1. Israeli women: mothers or citizens?
An investigation into how the republican construction of
Israeli citizenship has understood women’s place within
society as that of mothers.
Student Number: 620006187
POL3040: Dissertation
Due Date: 26th
April 2016
Word Count:

2. 1
CONTENTS
Introduction: ..................................................................................................................... 2
Chapter 1: What is citizenship?........................................................................................ 6
A Brief History:......................................................................................................... 6
Citizenship as a Masculine state of affairs:............................................................... 8
The Public and Private Domain: ............................................................................... 9
The Public and Private Domain in Israel: ............................................................... 10
Citizenship Discourses in Israel:............................................................................. 12
Israeli Citizenship and Militarism:.......................................................................... 13
Chapter 2: Participation.................................................................................................. 16
Women’s Participation in the IDF: ......................................................................... 18
Women’s Participation in the Labour Market:........................................................ 20
Chapter 3: Rights............................................................................................................ 24
Economic Rights:.................................................................................................... 27
Political Rights:....................................................................................................... 29
Civil-Social Rights:................................................................................................. 30
Chapter 4: Identity.......................................................................................................... 33
Universalistic Republican Citizenship:................................................................... 33
Particularistic Religious Citizenship:...................................................................... 35
Women’s Identity and its Creation: ........................................................................ 36
Chapter 5: Women in combat......................................................................................... 40
Conclusion: .....................................................................................................................43
References: ..................................................................................................................... 45
Appendix A: ................................................................................................................... 50

3. 2
INTRODUCTION:
This work seeks to investigate how the creation of Israeli citizenship has affected
women’s1
place in Israeli society. This is carried out through the theoretical framework
of citizenship which allows for an analysis of the discrimination women are subject to.
Israel, like all other nations, is home to a series of competing citizenship discourses
which seek to shape who can be considered a member of the collective. This paper
argues that the republican account of citizenship, which equates good citizenship with
the fulfilment of duties, is that which has gained most traction in Israel and enables the
necessary qualifications for Israeli membership. Consequently, given how men and
women alike are required to enlist in the Israeli Defence Service, Israeli citizenship
should be able to overcome the gendered barrier which relegates women to the private
sphere and glories men in the public domain. Nonetheless, the gendered nature of
republican citizenship, coupled with religious and militaristic factors, has served to
conceptualise Israeli women’s duty towards the state as that of mothers. Israeli female
citizenship is thus constructed along gendered lines, limiting and valuing women merely
as the bearers of future fighters.
This investigation begins by unwrapping the meaning of citizenship and highlight
that it is based on three pillars: participation, rights and identity. Over time this
meaning has changed and paved the way for the development of different
citizenship discourses, namely: liberal, republican and ethno-nationalists. Next,
the link between citizenship and militarism is established. This union highlights
1
The term women is inherently broad. For the purpose of this dissertation I will only be analysing the
position of Ashkenazi women, due to most of my research taking these as their subjects of study. Their
position like that of Ashkenazi men is ‘superior’ to Mizrahi Jewish men and women and Palestinian
Israelis.

4. 3
why women have traditionally been barred from receiving the same rights as men
given that this domain has been beyond their reach. Following this, a discussion
into the public and private domain is carried out, exploring how citizenship values
male qualities over those of females. The final three sections of this chapter draw
on these theories and investigate how they affect Israeli citizenship and the effect
this has on Israeli women.
In the second chapter the first pillar of citizenship, participation, is unpacked. This
sections illustrates how Israeli women are granted a prominent role in the protection of
the state given the requirement that all Israelis complete the draft. However, it is noted
that the decision to enlist women did not come about as an active decision to endow
these with the necessary civic virtue to be awarded citizenship, but as a result of the
security dilemma faced by Israel. From here a historical analysis of women’s
participation within the Israeli Defence Force, IDF, is explored, showing how their
gender limits their ability to rise up the ranks. This gendered division of labour is
likewise observed in the labour market. Consequently, both the IDF and the civil sector
enable women to fulfil their duty towards the state as mothers.
In the third chapter the second pillar of citizenship, rights, is explored. These are
separated into three different groups: civil-social, political and economic to enable a
better examination. This section highlights and describes how the lack of an Israeli
constitution, coupled with both the military and religious establishments, curtails
women’s rights. While women’s economic rights are protected by a series of laws, their
precarious jobs are justified on the grounds that they enjoy extensive maternity benefits.
Politically, while women are able to run for office they tend to be awarded government
positions that match their role in the IDF, while men’s military careers enable these to

5. 4
access top political positions with relative ease. Finally, in the civil-social realm,
women’s rights as mothers and wives are dictated by the patriarchal values of Judaism
which favour men over women.
The fourth chapter analyses the third and final pillar of citizenship, identity. It starts by
exploring the creation of Israeli identity and highlighting how it is underpinned by both
a particularistic and universalistic account of belonging. While the former is
exclusionary, the latter is open to all; yet these two conflicting versions prove
problematic. The universal republican conception of citizenship was used by the IDF to
coalesce the huge numbers of immigrants that were making Israel their new home, by
awarding citizenship to those whom fulfilled their duties towards the state. Nonetheless,
this secular membership was hijacked by the religious establishment and transformed
what it meant to be Israeli into a particularistic, religious account that was inherently
exclusionary. Consequently, while constructing the general Israeli identity both these
forces helped shape the notion of Israeli womanhood, which held motherhood as a
women’s national mission.
In the fifth and final chapter a brief exploration is carried out to understand what
changes, if any, have come about by enabling women to enlist in combat roles.
Preliminary research in this area highlights that allowing women to enlist does not
change the gendered nature of the IDF, and serves to reinforce the aforementioned
republican ethos. Consequently, the gendered nature of citizenship, coupled with the
prevailing masculinity of the IDF and the chauvinistic nature of Judaism has led to
Israeli women’s place in society being understood as that of mothers. Only though
motherhood then can they ever attain the rights and protections awarded to men. The

6. 5
conclusion bolsters the aforementioned points and highlights that unless structural
change comes about women’s citizenship will inherently be tied up with motherhood.

7. 6
CHAPTER 1: WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP?
The qualifications for who can be included and excluded from the citizen body have
long been debated. Even though citizenship is a contested term (Bellamy, 2013: 1-3;
Voet, 1998: 9), most political theorists agree that by being a citizen one is awarded a set
of legal and political protections, creating a civic equality between members who are
bestowed rights and duties that each is required to fulfil (Bellamy, 2013: 2). Thus,
citizenship can be best understood as a twofold relationship, the first between the
individual and the state and the second amongst citizens themselves (Voet, 1998: 9).
Bellamy (2013: 1) has noted that historically citizenship has sought to include
disenfranchised members into the political community, such as women or national
minorities, who manage to better their position via their enfranchisement.
A BRIEF HISTORY:
The notion of citizenship was first articulated in both Ancient Greece and Imperial
Rome. For the Greeks, citizenship was primarily awarded on the basis of “gender, race
and class” (Bellamy, 2013: 4), while the Romans envisioned a two-tier system whereby
one could retain their political status yet was awarded an alternate legal citizenship
under the protection and jurisdiction of the Empire. These two traditions, which are
present today in a distilled format, conceptualise two different views on citizenship,
which Bellamy (Ibid: 3) refers to as, the intrinsic and instrumental accounts. The
intrinsic notion focuses on the interactions between members, and requests both non-
discrimination within the polity on grounds of difference, be this ethnic, religious or
sexual, and the recognition of these variances within the public sphere (Ibid: 4).
Meanwhile, the instrumental conception is more concerned with the structures of

8. 7
society as a whole, and seeks to extend equality regardless of individuals belonging to
the political community; boundaries should not limit the commitment to equal
opportunity (Ibid: 3-4). Consequently, while the former is more concerned with the
quality of equality, the latter is more focused on its scope. These accounts of citizenship
have through time been developed into the modern republican and instrumental
discourses which are discussed later.
The concept of citizenship has however not remained fixed in the past. The tradition has
adapted and shaped itself through historical changes in society and can be best
understood as bridging the gap between “antiquity” and modernity (Shafir and Paled,
2002: 3). The link between past and present is epitomised by the fusing of the civic and
political self-conceptions in the Greek polis and Roman Empire with the French and
Enlightenment notion of individual equality and moral worth (Ibid: 3). Meanwhile,
Bellamy (2004: 6) argues that our modern understanding of citizenship came about as a
two-fold process: first by the social changes in America and France and second through
the Industrial Revolution. The outcome of this, which still remains relevant to this day,
was both a new understanding of the role of the nation-state and citizenship.
Consequently, the contemporary understanding of this idea holds three key elements at
its core, namely: individual rights, national identity and participation within the
economic and political spheres of the state. These have in turn been associated with
different discourses on citizenship; rights with liberalism, identity with
communitarianism or ethno-nationalism and participation with republicanism. However,
states are nor purely liberal, republican or communitarian but an amalgam of these.
Before continuing on the topic of this dissertation, it is important to briefly describe the
different discourses previously outlined. The liberal typology understands citizenship as

