1. Introduction:
The management of Earth’s environment and resources is often challenged by scientific
uncertainty and political conflict. Effective management often requires the ability to predict the
behaviors of an ecosystem (Mitchell, 2015). As Mitchell (2015) explains, uncertainty arises
within resource and environmental management when “it is not possible to estimate the
probability of a given outcome,” (p. 15). When science and research is uncertain about the future
of the resource, the governments and stakeholders find it difficult to collaborate on management
strategies. They also face challenges when it comes to political conflicts. Different groups see the
issue and its resolution differently; these differing viewpoints can create an atmosphere where
collaboration is impossible.
This essay will examine three case studies of resource and environmental management:
The Skeena Watershed Committee, The Forest Stewardship Council, and the Western Climate
Initiative. It will also examine the ways in which conflict interacts with uncertainty, and finally,
how conflict and uncertainty can sometimes foster successful management.
The Skeena Watershed Committee:
The Skeena watershed, in British Columbia, is one of the largest watersheds in the
province (Gottesfeld & Rabnett, 2007). First nations have lived on the watershed for thousands
of years and managed the fish in the rivers throughout that time (Wright, 2010). In the 1900’s the
federal government via the Department of Fisheries and Oceans decided to become more active
in managing Canadian fisheries; for the Skeena Watershed this meant increased state regulations
and policies that were in place to outline allowable catch rates (Wright, 2010). These new
changes by the government were met by resistance from the First Nations in the Watershed.
Aboriginal communities believed that the science being used by the DFO was inaccurate: they
believed that the guidelines and restrictions placed upon fisheries in the Skeena River would lead
to overexploitation and argued that the traditional ecological knowledge being used by First
Nations had been sufficient at managing fish stocks (Wright, 2010). Most of the claims made by
First Nations were ignored, and the fishing industry within the watershed continued to grow.
The growing industry soon resulted in the decline of many fish stocks; while sockeye
salmon grew in abundance, other fish species that were historically low in abundance started to
decline in stock rapidly (Pinkerton, 1996). During this time, other stakeholders began to
complain about the status of fish stocks (Pinkerton, 1996). To deal with complaints, Pinkerton
reports that the government requested commercial fisheries implement new strategies to reduce
their harvest rates of salmon. She adds that the commercial industry was not impressed with
these demands: they realized that this request would reduce their harvest rates, while the other
fishers within the watershed would see no decline in their harvest rates. By this point, multiple
stakeholders in the watershed were worried about the status of the fish stocks, including the First
Nations and the commercial industry, so in 1992, they came together and created the Skeena
Watershed Committee to collaborate on fish management along the river (Pinkerton, 1996).
The original members of the Skeena Watershed Committee included the Aboriginal
communities living on the watershed, the sport fishing industry, the commercial fishing industry,
and the federal/provincial government (Pinkerton, 1996). For the stakeholders, the biggest area
of contestation was determining the proper yield rates to avoid exploitation of fish species that
were already low in abundance (Pinkerton, 1996). Pinkerton also found that conflict existed in
the form of the Aboriginal Fishing Strategy Agreement signed between the Gitksan Tribe and the
government (Pinkerton, 1996). This agreement granted the Aboriginals the ability to harvest 50

2. 000 sockeye salmon for commercial purposes. The sporting and commercial industries, via the
committee, voiced their concerns about how this agreement would affect their stock rates, and
hoped for a larger say in the decision making process (Pinkerton, 1996).
Originally, the Skeena Watershed Committee saw very little progress towards creating a
management strategy until 1994 (Pinkerton, 1996). In 1994, the stakeholders were given more
control and created their fish management strategy, in which they would use scientific modeling,
to ensure that all fish species were able to make it upriver and spawn (Pinkerton, 1996).
Unfortunately, Pinkerton observed that conflict continued after the implementation of the
strategy: the government could not grant the funding the Committee was promised, and the
commercial industry went against the proposed strategy and requested to harvest over the limits.
These two issues ultimately led to mistrust between the stakeholders and the collapse of the
Skeena Watershed Committee.
