The 'Locomotive' Illusion - Socio-Economic Drivers of Conflict in Resource-Rich Colombia

The “Locomotive” Illusion
Socio-Economic Drivers of Conflict in
Resource-Rich Colombia
By: Julia Anderson, Tsechu Dolma, Taylor Fulton,
Haruna Minoura, and Jonathan Rosario

1
Cover photo: Small-scale gold miners working in Marmato, Caldas, Colombia.
All photographs in this report were taken by CICR researchers.
For further information, including any documentation referenced in this report, please contact the
research team at jfa2121@columbia.edu
© Center for International Conflict Resolution
Columbia University - School of International and Public Affairs
420 West 118th Street, 13th Floor
New York, NY 10027

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ACRONYMS
ACAAC Environmental and Agricultural Association Committee of Puerto Gaitán
ANH National Hydrocarbons Agency
ANLA National Environmental Licensing Authority
ANM National Mining Agency
ANUC National Association of Peasant Land Users
ASOMICHOCO Association of Chocó Miners
AUC United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia
BACRIM Criminal bands
CAR Autonomous Regional Corporations
CIM Union Committee of Meta
CORMACARENA Autonomous Regional Corporation for the Macarena Region
CORNARE Autonomous Regional Corporation for the Negro and Nare Rivers
DNP National Planning Department
ECLAC United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean
ELN National Liberation Army
FARC Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FEDEMICHOCO Federation of Chocó Miners
FUNCENER Renewable Energy Training Center Foundation
HRW Human Rights Watch
IIAP Environmental Research Institute of the Pacific
IOM International Organization for Migration
IPC Popular Training Institute
JAC Community action boards
MACUPAZ Culture of Peace and Environment Roundtable of Meta
MNC Multinational Corporation
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OHCHR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
OIA Indigenous Organization of Antioquia
ONIC National Indigenous Organization of Colombia
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNUMA Indigenous Organization of Meta

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Table of Contents
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY......................................................................................................................... 4
METHODOLOGY ..................................................................................................................................... 7
BACKGROUND......................................................................................................................................... 9
STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS.................................................................................................................12
Government..................................................................................................................................................... 12
Local Communities........................................................................................................................................ 14
National & Multinational Extractive Corporations............................................................................ 16
Armed Groups................................................................................................................................................. 18
FINDINGS: Drivers of Conflict .........................................................................................................20
Root Causes...................................................................................................................................................... 20
Triggers............................................................................................................................................................. 22
Effects of Social Conflict............................................................................................................................... 24
RECOMMENDATIONS .........................................................................................................................29
Colombian Government............................................................................................................................... 29
Corporations.................................................................................................................................................... 31
Civil Society...................................................................................................................................................... 32
United Nations Development Programme............................................................................................ 32
Appendix 1: List of Primary Source Interviews........................................................................36
Appendix 2: Works Cited..................................................................................................................38
Appendix 3: Problem Tree...............................................................................................................41
Appendix 4: Research Team Site Visits .......................................................................................42
Appendix 5: Case Studies..................................................................................................................43
Buriticá, Antioquia........................................................................................................................................ 43
Jericó, Antioquia............................................................................................................................................. 44
Marmato, Caldas............................................................................................................................................. 45
Chocó.................................................................................................................................................................. 46
Humadea, Guamal, Acacias, and Castilla La Nueva, Meta................................................................ 48
Puerto Gaitán, Meta....................................................................................................................................... 49
Vista Hermosa, Meta..................................................................................................................................... 51
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................................53

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Colombia is closer now than ever to ending the longest armed conflict in the western hemisphere
through the ongoing peace negotiations between the national government and the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in Havana. With significant improvements in the security
situation and high economic growth over the last decade, President Juan Manuel Santos
continues to portray Colombia as a “post-conflict” country. Since taking office in 2010, he has
trumpeted extractive industries as a “locomotive” that will drive the Colombian economy
forward. Minerals mining and oil extraction are one of five key sectors for growth and
employment generation in the 2011–2014 National Development Plan.1
As a result, a flood of
multinational and domestic extractive companies is changing the country’s economic and
physical landscape. Yet while the economy continues to show strong growth, relatively few
benefits have trickled down to local communities. New factors introduced by the expansion of
the extractive industry are threatening traditional livelihoods, changing culture, dividing
communities, affecting how local populations view development, and altering the nature of the
citizen-state relationship.
This report identifies the key issues related to the extractive industry’s effect on social conflict in
Colombia by focusing on how extractive industries can exacerbate, create, or lay the foundation
for future social conflict. Two primary research questions formed the basis of the analysis: (1)
How does large-scale, small-scale and artisanal mining affect local social conflict in campesino
and Afro-Colombian communities in the departments of Antioquia and Chocó? (2) How does oil
exploration and extraction, at both national and multinational levels, affect campesino and
indigenous communities in the department of Meta?
This report is based on the findings of five graduate student researchers at Columbia University’s
Center for International Conflict Resolution, in partnership with the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) in Colombia. Although research was conducted with support
from UNDP, this report is an independent product. The research team conducted a total of seven
case studies. Research focused on gold mining in the departments of Antioquia, Caldas and
Chocó. In Antioquia, the team made field visits to the towns of (1) Buriticá and (2) Jericó; in
Caldas the team visited the town of (3) Marmato; and in Chocó the team traveled to the city of
(4) Quibdó. The focus of research shifted to oil extraction in the department of Meta where the
team visited the towns of (5) Humadea, Guamal, Acacias, and Castilla La Nueva, (6) Vista
Hermosa, and (7) Puerto Gaitán. 2
Case studies explored the roles of several stakeholders
including: the government, multilateral organizations, extractive industries, Afro-Colombian
communities, campesino communities, indigenous communities, armed groups and civil society.
Findings are based on a combination of primary and secondary research, including over 90
firsthand interviews with local communities, NGOs, government officials, and private sector
representatives. Findings are a complex analysis of the drivers of social conflict stemming from
1
República de Colombia, Prosperidad para Todos, National Development Plan 2011-2014, 63, accessed
August 2, 2014, http://www.irc.gov.co/irc/en/fiscalinformation/National%20Development%20Plan%202011-
2014.pdf.
2
See Annex 4 for a map of site visits by the research team, and Annex 5 for a background description of each
case.