9. 8
a legal status (Voet, 1999: 10) and conceives the role of government as being limited to
the protection of individual private property (Shafir & Peled, 2002: 4). Meanwhile,
republicanism is concerned with the participation of individuals in the decision making
of the state (Voet, 1999: 10) and holds that each person has civic-duties which are
paramount for their inclusion. Finally, the ethno-nationalist account conceives
citizenship on the basis of ethnicity and holds markers such as “culture, religion or
history” as that which makes a ‘people’ (Shafir & Peled, 2002: 6).
CITIZENSHIP AS A MASCULINE STATE OF AFFAIRS:
Pateman (1989: 185) adds to the citizenship debate by highlighting how the
requirements for the granting of this status are intricately bound with three notions of
independence; “the capacity to bear arms, hold property and be self-governing”.
However, these are not gender-neutral but closely linked to “masculine attributes and
abilities”: only men can achieve the independence necessary to be awarded citizenship.
Furthermore, important for this study is how Pateman (Ibid: 11, 185) suggests that the
“defence of the state”, which is understood as “the ultimate test of citizenship”, is also
“a masculine prerogative” unavailable to women. Women are barred from carrying out
this duty as it is believed that they would be both unwilling and opposed to the fulfilling
this2
. Furthermore, it was assumed that women were unable to provide for their own
protection given their weakness, while their lack of independence rendered them
“unilaterally disarmed” (Steinhm, 1989: 7) and required they seek protection from those
who could provide it: men. Given then that women do not partake in this defining
obligation, these cannot be conceptualised as full and equal citizens. Subsequently,
women are bestowed a different duty within the polity: motherhood. Obligations thus
2
Much of the debate regarding why women should not be given the vote was based on (Pateman, 1989)

10. 9
were sex-dependent. Meanwhile, throughout history women have been excluded from
the status of citizens, “even [that] of the lowest rank” (Freidman, 2005: Online), and
when awarded, it has been not as equal to men but as second-class membership (Voet,
1998). Thus, even though developments in the twentieth century have greatly improved
women’s position, the gendered nature of citizenship still trumps the achievement of
equality. This, has resulted in a large array of feminist commentators contesting the idea
of citizenship as an open and inclusive concept (Voet, 1998; Pateman, 1989; Friedman,
2005) and seeking to highlight that its inherently unequal structure is what places limits
on women. One of the reasons that citizenship has prevailed as a male domain and
makes reference only to these, is through the belief that citizenship deals only with the
public sphere, that which is “common and general” (Voet, 1998: 7). Therefore, given
that women are part of the private domain their exclusion can be rationally justified.
THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE DOMAIN:
The quest for female equality in Western nations has sought to dismantle the public-
private dichotomy. This dichotomy separates male and female qualities, enabling the
gendering of social behaviour and awards the public domain a greater importance
(Herzog: 1998). Pateman (1989) notes that the duality of that which is public and
private came about through the development of the relationship between the state and its
citizens as one of a social contract, where this is understood as a “fraternal pact that
constitutes civil society as a patriarchal or masculine order” (Ibid: 33). Social contract
theory according to Pateman, views all that which pertains to the familial and conjugal
domain as private, while everything else as the realm of civil sphere (Ibid: 34).
Accordingly, that which belongs in the former is automatically excluded from the latter
and highlights the exclusionary nature of this division. By suggesting that all which is

11. 10
related to the family is separate from the rest, this division implies that those “capacities
and characteristics” (Ibid: 3) that are displayed in the private arena are deemed
inappropriate and unfit for public life. Meanwhile, the public sphere is theoretically
built around an individual who is taken to be “sexually neutral [and] universal”, a label
applicable to all (Ibid: 3). Nonetheless, Pateman is critical of this idea given that
contract theorists who first used this term were widely understood as to have been
referring to individual men. Once the shroud of invisibility was lifted, it became obvious
that the all-encompassing-individual was in fact a man to whom the public sphere
belonged. Furthermore, contract theorists believed men’s “natural freedom and
equality” could not be extended to women, leading these to equate “sexual difference
as…political difference”; men’s natural qualities granted them entrance into the public
sphere and enabled the exclusion of women given their natural subjugation and
inferiority (Ibid: 5). Consequently, women’s exclusion rested on these being thought of
as unable to “transcend their bodily natures and sexual passions” which made it
impossible for these to develop “political morality” (Ibid: 4). However, while
citizenship can be understood as exclusionary, women have been brought into the fold;
unsurprisingly however their inclusion has been driven by the gendered nature of this
concept. Women have thus attained their status in society not as non-gendered citizens
by as women; their sexual difference vis-à-vis men is both what grants them a place in
society and limits them (Ibid: 4).
THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE DOMAIN IN ISRAEL:
While the dismantling of the private-public dichotomy is necessary for the attainment of
equality, the Israeli case is hindered by additional factors (Herzog, 1997: 63). Within
Israel attempts at dismantling this duality are contested by religious institutions, Jewish

12. 11
and Arabic traditional culture and most importantly the “security frame” (Ibid: 63). This
division is encapsulated for Herzog through the military separation of the ‘home front’
and the ‘battle front’ with the former referring to the private realm and the latter to the
public (Ibid; Hever, 1999: 229-231; Yuval-Davis; 1985). Furthermore, the central role
that the family plays in nationalistic societies, such as Israel, pushes women further
away from the public domain by requesting that these engage in their traditional role as
child bearers. This is heightened in Israel given how the security of the state is
considered an “existential threat” (Herzog, 1997: 64). Nevertheless, this public-private
dichotomy is not in and of itself unequal as its existence provides different needs for
society and individuals alike. However, what makes this division uneven are the
assumptions that are associated with each; care of the family is awarded less importance
than the protection of the state and by consequences it makes women’s position inferior
to that of men.
Berkovitch (1997) likewise refers to the problems underpinning this private-public
divide. However, unlike Herzog, she believes that the there has never been a clear
divide between the private and public spheres within Israel; the latter has always been
subservient to the demands of the former. The reasons for this subservience goes further
than the traditional role of women in society and is strengthened through the militaristic
ethos which underpins Israeli citizenship (Ibid). Even though women are drafted, the
roles they perform in the army tend to be gender specific, affecting “the position they
[later] assume in [civil] society” (Ibid: 607): namely that of mothers and wives.
Berkovitch (Ibid) further highlights how through a series of laws, namely the 1949
Basic Service Law and the 1951 Women’s Equal Right’s Law, this dichotomy is
understood as more than just a set of culturally constructed norms with no tangible base,

13. 12
but that through its legal codification this position is both fostered and expected. Thus,
even though the Israeli Defence Services Law requests that all male and female Israeli
citizens3
be called to the draft, there are a series of exemptions granted to women4
that
are inherently problematic for their ability to be awarded full citizenship. For example,
exemptions are granted to certain women who “declare reasons of conscience or
religious conviction [as] prevent[ing them] from serving on defence service” (Israeli
Defence Services Law, 1949). This unsurprisingly does not apply to men. Women are
permitted to ‘escape’ the draft only if they have already fulfilled their prior duty as
mothers towards the state. Meanwhile, in the 1951 Women’s Equal Rights Law all but
one of the articles refers to “family issues”, therefore not applying to women but to
mothers and wives (Berkovitch, 1999: 612). This systematisation of women as
‘mothers’ and ‘wives’ further serves to highlight that their position within society is
based on their sexual difference. Hever (1999: 229-231) furthers the above by
highlighting how birth and war are seen as polar opposites; being involved in one
excludes you from the others. Consequently, women are caught in a ‘catch 22’ situation
whereby giving up their duty to serve excludes them from full equality within society,
while becoming involved militarily requires these to forgo their duty to provide the next
generation; citizenship once again is shown to be a male status.
CITIZENSHIP DISCOURSES IN ISRAEL:
According to Shafir and Peled (2002: 33) Israel is home to all three citizenship
discourses5
previously mentioned. Each of these is in constant competition to establish
3
Palestinian Israelis are not included in this category.
4
Refer to Appendix A to read the sections of the Israeli Defence Services Law which highlight the
exemptions given to women.
5
I would argue that the ethno-nationalist and communitarian views on citizenship are similar, if not the
same, given that both of these hold a people/nation/ethnicity as its qualifying criterion.

