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SECuRE and Trustworthy
Computing Lab
Authors
Mahmud Hossain, Shahid Noor, Ragib HasanSECuRE and
Trustworthy computing Lab (SECRETLab)
University of Alabama at Birmingham
Presenter: Mahmud Hossain, PhD Candidate, Dept. of Computer and
Information Sciences, UAB
http://secret.cis.uab.edu
IoT
HSC-IoT: A Hardware and Software Co-Verification based
Authentication Scheme for Internet of Things
SECuRE and Trustworthy
Computing Lab
2
The Internet of Things (IoT)
 A programmable world
 Everyday objects are
interconnected
 Objects are smart enough to
make decision
SECuRE and Trustworthy
Computing Lab
The Scope of This Propose Work
3
Secure Network
Admission
Secure Service
Access
 Life cyle of an IoT node
SECuRE and Trustworthy
Computing Lab
Content Outline
 Motivation and Threat Model
 Contribution
 Background
 Operational model
 Security Analysis
 Performance Analysis
4
SECuRE and Trustworthy
Computing Lab
Motivation and Threat Model
 Hardware compromise
 Counterfeit IoT deices to impersonate a real device
 E.g., fabricated medical IoT devices can be sold at a cheaper price
 Node cloning
 Extract keying materials for impersonation types of attacks
 Simulate IoT devices using virtualization layer
 Software compromise
 A legitimate device with malicious software
 Node reprogramming with malicious code
 Running an older version of a software
 A vulnerable version the software
 Usage of static device identity for authentication
 Does not provide location privacy
 Vulnerable to location tracing attacks
5
SECuRE and Trustworthy
Computing Lab
Motivation and Threat Model
 T-Mote Sky
 CPU 8 MHz
 RAM 8 KB
 ROM 48 KB
 Communication 250 Kbps
 RE-Mote
 CPU 16 MHz
 RAM 8 KB
 ROM 48 KB
 Communication 250 Kbps
6
SECuRE and Trustworthy
Computing Lab
Contributions
 Hardware and Software co-verification
 Protect node cloning and reprogramming attacks
 Physical Uncloneable Function (PUF) for hardware integrity verification
 Hardware Performance Counter (HPC) for software integrity verification
 Privacy-aware identity usage
 Prevent location tracking attacks
 Resource efficient mutual authentication
 Protected access to IoT resources and services.
7
SECuRE and Trustworthy
Computing Lab
8
Background
SECuRE and Trustworthy
Computing Lab
Physical Uncloneable Function (PUF)
 Same circuitry is embedded with different
devices
 Same challenge bits
 Different device produces different and unique
response bits
 Complex and statistical variation in logic and
interconnect in an IC
9
SECuRE and Trustworthy
Computing Lab
Hardware Performance Counter (HPC)
 HPCs are registers present in all commodity processors
 ARM, Intel, AMD
 HPCs can keep count of number of CPU cycles require to
complete a task (to execute code segments)
 Conventional usage
 To determine software performance
 Software profiling
 Usage in security in rich resource devices
 Code behavior analysis
 Malware detection
10
SECuRE and Trustworthy
Computing Lab
11
Operational Model
SECuRE and Trustworthy
Computing Lab
Hardware and Software Co-verification
12
Our Approach
Conventional
Approach
E.g., Temperature
Sensing
Software Hash
SECuRE and Trustworthy
Computing Lab
System Architecture
13
 IoT Identity Provider (IIP)
