
Page 9 of 24

“Vices that block Comprehension” – 2. “Aesop’s camel”
In Aesop’s fables, a camel driver offers his camel the choice of going up or down the
desert, which – in fact – is flat. The camel replies “why offer a choice when there is
none?”. A similar construction occurs in many statutes, an example being “on
payment or otherwise”20
Harriot v DPP21
concerns an offence which hinges on whether it occurred in a “place
to which the public have or are permitted access, whether on payment or otherwise.”.
According to Bennion: “My respectful contention is that the conclusion of Sedley LJ,
and also that of Mitting J who concurred, was … erroneous”22
In “Bennion on Statute Law”, he cites a number of examples where a list of
exceptions follows a general case. Despite also defining the error of “self-defeating
text”23
, he does not appear to examine the case where the two are entirely mutually
exclusive, such as “on payment or otherwise”.
DeMorgan’s analysis shows that “A OR NOT A” will always be true, Thus “on
payment or not on payment” encompasses ALL possible scenarios and is therefore
self-defeating. One might equally say “irrespective of payment”, yet since brevity is
one of Bennion’s parameters, why include a phrase which on its own face is irrelevant
20
S139(7) Criminal Justice Act 1988
21
[2005] EWHC 965 (Admin)
22
Bennion, F – “Statutory Definitions – A problem of logic, or something else?” [2007] JP 171, p784
23
“Bennion on Statute Law” supra at p261
Page 10 of 24

and does nothing but increase the word-count?. It is difficult to see how a “police
officer or any other person”24
could disagree!
Returning to Mirvahedy, Lord Walker states that “Parliament does not normally use
the word ‘or’ to mean ‘that is to say’”25
( Is the clause “good reason or lawful
authority” in s4 of the 1988 act such an abnormality? After all, is not “lawful
authority” the best reason? Is not the act defining “good reason” as a type of lawful
authority by also allowing it as a defence?)
Ignoring this side-issue, the pivotal clause is “have[sub-clause H] OR are permitted
access[sub-clause P]”. If the phrase is to have ay meaning at all, then H and P must
represent two distinct but somehow inclusive classes of place: This conclusion can be
reached by considering the alternatives
1. Synonymity: “having access” = “are permitted access” – one is left with the
reductio ad absurdio of “H or H”26
. This agrees with Lord Walker’s contention,
otherwise s7 reduces to the statement that a public place includes any place to which
the public are permitted access, which is would hardly have been illuminating enough
to have warranted its own section. Logically and judicially, this option must be
discounted.
2. Antonymity: “having access” = NOT “are permitted access” –Aesop’s camel’s “A
or NOT A” results. “Permission” is a binary concept: no matter the conditions on
24
s13(3) Aviation Security and Piracy (Overseas Territories) Order 2000 (SI 2000/3059) although the
“or any other person” construction also occurs in many primary acts.
25
26
Or, by definition, “P or P”!
Page 11 of 24

which it is granted, ultimately one either has it or one doesn’t. This option would then
reduce s7 to another absurdity that “public place” includes any place! One might be
forgiven for wondering what was wrong with “when not at his place of abode”27
3. Semantic overlap. This has three subclasses:
i) H is an entire subset of P. Thus H implies P: all places that one has access, one is
permitted access which is obviously incorrect.
ii) P is an entire subset of H. Thus P implies H: all places that one is permitted access,
one has access. While seductive, this option tends towards P being synonymous with
H: with permission you have access, which differs only from synonymity if “have”
has a meaning other than “permitted”. Harriott’s counsel on appeal suggested “are
not excluded from”28
, which was rejected. Thus this limb seems also fruitless.
iii) an “intersection” of H and P. The fictional Sherlock Holmes said “When you have
eliminated the impossible, whatever is left – no matter how improbable – must be the
truth”29
. Reassuringly, having eliminated the impossible, this subclass is not
improbable at all: It accords with the notion that s7 appears to be linguistic
scaffolding for the perverse case where the public in fact have access, while not
having permission, whose corollary is an element of trespass.
Using a purposive analysis, one might say the mischief of s139 is the carrying of
sharp items in an environment which puts the public at risk. For that risk to
materialise, physical proximity is required (irrespective of permission). Did
27
S25(1) Theft Act 1968 inter alia
28
Harriot v DPP, Supra at para 16 per Mitting J
29
Conan Doyle, A. – Silver Blaze
Page 12 of 24

