For tourism

2.  Situated in the southwest Pacific, Fiji is an archipelago of over
300 islands, one third of which are inhabited (TCSP, nd). The
1996 census recorded a total population of 772,655 with
indigenous Fijians accounting for 51% of the population, Indo-
Fijians 44%, and other ethnic backgrounds 5%.
 Most of the population (75%) lives on the main island of Viti
Levu with the second largest island, Vanua Levu, accounting
for a further 18%. The remaining 7% are spread across
approximately 100 outer islands.
 According to the Ministry of Information, just under 40% are
urban dwellers, concentrated mainly in the Suva-Nausori area,
Labasa, Lautoka, Nadi, and Ba (Ministry of Information, 1999).

3.  In terms of its tourism product, Fiji offers all of the attributes
associated with a tropical island destination—sun, sea, sand,
and surf—along with a reputation for friendly service and a
welcoming resident population (Ministry of Tourism &
Transport et al.,1998).
 Traditionally, Fiji has traded on this idyllic tourist image. Two
examples include a recent Fiji Visitors’Bureau (FVB) campaign
“Discover the Fiji You Don’t Know” followed later by “Discover
the Fiji You’ll Never Forget.”
 These developments were further reinforced in 1998 with the
release of Ecotourism and Village Based Tourism: A Policy
and Strategy for Fiji (Harrison, 1999), and by the inclusion of
a section on ecotourism in the tourism sector development
plan, which comprised a component of the National
Development Plan (Berno and King, 2001).

4.  Traditionally, Fiji’s tourism industry has been predicated on the
dominant short haul markets of Australia and New Zealand.
The visitor profile has, however, changed since 1987 with
visitation from Australia declining as a proportion of the total.
The positive element of this change has been that Fiji’s range
of source markets is now highly diversified.
 Short-haul travelers do, however, remain extremely important
because of the longer average length of stay of visitors from
Australia and New Zealand. This results in a disproportionate
influence for Australia in responding to political crises in Fiji
(e.g., the placing of sanctions). Fiji has no substantive
domestic market and relies almost exclusively on visitors who
arrive by air (McVey and King, 1999).

5.  Sugar and tourism are the mainstays of the Fijian economy,
though other industries such as manufacturing, forestry,
fisheries, and mining also make significant contributions. The
sector generated foreign exchange earnings of $568.2 million
and contributed, directly and indirectly to 27% of GDP, up from
a reported 20% in 1998.
 The outlook for the year 2000 was promising. Until the events
of May 19, 2000, the Fiji Visitors Bureau arrival target of
412,300 appeared quite realistic. These figures demonstrate
the potential vulnerability of Fiji’s tourism economy to political
instability.
 Figure 1 shows the long-term arrivals trend and highlights the
severity of both coups on overall arrivals to Fiji. Double digit
falls were recorded in all source markets with the exception of
Korea, which surprisingly grew by 127%, albeit from a low
base. It was not until June 2001, a year after the coup, that
the monthly visitor arrivals exceeded those of the previous
year.

6.  Superficially, there were many similarities between the
events of 1987 and 2000. As had been the case in 1987,
the effect of the coup on the tourism industry was swift
and far reaching.
 The circumstances were, however, quite different and
tourism had changed considerably during the intervening
period, prompting the need for different recovery tactics.
 The swift conclusion to the so-called bloodless coups of
1987 allowed the tourism industry to focus on its recovery
strategy.

7.  This gathering of local tourism industry leaders was used as a
forum to develop plans for industry recovery. During the
Tourism

9.  Convention, an agreement was reached to set up a crisis
management team within the National Tourism Office, to
be called the Tourism Action Group (TAG). TAG had a
single objective—to bring tourists back to Fiji as fast and
effectively as possible (TAG, 2000a).
 To accomplish this, four immediate goals were
established:
■ Removal of travel advisories and union bans in
Australia and New Zealand;
■ A doubling of the National Tourism Organization
marketing budget;
■ Familiarization visits from the main markets for trade
representatives; and,
■ Marketing of special airfares and packages to the
markets noted above.

