1. Deviance
Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice | 2002 | TITTLE, CHARLES R. | Copy right
DEVIANCE
The term "deviance" usually refersto some behavior that is inconsistent w ith standards of acceptable conduct prevailing in a given
socialgroup, although the term has also been used to designate personalconditions, ideas, or statuses that are stigmatized or
disreputable. Social scientists disagree, about a precise definition of deviance because they use different approachesin try ing to
determine exactly w hat the standards of conduct or the acceptable statuses and conditions are in a given group (Gibbs, 1981). At
least five w aysof conceptualizing deviance are used.
Conceptualizations of deviance
The statistical approach. One w ayof defining standardsof conductand deviance fromthem is to observe how people in a
particular group actually behave (Wilkins, 1964). Accordingly, if a large proportion of people in a group smoke cigarettes, s moking is
"normal" w hile failure to smoke w ould be atypical, or deviant. With a "statistical" perspective, skydiving, eating snails, and murder
are all deviant in the United States since they are all unusual. On the other hand, highw ay speeding, "fudging" on one's income tax,
and pilfering small items from employers are all conforming behaviors since they are currently committed by a fairly large proportion,
if not a majority, of the population.
A statisticalapproach rests on a common observation: many people assume that something that "everybody does" cannot be in
violation of conduct standards. Indeed, a frequent justification (or rationalization) for conduct that is being threatened w ith sanctions
is to claim that everybody else or at least most others do it. And, many people decide w hat is appropriate by w atching what others
do.
Even though a statisticalapproach appears to correspond with the everydaythinking of many laypersons, it is not w idely used by
socialscientists. Scholars have found that statisticalpatterns only superficially reflect how socialgroups formulate standardsof
conduct. Most people in the United States, for example, w ould feeluncomfortable classifying behaviorslike church tithing,
abstinence fromall alcoholuse, and maintenance of premarital sexualvirginity (all atypicalbehaviors) as "deviant." There is an
underlying agreement that even though they are unusual, these behaviors are somehow "good," acceptable, even desirable, and
that they are to be encouraged as w aysof behaving. Similarly, most people feeldiscomfort in thinking of adultery, lying to one's
spouse or sw eetheart, or pilfering froman employer as appropriate, even though they are frequently committed by a large proportion
of the populace. Yet, most can easily endorse the inappropriateness of acts that are atypicalin a negative w ay—more evil,
unacceptable, or undesirable than the average. Therefore, most students of deviance contend that despite some tendency for
people to refer to statisticalguidelines, normative standards mainly revolve around notions of rightness and w rongnessor w ith what
people think others "ought" to do.
The absolutistapproach. A second approach applies idealconduct standards set down by a socialscientist (or group of social
scientists) to all groups and individuals under study. A socialscientist decides w hat is good, useful, or just, and then measures
deviations fromthose evaluative criteria. For example, some theorists (functionalists) view societies as interdependent mechanisms;
all parts that w orktogether for maintenance of the society are regarded as essentialand in that sense "good" or nondeviant. But a
society may contain dysfunctional(dangerous or destructive) elements (see Gross), which are regarded as deviant. Most w ho us e
this approach assume that societies w illusually condone inherently good behaviors and condemn those that are inherently bad.
Indeed, it has been argued that contemporary societies exist because throughout evolutionaryhistory they practiced and condoned
usefulbehavior w hile avoiding and condemning dangerous behavior. Presumably, socialgroups that failed to do this did not survive
the ravages of time (Parsons).
Functionalists assume that an investigator can, through logic and research, actually determine w hat is good for a society. For
example, incest is thought to be dysfunctional(Davis; Murphy) because if widely practiced, it could lead to biological deterioration of
the population, destruction of orderly socialrelations, and disruption of the mechanisms for efficient child rearing. According to
some, therefore, incest is inherently and obviously deviant because it is socially dangerous. Most members of any existing society
presumably w illdisapprove of incest and w illrefrain frompracticing it because only those societies that in the past developed and
enforced socialrules prohibiting incest w ould have survived to be represented in the contemporary w orld. Similar arguments c an be
made for murder, rape, assault, homosexuality, child abuse, mental illness, and other behaviors.
