CASE STUDY BPBP and the Deepwater Disaster Christina

CASE STUDY: BP
BP and the Deepwater Disaster
Christina Ingersoll, Richard M. Locke, Cate Reavis
The assignment is at the end of the case study
I recommend you review the Near Misses and Hidden Traps
BEFORE you read the case. Also review Duties and Rights
Ethics.
The purpose of this exercise is to help you see, that in reality,
how easy it is for people and organizations to fail in many of
decision-making concepts and ethical theories we have studied.
The goal is to show you that the concepts we have studied
academically really are relevant. It is also to show you that
when we fail in our ethical obligations and in our expectations
to others, how catastrophic the affect is on our moral code.
When Mike Williams woke up on Tuesday, April 20, 2010, he
knew the procedures for jumping from a 33,000 ton oil rig. This
would prove to be important knowledge later that night when an
emergency announcement was issued over the rig's PA system.
Williams was the chief electronics technician for Transocean, a
support company that specialized in deep water drilling
equipment. The company's $560 million Deepwater rig was in
the Gulf of Mexico working on the Macondo well. British
Petroleum (BP) held the rights to explore the well and had
leased the rig, along with its crew, from Transocean. Of the 126
people aboard the Deepwater, 79 were from Transocean, seven
were from BP, and the rest were from other firms.

Williams was accustomed to emergency alarms. Gas levels had
been running high enough to prohibit any such work as welding
or wiring that could cause sparks. Normally, the alarm system
would have gone off with gas levels as high as they were.
However, the alarms had been disabled in order to prevent false
alarms from waking people in the middle of the night. But the
emergency announcement that came over the PA system on the
night of April 20 was clearly no false alarm.
Moments after the announcement, Williams was jolted by a
shake and the revving of one of the rig's engines. Before he
knew it, there were two explosions forcing him and other crew
members to abandon ship by jumping into the partially flaming
ocean. Of the 126 workers, 17 were injured, including Williams,
and 11 were killed. The rig burned for 36 hours, exploding the
700,000 gallons of oil that were on board. The Deepwater sank
on April 22, taking with it the top pipe of the well and parts of
the system that were supposed to prevent blowouts from
occurring.
As of 2010, the Deepwater disaster was the largest marine oil
spill ever to occur in U.S. waters. By the time the well was
capped on July 15, 2010, nearly five million barrels of oil had
spilled into the Gulf of Mexico.
It was surprising to analysts how such a disaster could happen,
particularly involving a company like BP, which publicly prided
itself on its commitment to safety. It did seem clear that, in an
effort to close up the Macondo well, several key decisions were
made, each involving multiple stakeholders and trade-offs of
time, money, safety, and risk mitigation. The public debate
began immediately on whether the result of these decisions
indicated operational or management problems on the rig, and
whether these problems were endemic to the oil industry, or
resided within BP itself. To help answer these questions, several
task forces were formed to investigate the root causes of the
disaster and who among the various players involved with the
Macondo well bore responsibility for the disaster and for its
resolution.

British Petroleum
In the late 1970s, the British government began selling off its
ownership of BP in an attempt to increase productivity. When
the government sold its final 31% share in 1987, BP's
performance was in trouble. The company's performance
continued to decline as a private company. In 1992, BP posted a
loss of $811 million. Nearing bankruptcy, the company was
forced to make dramatic cost cutting measures. Things started
to improve in the mid-1990s. With a smaller workforce BP's
new CEO put into effect an aggressive growth strategy.
In 2001, BP began recreating itself. The company wanted to be
known as an environmentally friendly oil company. Over the
next decade, the company launched the new Alternative Energy
division, that was the world's largest manufacturer of solar cells
and Britain's largest producer of wind energy. Between 2005
and 2009, BP invested $4 billion in alternative energy. BP's
total company investment over the same time period was $982
billion.
In May 2007, Tony Hayward replaced John Browne as CEO.
Hayward promised to "focus on safety issues, slow down growth
and reduce production targets." Hayward improved corporate
performance by shrinking the Alternative Energy division and
reduce staff and four levels of management. BP's workforce fell
from 97,000 to 80,300 people.
In addition to cutting management, Hayward also transformed
BP's culture to one that was not afraid to take risk. He believed
that too many people were making decisions leading to extreme
cautiousness. He said, “being too safe is killing us".
In a short period of time, BP transitioned from a small, state-
sponsored company to one of the largest non-state-owned oil
companies in the world. In the month before the Deepwater
disaster, BP was the largest company listed on the London
Stock Exchange. The change required merging with and
purchasing other companies. BP also took further strict cost
cutting measures.

Organizational Strategy
In the late 1980s, BP comprised of several layers of
management that made it difficult for anyone to make decisions
quickly. In some cases, a proposal for change required 15
signatures. At the same time, the company had too much debt
and its performance was bad. Robert Horton, appointed CEO in
1989, cut $750 million from BP's annual expenses. He removed
several layers of management - 80 people. Horton increased the
speed of managerial decision making. Horton transformed
hierarchically structured departments into smaller, more flexible
teams charged with maintaining open lines of communication.
Horton transferred decision making power away from the
corporate centre to the upstream and downstream business
divisions. Employees at all levels were encouraged to take
responsibility and exercise decision making initiative. In 1992,
David Simon was appointed CEO replacing Robert Horton.
Simon continued Horton's policy of cost cutting, especially in
staffing.
The biggest changes occurred in BPX, which was led by John
Browne. Browne created a feeling of entrepreneurship among
his staff. He extended decision making responsibilities to
employees at more levels in the organization. Under this
strategy, decision making authority and responsibility for
meeting performance targets was no longer held by BP's
regional operating companies, but by onsite asset managers.
Employee compensation was tied to asset performance and the
overall performance of the site. After Browne took over this
model was applied across the company.
One trade-off with this model was that because each site
manager managed their own "asset" and was compensated for its
performance, there was little incentive to share best practices on
risk management among other BP exploration locations. There
was little oversight over setting performance targets,
particularly where risk management and safety were essential to