 Stores challenge-response pairs, software hash, value of HPC
 Authenticates an IoT device
 Domain Security Manager
 Provides an IoT device access to the network
SECuRE and Trustworthy
Computing Lab
Enrollment Phase
14
1. Challenge C
2. Response Ri
IoT Device Challenge/
Device ID
Response Task HPC
Cycles
Software
Hash
Smart
Thermostat
C1 = R1 R՛1
Temperature
Sensing
CC1 SH1
Smart Light C2 = R2 R՛2
Turn Light On CC2 SH2
PUF
HPCs
3. Response R՛i
Devices
IoT Identity Provider (IIP)
Challenge as
Device Identifier
SECuRE and Trustworthy
Computing Lab
An Overview of the Operational Model
15
DSM
IIP
C1, R1
C1, R1
C2, R2
C2, R2
NIT1
C= Challenge, R = Response
NIT= Network Identity Token
DSM
IIP
C2, R2
C2, R2
C3, R3
C3, R3
NIT2
DSM
IIP
C3, R3
C3, R3
C4, R4
C4, R4
NIT3
Site 1
Site 2
Site 3
SECuRE and Trustworthy
Computing Lab
IIP Authenticates Device
16
DSM
IIP
R = PUF(C)
C՛ = F(R)
R՛ = PUF (C՛)
C, X = R ⊕ R ՛
Y= CC ⊕ SH
MACR(X ⊕Y)
Retrieve R for C from DB
R ՛ = X ⊕ R
Certificate-based
Mutual Authentication
F  Public Random Generator
Shared by IIP and Device
Retrieve SH for C from DB
CC = Y⊕SH
Verify MACR(X⊕Y)
C՛ = F(R)
Sore [C՛, R ՛ ]
SECuRE and Trustworthy
Computing Lab
Device Authenticates IIP and DSM
17
DSM
IIP
R = PUF(C)
C՛ = F(R)
R՛ = PUF (C՛)
MACR(H(R))
h = H(R)
MACR(C՛)
h = H(R)
N, MACh (N)
MACR(C՛)
Store h
Verify MACR(C՛)  Authenticates IIP
Verify MACh (N)  Authenticates DSM
F  Public Random Generator
Shared by IIP and Device
SECuRE and Trustworthy
Computing Lab
Network Identity Token (NIT) Assignment
18
DSM
IIP
ECC Pair (dd,Qd)
Q , MACh (Q)
Verify MACh (Q) 
Authenticates Device
NIT = ECDSAdt(Qd)
ECC Pair (dt,Qt)
h = Hash (R)
Q , MACh (Q)
h = Hash (R)
 DSM authenticates device
SECuRE and Trustworthy
Computing Lab
 Certificateless authentication
 No need process to certificate chain
Peer Authentication (Device to Device)
19
[(da, Qa), NITa ] [(db, Qb), NITb ]
Qa, NITa
 Verify NITa using DSM
Public key (Qdsm)
 K = db * Qa = da*db*G
N1, MACK(N1) , Qb NITb
 Verify NITb using
DSM Public key
 K = da * Qb = da*db*G
 Verify MACK(N1)
N2, MACK(N2)
 Verify MACK(N2)
SECuRE and Trustworthy
Computing Lab
20
Security Analysis and
Comparison
SECuRE and Trustworthy
Computing Lab
Comparison of security properties
21
One Time Pad
Encryption
Cryptographic
Nonce
Unique Device
Identifier
IIP DSM IoT
Keyed Hash
(HMAC)
PUF
HPCs
SECuRE and Trustworthy
Computing Lab
22
Performance Analysis of
Device Authentication
SECuRE and Trustworthy
Computing Lab
PUF-Circuit
23
SECuRE and Trustworthy
Computing Lab
Comparison of Operations
24
XoR, Shift Operation, Random Number, Hash, MAC, Memory Access,
Concertation operations are reduced
SECuRE and Trustworthy
Computing Lab
Comparison of Resource Efficiency
25
 Do not provide good scalability
 Provide lower degree of security
SECuRE and Trustworthy
Computing Lab
Comparison of Computation Cost
26
 Do not implement majors security properties
 privacy and mutual authentication
 Suitable for passive devise (RFID Tags)
 Cannot be applied to active devices (IoT)
SECuRE and Trustworthy
Computing Lab
Performance Analysis of
Peer Authentication
27
SECuRE and Trustworthy
Computing Lab
Simulation Setup
 IoT Identity Provider
 Amazon EC2 Virtual Machine
 Network Access Controller
 A desktop commuter running Ubuntu