14. 13
itself as the one true qualifier for what it means to be Israeli. Therefore, while the liberal
account seeks to be all inclusive and extend the franchise to all who reside within the
territorial borders6
, ethno-nationalism is exclusionary in nature as it presupposes a
Jewish heritage and a commitment to Judaism as a qualifier7
. Meanwhile, the republican
discourse of participation has conceived Jewish society in a hierarchy, with Ashkenazi
men at the pinnacle, to which all other social groups are beholden to. For Shafir and
Peled (Ibid: 33-34) then, it is this republican discourse that manages to counterbalanced
the other two by providing a buffer through which privileges within Israeli society can
be attained, so long as duties are fulfilled. Republicanism was thus discourse upon
which the state of Israel was conceptualised as it enabled membership to be granted to
those who contributed to the security of the nation.
ISRAELI CITIZENSHIP AND MILITARISM:
Israel, like many other states has required that its citizens be drafted by law. However,
what differentiates Israel is that both men and women are called to the draft (Sasson-
Levy & Amram-Katz, 2007: 106). The demand for all to enlist in the IDF is a prime
example of the republican ethos in play, given that the fulfilment of one’s draft is seen
as a precondition for ‘good’ citizenship. By superseding the male-female divide Israeli
citizenship could be understood as more inclusive than others, for citizens are not
disqualified in their duties towards the state because of their sex. Therefore, given how
the fulfilment of duties awards rights, the inclusion of both men and women in the
military ought to have guaranteed access to privileges and rights to any who partook in
the IDF. This sexual equality was to be central for the founders of the state of Israel
who wanted the new state to embrace modernity, be open to all and move away from
6
This work will not delve into the contestations of Israeli borders.
7
There are those who want Israel to be a Jewish state.

15. 14
the traditional Jewish division of gender roles. The Israeli-Hebrew woman was to take
“an equal part in the Zionist project” (Berkovitch, 1997: 608; Rapoport & El-Or, 1997:
574-575).
The adoption of republicanism as the base through which Israeli membership was to be
awarded came about through the protracted conflict between Israel and its’ neighbours
which required that the state harness all the manpower possible to fend off any attack.
Both men and women were needed for this job. This militarisation, which percolated
into all levels of the nation’s social fabric, resulted in the idea that one’s involvement in
the protection of the state was a key enabler to enter the public sphere (Kimmerling,
1993: 4). Given this, the Labour Settler Movement used its preeminent position in the
creation of the Israeli state to cemented the notion that only through the completion of
the draft could one be considered Israeli (Shafir & Peled, 2002: 8). Consequently, a vast
array of research indicates that fulfilment of military service in Israel is thought of as an
“integral component” of citizenship (Levin, 2011: 23), underscoring the “true [meaning
of Israeli] citizenship” (Berkovitch, 1997), and is “a sine qua non of full citizenship”
(Sasson-Levy & Amram-Katz, 2007; Sasson-Levy, 2003).
Even though the placing of military service at the centre of Israeli citizenship was meant
to counterbalance the ethno-centric and liberal discourses, this had been far from the
case. First, a large section of those deemed citizens of Israel are excluded from the draft
because of their ethnicity8
. These are consequently hindered in their ability to enjoy all
the same rights given that they are prevented from participating in the protection of the
state which is “perceived as Israel’s most existential problem” (Sasson-Levy, 2003).
Second, even though women are able to participate in the military, historically their
8
Palestinian Israelis.

16. 15
roles have been gendered (Sharoni, 1998; Raday, 1991; Yuval-Davis, 1985; Sasson-
Levy & Amram-Katz, 2007; Sasson Levy, 2003; Herzog, 1998; Robbins & Eliezer,
2000; Berkovitch, 1997; Hever, 2012; Weiss, 1998; Klein, 2002; The Army and Society
Forum, 2003; Golan, 1997; Ramalt, 2003; Jacoby, 2010; Levin, 2011) in such a way as
to reinfornce their position in society as women instead of as citizens. This is caused by
the centrality of masculinity within the Jewish religion, which has inevitably percolated
into the mentality of the Israeli state and conceptualised the position of men as
protectors of the realm while regarding women as requiring of this protection
(Berkovitch, 1997; Robbins & Eliezer, 2000; Sharoni, 1998; Ezrahi, 1997; Sasson-Levy
& Amram-Katz, 2007; Jacoby, 2010; Levin, 2011). Furthermore, this male-centrism has
understood women’s place within society as that of care-takers, wives and mothers
(Berkovitch, 1997; Israeli Service Basic Law, 1949; Hetch & Yuval-Davis, 1978;
Sharoni, 1998; Ezrahi, 1997; Hever, 2012; Yuval-Davis, 1985; Sasson-Levy & Amram-
Katz, 2007; Rapoport & El-Or, 1997; Klein, 2002; Herzog, 1998; Robbins & Eliezer,
2000; Levin, 2011). Consequently, the gendered nature of citizenship, coupled with the
gendered role awarded to women in the military and the chauvinistic-ness of Judaism
has created a situation whereby women’s place within society is conditioned by their
sex; the inequality resides in their exclusion from the “the ultimate test of citizenship”
(Pateman, 1989: 185): combat.

17. 16
CHAPTER 2: PARTICIPATION
This second chapter analyses the first pillars of citizenship, participation, and seeks to
understand how women have participated, both in IDF and in the labour market. Firstly,
Israeli women, unlike their Western counterparts, are given access to a wider array of
positions within the army which ought to enable them to attain a higher rank.
Nonetheless, women’s inclusion in the draft was not introduced as an attempt to make
these equal citizens, but because of the security dilemma face by Israel. Consequently,
given this ad hoc incorporation, the nature of women’s participation within the IDF has
been based on their gender. This has resulted in a gendered division of jobs in the army
and resulted in women being perceived as less prepared to take up positions of
responsibility, even in those sectors within the labour market which are understood as
the female domain.
According to the IDF, “women compromise 34% of all IDF soldiers…[with] 88% of all
roles in the IDF…[being] open to female candidates” (IDF Blog, 2010: Online).
Furthermore, a decision by the Supreme Court of Israel in the year 2000 enabled women
to serve within the traditionally male unit of the air-force after Alice Miller, a South
African-Jew, sued the military when it denied her entrance into a pilot academy based
on her gender (IDF Blog, 2015: Online). This court ruling was the first step in opening
up of an array of positions which had previously been closed to women because of their
woman-ness. Meanwhile, as of 2010 women have actively been present in “69% of all
[IDF] positions” and “constitute 20% of [all] career soldiers” with “23% and 22% [of
these being awarded the rank of] Captains and Majors respectively” (Ibid: Online).
Moreover, as a result of mounting public pressure towards the military establishment,

18. 17
the IDF conceded to the involvement of women in combat units and created the first co-
ed battalion, Caracal, in the year 2000, who as part of the Israeli Army’s Second
Command are bestowed with patrolling the Israeli-Egyptian border (IDF, 2016). In
addition to Caracal, there has been such a growing demand for women to participate in
front-line combat positions that it has required the IDF to create more battalions, such as
the Lions of Jordan, to accommodates these recruits (Zitun, 2015: Online). What is
more, 2014 also saw the appointment of the IDF’s “first female combat battalion
commander, Lt-Col. Oshrat Bachar,” (Sudilovsky, 2014: Online) while a year later, the
length of service imposed on both men and women was brought closer together. Thus,
while men’s service has typically been three years long, as of July 2015, this had been
reduced to 32 months while women’s service has been brought up from two years to 28
months (Ibid: Online). The resulting consequence of this extension is that women are
now able to enlist in and acquire technical positions which serve as springboards for
gaining better jobs in the labour market. By increasing the duration of the draft the
military establishment has realised that women are as capable as men at fulfilling the
same roles and has awarded these similar obligations as their male counterparts.
Nevertheless, while the IDF is comparatively forward-looking regarding the
involvement of women in the army vis-à-vis other Western militaries, it is still an
inherently male dominated space where only “three to four percent of IDF women serve
in combat and semi-combat positions” (Ibid: Online). Furthermore, even though today’s
women are able to access a wider range of positions, this has historically not been the
case.

