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Android Malware Heuristics
         Masata Nishida

         AVTOKYO 2012

           2012/11/17

                          (Photo: Android Lineup – Beige By .RGB.)
Who am I ?
Masata Nishida
• SecureBrain, Advanced Research Laboratory
• I’m not a malware researcher, I’m just a software
  developer.
• Rubyist
• @masata_masata
Today’s Theme
Presented the same topic at CSS2012.
• CSS (Computer Security Symposium)2012
  – 2012/10/30-11/01
  – Matsue City, Shimane Prefecture

   Title: “Android Malware Heuristics
        using Digital Certificates”
 Japanese Title: 署名情報を利用したAndroid マルウェアの推定手法の提案
Android malwares increase
          explosively!!




(Photo: High Sheeps By Bertoz)
McAfee Threat Report: Second Quarter 2012 By McAfee Labs
Everyone say:
          Android malwares increase
          explosively!!
            But…(what is reality?)




(Photo: High Sheeps By Bertoz)
Although the number of
                               malwares is rapidly increasing,
                               but we don’t actually have
                               insights into the growth.


                               Today, we will focus on the
                               certificate used by Malicious
                               Android app. Then we can find
                               another side of Android
                               malwares.
(Photo: DSC_6557 By euthman)
Background
• Android application must
  be digitally signed.
• Self-signed certificate can
  be used.
• The signature information
  is in META-INF/ directory
  in Apk file(zip archive file).

                                   (Photo: Marriage Certificate By The Gearys)
Question
                                  How many Android malwares use
                                            the same certificate?




(Photo: Thinking… By Mr Tickle)
I’m bored.
  I counted number
of unique certificates
in Android malwares.
First, collect malware samples
 • Target Android malwares                                    Family         samples
                                                              FakeInst           4,911

          – are about 15,000 samples.                         Kmin               2,464
                                                              OpFake             2,360
                                                              Boxer
          – include many polymorphic                                             1,399
                                                              DroidKungFu          824
               samples.                                       Lotoor               432
                                                              GingerMaster         272
                                                              SmsSend              221
                                                              SmsAgent             209
                                                              JiFake               137
                                                              Others             1,488
                                                              Total             14,717
(Photo: Catching Bugs, II, III By New Mexico Forestry Camp)
Then
   count certificates.
(Photo: Microscope Night By Machine Project)
Counting certificates requires
                                   lotta patience...




(Photo: Microscope Night By Machine Project)
The result…
Unique certificates

14,717 samples
                 
589 certificates
 Many malwares use the same certificate!!
FakeInst
                   Polymorphic sample




   4,911 samples
                       
   31 certificates
Polymorphic malwares also use the same certificates.
FakeInst
           Polymorphic sample




  Most reused certificate

               
Reused by 2,602 samples
Period of use

Certificates used for over a year.

             
       13 certificates
      (2,764samples)
         Some certificates used for long term.
The Movie (Dougalek)  Japan-specific malware


•   An incident in Japan (Apr. 2012)
• Malwares are distributed from Google Play.
     – About 50 malwares.
     – Used 7 developer accounts.
• The malware sends private information to external
    server.
• The application name is like “xxx the Movie”.
     – “xxx” is replaced with a pop star or famous game name.
• Installed over 90,000 devices.
• Sent 12,000,000 information to external.
• The suspects were arrested last month(30th Oct 2012).
The Movie (Dougalek)
       Japan-specific malware




   24 samples
            
   7 certificates
Today’s
                        Conclusion

(Photo: New Blackboard By uncultured)
Many Android malwares are signed
                          using the same certificate.



               We can detect new malwares using the
                  certificates of well-known malwares.

                                    (for now…)
(Photo: The Detective By paurian)
Many Android malwares are signed
                        using the same certificate.