28
 IoT Nodes: T-Mote SKY
 IoT Operating System: Contiki
 Device Simulator: Cooja
 Serial Line IP (SLIP)
 IP over serial tunnel
SECuRE and Trustworthy
Computing Lab
Experimental Network
29
SECuRE and Trustworthy
Computing Lab
Analysis of Payload Overhead
30
Total Number of UDP Packet Fragments:
NIT  10
ECQV  13
HIP  17
X.509  53
SECuRE and Trustworthy
Computing Lab
Comparison of Crypto Operations
31
 Number of Encryption (AES) and Hash
operations (SHA-1) are reduces
 Intensive Cryptographic overhead
 Modular Exponentiation:
 gab
 Elliptic Curve cryptography
 Lightweight
SECuRE and Trustworthy
Computing Lab
32
NIT
DTLS-
ECQV
DTLS-
X.509
HIP
Comparison of Speed
2x
3x
5.5x
SECuRE and Trustworthy
Computing Lab
Comparison of Energy Consumption
33
NITDTLS-
ECQV
DTLS-
X.509
HIP
 Lightweight cryptography
 Reduced number of interactions
 Less number of packet fragments
SECuRE and Trustworthy
Computing Lab
Conclusion and Future Work
 Secure network admission
 Authentication based on hardware and software integrity verification
 Secure access to service
 Certificateless and lightweight mutual authentication scheme
 Secure against strong adversarial Scenarios
 Future work
 FPGA implementation of the PUF-based scheme
 In-device intrusion detection based on Hardware Performance Counter
34
SECuRE and Trustworthy
Computing Lab
Thank You
35
SECRETLab@UAB
 Phone: 205.934.8643
 Fax: 205.934.5473
 Web: http://secret.cis.uab.edu/
Mahmud Hossain
 Email: mahmud@uab.edu

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HSC-IoT: A Hardware and Software Co-Verification based Authentication Scheme for Internet of Things

  • 1. SECuRE and Trustworthy Computing Lab Authors Mahmud Hossain, Shahid Noor, Ragib HasanSECuRE and Trustworthy computing Lab (SECRETLab) University of Alabama at Birmingham Presenter: Mahmud Hossain, PhD Candidate, Dept. of Computer and Information Sciences, UAB http://secret.cis.uab.edu IoT HSC-IoT: A Hardware and Software Co-Verification based Authentication Scheme for Internet of Things
  • 2. SECuRE and Trustworthy Computing Lab 2 The Internet of Things (IoT)  A programmable world  Everyday objects are interconnected  Objects are smart enough to make decision
  • 3. SECuRE and Trustworthy Computing Lab The Scope of This Propose Work 3 Secure Network Admission Secure Service Access  Life cyle of an IoT node
  • 4. SECuRE and Trustworthy Computing Lab Content Outline  Motivation and Threat Model  Contribution  Background  Operational model  Security Analysis  Performance Analysis 4
  • 5. SECuRE and Trustworthy Computing Lab Motivation and Threat Model  Hardware compromise  Counterfeit IoT deices to impersonate a real device  E.g., fabricated medical IoT devices can be sold at a cheaper price  Node cloning  Extract keying materials for impersonation types of attacks  Simulate IoT devices using virtualization layer  Software compromise  A legitimate device with malicious software  Node reprogramming with malicious code  Running an older version of a software  A vulnerable version the software  Usage of static device identity for authentication  Does not provide location privacy  Vulnerable to location tracing attacks 5