the long-term success of an oil company. BP had a lot of safety
violations.
Safety Issues at BP
In the mid-2000s, disaster struck BP twice within a 12-month
period. On March 23, 2005, an explosion at BP's Texas City
Refinery killed 15 people and injured another 180, and resulted
in financial losses exceeding $1.5 billion. BP hired outside
experts to write an report on the Texas City tragedy. One of the
findings highlighted in the Report was that the company had cut
back on maintenance and safety measures at the plant in order
to reduce costs, and that responsibility for the explosion
ultimately rested with company senior executives. Another
concern outlined in the Report was that while BP had
emphasized personal safety and achieved significant
improvements, the company "has mistakenly interpreted
improving personal injury rates as an indication of acceptable
process safety, creating a false sense of confidence." The
Report went on to state the following:
BP documents suggested that many employees did not believe
that safety was a core value at BP. One of the reasons for this
belief is that BP's executive and corporate refining management
had not communicated a consistent and meaningful message
about the importance of process safety and a firm conviction
that process accidents were not acceptable. The BP stated policy
on health and safety, "no accidents, no harm to people and no
damage to the environment" was not widely known to the
employees.
Until BP's many layers of management consistently articulated a
clear message on process safety, it would be difficult to
persuade the refining workforce that BP was truly committed on
a long-term basis to process safety excellence.
In March 2006, a second disaster struck BP. In Alaska more
than 200,000 gallons of oil poured into the bay from a hole in

the pipeline, making it the largest oil spill in Alaska. Alaskan
state regulators had been warning BP since 2001 that its
management procedures were out of alignment with state
regulations, and that critical equipment needed to be better
maintained.
BP took several actions in response to the Report. BP
executives clearly realized that when it came to safety, there
was room for improvement.
John Browne met with the company's top 200 leaders to stress
BP's commitment to safety and communicate his expectations
regarding safety. Additionally, BP senior managers attended
town hall meetings with employees to discuss safety issues. The
chief executive conducted meetings and sent written
communications to BP America employees regarding safety
issues.
BP announced that it had committed $7 billion over the next
four years to upgrade all aspects of safety at its U.S. refineries
and to repair and replace pipelines in Alaska. The company had
also announced $300 million and significant external input for
process safety management renewal in refining.
The Macondo Prospect
The Macondo Prospect was located in the Gulf of Mexico. At
5,000 feet below sea level, the well demonstrated great potential
for extracting oil, but was also hazardous. Natural gas levels
were high in the reservoirs, which made drilling challenging.
Drilling in deep and ultra-deep water started to become
economically profitable and technically feasible in the mid-
2000s. Because of the complexities of deep water operations,
creating a productive deep water oil field was extremely
expensive compared to shallow water oil drilling. But the
potential payoff was enticing. A well producing in shallow
water might yield a few thousand barrels of oil a day. Deep
water wells could yield more than 10,000 barrels per day.
BP acquired the rights to the Macondo Prospect. BP was the

principal developer and operator, holding a 65% financial share
in the project. BP leased a rig, equipment and staff from
Transocean. While BP maintained operational decision making
authority, Transocean employees, who performed the majority
of the work on the rig, had some decision making authority over
operations and maintenance. BP started drilling the Macondo
well in October of 2009. Drilling, however, was interrupted by
Hurricane Ida. BP commenced drilling on February 3, 2010
leasing Transocean's Deepwater rig.
Transocean charged BP approximately $500,000 per day to lease
the rig, plus the same amount in contractor fees. BP originally
estimated that drilling the Macondo well would take 51 days
and cost approximately $96 million. By April 20, 2010 the rig
was already on its 80th day on location and had exceeded its
original budget.
The Deepwater Rig
The Deepwater rig came with a long list of maintenance issues.
In September 2009, BP conducted safety tests on the rig, which
was in use at another BP drilling site at the time. The test
identified 390 repairs that needed immediate attention. It was
later learned that the Deepwater rig was never taken in for
repairs previous to the disaster and never stopped working at
any point between the September 2009 tests and April 20, 2010.
As Transocean's Chief Technician Williams experienced, the
crew learned how to develop
short-cuts in order to maintain the function of the rig. Williams
was responsible for maintaining the three oversight computers
that controlled the drilling technology. These computers,
operating on an old Windows operating system, would
frequently freeze. If computer A went down the driller would
have to go to computer B in order to maintain control of the
well. If somehow all three computers went down at once, the
drill would be completely out of control. Williams frequently
reported the software problems and the need to have them fixed.

Despite the hazards of the Macondo well site, the known
maintenance issues on the rig, and the setbacks, BP felt
confident that it had found oil. However, since Deepwater was
an exploratory vessel, the crew was under orders to close the
well temporarily and return later with another rig to extract the
oil.
Anatomy of a Disaster
Closing the Macondo well was very complex due to competing
interests of cost, time and safety, as well as the number of
people and organizations involved in the decision making
process. Adding to the complexities of decision making on the
Deepwater was the fact that many of BP's decision makers for
the Macondo well had only been in their positions for a short
time before disaster struck.
As the Deepwater Disaster was analyzed, questions arose as to
whether, in combination with the chaotic mix of decision
makers, three key decisions on closing the Macondo well played
a role in the downing of the oil rig - Well Casing, Centralizers,
and Circulating Mud and the Cement Bond Log
Well Casing
The process of deep water drilling involves dril ling through
rock, installing and cementing casing to secure the well hole,
then drilling deeper and repeating the process. On April 9,
2010, the crew of the Deepwater finished drilling the last
section of the well, which extended 18,360 feet below sea level
and 1,192 feet below the casing.
During the week of April 12, BP project managers had to decide
how best to secure the well's final 1,192-foot section. One
option involved hanging a steel tube called a liner on the bottom
of the casing already in the well and then inserting another steel
liner tube called a "tieback" on top of the liner hanger. The
liner/tieback casing option provided four barriers of protection
against gas and oil leaks getting into the well accidentally.