parliament intend that a knifeman should be able to stand on an unfenced private
garden and gain immunity from arrest under s139? The only logical way to answer
“no” is to accept the “Sherlock Holmes” solution that “have access” means “able to
access”. One must construe s7 as including a place that the public are able to access
irrespective of permission - thus bringing them within the proximity of the mischief
whether by their own or the suspect’s trespass.
This is the only logical meaning when mathematical set theory is applied (U being the
“Universal Set” of all places and the shaded area of H being the set of “trespassory”
places (i.e. Have access, but are not permitted)
.
It appears that the arresting officer in Harriott and the Judge at first instance, took this
meaning, as does Bennion who uses a process of “comminution” to arrive at the same
result30
. Furthermore, empirical research31
shows that 83% of police officers
questioned also believe that this is the legal meaning of s139.
30
“Statutory Definitions” supra at p 784
31
Field Research conducted by the author – see Appendix 1
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Despite this evidence, the obiter dicta in Harriot attempt to clarify the ratio of the
case:
Sedley LJ: “While it would not be useful or wise for this court to attempt to substitute
for the statutory phrase some definition or exegesis of its own…”32
This approach was acceptable however in Mirvahedy, where there was no other
option but to do just that, since a “Pepper v Hart” recourse to Hansard revealed
nothing helpful!
“…It would, moreover, be disruptive of legal certainty if a phrase repeatedly used by
Parliament, albeit for different purposes, were given differential meanings… “33
Sedley LJ’s phrase appears hollow in the light of a comment by Professor Ormerod:
“The term "public place" is found in so many statutes covering such a wide range of
offences and has been the subject of so much litigation that is not difficult to find
examples in the law reports to support claims that property is public or private to suit
one's argument”34
Finally, Sedley LJ states:
32
Harriot v DPP, supra at para 10
33
34
Ormerod, D – “Possession of bladed weapon in a public place: whether public place having different meaning
on offence” Crim LR 2006, May, 440
Page 14 of 24

…The District Judge placed weight upon the undoubted fact that access from the
street was unimpeded, whether physically or by displayed notices. But this is, in my
judgment, not enough to turn a private place into a place to which the public has
access …”35
Since this appears as the only possible logical meaning, it begs the question: “what is
enough”?
In rejecting the suggestion of Harriot’s counsel (the “not excluded from” meaning),
Mitting J appears to have fallen into one of the absurdity traps above: His double
negative cannot mean that “has access” is synonymous with “is excluded”, so the
wording of s139 is not clarified by the decision – far from it! - since nowhere do the
dicta tell us what “have access” does mean.
Is it not a matter of the greatest concern that the majority of police officers and many
leading academics have a different understanding of s139 from that of the judiciary?
How does this situation promote certainty in the law?
Parallels 2: The development cycle / feedback mechanisms
The classic IT development cycle has been given the acronym CRUDE for
Compile/Run/Understand/Debug/Evaluate. It runs in a constant loop until there are
acceptably few bugs and the product is ready for delivery. The evaluation process
must, of necessity, measure the actual results against the original requirement for a
given hypothetical set of input data, whose composition should match as closely as
35
Page 15 of 24