Other absolutist thinkers employ a different rationale. Radical, Marxist, and humanist scholars often maintain that a sensitive
informed researcher can apply absolute moral standards to behavior in any given society or specific situation to decide w hether
various activities are unjust or evil (deviant) (Schwendinger and Schwendinger). Some believe that any exploitation of one person or
a category of persons for the benefit of another, or any conduct that threatens the dignity and quality of life for specific people or
humanity as a w hole, is inherently evil, and thereby deviant (Simon). Others contend that any behavior causing people to suffer or
violating any person's right to self-actualization and freedomis inherently immoral, or deviant (Platt). Marxist scholars, for instance,
point up the exploitative nature of economic relations in capitalistic societies and regard this inherent exploitation, along w ith the
selfish and insensitive acts it breeds, as deviant or "criminal" because it corrupts human qualities (Bonger; Quinney, 1970, 1980).
Similarly, humanists regard racialdiscrimination as deviant because it deprives a w hole group of people of equal rights and human
dignity.
Absolutist approaches to deviance are not w idely used because of their subjectivity.Trained (sensitized), carefulobserversdisagree
about w hat is good or bad for society, what is contraryto human dignity, and w hat is fair or unfair. And w hat one observer believes
to be functionalfor a society another may find dysfunctional. It has even been argued that a certain amount of deviance itself may
2. benefit society. Dealing w ith deviance may help a group differentiate its members, crystalize the norms so group members w ill know
how to behave, provide a means for tension to be reduced, keep the mechanisms of social controlin good w orking order so that
they w illbe efficient in true emergencies, and generate cohesion as the members of a group unite in opposition to deviance (Cohen,
1966; Dentler and Erikson). Since there is no reason to believe that the values or insights of socialscientists are in any w ay
superior, more desirable, or defensible than those of anyone else, or that the values of any particular socialscientist are any more
justifiable than those of another social scientist, an absolutist approach in the study of deviance cannot be used in a consistent and
meaningful w ay.
The legalistic approach. A third wayof identifying conduct standardsand deviant behavior is to simply use illegality as the criterion
of w hether a given activity is in violation of behavioralnorms. Accordingly, if the law prohibits an act, it is deviant; and if the law
requires an act, failure to performit is deviant. If the law is silent about, or permits, an act, then that act is considered consistent with
conduct standards, or conforming.
The rationale for a legal criterion of deviance differs depending on how the law is viewed. Some contend that the law expresses
collective sentiment indicating that particular activities are dangerous or threatening enough to require efforts at control(see Tittle,
1994). Although recognizing that law making is a political process, which often reflects conflicting interestsand the clash of pow er,
some nevertheless believe that, in the main, law reflects popular sentiment as w ellas efforts to promote the public good.
Others see the law as an instrument by w hich the pow erfulmaintain their elite positions and protect their privileges, but these
scholars accept illegality as the appropriate criterion of behavioralstandards because they believe conformity and deviance are
inherently w hatever people powerfulenough to impose their ow n views saythey are. Accordingly, norms (or conduct standards) are
"definitions of the situation" imposed upon a socialgroup by pow er elites (McCaghy; Quinney).
Still others view law as a combination of popular sentiment and elite desires. They contend that some law expressesconsensus
among the population (such as law sprohibiting assault, murder, child abuse) w hile other law sreflect the desires of special interests
(such as law s prohibiting importation of competitive products, requiring licenses to provide certain services, or denying the right of
laborers to strike). For these scholars, w hether law is collectively or particularistically oriented is irrelevant; in both instances, law
expresses coercive potential—a key element of behavioralnorms. Thus, the conduct rules that matter are those that can be
enforced. Since the law reflectsbehavioralrules backed up by pow er of enforcement, it necessarily encompasses conduct norms—
at least those w orth socialscientists' study.
