1. I
read
with
interest
that
Paul
Allen
was
inducted
into
the
New
Mexico
Museum
of
Space
History’s
International
Space
Hall
of
Fame
late
last
year.
Another
person
of
similar
great
significance
in
world
history
was
also
inducted
at
the
same
time.
His
name
is
John
C.
Houbolt
of
NASA.
On
the
next
couple
of
pages
I
put
together a bit of text together about
what
Mr.
Houbolt
accomplished
despite
the
opposition
of
his
peers
and
superiors.
Mr.
Houbolt
exhibited
great
“creative
defiance”
that
would
have
been
appreciated
by
David
Packard
of
Hewlett
Packard
fame.
I
have
experienced
bouts
of
“technological
enthusiasm”
similar
to
what
John
C.
Houbolt
experienced.
Thus
enthused,
I
instigated
many
“chain
reactions”
with
immense
positive
impacts
on
Boeing’s
supply
chain
and
future
products.
Some
due
to
speed
I
enabled
and
some
due
to
Boeing
trade
secrets
where
I
played
a
key
role
to
cause
them
to
come
into
being
far
more
valuable
to
the
company
than
otherwise
would
have
happened.
One
time
I
even
helped
Boeing
win
a
$
400
million
defense
contract
because
I
catalyzed
a
conversation
between
two
people
that
was
not
going
to
happen
otherwise.
It
was
a
contract
that
Boeing
had
no
chance
of
winning
unless
something
different
happened.
Yet
what
I
instigated
was
the
difference
that
caused
that
win.
I
was
not
any
smarter
than
other
people.
I
just
saw
(and
see)
reality
different
than
other
smart
people.
I
see
the
“gap”
between
the
functioning
of
the
status
quo
and
what
is
truly
possible.
And
I
have
a
mindset
that
lets
me
be
just
a
little
less
“stuck”
than
other
people
and
the
human-based
systems
that
exist
in
the
world
today.
From
“Engineers
of
Victory”
by
Paul
Kennedy
(2012):
In
sum,
the
winning
of
great
wars
always
require
superior
organization,
and
that
in
turn
requires
people
who
can
run
those
organizations,
not
in
a
blinkered
way
but
most
competently
and
in
a
fashion
that
will
allow
outsiders
to
feed
fresh
ideas
into
the
pursuit
of
victory.
None
of
this
can
be
done
by
the
chiefs
alone,
however
great
their
genius,
however
massive
their
energy.
There
has
to
be
a
support
system,
a
culture
of
encouragement,
efficient
feedback
loops,
a
capacity
to
learn
from
setback,
an
ability
to
get
things
done.
And
all
this
must
be
done
in
a
fashion
that
is
better
than
the
enemy’s.
That
is
how
wars
are
won.”
In
the
same
book
there
is
also
the
quote
“Wars
are
auditors
of
institutions”.
There
are significant
amounts of "war"
going
on
right
now
in the world that
gets in the way of
human potential. I am
instigating a response to that "war". And in the process "Rescue Genius".
Just as Leo Szilard did,
the physicist who first understood the possiblity of nuclear chain reaction. He “rescued genius”
was using the royalties from a joint patent (issued in the 1950s for a commercial biological
process he invented) in a novel and altruistic way (and Szilard was not a rich man!). That money
was used to bribe Hungarian and Austrian border guards to get scientists and their families out
from behind the Iron Curtain and into the West. Szilard had no definite plans for their genius. He
just knew that such people could provide far more value and good to humanity in the West than
in the Communist Bloc of countries when they were given "freedom for excellence".
From: http://www.leadershipnow.com/leadingblog/2012/06/innovation_at_bell_labs.html
“John
Pierce
is
one
of
the
brilliant
and
interesting
people
we
are
introduced
to
in
Gertner’s
story.
It
was
Pierce
that
suggested
calling
the
new
device
of
1947
a
transistor.
Pierce
was
what
Gertner
calls
an
instigator.
“An
instigator
is
different
from
a
genius,
but
just
as
uncommon.
An
instigator
is
different,
too,
from
the
most
skillful
manager,
someone
able
to
wrest
excellence
out
of
people
who
might
otherwise
fall
short.”
Pierce’s
real
talent
was
“in
getting
people
interested
in
something
that
hadn’t
really
occurred
to
them
before.”
I
am
an
instigator.
And
then
I
cause
action
to
result.