10.  Initially established for a six-month period, TAG was
disbanded after 11 weeks, following evidence that the
recovery was under way
 A subsequent coup in September 1987 (after TAG had been
disbanded) brought the recovery of the tourism industry to a
sudden halt, but the TAG strategy was still relevant to a large
extent and the industry experienced a significant recovery
during 1988 (Lea,1996 ).
 Like many other tropical island nations, Fiji has long
established procedures in place to deal with emergencies such
as cyclones.
 This meant that the overall preparedness in 1987 was
relatively good with provisions to contact hotels across the
country to give advice on how to react.

11.  The experience of 1987 showed that a crisis management
plan was a necessary contingency in the event of political
unrest as well as for possible natural disasters
 The experience of 1987 showed that a crisis management
plan was a necessary contingency in the event of political
unrest as well as for possible natural disasters.
 Consistent with this requirement, the crisis management group
formed an integral part of both the marketing objectives and
the marketing strategies of the Year 2000 Fiji Visitors Bureau
Marketing Plan Summary (FVB, 1999).

12.  The 2000 coup had an immediate and significant impact on
Fiji’s economy and tourism industry. Many tourists to Fiji Cut
short Their holiday's and Many prospective Tourists made
cancellations . The peak tourism months in Fiji are June
through August. The coup resulted in a Decline of visitor
arrivals in that period of almost 70%. The loss of tourism
revenue Had reached an estimated F$84.6 million by the
beginning of August. As a result, the hotel sector experienced
a 44% reduction in employment.
 The prior experiences of 1987 prompted the tourism industry
to mobilize Quickly. A meeting of key members of the tourism
industry was convened jointly By FVB and Air Pacific during
the week after the 2000 coup. At that meeting, several
resolutions were adopted as part of a crisis management plan.

13.  The key issues Were identified as:
■ Communication with overseas source markets, overseas
diplomatic missions, and the media;
■ Operational issues such as how to deal with cancellations
and travel insurance Issues
■ Monitoring of key relationships for resorts and operations
(e.g., landowners, Unions, and staff); and
■ Developing a long-term strategy to address tourism industry.
 Consistent with the cooperative and cohesive response to the
events of 1987, TAG 2000 was formed. The group
implemented a series of initiatives intended to expedite a
recovery.

14.  According to the TAG the objectives were to:
■ Develop an International Plan that was fully coordinated;
■ Establish that Fiji is safe and desirable;
■ Finance the promotion of Fiji with cooperative support from the
private sector and government;
■ Seek the involvement of wholesalers and retailers in all source
markets;
■ Implement multiphase marketing strategies to achieve both
short-term and long-term objectives; and
■ Reinstate lost employment in the industry.
 With the funding and strategies in place, the recovery plan was
ready to be operationalized as a two-phase campaign. Phase
One was to be an intensive tactical promotional campaign in all
key markets, followed by Phase Two, a follow-on coordinated,
long-term advertising support program.

15.  In 2000, the timing of the implementation of the full recovery
plan became a major preoccupation. Marketing could not bring
about recovery in the tourism industry until the political situation
was stable enough to warrant the lifting (or at least the
downgrading) of the travel advisories issued by foreign
governments.
 Some foreign governments warned that any preemptive launch
of a full recovery campaign before the lifting of the relevant
travel advisories would force them to react, and to actively
discourage their citizens traveling to Fiji. These public relations
activities were seen as being essential in preparing Fiji for the
recovery program and protecting Fiji’s tourism product.

16.  One element of the campaign was the “Spirit of Fiji” (Sa ka ga
ni yalo; FVB, 2000b). The Spirit of Fiji campaign was created
in part as a response to the takeover by landowners of some
key resorts in July. The campaign was aimed at the local
indigenous community, and sought their help, assurance, and
hard work to rebuild the idea of the “friendly Fiji islands.”
Advertisements appeared on television with employees and
landowners featured prominently because they were
considered to play a significant role in the hospitality industry.
 Land ownership was also affecting the tourism industry eight
resorts were occupied by hostile landowners, the most notable
being Turtle Island Resort which was taken over during
“children’s week.” The resort had recently won the British
Airways’ Tourism for Tomorrow Award for the Pacific Region,
thereby ensuring high-profile media coverage and a strong
word-of-mouth effect.