A legalistic approach is straightforward and usually easily applied (since a scholar need only refer to the codification of law s), and it
hinges on an extremely important element of sociallife—the exercise of politicalpow er. Moreover, a related body of inquiry—
criminology—almost exclusively uses a legalistic approach to define its subject matter. Yet the legalistic conceptualization is not
generally used for the larger study of deviance, of which crime may be a part. For one thing, not all societies have a clearly defined
body of w ritten statutes that can be identified as law . Primitive societies, for example, have deviant behavior but no formally w ritten
law that defines it as such (Malinow ski; Hoebel). Using a legalistic approach in nonliterate societies assumes the resolution of a prior
definitional problem—w hat is law ?
In addition, in any society many of the activities that are illegal nevertheless appear to be normatively acceptable. For instance,
despite legal prohibitions on the sale of tobacco products to minors, in many places such products are easily available to minors in
vending machines and minors are officially allow ed to smoke in designated areas by many schools. Moreover, it is rare for the police
to arrest anyone for selling tobacco to minors; and most people may not regard such sale as bad, dangerous, or abnormal (although
public opinion about this appears to be undergoing a change). Thus, law s are often out of synch with actualbehavior and public
sentiment, sometimes because society changes without the law sbeing changed or repealed and sometimes because law sresult
frompolitical action by interest groups w hose agendas may not correspond with views of the generalpublic.
By contrast, many activities that appear to be inconsistent w ith generalconduct standardsare not illegal. It is not a crime to lie to
one's spouse or sw eetheart although evidence suggeststhat a large proportion of the people disapprove of it (Tittle, 1980). Similarly
in some places it is not illegal to operate a topless bar, yet such establishments frequently meet w ith scorn, protests, and sometimes
violent opposition by neighbors. Further, legal statutes rarely prohibit eating human flesh although it is clearly outside the bounds of
acceptable conduct in contemporary societies.
Finally, despite the importance of the legal realm, conduct norms are not limited to that realm but instead are ubiquitous at all levels
of sociallife fromthe interpersonalto the societal. A legalistic approach, therefore, narrowly focusesattention on one tier of a multi-
tiered system.
The reactive approach. A fourth way of defining deviance is by socialreaction (w hat people do about behavior or a condition).
According to this approach, w hen socialreaction to some behavior is condemnatory, punitive, or simply disapproving, it indicates
that the behavior is in violation of behavioralstandards prevailing in that group and is therefore deviant. One variation of the reactive
approach emphasizes the "typical" reaction to a class of behaviors. Anotherstressessocialreaction to particular instances of
behavior w hile assuming that this particular reaction implies nothing about the deviance of the entire class of behaviors of which the
particular case is an instance. Such basic differencesare complicated by questions concerning which part of the socialsystemmust
react negatively to qualify something as deviant. Some emphasize negative reactions by officialagents and functionaries, but others
accord more importance to informal reactions by a collective socialaudience.
Probably the best-know nreactive approach to deviance is that embodied in the "labeling perspective" (Tannenbaum; Becker; Schur;
Gove). Labeling theorists do not agree about their focus, and they are sometimes ambiguous in presentation. Nevertheless, most
3. scholars agree that the predominant concern of the labeling perspective is legal reaction to specific acts, particularlythe reaction of
agents of the criminal justice system(such as police) to particular instances of behavior disapproved by power holders, whose
interests are embodied in the legal codes (Gove). Accordingly, some labeling proponents recognize no categories or classes of
deviant behavior. To them, murder, rape, child abuse, or smoking marijuana are not necessarily deviant. Rather, specific acts of
murder, rape, child abuse, or marijuana use may or may not be deviant depending upon w hether officials arrest the perpetrator and
label him/her as deviant. When labeling occurs, the particular act of murder, rape, child abuse, or marijuana use is deviant;
otherw ise, it is not.
