1. 1
UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM
MIDDLE EAST SYMPOSIUM
ONE YEAR ON FROM THE ARAB SPRING?
HAS ANYTHING ACTUALLY CHANGED IN THE MIDDLE EAST
AND NORTH AFRICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY?
REPORT
Prepared by Lana Khattab
24 FEBRUARY 2012 EUROPEAN RESEARCH INSTITUTE Room G51
A Middle East Symposium entitled „One Year on from the Arab Spring: Has anything
actually changed in the Middle East and North Africa and the International Community?‟
took place on February 24th at the European Research Institute, University of Birmingham.
Hosting a number of renowned experts on Middle Eastern and Islamic studies and external
actors‟ relations with the Middle East and North African (MENA) region, the Symposium
was split into three panels.
Welcoming the large audience, Colin Thain remarked that the Arab Spring discredited neo-
liberal assumptions concerning the possibility of democratisation in Arab states. Thain
described the uprisings as broader social movements - beyond ethnic and religious boundaries
- rejecting years of perceived humiliation. He also pondered whether the Arab Spring led to
the questioning of Western assumptions in general about how to deal with the complexities of
the Middle East (ME). Has the United States (US) supported the Arab Spring or simply its
national interests? Has the Arab Spring led to a genuine rebirth of MENA societies or not?
The first panel was chaired by Stefan Wolff and focused on Palestine and Egypt. Wolff
started off by emphasising that Chatham House rules applied throughout the day‟s event. The
first speaker, Sari Nusseibeh from Al Quds University, addressed the lack of an Arab Spring-
like uprising in Palestine by highlighting two points:
Firstly, Nusseibeh claimed that the realisation of sovereignty and people power by the Arab
populations lay at the core of the Arab Spring. Arab people realised that they can change the
political order in which they live. However, Palestine‟s unique history and experience of
being under Israeli occupation have made Palestinians feel „sovereign‟ for a while. Nusseibeh
argued that Palestinians have had to take matters into their own hands in the past 40 years of
occupation of the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem. Having been in a constant state of
struggle since the creation of Israel in 1948, Nusseibeh claims that Palestinians have known
the feeling of people empowerment for some time - which the rest of the Arab peoples of the
MENA region have only experienced recently.
Secondly, the Palestinian case is unique in the sense that the political order is more complex
than in other Arab states. Above the immediate layer of Palestinian political leadership exists
the umbrella layer of the occupation. While other Arab states can visibly change the domestic
political layer, Nusseibeh argued that Palestinians are fully aware of the weaknesses of their
leadership in the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem. Staging an uprising against the
Palestinian leadership cannot be effective, since the umbrella layer of the occupation holds

2. 2
the absolute power. Ultimately, Palestinians do not feel that the Palestinian leadership has
any direct power over their lives since the real power is rather the Israeli occupation.
Pointing to the deadlock of negotiations on a two-state solution, the frustration of people on
both sides, the practical difficulty of designing a shared capital for a state of Palestine and
Israel, Nusseibeh proposed a one-state solution, a form of federation for Palestinians and
Israelis, which would uphold principles of freedom and human rights. This solution,
according to Nusseibeh, would require devising a parallel roadmap, and giving back some
basic civil rights to Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem such as the right
of free movement.
Stefan Wolff then gave the floor to Hassan Nafaa from the University of Cairo who spoke on
prospects for democracy a year after the revolution in Egypt. Nafaa summarised events in
Egypt in four points. Firstly, he addressed the specificity of the Egyptian revolution in that it
was an uprising triggered by a well-educated middle-class youth who aspired for freedom,
social justice and dignity and who were not part of any existing political party or group and
who relied on different ideological bases. For Nafaa, the Mubarak regime did not end up
being „toppled‟ but the president was simply „deposed‟. Egypt‟s revolution did not start out
from a vacuum since protest movements such as Kefaya had built the ground for the mass
protests of January 2011 - characterised by a lack of an institutional framework, leadership or
specific ideology. Nafaa claimed that the work of the Egyptian revolution is still unfinished.