From its inception the Skeena Watershed Committee dealt with high levels of uncertainty
and conflict. Originally, First Nations questioned the quantitative data regarding stock rates; even
in the early years the Aboriginals knew that the ability for humans to accurately measure fish
stocks was imperfect. This uncertainty ultimately led to an interest-based conflict. In the early
1990’s, most stakeholders were aware of the uncertainty in the stock rates, and recognized that
overfishing was a part of the problem, but the recommendation that only commercial fishers pay
for the costs of management, while other stakeholders would continue to benefit from
overfishing led to conflict (Pinkerton, 2996). Because of these recommendations, the commercial
industry decided that they would not sit idly by and let their interest go unheard, so the Skeena
Watershed Committee was formed, but the interested-based conflict that started the committee,
also led to its demise. The stakeholders could not agree on a way to manage the fish where they
would all benefit. In the end, Pinkerton states that the commercial industry went against the other
stakeholders to ensure that they would benefit from governmental policy while the others would
continue to pay the costs of overexploitation of fish on the watershed.
Western Climate Initiative:
Today, the risk of climate change is well known, but in the 1990’s uncertainty was still
running rampant. The Kyoto Protocol, which was created to deal with climate change and the
emission reduction targets that have been recommended to stay within Earth’s carrying capacity,
was never formally ratified in the USA (Victor, 2008). This meant that the United States would
no need to create any legal policies for greenhouse gas emissions. But, regional governments
across America recognized that the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. These governments,
which included California, British Columbia and Quebec decided that policies for emission
reduction were needed – even if they were only at state level (Warren, & Tomashefsky, 2009).
Together these regions of North America created the Western Climate Initiative.
The original goal of the Western Climate Initiative was to reduce greenhouse gas
emission by 15%, with a deadline of 2020 (Warren, & Tomashefsky, 2009). Warren and
Tomashefsky (2009) explain that to meet this goal, the governmental bodies decided to
implement the cap and trade system in their state or province. Within a cap and trade system,
governments set emission limits that reduce over time; industries that emit less than the
maximum would be able to auction off excess emissions, while industries that emit over the
maximum would have to pay to ensure that they could continue emitting at high levels (Warren,
& Tomashefsky, 2009).

3. Unfortunately, the Western Climate Initiative has seen little success. Both uncertainty
and value-based conflict resulted in only two of the nine original members actually
implementing a cap and trade system (Houle, Lachapelle, & Purdon, 2015). Uncertainty is high
when examining the effectiveness of the cap and trade system. Researchers are still unsure if this
system is the best approach for successful emission reduction, because they cannot accurately
predict the success rate of a cap and trade system it can be challenging for local government to
convince its people and industries to support a system that could fail them (Warren, &
Tomashefsky, 2009).
While uncertainty made it hard for governments to commit to the Western Climate
Initiative, value-based conflict made it easy to ignore the initiative and continue emitting at
regular rates. As Victor (2008) explains, many industrialized nations often feel like they must
decide between ecological safety and economic stability, and this decision creates value-conflict
for governments as they try to decide which aspect is more important to its people. Additional
pressure may have occurred because the federal governments of USA and Canada both withdrew
from the Kyoto Protocol – implying that, at the federal level, their focus would be on the
economy (Victor, 2008). Secondly, Houle et al. (2015) noticed that lack of implementation was
often related to the states or provinces economic opportunities. For example, prior to
implementing a cap and trade system, British Columbia had seen a boom in their natural gas
industry and worried that implementation of an emission reduction strategy would lead to losses
to their economy (Houle et al., 2015). From this analysis, it seems likely that a combination of
uncertainty about the cap and trade system and value-based conflict between the environment
and the economy led to withdrawal from the Western Climate Initiative by seven of the original
nine members and a lack of further progress since its inception.