2. Saving
$
20
Billion
US
in
1960’s
Dollars.
People
Do
Have
These
Level
Of
Ideas!
Page
1
of
2
As
an
example
where
innovation
was
almost
thwarted
by
very
smart
people,
consider
this
story
about
the
US
effort
to
put
the
man
on
the
moon.
From
the
magazine
Spaceflight,
August
2014
in
an
article
about
John
C.
Houbolt:
“When
the
NACA
became
NASA
on
the
1
October
1958,
many
throughout
the
agency
turned
to
thoughts
of
space
exploration.
However,
a
group
within
the
Theoretical
Mechanics
Division
at
Langley
ignored
the
general
focus
on
a
manned
space
station
and
began
to
think
about
flights
to
the
moon.
Led
by
Clinton
E.
Brown,
a
small
team
including
Houbolt,
bulled
up
on
orbital
mechanics.
Their
reference
was
a
book
titled
An
Introduction
to
Celestial
Mechanics
written
in
1914
by
the
British
Astronomer
Forrest
R.
Moulton.
Building
on
Moulton’s
work
they
quickly
developed
trajectories
and
wrestled
with
spherical
trigonometry
to
perfect
optimum
flight
paths
to
the
Moo.
First
assembled
in
1959,
the
group
was
joined
by
English
mathematician
Leonard
Roberts.
Houbolt
honed
his
knowledge
of
orbital
rendezvous
for
a
paper
by
Bill
Michael
on
the
advantages
of
parking
a
spacecraft
in
Moon
orbit
while
a
small
lander
went
down
to
the
surface,
calculating
that
a
50%
saving
in
weight
could
be
obtained
by
this
technique.
Thus
was
born
the
idea
of
Lunar
Orbit
Rendezvous
(LOR).
Over
the
next
two
years
John
Houbolt
was
to
turn
this
into
a
personal
crusade,
campaigning
against
strong
opposition
for
what
he
believed
was
the
only
sensible
way
to
put
people
on
the
surface
of
the
Moon……
When
President
Kennedy
formally
challenged
NASA
to
put
man
on
the
Moon
by
the
end
of
1969,
the
von
Braun
paradigm
was
set
–
it
would,
many
thought,
be
achieved
through
the
multiple
use
of
Saturn
rockets
assembling
in
Earth
orbit
the
giant
rocket
which
would
carry
astronauts
to
the
Moon.
All
that
began
to
change
when
Houbolt,
seeing
the
frustration
of
having
his
concept
of
a
single
launch
bypassed,
appealed
directly
to
NASA
associate
Administrator
Robert
Seamans,
cautioning
him
that
`It
is
conceivable
that
after
reading
this
you
may
feel
you
are
dealing
with
a
crank.
Do
not
be
afraid
of
this.
The
important
point
is
that
you
hear
the
ideas
directly,
not
after
they
have
been
filtered
through
a
score
or
more
of
other
people,
with
the
attendant
risk
that
they
may
not
even
reach
you`.
Seamans
listened
and
began
to
dig.
In
the
furor
that
followed,
Houbolt
was
challenged
by
some
of
the
greatest
space
engineers
of
the
day.;
‘His
figures
lie’,
said
Max
Faget,
the
design
genius
behind
Gemini,
Mercury,
and
Apollo,
while
another
colleague
from
Langley
claimed
`He
doesn’t
know
what
he
is
talking
about`.
Gradually,
the
arguments
tipped
in
favor
of
Houbolt’s
LOR
concept.
Without
his
stoic
determination
and
sheer
stubbornness,
it
is
highly
likely
the
method
chosen
for
reaching
the
Moon
would
have
been
the
more
protracted,
dangerous,
and
costly
one
of
Earth
Orbit
Rendezvous.
In
July
1962
von
Braun
came
round
to
Houbolt’s
idea
and
placed
his
faith
in
a
single
Saturn
V
with
two
separate
spacecraft
–
one
for
Moon
orbit,
the
other
to
fly
down
to
the
surface.”
Later
in
the
article:
“Of
all
the
awards
and
accolades
Houbolt
received
over
the
decades,
in
his
own
quiet
way
the
one
he
probably
cherished
the
most
was
when
he
was
personally
invited
to
Mission
Control
by
Werner
von
Braun
for
the
splashdown
of
Apollo
11.