17.  The status of Turtle Island as a luxury property attracting the
rich and famous meant that news of its difficulties caused the
concern among travel distributors that no one anywhere in Fiji
was entirely immune to the instability

18.  Media coverage played an important role in both 1987 and
2000, but exerted a greater influence in the latter case. As
has been widely observed, tourism thrives on positive publicity
and the communication of negative and threatening images
has been particularly vexing for a tourism industry that is more
comfortable with images of happy, smiling faces.
 Shortly before the 2000 coup, the Fiji Visitors Bureau (FVB)
had launched its new branding campaign, “Fiji—the world’s
one truly relaxing destination.” Complementing this preferred
positioning, the South Pacific Tourism Organization’s branding
of Fiji stated that “Hospitality is a way of life for the Fijian
people and as a visitor you will be genuinely welcomed.”

20.  This slogan was accompanied by photographs of smiling
indigenous Fijians and such copy as, “[Fiji is] home to people
who have been called ‘the friendliest on earth.’” The images
projected around the world of balaclava-clad gunmen and the
looting and burning of Suva were in stark contrast to the
touristic images of a peaceful, friendly, and above all relaxing
South Pacific holiday destination.

21.  Ironically the pre-1987 branding of Fiji was “Fiji—the way the
world ought to be.”The 2000 branding was in some ways a
return to this theme, and had been prompted by the sense that
Fiji had now moved beyond the political uncertainty and division
of1987. This renewed confidence has proved to be short-lived.
 Negative media images had also been broadcast in 1987, but
communication developments ensured a larger international
audience and consequently greater market penetration and
currency. In particular, the Internet provided up-to-the-minute
information and commentary about the happenings in Fiji to a
worldwide audience.
 The Internet projected uncensored news in an uncontrolled
fashion to a potential audience of millions. Supplementing this
coverage, the various chat rooms and discussion sites ensured
that the events in Fiji were deconstructed as well as reported.

22.  According to Narayan, attempts at gagging some Internet-
based media during the coup were unsuccessful, as the blocked
sites simply moved to a sympathetic mirror site (Narayan,
2000). Such coverage greatly impeded the ability of the
government and the tourism authorities to control the message
or to ensure selective coverage.
 The recovery program has had to compete with a constant
media barrage of negative image and copy. The easy
accessibility of archival information on the Internet has also
helped keep the situation in Fiji alive in the public’s mind long
after it might have faded. The ubiquity of the Internet also
prevented tourism operators from identifying potential market
sources that may have been unaware of the relevant political
events.

23.  One notable resort on the island of Taveuni focused its post-
1987 coup promotion on the US market on the basis that few
agents and even fewer potential consumers in that market had
any consciousness of the political events that had occurred.
 The assumption appeared to be correct since the resort
returned rapidly to high occupancies. Such opportunities were
not available in 2000. In 2000, the experiences of the Korean
and Japanese markets appeared to be contradictory. Korean
Airlines recommenced services to Nadi on August 6, bringing
in 200 passengers and 18 “key tourism related officers.”
These led to a steady recovery and to numbers that
outstripped the previous year. In contrast, Air Pacific
recommenced flights to Narita in Japan on August 10, but this
action failed to prompt a recovery.

24.  The price sensitivity of the Korean market may have
played apart in the different responses. It may have been
that the discounted prices on offer were a major incentive
to attract Korean operators. The responses may also
indicate that the affected destination country (in this case
Fiji through its national carrier Air Pacific) is less able to
make a quick impact than an initiative launched in the
source country (i.e., in Korea through the national carrier
Korean Airlines).

25.  The lifting of travel advisories, which TAG had initially
anticipated, did not occur. The benchmark for the launch of the
recovery program was shifted to the time at which the travel
advisories were downgraded. In a sense this made tourism a
captive to external events and actions.
 The hostage-taking of two Air Fiji pilots (both New Zealand
nationals) on Vanua Levu on July 27 increased the
determination of governments in source markets to persist with
their travel advisories. While the pilots were only interned for
two days and were unharmed, the incident stiffened the resolve
of the New Zealand government concerning its travel advisories.

26.  It was not until late August that the situation in Fiji was
sufficiently settled for New Zealand and Australia to follow the
actions of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan
in downgrading their travel advisories.
 Although the organizers of the Spirit of Fiji campaign attributed
their initiative as having played “an instrumental role in the
lifting of travel advisories against Fiji,” it is more likely that the
more settled prevailing political situation resulted in the
change.
 The tourism industry looked forward to the start of the much-
awaited recovery with the downgrading of the advisories. As
originally planned, TAG immediately launched Phase One of
the recovery with a range of price-driven recovery-marketing
initiatives in Fiji’s key markets.