                      Not too many malware developers??
                                            or
           The private key of the certificates are shared
                               between malware developers??
(Photo: DSC_6565 By euthman)
END
[Appendix]
apk analysis library for Ruby
• Open Source
   – Source: https://github.com/securebrain/ruby_apk
   – Install: “$ gem install ruby_apk”
• Requirements
   – Ruby1.9.x
• Features
   – AndroidManifest.xml analysis
       • components(activity, service, receiver, provider)
       • use-permission, intent-filter,…
   – Extract files in apk
   – resource analysis(partial)
   – dex analysis(partial)
       • Extract classes, methods, fields, strings

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AVTOKYO2012 Android Malware Heuristics(en)

  • 1. Android Malware Heuristics Masata Nishida AVTOKYO 2012 2012/11/17 (Photo: Android Lineup – Beige By .RGB.)
  • 2. Who am I ? Masata Nishida • SecureBrain, Advanced Research Laboratory • I’m not a malware researcher, I’m just a software developer. • Rubyist • @masata_masata
  • 3. Today’s Theme Presented the same topic at CSS2012. • CSS (Computer Security Symposium)2012 – 2012/10/30-11/01 – Matsue City, Shimane Prefecture Title: “Android Malware Heuristics using Digital Certificates” Japanese Title: 署名情報を利用したAndroid マルウェアの推定手法の提案
  • 4. Android malwares increase explosively!! (Photo: High Sheeps By Bertoz)
  • 5. McAfee Threat Report: Second Quarter 2012 By McAfee Labs
  • 6. Everyone say: Android malwares increase explosively!! But…(what is reality?) (Photo: High Sheeps By Bertoz)
  • 7. Although the number of malwares is rapidly increasing, but we don’t actually have insights into the growth. Today, we will focus on the certificate used by Malicious Android app. Then we can find another side of Android malwares. (Photo: DSC_6557 By euthman)
  • 8. Background • Android application must be digitally signed. • Self-signed certificate can be used. • The signature information is in META-INF/ directory in Apk file(zip archive file). (Photo: Marriage Certificate By The Gearys)
  • 9. Question How many Android malwares use the same certificate? (Photo: Thinking… By Mr Tickle)
  • 10. I’m bored. I counted number of unique certificates in Android malwares.
  • 11. First, collect malware samples • Target Android malwares Family samples FakeInst 4,911 – are about 15,000 samples. Kmin 2,464 OpFake 2,360 Boxer – include many polymorphic 1,399 DroidKungFu 824 samples. Lotoor 432 GingerMaster 272 SmsSend 221 SmsAgent 209 JiFake 137 Others 1,488 Total 14,717 (Photo: Catching Bugs, II, III By New Mexico Forestry Camp)
  • 12. Then count certificates. (Photo: Microscope Night By Machine Project)
  • 13. Counting certificates requires lotta patience... (Photo: Microscope Night By Machine Project)
  • 15. Unique certificates 14,717 samples  589 certificates Many malwares use the same certificate!!
  • 16. FakeInst Polymorphic sample 4,911 samples  31 certificates Polymorphic malwares also use the same certificates.
  • 17. FakeInst Polymorphic sample Most reused certificate  Reused by 2,602 samples
  • 18. Period of use Certificates used for over a year.  13 certificates (2,764samples) Some certificates used for long term.
  • 19. The Movie (Dougalek) Japan-specific malware • An incident in Japan (Apr. 2012) • Malwares are distributed from Google Play. – About 50 malwares. – Used 7 developer accounts. • The malware sends private information to external server. • The application name is like “xxx the Movie”. – “xxx” is replaced with a pop star or famous game name. • Installed over 90,000 devices. • Sent 12,000,000 information to external. • The suspects were arrested last month(30th Oct 2012).
  • 20. The Movie (Dougalek) Japan-specific malware 24 samples  7 certificates
  • 21. Today’s Conclusion (Photo: New Blackboard By uncultured)
  • 22. Many Android malwares are signed using the same certificate. We can detect new malwares using the certificates of well-known malwares. (for now…) (Photo: The Detective By paurian)
  • 23. Many Android malwares are signed using the same certificate. Not too many malware developers?? or The private key of the certificates are shared between malware developers?? (Photo: DSC_6565 By euthman)
  • 24. END
  • 25. [Appendix] apk analysis library for Ruby • Open Source – Source: https://github.com/securebrain/ruby_apk – Install: “$ gem install ruby_apk” • Requirements – Ruby1.9.x • Features – AndroidManifest.xml analysis • components(activity, service, receiver, provider) • use-permission, intent-filter,… – Extract files in apk – resource analysis(partial) – dex analysis(partial) • Extract classes, methods, fields, strings