possible the data that will be used in the “live” scenario. This “feedback” loop is an
inescapable step in the overall process. Although it can be measured in many months
for large and complex projects, it can occur in minutes in some “real-time” or Internet
applications.
The IT world abounds with automated tools which simplify the process: compilers
check code automatically for logic errors, debuggers hone in rapidly on hypothetical
data that produces results failing to match the expected outcome as prescribed by the
specification. They are as much a part of the cycle as the code itself. The testing phase
of all but the smallest of systems can easily exceed the length of the design phase.
What is the analogous process in law?
Historically, judicial rhetoric has been extraordinarily polite when criticising
notoriously ill-drafted statutes. Lord Scott in Mirvahedy: “Over the 30 years or so
that the Act has been in force different judicial views have been expressed on this
issue of construction. However this is the first time that the issue has reached your
Lordships' House. An authoritative ruling is overdue……the language of s 2(2) has
been the subject of judicial excoriation in a number of cases”36
Thus although it is generally accepted that a statute may be flawed, the only
mechanism for rectification is to try to “patch” a “live” case by interpreting the ill-
formed language – often in ways that strain it beyond breaking point. The lack of a
“test” system (statutory mooting?) means that the legal “feedback mechanism” is
sometimes measured in decades. One might ask whether this would be acceptable in
any other field of endeavour, given the gravity of the consequences?
36
Page 16 of 24

The relatively recent device of a “statement of incompatibility”37
comes close a
feedback mechanism, but it is only a “flagging” event. It does not feed directly back
into a CRUDE cycle. Pepper v Hart is perhaps the closest the judiciary can get to a
programmer discussing a bug in the requirements with an IT systems designer, but it
is severely limited by its lack of interactivity.
A true legal CRUDE cycle would require constitutional heresy: Police Officers and
Judges would need to have a say in the wording of the laws that they enforce or
interpret. Yet the “separation of powers” is already breached in many ways in modern
societies: it can seem more an academic “sacred cow” than a fundamental requirement
of a mature and stable democracy. In IT, the concept of “discontinuous change” is
well understood – when code has been “patched” so many times that the original
wood can no longer be seen through the new trees, there are few who would argue for
yet another amendment over and above a complete re-write.
Gordon Brown is known to be in favour of codification of some areas of the law38
–
but his plans are unlikely to encompass the degree of discontinuous change that would
be required for true clarity of the law. The piecemeal design of our constitution allows
only for patching.
37
s3 Human Rights Act 1998
38
Parliamentary Speech 3 July 2007
Page 17 of 24

Parallels 3: Standardisation.
Bennion discusses “standardisation” thus: “Drafting technique, like any other, is
always capable of minor improvements here and there. The only improvement of
major significance I envisage however is in the use of standardisation. Far too much
unnecessary confusion is caused by the tendency of drafters to say the same thing…in
different ways”39
.
A similar reluctance to ”reinvent the wheel” has been a driving factor in IT since its
inception. Consider the following passage from “A history of modern computing”40
“Of the early stored-program computers, the EDSAC in Cambridge, England,
carried this scheme to the farthest extent, with a library of sequences already written,
developed, and tested, and punched onto paper tapes that a user could gather and
incorporate into his own program”
Such a standardised, software component is known as a “subroutine”. A more extreme
example is the construction of modern computers themselves. As early discrete logic
gates became better understood and more frequently used as building blocks,
advances in technology allowed for their fabrication on an ever smaller scale, creating
“integrated circuits” which performed well-defined functions - such as adding two
numbers – in a single physical component or “chip”. This process has lead to the
modern desktop computer having some components – notably the central processing
unit (CPU) – containing several million individual gates that represent the cumulative
knowledge and experience of decades of engineering. This standardisation has been at
39
“Bennion on Statute Law”, supra p26
40
Ceruzzi, Paul E – A History of Modern Computing 2nd
Ed. (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, USA) 2003
p 84
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the heart of the exponential boom in the IT industry and has been replicated on the
software side by the development of software components and “object-oriented”
computer languages which rely on “encapsulation” as answers to the ever-growing
problem of managing complexity. Combined with the CRUDE cycle, encapsulation
has allowed the IT industry to achieve a position in 50 yeas that other disciplines have
taken centuries to achieve and that the law is still a long way from.
Equating IT encapsulation with Bennion’s standardisation, one could envisage a
single, well-defined library of tested statutory terminology which could be cross-
referenced by newer enactments in a way which would reduce the overall complexity
of the canon of English law, and prevent many of the problems that Bennion cites. He
even suggests a separate statutory body for such a function – could this body not also
run a legal CRUDE cycle on their products?
Sadly, his view on such a “novel machinery” however is that it would “pose immense
practical problems and is unlikely to be adopted by the authorities”41
This view is not uncommon: “These problems would be greatly reduced if we took the
trouble to write clearly. Unfortunately most lawyers think this is unnecessary”42
One
might ask why this is so – among the websites of Clarity International, Campaign for
Plain English and the Plain Language Commission a variety of reasons are suggested
for retaining the “junk antiques of the legal vocabulary”43
. These include a desire to
41
“Statutory Definitons”, supra p 786
42
Adler, M – “Bamboozling the Public” (New Law Journal 26th
July 1991)
43
Mellinkoff, D – “Legal Writing: Sense and Nonsense” (Scribner 1982)
Page 19 of 24

