1.
Politics
Beyond
Perception
Julien
F.
Thomas
Sandberg
Instituut:
Designing
Democracy

2. 1
Contents
4
Introduction
8
The
Performance
of
Politics
12
Metaphorical
Bases
of
Thought
17
Affordances:
Between
Concept
and
Action
22
From
Language
to
Embodiment
27
Conclusion
29
In
Gratitude
30
Works
Cited

3. 2

4. 3
Conversation
Balance,
2016

5. 4
Introduction
This
dissertation
plots
an
exploration
into
the
nature
of
political
agency.
Is
a
rock
political,
or
a
wave?
Can
agency
exist
apart
from
our
comprehension
–
intimately
felt,
but
removed
from
intellect?
Can
gravity
be
political?
I
propose
that
agency
can
be
found
across
a
spectrum
of
human
experience
and
expression,
and
perhaps
beyond.
Beyond
laws,
policies,
and
rhetoric,
politics
can
be
experienced
prior
to
human
cognition,
and
such
experiences
fundamentally
prime,
frame,
and
influence
our
overt
political
lives.
I
argue
that
political
opportunities
lie
amongst
the
relations
that
exist
in
between.
From
theory
to
metaphor,
words,
actions,
and
the
edges
of
human
perception,
political
agency
interlaces,
reverberates,
and
emanates.
Such
an
approach
to
agency
acknowledges
the
latent
potential
for
political
expression
to
emerge
from
multiple
modes
of
human
existence.
I
believe
that
if
we
can
appreciate
the
political
opportunities
of
a
color,
a
shape,
a
texture,
or
a
sound,
we
can
widen
our
expectation
of
the
possible,
not
just
in
conventional
political
terms,
but
also
in
the
emergence
and
recurrence
of
the
everyday
as
political.
The
task
is
not
only
to
perceive
political
agency
in
new
and
expanded
ways,
but
to
also
acknowledge
the
limits
of
perceiving
things
as
political.
In
acknowledging
politics
beyond
perception,
we
can
anticipate
and
imagine
those
aspects
of
agency
that
lie
over
the
horizon
of
human
cognition
and
intellect.
A
political
agency
intimately
experienced
yet
beyond
cognition,
is
every
bit
as
real
as
our
conventional
political
practices.
If
we
can
venture
into
this
territory,
we
may

6. 5
better
understand
the
nature
of
politics
as
an
intensely
personal
experience
that
is
inextricably
tied
to
our
lives
and
the
world
in
its
myriad
forms.
I
propose
that
such
an
approach
allows
an
ethics
to
begin
to
form,
to
show
itself
when
we
observe
and
sense
the
emergence
of
agency
in
human
relations.
This
approach
could
inspire
a
different
politics:
an
alternative
entry
point
into
current
affairs;
an
appreciation
of
the
seemingly
mundane
as
political;
or
an
awareness
of
embodied
movement
as
political
expression.
The
opportunities
are
multiple
and
multivalent.
One
of
the
goals
of
this
dissertation
is
to
develop
a
richer
understanding
of
what
it
means
to
enact
political
agency,
and
furthermore,
to
contribute
practical
examples
of
how
objects
can
drive
experiences
that
feed
back
into
the
theory
and
practice
of
politics.
Through
my
research,
I’ve
been
drawn
to
the
notion
that
objects
can
provide
multiple
entry
points
for
exploring
the
nature
of
political
agency.
Objects
exist
in
both
physical
and
conceptual
form,
and
their
use
provides
possibilities
for
expanded
thought
and
action.
As
a
shovel
enables
its’
user
to
transform
physical
environments
through
tactile
manipulation,
it
also
initiates
metaphorical
capacities
for
understanding
the
world
anew.
For
without
the
shovel
we
could
not
dig
into
issues,
unearth
the
new,
and
bury
the
old.
In
this
way,
as
one
acts
upon
the
world
with
an
object,
the
object
in
turn
acts
upon
the
user,
and
new
ways
of
behaving,
conceiving,
and
acting
open
out
of
the
relationship
between
the
two.
As
experiential
drivers
that
allow
us
to
embody
and
perform
certain
physical
gestures,
speculative
scenarios,
and
abstract
concepts,
objects
can
facilitate
multiple
expressions
of
acting
in
the
world.

7. 6
In
order
to
explore
a
rich
terrain
of
political
agency
through
objects,
I
seek
to
expand
their
conceivable
application.
Reconceiving
objects
towards
new
applications
may
allow
for
users
to
land
in
a
contingent
space
where
alternative
expressions
emerge,
unexpected.
In
order
to
achieve
this,
we
must
delay
the
articulation
of
an
object’s
utility,
and
allow
new
uses
to
arise.
While
necessity
is
often
cited
as
the
mother
of
invention,
I
propose
that
the
most
influential
inventions
predicate
new
necessities,
relations,
and
realities
to
emerge.
By
pushing
the
application
of
an
object
into
tentative
situations,
a
wide
array
of
political
agency
may
be
uncovered
and
enacted,
and
political
relations
may
be
seen
anew.
To
apply
objects
as
metaphors
and
interfaces
for
political
agency,
this
dissertation
investigates
the
development
of
a
specific
object:
a
platform
480
centimetres
in
diameter
and
50
centimetres
in
height,
with
a
curved
and
unstable
bottom.
Four
to
eight
people,
when
standing
on
the
platform,
are
instantly
implicated
in
negotiating
the
physical
dynamics
of
movement.
While
body
language
is
ever-­‐present
in
interpersonal
communication,
the
weight
of
a
gesture
often
carries
less
impact
than
words.
On
the
platform,
the
situation
is
redrawn
and
body
language
may
gain
prominence.
By
providing
an
alternative
scenario
where
movement,
speed,
and
weight
become
raw
materials
for
inter-­‐subjective
communication,
the
platform
acts
as
a
point
of
departure
towards
a
politics
of
embodied
expression.
If
political
agency
exists
across
a
spectrum
of
experience,
then
a
dissertation
exploring
its
nature
should
be
elaborated
from
various
points
along
that
spectrum.
In
order
to
accomplish
such
a
task,
this
inquiry
traverses