  • 6. SECuRE and Trustworthy Computing Lab Motivation and Threat Model  T-Mote Sky  CPU 8 MHz  RAM 8 KB  ROM 48 KB  Communication 250 Kbps  RE-Mote  CPU 16 MHz  RAM 8 KB  ROM 48 KB  Communication 250 Kbps 6
  • 7. SECuRE and Trustworthy Computing Lab Contributions  Hardware and Software co-verification  Protect node cloning and reprogramming attacks  Physical Uncloneable Function (PUF) for hardware integrity verification  Hardware Performance Counter (HPC) for software integrity verification  Privacy-aware identity usage  Prevent location tracking attacks  Resource efficient mutual authentication  Protected access to IoT resources and services. 7
  • 9. SECuRE and Trustworthy Computing Lab Physical Uncloneable Function (PUF)  Same circuitry is embedded with different devices  Same challenge bits  Different device produces different and unique response bits  Complex and statistical variation in logic and interconnect in an IC 9
  • 10. SECuRE and Trustworthy Computing Lab Hardware Performance Counter (HPC)  HPCs are registers present in all commodity processors  ARM, Intel, AMD  HPCs can keep count of number of CPU cycles require to complete a task (to execute code segments)  Conventional usage  To determine software performance  Software profiling  Usage in security in rich resource devices  Code behavior analysis  Malware detection 10
  • 11. SECuRE and Trustworthy Computing Lab 11 Operational Model
  • 12. SECuRE and Trustworthy Computing Lab Hardware and Software Co-verification 12 Our Approach Conventional Approach E.g., Temperature Sensing Software Hash
  • 13. SECuRE and Trustworthy Computing Lab System Architecture 13  IoT Identity Provider (IIP)  Stores challenge-response pairs, software hash, value of HPC  Authenticates an IoT device  Domain Security Manager  Provides an IoT device access to the network
  • 14. SECuRE and Trustworthy Computing Lab Enrollment Phase 14 1. Challenge C 2. Response Ri IoT Device Challenge/ Device ID Response Task HPC Cycles Software Hash Smart Thermostat C1 = R1 R՛1 Temperature Sensing CC1 SH1 Smart Light C2 = R2 R՛2 Turn Light On CC2 SH2 PUF HPCs 3. Response R՛i Devices IoT Identity Provider (IIP) Challenge as Device Identifier
  • 15. SECuRE and Trustworthy Computing Lab An Overview of the Operational Model 15 DSM IIP C1, R1 C1, R1 C2, R2 C2, R2 NIT1 C= Challenge, R = Response NIT= Network Identity Token DSM IIP C2, R2 C2, R2 C3, R3 C3, R3 NIT2 DSM IIP C3, R3 C3, R3 C4, R4 C4, R4 NIT3 Site 1 Site 2 Site 3
  • 16. SECuRE and Trustworthy Computing Lab IIP Authenticates Device 16 DSM IIP R = PUF(C) C՛ = F(R) R՛ = PUF (C՛) C, X = R ⊕ R ՛ Y= CC ⊕ SH MACR(X ⊕Y) Retrieve R for C from DB R ՛ = X ⊕ R Certificate-based Mutual Authentication F  Public Random Generator Shared by IIP and Device Retrieve SH for C from DB CC = Y⊕SH Verify MACR(X⊕Y) C՛ = F(R) Sore [C՛, R ՛ ]
  • 17. SECuRE and Trustworthy Computing Lab Device Authenticates IIP and DSM 17 DSM IIP R = PUF(C) C՛ = F(R) R՛ = PUF (C՛) MACR(H(R)) h = H(R) MACR(C՛) h = H(R) N, MACh (N) MACR(C՛) Store h Verify MACR(C՛)  Authenticates IIP Verify MACh (N)  Authenticates DSM F  Public Random Generator Shared by IIP and Device
  • 18. SECuRE and Trustworthy Computing Lab Network Identity Token (NIT) Assignment 18 DSM IIP ECC Pair (dd,Qd) Q , MACh (Q) Verify MACh (Q)  Authenticates Device NIT = ECDSAdt(Qd) ECC Pair (dt,Qt) h = Hash (R) Q , MACh (Q) h = Hash (R)  DSM authenticates device