19. 18
WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION IN THE IDF:
Prior to the establishment of the Israeli state, “women made up 20% of existing military
organisations” (Nevo & Shur-Shmueli, 2003: 8). This, coupled with their calling to the
draft under the aforementioned 1949 Basic Services Law could be understood as
complying with the republican ethos, whereby participation enabled access to
privileges. Nonetheless, the thought that prior involvement in combat was what drove
the founders of the State of Israel to request that women be called to the draft is a myth
(Robbins & Ben-Eliezer, 2000: 316). Women were granted the same role as men for no
other reasons than the inherent insecurity Israel was subject to after its declaration of
independence; it was considered a “necessary evil” (Ibid: 316), not an attempt to bestow
women with a citizenship-awarding duty. Yuval-Davis (1985: 653) further adds that this
was done on an “ad-hoc” basis, not as a planned policy; the possibility of a spontaneous
attack meant that the state had to harness all of its manpower in the case of conflict.
Furthermore, women’s draft was never meant to enable their entrance into combat zones
given the possibility that upon capture a female soldier could be raped (Bloom, 1991:
317; Sasson-Levy, 2003: 443-444). Thus, the hesitation of sending women to the front
line has to be understood not only as a protective measure, but as a symbolic restraint.
Given the image of Jewish women as mothers, the rape of the Israeli female soldier
could be understood as the symbolic rape of the Israeli nation; raping she who enables
the life of the Israeli people is seen as the violation of all Israel as a whole. Therefore,
this reluctance reinforces the idea that women are weak and require protection (Sharoni,
1998: Online; Ezrahi, 1997: 248; Stiehm, 1989: 230).
Meanwhile, between 1950 and 1970 the main jobs available to women in the IDF, and
which enabled their participation, were those considered “noncombat social roles”

20. 19
(Robbins & Ben-Eliezer, 2000: 315) such as teachers or “immigrant absorbers” (Ibid:
315-323). This however was altered in the early 1970’s as a result of the 1973 Yom
Kippur War. The war highlighted the shortage of soldiers within the IDF and the need
for a larger combat force, consequently the army shifted its “strategic conception” and
transferred men from professional roles to combat positions (Ibid: 322-323). Women
thus filled this vacuum and took on jobs that had come to be traditionally associated
with men such as “tank instructors, radar operators or flight controllers” (Ibid: 322-
323). Women were subsequently promoted from the office out into the field. The 1990’s
once again transformed women’s position within the army by awarding them “quasi-
combatant” status (Ibid: 329). This came about through a two-fold process: first, just
like in the 1970’s, women filled roles as a result of a shortage in men. Secondly, it was
acknowledged that their exclusion from combat hindered their ability to cash-in the
rewards granted to combat soldiers, given how, amongst other benefits, a high military
rank enabled access to positions of responsibility within the labour market.
Given the above, it can be seen that women’s advancement in the military has come
about not as an active policy to grant these more equality, but that women have only
managed to climb the ladder because of inherent shortages in “man power” (Yuval-
Davis: 1985: 652). This is extremely problematic for the conception of equal citizenship
given that women’s progression is linked to men’s inability to fulfil that which is
required of them. If only through a shortage of men can women better their position
within society, then the moment there is a surplus of men, women can easily be shipped
back home and take on their traditional roles (Ibid: 652). Moreover, during the mid-
1990s plans were drawn up within the IDF to significantly cut, but not scrap, the
number of female recruits called to the draft (Robbins & Ben-Eliezer, 2000: 330-331).

21. 20
This decision highlights how even though “the ethos of mass participation was still
strong”, women’s involvement in the army was not seen as necessary for its success
(Ibid: 330-331). This becomes even more noticeable upon the realisation that their
incorporation has historically excluded these from the IDF’s fundamental role as
protector of the realm (Nevo & Shur-Shmueli, 2003: 14). Women then are merely
honorary members of the IDF, as their exclusion would render the republic ethos
nonsensical. They are awarded a status of semi-inclusion. Therefore, while women can,
at least on the surface, fulfil their civic duty, they are actually excluded from achieving
equality vis-à-vis men, given they do not sacrifice their life for the nation (Robbins &
Ben-Eliezer, 2000: 317-318). This status of semi-inclusion furthers another notion: that
bringing women into the army is done so as to enable men to fulfil their duty. Women
are expected to take up the roles of carer, nurse and organiser within the IDF so that
men can fight and, if need be, die.
WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION IN THE LABOUR MARKET:
In addition to the gendered division of roles within the IDF, women positions are also
limited within the labour market due to their sex. The sectors women are most likely to
find employment in, once they have finished their draft, tend to be female ‘pink collar’
jobs, such as clerical “office work” (Yuval-Davis, 1985: 662-663), “secretarial and
administrative” positions, or roles within social services, nursing and teaching (Sasson-
Levy, 2003: 445; Nevo & Shur-Shmueli, 2003: 14). This gendered separation tends to
come about because of the jobs women have been awarded within the IDF; the labour
market mimics the segregation within the army. Thus, when men, who have been
combat soldiers, leave the IDF they are awarded “recognition and respect” (Burk, 1995:
503) for having completed the requirements of a ‘good citizen’. Meanwhile, given that

22. 21
women’s involvement in the army tends to not be regarded “very highly” (Klein, 2002:
679) they are prevented from accessing positions that harness their technical and
managerial abilities. Therefore, when women leave the IDF they neither enjoy the same
privileges nor hold the same “social capital” (Ibid: 679) as men. Furthermore, even
when women do attain positions of power, such as the head of the now-defunct
Women’s Corp, they still do not manage to obtain the same rank given how
requirements for the attainment of a senior rank within the IDF are based on ones “field
and combat service”. Consequently, given that until recently women have not be able to
acquire this experience it comes as no surprise that as of yet no women has ever been
made a Chief of General Staff. Meanwhile, it was only in 2011 that Orna Barbavai was
made Major General of the Manpower Directorate, the first women to ever attain this
position (Katz, 2011: Online), and up until 2008 only twelve women had achieved the
position of Brigadier General, the third highest rank within the IDF (Feldinger, 2008:
Online). Likewise, it is important to note how not only the jobs carried out by men
within the IDF are awarded a greater value, but so too are the skill-sets these develop
through their training. The longer duration of their draft enables them to gain access to
positions which require longer training and are in turn more prestigious than those
awarded to women. Because of this, when they finish their draft and move into the civil
sphere, military men are “parachuted” into managerial positions within the business
sector and awarded “senior positions in… government” (Golan, 1997: 583). Once again
men are seen as being better equipped at occupying positions within the public sphere.
Furthermore, not only are men understood to be better suited at these jobs, but as a
result of the security dilemma within Israel, a “civilian culture [is promoted] that [is]
deeply influenced by the masculine-military mind-set” (Herzog, 1998: 71) to the extent

23. 22
that it even accepts men are better prepared to deal with jobs that are traditionally
considered ‘feminine’. Herzog (Ibid: 71) examines two cases where women are left out
of their domains, highlighting the aforementioned point. First, “municipal
governments”, areas where women are the “principle consumers…[and] providers of
services”, tend adopt a military-management style, therefore employing men with
“security experience” over women who are better suited at achieving effective policy
delivery. Given this, it is not surprising to note how female representation within the
Knesset, Israel’s Parliament, has never been particularly high9
and that out of 12 elected
Prime Ministers only one, Golda Meir, has been a woman10
. Secondly, men tend to be
appointed as heads of schools over their female counterparts because it is understood
that their training is better suited at managing educational institutions (Ibid: 71).
Ironically then, women are limited in their professional advancement by the glass
ceiling, while men, somehow, manage to ride the glass elevator (Nevo & Shur-Shmueli,
2003: 15) and land positions of authority even in these employment sectors which have
historically been the bastions of femininity.
Consequently, women’s inclusion in the IDF came about not as an active policy to
award these the same citizenship status as men, but as a result of the security dilemma
faced by Israel. Meanwhile their participation has historically been gendered, in so far
as the roles these have performed have matched that which has historically been
associated with women: caring, nursing and teaching. Likewise, given that the IDF
9
The 2015 Israeli Elections which elected the 20th
Knesset rose the number of female members of the
Parliament from 27 to 29, making this the highest ever number and representing 24% of the total seats
available (Heruti-Sover, 2015: Online)
10
Golda Meir became Israel’s Prime Minister in 1969 after the sudden death of the incumbent Levi
Eshkol as a “consensus candidate” and while she was seen as buying time for the Labour party, Mapai,
she won re-election in her own right in that same year (BBC, Unknown: Online; Israeli Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, 2013: Online)

24. 23
serves as a springboard into the civil sphere, women have typically entered professions
that mimic the role they were assigned within the military, which has in turn limited
their chance at gaining positions of power. Furthermore, the security mind-set has led to
the valuing of male qualities as better than those of females even in traditionally female
jobs men are more highly rewarded.