27.  The implementation of Phase One, with its special recovery
airfare and accommodation packaging and comprehensive
media and public relations campaign, was followed by Phase
Two in October.
 Phase Two focused on revised airfare and land content
packages, continued public relations efforts, and market-
specific cooperative campaigns. The campaign achieved some
success.
 Australian numbers also increased marginally, but the Sydney
Olympics, staged in September, had a diversionary effect on
potential travel to Fiji.
 Despite these optimistic signs of recovery, the challenges of
the 2000 coup were not yet over. Although the device was
safely disarmed, the wide reporting of the incident further
reinforced the international image of Fiji as a volatile place.

28.  Twenty of the armed rebels escaped prompting the imposition
of a 36-hour curfew in the greater Suva region. Most of the
rebels were quickly apprehended.
 TAG immediately went into damage control, lobbying foreign
embassies to downgrade travel advisories and disseminating
the message that the upgraded advisories applied only to the
greater Suva region.
 They made it clear that the rest of the country remained safe
and that tourism establishments such as hotels, resorts, and
attractions were unaffected by the uprising.
 Such arguments are difficult to sustain in tourism because the
security consciousness of visitors makes them reluctant to
accept arguments that attempt to confine security problems to
particular localities, especially where normally tranquil resorts
become targets (as was mentioned previously, Turtle Island
was one of these).

29.  The swift and decisive response by the military along with
TAG’s quick action resulted in the mineralization of the impact
on the recovering tourism industry. Few cancellations were
received from either New Zealand or Australia and resorts
around the tourism centers reported good occupancies.
 All airlines in and out of Nadi and all tourism services
continued to operate as normal. Ongoing political unrest was
not the only threat to TAG’s recovery efforts.
 Phase One of the recovery campaign itself came under fire
through an objection lodged with the Advertising Complaints
Standards Board in New Zealand, which highlighted
fundamental contradictions between the views of the tourism
industry and those wishing to prolong the sense of political
crisis.

30.  The recovery campaign, which showed an idyllic Fiji beach
scene with the caption “Fiji Before and Fiji After . The only
thing that’s changed is the price,” drew complaints from the
Coalition for Democracy in Fiji (Pacific Media Watch, 2000).
 The latter claimed that the caption did not differentiate
between Fiji’s tourism product and the country itself. It was
argued that this left room for the viewer to infer that the coup
had inflicted no lasting effect on Fiji.
 The campaign was subsequently amended to read “Fiji
holidays before and Fiji holidays after . The only thing that’s
changed is the price.” The impact of the message was clearly
reduced as a result of the qualification that had been added to
the statement.
 Despite widespread media coverage for the incident in both
New Zealand and Fiji, no detectable decrease in tourist
numbers was evident. This confirms the view that tourists
seeking relaxation take little notice of political matters at the
destination, provided that personal security is assured.

31.  In spite of the setbacks, the tangible results of TAG’s efforts
suggest that their strategy for dealing with tourism in the face
of political crises was successful. Average daily arrivals based
on visitor permits at Nadi airport (the main gateway airport for
Fiji, and after the coup, the only airport processing
international arrivals) increased significantly after the launch of
the campaign.

34.  By October, many resorts were reporting occupancies in
excess of 50%, with bookings improving rapidly. The public
relations campaign saw over 100 media personnel, from over
50 media organizations worldwide, visiting Fiji through the
TAG and FVB Media Visitation Program. Over 1,000 travel
agents were projected will to have visited Fiji by March 2001.
Industry employment was less resilient.

35.  Fiji Tourism Forum in December 2000, TAG summarized their
vision of the way forward as follows:
■ On May 19, 2000, the tourism tap was abruptly turned off;
■ Tourism arrivals declined to a trickle;
■ Fiji’s economy suffered and so did Fiji’s tourism industry;
■ We are now in recovery mode;
■ The flow of visitors is starting to increase;
■ Fiji tourism needs to be united in our efforts to recover our lost
status;
■ We need to continue to deliver the promised service to our
visitors at all levels (hotels, shops, tours, transportation, etc.);
and
■ Reinstatement of lost employment should remain a priority.