8. 7
several
domains
of
knowledge
including
political
theory,
conceptions
of
metaphor,
and
philosophies
of
perception.
I’ve
chosen
to
address
agency
from
academic,
and
experiential
points
of
view
in
an
effort
to
find
ways
for
the
platform
to
become
relevant
for
politics
today.
I
believe
that
applied
research
is
crucial
in
finding
new
ways
for
civil
servants,
politicians,
and
citizens
to
enact
alternative
political
relationships,
and
through
this
thesis
I
advocate
for
a
method
based
on
object-­‐based
performance,
expression,
and
discovery.
I
begin
the
dissertation
from
an
academic
standpoint,
by
plotting
key
points
of
agonistic
political
philosophy
as
developed
by
Chantal
Mouffe.
In
particular,
Mouffe’s
ideas
of
hegemony
provide
a
valuable
basis
for
discussing
the
performative
dynamic
of
politics.
Through
Lakoff
and
Johnson,
I
move
to
introduce
the
centrality
of
metaphor
to
conceptual
thought,
in
order
to
locate
the
linguistic
mechanisms
by
which
politics
becomes
performed.
After
examining
metaphor,
I
discuss
the
concept
of
affordances
to
explain
how
the
platform
could
facilitate
new
expressions
of
agency
by
remixing
metaphorical
definitions
of
the
world.
Finally
I
draw
upon
the
work
of
Brian
Massumi
to
step
away
from
linguistic
articulations
of
politics,
and
to
consider
how
embodiment
and
movement
can
become
a
key
driver
for
new
experiences
of
affect.
Rather
than
a
linear
sequence
of
inquiry,
I
see
these
sections
as
steps
leading
ever-­‐deeper
into
an
exploration
of
what
it
means
to
act
politically.
Politics
exists
in
theory,
in
metaphor,
and
in
movement.
To
pursue
several
levels
of
analysis
is
to
stitch
a
more
complete
picture
of
the
political
basis
of
human
experience.

9. 8
Chantal
Mouffe
and
the
Performance
of
Politics
I
embark
with
theories
of
agonistic
politics,
as
proposed
by
Chantal
Mouffe.
Mouffe’s
work
has
proven
popular
in
not
only
diagnosing
the
current
malaise
of
democratic
politics,
but
also
in
proposing
compelling
ways
of
relating
to
conflict
and
cooperation.
Her
theories
are
a
combination
of
realism
(acknowledging
the
fundamental
basis
of
conflict
in
society)
and
idealism
(arguing
for
institutions
that
facilitate
collaboration)
that
hold
widespread
appeal.
She
further
manages
to
concoct
an
enticing
blend
of
democratic
radicalism,
radical
both
in
the
sense
of
working
at
the
root
of
human
identities
and
desires,
and
also
in
the
consequences
her
work
has
for
the
role
of
institutions
and
political
actors.
I
find
her
work
particularly
important
in
developing
interpretations
of
politics
that
acknowledge
conflict
yet
seek
cooperation.
I
explore
the
performative
qualities
of
political
expression
through
Mouffe’s
theory
of
agonistic
politics,
and
the
specific
role
that
hegemony
plays
in
imbuing
our
acts
with
political
weight.
Overt
political
engagement
encompasses
many
expressions,
from
voting
and
advocacy,
to
protest,
terrorism,
and
the
intentional
acceleration
of
socio-­‐political
systems.
Some
of
these
expressions
are
more
or
less
accepted,
more
or
less
expedient,
with
their
effectiveness
depending
upon
a
variety
of
factors.
Yet
all
forms
of
agency
hold
performative
qualities
that
influence
their
potential
impact.
Whether
it
be
a
politician’s
demeanor,
a
theorist’s
approach,
or
an
artist’s
palette,
all
are
infused
with
qualitative
dimensions
of
performance
that
carry
consequence,
such
as
the
ineffable
personality
traits
of
a

10. 9
politician
that
engenders
trust,
or
the
stylistic
gestures
of
an
artist
that
attracts
a
following.
For
Mouffe
politics
is
tied
up
with
identity,
and
cannot
avoid
engaging
with
conflict.
She
suggests
that
all
identities
are
defined
according
to
difference
–
for
an
‘I’
to
exist,
there
must
be
an
understanding
of
a
‘you’
that
stands
in
contrast.
For
group
identities
to
develop
–
for
an
‘I’
to
identify
with
an
‘us’
–
individuals
must
also
foster
emotional
ties
and
collective
bonds
in
relation
to
a
‘them.’
Since
identities
are
built
upon
conceptions
of
otherness,
they
require
the
exclusion
of
some
over
others,
and
cannot
but
remain
conflictual.
Mouffe
argues
that
current
forms
of
democratic
politics
address
this
basic
dynamic
of
identity
and
conflict
in
destructive
terms,
either
ignoring
it
or
exacerbating
it
through
exclusionary
policies.
She
suggests
that
current
political
institutions
are
therefore
anti-­‐political
in
their
aims,
and
either
lead
to
disaffected
or
enraged
citizens,
not
unlike
in
today’s
situation.
In
contrast,
Mouffe
argues
that
the
true
goal
of
democratic
institutions
should
be
to
transform
constituents’
passions
into
acts
that
acknowledge
the
fundamental
conflictual
nature
of
society,
and
to
seek
constructive
agreement
among
conflicting
parties
(Mouffe,
2005).
Mouffe
asserts
that
hegemonic
regimes
are
central
in
the
process
of
transforming
constituents’
identities,
needs,
and
desires
into
legitimate
democratic
acts.
According
to
Mouffe,
every
social
order
is
unavoidably
predicated
upon
‘hegemonies,’
politically
structured
worldviews
that
are
presented
as
universally
valid,
and
that
define
the
meaning
and
role
of
social
institutions.
These
worldviews
extol
certain
political
logics
and
symbolisms,
thereby
condoning
or
denying
citizens’
expressions
according
to
certain
social