25. 24
CHAPTER 3: RIGHTS
This chapter explores the second pillar of citizenship, rights, and seeks to explore their
effect on women. It begins by explaining the reasons why Israel lacks a constitution and
highlights how this lack of proper judicial review, coupled with religious and military
constraints, has served to stifle women’s rights in the civil-social, political and
economic domains. First, women’s economic rights are hindered by the gendered
division of labour previously mentioned. Second, given the revolving door between the
IDF’s high ranking officials and the government, women have been less likely to attain
positions of power due to their, until recent, exclusion from combat roles. Third, the
civil-social sphere is controlled by religious law, which understands women as being
inferior, and cannot be altered given the lack of a constitution and the power of religious
parties within the Knesset.
United Nations Resolution 181 stated that the partition of the British Palestinian
Mandate was to allow for the formation of two states, one Arab and one Jewish. The
resolution required that both nations draw up a constitution which would “choose a
provisional government to succeed the Provisional Council of Government appointed
by the Commission” (United Nations, 1947: Online). Nevertheless, David Ben-Gurion
was quite opposed to this. He believed that imposing limits on the ability of the Knesset
to enact legislation would be problematic for a newly created state like Israel, whose
borders were still not defined and whose population was rapidly increasing through
immigration (Shafir & Peled, 2002: 260-262). If the state of Israel wanted to survive, it
needed to be able to act fast and decisively, something which a constitution would not
allow for. Therefore, it was collectively decided that instead of redacting a document

26. 25
which would impose these restrictions, a constitution would be gradually created
through “individual pieces” of legislation, known as the Fundamental or Basic Laws
(Mehler, 1990: 83). Nonetheless, 68 years after the formation of Israel there is still no
formally written constitution. This aversion towards the establishment of such a binding
document came about, according to Shafir and Peled (2002: 261), through Ben-Gurion’s
“commitment to the republican discourse of citizenship” which understood that there
was no need for a bill of rights given that “in a free society”, like Israel, the rights of
citizens could not be overrun by democratically elected representatives (Ibid: 261). It
was thought that Israel “[would] not be built, [would] not be defended and [would] not
fulfil its mission in Israeli history – without intensified chalutziyut [civic virtue]”
(Knesset, 150: 819). Therefore, what the nation needed was not a list of protections but
one of duties. Israel as a participatory, republican democracy would only succeed if all
its citizens became involved by fulfilling their duties (Shafir and Peled, 2002: 261;
Berkovitch, 1997: 609). This execution of duties would in turn award rights.
Though the lack of a constitution may prove problematic, there are various Basic Laws
and statutory clauses which make direct reference to women and award them rights11
.
The two most preeminent pieces of legislation that are usually cited when
discrimination takes place are the 1948 Israeli Declaration of Independence and the
1951 Women’s Equal Rights Law. While the former claims that the state has to ensure
“equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race
or sex” (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016: Online) the latter indicates that “there
shall be one law for men and women in all judicial cases, any regulation discriminating
11
“Employment: 1964 Equal Pay Law and 1988 Equal Employment Opportunity Law, retirement: 1987
Equal retirement Age, nationality: 1952, violence and violence in the family: 1992 and all aiming at
equalizing the status of women to that of men.” (Berkovitch, 1997: 613).

27. 26
against a woman as such will be invalid” (Women’s Equal Rights Law, 1951 quoted in
Yishai, 1997: 147). It is also worth noting that the 1948 Declaration was one of the first
to acknowledge sexual differences in an attempt to ensure equality amongst men and
women, underlining the ethos of “equal treatment” the new state was to be based upon
(Raday, 1991: 18; Berkovitch, 1997: 608; Rapoport & El-Or, 1997: 574-575).
Meanwhile, the 1951 Law was passed as a method of harmonising legislation and
providing for equality between men and women. Nevertheless, both the 1948
Declaration and 1951 Law are laws of ordinary statute which do not carry
“constitutional authority by the Supreme Court” (Raday, 1991: 18-19). Therefore, even
though equality of the sexes has been alluded to, it was neither formally acknowledged
nor recognised as a “fundamental right” until 1987; until that point female equality in
Israel rested on a “relativist’s interpretation” (Ibid: 19) of the law where women could
only claim sameness under specific conditions.
From the above it can be noted that the difficulty in attaining equal rights hinges on two
points. First, given that there is no overarching legal document that provides for a
proper “judicial review of legislation” (Shafir and Peled, 2002: 262), Basic Laws cannot
go unchallenged and can only be altered through individual amendments. Secondly, and
most importantly, advancements have been blocked by the interaction between religious
tradition and the military ethos which, as previously mentioned, play a significant role
in influencing the nature of the Israeli state (Dotan, 2015: 8; Shafir & Peled, 2002, 95-
109; Raday, 1991: 18-27). Before moving on, it is key to flesh out these two latter
points and see how they hinder the achievement of equality. Under Jewish religious law,
halakha, women are seen as “subordinate” to men and understood to be inferior (Raday,
1991: 19). Moreover, patriarchal assumptions are inherently pervasive within Judaism,

28. 27
further stipulating that women are incapable of giving “evidence in court, and cannot be
appointed as rabbis or judges” (Ibid: 19) due to these lacking the necessary rationality;
once again male thought pushes women away from the public sphere and relegates these
to the fringes of decision making. Meanwhile, given that the awarding of rights is
dependent on the fulfilment of duties, the barring of women’s ability to carry arms has a
direct effect on their attainment of equal rights (Sasson-Levy & Amram-Katz, 2007:
109; Pateman, 1985: 11; Shafir & Peled, 2002: 101-102).
To best conceptualise how women’s rights are affected an analysis will be carried out in
three separate areas: civil-social, political, and economic. This division allows for an
easier examination while enabling an understanding of how these apply within the
public and private domains of citizenship; political and economic rights pertaining to
the former while civil-social making reference to the latter. Furthermore, while a
concrete definition for what equal rights entails is not given, the research for this work
understands equality in each domain as follows: civil-social rights as freedom from
religious courts, political rights as the freedom to run and attain office while economic
rights as the chance to equal, free access within the labour market.
ECONOMIC RIGHTS:
The economic rights of women in Israel are, as previously mentioned, intricately linked
to their assigned role in the IDF. Women tend to typically occupy positions of less
influence within all sectors of the economy compared to that of their male equivalents.
This, coupled with a lack of “affirmative action legislation” and the “reluctance of
career oriented women to delay child bearing” (Yishai, 1997: 154) makes the quest for
equality problematic. Thus, the Israeli labour market is characterised by high levels of
industry segregation and limited vertical mobility, given that a lack of child-support

29. 28
services handicaps women’s ability in rising up the ladder (Ibid: 154). Consequently,
women occupy part-time, low paying jobs (Ibid; Izraeli, 1991: 171-173). However,
Yishai (1997: 147) outlines three mechanisms through which governments can change
this imbalance: “denial, protection and encouragement”; denial and protection being the
most utilised in Israel. The former makes reference to the government’s acceptance that
the unequal distribution of goods is based on women’s familial role, while the latter
enforces protections, but by doing so reifies the stereotype that women need protecting
(Ibid: 147). Therefore, Yishai would argue that the passing of the 1988 Equal
Employment Opportunity Law12
, should be understood not as an effort to curtail
inequality, but seen as a piece of legislation which takes women’s differences with men
as requiring for an added layer of safeguards. However, Israeli women do enjoy a
generous maternity package13
which enables these to start a family without fear of
retribution. Nonetheless, this can be understood as a ‘strings-attached’ policy. These
guarantees, coupled with the fact that “part-time work is not penalised in Israel”
(Yishai, 1991: 155), enables the government to claim that women are protected. Their
position within the labour market is a result of their decision to become mothers not
because of a lack of opportunities. However, while these benefits are considerably
greater than those enjoyed by Western women (Herzog, 1998: 72), they are arranged in
a way which facilitates and incentivises Israeli women in fulfilling their civic role as
mothers; emphasising the idea that their place lies in the private domain. Consequently,
while the realisation of women’s economic rights grants them entry into the labour
market, by enabling these to escape their traditional role, the system is arranged in such
a way as to ensure women can still perform their duty towards the state. Given the
12
Which legally forbade discrimination towards women in all stages of employment.
13
Women are entitled to 26 weeks off from work, which is too be shared with their husbands, out of
which 7-14 of these are paid depending on the delivery date (All Rights, 2016: Online).