5
extractive industry expansion in Colombia. This report identifies root causes that permit conflict,
triggers for direct confrontation, and the effects of resulting social conflict. Root causes include:
(1) national government policy and laws regarding extractive industries, (2) a lack of effective
state institutions for natural resources management, (3) a lack of local and ethnic community
capacity to advocate for their needs and engage on an equal footing with national government
and multinational corporate actors, and (4) continued instability resulting from Colombia’s
history of civil war. Direct triggers for conflict include: (1) specific national government policies
that favor multinational corporations (MNCs), (2) corruption by a variety of actors (including
government representatives, industry representatives, and community leaders) at the national,
departmental, and local levels, (3) MNCs fulfilling the role of the state in the areas where they
operate, (4) environmental damage resulting from unsustainable extractive practices, particularly
contamination of water sources, and (5) the presence of illegal armed actors, including the FARC,
National Liberation Army (ELN), former United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)
members, and criminal band (BACRIM) groups in resource-rich areas.
These root causes and triggers lead to conflict in several areas of Colombian society: within
communities, between communities and corporations, and between communities and the
government at all levels (local, departmental and national). They also serve to exacerbate the
continued national conflict in Colombia by providing new revenue streams to armed groups, who
either engage in illegal mining themselves or extort actors at various points in the extractive
industry supply chain. It is estimated that 30% of the FARC’s revenue now comes from illegal
mining activities.3
Effects of social conflict identified include: (1) the destruction of economic
livelihoods for local populations, (2) the destabilization and fragmentation of societies, and (3)
violence and displacement. A thorough explanation of each root cause, trigger, and effect can be
found in the “findings” section of this report.
The report concludes with recommendations to address the identified root causes, triggers and
effects of social conflict. Separate recommendations are identified for the Colombian
government, national and multinational extractive corporations, civil society, and UNDP. A
comprehensive list of recommendations appears in the final section of this report. Key
recommendations include the following:
Colombian Government
The national government of Colombia should:
 Increase efficiency, coordination, and communication amongst all relevant ministries and
agencies.
 Improve and expand the technical capacity of government employees tasked with
extractive industry oversight.
 Re-assess the nation's extraction policies and constitutional provisions; noting, in
particular, the divisive relationship between “topsoil” and “subsoil,” and policies for
awarding land titles.
 Revise the current policy governing prior consultations with local communities to better
accommodate the needs of all relevant stakeholders.
3
Edward Fox, “Illegal Mining Colombia’s Biggest Challenge: Police Chief,” Edward Fox, InSightCrime,
April 23, 2012, accessed July 30, 2014, http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/illegal-mining-colombias-
biggest-challenge-police-chief.

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 Develop better evaluation and compliance assessment mechanisms for corporate actors.
Corporations
Both national and multinational extractive corporations operating in Colombia should:
 Thoroughly research targeted exploitation areas before acquiring land titles.
 Develop a two-pronged community needs assessment strategy that assesses long-term
and short-term community development needs, allowing the company to engage in more
effective corporate social responsibility.
 Develop a transparent, in-house hiring process for employing local citizens.
Civil Society
Both national and local civil society organizations should:
 Strengthen the effectiveness of existing roundtable platforms.
 Prioritize the education of citizens on their constitutional roles, responsibilities, and
extraction rights.
 Develop sustainable networks of communication between local communities and
representatives in the capital city of Bogotá to ensure community concerns are properly
transmitted to the national authorities.
UNDP
UNDP Bogotá Office Should:
 Develop a natural resources strategy that addresses the potential for violence that could
undermine its peacebuilding agenda.
 Increase coordination with UNDP regional offices around the country.
 Facilitate dialogue between local communities, national government ministries, and
MNCs.
UNDP Antioquia Office should:
 Prioritize addressing the social conflict stemming from gold mining by designating more
personnel in charge of addressing the issue, establishing more connections and increasing
dialogue with the Antioquia government and CARs, and increasing work on educating
and informing gold miners of their rights and regulations they are required to comply
with.
 Increase communication and coordination with UNDP Bogotá Office by conducting joint
studies on the impact of extractive industries on local communities and holding weekly
conference calls and site visits.
UNDP Meta Office should:
 Frame social conflict stemming from oil and natural resource extraction as part of lager
work on peacebuilding.
 Increase communication and coordination with UNDP Bogotá Office by conducting joint
studies on the impact of extractive industries on local communities and holding weekly
conference calls and site visits.