These barriers included the cement at the bottom of the well,
the hanger seal that attaches the liner to the existing casing in
the well, the cement that secures the tieback on top of the liner,
and the seal at the wellhead.
The other casing option, known as "long string casing,"
involved running a single string of steel casing from the
seafloor all the way to the bottom of the well. Long string
casing provided two barriers to the flow of gas up the annular
space that surrounded the casing: the cement at the bottom of
the well and the seal at the wellhead. Compared to the liner tie-
back option, the long string
casing option took fewer days to install.
The decision about which casing design to use changed several
times. A BP Plan Review recommended against using long
string casing because of the inherent risks of having fewer gas
barriers. But internal communications within BP indicated the
company was actually leaning towards using the long string
casing option. On March 25, 2010, a BP drilling engineer,
emailed Allison Crane, a materials management coordinator for
BP, and said choosing long string casing "saves a lot of time ...
at least 3 days…" On March 30, the BP drilling engineer
emailed the BP completions engineer, another BP drilling
engineer, and said "not running the tieback ... saves a good deal
of time/money." On April 15, BP estimated that using a liner
instead of the long string casing "will add an additional $7 - $10
million to the completion cost."
A few days after BP completed the first version of its Forward
Plan Review, the company released a revised version which
referred to the long string casing option as "the primary option"
and the liner as "the contingency option." The Forward Plan
Review acknowledged the risks of long string casing, but
considered it the "best economic case and well integrity case for
future completion operations."
Centralizers

In closing up the well, BP was responsible for cementing in
place the steel pipe that ran into the oil reservoir. The cement
would fill the space between the outside of the pipe and
surrounding rock, allowing a more uniform cement sheath to
form around the pipe, while preventing any gas from flowing up
the sides. Centralizers are special brackets that are used to help
keep the pipe centreed.
To help inform decision making on the well pipe centralization,
BP hired Halliburton, the cementing contractor, to run
simulations and lab tests. Jesse Marc Gagliano was the
Halliburton account representative for BP. He worked in BP's
Houston office and was on the same floor as the BP Macondo
well management team of John Guide, who was part of the
operations unit, and Brett Cocales, Brian Morel, and Mark Hafle
who were part of the engineering unit. Gagliano also worked
with the Halliburton crew members on the rig to advise them on
logistics.
One of Gagliano's main responsibilities was running an
OptiCem model designed to help predict potential gas flow that
might interfere with getting a good cement job on a well site.
The OptiCem model, considered highly reliable, took data
inputs from BP engineers and evaluated the likely effectiveness
of various well designs. Gagliano said after the disaster, "It is a
model. It is as good as the information you put into it. So the
more accurate information you have, the more accurate the
output will be." After running the model, Gagliano discovered
that if BP used only six centralizers, as was planned, the risk
for problems was quite significant. He found that at least 21
centralizers would be needed to significantly lower the risk.
Though nothing was written down, court testimony revealed that
Gagliano expressed concern that the OptiCem results indicated a
very high risk that the cement job would encounter
"channeling." BP questioned the reliability of the OptiCem
results because some of the earlier outputs related to
compression factors in the well were different than what the

crew engineers measured onsite.49 According to Gagliano, the
group spent much of the morning trying to figure out the best
way to use the centralizers they did have.
After their meeting, a series of emails were exchanged, leading
off with one from Morel explain how to utilize the six
centralizers they had on hand. A few hours after Morel sent his
email, Walz wrote a lengthy email to Guide, the Macondo well
operations manager, expressing his concern about using just six
centralizers. Guide responded to Walz's email early in the
afternoon on Friday, April 16, expressing concern about the
decision made by his supervisor, David Sims, to order
additional centralizers.
When asked in court why he would ever question the OptiCem
model's results, Guide responded, "There were several reasons,
first of all, it's a model, it's a simulation, it's not…the real
thing. From past experiences sometimes it's right and sometimes
it's wrong. And I also know in this particular case…they made
reference to having to tinker with it to try to get some of the
results that were reasonable."
Meanwhile, Morel had gotten 3D profile information on the well
hole, which indicated that it was actually very straight: 6/10ths
of a degree off of vertical. In an email to Cocales, Morel
questioned Gagliano's recommendation to use more centralizers.
He believed doing so could slow down the process of sealing
and cementing the well.
Based on the information about the straightness of the well
hole, Cocales believed that despite the OptiCem model's results,
additional centralizers would only add a small additional
measure of safety. In his reply to Morel, Cocales indicated he
was in agreement with Guide.
As it turned out, the additional centralizers that Sims gave the
green light to order were a "slip-on" variety that took more time
to install on a pipe, and were considered risky because of fears
they might come off during installation and get stuck in the
casing above the well-head. As a result, Guide and Walz
decided not to use any additional centralizers. Gagliano later

learned of their decision from another Halliburton employee
who was on board the Deepwater. In his testimony in court
Guide revealed that no one had considered postponing or
putting a stop work order on the cement job until centralizers of
the right kind were located.
On April 18, two days after Guide and Walz decided not to use
the additional centralizers, Gagliano sent the formal report of
the OptiCem results as an email attachment to the Macondo well
management team. The report included the following
observation: "Based on the well analysis of the above outlined
well conditions, this well is considered to have a SEVERE gas
flow problem. Wells in this category fall into Flow Category 3."
However, the text of the email that Gagliano sent to the BP
managers on April 18 did not say anything about the hazards of
the Macondo well. Cocales and Guide later testified that neither
had read that part of the report – both had skimmed the report
for the information they were most interested in.
Circulating Mud and the Cement Bond Log
The whole process of cementing an oil well is notoriously
tricky. A 2007 study by the MMS found that cementing was the
single most significant factor in 18 of 39 well blowouts in the
Gulf of Mexico over a 14-year period.
Before cementing a well, it is common practice to circulate the
drilling mud through the well, bringing the mud at the bottom
all the way up to the drilling rig. This procedure, known as
"bottoms up," allows workers to check the mud to see if it is
absorbing gas leaking in. If so, the gas has to be separated out
before the mud can be re-submerged into the well. According to
the American Petroleum Institute, it is cementing best practice
to circulate the mud at least once. In the case of the Macondo
well, BP estimated that circulating all the mud at 18,360 feet
would take anywhere from six to 12 hours. According to the