Secondly, Nafaa examined the role of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) in
the revolution by noting that the uprising was protected by the army since the latter refused to
use violence against the protesters. Historically, the Egyptian army is well-respected by the
Egyptian people and in some instances staged coups itself. It is historically difficult to use the
army against the people: the bread riots in 1977 and 1986 during which the army repeatedly
refused to shoot at the people are just one example. Nafaa stated that the army had
reservations regarding the succession scheme of Gamal Mubarak and the role played by the
business elite, embodied by the ruling party the National Democratic Party (NDP).
Nevertheless, the army (represented in particular by the Military Council) has been acting
more as a continuation of the regime rather than a change from Mubarak‟s rule.
Thirdly, Nafaa outlined the ways in which the SCAF has mismanaged the transitional period.
The Military Council has refused to establish a Presidential Council and opted not to involve
civilian opinion. All key players in the government have been selected among those who had
friendly relations with the past regime, instead of involving new players such as the youth.
Moreover, the Council has thus far failed to improve the standard of living of Egyptians and
also failed to re-establish a trustworthy security apparatus, along with committing grave
human rights violations. While the Council is ready to reform the system it is not ready to
change the whole system, including Egypt‟s domestic and foreign policies.
Fourthly, the upcoming Presidential elections will be crucial in determining whether Egypt
will take a democratic course or not. What remains to be solved is how mistakes from the
past year can be corrected. Furthermore, the timing of the drafting of the constitution is
problematic and needs special attention. A final challenge concerns the demands of the
Council which calls for no civilian oversight or interference into its affairs. In concluding,
Nafaa outlined three possible future scenarios. In the first scenario, a moderate Muslim
Brother would be elected as President which would increase the already existing polarisation
between Islamists and non-Islamists. In the second, SCAF and the Muslim Brotherhood (MB)

3. 3
will agree on a President in an undemocratic process which will result in a powerless
President and SCAF “ruling behind the scenes”. The third and most preferable scenario
would be an independent President who enjoys good relations with Islamists and non-
Islamists and who has a good reputation to play a major role in establishing a democratic
system in Egypt. Although the most favoured, the last scenario might not happen. What is
essential to note however is that the Egyptian people will never go back to the status quo: the
Egyptian revolution is unfinished and will continue.
After Nafaa‟s presentation, Stefan Wolff opened the floor to questions from the audience. On
the future of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, it was argued that it will stay in place and not
be put to any referendum; however Israel might be forced to respect the agreement of peace
in the region. Following questions from a BBC Reporter and Michelle Pace from POLSIS
focusing on the extent that Palestinian civil society and youth groups could influence Israeli
civil society, it was claimed that the majority of Palestinian youth belonged to existing
political parties (that is, either to Fatah or Hamas) and were not independent. Palestinians
have tried to engage with the Israeli left in the past however the Israeli political left is very
weak.
On the possibility of a secret deal between the MB and the SCAF it was claimed that this sort
of deal would visibly weaken the military‟s status and not succeed in getting the divided
spectrum of Islamists on board. There is a big risk that such a deal would not work well for
both SCAF and the MB, so the likelihood of it happening is quite low. Moreover, anti-US
actions improve SCAF‟s popularity among the Egyptian people. There is a desire on the part
of the Egyptian side to reassess US-Egyptian relations. On the role of secular liberals in
Egyptian politics, it was noted that the past polarisation between the NDP and the MB left
little space for liberal leftist parties to develop. However, the political map is changing very
quickly and will require political parties, including the MB, to evolve and adapt.
The second panel was chaired by Haifaa Jawad from the University of Birmingham‟s
Department of Theology and Religion and focused on Yemen, Bahrain and Syria. The first
speaker was Vincent Durac from the University College Dublin in Ireland who examined the
nature of Yemen‟s uprising. Since Saleh handed over power to his deputy and the transition
to a unity government has been underway, there has been more regime maintenance than
„actual democratic change‟. Durac outlined the context of Yemen‟s uprising: it is the poorest
country in the Arab world with high levels of illiteracy and corruption. Its economy is
dependent on a limited oil industry which constitutes 90% of its export, however oil is said to
be running low by 2015. While Yemen had experienced limited political liberalisation in the
early 1990s, this came to a halt in 1994. Although a lively opposition landscape has existed in
the past, the protests have emerged as a youth-triggered leaderless movement. The uprising
was followed by significant defections from the ruling party and isolation of the regime. The
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) initiative only involved political parties and did not attempt
to involve Yemen‟s youth. The deal brokered by the GCC guaranteed Saleh and his family
immunity and left a number of his family members in control of the security apparatus. The
current political landscape is characterised by divisions among the coalition of the opposition,
continuing protests and a relative regime continuation.