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METHODOLOGY
This report is based on the findings of five graduate student researchers at Columbia University’s
Center for International Conflict Resolution, in partnership with the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) in Colombia. Although research was conducted with support
from UNDP, this report is an independent product.
The research team conducted four months of desk-based research in New York City during the
spring of 2014, followed by two months of field research during June and July, 2014. The
research was qualitative in nature. Findings are based on a combination of primary and
secondary research, including over 90 firsthand interviews with local communities, NGOs,
government officials, and private sector representatives.4
The privacy and safety of interview
subjects is of the utmost importance to the research team, and subjects who wished to remain
anonymous are not cited by name. In most cases, information obtained through interviews is
attributed to the organization, rather than individuals, to allow for the interviewees to speak
freely. With the exception of a few interviews in Bogotá, all interviews were conducted in
Spanish, with translation by members of the research team. Research questions focused on
understanding the key concerns of stakeholders vis-à-vis how the expansion of the extractive
industry affects their local communities or their interests, including social, economic, and
environmental effects of extraction, and how these industries are tied to broader conflict
dynamics in Colombia.
The research team conducted a total of seven case studies. Research focused on gold mining in
the departments of Antioquia, Caldas and Chocó. In Antioquia, the team made field visits to the
towns of (1) Buriticá and (2) Jericó; in Caldas the team visited the town of (3) Marmato; and in
Chocó the team traveled to the city of (4) Quibdó. The focus of research shifted to oil extraction
in the department of Meta where the team visited the towns of (5) Humadea, Guamal, Acacias,
and Castilla La Nueva, (6) Vista Hermosa, and (7) Puerto Gaitán.5
Case studies explored the
roles of several stakeholders including: the government, multilateral organizations, extractive
industries, Afro-Colombian communities, Campesinos, indigenous communities, armed groups
and civil society.
Several limitations can be identified for this study, stemming primarily from the qualitative
nature of the study. The research team made the utmost effort to survey a wide variety of actors
and perspectives. However, more interviews were conducted with civil society, local
communities and government, than corporate actors. There were several instances when the team
was able to speak with extractive industry employees, but doing so required total anonymity.
Additionally, the research team was dependent on UNDP for field support and transportation.
This meant the team could only operate in departments with a UNDP presence. At times, the
researchers were accompanied by UN staff members, which may have affected the interviewees’
perception of the researchers as independent, and affected their responses. Due to safety and time
constraints, the team was not able to visit certain regions where illegal mining is believed to take
4
See Appendix 1 for a list of primary source interviews.
5
See Annex 4 for a map of site visits by the research team, and Annex 5 for a background description of each
case.

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place. This reduced the number of case studies the team could focus on. Finally, although
interviews were conducted in Spanish, and the research team translators are fluent, they are not
native speakers. Thus, some of the nuances in the interviewee’s responses may have been lost in
translation.
This report builds upon, but is not directly tied to, research conducted by a previous group of
graduate students from the Center for International Conflict Resolution in 2012.6
Their research
investigated how foreign investment in gold mining is affecting social stability in two Colombian
departments, Antioquia and Nariño. While overlapping themes exist between this product and
their 2012 report, this report stands alone from the previous research. It expressly focuses on
extractive industry effects on social conflict dynamics by examining key issues related to the
environmental, economic and political effects of gold and oil extraction in indigenous, Afro-
Colombian and campesino communities in Colombia.
6
Barbey, et al.,“A Return to El Dorado”: The Opportunities and Risks Presented by Foreign Investment in
Colombian Gold Mining, Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs, November 2012.

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BACKGROUND
Colombia’s history of conflict dates back to the 1960s when leftist groups, inspired by the Cuban
revolution, accused the central government of rural neglect leading to poverty and an inequitable
distribution of land. This societal discontent led to the rise of several armed rebel groups,
including the aforementioned FARC and ELN, which demanded land redistribution and social
reform from the government. In response to continued violence, kidnapping, extortion and
terrorist attacks by the leftist guerilla groups, wealthy landowners formed right-wing paramilitary
groups in the 1980s to protect themselves. These groups collectively organized to form the AUC.
As the illicit cocaine trade shifted to Colombia in the 1980s, it became a major source of revenue
for both left and right-winged armed groups. Over the past five decades, this conflict has had a
significant impact on Colombia. Tens of thousands of Colombians have died, an estimated
45,000 have “disappeared,” and four million people have been displaced.7
This has caused
humanitarian crises and severe poverty, disproportionately affecting Afro-Colombian and
indigenous populations.
Former President Álvaro Uribe concluded a peace deal with the AUC in 2003, which ceased
operations in 2006.8
However, the Colombian government’s demobilization of the AUC between
2003 and 2006 suffered from a failure to plan for the reintegration of former AUC members into
society. Despite the demobilization of 37 armed blocks of the AUC, new paramilitary groups
took the reins of the AUC’s criminal operations, resulting in increased rates of violence and
internal displacement in the country between 2004 and 2010.9
Formerly demobilized members of
the AUC have also reorganized, forming BACRIM groups, which have scrambled for territorial
power over narcotrafficking supply lines.10
The FARC and ELN continue to operate as armed
rebel groups, and actively affect the lives of communities around the country.
President Juan Manuel Santos began laying the groundwork for the current round of peace
negotiations from the moment he took office in 2010. He launched several legislative reforms,
which in retrospect can be seen as precursors to the current negotiations. The Victims and Land
Restitution Law, which compensates an estimated four to five million victims of the conflict with
economic reparations and land restitution for forced displacement was passed. Implementation
began in 2012.11
Additionally, the government passed the Peace Framework Law in 2012, which
provides a transitional justice structure for the eventual peace process. Upon taking office,
President Santos also took steps to warm relations with Ecuador and Venezuela by re-
establishing the diplomatic ties that were severed during the Uribe administration. This was a
critical step for the peace process as the late Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez was a key actor
for facilitating FARC participation in negotiations.
7
June S. Beittel, “Peace Talks in Colombia,” Congressional Research Service, March 1, 2013, 2, accessed
April 30, 2014, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42982.pdf, 2.
8
Ibid., 10.
9
Human Rights Watch, “Paramilitaries’ Heirs: The New Face of Violence in Colombia,” February 2010,
accessed April 23, 2014, http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/colombia0210webwcover_0.pdf.
10
Briefing by a Security Expert, UNDP Bogotá, Bogotá, D.C., June 20, 2014.
11
Beittel, “Peace Talks in Colombia,” 15.