11. 10
and
political
forces.
It
is
through
this
hegemonic
structuring
that
passions
can
be
harnessed
or
squandered.
In
light
of
the
unavoidably
central
role
played
by
hegemony,
Mouffe
proposes
that
the
true
task
of
political
agents
lies
in
what
she
terms
‘hegemonic
interventions,’
translating
constituents’
passions
into
political
expressions
that
are
coherent
with
alternative
hegemonic
regimes
which
constructively
address
conflict
(Mouffe,
2005,
2013).
In
probing
for
expanded
notions
of
political
agency,
the
potential
of
Mouffe’s
approach
lies
in
the
continuous
performance
of
hegemony.
Hegemonic
articulations
rely
on
a
constant
process
of
re-­‐articulating
existing
discourses
and
practices
in
order
to
maintain
coherence
within
a
regime.
By
this
performative
nature,
hegemonic
regimes
are
both
temporary
and
precarious
(Mouffe,
2013).
The
constant
articulation
of
power
allows
for
re-­‐interpretations
of
the
meaning
and
role
of
social
institutions
to
become
possible,
and
here
is
where
I
believe
the
performative
qualities
of
political
agency
opening
up
gaps
for
emergence
and
new
expression.
For
new
insights
and
new
meanings
must
surely
enter
the
mix.
Stylized
renditions,
altered
views,
expanded
notions.
Over
time,
reiteration
must
lead
to
qualitative
change,
and
in
this
continuous
performance
the
kernel
of
latent
agency
can
be
found.
The
latent,
stylistic
qualities
of
agency
are
well
explained
through
the
metaphor
of
sport.
When
asked
to
define
football,
one
may
explain
the
rules
of
the
game,
or
elaborate
upon
historical
and
social
factors.
Such
definitions
of
a
sport
can
be
interchanged
for
Mouffe’s
explanation
of
politics,
as
football
also
includes
rituals,
norms,
and
exclusions
of
one
practice
over
another.
Yet
such
definitions
may
struggle
to
explain
the
crucial,
and

12. 11
often
revolutionary
role
of
personal
style
in
football.
Despite
the
rules
–
or
perhaps
in
concert
with
them
–
individual
players
often
express
unique,
stylistic,
symbolic
variations
that
may
come
to
transform
the
game
of
football
altogether.
Individual
traits
such
as
a
slight
twitch
or
hesitation,
while
apparently
arbitrary,
can
contribute
to
one
player
mastering
the
field,
and
may
indeed
influence
the
rules,
the
history,
and
the
social
nature
of
a
sport.
Only
through
the
performance
of
a
sport
can
it
evolve
over
time.
Similarly,
only
through
the
performance
of
politics
can
political
change
arise.
While
Mouffe’s
ideas
may
prove
compelling,
they
remain
speculative
and
beyond
our
physical
grasp.
Her
theories
linger
on
the
page,
waiting
to
be
performed.
The
task
of
realization,
from
political
theory
to
political
reality,
is
a
complex
one
that
often
comes
about
–
if
it
comes
about
at
all
–
through
the
cunning
and
endurance
of
traditional
politics
itself.
Yet
despite
the
generally
held
assumption
of
political
change
through
established
means,
I
believe
that
Mouffe
has
written
an
exit
strategy
into
her
ideas,
specifically
through
the
notion
of
performance.
With
her
conceptions
of
identity,
conflict,
and
hegemonic
articulations,
Mouffe
proposes
a
view
of
politics
that
is
“essentially
unstable
and
requires
constant
displacements
and
renegotiations”
(Mouffe,
2005,
p.
18).
She
holds
that
this
state
of
dynamism
need
not
spell
disaster,
for
if
political
agents
can
reframe
the
task
of
politics
towards
redefining
constituents’
conflicting
needs,
we
may
arrive
at
a
more
realistic
conception
of
democracy,
one
that
is
more
fluid
and
responsive
to
our
needs.
I
begin
to
explore
this
exit
strategy
in
relation
to
the
role
of
metaphor
in
conceptual
thought,
using
the
example
of
how
a
balance
platform
acts
as
a
metaphor
to
Mouffe’s
theories.

13. 12
At
first
glance,
a
balance
platform
and
Chantal
Mouffe’s
theories
of
agonistic
politics
are
fundamentally
connected
through
their
shared
definitions.
Mouffe
suggests
that
politics
requires
“coming
to
terms
with
the
lack
of
a
final
ground….
The
fact
that
every
society
is
the
product
of
a
series
of
practices
attempting
to
establish
order
in
a
context
of
contingency”
(Mouffe,
2005,
p.
17).
Just
as
this
definition
covers
politics
for
Mouffe,
it
surely
describes
an
unstable
platform
that
requires
participants
to
seek
balance.
When
Mouffe
asks
for
a
“symbolic
space
within
which
conflict
takes
place”
(Mouffe,
2005,
p.
21),
the
platform
becomes
a
tentative
response,
an
invitation
to
experience
politics
differently.
The
movements
performed
on
the
platform
thus
become
a
metaphor
for
the
constant
re-­‐articulation
of
hegemony
–
Mouffe’s
conception
of
politics
gains
a
physical
and
experiential
form.
Metaphorical
Bases
of
Thought
Through
the
balance
platform,
an
object
becomes
a
metaphor,
a
thought
experiment
for
concepts
yet
to
be
realized.
The
idea
of
object
as
metaphor
and
conceptual
midwife
may
appear
as
a
novel
development,
perhaps
even
far-­‐fetched.
But
once
the
foundational
aspects
of
metaphor
are
understood
–
the
role
they
play
in
scribing
human
reality
–
object
as
metaphor
appears
as
a
matter
of
course.
In
line
with
George
Lakoff
and
Mark
Johnson
(1980),
I
suggest
that
metaphors
are
the
key
enabling
device
for
human
thought
and
communication.
These
authors
provide
the
example
of
‘argument
is
war’
to
illustrate
how
Western
cultures
apply
metaphorical
notions
of
warfare
to
frame