drilling logs from Monday, April 19, mud circulation was
completed in just 30 minutes.
In concert with the decision to do a partial circulation, BP
managers chose not to run a test called a "cement bond log" to
check the integrity of the cement job after it was pumped into
the well, despite Gagliano's warnings of potential channeling.
Workers from Schlumberger had been hired to perform a cement
bond log if needed, but on the morning of Tuesday, April 20,
about 12 hours before the blowout, BP told the Schlumberger
workers their services would not be needed. According to
Schlumberger's contract, BP would pay a cancellation fee equal
to 7% of the cost of having the cement bond log and mechanical
plug services completed.
BP and the engineers on site had used a decision tree, a system
of diagnostic questions to define future actions, to determine
whether they would need to perform a cement bond log. BP
ultimately followed their own decision tree accurately, but when
reviewed in court, it was pointed out that there could have been
channeling in the well pipe during the cement job. Channeling
was considered highly likely given that far fewer centralizers
were used than what the OptiCem model had recommended.
Such mud-cement channeling would not have been picked up in
the diagnostic tests listed in BP's decision tree. The only way to
accurately diagnose a bond failure due to channeling was with a
cement bond log. However, when asked in court about the
decision not to run a cement bond log despite seeing a loss
return of 3,000 barrels of drilling mud, Mark Hafle, one of BP's
drilling engineers, responded that the model he had from
Halliburton indicated that the cement job should be fine. He
also went on to explain that a cement bond log would be done at
some point on this well, but that it was usually done pre-
production:
So, that cement bond log is an evaluation tool that is not always
100% right. There's many factors that can affect its quality. It's
not a quantitative tool. It does not tell you the exact percentage
of cement at any given point. … It's a tool in the engineering

tool box that has to be used with a bit of caution. But if it shows
there's no cement two or three years from now when we come to
do the completion we will do a remedial cement job on that
casing.
Fallout from Disaster
The impact of the Deepwater explosion and the subsequent
Macondo well oil leak was devastating on a number of fronts,
the most obvious being the death of 11 crew members and the
injuries sustained by another 17. The environmental damage
from the oil spill was extensive, with 25 national wildlife
refuges in its path. Oil was found on the shores of all five Gulf
States, and was responsible for the death of many birds, fish,
and reptiles. The total amount of impacted shoreline in
Louisiana alone grew from 287 miles in July to 320 miles in
late November 2010. Unlike conditions with the Alaskan
Exxon-Valdez oil spill, the contaminated Gulf shoreline was not
rock but wetland. Grasses and loose soil, a perfect sponge for
holding oil, dominated wetland ecosystems.
In terms of direct economic damages, the sinking of the
Deepwater rig represented a $560 million loss for Transocean
and Lloyds of London, the insurance company which had
unwritten the rig. The unprecedented loss of an entire semi -
submersible rig was predicted to change underwriting policies
for all oil rigs. As one underwriter noted, "It's never happened
that a semi could burn into the sea and completely sink. Now
underwriters have to include that as a risk. That's probably
$10,000 to $15,000 more per day in rig insurance. They'll make
it up by charging more on a per-rig basis."
BP's price tag for the lost oil - five million barrels - was $374
million. If a federal court ruled that the company was grossly
negligent, BP could face up to $3.5 billion in fines. On April
15, five days before the disaster, BP's stock was trading on the

NYSE at $60.57 and on June 25, it hit a 14-year low of $27.02.
In addition to the frustration felt by shareholders and the public
at large that the company had failed at several attempts to stop
the leak, they were also unimpressed with BP's PR strategy,
citing skepticism over the company's offer to pay fishermen if
they signed a waiver promising not to sue the company.
Alongside those companies directly involved with the Macondo
well project, the Deepwater disaster affected the oil industry as
a whole. On May 28, 2010, Secretary of the Interior issued a
moratorium on all deep water oil drilling in U.S. waters. The
purpose of the moratorium was to allow time to assess the
safety standards that should be required for drilling, and to
create strategies for dealing with wild wells in deep water.
Government analysts estimated that about 2,000 rig worker jobs
were lost during the moratorium and that total spending by
drilling operators fell by $1.8 billion. The reduction in spending
led to a decline in employment-estimates indicated a temporary
loss of 8,000 to 12,000 jobs in the Gulf Coast -and income for
the companies and individuals that supplied the drilling
industry. The moratorium also reduced U.S. oil production by
about 31,000 barrels per day in the fourth quarter of 2010 and
by roughly 82,000 barrels per day in 2011. This loss, however,
was not large relative to total world production, and was not
expected to have a discernable effect on the price of oil. The
moratorium, originally intended to last until the end of
November, was lifted in mid-October 2010.
The economic losses also extended to the thousands of coastal
small business owners
including fishermen, shrimpers, oystermen, and those whose
livelihood depended in whole or in part on fishing or tourism.
The tourism industries in Alabama, Louisiana, and Florida were
particularly hard hit. Ironically, analysts had previously
predicted that tourism in the Gulf region, which was devastated
by Hurricane Katrina in 2005, would return to pre-Katrina
levels in 2010. Between the energy, fishing, shrimping, and
tourism industries, the Gulf region lost an estimated 250,000

jobs in 2010.
BP pledged to compensate those individuals whose livelihoods
would be affected. On June 16, 2010, in agreement with the
U.S. government, the company established the Gulf Coast
Claims Facility (GCCF), an escrow fund of $20 billion to pay
for the various costs arising from the oil spill. GCCF staff
evaluated the claims of companies and individuals who suffered
demonstrable damages from the oil spill. The fund was also
intended to pay municipalities, counties, and state organizations
for lost tax revenue or additional clean-up costs.
By February 28, 2011, the GCFF had received over 500,000
claims, and 170,000 people and businesses had been paid over
$3.6 billion. Some people accused the facility of not acting
quickly enough to process claims and make payments. In
response, the GCCF increased transparency of the system and
hired staff in the Gulf to answer questions from applicants in
person. The GCCF was scheduled to remain in place until
August 2013.
Conclusion
As of early 2011, investigations into the actual causes of the
Deepwater disaster were ongoing, and the various parties
involved in the Macondo well project were engaged in a highly
publicized finger pointing exercise. The three major decisions
on closing the Macondo well involving the well casing, the
number of centralizers used, and the decision not to perform a
cement bond log may have contributed to the conditions that
caused the well to blow out.
Regardless of what the ultimate causes are found to be, the
conditions on the Deepwater, and the culture and organizational
architecture of BP and its relationships with its contractors is
worth examining. Each of the three decisions discussed above,
as well as decisions on how to convey dangerous model results
and earlier decisions about how best to structure incentive
systems, may have played a role in the outcome. Throughout the