The floor was then given to Sajjad H. Rizvi from the University of Exeter who shed light on
the neglect of Bahrain‟s Arab Spring. This neglect is attributed to a number of wrongly-held
assumptions. First, as a Gulf country it is assumed to be very wealthy, but the reality

4. 4
represents 40% youth unemployment, poor welfare services, little electricity and housing
shortages. Second, considering the high percentage of the Shia population in Bahrain external
intelligence was argued to be at play. Third, the sectarian nature of the uprising was over-
emphasised which fed into the hysteria about the Shias taking over the region. The Bahraini
uprising has commonalities with other uprisings in the region: it is leaderless, organised by
youth, marked by an impossibility to return to the status-quo, repression by security forces
including deaths of protesters and was partly due to economic concerns such as growing
inequalities and unemployment.
Rizvi then went on to highlight the historical roots of the Bahraini uprising, which include the
spread of an exclusive historic narrative, serious political claims for democratic
accountability and the „Saudi factor‟. Saudi Arabia has attempted a coup in Bahrain in 1991
and fears the threat posed by the Shias in the region. The shifting situation on the ground in
Iraq poses a great concern for both Saudi Arabia and the ruling elite of Bahrain: political
change in the nature of the state – in this case Iraq‟s Shia – can change facts on the ground
and pose a danger to the status quo. Bahrain itself is of utmost importance since it has energy
resources, represents an example of a strong democratic movement in the Gulf, and
demonstrates human rights abuses which should normatively be a matter of concern. Rizvi
argued that any move forward will have to include all parties on the ground. A research area
which will emerge after these events will be on counter-revolution forces notably by Saudi
Arabia. Since the last Spring, 25 people have been killed in Saudi Arabia. Rizvi applauded
the growing condemnation of Saudi hypocrisy as a positive development.
The final speaker on this panel was Christopher Phillips from Queens Mary University of
London, who examined the Syrian uprising and whether the current context of the uprising is
changing Syrian national identity. As a major revolt against the Baathist regime which had to
date claimed well over 8000 dead, Syria entered its 11th month of uprising at the time of the
Symposium. The return to the old flag used under the democratic era when the Sunni
community was in charge arguably highlights rival ethnic and sectarian lines. Phillips closely
examined the causes of the Syrian uprising. Syria is a colonially created state with various
ethnic and sectarian groupings: roughly 65% are Sunni Arab, 10% Alawi, 12% Kurdish, 3%
Druze and 1% other. Between 1935 and 1970, Syria experienced a high level of political
instability (15-19 coups) but enjoyed greater freedom and a more or less functioning political
system. With the coming to power of Hafez Al-Assad, democracy was sacrificed for security
and stability and a „stable state‟ was constructed. Hafez Al-Assad constructed a coup-proof
political system, building his support base on minority rights (such as Alawis, Druze and
Christians), farmers and poor people, in the major cities of Aleppo and Damascus.
Hafez Al-Assad‟s regime seemed most robust when he crushed an uprising in 1982, notably
in the Hama massacre. However Phillips claimed that Hafez Al-Assad failed to create a clear
national Syrian identity. The regime of Hafez Al-Assad built what was very much defined by
sect, including Syria‟s education and legal systems. While his rhetoric used to be very
nationalistic, the reality was based along ethnic lines. By exacerbating the growth of
economic liberalisation by the Alawis and abandoning the wider support base Hafez had built
Syria by neglecting peasants, cutting subsidies, etc and the Syrian people quickly lost faith in
him. In 2000, Hafez Al-Assad‟s son Bashar came to power. Although he has been generally
popular, his manner of rule exacerbated ethnic and sectarian tensions. Furthermore, Syria
possesses a growing urban problem and an increased intelligence presence inside Syria
operating in chiefdoms.

5. 5
Phillips identified two short term triggers that transformed the protests into an uprising.