14. 13
thought
and
action
concerning
arguments.
One
talks
about
defending
a
position,
a
weak
argument,
undermining
an
opponent,
or
attacking
an
idea
–
all
terms
derived
from
the
basic
components
of
physical
warfare.
Not
only
does
the
metaphor
of
‘argument
is
war’
lend
terminology
to
describing
arguments,
it
also
determines
relevant
courses
of
action.
Just
as
it
would
be
inconceivable
to
disclose
one’s
position
on
the
battlefield,
it
would
be
unthinkable
in
an
argument.
In
contrast
to
the
‘argument
is
war’
metaphor,
Lakoff
&
Johnson
provide
an
example
of
a
hypothetical
culture
in
which
argument
is
viewed
as
a
dance:
The
participants
are
seen
as
performers,
and
the
goal
is
to
perform
in
a
balanced
and
aesthetically
pleasing
way.
In
such
a
culture,
people
would
view
arguments
differently,
experience
them
differently,
carry
them
out
differently,
and
talk
about
them
differently.
But
we
would
probably
not
view
them
as
arguing
at
all:
they
would
simply
be
doing
something
different.
It
would
seem
strange
even
to
call
what
they
were
doing
"arguing."
Perhaps
the
most
neutral
way
of
describing
this
difference
between
their
culture
and
ours
would
be
to
say
that
we
have
a
discourse
form
structured
in
terms
of
battle
and
they
have
one
structured
in
terms
of
dance.
(Lakoff
&
Johnson,
1980,
p.
5-­‐6)
While
such
practices
might
seem
absurd
to
those
in
Western
cultures,
the
contrast
allows
one
to
understand
the
extent
to
which
metaphor
determines
reality.
The
authors
define
‘argument
is
war’
as
a
structural
metaphor,
in
that
it
acts
as
a
foundational
marker
for
a
whole
system
of
thought
and
behavior.
These
metaphors
script
our
ideas,
enabling
some
courses
of
action
while
hiding
others.
In
their
ability
to
present
a
coherent
set
of
values,
and
to
open
or
close
certain
avenues
of
agency,
structural
metaphors

15. 14
can
be
likened
to
Chantal
Mouffe’s
idea
of
hegemonic
regimes.
Both
metaphors
and
hegemonies
offer
‘common
sense’
interpretations
of
the
world,
and
one
could
say
that
politics
operates
on
the
level
of
metaphor,
with
political
agents
competing
over
alternative
metaphorical
definitions.
In
understanding
the
construction
of
metaphors,
the
substantial
basis
of
hegemony
may
be
clarified.
Metaphors
are
references,
connectors
that
enable
understanding
of
one
thing
by
comparison
with
another.
Some
of
the
most
basic
and
expansive
metaphors
are
orientational,
in
that
they
organize
a
vast
system
of
concepts
according
to
spatial
orientations
based
on
physical
experience
(Lakoff
&
Johnson,
1980).
Up-­‐down,
forward-­‐back,
left-­‐right,
in-­‐out;
all
are
intimately
felt
by
the
human
body,
and
that
allow
us
to
understand
and
communicate
difference.
Through
metaphorical
construction
we
scaffold
basic
human
experience
into
concepts,
creating
bridges
and
plateaus
on
which
to
make
sense
of
the
world.
Politics
thus
becomes
arranged
according
to
left
and
right;
progress
moves
forward;
and
growth
rises.
In
this
sense,
human
expression
becomes
political
through
mechanisms
of
metaphor.
Beyond
bodily
orientations,
Lakoff
&
Johnson
(1980)
suggest
that
human
experience
gives
rise
to
further
metaphorical
bases
through
our
perception
of
phenomena.
We
experience
our
bodies
as
bounded,
held
in
by
our
skin,
separate
from
an
outside
world.
As
bodies
sensing
our
own
physical
limits,
we
unwittingly
extrapolate
this
sensation
onto
objects
around
us,
to
create
the
metaphor
of
bounded
physical
containers.
Through
human
perception,
nonhuman
entities
are
bundled
together,
given
identities,
territories,
and
borders.
In
other
instances,
visibility

16. 15
enables
categorization,
as
when
the
limits
of
observation
demarcate
a
visual
‘container.’
Sight
lines,
visual
planes,
and
points
of
view
come
to
describe
our
relation
to
the
world.
In
a
more
dynamic
sense,
perceptions
of
movement
and
time
come
to
define
our
concepts
of
‘event,’
as
we
determine
a
relationship
between
the
movement
of
objects
and
the
time
they
take
to
travel
distances.
Through
these
perceptual
metaphors,
Mouffe’s
concepts
of
identity,
conflict,
and
politics
could
not
exist.
Seen
in
this
light,
metaphors
form
the
building
blocks
of
political
thought
and
action.
As
conceptual
devices,
we
must
understand
the
function
of
metaphors
in
connecting,
overlapping,
hiding,
and
disclosing
thought
processes
and
actions.
But
what
if
we
could
dismantle
and
reconstruct
our
metaphorical
bases,
or
at
least
build
new
connections
between
them?
If
metaphors
are
based
on
experience
and
perception,
then
a
key
to
their
reconfiguration
lies
in
creating
new
experiences.
As
a
descriptive
metaphor,
the
platform
would
at
least
lend
credence
to
Mouffe’s
theories
as
a
thought-­‐experiment
helps
to
illustrate
a
scientific
theory.
But
once
a
balance
platform
becomes
a
physical
object,
its
operation
provides
the
experiential
basis
to
dissociate,
scramble,
and
reconnect
our
metaphorical
conceptions.
Much
like
Mouffe’s
conception
of
hegemonic
articulations,
I
suggest
the
balance
platform
provides
a
basis
for
metaphorical
articulations.
Lakoff
&
Johnson
(1980)
propose
that
the
truth
or
validity
of
a
metaphor
is
primarily
maintained
through
the
consequences
it
provides.
If
we
act
as
if
‘argument
is
war’
in
a
culture
that
assumes
as
much,
then
the
metaphor
maintains
its
validity
by
guiding
us
in
socially
appropriate
behaviour.
But
if
we

17. 16
apply
the
same
metaphor
in
an
entirely
different
context,
it
may
lose
validity,
and
new
metaphors
will
be
required
to
make
sense
of
the
situation.
Similarly,
if
the
platform
can
shake
up
the
experiential
basis
for
metaphors,
it
may
enable
a
rewiring
of
new
connections
and
associations.
The
platform
can
achieve
this
by
providing
different
experiences
of
gravity,
speed,
motion,
and
direction.
For
example,
the
act
of
moving
away
or
towards
someone,
or
being
above
or
below
them
carries
specific
connotations.
Moving
towards
someone
may
signify
an
act
of
agreement,
and
being
above
may
symbolize
a
hierarchical
relationship.
But
when
such
arrangements
take
place
upon
an
unstable
platform
that
moves
in
and
out
of
balance,
these
metaphors
carry
a
multiplicity
of
meaning.
Perhaps
moving
in
agreement
may
in
fact
tip
the
platform
out
of
balance.
In
such
a
case,
do
the
old
metaphors
still
hold
weight?
More
than
a
thought
experiment,
the
physical
platform
holds
potential
to
deconstruct
and
rebuild
our
metaphors,
and
our
interpersonal
reality.
In
addition
to
providing
new
bases
for
metaphorical
thought
and
action,
platform
dynamics
also
play
with
notions
of
language,
potentially
scrambling
and
rewiring
them.
Language
is
conceived
metaphorically
as
a
spatial
concept,
a
linear
arrangement
of
words
strung
one
after
the
other
(Lakoff
&
Johnson,
1980).
Different
placements
of
an
adjective
can
lead
to
vastly
different
meanings,
as
can
the
decision
of
when
to
speak
in
a
group.
Such
consequences
related
to
the
ordering
of
language
demonstrate
the
relationship
between
form
and
content
in
linguistic
communication;
the
decision
of
how
to
speak
becomes
as
important
as
what
to
say.
In
regular
group
settings
where
language
is
the
primary
means
of
communication,
interaction
follows
a
linear,
narrative
path.
What
of
a