decision making process, we see some actors who were
advocates of caution over cost, for fixing problems even when
inconvenient. Yet court testimony indicates that the three key
decisions, and perhaps others as well, came down on the side of
cost-reduction and expediency, over caution.
Assignment
This assignment requires students to complete this table,
matching the concepts learned in Near Misses, and Hidden
Traps - HBR readings to the facts of the case. Students will also
address Duties and Rights based ethics. See assignment
requirements under UNIT 9
PART 1 – Problems in Decision-Making
A. Find examples in the case study for EACH of the following
ten (10) Near Miss key terms or concepts. Provide an
explanation how these FACTS from the case fit the key term or
concept. Complete your answer in full and complete sentences.
Review Near Misses to remind yourself of the meaning of the
following terms and concepts.
1. inherent/human errors
2. heuristically approaching problems
3. enabling conditions
4. not raising alarm and prompting action
5. overlooking warning signs
6. multiple near misses proceeding a disaster
7. normalization of deviance
8. tendency overtime to accept anomalies
9. outcome focused bias
10. a process was assumed to be fundamentally sound but was
not.
B. For ALL seven (7) Hidden Traps, find examples in the case

to support that Hidden Trap. Complete your answer in full and
complete sentences. Review Hidden Traps to remind yourself of
the meaning of the following terms and concepts.
Present your answer as follows:
· Hidden Trap Name:
· Definition of the Hidden Trap:
· Detailed FACTS from the case that agree with the definition
of the hidden trap.
PART 2 – Duties and Rights Ethics
1. Answer the following with respect to the BP Case and Rights
Based Ethics. Complete your answer in full and complete
sentences.
· Provide a definition of Rights Based Ethics.
· Provide a paragraph explaining how BP failed in its
expectation of considering the Rights of its employees. This
explanation must agree with the definition provided.
2. Answer the following with respect to the BP Case and Duty
Based Ethics. Complete your answer in full and complete
sentences.
· Provide a definition of Duties Based Ethics.
· Provide a paragraph explaining how BP failed in meeting its
obligation of protecting the Duties of its employees and
community. This explanation must agree with the definition
provided.

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DROP TABLE IF EXISTS CLASS;
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS STUDENT_GRADE;
CREATE TABLE STUDENT(
STUDENT_ID INTEGER AUTO_INCREMENT NOT NULL
PRIMARY KEY,

Last_Name VARCHAR(30),
First_Name VARCHAR(30),
Address VARCHAR(40),
ZIP VARCHAR(10),
MAJOR VARCHAR(20),
CLASS int(2),
STATUS VARCHAR(20));
INSERT INTO STUDENT (Last_Name, First_Name, Address,
ZIP, MAJOR, CLASS, STATUS)
VALUES('Morote','Italo','P.O. Box 619, 5808 Semper
St.','32828','MATHEMATICS',2,'FAILING');
VALUES('Martin','Yacky','313-6948 Nunc,
Ave','36702','SPANISH',3,'SATISFACTORY');
VALUES('Yostin','Duglas','Ap #593-8291 Id
St.','26151','BUSINESS',1,'SATISFACTORY');

VALUES('Dasti','Cosimel','328-4572 Elit
Rd.','95886','SPANISH',2,'FAILING');
VALUES('Dixon','Steve','Ap #547-7314 Feugiat.
Street','42756','PHIL',1,'FAILING');
VALUES('Alfaro','Patricia','P.O. Box 977, 6922 Sed
Street','52838','ENGLISH',1,'FAILING');
VALUES('Farruco','Rose','Ap #179-4485 Lectus
Road','10816','ENGLISH',3,'FAILING');
VALUES('Pope','Vector','Ap #878-2252 Curabitur
Av.','53175','PHYSICS',3,'SATISFACTORY');
VALUES('Los','Angeles','Ap #552-758 Convallis
St.','56968','FINANCE',3,'FAILING');

VALUES('Diaz','Cameron','Ap #145-1961 Sed
Street','63397','BUSINESS',3,'SATISFACTORY');
VALUES('Gonzalez','Andew','Ap #141-9425 In
Road','87521','BUSINESS',4,'SATISFACTORY');
VALUES('Michael','Jordan','Ap #412-5802 Venenatis
Rd.','77696','MARKETING',2,'FAILING');
VALUES('Chelerson','Scholy','911-8666 A
Rd.','32829','CIS',2,'SATISFACTORY');
VALUES('Payton','Tanya','5759 Nec,
Street','23461','SPANISH',3,'FAILING');
VALUES('Jorge','Michael','Ap #642-7393 Ut,
Ave','33186','PHIL',1,'SATISFACTORY');

VALUES('Cretiza','Noitus','8659 Arcu.
Avenue','91267','PHYSICS',2,'FAILING');
VALUES('Delami','Oscar','3512 Pellentesque.
St.','33481','MATHEMATICS',4,'FAILING');
VALUES('Francisco','Zoeter','285-9157 Proin
Road','98674','CS',1,'SATISFACTORY');
VALUES('Cohen','Aurora','P.O. Box 957, 9450 Arcu
Street','30350','PHIL',3,'FAILING');
VALUES('Black','Joshua','3655 Sed
St.','95684','FRENCH',2,'FAILING');
VALUES('Barber','Michael','875-9349 Magnis
St.','66498','PSY',4,'SATISFACTORY');