  • 19. SECuRE and Trustworthy Computing Lab  Certificateless authentication  No need process to certificate chain Peer Authentication (Device to Device) 19 [(da, Qa), NITa ] [(db, Qb), NITb ] Qa, NITa  Verify NITa using DSM Public key (Qdsm)  K = db * Qa = da*db*G N1, MACK(N1) , Qb NITb  Verify NITb using DSM Public key  K = da * Qb = da*db*G  Verify MACK(N1) N2, MACK(N2)  Verify MACK(N2)
  • 20. SECuRE and Trustworthy Computing Lab 20 Security Analysis and Comparison
  • 21. SECuRE and Trustworthy Computing Lab Comparison of security properties 21 One Time Pad Encryption Cryptographic Nonce Unique Device Identifier IIP DSM IoT Keyed Hash (HMAC) PUF HPCs
  • 22. SECuRE and Trustworthy Computing Lab 22 Performance Analysis of Device Authentication
  • 23. SECuRE and Trustworthy Computing Lab PUF-Circuit 23
  • 24. SECuRE and Trustworthy Computing Lab Comparison of Operations 24 XoR, Shift Operation, Random Number, Hash, MAC, Memory Access, Concertation operations are reduced
  • 25. SECuRE and Trustworthy Computing Lab Comparison of Resource Efficiency 25  Do not provide good scalability  Provide lower degree of security
  • 26. SECuRE and Trustworthy Computing Lab Comparison of Computation Cost 26  Do not implement majors security properties  privacy and mutual authentication  Suitable for passive devise (RFID Tags)  Cannot be applied to active devices (IoT)
  • 27. SECuRE and Trustworthy Computing Lab Performance Analysis of Peer Authentication 27
  • 28. SECuRE and Trustworthy Computing Lab Simulation Setup  IoT Identity Provider  Amazon EC2 Virtual Machine  Network Access Controller  A desktop commuter running Ubuntu 28  IoT Nodes: T-Mote SKY  IoT Operating System: Contiki  Device Simulator: Cooja  Serial Line IP (SLIP)  IP over serial tunnel
  • 29. SECuRE and Trustworthy Computing Lab Experimental Network 29
  • 30. SECuRE and Trustworthy Computing Lab Analysis of Payload Overhead 30 Total Number of UDP Packet Fragments: NIT  10 ECQV  13 HIP  17 X.509  53
  • 31. SECuRE and Trustworthy Computing Lab Comparison of Crypto Operations 31  Number of Encryption (AES) and Hash operations (SHA-1) are reduces  Intensive Cryptographic overhead  Modular Exponentiation:  gab  Elliptic Curve cryptography  Lightweight
  • 32. SECuRE and Trustworthy Computing Lab 32 NIT DTLS- ECQV DTLS- X.509 HIP Comparison of Speed 2x 3x 5.5x
  • 33. SECuRE and Trustworthy Computing Lab Comparison of Energy Consumption 33 NITDTLS- ECQV DTLS- X.509 HIP  Lightweight cryptography  Reduced number of interactions  Less number of packet fragments
  • 34. SECuRE and Trustworthy Computing Lab Conclusion and Future Work  Secure network admission  Authentication based on hardware and software integrity verification  Secure access to service  Certificateless and lightweight mutual authentication scheme  Secure against strong adversarial Scenarios  Future work  FPGA implementation of the PUF-based scheme  In-device intrusion detection based on Hardware Performance Counter 34
  • 35. SECuRE and Trustworthy Computing Lab Thank You 35 SECRETLab@UAB  Phone: 205.934.8643  Fax: 205.934.5473  Web: http://secret.cis.uab.edu/ Mahmud Hossain  Email: mahmud@uab.edu