Forest Stewardship Council:
A successful case of resource and environmental management exists in the case of the
Forest Stewardship Council. Because, for the most part, forests are openly accessible and non-
excludable, they are considered a commons (O’Connor, 2008). As Roopnarine (2013) explains,
commons face tragedy because of an individual's desire to maximize which leads to
overexploitation. For many environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGO for short), it
soon became clear governments could use assistance to manage their forests sustainably and
avoid tragedy (Schepers, 2009 ). By the 1970’s consumers were demanding the option to choose
sustainable wood products: these demands led to the formation of an intergovernmental body
that would address forestry management (Scheper, 2009). This body was unable to create an
international convention for the management of global forests, so NGO’s decided it was time to
take action on their own and the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) was formed (Schepers,
2009).
The FSC is a management scheme which is based off of governance and certification
schemes. The original council members included environmental nongovernmental
organizations, retailers that dealt with wood products, companies that produce wood products,
and the forestry industry. The Forest Stewardship Council’s goal is to certify forests and wood
products that are sustainably managed (Schepers, 2009). The first certification outlines the rules
for logging operations so that a forest can become sustainably certified. The second certification
outlines the ways in which a wood product can become certified – it involves documentation of
the chain-of-custody to ensure that the product was logged, produced and sold through
sustainable practices (Schepers, 2009). In 2010, approximately 117 million hectares of forest had

4. been certified because of “rigorous standards; independent, third-party certification; its standard
setting process; system transparency; inclusion of social standards; chain-of-custody
certification; and global nature” (Schepers, 2009, p. 280).
To have proper governance, in which non-state actors receive more control of
environmental management strategies, decision making is a collaborative process where all
stakeholders (ie. environmental, economic, and social supporters, as well as stakeholders from
the Global North and South) are equally represented (Mitchell, 2015; Bell, & Hindmoor, 2011).
Like the Western Climate Initiative, the Forest Stewardship Council blossomed during
times of uncertainty and conflict. It was clear that governments around the world were aware that
there might be risks associated with human exploitation of forests; including: biodiversity loss,
deforestation and loss of carbon sinks (O’Connor, 2008). They had even gathered to discuss and
attempt to address the uncertainty and concerns regarding forest sustainability. But their
recommendations and policies were, in the opinion of ENGOs, inadequate at dealing with the
uncertainty of forest health (Forest Stewardship Council, n.d.). Government inaction led to the
implementation of the Forest Stewardship Council. Furthermore, as mentioned previously,
governments around the world have been left out of the Council, likely because of value-based
conflict. Governments, especially in the Global South, rely heavily on the logging industry to
maintain a strong economy which leads to pressures to remain uncertified. This type of pressure
primarily occurs in the South, but it can also happen in more industrialized nations. In British
Columbia, the provincial government opposed certification because they favored economic
development (Wilson, 1998). The Forest Stewardship Council has persisted across time, and in
more recent years, many governments have started encouraging FSC certification and requesting
to become more involved with the Council (Bell, & Hindmoor, 2011); thus proving that conflict
and uncertainty can eventually foster true collaboration by all stakeholders.
In Conclusion:
Across Canada, and around the world, resource and environmental management issues
are becoming more common. One common aspect when examining many management issues is
uncertainty. Deciding upon the right management strategy is difficult; especially when – as seen
in the case studies provided – the scientific data does not lead to accurate estimates and
predictions for the future outcomes. So, while we are able to measure and gather the data needed
to understand forests, fisheries, and climate, it is impossible to know for sure if our estimates are
accurate – making it hard for decision makers and stakeholders to come to agreements on the
best course of action.
From examining the Skeena Watershed Committee, the Western Climate Initiative, and
the Forest Stewardship Council, it seems likely that the conflicts that arise interact with
uncertainty in ways that can either help or hinder the management process. In the case of the
Skeena Watershed Committee and the Western Climate Initiative, the relationship between
conflict and uncertainty led to the demise of the management strategy; while the Forest
Stewardship Council managed to become successful even in the face of uncertainty and conflict,
and as it grows the governments around the world are becoming active participants in the
certification process – proving that conflict and uncertainty can lead to effective collaboration –
which is what every stakeholder must strive for.

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