VALUES('Preston','Inez','Ap #829-845 Nisi
Av.','27404','PSY',1,'FAILING');
VALUES('Direz','Blaster','439-1369 Cursus
Av.','60644','MARKETING',2,'FAILING');
VALUES('Aiton','Valeria','7513 Vitae
Street','61245','MARKETING',2,'FAILING');
CREATE TABLE CAMPUS
(
CAMPUS_NAME VARCHAR(45) NOT NULL,
Address VARCHAR(40),
ZIP VARCHAR(10),
PHONE_NO VARCHAR(20),
UNIQUE(CAMPUS_NAME),
PRIMARY KEY(CAMPUS_NAME));

INSERT INTO CAMPUS (CAMPUS_NAME, Address, ZIP,
PHONE_NO)
VALUES('New York Campus','405-6298 In
Street','62840','1-639-674-3520');
PHONE_NO)
VALUES('Chicago','820-7808 Risus, Rd.','51852','1-824-
430-8362');
PHONE_NO)
VALUES('San Francisco Campus','505-182 Luctus,
Ave','21345','1-460-439-2331');
PHONE_NO)
VALUES('Seattle Campus','P.O. Box 215, 1469 Eu
Rd.','52681','1-448-789-7971');
PHONE_NO)
VALUES('Washington Campus','631-5139 Leo.
St.','29402','1-282-625-5720');
PHONE_NO)
VALUES('Los Angeles Campus','6161 Nostra,

Road','83643','1-547-459-9473');
PHONE_NO)
VALUES('Denver Campus','9309 Cras Road','23421','1-
680-673-7298');
PHONE_NO)
VALUES('Austin Campus','P.O. Box 878, 7621 Donec
Road','73261','1-755-573-0468');
PHONE_NO)
VALUES('Houston Campus','P.O. Box 406, 9600 Odio
Ave','32802','1-721-423-4315');
PHONE_NO)
VALUES('Detroit Campus','7574 Semper St.','21211','1-
583-233-9026');
PHONE_NO)
VALUES('San Diego Campus','6939 Ligula. St.','75022','1-
941-394-7241');
PHONE_NO)
VALUES('San Antonio Campus','7422 Vel

Avenue','63763','1-604-359-7505');
PHONE_NO)
VALUES('Memphis Campus','P.O. Box 328, 5280 Donec
Rd.','75068','1-865-208-5487');
PHONE_NO)
VALUES('Portland Campus','788-7924 Tellus.
Street','75088','1-260-552-0600');
PHONE_NO)
VALUES('Miami Campus','518-7627 Ac
Avenue','89090','1-262-155-0231');
PHONE_NO)
VALUES('Phoenix Campus','921-4825 Nullam
Rd.','23117','1-324-211-7180');
PHONE_NO)
VALUES('Dallas Campus','Ap #202-6418 Eleifend
Ave','54674','1-663-374-3235');
PHONE_NO)
VALUES('Atlanta Campus','927-3569 Id Road','71661','1-

315-710-9509');
PHONE_NO)
VALUES('San Jose Campus','8637 Ullamcorper
Rd.','10001','1-224-161-4524');
PHONE_NO)
VALUES('Las Vegas Campus','P.O. Box 169, 7139 Arcu
Rd.','83588','1-789-125-9687');
PHONE_NO)
VALUES('Indianapolis Campus','744-3904 Vulputate,
Road','37762','1-640-455-9785');
PHONE_NO)
VALUES('Baltimore Campus','2849 At Ave','40882','1-
299-696-4483');
PHONE_NO)
VALUES('Cleveland Campus','P.O. Box 785, 7330 Urna.
St.','55794','1-789-114-1794');
PHONE_NO)
VALUES('Oklahoma Campus','172-3924 At

Ave','31619','1-111-206-2900');
CREATE TABLE SEMESTER
(
SEMESTER_NAME ENUM('FALL', 'SPRING', 'SUMMER'));
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS ROOM CASCADE;
CREATE TABLE ROOM
(
Campus_Name VARCHAR(45),
ROOM_NO VARCHAR(10),
FACILITY VARCHAR(45),
CAPACITY int(3)
);
INSERT INTO
ROOM(Campus_Name,ROOM_NO,FACILITY,CAPACITY)

VALUES('New York Campus','6','Lloydminster',30);
INSERT INTO
VALUES('Chicago','19','Erode',32);
INSERT INTO
VALUES('San Francisco Campus','40','Cantalupo in
Sabina',38);
INSERT INTO
VALUES('Seattle','40','Assiniboia',25);
INSERT INTO
VALUES('Washington Campus','23','Kessenich',42);
INSERT INTO
VALUES('Los Angeles Campus','47','Stony Plain',46);
INSERT INTO
VALUES('Denver Campus','29','Ulm',44);
INSERT INTO

VALUES('Austin Campus','46','Bielefeld',39);
INSERT INTO
VALUES('Houston Campus','37','Georgia',38);
INSERT INTO
VALUES('Detroit Campus','29','Lummen',30);
INSERT INTO
VALUES('San Diego Campus','3','Pak Pattan',33);
INSERT INTO
VALUES('San Antonio Campus','37','South Perth',27);
INSERT INTO
VALUES('Memphis Campus','35','Meeuwen',14);
INSERT INTO
VALUES('Portland Campus','20','Belcarra',23);
INSERT INTO

VALUES('Miami Campus','5','Jette',27);
INSERT INTO
VALUES('Phoenix Campus','24','Milwaukee',18);
INSERT INTO
VALUES('Dallas Campus','23','Afsnee',39);
INSERT INTO
VALUES('San Jose Campus','50','Stamford',26);
INSERT INTO
VALUES('Atlanta Campus','5','Stamford',21);
INSERT INTO
VALUES('Las Vegas Campus','40','Morgex',11);
INSERT INTO
VALUES('Indianapolis Campus','1','Montague',21);
INSERT INTO
VALUES('Baltimore Campus','40','Cumberland',21);