36.  It has been suggested by a Fiji academic that the country
needs to consider what should be done to deal with the next
coup, not make plans in case there would be another coup.
 One of the key lessons learned from the experience of the
tourism industry is much the same: the need to be prepared.
Most tourism plans, particularly those in tropical destinations,
contain contingencies for natural disasters such as cyclones.
 They also need to consider other types of crises, such as
political unrest. As a result, the industry was relatively well
prepared to respond quickly to the mounting crisis.

37.  Beirman has highlighted this as an example of good practice,
contrasting it with the cancellation of key trade events in
Australia in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks on
September 11, 2001 (Beirman, 2001).
 A coordinated and collective approach to the recovery process
(i.e., one voice, one message) was essential. This was
particularly important in dealing with the media and for
downgrading the travel advisories. Although there was some
internal debate about the size of the financial contributions
demanded by the TAG and the promotion of a single product
branding campaign, the strategy has ultimately been
successful in attracting visitors back to Fiji.

38.  The ability of Fiji to reconvene the TAG at short notice
following the terrorist attacks in the United States was a major
competitive advantage. The fact that funding was expected to
involve a partnership between the public and private sectors is
consistent with the “user pays” philosophy, which has become
increasingly characteristic in developed countries in the
1990s.
 This difference between 1987 and 2000, then, is the result of
the changing macro environment. Important lessons had been
learned in 1987 about dealing with the media.
 As Scott (1988, p. 69) stated, “While the media clearly have a
duty to inform, it was found that handling information with
candor and integrity [could] in fact ensure that media coverage
[could] be harnessed to aid the recovery process.” Although
TAG and FVB had solid strategies in place for media liaison
and public relations, changes in information technology since
1987 meant that this was a much more difficult task in 2000.

39.  The uncontrollable nature of the Internet in particular posed
significant challenges to Fiji’s international image, and hence,
to the recovery program.
 Private capital and freehold land ownership in tourism in Fiji,
however, challenge this tradition. One of the manifestations of
this juxtaposition was the takeover of various tourist resorts by
indigenous landowners in 2000.
 The Spirit of Fiji campaign was one way of addressing the
issues. However, grassroots initiatives were also affected.
 One of these was a Tourism Awareness Training Program
initiated by the Savusavu Tourism Association and the Tui
Wailevu after the hostage taking of the New Zealand pilots in
Savusavu (Berno and Bricker, 2000; Carswell, 2000).

40.  Despite these efforts, land ownership will clearly be an
ongoing concern that will need careful consideration. After the
coups in 1987, a recovery to pre-coup tourist arrival numbers
was realized by the end of 1988.
 Despite the success of TAG’s campaign, a full recovery after
the coup in 2000 is likely to take longer. It is going to take a
continuing collaborative, concerted effort to recapture the
image of “Fiji—the world’s one truly relaxing destination.” As
long as the prospect of another coup cannot be ruled out, it
may be difficult to offer tourists the prospect of absolute
relaxation.
 In some respects, Fiji may have lost its innocence in 1987,
leaving the tourism sector with no choice but to manage the
new reality. Words such as relaxation, paradise, and idyllic
can become tinged with irony. The events of September 11
have provided an extra layer of complexity.

41.  Prior to that date, Fiji may have appeared a very unsafe
place. The Fiji experience is a timely reminder to other island
destinations of the need to consider the full implications of
terms such as paradise, tranquility, and true relaxation, which
have been adopted by many island destinations.
 Fiji was better prepared than many to confront the crisis when
it arose because of the familiarity of the country with cyclones
and related natural disasters. Overcoming skepticism on the
part of the overseas travel industry and the traveling public is
a bigger challenge.
 Fiji’s tourist sector recovered from the experience of 1987 and
will do the same again, though the downturn in world tourism
following the terrorist attack in the United States has been a
further setback. It is clear that destinations are vulnerable to a
confluence of local issues (e.g., the coups) and global
concerns (the implications of the terrorist attacks).

42.  Such destinations could learn from Fiji’s preparedness for
crisis, particularly the second time around. The development
of widely applicable recovery models would be useful. Such
research would be positively received in a world where
travelers need increasing reassurance that industry and
governments have the appropriate responses in place when
crises strike.