18. 17
platform
that
enables
bodily
motion
to
intervene
in
the
space
of
language?
Can
it
shift
the
priority
of
communication
from
words
to
actions,
by
providing
a
space
for
both
to
coexist
differently?
And
can
such
a
shift
open
space
for
new
political
expressions
to
arise,
for
new
consequences
to
unfold?
If
movement
is
given
the
opportunity
to
be
expressed
together
with
language,
then
perhaps
such
a
shift
may
take
place.
At
this
point
in
the
thesis,
many
questions
remain
exposed
and
unanswered.
This
should
seem
appropriate,
for
such
an
inquiry
seeks
to
open
up
issues
rather
than
resolve
them.
Even
so,
I
wish
to
mark
a
juncture
and
turn
towards
practical
matters
of
how
the
platform
interfaces
with
experience.
This
transition
from
abstract
to
concrete
reflects
my
proposal
that
political
agency
exists
across
multiple
modes
of
existence,
from
theory
and
metaphor,
to
perception
and
cognition.
I
now
turn
to
the
point
at
which
theory
becomes
embodied.
In
exploring
the
tactile
and
sensorial
aspects
of
the
platform,
I
seek
to
define
a
domain
of
practical
activity
that
allows
participants
to
generate
political
agency
through
these
multiple
registers.
Affordances:
Between
Concept
and
Action
In
transitioning
from
political
theory
and
linguistics
to
embodied
action,
I
confess
the
limited
ability
of
conceptual
thought
to
influence
practical
application.
While
certain
concepts
have
informed
the
platform,
one
cannot
expect
those
concepts
to
overtly
define
the
behaviour
of
participants,
for
users
will
inevitably
bring
along
their
own
concepts,
metaphors,
fears,
and
desires.
Given
this,
how
to

19. 18
invite
participants
in
setting
aside
their
routines
and
entering
anew?
The
physical
and
programmatic
design
of
the
platform
must
invite
participants
to
approach
and
experience
the
object
accordingly.
This
section
considers
theories
of
affordance
–
the
relationship
between
form
and
behaviour,
and
addresses
some
practical
terms
of
engagement
with
the
platform
in
order
to
frame
specific
actions
that
correspond
with
the
conceptual
underpinnings
of
the
object.
If
the
platform
holds
a
potential
to
catalyze
political
expression,
then
affordances
act
as
their
linchpin,
enabling
such
expressions
to
emerge
in
specific
physical
and
social
contexts.
Theories
of
affordance
seek
to
understand
how
certain
behaviours
arise
through
the
complex
relationship
between
actors
and
their
environment.
Affordances
are
defined
as
motor
possibilities
offered
up
by
the
environment,
such
as
when
an
object
affords
touching,
grasping,
sitting,
or
walking
(Rietveld,
2014).
I’m
drawn
to
ideas
of
affordance
because
they
address
the
point
at
which
objects
and
actors
converge
into
specific
behaviour,
the
complex
dynamic
through
which
actions
emerge.
Affordances
suggest
a
mutualistic
understanding
that
refuses
to
prioritize
environment
or
actor
over
one
other,
instead
taking
the
unique
aspects
of
each
as
a
unit
of
analysis
(Withagen
et
al,
2012).
In
their
physical
form,
affordances
exist
as
opportunities
awaiting
activation.
Yet
according
to
more
recent
conceptions
such
as
those
held
by
Rietveld
(2014),
our
engagement
with
affordances
is
always
coloured
by
a
social
lens
that
informs
our
abilities
to
act
within
specific
contexts.
We
must
appreciate
both
the
physical
and
social
contexts
in
order
to
understand
how
actions
are
afforded.

20. 19
A
question
arises
as
to
the
potential
influence
of
affordances:
whether
they
define
possible
behaviour,
or
go
beyond
to
evoke
certain
acts.
An
answer
to
this
question
would
elaborate
on
the
relationship
between
affordance
and
agency.
In
illuminating
the
relations
between
an
environment
and
actor,
theories
of
affordance
suggest
that
actions
emerge
from
complex
combinations
of
both.
Agency
thus
opens
out
of
the
potential
afforded
by
environmental
opportunities
and
human
action
in
concert.
Such
an
idea
denies
the
causation
implied
in
relationships
of
subject
and
object,
structure
and
agency.
I
quote
Gibson
in
explaining
that
“an
affordance
cuts
across
the
dichotomy
of
subjective-­‐objective
and
helps
us
to
understand
its
inadequacy.
It
is
equally
a
fact
of
the
environment
and
a
fact
of
behavior”
(Gibson,
1979/1986,
p.
129).
This
forms
an
important
basis
for
my
suggestion
that
political
agency
exists
in
between,
arising
from
a
mixture
of
conditions
and
connections.
Even
in
seemingly
straightforward
examples
such
as
the
case
of
a
pen,
objects
afford
action
through
a
complex
congruence
of
social
and
material
forces.
One
can
simply
grasp
how
the
affordance
of
a
pen
differs
when
in
the
hands
of
a
politician
or
a
poet
–
or
when
the
poet
is
at
home
or
in
a
voting
booth.
This
particular
example
illustrates
how
an
actor’s
reception
to
affordances
may
change
through
sociocultural
and
temporal
states.
Rietveld
(2014)
provides
a
valuable
amendment
to
theories
of
affordance
by
elaborating
on
the
social
aspects
that
influence
our
engagement
with
affordances.
He
introduces
a
normative
dimension,
which
allows
for
some
acts
to
be
understood
as
better
or
worse,
adequate
or
inadequate.
Such
considerations
concerning
proficiency
are
important
in
relation
to
the
platform,
because
they
anticipate