Firstly, the general events of the Arab Spring and especially the seeming successes of Tunisia
and Egypt raised hopes that something similar could be achieved in Syria. Secondly, what
started out as peaceful protests quickly turned into a violent, sectarian conflict. Crucially,
Syrian people are aware of the need to avoid sectarian conflict, which would only support the
regime. Phillips noted a shift towards more sectarian slogans such as anti-Alawi and pro-
Sunni ones. The use of the old flag recalls Sunni majority power and is suspiciously looked at
by the Kurdish minority.
With the regime still very strong, a weak opposition and a hugely divided international
community, Phillips claims that Syria is likely to face a stalemate. A potential for game
changing includes more defections, large protests from the key cities of Damascus and
Aleppo and international involvement.
After all three panellists held their presentations, Haifaa Jawad opened the floor to the
audience. On the question whether there was a polarisation of the revolution within Syria
asked by a journalist from the BBC, it was argued that the polarisation was between 20% of
pro-regime and 20% pro-revolution of the population. The vast majority of Syrians
represented the silent middle. Michelle Pace from POLSIS asked whether Hezbollah‟s
support of the Syrian regime plays into Israel‟s presumed plan on attacking Iran. It was
answered that Israel is currently quiet on this issue. Although Israel would like to see the
Assad regime gone in the short term since it supports Hezbollah, such an initiative would
destabilise Israel‟s northern border in the short term.
The third and final panel chaired by Michelle Pace addressed a number of issues. It started on
the topic of Islamism with a presentation by Abdelwahab ElAffendi from the University of
Westminster. He argued that Islamists were not very keen to push for political power. In
Tunisia, Al-Ghannoushi (leader of En-Nahda party) specifically insisted on keeping a low
profile, but he is nevertheless very popular. ElAffendi claimed that the sudden rise of
Islamists was not something they had planned for nor something they desired. Islamism has
something beyond simply Islamist movements, which might benefit Islamist groups. In
Turkey, for instance, Islamists took over responsibility for state and society. However,
Islamists do not have a practical and feasible programme. It is important to bear in mind that
today‟s Islamists are more political rather than religious groups.
Michelle Pace then gave the floor to George Joffé from the University of Cambridge who
examined whether post-Gaddafi Libya has demonstrated change or has deteriorated towards
chaos. Six months after the end of the Gaddafi regime it is legitimate to evaluate events.
Today, the authority of the National Transitional Council (NTC) is being widely challenged.
There has not been any large scale reconstruction undertaken since the end of the civil war,
and there are doubts over the feasibility of holding elections in June 2012. Although life in
Libyan towns has emerged as normal, it may seem as the appearance of normality rather than
genuine stability. Concerns arise regarding the certainty of Libya remaining a unitary state,
the possibility for the NTC to re-impose its security, and the tackling of tensions between
East and West Libya.
The Libyan revolution began in Benghazi and was not coordinated. There are around 100
militias inside Libya today which act as the security apparatus of the state, since Libya still
lacks one. Joffé claimed that no central state authority exists in terms of articulating law and
order. While the autonomy of the militias is a source of grave concern, the inability of the

6. 6
NTC to bring them together is equally worrying. The unity of the Libyan state is threatened
by the location of the oil fields in the East of the country, which would be the financing
source of the East if it wanted to break out. Libya needs to go through a phase of
reconciliation in order to continue as a state: something it has not managed to do yet. Joffé
argued that the likelihood of elections in June was small. Political parties in Libya are small
and inexperienced. Moreover, Libya is threatened by its neighbours such as Mali and Algeria.
Joffé concluded his presentation by stating that Libya has indeed become the paradigm that
highlights the fact that uprisings and their aftermath do not happen smoothly.
The next speaker on the panel was Proinsias De Rossa, Policy Advisor of the Labour Party in
Ireland and former President of the European Parliament (EP)‟s delegation to Palestine, who
addressed the EP‟s approach to the Arab Spring and its impact on the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. De Rossa briefly outlined the workings of the EP: it has 750 members who get
elected by around 500 million people. Members are grouped along the political spectrum and
encouraged to take European positions although geographic positions do matter too, for
instance the proximity of Southern EU states to the ME. De Rossa noted that the Arab Spring
and the need for a consistent approach should be factors which make the EU more positive
towards Palestinians, especially since Netanyahu seems „more concerned with keeping his
government in place rather than wanting progress‟. The EU‟s consistency is essential to
ensure it regains credibility. De Rossa claimed that human rights clauses in trade agreements
which theoretically denote the legal basis for measures taken were rejected on the basis of a
„political objective‟ being sought whenever challenged. In the EU‟s response to the uprisings
in the Arab Spring published in March 2011 „A Partnership for Democracy and Shared
Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean‟ one sentence only refers directly to the Peace
Process.