Some labeling theorists are more restrictive in w hat they define as deviant. They maintain that an act is not deviant unless and until
a collective socialaudience has accepted the label of deviant for the act and/or the perpetrator. It is said that a label attached by
officials must "stick"; that is, it must be recognized by a social audience and serve as the vehicle through w hich the group attributes
bad character to the actor, or attributes badness to the act (Becker; Kitsuse).
Another variant of the reactionist approach accepts the generally deviant nature of some categories of behavior. Accordingly, if a
socialcollectivity or its chief representativestypically react negatively to some behavior or typically attach a stigma to those w ho are
caught, that kind of behavior is deviant even if a particular perpetrator escapes being labeled. For instance, if a social group usually
show sits condemnation of some class of behaviors by punishing specific actsof that class or if it usually attributes bad character to
those w ho commit such acts, then theorists w ould assume that in that socialgroup those behaviors are deviant. Using this
approach, apprehension, punishment, or group attribution of bad character for a specific act may be treated as problematic but such
actions are not essentialfor a given act to be deviant.
Still another variation of the reactive/labeling approach does not limit itself to behavior but includes as deviance, statuses, statesof
being, or physicalconditions (Lemert). According to this approach, "deviance" inheres in disreputable or pejorative statuses , styles
of life, or physicalattributes; therefore, deviance is a condition not a behavior or set of behaviors. Accordingly, race, gender, poverty,
and criminality have all been identified as stigmatized "deviant" statuses w hile physicalhandicaps, unattractive appearances,
speech impediments, and small statures have been designated as stigmatized conditions qualifying as deviant. Although most
approaches to deviance raise issues about how and why particularacts or categories of acts come to be deviant and w hy
individuals come to commit acts that are deviant or that are likely to be regarded as deviant, this particular approach poses different
questions—how stigma comes about and how people w ho are targets of stigma react to, or manage, the deviant identity associated
w ith it.
The reactive approach has been w idely used, and during the 1960s and 1970s w as the dominant orientation. Even now many
people associate the study of deviance exclusivelywith the reactive approach. This popularity stemmed partly from the key idea that
deviant acts or conditions are those disapproved, either by officials or by group members, or in one version of this approach, are
considered important enough by key functionaries of the socialsystemto w arrant attention. The reactive approach was also popular
because of the appeal of the larger labeling argument, fromw hich many of the reactive conceptualizations sprang. The notion that
deviant behavior and stigmatized conditions are highly problematic intrigued many. Moreover, the contentions of the labeling school
that deviance is a creation of the very forces intending to do something about it and that designating acts as deviant represents
unequal pow er in action, w ith large consequencesfor those labeled and for society, meshed w ith the ideologicalbent of many social
scientists of the time.
In due course, however, numerous problems caused the reactive approach to lose its dominance. Among other concerns, many
behaviors that appear to be in violation of conduct standards are not necessarily the focusof negative reactions, especially not
officialreactions. For instance, adultery in the United States is almost never dealt w ith by the police or the courts, and it rarely
results in a deviant label for the actor. Even w hen there are citizen complaints, the police normally refuse to make arrests. Yet
surveys show that most people believe adultery to be w rong, bad, or inappropriate, and it is thought by many socialscientists to
have crucialimplications for a major socialinstitution—the family.
Furthermore, the police frequently arrest people, and courts sometimes impose severe penalties, for behaviors that are not w idely
disapproved and do not seem to have much impact on society (such as marijuana use during the 1960s). Third, the narrow er
reactive definitions created unusualconceptualinconsistencies. If murder is regarded as deviant only w hen discovered and reacted
against by officialagents, then it must also be regarded as conformity if the perpetrator escapespunishment—regardlessof the
number of group members w ho may disapprove of it, how socially dangerous it might be, or how many people do it. Moreover,
according to this kind of reactive definition, deviance can only be studied on a case-by-case basis afterthe fact, thereby making
generalization or consideration and explanation of categories of deviance impossible.