10
In August 2012, President Santos announced that exploratory talks had taken place between the
government and the FARC in Cuba, and that the two parties had come to an agreement on a
framework for the talks. The peace process agenda identifies five priority areas: (1) rural
development and land policy, (2) political participation for the FARC, (3) illegal drug trafficking,
(4) reintegration into civilian life for demobilized rebels, and (5) victims’ reparations.12
To date,
the government and the FARC have agreed on the first three of these points.13
The ELN
expressed interest in joining the negotiations, and on June 10, 2014, just five days before
Colombia’s run-off election (won by President Santos), the government and the ELN announced
the beginning of formal peace talks after almost two years of preliminary negotiations.14
The peace negotiations between the national government and the FARC and ELN provide
reasons for optimism, but not everyone favors the process. Although 70% of Colombians polled
said they supported the talks, there have also been many vocal critics. Former President Uribe
has been highly critical of the peace talks, calling them a “concession to terrorists”.15
The FARC,
ELN, BACRIM, and former paramilitary groups still control large swaths of territory throughout
the country. These rebel zones have little to no state presence and the local communities that live
in these areas are subject to guerilla law. Most of these territories are rural but some pockets of
major cities, such as Medellín, are also under rebel control.16
In spite of the ongoing conflict and peace negotiations, the Colombian government treats the
economy as if Colombia is in a post-conflict, fragile development phase, actively pursuing
international investment in infrastructure and the extractive industry, and promoting tourism. The
emphasis on extractive industries is understandable; Colombia is blessed with an abundance of
natural resources, which have been an important part of the economy for centuries. Natural
resources such as oil, natural gas, gold, emeralds, coal, and other minerals have the potential to
stimulate significant economic growth in what has emerged as one of South America’s strongest
economies despite six decades of conflict. Colombia is the world’s fourth largest coal producer
and Latin America’s fourth largest oil producer.17
The crucial role that natural resources play in
the Colombian economy was cemented in the 1991 constitution. Article 332 of the constitution
stipulates, “the State is the owner of the subsoil and of the natural, non-renewable resources.”18
This affords the government the exclusive right to decide how the country’s natural resources
will be exploited. Thus, as the extractive sector expands, the national government will have
significant funds with which to steer Colombia’s development.
12
Beittel, “Peace Talks in Colombia,” 17.
13
The Economist, “The Moment of Truth,” August 30, 2014, accessed September 12, 2014,
http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21614157-government-and-farc-grapple-victims-truth-justice-and-
mechanics-ending.
14
Daniel Medendorp Escobar, “Colombia govt, ELN rebels announce formal peace talks,” Colombia Reports,
June 10, 2014, accessed July 29, 2014, http://colombiareports.co/colombia-begin-peace-process-eln-
newspaper-reports/.
15
Beittel, “Peace Talks in Colombia.”
16
Primary interviews with UNDP, OCHA, UNHCR, OHCHR, and IOM branches in Antioquia, Chocó and
Meta.
17
Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Colombia, accessed September 13, 2014,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/print/country/countrypdf_co.pdf.
18
Constitution of the Republic of Colombia, 1991 (rev. 2005), accessed September 13, 2014,
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia_2005.pdf.

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The breadth and depth of natural resources available in Colombia provides many opportunities
for research on the links between extractive industries and conflict. However for the scope of this
report, research focused on the extraction of gold and oil. Artisanal gold mining in Colombia
dates back to pre-Columbian civilizations. Many Colombians live in communities that have
practiced artisanal mining for centuries and continue to rely on the industry as their main
livelihood.19
However, the rise in gold prices resulting from the 2008 financial crisis created a
modern gold rush. 20
This, combined with the emphasis placed on mining for economic
development by the Santos administration, has led to an influx of corporations into Colombia
and a mining boom.
Oil has been extracted in Colombia for export since the mid-1980s. In 2003, the government
enacted a series of regulatory reforms to attract foreign oil investors, including the creation of the
National Hydrocarbons Agency (ANH) to auction hydrocarbon titles, and partially privatizing
the state oil company, Ecopetrol.21
Since the implementation of these reforms, Colombia has
seen an increase in oil production and export.22
While the natural resources sector can be a powerful engine of growth for Colombia, pursuing
this line of development must be handled with care. Otherwise, it will lay the groundwork for
latent social conflict between local communities, MNCs, and the Colombian government.
Natural resources are also an important source of wealth for illegal armed groups to finance their
operations. Illegal armed groups have targeted multinational and domestic energy companies for
extortion, kidnapping of workers, and threats to attack facilities for ransom. Illegal armed groups
have used these threats as a way to increase political pressure on the government and MNCs. The
entry of MNCs, which are protected by the Colombian National Army and private security firms,
to areas where armed groups operate further increases the potential for a return to the violent
clashes of previous decades.
19
Interview with Echandia Defense Committee of Marmato, Marmato, Caldas, July 11, 2014; Interview with
the Civic Committee of Marmato, Marmato, Caldas, July 11, 2014.
20
Barbey, et al.,“A Return to El Dorado.”
21
United States Energy Information Administration, Colombia, January 7, 2014, accessed July 29, 2014,
http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=CO.
22
United States Energy Information Administration forecasts that Colombian oil production will rise and peak
at 1.3 million bbl/d in 2020. Ibid.