INSERT INTO
VALUES('Cleveland Campus','4','Harrison Hot
Springs',32);
INSERT INTO
VALUES('Oklahoma Campus','10','Sainte-Ode',15);
CREATE TABLE GRADES
(
Grade ENUM('A','B','C','D','F','I','W')
);
CREATE TABLE COURSE
(
Course_No Varchar(10) NOT NULL,
Course_Name Varchar(25),

CreditHours int(2),
UNIQUE(COURSE_NO),
PRIMARY KEY(COURSE_NO)
);
INSERT INTO
COURSE(Course_No,Course_Name,CreditHours)
VALUES('1043','TECH121',1);
INSERT INTO
VALUES('1006','Psy101',3);
INSERT INTO
VALUES('1696','Psy101',2);
INSERT INTO
VALUES('1291','HUM234',2);
INSERT INTO
VALUES('1841','Psy101',3);
INSERT INTO

VALUES('1697','ELE102',2);
INSERT INTO
VALUES('1292','LIT405',2);
INSERT INTO
VALUES('1698','ELE101',3);
INSERT INTO
VALUES('1255','Math101',2);
INSERT INTO
VALUES('1842','TECH121',3);
INSERT INTO
VALUES('1010','Psy101',3);
INSERT INTO
VALUES('1810','Psy101',1);
INSERT INTO

VALUES('1044','Math131',3);
INSERT INTO
VALUES('1293','Math131',1);
INSERT INTO
VALUES('1528','CS234',2);
INSERT INTO
VALUES('1324','PHY345',2);
INSERT INTO
VALUES('1045','Math101',1);
INSERT INTO
VALUES('1659','CS211',1);
INSERT INTO
VALUES('1294','PHY345',3);
INSERT INTO

VALUES('1144','Psy101',2);
INSERT INTO
VALUES('1843','ELE102',1);
INSERT INTO
VALUES('1569','Math101',3);
INSERT INTO
VALUES('1811','ENG304',3);
CREATE TABLE INSTRUCTOR
(
INSTRUCTOR_ID VARCHAR(10) NOT NULL,
LAST_NAME VARCHAR(30),
FIRST_NAME VARCHAR(20),
ADDRESS VARCHAR(40),
ZIP VARCHAR(10),
OFFICE_NO VARCHAR(10),

UNIQUE(INSTRUCTOR_ID),
PRIMARY KEY(INSTRUCTOR_ID)
);
INSERT INTO
INSTRUCTOR(Instructor_ID,FIRST_NAME,LAST_NAME,AD
DRESS,ZIP,OFFICE_NO)
VALUES('400','Thane','Puckett','P.O. Box 895, 191 Erat
Rd.','53841','30');
INSERT INTO
VALUES('737','Jared','Tate','Ap #177-1334 Faucibus
St.','88675','21');
INSERT INTO
VALUES('640','Yuli','Hurst','Ap #799-5088 Scelerisque
St.','26162','12');
INSERT INTO
VALUES('256','Micah','Pace','P.O. Box 638, 2109
Adipiscing Rd.','40665','12');

INSERT INTO
VALUES('741','Kasper','Duran','565-193 Nunc
Avenue','55756','17');
INSERT INTO
VALUES('653','Dolan','Moore','3869 Cursus
Road','37236','10');
INSERT INTO
VALUES('688','Ciaran','Blackwell','Ap #754-6723
Faucibus Rd.','83479','17');
INSERT INTO
VALUES('940','Kennedy','Fowler','749-1142 Non
Av.','98172','22');
INSERT INTO
VALUES('499','Devin','Acosta','7613 Vel
Road','93686','19');

INSERT INTO
VALUES('280','Driscoll','Justice','P.O. Box 113, 3705 Ut,
St.','69877','23');
INSERT INTO
VALUES('937',',Cairo','Donaldson','6470 Adipiscing
Rd.','63032','26');
INSERT INTO
VALUES('415','Hammett','Glenn','262-2645 At
Rd.','84839','22');
INSERT INTO
VALUES('549','Elliott','Donaldson','5470 Dolor.
Street','62489','23');
INSERT INTO
VALUES('639','Lamar','Robles','5719 Consectetuer
St.','20213','25');
INSERT INTO

VALUES('767','Colin','Riley','P.O. Box 114, 1663 Ultrices.
Street','23254','16');
INSERT INTO
VALUES('344','Richard','Thornton','P.O. Box 931, 8187
Lacinia. St.','29349','23');
INSERT INTO
VALUES('581','Raymond','Snow','1032 Est
St.','66699','20');
INSERT INTO
VALUES('474','Nero','Rhodes','6050 Ante
Ave','37967','28');
INSERT INTO
VALUES('534','Tate','Carr','P.O. Box 213, 1879 Purus.
Ave','19803','15');
INSERT INTO

VALUES('521','Lance','Waters','656-7361 Conubia
Ave','6315','26');
INSERT INTO
VALUES('413','Abbot','Ross','P.O. Box 859, 9379 Sed
Avenue','45051','25');
INSERT INTO
VALUES('891','Dylan','Forbes','225-3164 Fermentum
Ave','65642','26');
INSERT INTO
VALUES('879','Arsenio','Singleton','505-6318 Vel,
St.','97288','10');
INSERT INTO
VALUES('350','Thor','Copeland','Ap #816-3443 Magna.
Avenue','43447','4');

CREATE TABLE APPROVED_INSTRUCTOR
(
Instructor_ID VARCHAR(10) NOT NULL,
Course_No VARCHAR(10) NOT NULL
);
INSERT INTO APPROVED_INSTRUCTOR(Instructor_ID,
Course_No)
VALUES('400','1044');
Course_No)
VALUES('737','1528');
Course_No)
VALUES('640','1324');
Course_No)
VALUES('256','1842');
Course_No)

VALUES('741','1006');
Course_No)
VALUES('653','1431');
Course_No)
VALUES('688','1291');
Course_No)
VALUES('940','1810');
Course_No)
VALUES('499','1841');
Course_No)
VALUES('280','1211');
Course_No)
VALUES('937','1144');
Course_No)
VALUES('415','1255');