21. 20
participants’
structuring
of
experiences
according
to
pre-­‐
existing
evaluative
criteria.
In
presenting
the
platform,
special
attention
must
be
made
to
frame
the
experience
in
such
a
way
that
enables
participants
to
expand
their
range
of
expectations.
In
relating
affordances
to
the
platform,
the
objective
is
to
frame
its
use
in
ways
that
reflect
contexts
relevant
users,
while
translating
them
to
a
user-­‐friendly
frame
of
reference.
Here
I
am
inclined
to
the
metaphor
of
software
and
hardware,
where
the
user
interface
(the
platform
and
its
use)
may
embody
the
theories
that
inform
it.
In
recalling
how
Chantal
Mouffe’s
definition
of
agonistic
politics
mirrors
that
of
a
balance
platform,
it
becomes
evident
that
her
theories
directly
inform
the
shape
(hardware)
of
the
object,
and
therefore
its
use.
Furthermore,
in
her
proposal
that
hegemony
requires
constant
re-­‐articulation,
one
may
see
a
requirement
that
the
platform
have
a
continuously
round
underside
to
allow
constant
movement.
In
applying
theory
to
software
affordances,
a
consideration
for
programming
the
platform
might
be
to
address
participants’
metaphorical
assumptions
relating
to
concepts
of
balance,
interdependence
etc.,
and
to
frame
activities
that
provoke
new
understandings
of
basic
orientations
such
as
up-­‐down,
in-­‐out.
Finally,
in
keeping
with
overarching
themes
of
fluidity,
emergence,
and
latency,
these
software
considerations
should
be
taken
as
a
programmatic
outline
to
be
filled
in
according
to
specific
requirements,
concerns,
and
contexts,
rather
than
a
strict
methodology
defining
use.
The
aim
of
this
thesis
is
to
elucidate
a
context,
lines
of
thought
that
suggest
potential
response.
The
final
section
sets
out
to
consider
values
and
ethics
for
the
use
of
the

22. 21
platform,
according
to
philosophies
of
embodiment
and
affect.
I
will
discuss
ethics
–
what
we
should
and
shouldn’t
do
–
in
relation
to
philosophy
–
what
we
know
and
don’t
know
–
in
order
to
guide
the
use
of
the
platform.
Since
the
conceptual
world
remains
inadequate
in
accounting
for
the
breadth
of
human
experience,
one
of
the
key
dangers
lies
in
applying
conceptual
thought
to
our
inward
selves.
Therefore
I
outline
an
ethics
that
acknowledges
conceptual
limits
and
plots
boundaries,
in
order
to
relate
acts
of
unintelligible
creation
as
potential
expressions
of
political
agency.
Let’s
begin
with
a
tracing
of
aforementioned
concepts,
leading
towards
their
limits.
Through
Mouffe
I
proposed
the
idea
of
constant
articulation,
and
the
inevitable
opening
up
that
comes
about
through
the
performance
of
politics.
The
interpretive
element
of
hegemonic
articulations
allows
for
the
possibility
of
new
meaning
to
emerge.
Slippage
is
an
unavoidable
factor
in
the
transmission
and
re-­‐articulation
of
ideas.
A
gap
is
opened,
inviting
something
new,
old,
different,
or
the
same
to
fill
it.
Through
this
gap,
stylistic
variation
arises
as
an
expression
of
power.
This
power
is
imbued
through
symbolic
ritual,
physical
gesture
or,
personality
traits
that
correlate
to
punch
above
their
weight.
Through
performance
and
style,
the
form
of
the
message
and
its
delivery
become
as
important
as
the
content.
What
are
the
qualitative
elements
of
hegemonic
articulation?
What
are
hegemonies
made
of?
How
must
we
truly
understand
their
form
and
content,
apart
from
an
abstract
conception
of
politically
structured
worldviews
constantly
vying
for
ascendance?
In
turning
to
metaphor,
hegemony
takes
a
linguistic
form.
Power
is
grounded
in

23. 22
physical
experience,
stitched
through
syntax,
quilted
into
analogy
and
allegory.
The
substance
of
hegemony
finally
becomes
apparent
through
linguistic
form.
It’s
no
coincidence
that
this
thesis
makes
use
of
metaphor,
twisting
and
stitching
imagery
to
pull
it
towards
new
expressions.
Through
theory
and
word,
I
aim
to
bring
metaphors
to
the
surface,
to
acknowledge
their
omnipresence.
Our
daily
crafting
of
metaphor
forms
the
stuff
of
hegemony.
Our
performance
of
language
is
in
fact
a
performance
of
hegemonic
articulation.
This
exploration
of
metaphor
isn’t
simply
to
make
hegemony
tangible,
but
also
to
comprehend
the
imaginative
process
by
which
we
colour
our
experiences
in
meaning.
Despite
arriving
at
rich
colouration,
theory
has
its
limits.
To
stop
at
conceptual
or
linguistic
understandings
of
politics
would
be
to
commit
a
grave
omission,
denying
personal
experiences
that
reach
beyond
language.
At
some
point,
an
exploration
of
agency
must
leave
words
behind,
and
venture
into
aspects
that
encompass
touch,
movement,
non-­‐sense.
To
many,
the
literal
suggestion
that
a
rock
or
wave
is
political
remains
absurd.
Metaphors
can
hint
at
the
potential
power
of
natural
elements,
but
embodiment,
divorced
from
narrative
device,
normative
statements,
and
sensibility,
may
allow
us
to
confront
politics
in
ways
that
words
cannot.
Here
I
turn
to
Brian
Massumi’s
vital
exploration
of
the
relationship
between
embodied
movement
and
change.
Massumi
seeks
to
separate
notions
of
movement
from
their
ideological
frames
of
reference,
and
to
place
them
in
a
different
light,
one
that
respects
their
different
logics.
While
previous
sections
of
the
thesis
elaborate
notions
of
agency
from
conventional
bases,
Massumi
seeks
to
pull
the
carpet
from
underneath.