30. 29
above, it appears that women are hindered in their ability to attain equal economic
rights.
POLITICAL RIGHTS:
In the political realm, high ranking government appointments are predominantly
occupied by men, given that military experience is an unwritten precondition for office.
Nevertheless, women have not been totally excluded from politics. Golda Meir and
Tzipi Livni14
, amongst others, stand as examples of women who have occupied
positions of power both within the Knesset and through ministerial office. Yet, while
Meir was awarded the Defence portfolio, “considered the most important”, this has to
be seen as an exception, not norm (Herzog, 1998: 70). Meanwhile, it wasn’t until 1992
that women were granted a seat in either the Foreign Affairs or the Security Committee,
both of which are understood to be the “Knesset’s most prestigious bodies” (Ibid: 70).
Typically, therefore, female Members of the Knesset, MK’s, have been appointed to
lead what are considered to be been ‘feminine’, less prominent committees (Ibid: 70-71;
Herzog, 1996: 7-10). Consequently, while women are able to run for office they are
handicapped by their lack of military experience. Religion meanwhile has also played a
role in seeking to limit the appointment of women to office. For example, in the case of
Shakdiel v Minister for Religious Affairs, the claimant, Leah Shakdiel, was blocked
from her position “as an elected member of a local religious services council, on the
grounds that she was a woman (emphasis added)” (Raday, 1991: 23). The local Rabbi of
her municipal council used the 1971 Jewish Religious Services Law15
as grounds for
14
She has held the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs (2006-09), Minister of Justice (2013-14) and
was also leader of the Kadima party (2008-12) (D Susser, Unknown: Online)
15
Whose membership was decided “by the Minister of Religious Affair, the local Chief Rabbis and the
Local Council, following a procedure whereby each of the above voices his opinion of the others’
candidates. Disagreements between the parties concerning proposed members of the religious council are

31. 30
barring her access. However, the Supreme Court of Israel determined that given that
local religious councils were part of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and consequently
administered by a public body, “unlawful discrimination” was unjust. Furthermore,
while these councils performed services of a religious nature they did not deal directly
with enforcing halakha and therefore admissions into this body were to be determined
by general law, which forbade prejudice against women on the basis of gender
(Shakdiel v. Minister of Religious Affairs, [1988]). The decision by the Court was
enforced as absolute and served as a precedent for the inclusion of women in these
bodies.
CIVIL-SOCIAL RIGHTS:
While military, and to a lesser extent religious, constraints have curtailed women’s
attainment towards fully equal rights in the political and economic domains, in the civil-
social sphere religion has been the main cause in kerbing women’s freedom. This is
noticed most prominently in matters pertaining to family law16
, which, amongst other
things, prevents women from obtaining divorce without the authorisation of their
husbands17
, or considers children born before the acceptance of a divorce as bastards,
who are excluded from the possibility of marriage within the Jewish community
(Raday, 1991: 20). Unsurprisingly men are not subject to these rules. Ironically then,
even within what should be the female stronghold, the family, women are actively
discriminated upon. It is worth noting that the imposition of Jewish religious beliefs was
resolved by a ministerial committee comprised of representatives of the Prime Minister, the Mister of
Religious Affairs and the Minister of the Interior” (Versa Cardozo, undated: Online).
16
It is important to note that in Israel religious courts still have jurisdiction over marriage, divorce and
child-custody which in many cases disfavour woman given the patriarchal nature of Jewish law that
benefits men disproportionately (Berkovitch, 1997: 613).
17
Known as the Gett which affects both religious and non-religious Israelis; if you are Jewish in Israel
marriage and divorce are conferred by halakha.

32. 31
not challenged by the founding fathers of Israel because without the support of these
religious parties, Ben-Gurion and Mapai, would have been unable to form Israel’s first
government (Shafir and Peled, 2002: 261). This initial unwillingness is further hindered
by the lack of a constitution, which, as previously stated, prevents one law from
superseding another, unless sufficient votes are attained to repeal the power of the
religious courts. However, this is unlikely given the strength of religious parties within
the Knesset. Nonetheless, Halperin-Kaddari (2004:25-26) highlights that amendments,
such as those made in the year 2000, have been passed to improve the status of women.
For example, the law no longer stipulates that there is “one law for men and women”18
,
but states that any discrimination towards women on the basis of their gender is strictly
prohibited. This showcases a conscious move away from formal equality towards a
more substantive and inclusive understanding of the law (Ibid: 26). However, even
though attempts by liberal-pro-feminist MK’s have been made to overhaul the law in its
entirety, the inability to do so has been caused by the unwillingness of religious parties
to cave; while the former seek to grant citizenship on the basis of liberal values, the
latter understand membership within the collective in ethno-nationalist terms and posit
that there is no need for man-made laws when God has already bestowed men with his
own constitution19
(Shafir & Peled, 2002: 261). The civil-social realm epitomises how
women are not only seen as inferior, but how they are actively discriminated upon given
the patriarchal nature of Judaism which favours husbands over their wives.
Consequently, even though the Israeli Declaration of Independence stipulated that
discrimination based on gender was not to take place within the newly created state and
that women were to be awarded equal rights, full equality has still not been achieved.
18
Women’s Equal Rights Law, 1951.
19
The Torah.

33. 32
Therefore, the difference in rights awarded to men and women has come about through
a triple process. First, the lack of a constitution has prevented proper judicial review to
annul the power awarded to religious courts. Secondly, the republican ethos of
citizenship which holds the duty of combat as superior to that of child-rearing, and
awards those who partake in the protection of the realm ease of access in the civil
sphere as their skills are greater valued. Thirdly, by being unable to transfers matters of
marriage and divorce to civil courts, women remain actively disfavoured and subjected
to a set of rules that are geared against them.

34. 33
CHAPTER 4: IDENTITY
This fourth chapter investigates the final tenant of citizenship, identity, and understands
that its construction has been carried out in such a way that bestows each gender with a
specific role within society. To be a citizen of a state entails an element of belonging,
achieved through the sharing of values and practices which enables the individual to
self-identify with the body politic. Identity creation is therefore part of the citizenship
making process. Kimmerling and Moore (1997: 32; 2008), draw on Eisenstadt (1974),
note that the formation of Israeli identity has been based around a “collectivist Zionist”
notion which held two opposing points at its core: a “particularistic (Jewish and
religious)” identity and a “universalistic (socialist, nationalist, and liberal)” membership
(Kimmerling and Moore, 1997: 30). These two opposing ideals are fleshed out via the
military institution and the religious establishment, which together have constructed
what it means to be both and Israeli man and woman (Klein, 1999; Herzog, 1998;
Kimmerling, 1993, 2001; Sasson-Levy, 2002, 2003).
UNIVERSALISTIC REPUBLICAN CITIZENSHIP:
According to Kimmerling (2001: 90-93) while the formation of a national conscience
came about soon after the first Jewish immigrants settled within Palestine, it was not
until the “first decade” after the establishment of the new state that a whole scale effort
was made at both creating a national identity and developing an Israeli variant of
nationalism (Ibid: 93-94).The new state, which was quickly being filled with
immigrants from a myriad backgrounds, was to draw on the “melting pot doctrine” as a
mechanism to coalesce all these different traditions and homogenise the wide range of
peoples, customs and practices that were taking root. However, this did not apply to

35. 34
Arab individuals who were to remain excluded from the collective, “at least for a
generation” (Ibid: 97), because of the security risk they posed. Meanwhile, given the
enormity of the task this project entailed, the state required a huge investment of
resources and enlisted all of its institutions to participate in the creation of the ‘new’
Israeli; schools, youth movements and “particularly, the military [were] to create a
uniform new Israeli person and personality” (Ibid: 97). This mass mobilisation was
enabled through the development of a statist ideology (Ibid: 96-97; Berkovitch, 1997:
606), which also resulted in the placing of the Ashkenazi Jew at the pinnacle of Israeli
society and that upon which this new society was to be built (Shafir & Peled, 2002:
17,32). By doing this, the Ashkenazim could remain in power regardless of the entrance
of non-Ashkenazim Jews20
. This statist ideology also brought along with it a new “civil
religion”, at the helm of which stood the military (Kimmerling, Ibid: 101). This
institution was no longer charged only with the protection of the realm, but was the
mechanism through which the newly created Israeli was to come about21
(Ibid: 97, 101).
The IDF therefore was conceived as a key tool in providing “cohesion, social
integration and solidarity” within this immigrant society; it would guarantee that every
soldier, irrespective of their background, could climb the ladder and attain a position of
importance (Sasson-Levy, 2002: 362). Therefore, equality of opportunity and the
fostering of a common goal underpinned the draft. Consequently, all whom adhered to
this image and fulfilled their duties was granted access within the collective; as long as
one did what was expected on could claim citizenship.
20
The 1950 Law or Return allows any Jew to return to Israel. This open invitation for Jews has brought
people from multiple ethnic backgrounds into Israel.
21
“She or he was supposed to be healthy, muscular, a warrior, industrious, hard-working, rational,
modern, Western or ‘Westernised’, secular, a vernacular, accent-less Hebrew speaker, educated (but not
intellectual), and obedient to authorities (that is, to the state and it’s representatives)” (Kimmerling, 2001:
101)

36. 35
PARTICULARISTIC RELIGIOUS CITIZENSHIP:
Even though the secular Zionist socialists were averse to the idea of religion percolating
within the institutions of the new state, the success of the 1967 war, and its framing22
,
undermined their plan. Kimmerling (2001:109) highlights how the war, which gave
Israeli’s control to previously inaccessible land, was understood by many as a ‘miracle’,
as an act of divine intervention. The conquest of this ancestral holy land further served
to validate the whole Israeli-Jewish project. However, the incorporation of this
Jordanian controlled area was problematic, as it was not an unpopulated, barren
expanse, but home to a large Arab population. If Israel was to annex this, it had to either
expel those living there or bring them into the fold. However, neither of these options
were viable: the former would have brought with it the wrath of the international
community, while the latter would have re-shaped the demographics of the state,
transforming it from a predominantly Jewish society into a “binational state” (Ibid:
110). Instead of adopting either of these policies, a third way was embraced: settlement
expansion. This move into the sacred heartland of historic Israel was driven by a
fervently religious community who, thanks to government subsidies and protections,
managed to wedge itself into the national discourse and subsequently reopened the
debate regarding what it meant to be Israeli (Ibid: 110). Ironically then, those who had
sought to limit the effect of religion on the new state, facilitated its entrance into the
national discourse. Kimmerling (Ibid: 110) further notes that the endorsement of these
settlements by the government enabled an alliance between the “secular chauvinis[ts]
and religious ethnocentri[sts]”. This partnership paved the way for the latter to change
the nature Israeli-hood: from an open, universalistic membership into one which was
22
As a divine miracle.