Finally, practicalapplication of some reactive definitions has proven difficult. Empirically ascertaining w hen labeling has occurred (is
an arrest a labeling act, or must one be convicted?) or w hen a labelsticks (how do we know the boundaries of a socialaudience,
how many must accept the label, w hat constitutes stigma?) renders some versions of the reactive approach almost completely
unw orkable (see Gove). Furthermore, those reactive definitions that focus on disreputable statusesand conditions raise limited
questions leading to repetitious research about the importance of pow er in the stigmatization process and about the w ay various
stigmatized people manage their identities. In addition, evidence and logical critiques have eroded the luster of labeling theory,
w hich had earlier energized reactive approaches (Gibbs, 1966; Gove; Hagan, 1973; Mankoff; Wellford).
The groupevaluation approach. A fifth method of identifying conduct standards and deviance is by the beliefs or opinions of group
members. Accordingly, deviant behavior is that regarded as unacceptable, inappropriate, or morally w rong in the opinion of the
members of a group. One problem is deciding how many people in a group must believe some behavior to be unacceptable for it to
4. qualify as deviance, although it is generally assumed that a significant consensusexistsamong group members about rightness or
w rongness and about how people ought to behave. If this assumption is correct, socialdisapprovalindicates that some behavior is
outside acceptable standards of conduct. And suchdisapprovalwould suggest deviance regardless of the typicality or prevalence of
the behavior, w hether anything is actually done about the offense, or whetherthe shared conceptsabout rightness or wrongness
grew out of common experiences or out of carefulsocialization by particular interest groups with an investment in promoting s pecific
ideas.
A group evaluational definition of deviance has never been the dominant approach although it is conceptually clear, has intuitive
meaning, permits deviance to be treated meaningfully as a continuous variable expressing the extent to w hich different behaviors
are disapproved, and provokes many sociologically relevant questions—such as whysome people do disapproved things, w hy and
how socialprocessessometimes produce shared opinions of disapproval, w hygeneralopinions sometimes change, and w hy social
processes sometimes come to activate collective responses to behavior but not at other times. Perhaps the major reason f or under
use of the group evaluational approach is its assumption that all group members' opinions are of equal value. Research show s that
the opinions of some are more important than the opinions of others because some people can implement their opinions w ith
coercive action, and some are more influential in persuading others to their points of view . In addition, some question the usefulness
of a conceptualization of deviance that treats as a violation of conduct standards some acts about w hich nothing is done and for
w hich no sanctions are brought to bear. Furthermore, efficient application of this approach requires surveydata—public opinion
information about perceptions of conduct. Such information is rarely available for all the acts that one might w ant to consider as
potentially deviant, and in some societies no survey data about any behavior are available. Finally, this approach assumes that the
boundaries of groups are clear enough to permit scholars to ascertain the thoughts of most people w ithin those boundaries about
the appropriateness of various behaviors. In reality, how ever, group boundaries are often ambiguous, particularly in a
heterogeneous society with overlapping subculturesand diverse group identities.
The synthetic approach. Some scholars merge different definitions of deviance in an effort to produce more effective, though more
complicated, "integrated" approaches. For example one synthetic definition (Tittle and Paternoster) combines the reactive and the
group evaluation approaches because they pose especially salient questions about socialbehavior—do most people believe it is
w rong and are there usually negative sanctions associated with the behavior? Deviance is defined as any type of behavior that the
majority of a given group regards as unacceptable or that typically evokes a collective response of a negative type. In this definition,
"unacceptable" means the behavior is disapproved, or regarded as w rong, inappropriate, bad, or abnormal—in short, behavior that a
group evaluates negatively. "Majority" means that over half of the people in a specified, bounded group regard the behavior as
unacceptable. Although this is an arbitrary cutoff point, it is used because the main objective is to array behavior on a continuum
fromvery nondeviant (hardly anybody considersit unacceptable) to very deviant (almost everybody in the group considers it
unacceptable), w ith any particular act falling somew here on the continuum. Collective response of a negative type implies that the
majority of the specified group typically does something to express its displeasure, or the officials who possesscoercive powerover
the members of the group typically respond to the behavior in a w ay that expresses negative evaluation. Whether synthetic,
integrated conceptualizations become w idely accepted remains to be seen.