mystify the lawyers’ work44
but generally rely on the “tried and tested” argument
allied to the innate conservatism of the legal profession.
The concept of using IT and/or mathematics to formalise the law (to ensure logical
correctness) is not new and other authors have not only proposed such ideas, but have
also been dispirited by the inertia of “the authorities” to such radical concepts. Uriel
Wittenberg describes how he deliberately avoided using the subject for his PhD
dissertation as a result of negative reactions from the Carnegie-Mellon faculty:
“I believe my reaction to these law courses, my first exposure to the legal discipline,
was a very natural one for anyone who has studied math and grasped its intellectual
elegance, or who has learned to appreciate the established principles of sound
software development. I was struck by the primitivity of the intellectual apparatus
used in law to analyze and articulate complicated, intricate ideas. One can hardly
express what was missing more aptly than the mathematician, Alfred North
Whitehead:
By relieving the brain of all unnecessary work, a good notation sets it free to
concentrate on more advanced problems, and in effect increases the mental power of
the race.
Unfortunately, law lacked any notation. And it knew none of the mechanisms, familiar
to any computer scientist, for breaking down complex problems and developing
elaborate structures of rules”45
44
Rao, H.D. “Lawyers Write Plainly, Please” http://www.clarity-international.net/downloads/lwpp.pdf
17/12/2007
45
Wittenberg, U – “How ‘Mathematica Notation for Law Respresentation’ Came to be”
http://urielw.com/mathlaw/index.htm 17/12/2007
Page 20 of 24

Conclusion
There are many parallels between the formal procedural techniques of software
development and the drafting of legislation. The relatively new art of programming
has grown simultaneously with an extensive catalogue of tools and techniques that
have allowed it to become an integral and essential part of almost every aspect of
human endeavour.
The Law is perhaps the last bastion of resistance to such change, especially in the
field of legal language and drafting. In an age when the rolls consisted of vellum
parchment, amending them would not have been an easy task – even subsequent
modern printing techniques still do not allow the inordinate flexibility, convenience
and speed of modern IT text processing systems.
The new vernacular of the IT world has given us an opportunity, the tools and the
methods to make that change sooner rather than later. Perhaps now is the time for
“The Emperor” of the Law to realise why the ingénue IT is pointing and giggling at
the Emperor’s new clothes.
"We cannot solve our problems with the same thinking we used when we created them."
- Albert Einstein
Page 21 of 24

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Barr, A – “Find the Bug: A Book of Incorrect Programs” (Addison Wesley, USA) 2004
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Ceruzzi, P – “A History of Modern Computing” 2nd Ed. (MIT Press, Cambridge, USA) 2003
Conan Doyle, A – “Silver Blaze” (pub unknown)
Giliker, P and Beckwith, S – “Tort” (Sweet & Maxwell, London) 2004
Holland, J and Webb, J – “Learning Legal Rules” (OUP, Oxford) 2003
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Hutcheson, M – “Software Testing Fundamentals: Methods and Metrics” (Wiley, USA) 2003
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Barnes, J – “The continuing debate about ‘plain language’ legislation: a law reform conundrum” Stat.
L.R. 2006, 27(2), 83
Bennion, F – “Statutory Definitions – A problem of logic, or something else?” J.P. 2007, 171(45), 783
Bennion, F – “Aspects of the legal Meaning” J.P. 2007, 171(41), 715
Greenberg, D – “The nature of legislative intention and its implications for legislative drafting” Stat.
L.R. 2006, 27(1), 15
Hunt, R – “Plain Language in legislative drafting: an achievable object or a laudable idea” Stat. L.R.
2003, 24(2), 112
Hunt, R – “Plain Language in legislative drafting: is it really the answer?” Stat. L.R. 2002, 23(1), 24
Ormerod, D – “Possession of bladed weapon in a public place: whether public place having different
meaning on offence” [2006] Crim L.R. 440
Page 22 of 24