37. 36
religious and inherently exclusionary. The decision to not award citizenship to the Arab
population that came under direct Israeli control as a result of the 1967 war, coupled
with the refusal to include Israeli Arab-Muslims in the draft, highlights that Israeli
citizenship is not all encompassing. Therefore, while the republican, universalistic and
secular account of citizenship claims that this status should be awarded on the basis of
duty fulfilment, it became apparent that the open rejection of this group showcased how
the foundations of the Israeli national-identity project were not as welcoming as it
appeared to be. Furthermore, by imbuing citizenship with a religious streak all those
that are not Jewish face a further hurdle in becoming members. Consequently, one is not
automatically brought into the collective through the fulfilment of duties towards the
state but through one’s religion; to be Israeli then is to be Jewish23
.
WOMEN’S IDENTITY AND ITS CREATION:
While the above tells us how the formation of a general Israeli identity came about, it
tells us nothing about how this affected women. For Berkovitch (1997: 606) then, while
women’s inclusion was theoretically carried out under the veil of gender equality,
stating that these were to be included through the open and universalistic mechanism of
citizenship, in reality their place in society was created following the traditional
conception of women as child bearers. Consequently, Israeli womanhood is constructed
in such a way that it views these as being first and foremost mothers and wives instead
of “individuals and citizens”; their inclusion is based on their difference from men.
Meanwhile, Hecht and Yuval-Davis (1978: Online) point out that the identity of the
Israeli woman has been fashioned as a result of the exemptions she is awarded through
the Israeli Defence Services Law. Subsequently, the Israeli woman is both a mother
23
I am fully aware that this claim requires a lengthy discussion to explore its validity, but I draw this
notion from my interpretation and analysis of Kimmerling (2001).

38. 37
who “carr[ies] out her demographic duty to the nation” by raising the next generation,
and a “surrogate mother” through her job within the IDF as a teacher and immigrant
integrator. This surrogacy is best understood through the previously mentioned ‘melting
pot doctrine’, whereby women are included in the IDF to serves as the “stirring spoon”
that enables the homogenisation of society (Ibid: Online). In addition to this, Yuval-
Davis (1985: 670) further notes that by totally excluding certain female groups from the
army, most prominently Jewish Orthodox women, this motherhood role is exacerbated
further. Thus, by enabling women to skip the draft through motherhood, the state is both
condoning and incentivising this practice. Furthermore, given the reliance of Israeli
citizenship on republicanism, it comes as no surprise that the gendered citizenship roles
of “citizen-soldier [and] citizen-mother” (Sarvasay, 1997: 96-97) have become accepted
as the norm. Accordingly, while men obtain virtue through combat, women managed to
acquire virtue by rearing the next generation of fighters. In addition to this, Shafir and
Peled (2007: 97) contend that the ethno-nationalist, religious, discourse has also had an
effect on women’s identity within society given how it “claims the unity of all Jews as
its highest value” and imposes the traditional hierarchical values upon society as a
whole. It is striking to note then how even Amira Dotan, the first female brigadier-
general of the IDF, accepts that women’s place in society is part of this Israeli-Jewish
heritage, by endorsing the fact that the primary role of the Israeli-Jewish-woman if that
of a “mother [at] the centre of the family” (Rabinovich, 1988: 140). Dotan further
believes that sending women into combat goes against this common heritage and should
not be advocated for (Ibid: 140). For her then, the biological differences between men
and women determines what each is required to do in order to obtain recognition: men
fight and women mother.

39. 38
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has added a further dimension towards the importance of
Jewish women maintaining a high birth rate. The demographic imbalance between Jews
and Muslim-Arabs, both within the state and in the wider region, amplifies the need for
raising large families and underscores that birth is not only a citizenship conferring
duty, but is a woman’s “national mission” (Berkovitch, 1997). Consequently, while men
protect the Jewish state by fending off its adversaries, women birth and nurture so that
Jews remain the majority within the territorial confines of the state; women shield the
state from within (Berkovitch, 1997; Shafir & Peled, 2002: 96-97). Thus, the fear that
Jews could become a minority within the state has fuelled policies that enable women to
raise large families without straining the family economy24
; the so called ‘battle of the
cribs’ pits Jewish women against their Muslim-Palestinian counterparts (Shafir & Peled,
2002: 97). It is paramount then for the survival of Israel, as a Jewish state, for Jews to
be the majority, given that becoming a minority will compromise the states character.
Consequently, Israeli identity has come about through the interplay between both a
universalistic and particularistic account of belonging. Though the former should have
been open, the exclusion of Israeli Arabs highlights how only a certain individual was
welcome within the state. Likewise, the particularistic religious dimension heightened
this exclusion by imbuing citizenship with Judaism, forcing those that did not ascribe to
this outside the body politic. Meanwhile, it can be understood that a women’s identity
within the state of Israel has been constructed as that as a mother. This formulation can
once again be attributed to the gendered nature of citizenship, coupled with the
prevailing power of the military and religious establishments. The sexual division
advocated by republicanism sees each gender as having a particular role to play within
24
Chapter 2: Economic Rights p. 31.

40. 39
the state, rewarding male participation above that of women. Likewise, the ability of
women to skip the draft underlines that their contribution towards the state is not that of
a fighter but that of a child bearer. Meanwhile, the religious establishment altered the
secular conception of citizenship and linked its meaning to a profession of the Jewish
faith. This imposed the traditional male domination of women and expected these to
comply with their traditional role as mothers at the “centre of the family” (Rabinovich,
1988: 140). Coupled with this, the numerical inferiority of Jews demands a high birth
rate so as to ensure that these do not become a minority within the state of Israel.

41. 40
CHAPTER 5: WOMEN IN COMBAT
This brief, but important chapter looks at the effect the inclusion of women in combat
has had on their role in society. It argues that enabling women to bear arms has not
drastically altered their position in society for two reasons. First, the gendered nature of
the IDF has resulted in women appropriating this masculinity as their own and
subsequently accepting it as that which enables qualifications for membership.
Secondly, combat endows men, not women, with the necessary civic virtue given that
republicanism understands this as the domain of men and believes women attain virtue
through their role as mothers.
One of the main ideas put forward throughout this paper is that the Israeli republican
ethos of citizenship understands the fulfilment of military duty, explicitly combat, as
that which grants individuals full access to the privileges and honours awarded by the
state. Therefore, the opening of combat positions to women, should have resulted,
according to the universalistic republican discourse, in a positive change for their social
position. Golan (1997: 582) notes how the inclusion of women into the Israeli Borders
Guards in 1996 was, at the time, hailed as a break-through in the advancement of
women’s attainment of “combat or combat-like positions”. However, while women’s
previous inclusion in the police force had done little to improve their “image and
status”, it was unlikely that their entrance into the Border Guards would radically alter
this. Nonetheless, regardless if no actual change came about, the breaking of this mental
barrier had to be seen as the first step towards equality (Ibid: 582). Furthermore, given
the high emphasis the state of Israel has traditionally placed on security, the availability
of combat positions for women has to be understood as a necessary precondition for

42. 41
their attainment of equal citizenship. Therefore, improvements in women’s role within
society were unlikely to come about until it was acknowledged that women were fit to
fight; only by reconceptualising the role of women in society could these highlight their
precarious position vis-à-vis men. Excluding women indefinitely would have furthered
the idea that their role within society was that of a “subsidiary” (Ibid: 582); one who
does not actively participate in the state and requires others for her protection.
Sasson-Levy’s (2003: 440) study highlights how women who have enlisted in combat
roles are likely to reshape their gender identity to mimic that of the “hegemonic
masculine soldiers” so as to better fit into the IDF. Furthermore, women soldiers tend to
end up imitating “[male] combat soldiers discursive and bodily practices, distanc[e]
[themselves] from ‘traditional femininity’ and trivialis[e] sexual harassment”; their
inclusion does not change the gendered nature of the IDF but reinforces its masculinity.
Consequently, integration not only makes women behave more like men but results in
these unknowingly appropriating “the masculine republican ethos” as their own. By
internalising this, women are accepting two points: first they consent to the idea that
each person’s place within society is intricately linked to their role and involvement
within the IDF. Secondly, these agree to the gendered nature of republican citizenship,
which conceptualises duty as being sex dependent25
. Therefore, by not challenging this
military construction, female soldiers are implicitly accepting the barriers that serve to
hinder all women. Furthermore, while women can, and do26
, acquire power through the
IDF, this is limited to the barracks. Once these move out into the civilian sphere they
lose all that which they have fought to attain27
. As a result of this, while involvement in
25
Chapter 4: Women’s Identity and its creation p.29.
26
Chapter 1: Women’s Participation in the Labour Market p. 13.
27
Ibid.; p.13-14.