The relativity and importance of deviance
Most students of deviance regard it as a socially constructed phenomenon; that is, things regarded as deviant have no inherent
pejorative qualities but instead are the objects of socialprocessesin a given context that result in negative attributions. With the
exception of those w ho employ an "absolutist" definition, scholars note that w hat is deviant behavior varies fromgroup to group,
fromone time to another, and fromone status to another.
Explaining such differences, including differencesin legality, has been of prime concern to students of deviance because they
believe the processesaffecting socialattributions of deviance are fundamentalto the maintenance and operation of social
groups. Émile Durkheim, regarded by many as the father of studies of deviance, called attention to a shifting scale of attribution by
w hich societies adjust their conceptions of unacceptable conduct to the volume of specific behaviorsthat exist and can be managed.
He pointed out that even saints recognize deviant behavior among themselves, although w hat they regard as deviant is usually quite
saintly from the point of view of the outside w orld. Studies show that groups sometimes shift standards downward, expanding the
supply of deviant behavior or enhancing the evilness of acts that w ere previouslyregarded as trivial(Erikson). The standards are
also sometimes moved upw ard, reducing the number of things that are regarded as unacceptable or transforming behaviors that
w ere once regarded as bad into acceptable conduct. This general process has been called "the elasticity of evil" (Cohen, 1974) or,
w hen it specifically involves acceptanceof things previously thought of as intolerable, "defining deviancy down" (Moynihan).
Because transforming deviance into conformity or vice versa is a major means by w hich socialchange occurs, studentsof deviance
try to understand the process and the conditions under w hich conceptionsof deviance change.
In addition, Durkheim and his follow ersbelieved that the process of identifying and doing something about deviant behavior is
normal, even essentialfor group emergence and maintenance. Much like pain is unpleasant but essential for the human body to
protect itself fromtruly destructive conditions, so is deviance essentialfor group survival. Although scholars have not been able to
demonstrate that identifying and managing deviance is necessary forsocialorganization, they have shownthat such processes are
ubiquitous so that w hat is or is not deviant is highly variable, often in predictable w ays. As a result, almost all students of deviance
reject the idea that deviance is inherent to particular behaviors; rather, they see it as a quality conferred upon some behav iors or
individuals by groups as they go about the business of socialorganization.
Moreover, the fact of being deviant is thought to influence w hether people do it or not. For that reason most students of deviance
have concluded that one cannot simply explain behavior that happens to be deviant in a given group and expect the explanation to
apply to all such behavior in all contexts. Some go even further, arguing that specific forms of deviance in a given social s etting,
5. such as addictive drug use, cannot be explained in the same w ay that other forms of deviance in that context, such as fraud, are
explained, nor can acts of crime be explained the same w ay actsof noncriminaldeviance are explained. Such contentions have
spaw ned a controversy concerning the potentialvalue of general theories as opposed to theories aimed explicitly at one or another
formof deviance. This controversyalso bears on the relationship betw een criminology and studies of deviance.
Relationshipbetween deviance and crime
To a large extent, criminology and studies of deviance have developed along separate tracks although they show much overlap.
Criminologists have typically limited themselves to issues about legality, crime, or crime-related phenomena. Students of deviance,
on the other hand, have studied crime as w ellas a w ider range of behaviors or conditions that are deviant by one or another of the
definitions review ed but are not necessarily illegal, such as suicide, alcoholism, homosexuality, mentally disordered behaviors,
stuttering, and even such behaviors as public nose picking or flatulence, sectarian religious behaviors, and body mutilation. Hence,
it is difficult to distinguish criminology clearly fromstudies of deviance (Bader et al.).