Specific Website Articles
Cutts, M – “Less Taxing Law” http://www.clearest.co.uk/files/LessTaxingLaw.pdf 20/10/2007
Cutts, M – “Lucid Law” 2nd Ed http://www.clearest.co.uk/files/LucidLawA-T.pdf 20/10/2007
Kimble, J – “Answering the critics of Plain Language”
http://www.plainlanguagenetwork.org/kimble/Anwering2.pdf 20/10/2007
Rao, H “Lawyers Write Plainly, Please” http://www.clarity-international.net/downloads/lwpp.pdf
17/12/2007
Wittenberg, U “Mathematical Notation for Law Respresentation”
http://urielw.com/mathlaw/mathlaw.htm 17/12/2007
Wittenberg, U – “How ‘Mathematical Notation for Law Respresentation’ Came to be”
http://urielw.com/mathlaw/index.htm 17/12/2007
Websites – General
http://rmjacobsen.squarespace.com/articles/2006/8/21/scholar-champions-clearer-legal-writing.html
http://www.adler.demon.co.uk
http://www.clarity-international.net
http://www.clearest.co.uk
http://www.cooley.edu/faculty/kimble.htm
http://www.francisbennion.com
http://www.michbar.org/generalinfo/plainenglish/columns/126.html
http://www.plainenglish.co.uk
http://www.plainlanguagenetwork.org/Legal
Page 23 of 24

Appendix 1: Research Plan / Field Research Methodology
During research for last year’s mooting competition I used the legal databases
LexisNexis, Westlaw and Justis to find cases where a direction to find guilty had been
given. This led me to R v Wang46
which concerned s139 Criminal Justice Act 1988.
As a by-product, I also came across Harriot v DPP47
ref which had what I believed to
be a very surprising outcome. I was convinced that the result was “wrong” in relation
to the way in which s139 had been interpreted.
I recalled a case (Mirvahedy v Henly48
) from my 2nd
Year Tort textbook which had
hinged on the difficult wording of another statute, and in both cases it appeared that
there were logical flaws in the statutory wording.
Using “Google” to cast a wider net, I searched for material on logic and language,
finding many sources which related to programming and IT. It appeared that there
were many parallels between the two fields and I thus used the library to find books
on statutory interpretation, logic, language and the relationships between them. It
became apparent that Francis Bennion was a highly regarded author on the subject.
Being unable to find the detailed reasons that parliamentary draftsmen used in the
selection of one phrase over another, and I contacted Mr Bennion via his website,
initiating an exchange of emails on the subject from which I was able to glean further
avenues of research.
Ultimately, I realised that my argument would need to form a view on how the front-
line practitioners of those statutes and the only way to find that would be empirical
field research. I built a “powerpoint” presentation and contacted several police forces
to allow me to canvass their officers. I also designed a built a website with a similar
questionnaire, and publicised it via Internet and police magazines.
A “Harriot” scenario was posited, along with an aerial photo of the actual Harriot
locality (found on Google Earth from the description of the property in the case) and
the question asked “Would you have arrested?”.
The results are tabulated below:
Source Respondents Yes No %
Personal Website 61 48 13 78.69
Cambs Police 23 18 5 78.26
MPS Hendon 27 27 0 100.00
MPS Enfield 16 12 4 75.00
Totals 127 105 22 82.68
After the police presentations, there were group discussion about the officers’
understanding of s139 and the legal meaning of a public place, and the constitutional
implications of many officers having a different view from the judiciary, with no
formal mechanism to inform them of operational implications of changing case law.
46
[2005] 1 All ER 782
47
[2005] EWHC 965 (Admin)
48
[2003] 2 All ER 401
Page 24 of 24

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