The last panellist addressing the audience was Mark Fitzpatrick from the International
Institute for Strategic Studies who worked as a US diplomat for 26 years. Fitzpatrick stated
that the US should have claimed some credit when protesters took the streets in Tahrir Square
in Cairo for several reasons. Firstly, the protesters espoused the ideals of President Obama‟s
2009 Cairo speech and he helped to legitimise their political struggle. Secondly, President
Obama directly helped to ensure the end of the Mubarak government. By publically calling
for Mubarak to step down, he made a swift and historic response to such a dramatic change in
US political history. Thirdly, the vast majority of the US public was supportive of the
uprising. Fitzpatrick claimed that the US was blamed for „throwing Mubarak under the bus‟
and abandoning him, especially by Gulf leaders who fear the US would treat them in the
same way. He criticised Russia and China‟s attitude towards the democratic uprisings in the
MENA such as in Syria and argued that the US stood on the right side of history. What the
US currently needs is patience in dealing with a changing region. Fitzpatrick concluded his
presentation by stating that the US has realised that repressive regimes are not a long-term
solution for stability in the MENA.
After the presentations by the panellists, Michelle Pace opened the floor to questions from the
audience. On the similarity between Libya and Somalia, it was argued that the situation in
Libya was no where near that of Somalia, since there is no total breakdown of law and order,
daily life still operates and there is no large rebel group such as Al-Shabab. Moreover, the
Libyan people and militias have enough interest in their common good to not let the situation
slide towards a civil war. A POLSIS student‟s question concerned the role of the EU
regarding the ongoing Israeli-Iranian tension. The panellists‟ reply was that the EU opposed
war with Iran but applied sanctions. The EU‟s role as an external actor being centred more

7. 7
towards democracy promotion and human rights, it is unlikely to support direct military
action. It was pointed out however that individual member states were entitled to and
engaged in their own foreign policy which might differ from the EU‟s position.
On the relation between Israel and Syria, it was argued that Israel would be glad to see
Bashar Al-Assad‟s regime go since it would enhance Israeli national sovereignty by isolating
Iran further in the region. A student for the University of Durham asked the panel why it
thought the US felt reluctant to intervene in Libya from the beginning. While the US was
ultimately glad to see Gaddafi go since he had been an irritant on the international scene for
years, it had reservations for direct intevention for other reasons. After Afghanistan and Iraq,
Americans are tired of supporting war abroad. The Obama administration was clear that it
would not bear the costs of military interventions by Europe anymore. Europe needs to start
taking responsibility for its own military actions.
The concluding remarks of the Symposium were made by Nick Wheeler who thanked the co-
sponsors of the event: the School of Government and Society, the Institute for Conflict,
Cooperation and Security (ICCS), POLSIS, the Security Studies Research Group (POLSIS),
the ERI – all at the University of Birmingham and the British International Studies
Association (BISA) and its working group on International Mediterranean Studies. He also
thanked Michelle Pace, Stefan Wolff and Haifaa Jawad, the prestigious group of speakers, the
excellent audience, as well as Helen, Sam, Lana and Valentina for all their support in
organisational matters.
Nick Wheeler went on to state that Russia and China‟s anger over the UNSC Resolution 1973
which legitimised NATO intervention in Libya should be cause for them to be more
concerned regarding Syria, in which Russia has massive national security interests. Although
the West is criticised to be selective in its interventions, this is sometimes justified:
governments need to be confident about what can be done about the situation since
humanitarian ends are not a guarantee for success, especially when intervention is involved.
Wheeler emphasised the support of the Arab League as a key game changer in the
legitimisation of the intervention in Libya. The recent events in the ME sharpened our
awareness on the protection of human rights in non-direct ways and highlighted the ethical
dimensions of interventions which need to be reintroduced into our reflections.