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STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS
The stakeholders identified in this section refer to those actors that play a role in fueling or
mitigating social conflict in Colombia at the national, regional, and local levels. In many
instances, the interests of one stakeholder directly overlap or interfere with the interests of
another, further fueling the effects outlined in the conflict analysis findings. Additionally,
positions and motivations within groups are not always clear, with many groups divided in their
stance on, or approach to, the extractive sector.
Government
National Level Ministries and Agencies
Since 2010, President Santos has sought to turn natural resource extraction into the central
economic engine of prosperity for Colombia. This position has incentivized the government to
prioritize large-scale gold mining and oil extraction by national and multinational corporations,
as evidenced, for example, in the Mining Code (Law 658 of 2001).23
The administration has gone to great lengths to establish an institutional framework that ensures
the industry is regulated, monitored, and boosts economic development. In particular, this has
meant providing national regulatory agencies - including the ANH,24
the National Mining
Agency (ANM),25
and the National Environmental Licensing Authority (ANLA)26
- with the
legal authority to control the bidding, plotting, and issuing of mining and oil extraction titles and
environmental licenses to national and international extractive companies and title holders. As a
result, the national government has great power and authority over these issues. At the same
time, the national government is often perceived by departmental and local authorities as being
unaware of the problems and incompatibilities at the local level, too slow to address local
concerns, and unable to make adequate changes in its policies.27
These institutions have a vested interest in seeing the expansion of the extractive sector. Officials
are often driven by the directive to comply with the party platform encouraging extraction, and
are under pressure to rapidly expand regardless of their ability to do proper environmental and
social due diligence before giving out titles and licenses.
23
The original text of the Mining Code (Law 685 of 2001) can be consulted at the Official Ministry of Mines
and Energy’s Colombia Mines Information System website, accessed September 26, 2014,
http://www.simco.gov.co/Portals/0/ley685_E.pdf.
24
Official ANH website, Agencia Nacional de Hidrocarburos, accessed July 29, 2014,
http://www.anh.gov.co/Paginas/inicio/default.aspx.
25
Official ANM website, Agencia Nacional de Minería, accessed July 29, 2014, http://www.anm.gov.co/.
26
Official ANLA website, Autoridad Nacional de Licencias Ambientales, accessed July 29, 2014,
http://www.anla.gov.co/portal/default.aspx.
27
Interview with Government of Antioquia Secretary of Mines, Medellín, Antioquia, July 10, 2014; interview
with Government of Meta, Secretary of Environment and Energy Mining, Villavicencio, Meta, July 18, 2014;
interview with representative of the Government of Meta, Office of Administrative Planning, Villavicencio,
Meta, July 16, 2014.

13
Departmental Level Agencies
Established by the Ministry of the Environment in 1993, there are 34 Autonomous Regional
Corporations (CARs)28
that act as the primary environmental authority for the 32 departments in
Colombia. 29
Endowed with their own administrative and financial authority, they are
commissioned, by law, to regulate the environmental development projects and mining titles
distributed in the area under their jurisdiction. 30
These corporations are also tasked with
maintaining regional-level relationships with community members and extractive companies.
This includes monitoring extractive companies for potentially non-compliant mining activities
and sanctioning those companies who violate regulations.31
They communicate directly with the
ANH, ANM, and ANLA about potential obstacles to the progress of exploratory mining projects,
but do not have the authority to halt or deter extractive projects - an authority reserved for the
national government.32
Municipal Level Authority
On the municipal level, mayors hold the primary authority for regulating and monitoring the
social welfare of the community under their jurisdiction. As a result of the current influx of
MNCs, particularly in municipalities with extremely viable land for mineral and crude oil
extraction, mayors act as the liaison between the community and extractive companies to address
any social, economic, or political grievances. Mayors often face obstacles in wielding their
authority, given the more powerful capacities of regional and national actors - particularly in
regulating the distribution of titles to MNCs.33
While mayors are responsible for advocating on
behalf of their communities, national policies and the strong economic agenda of national and
multinational companies often limit or corrupt mayoral authority, resulting in substantial social
inequalities, decreased standards of living, and a lack of trust between the mayor and the
citizenry.34
Departmental and local government figures also feel the pressure to comply with the directives
of their superiors to expand the extractive sector, although that pressure is less intense because
they are further removed from the national party. For example, in major oil extraction towns
such as Puerto Gaitán, community leaders of local Juntas de Acción Comunal (JAC), or
community action boards, have the ability to push back on the extractive industry as they
advocate for their communities. However, the motivations of these actors are not cut and dry. As
the extractive industry expands, so do opportunities for corruption. Some community leaders
make money by collecting bribes paid to them by migrants from outside of the town in exchange
28
Official CAR website, Asociación de Corporaciones Autónomas Regionales y de Desarrollo Sostenible,
accessed July 29, 2014, http://www.asocars.org.co/.
29
Ibid.
30
Official Corantioquia website, Corporación Autónoma Regional del Centro de Antioquia, accessed July 29,
2014, http://www.corantioquia.gov.co/.
30
Ibid.
31
Interview with CORMACARENA, Villavicencio, Meta, July 23, 2014.
32
Ibid.
33
Interview with Mayor’s Office Vista Hermosa, Meta, July 17, 2014.
34
Interview with Ombudsman of Meta, Villavicencio, Meta, July 22, 2014.