On
completion
of
the
first
Moon
landing
mission,
von
Braun
turned
to
Houbolt
and
said
three
deeply
significant
words:
“Thank
you
John”.

3. Saving
$
20
Billion
US
in
1960’s
Dollars.
People
Do
Have
These
Level
Of
Ideas!
Page
2
of
2
Without
his
perseverance
and
tenacity,
it
is
doubtful
that
NASA
would
have
made
it
to
the
Moon
by
the
end
of
the
1960s.
John
Houbolt
died
on
April
15,
2014
at
Scarborough,
Maine.
Read:
http://www.nasa.gov/content/john-­‐c-­‐houbolt-­‐unsung-­‐hero-­‐of-­‐the-­‐apollo-­‐program-­‐dies-­‐
at-­‐age-­‐95/
http://history.nasa.gov/monograph4.pdf
“By
the
early
summer
months
of
1960,
when
the
Lunar
Mission
Steering
Group
first
began
holding
meetings,
Houbolt
already
had
discovered
the
advantages
of
a
lunar
landing
mission
via
lunar-­‐
orbit
rendezvous.
Intellectually
and
emotionally,
he
had
embraced
the
concept
as
his
own.
Sometime
during
the
previous
months,
while
performing
"back-­‐of-­‐
the-­‐
envelope"-­‐type
calculations
to
confirm
how
much
less
rocket-­‐boosting
power
NASA
would
require
if
it
went
to
the
Moon
via
lunar-­‐orbit
rendezvous,
the
Langley
engineer
had
experienced
a
powerful
technological
enthusiasm
akin
to
a
religious
experience.
Three
years
later,
in
a
1963
article,
he
described
what
happened:
"Almost
simultaneously,
it
became
clear
that
lunar
orbit
rendezvous
offered
a
chain
reaction
simplification
on
all
‘back
effects':
development,
testing,
manufacturing,
erection,
countdown,
flight
operations,
etc."
Inside
his
head,
everything
"clicked"—
"all
would
be
simplified."
Everything
about
a
manned
lunar
landing
would
be
made
much
easier.
"This
is
fantastic,"
he
thought
to
himself.
"If
there
is
any
idea
we
have
to
push,
it
is
this
one!"
In
this
moment
of
revealed
truth
arose
an
ardent
resolve:
"I
vowed
to
dedicate
myself
to
the
task."
From
that
moment
on,
until
NASA's
selection
of
the
mission
mode
for
Project
Apollo
in
July
1962,
Houbolt
proved
to
be
NASA's
most
dedicated,
active,
eloquent,
stubborn,
and
informed
crusader
for
what
came
to
he
known
as
"the
LOR
concept."
Houbolt's
biggest
complaint
was
against
the
bureaucratic
guidelines
that
had
made
it
impossible
for
the
Heaton
Committee
to
consider
the
merits
of
LOR.
"This
is
to
me
nonsense,"
he
stated
frankly.
"I
feel
very
fortunate
that
I
do
not
have
to
confine
my
thinking
to
arbitrarily
set
up
ground
rules
which
only
serve
to
constrain
and
preclude
possible
equally
good
or
perhaps
better
approaches."
Too
often,
he
declared,
NASA
has
been
narrowly
circumscribing
its
thinking:
While
at
the
AGARD
meeting
in
Paris,
Garrick
noticed
a
little
blurb
in
the
overseas
edition
of
the
New
York
Herald
Tribune
about
NASA's
decision
to
proceed
with
LOR.
Garrick
showed
the
paper
to
Houbolt,
who
had
not
seen
it,
shook
Houbolt's
hand,
and
said,
"Congratulations,
John.
They've
adopted
your
scheme.
I
can
safely
say
I'm
shaking
hands
with
the
man
who
single-­‐handedly
saved
the
government
$20
billion."
Note!
This
was
in
1960’s
dollars!
But
what
is
far
more
important
that
the
money
saved
with
the
fact
the
tremendous
amounts
of
Apollo
program
risk
and
technical
risk
were
eliminated
by
adopting
Houbolt’’s
approach!
Any
number
of
setbacks
in
the
Apollo
program
could
have
resulted
in
its
termination
because
some
members
of
Congress
were
questioning
the
cost.
Alternatives
to
Houbolt’s
approach
were
far
riskier!
And far more
expensive. He
didn’t
give
up!
Despite opposition. And
thus
we
landed
on
the
moon!