Many criminologists concede that illegal acts are not fundamentally different fromlegalbut deviant acts, except by the fact of
illegality itself, w hich is largely an arbitrary designation by legal functionaries. At the same time, students of deviance readily
acknow ledge that many deviant acts are also illegal and they have found data about crime especially usefulbecause it is more
systematic than most data concerning legal forms of deviance. Recognizing this overlap is obvious among those deviance scholars
w ho employ a legalistic definition of deviance, but almost every comprehensive treatment of deviant behavior, regardless of the
definition used, includes a subsection on criminal acts that are also deviant. Furthermore, both camps have raised similar questions
and have come to share a common set of theories for explaining the phenomena in their domains. Among other issues,
criminologists as w ellas students of deviance want to explain w hythe acts they study are deviant or criminal; they w ant to describe
and explain the distribution, frequency, prevalence, and change in the occurrenceof various criminalor deviant acts; they w ant to
explain w hy and how criminalor deviant acts are committed; they w ant to explain how socialgroups manage and respond to crime
and deviance and how people w ho are accusedor guilty of crime or deviance respond to being accused or managed; and they w ant
to understand how criminalor deviant phenomena affect and are affected by other aspectsof sociallife.
Because of the overlap betw een crime and deviance, some scholars now regard distinctions between criminology and deviance
studies as false and counterproductive, and they have called for a merger of the subject matters. Since all definitions of deviance,
except the legalistic one, portray deviant behavior as a more inclusive concept, merger might imply subsuming criminology under
the umbrella of deviance studies. Under that conceptualization, criminal behavior w ould be treated as a specialcase of deviant
behavior—that w hich is prohibited in law , thereby meriting the possibility of officially imposed sanctions that legal forms of deviance
escape. On the other hand, some contend that criminology has already preempted deviance studies so that deviance as a separate
subject matter no longer exists or matters (Sumner), and still others contend that the tw o fields should clearly differentiate
themselves by allocating legally related phenomena exclusively to criminology, leaving other forms of disapproved behavior to
deviance studies (Bader et al.).
There are tw o main intellectual barriers to merging criminology w ith studies of deviance. First, some criminal behavior in some
places (such as gambling) is not deviant, at least by most definitions of deviance, so w ould be subject to criminological study but not
to study by students of deviance. The political processes that produce laws can result in behaviors being declared illegal although
the conduct is not deviant by any definition except a legalistic one. How those political processes unfold and how enforcement might
fare w hen illegality does not match socialreality are of great importance to some criminologists. In addition, some behaviors are
deviant at the time they become illegal but later become non-deviant w ithout the law having been changed. Therefore, those
intellectually opposed to merger might note that subsuming criminology under deviance studies w ould exclude some of the more
interesting aspects of criminology.
A second intellectual obstacle to conceiving of crime and deviance as one subject matter hinges on disagreements about the nature
of human behavior. Some criminologists and some students of deviance contend that all forms of behavior, including specific acts or
types of crime or deviance, are more or less distinct, requiring unique explanations. By observing a plethora of differences, such as
w hether committed by males or females, blacks or w hites, young or old, in some circumstances rather than others, whether legalor
not, w hether regarded as especially serious or not, w hether violent or simply immoral, w hether committed w ith planning or
spontaneously, and the like, some conclude that specific behaviors have few similarities that w ould justify their being explained by
the same theories. This orientation has generated a large number of explanations of specific behaviors, such as predatory crime
(Braithw aite), common juvenile misdeeds (Hagan, 1989), embezzlement (Cressey), mentalillness (Scheff), homicide by females
(Ogle et al.), and many others.