14
for employment opportunities with large oil companies.35
This means that local government
leaders have a complex set of drivers for their actions.
Local Communities
Campesino Communities
Generally speaking, campesino communities are against the presence of gold and oil companies
in their communities as they are traditionally involved in the agricultural sector and the raising of
livestock. The largest campesino organization in Colombia, the National Association of Peasant
Land Users (ANUC), 36
aims to represent and defend the economic, social, cultural and
constitutional rights of campesino communities granted to them in the 1991 constitutional
reform. Chief among their concerns are poor social services, the loss and contamination of water
sources, population displacement, loss of employees to the extractive industry, and migration.37
Many campesino populations unite their voice by forming roundtables and conducting peaceful
protests.38
However, not all campesinos are united in their opposition to the extractive sector.
Some, particularly youth, see the entrance of the extractive sector as an opportunity to join a
more lucrative industry, creating divisions within communities.39
Indigenous Communities
The current Colombian constitution recognizes and protects historically neglected groups.
Indigenous populations are specifically referenced in the following constitutional articles: Article
171 grants two senators to represent indigenous communities; Article 286 allows indigenous
communities collective ownership of territories, called reservations; and Article 330 affords
indigenous communities the right to freely exercise an autonomous legal system within their
respective reservations.40
Several indigenous organizations have been created in Colombia over
the last 30 years as a result of the 1991 constitutional reform.41
The largest such organization is
known as ONIC, 42
the National Indigenous Organization of Colombia. According to the
indigenous populations the research team has spoken with, the entrance of extractive industries
has created significant social conflicts in their communities.43
Several indigenous populations,
including the Sikuani, Piapoco and Sáliva, have had their nomadic lifestyles disrupted as a result
of extractive companies working on traditionally ancestral indigenous lands. Moreover, because
35
Anonymous interviews.
36
Official ANUC website, Asociacion Nacional de Usuarios Campesinos, accessed July 29, 2014,
http://anuc.co/.
37
Interview with National Association of Peasant Land Users (ANUC), Villavicencio, Meta, July 21, 2014.
38
Focus group with Environmental Roundtable of Jericó, Jericó, Antioquia, July 3, 2014; Resistance
Committee Against Lorito-1, Guamal, Meta, July 19, 2014.
39
Ibid.
40
Constitution of the Republic of Colombia, 1991 (rev. 2005), accessed September 13, 2014,
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia_2005.pdf.
41
The Political Constitution of Colombia, Title XI, Chapter 1, Article 286.
42
Official ONIC website, Organización Nacional Indígena de Colombia, accessed July 29, 2014,
http://cms.onic.org.co/.
43
Focus group with UNUMA, Puerto Gaitán, Meta, July 23, 2014.

15
extractive companies often operate in close proximity to indigenous reservations,44
there are
added concerns of environmental degradation, which threatens the health and wellbeing of
indigenous people. Indigenous populations often spoke about the change in cultural and societal
norms as their youth populations are influenced by the influx of outsiders brought into
communities to work for these extractive companies.45
Afro-Colombian Communities
Unlike indigenous populations, Afro-Colombians were not afforded equal constitutional
protection in 1991. It was not until Law 70 of 1993 that Afro-Colombian populations were
legally afforded protected territorial rights and priority in the distribution of mining titles like
their indigenous counterparts.46
This law also stipulates that Afro-Colombian communities shall
be given first priority when it comes to mining non-renewable natural resources within their
collective territories.47
Situated predominantly along the Pacific coast of the country in the department of Chocó, many
Afro-Colombian communities make a living from artisanal gold mining. However, the national
push for extraction and the presence of armed groups has resulted in the displacement of these
artisanal miners from their lands to make way for larger MNCs and illegal or criminal mining
operations. 48
Medium-scale miners are also displacing many artisanal miners from their
traditional mining areas, which has forced artisanal miners to work for medium-scale mining
businesses due to a lack of other employment opportunities.49
This distinction is important to understand the positions and underlying interests of the small and
medium-scale miners. Artisanal miners have practiced their livelihood for generations. Although
artisanal mining has significant problems, including the use of toxic chemicals, extraction is
generally conducted in a small-scale, and mostly sustainable, manner. However, as medium-
scale miners who are interested in making a profit quickly enter the industry, their interests come
up against those of the artisanal Afro-Colombian miners. Medium-scale miners use heavy
machinery and toxic chemicals that exacerbate the pace of environmental degradation.50
As these
medium-scale miners quickly extract gold from rivers, traditional artisanal practices like panning
can no longer be used to sustain a living. With few other employment opportunities available,
artisanal miners wind up working for those who have displaced their livelihood.51
However, in
44
Ibid.
45
Ibid.
46
Law 70 of the Colombia (1993): In Recognition of the Right of Black Colombians to Collectively Own and
Occupy their Ancestral Lands, translated by Dr. Norma Lozano Jackson and Dr. Peter Jackson, accessed
August 2, 2014, http://www.benedict.edu/exec_admin/intnl_programs/other_files/bc-intnl_programs-
law_70_of_colombia-english.pdf.
47
Ibid.
48
Interview with Chocó Miners Association (Asomichoco), Quibdó, Chocó, July 8, 2014; Interview with a
freelance journalist, Quibdó, Chocó, July 7, 2014.
49
Interview with Chocó Miners Association (Asomichoco), Quibdó, Chocó, July 8, 2014.
50
Interview with Chocó Miners Federation (Fedemichoco), Quibdó, Chocó, July 7, 2014; interview with
Chocó Miners Association (Asomichoco), Quibdó, Chocó, July 8, 2014; interview with a freelance journalist,
and Chocó Women’s Network, Quibdó, Chocó, July 7, 2014.
51
Ibid.