24. 23
From
Language
to
Embodiment
In
developing
an
ethics
of
the
platform,
I
aspire
to
wrest
the
body
from
its
linguistic
hold,
and
explore
how
embodied
movement
can
potentially
cascade
into
new
political
expressions.
One
of
Massumi’s
(2002)
core
charges
is
to
dissociate
acts
of
making
sense,
with
acts
of
sensing.
For
unmediated
sensations
of
touch,
scent,
and
sight
cannot
express,
and
mediated
expressions
cannot
sense.
Because
senses
are
conveyed
through
expression,
one
can
easily
forget
that
explaining
a
sensation
is
not
the
same
as
feeling
it.
Seemingly
unnoticed,
cognition
and
expression
overtake
the
senses,
and
representations
come
to
stand
in
for
the
initial
experience.
Here
we
find
the
primary
fallacy
enabled
through
linguistic
bases
of
thought.
While
metaphors
certainly
work
to
order
the
world
into
explainable
and
actionable
coherence,
metaphorical
orientations
cannot
be
confused
with
the
senses
upon
which
they
are
based.
The
separation
between
embodied
sense
and
symbolic
expression
suggests
that
they
arise
and
operate
according
to
different
logics.
Massumi
(2002)
elaborates
on
the
relationship
between
embodiment
and
expression,
and
suggests
that
representations
of
embodiment
cannot
avoid
being
bound
up
in
politics.
The
key
reminder
is
that
linguistic
expression
is
reliant
upon
signifiers,
which
relate
one
thing
to
another
through
coherent
systems
of
meaning.
Sensation
can
only
be
expressed
through
references
embedded
in
power
structures,
and
in
doing
so,
embodiment
becomes
codified
and
translated
into
frozen
points
on
a
grid,
traces
of
its
original
existence.
Problematically,
in
relying
upon
a
system
of
coherence,
embodiment
must
remain
bound
to
it

25. 24
in
order
to
make
sense.
Words
place
bodies
on
flat
planes,
binding
their
movement
and
defining
their
potential.
In
insisting
that
things
make
sense,
we
conflate
the
rich
reality
of
existence,
and
the
possibility
for
expanded
expressions
of
political
agency
outside
of
predetermined
codes.
In
contrast,
one
may
attest
to
experiences
which
cannot
be
expressed
in
words.
Such
experiences
suggest
that
we
can
be
implicated
in
nuanced,
multiple,
possible
trajectories
that
cannot
be
accounted
for
in
strict
notions
of
codification.
Alas,
political
expressions
are
inevitably
placed
back
upon
a
narrow
frame
of
reference,
collapsing
complexity
into
definable,
defendable
positions.
A
major
folly
of
positionality
lies
in
its
prioritization
of
stasis.
A
position
indicates
a
moment
in
time,
but
when
is
time
ever
frozen?
Positionality
forces
an
unrealistic
portrayal
of
reality,
to
the
extent
that
it
inverts
the
real
order
of
things
and
suggests
stasis
is
the
norm
over
movement.
Massumi
explains
how
language
is
simply
incommensurate
with
the
essentially
indeterminate
nature
of
movement.
While
movement
corresponds
to
its
own
logic
of
unfolding
and
emerging,
language
inevitably
points
to
a
moment
in
the
past.
He
suggests
we
must
accept
the
paradox
of
movement,
that
while
we
perceive
it
in
linguistic
terms,
it
also
exists
in
abstract
form,
always
becoming
something
beyond
our
grasp.
The
relationship
between
bodies
and
language-­‐determined
positions
can
be
likened
to
the
relationship
between
energy
and
matter,
each
different
modes
of
the
same
reality,
each
holding
the
possibility
of
transitioning
into
the
other.
In
this
way,
language
can
be
seen
to
emerge
from
embodiment,
feeding
back
into
movement
and
structuring
it,
and
being
formed
by
it
in
turn
(Massumi,
2002).

26. 25
In
relating
to
an
ethics
of
the
platform,
it
is
vital
to
appreciate
and
anticipate
the
logic
of
embodied
sensation.
Embodiment
encompasses
a
vast
terrain
of
physical
and
psychological
states.
Heartbeat
and
breath,
touch
and
balance
intermix
with
conscious
and
unconscious
experiences
of
past
and
future,
happiness
and
sadness,
expectation
and
suspense,
action
and
reaction
etc.
Massumi
(2002)
explains
how
these
sensations
resonate,
dissipate,
loop,
and
infuse
within
bodies
to
create
states
of
affect,
sensations
akin
to
raw
unfiltered
emotion.
In
their
expansiveness,
affective
states
remain
virtual,
unable
to
become
fully
expressed
through
language
and
hence
incommensurate
with
actual
states.
Here
we
see
how
embodiment
becomes
a
site
for
complexity,
tension,
and
potential
newness.
It
is
this
expansiveness
of
embodiment,
the
fact
that
multiple
trajectories
are
compressed
into
the
narrow
transition
from
embodiment
to
actualization,
that
accounts
for
emergent
responses,
for
alternatives,
for
change
in
the
act
of
performance.
The
platform
should
seek
to
activate
both
physical
and
psychological
states,
provoking
the
resonation,
dissipation,
and
infusion
that
generates
a
flurry
of
sensical
and
non-­‐sensical
expression.
The
platform
may
initiate
a
process
of
looping
between
embodied
sensing,
affect,
articulation,
and
back
again.
Programmatic
techniques
could
facilitate
this
generative
potential,
urging
political
expression
to
emerge
from
the
fluctuation
between
sense
and
non-­‐sense.
Such
productive
potential
emerges
when
linguistic
positions
are
lifted
–
ever
so
briefly
–
to
allow
for
movement
to
restructure
meaning.
Any
ethic
for
the
balance
platform
should
treat
the
two
experiences
of
sensing
and
making
sense
as
distinct
and
worthy
in
their
own
right,
rather
than
collapsing
non-­‐sense