Challengers, how ever, contend that various deviant behaviors are only superficially different because similar underlying caus al
processes operate in most if not all forms of deviance. They often use the analogy of focusing so closely on individualtrees that the
forest is overlooked. In addition, those w ho advocate generaltheory contend that it is necessary in order to achieve scientific goals
of explanation and prediction based on assumptions about unity in nature; and that general theory is more parsimonious becaus e
specific accountsalready overlap, often in unrecognized ways. The generalist orientation has led to a number of theories that aim to
account for wide ranges of deviance in a variety of circumstances. These generalaccounts usually take one of tw o forms.
One formof general theorizing assumes a universalcausalprocess that generates different forms of devianceunder different
conditions. The theories attempt to identify that causalprocess and specifythe conditions under w hich it produces one form of
deviance rather than another (some examples are: Akers; Gottfredson and Hirschi; Agnew; Tittle). A second approach to general
theory assumes that different causalprocessesoperate at different times and under different conditions. The theories merge s everal
6. causalprocessesby specifying when or whyone or another w illcome into play to produce a given formof deviance at a specific
point in time or in a given circumstance (some examples are: Braithw aite; Conger and Simons; Elliott et al.; Thornberry).
The generalist orientation clearly implies that crime and deviance are one entity. How ever, no generaltheory has yet been generally
accepted as better than specific, focused accounts. Therefore, debates concerning the intellectual benefits of generaltheory and the
relative advantages of differentiating criminology and studies of deviance w illcontinue.
The main barriers to conceptualizing deviance and crime as a single entity are not intellectual, how ever—they are ideologicaland
practical. Criminologists claim a more centralrole in addressing issues of acute public concern and they position themselves more
favorably to receive government funds forresearch and to offer usefuladvice forcontrolling crime. Indeed, criminology has
traditionally been identified w ith practicalconcerns. In addition, because they regard many forms of deviant behavior that are not
illegal as unw orthy of serious attention, some criminologists resist identity as students of deviance. Finally, by focusing on illegal
conduct and limiting themselves to modern, politically, and geographically demarcated societies, criminologists avoid some of the
problems encountered by students of deviance who struggle to identify group boundaries, to measure opinions of group members,
or to document disapprovalof various behaviors. Students of deviance, on the other hand, often resist the idea that they are also
criminologists, maintaining that criminological study is too narrow ly focused on behaviors arbitrarily designated by simple acts of
legislative bodies. By so limiting itself, criminology ignores a large domain of phenomena crucialfor under-standing human behavior
and socialorganization. Some students of deviance also regard criminology as a handmaiden of government, committed to
preventing acts that are contrary to the interests of powerfulgroups who influence the content and enforcement of the criminal law .
Perhaps the major practicalbarrier to criminology and studies of deviant behavior becoming one subject matter is the tendenc y of
criminologists to orient themselves concretely while students of deviance are relativistically oriented. Assuming that concepts of
serious illegality are largely invariant across time and place (Wellford), most criminologists have focused on explanations of criminal
behavior or its distribution, w ith only a minority show ing concern with explaining variations in the law . Students of deviance,
how ever, have traditionally emphasized variations in socialattributions of deviance and have mainly tried to understand w hy
something is or is not deviant in a given place and time, w ith only a minority being concerned with explaining behavior itself.
Summary
Deviance generally implies pejorative departures fromsocialstandards of one kind or another. How ever, there are many
conceptualizations of deviance and how it is conceptualized affectswhat and how deviance is studied. One key unifying theme is
the relativity of deviance. Because much deviance is also illegal, there is great over-lap betw een criminology and deviance studies.
Some contend that the tw o areas of study should be regarded as one, but there are intellectual and practicalbarriers to such a
merger. A related issue concerns whether various forms of deviance can be explained w ith large generaltheories or requires s pecial
ad hoc accounts. Much w orkremains to be done before the key questions about deviant behavior can be answ ered.
Charles R. Tittle
See also Crime Causation: Sociological Theories; Criminology: Modern Controversies; Delinquent and Criminal Subcultures.
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