16
spite of the vastly different consequences of, and motivations for, their activities, the government
lumps these two types of miners together as “illegal,” 52
which further increases resentment and
grievances among the small-scale miners toward the government. The government argues that
these “illegal” miners must go through a formalization process to be considered legal. 53
Furthermore, the term “illegal” stigmatizes artisanal miners and causes them to be viewed in a
negative light.
To make matters worse, Afro-Colombians face the worst social service system in all of
Colombia, due to very little state presence in the department. According to a 2005 census
report,54
Chocó ranked last in education, infrastructure and health. A lack of state presence
allows for the extortion of Afro-Colombian artisanal miners by illegal armed groups as well.
Civil Society Organizations
Civil society organizations and NGOs working in local communities aim to unite their concerns
and mediate discussions with government and multinational extractive corporations. These
organizations include religious institutions, human rights organizations, environmental
organizations, and organizations that promote civic participation.55
The power of these actors is
often based on their moral authority and trust from local communities, and they strive to act as an
alternative to government institutions for communities to voice their concerns. However, they are
not necessarily united in their interests and efforts. For example, some churches receive financial
support from extractive corporations, which makes it difficult for them to publicly criticize the
actions, or lack thereof, of said corporations. Other churches attempt to distance themselves from
corporations and work more closely with local communities. This pattern can be seen in a variety
of civil society sectors.56
National & Multinational Extractive Corporations
Since 2010, over 75% of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Colombia has been in the natural
resources sector.57
Large national and international companies, the most dominant including
AngloGold Ashanti, Continental Gold, Gran Colombia Gold, Ecopetrol, and Pacific Rubiales,
possess significant economic and political capital at the national and local level. Given the nature
of their status as for-profit corporations, they have a vested interest in promoting the expansion
of the extractive sector in Colombia.
52
Interview with National Mining Agency in Chocó, Quibdó, Chocó, July 8, 2014.
53
Ibid.; interview with and Ministry of Mines and Energy, Bogotá, D.C., August 1, 2014; interview with
Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development, Bogotá, D.C., July 29, 2014.
54
Rex A. Hudson, Colombia: A Country Study (Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of
Congress, 2010).
55
For example, Pastoral Society, Conciudadania, and Comité Cívico.
56
Focus group with Environmental Roundtable of Jericó, Jericó, Antioquia, July 3, 2014; interview with
Pastoral Society of Puerto Gaitan, Puerto Gaitan, Meta, July 23, 2014.
57
Adriaan Alsema, “Colombia FDI Statistics,” Colombia Reports, June 20, 2012, accessed July 29, 2014,
http://colombiareports.co/colombia-fdi-statistics/.

17
In Colombia, gold mining takes many forms, including artisanal/small-scale, medium-scale and
large-scale mining operations. Artisanal gold mining involves using a pan by riverbeds to collect
the gold that naturally comes off of mountains. Medium-scale mining involves the use of
dredging and backhoe machines to move large quantities of earth. This type of gold mining is
highly controversial as it includes many illegal and/or foreign miners. In order to combat the
illegal operations, Colombian police forces have been known to set fire to these machines in
order to render them inoperable.58
This poses a huge problem for medium-scale miners who
conduct gold mining legally as they are sometimes mistaken for operating illegally. Large-scale
gold mining is conducted specifically by large, MNCs. These companies often hold several land
titles throughout the country. The issuance of land titles can be controversial as they sometimes
overlap with collective Afro-Colombian territories and indigenous reservations.59
In addition, it
is not uncommon for illegal miners to enter a region where a gold mining concession has been
awarded to an MNC, presenting significant difficulties for the multinationals. The mere notion
that gold may be present in a region is enough proof for miners to begin their illegal mining
activities in the area.60
The expansion of the oil industry has created a similar set of dilemmas leading to social conflict
in Colombia. The government has handed over thousands of acres of land to large corporations,
such as Ecopetrol and Pacific Rubiales, through concessions. Some of these land concessions
overlap with indigenous territories, causing friction between indigenous communities and oil
companies.61
In addition, oil industry practices have been known to create large amounts of
wastewater. Pacific Rubiales produces 194,650,647 m3
of wastewater per year through processes
of dehydrating crude oil, of which only 0.22% is re-used.62
The activities and working methods of the extractive industry have had a direct impact on the
development of gold and oil-related social conflict in Colombia. The industry is highly visible,
whom local communities perceive to have incompatible interests over the land and natural
resources in question. For example, in the case of gold mining, when corporations enter mining
towns, small and medium-scale miners are pushed out of the mining sites they were working in,
and these corporations hire only a few local miners.63
The local communities also perceive the
government to give preferential treatment toward MNCs over local miners. 64
However,
multinational mining companies mentioned that this is a myth put forth by the media and the
environmental authority,65
and that in reality, the Colombian government has become stringent
on the extractive activities of the companies, while leaving the illegal miners unregulated.66
58
59
Focus group with Resistance Committee against Lorito-1 in Guamal and Corpohumadea, Villavicencio,
Meta, July 22, 2014. Also confirmed by an interview with CORMACARENA, Villavicencio, Meta, July 23,
2014.
60
Interview with UNDP and UNOCHA officials, Medellín, Antioquia, July 27, 2014.
61
Ibid.
62
Official Pacific Rubiales website, Annual and Sustainability Report 2013, 128, accessed September 28, 2014,
https://asp-es.secure-zone.net/v2/index.jsp?id=5663/11548/24317&lng=en.
63
Interview with Esperanza Minera of Buriticá, Buriticá, Antioquia, July 2, 2014.
64
Ibid.; interview with Echandia Defense Committee of Marmato, Marmato, Caldas, July 11, 2014; Focus
group with Environmental Roundtable of Jericó, Jericó, Antioquia, July 3, 2014.
65
Interview with AngloGold Ashanti, Bogotá, D.C., July 31, 2014.
66
Ibid.