Course_No)
VALUES('549','1033');
Course_No)
VALUES('639','1881');
Course_No)
VALUES('767','1526');
Course_No)
VALUES('344','1249');
Course_No)
VALUES('581','1659');
Course_No)
VALUES('474','1298');
Course_No)
VALUES('534','1569');

Course_No)
VALUES('521','1192');
Course_No)
VALUES('413','1722');
Course_No)
VALUES('891','1511');
Course_No)
VALUES('879','1696');
Course_No)
VALUES('350','1844');
Create TABLE CLASS
(
Class_id VARCHAR(10) NOT NULL,
Course_No VARCHAR(10) NOT NULL,
Section VARCHAR(10),

Semester Varchar(15),
Year VARCHAR(4),
Instructor_ID VARCHAR(10) NOT NULL,
Campus Varchar(15),
Room_No VARCHAR(10),
Start_Date Date,
Start_Time Time,
UNIQUE (CLass_id),
PRIMARY KEY (Class_id)
);
INSERT INTO
CLASS(Class_ID,Course_No,Semester,Instructor_ID,Start_Date
,Start_Time,Section,Year)
VALUES('12408','1044','Fall','499','2014-10-
08','8:00','10','2014');
INSERT INTO
VALUES('15716','1006','Other','639','2014-10-
08','8:00','17','2014');

INSERT INTO
VALUES('12525','1291',' Other','767','2014-10-
08','8:00','18','2014');
INSERT INTO
VALUES('16500','1696','Winter','937','2015-01-
03','8:00','19','2014');
INSERT INTO
VALUES('19047','1291','Winter','280','2015-01-
03','8:00','14','2014');
INSERT INTO
VALUES('12587','1841','Other','280','2014-08-
10','8:00','15','2014');
INSERT INTO
VALUES('17106','1696','Other','400','2014-08-
10','8:00','10','2014');

INSERT INTO
VALUES('14331','1291','Other','413','2014-08-
10','8:00','14','2014');
INSERT INTO
VALUES('17246','1696','Summer','640','2015-06-
12','8:00','12','2014');
INSERT INTO
VALUES('17092','1255','Summer','639','2015-06-
12','8:00','10','2014');
INSERT INTO
VALUES('14169','1842','Fall','344','2014-08-
10','8:00','13','2014');
INSERT INTO
VALUES('13062','1006','Winter','879','2015-01-
03','8:00','12','2014');
INSERT INTO

VALUES('17267','1810','Summer','640','2015-06-
12','8:00','15','2014');
INSERT INTO
VALUES('15415','1044','Summer','549','2015-06-
12','8:00','15','2014');
INSERT INTO
VALUES('11386','1291','Fall','767','2014-08-
10','8:00','10','2014');
INSERT INTO
VALUES('14972','1528','Other','937','2014-08-
10','8:00','17','2014');
INSERT INTO
VALUES('15009','1324','Fall','256','2014-08-
10','8:00','11','2014');
INSERT INTO

VALUES('18265','1044','Winter','415','2015-01-
03','8:00','12','2014');
INSERT INTO
VALUES('16415','1659','Fall','474','2014-08-
10','8:00','14','2014');
INSERT INTO
VALUES('19464','1291','Fall','521','2014-08-
10','8:00','18','2014');
INSERT INTO
VALUES('12433','1144','Summer','415','2015-06-
12','8:00','10','2014');
INSERT INTO
VALUES('19175','1842','Winter','534','2015-01-
03','8:00','10','2014');
INSERT INTO

VALUES('19864','1569','Summer','280','2015-06-
12','8:00','14','2014');
INSERT INTO
VALUES('17022','1810','Other','940','2014-08-
10','8:00','15','2014');
CREATE TABLE STUDENT_GRADE
(
Student_ID MEDIUMINT NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
Class_ID VARCHAR(10),
Student_Grade ENUM('A','B','C','D','F','I','W'),
PRIMARY KEY(Student_ID)
);
Commit;

SHOW TABLES;
Installing MySQL
I T S 5 3 8 : D ATA B A S E S Y S T E M S
ITS 538
Database Systems
Course Project Ph1
Miguel Buleje, PhD
[email protected]
mailto:[email protected]
MySQL- Intro
• MySQL is a an open source DBMS by Oracle with a
Community
Version free to down load. I will demonstrate in this
presentation how
to install the latest version for MySQL at this time that is V.8,
on a 64
bit version of WIN 10.
• Components Required to complete your Projects:

• MySQL Server
• MySQL Workbench
• I will present in this instructional document a series of screen
shoots
to walk you through the installation process. We are going to
use the
Installer utility to install the latest MySQL Community Server
and
Workbench.
Step 1: Visit the URL below (dev.mysql.com)
Step 1: Navigate to “Downloads”
Step 3: Select “MySQL Community Server”
Step 4: MySQL Installer – “Go to Download Page”
Step 5: Select OS AND Download Smaller File
Step 6: Start Download (follow the option below)

Step 7: Open Downloaded File
Step 8: Chose Setup Type – “Custom”
Step 9 (a): Select Products and Features
(Select MySQL Server V8.0.20 x64 & Workbench V8.0.20 –
x64 for bit system)
Step 9 (b): Select Products and Features
x64 for bit system)
Step 9 (c): Select Products and Features
x64 for bit system)
Step 10: Initiate Installation – “Execute”
Step 11: Complete Installation – “Next”

Step 12: Product Configuration – “Next”
Step 13: High Availability
(Standalone MySQL Server/ Classic MySQL Replication)
Step 14: Type and Networking
Config. Type: Development Computer
Port: XXXX (Must keep record for this number. Please write
down)
All other settings intact.
Step 15: Authentication Method
(Use Legacy Authentication Method)
Step 16: Accounts and Roles
(Write down your Root Password – very important)
Step 17: Windows Service
(Configure MySQL Server as a Windows Service)
Step 18: Apply Configuration – “Execute”

Step 19: Apply Configuration – “Finish”
Step 20: Product Configuration – “Next”
Step 21: Apply Configuration – “Finish”
Step 22: Installation Complete – “Finish”
Step 23: Welcome to MySQL Workbench
(Use authentication / credentials you created)
Step 24: SQL Workbench – READY!

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