43. 42
the military, but most notably in combat, awards men the necessary civic virtue to thrive
in the civilian world, this mechanism does not apply equally to women. Therefore, the
idea that the fulfilment of duties is what awards one rights, regardless of gender, race or
ability, is a fallacy given that only a certain kind of Jewish individual, he who meets the
Ashkenazi ideal28
, manages to reap these rewards. Furthermore, while the inclusion of
women in combat has had the ability to both “integrate…and empower” women
(Sasson-Levy, 2003: 460), it has not resulted in these being awarded equality either
within the institution itself and in society as a whole. This inability to realise change is
linked both to the gendered nature of the IDF and citizenship itself. Mere inclusion does
not make for equality. For Sasson-Levy (Ibid: 461) then, the militaristic nature of the
Israeli state, which has equated ‘good citizenship’ with the completion of one’s military
service, is the key road block preventing women from advancing their rights in society.
Thus, only through a wholescale restructuring of the meaning of citizenship, so as to not
favour one sex over another, can women truly become equal members of the
community. Nonetheless, this is unlikely to come about until the conflict with the
Palestinians is resolved (Ibid: 461) and Israel no longer feels that it faces an existential
threat.
28
Chapter 4: Universalistic Republican Citizenship p. 20.

44. 43
CONCLUSION
This dissertation has investigated how the construction of citizenship in Israel has
served to create women’s position within Israeli society as that of mothers. This work
concludes that Israeli women are understood as mothers through a threefold process
involving both the gendered nature of citizenship and the IDF while being
supplemented through the chauvinistic-ness of Judaism. Meanwhile, even though it has
been noted that the incorporation of women in combat roles has not greatly altered the
gendered nature of the IDF, the study which this dissertation draws on was published in
2003 and may have become outdated. Therefore, it would merit further investigation to
explore if the ongoing integration of males and female combat recruits, coupled with the
ability of women to climb the ranks has served to alter the nature of the IDF.
Republicanism contends that to be a true member of the polity individuals need to
partake in the upkeep of the state through the completion of duties. By fulfilling these
duties, individuals are granted access to membership and subsequently bestowed rights
and privileges. Republicanism is however not a neutral citizenship discourse, but claims
that each gender has a role to play in the maintenance of the state. This division is
inherently unequal given how the responsibility awarded to men, as protectors of the
realm, is considered to be greater than that given to women, as mother of the nation.
Furthermore, by equating citizenship with military participation, women become
automatically excluded. Consequently, even though the republican nature of the Israeli
state was meant to enable anyone who wished to make Israel their home the ability to
acquire citizenship, women have not been equally included given the gendered nature of
this status. Furthermore, the recent inclusion of women in combat has not, as of yet,

45. 44
radically transformed their role given that their presence has not altered the masculine
ethos which underpins the IDF. Inclusion without structural transformation cannot bring
about change.
Meanwhile, Israeli women are further hindered in their quest for equal citizenship status
as a result of the security dilemma faced by Israel and the religious nature of the state.
Israel’s precarious security situation at the eve of its birth paved the way for the rise of a
militaristic culture which has percolated into all layers of society and become the
accepted norm: security trumps all other considerations. Consequently, through the
application of the republican ethos it has been assumed that the best way to protect the
realm is through the fulfilment of gender specific roles. Yet, while women have been
included in the IDF, this has been done so as to allow more men to take up combat
positions. Furthermore, women’s draft is geared in such a way that upon termination
these are ready to progress into their preordained role as mothers. Moreover, while the
founding fathers of Israel wished to imbue the new state with a republican aura, they
were adamant that for the national project to succeed the archaic notions of Judaism
needed to be side-lined. However, the decision to allow for religious law to remain as
that which decided matters of marriage and divorce, showed that this side-lining of
religion was only to be taken up in the public sphere, not the private domain of women.
Consequently, Jewish values which place a strong emphasis on familial ties and
presuppose that a woman’s place is that of a mother have remained unaltered.
Therefore, unless these three forces are challenged and structurally adjusted so as to be
more inclusive women’s role within Israel will remain unchanged.

46. 45
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51. 50
APPENDIX A:
Sections of the Israeli Defence Services Law that enable the exemptions
given to women as mothers
Israeli Defence Service Law:
- "person of military age" means an ordinary resident of an age as specified
hereunder:
o (a) in the case of a male person -- any age from eighteen to forty-nine
years inclusive;
o (b) in the case of a female person -- any age from eighteen to thirty-four
years inclusive.
- A calling-up officer may, by order, call upon:
o 1) a male of military age who has been found fit for service and is of any
age from eighteen years to twenty-nine years inclusive, and
o (2) a female person of military age who has been found fit for service
and who is of any age from eighteen years to twenty-six years inclusive.
- b) A male person of military age who has been called upon to report for regular
service under subsection (a), shall be liable to regular service -
o (1) if he was called upon to report for regular service while being of any
age from eighteen years to twenty-six years inclusive -- for a period of
twenty-four months;
o (2) if he was called upon to report for regular service while being of any
age from twenty-seven years to twenty-nine years inclusive - for a period
of eighteen months.
o (c) A female person of military age who has been called upon to report
for regular service under subsection (a) shall be liable to regular service
for a period of twelve months.
- (a) A person of military age who has been found fit for service and who is not
serving on regular service, shall belong to the Reserve Forces of the Defence
Army of Israel and shall be liable to reserve service as specified hereunder:
o (1) in the case of a male person of any age from eighteen years to thirty-
nine years inclusive, and in the case of a female person of any age from
eighteen years to thirty-four years inclusive - for a period not exceeding
thirty-one consecutive days of service each year plus one day of service
each month; provided that such day shall not fall on a Sabbath or Jewish
religious holiday;
- The following persons shall be exempt from the obligations of defence service:
o (1) the mother of a child;
o (2) a pregnant woman.
o (c) A married woman shall be exempt from the obligations of regular
service.
o (d) A female person of military age who has declared that reasons of
conscience or religious conviction prevent her from serving on defence

52. 51
service, shall, in such manner as shall be prescribed by regulations, be
exempted from the obligations of defence service.
Statutory exemption
from service
39. (a) The following persons shall be exempt from the duty of
defence service -
(1) the mother of a child;
(2) a pregnant woman.
(b) A married woman shall be exempt from the duty of regular
service.
(c) A female person of military age who has proved, in such
manner and t such authority as shall be prescribed by regulations,
that reasons of conscience o reasons connected with her family's
religious way of life prevent her from serving in defence service
shall be exempt from the duty of that service.
(d) A female person of military age who considers herself
aggrieved by decision of an authority as referred to in subsection
(c) may, on such conditions an in such manner as shall be
prescribed by regulations, object thereto before an objection
committee appointed by the Minister of Defence.
(e) The objection committee shall not be bound by rules of
procedure or rules of evidence but shall act as it deems most
expedient for the clarification of the questions to be decided by
it.
Exemption for
reasons of religious
conviction
40. A female person designated for defence service who declares
in writing under section 15 of the Evidence Ordinance (New
Version), 5731-1971[13], before a judge (shofet, i.e. a judge of a
civil court - Tr.) or a judge of a rabbinical court (dayan)(1) that
reasons of religious conviction prevent her from serving in
defence service and
(2) that she observes the dietary laws at home and away from
home and
(3) that she does not ride on the Sabbath shall be exempt from
defence service after delivering the affidavit, in the manner and
at the time prescribed by regulations, to a calling-up office
empowered in that behalf.
(Defense Services Law, 2007: Online)