27. 26
into
coherence.
For
movement
inevitably
becomes
expressed
and
articulated,
with
language
in
turn
acting
upon
embodiment.
The
translation
from
experience
to
articulation
can
act
in
complex
ways
that
feed
language
back
into
affective
states
(Massumi,
2002).
Just
as
the
rules
of
a
game
define
the
terms
of
play
and
influence
its
potential,
language
and
embodiment
complement
each
other
in
their
performance.
We
must
become
acquainted
with
indeterminacy,
and
the
transition
point
at
which
words
become
inadequate
to
our
understanding
of
experience.
Non-­‐sense
should
not
be
equated
with
absurdity.
On
the
contrary,
non-­‐sensical
acts
may
become
notions
of
legitimate
expression
if
pursued.
In
this
way,
coherence
is
not
required
for
political
agency
to
arise;
in
fact
it
may
dampen
such
expressions
from
ever
surfacing.
The
trick
is
to
keep
moving,
eluding
the
enclosure
of
definition.
In
illustrating
the
potential
for
affect
to
translate
into
political
agency,
Massumi
raises
the
example
of
presidential
candidate
Ronald
Reagan.
The
man’s
rhetoric
and
behaviour
were
curiously
incoherent,
a
mix
of
matter-­‐
of-­‐fact
conservative
ideology
and
apparent
idiocy
patched
together
with
swagger.
Despite
his
lilting
expression
and
conflicting
logic,
voters
perceived
confidence
instead
of
incompetence,
and
the
man
was
voted
into
the
Presidency
a
full
two
terms.
Massumi
explains
how
such
potent
political
expression
emerged
from
a
media
context
of
intense
movement
and
disjuncture;
the
current
scenario
of
image
and
information
overload
typical
to
late-­‐capitalist
culture.
Images
are
routinely
cut,
panned,
juxtaposed,
and
overlaid,
and
new
meaning
emerges
in
the
relation
between
incongruent
symbols.
In
disruption
and
dynamics,
coherence
is
formed.
Here
we
see
how
the
movement
of

28. 27
image
–
as
the
movement
of
bodies
–
can
provide
a
terrain
for
virtual
expressions
to
cascade
into
a
formidable
form
of
agency
(Massumi,
2002).
In
referring
back
upon
the
metaphor
of
football,
we
can
see
that
the
sport
cannot
but
evolve
over
time;
change
is
inevitable.
Through
performance
of
both
sport
and
politics,
key
questions
remain:
what
characterizes
change,
and
how
can
one
take
part
in
it?
What
sequences
produce
transformation?
I
propose
that
the
crucial
aspect
driving
such
change
is
the
continuous
transition
between
movement
and
stasis,
driven
by
the
recurring
acts
of
embodiment
and
articulation.
Entering
into
a
continuous
loop,
embodied
sensation
becomes
expressed,
articulated
through
language
that
processes
it
through
sociocultural
codes.
Yet
despite
the
confinement
of
movement
by
language,
performance
enables
new
opportunities
of
expression
to
arise
through
the
overflowing
potential
of
affect.
By
refusing
positions
in
favour
of
renewed
movement,
the
possible
range
of
actions
far
outweighs
our
ability
to
articulate
them,
so
that
alternatives
must
spill
over
our
current
situation,
creating
new
contexts
for
understanding
acts
as
political.
Conclusion
Through
all
of
this
indeterminate
probing
at
the
borders
of
sense,
a
final
question
remains:
what
becomes
of
utility;
what
is
of
value?
An
intensely
sensical
question
that
seems
difficult
to
approach
from
the
vantage
point
of
emergence
and
contingence,
but
one
nevertheless
intimately
related
to
notions
of
politics.
The
relation
between
means
and
ends

29. 28
can
be
suspended
for
a
time,
but
it
must
inevitably
be
approached
in
conclusion.
Two
points
can
be
shared,
the
first
in
elusive
resistance
to
pragmatics,
the
second
in
twisting
use
towards
unknown
grounds.
For
the
first,
the
process
of
unending
movement
cannot
be
a
concluding
act
that
seeks
to
establish
solid
positions.
Movement
is
essentially
ambiguous,
and
the
kind
of
intelligence
and
insight
drawn
from
its
dynamics
must
recognize
this
instability
as
a
value.
It
is
not
for
the
platform
to
draw
conclusions,
only
to
open
them
up,
another
kind
of
intelligence
to
be
sure.
For
the
second
point,
one
must
remember
that
all
useful
inventions
draw
from
pragmatism,
but
enable
a
future
use
to
unfold.
Inventions
expand
upon
the
possibility
for
their
use.
Political
value
arises
through
gaps
afforded
by
performance
and
play,
the
shifting
weight
tearing
at
the
seams
of
language
to
expose
newness
below.

30. 29
In
Gratitude
Thanks
to
Joanna
Ashworth
for
buying
my
flight
to
Helsinki
in
2012.
To
Sander
Siegmann
for
inviting
me
to
Amsterdam.
To
Annelys
de
Vet
for
inspiring
me
to
study
at
the
Sandberg.
To
Manon
Veldhuis
for
supporting
me
to
stay.
Thanks
to
Manon,
Sander,
and
my
parents
for
believing
in
me.
To
Julien
Manaira
for
his
detailed
eye
and
dedication
to
Conversation
Balance.
And
to
all
the
Rietveld
woodshop
and
CAD/CAM
staff
that
made
my
project
possible.

31. 30
Works
Cited
Gibson,
J.
J.
(1979/1986).
The
ecological
approach
to
visual
perception.
Boston:
Houghton
Mifflin.
Lakoff,
G.,
&
Johnson,
M.
(1980).
Metaphors
we
live
by.
London:
University
of
Chicago
Press.
Massumi,
B.
(2002).
Parables
for
the
virtual:
Movement,
affect,
sensation.
Durham,
NC:
Duke
University
Press.
Mouffe,
C.
(2013).
Agonistics:
Thinking
the
world
politically.
London:
Verso.
Mouffe,
C.
(2005).
On
the
political.
London:
Routledge.
Rietveld,
E.,
&
Kiverstein,
J.
(2014)
A
Rich
Landscape
of
Affordances.
Ecological
Psychology,
26(4),
325-­‐352.
Retrieved
from
(Gibson)://www-­‐tandfonline-­‐
com.proxy.uba.uva.nl:2048/doi/abs/10.1080/10407413.2
014.958035
Withagen,
R.,
Poel,
H.
J.,
Araújo,
D.,
&
Pepping,
G.
(2012).
Affordances
can
invite
behavior:
Reconsidering
the
relationship
between
affordances
and
agency.
New
Ideas
in
Psychology,
30(2),
250-­‐258.
Retrieved
from
http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.uba.uva.nl:2048/scie
nce/article/pii/S0732118X11000754