A look at the likely probabilities in a second referendum scenario.

1. Jonathan Wilmot - WilmotML
Roberto Foa – University of Melbourne
Contact: jonathan.wilmot@wilmotml.com
December 2018
Brexit Update
Second Vote Simulations
GLOBAL STRATEGY

2. 1
WHO WOULD WIN IN A SECOND BREXIT REFERENDUM?
• Let’s assume Mrs May’s wins today’s confidence vote but till can’t get her deal
through parliament by 21st January
• Most people expect that to lead to a second referendum, in which the
country votes to remain in the EU
• Our preliminary simulations for a three way referendum confirm that
intuition: on what we think are plausible assumptions remain would be the
clear favourite (80% probability).
• Mrs May’s deal would have a 19% probability and some form of “hard” Brexit
just 1%
• That is true even if a (managed) no deal scenario were to become surprisingly
popular as UK votes reacted against EU “inflexibility” on the backstop

3. 2
SECOND REFERENDUM IS RISKY FOR MAY
• To give the May deal a 50%-plus probability of winning we think she would:
1) Need to win over at least 20% of the 2016 Remain voters, and/or;
2) Have 75%+ of 2016 Leave voters to back her deal over “no deal,” or;
3) Have 75% of “no deal” voters allocate their second preference to her
• That seems like a tall order to us - though nothing is impossible in politics.
• The basic maths means that Mrs May will likely see a second referendum as
very much a last resort, and thus delay a meaningful vote in parliament on her
deal as long as possible. Meanwhile the DUP and hard Brexiteers will have to
figure out if a general Election or a Second Referendum is the bigger risk.
• We conclude that getting to a second referendum will not be quick or easy.
Instead, we can expect to hear a lot more about “delay for Norway”, and
about how to “manage” a no deal outcome in coming weeks

4. Methodology and Charts

5. 4
METHODOLOGY
• In order to estimate the likely outcomes of a second referendum on Britain’s
relationship to the European Union, we ran a set of 100,000 simulations.
• Each simulation was based on the following assumptions:
• The referendum itself would take the form of a three-way question
between choosing to remain in the EU, to depart on the terms of Mrs.
May’s deal, or to leave without an agreement.
• The referendum would take place using a single-transferable vote
method of casting ballots.
• Each voter marks both their first and second ‘preferred’ outcome, and the
votes of the least-favoured option are redistributed according to these
‘second-best’ preferences.

6. 5
ASSUMPTIONS
• We made the following assumptions regarding the distribution of preferences
in the electorate:
• The proportion of “Leave” voters from the 2016 referendum willing to
back Mrs May’s deal as first preference ranges from 30-70% (mean 50%)
with the remainder choosing a hard Brexit.
• The proportion of “Remain” voters from the 2016 referendum who will
back Mrs May’s deal ranges from 8-23%, with the rest choosing “remain”
• We then make several further assumptions regarding the likely distribution of
second-preference choices:
• If “hard Brexit” is the least-favoured option, then we assume that 50-80%
of hard Brexit supporters will cast a second preference to Mrs May’s
deal.
• If Mrs May’s deal is the least-favoured option, then we assume that 30-
70% of these voters will opt for “remain” as their second preference,
with the average split being 50%.

7. Results

8. 7
“ROUND 1” RESULTS – FIRST PREFERENCE VOTES ONLY
20.4% of outcomes: May Deal Eliminated, “Hard Brexit vs. Remain” Runoff
79.6% of outcomes: Hard Brexit Eliminated, “May Deal vs. Remain” Runoff

9. 8
“ROUND 2” RESULTS – AFTER DISTRIBUTION OF SECOND PREFERENCES
May’s Deal vs. Remain Hard Brexit vs. Remain
24.4% of these outcomes: May Deal Wins
75.6% of these outcomes: Remain Wins
2.5% of these outcomes: Hard Brexit Wins
97.5% of these outcomes: Remain Wins

10. 9
CAN MAY WIN A SECOND REFERENDUM?
• The answer is “yes - if.” Our simulations suggest that in order for Mrs. May to be favourite to win
this referendum, she would need one of three things to happen:
• She could get at least 75% of leavers from the 2016 referendum to back her deal as their
first preference - eschewing the temptations of the “hard Brexit” option.
• This seems unlikely, as it would require her to have either an exceptionally strong
campaign or for Brexit conservatives and the press to rally behind her deal.
• She could win over at least 23% of remain supporters from the 2016 referendum to support
her deal as their first preference.
• This could happen if there is a strong enough public sentiment to simply “get it over
with” - though based on the latest Ashcroft polling, scepticism of Mrs. May’s deal
remains widespread.
• Third, Theresa May’s compromise deal could attract more than 75% of second-preference
votes from voters selecting “Hard Brexit.”
• This seems May’s most likely avenue for securing a referendum win. But there are potential
dangers – if May’s deal remains unpopular, “hard Brexit” voters may leave their second
preference blank, and/or Brexit campaigners may argue that May’s deal is “worse than
remaining”

11. 10
2016 LEAVERS/REMAINERS REQUIRED BY MAY TO PASS BREXIT DEAL
If May gets over 23% of Remainers to back
her, she is likely to win the referendum…
…Or if she gets 70% of Leavers to back her
deal as their first preference

12. 11
May’s best avenue is to get 75%+ of second-preference votes from first-
preference “hard brexiters” – but for this her deal must be seen as credible.

13. 12
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