18
Furthermore, in regions where state presence is low, local populations depend on the MNCs to
fill in the role of the state, especially in providing public and social services as well as any
compensation for social economic impact.67
Although companies attempt to engage with the
community by implementing social investment projects, communities still feel that the
companies have not met their requirements. Finally, companies also face security risks and
insufficient information on the conditions on the ground, especially due to the involvement of
armed actors and illegal mining. In such cases, companies are powerless to do much except
report the illegal mining occurring on their titled areas, and ask the government to intervene.68
Therefore, for national and multinational corporations, balancing their need to create profit with
the significant expectations or objections from local communities creates significant challenges
for them to address.
Armed Groups
Today, armed groups such as the FARC and ELN, paramilitaries, and BACRIMs are said to
control over 40% of the nation's cultivable land.69
The FARC alone is recognized as the
wealthiest and the most powerful organized rebel group in Latin America, and currently controls
a quarter of Colombian national territory.70
There are economic, social, and political impacts as a result of the existence of armed groups in
Colombian society. In addition to their heavy involvement in narcotrafficking, armed and
paramilitary groups often participate in an array of illegal activities – including local level
extortion of community and government officials and forced child recruitment – which serve to
instill fear, displace landowners and violate human rights, particularly in areas with little or no
national government presence.
Armed groups, particularly the FARC, have become increasingly involved in the extractives
industry as a way to diversify their sources of funding from cocaine production and other
narcotics. They are highly involved in illegal gold mining. In some cases they operate their own
illegal mines. However in the majority of cases they extort artisanal, small and medium-scale
miners, or provide them with start up funds for mechanized mining operations in exchange for a
portion of the profits.71
The FARC employs similar extortion practices in the supply chain of oil
extraction companies.72
These patterns can be viewed throughout the Colombian extractive
sector, including minerals that were not the focus of this study, such as emerald, tungsten, and
iron.73
The fact that much of the extractive sites are located in regions with very little state
presence makes it easier for them to conduct their business. The involvement of armed actors in
67
Ibid.
68
Ibid.
69
Minority Rights Group International, World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous People: Colombia
Overview, May 2008, accessed July 29, 2014, http://www.minorityrights.org/?lid=5377.
70
Ibid.
71
Anonymous interviews
72
Various interviews in Meta. For example, interview with Pastoral Society in Villavicencio, Meta, July 18,
2014.
73
Interview with a human rights lawyer, Villavicencio, Meta, July 22, 2014.

19
the extractive industry exacerbates social conflict, and raises the potential for it to become a
violent conflict.
Armed groups, including both the FARC and ELN, have strong opinions on the expansion of the
extractive industry, driven by both the ideological foundation of their insurgent movements, and
the development of their complex structure as organized, violent, drug-trafficking organizations.
Given their socialist roots, they generally oppose the entrance of MNCs in Colombia. Thus, in
some communities, demonstrating support for an MNC can lead to violence and put one’s life in
danger.74
The opposition to extractive industries centers on the entrance of multinational actors
into the national economy, which results in the transfer of ownership of land from the Colombian
state and its citizens to private foreign companies. Land reform has always been the key tenant of
the FARCs political platform. State-owned companies, like Ecopetrol, face less opposition by
armed actors than MNCs do.75
However, this is complicated by the fact that their economic
motivations can be at odds with their ideological roots, as the expansion of the extractive sector
provides them with more opportunities to expand their funding sources.
74
75
Interview with the Human Rights Committee of Vista Hermosa, Vista Hermosa, Meta, July 17, 2014.

20
FINDINGS: Drivers of Conflict 76
This section seeks to identify and analyze the root causes, triggers, and effects of local social
conflict stemming from the expansion of extractive industries in Colombia. Many individual
policies, practices, and historical realities contribute to local social conflict. For the sake of
simplicity they have been grouped into overarching themes.
Root Causes
National Government Policy Regarding Extractive Industries
Two national government policies are key to understanding conflict over extractive industries in
Colombia. The first is that under articles 332 and 360 of the Colombian Constitution, the subsoil
and all natural non-renewable resources are property of the Colombian state.77
Private parties
may extract if they are given a title and an environmental license by the national government,
and if royalties are paid to the state. Private ownership of land for homes or farms only applies to
the topsoil. Thus, a tract of land can belong to a farmer but an MNC may also hold a mining title
to that same tract of land. In these cases it is very difficult for the local population to deny
companies access to their land because the government argues that the subsoil belongs to the
state, and they have the right to decide what is done with it. If private campesinos deny MNCs
access to their land, the companies will take them to court, where judges will usually rule that
access must be given to the company in question.78
The second crucial policy is that extractive industries have been declared one of the five
“locomotives,” or engines of growth, for development and job creation in Colombia.79
There is
immense pressure placed on national, departmental and local government agencies to pave the
way for extractive industries. While Colombia’s extractive industries have the potential to
stimulate significant economic growth, they also have the potential to exacerbate the ongoing
internal conflict in Colombia and drive a wedge between local communities and the Colombian
government. Poor natural resources management also has the potential to threaten biodiversity
and decrease environmental sustainability.80
Furthermore, several interviewees also referenced
the phenomenon of “Dutch Disease,” arguing that it can already be seen in local communities
76
See the Problem Tree in Appendix 3 for a visualization of the drivers of conflict.
77
Àlvaro J Rodríguez and Francisco Cabal Posse Herrera Ruiz, “Colombia,” April 14, 2014, Latin Lawyer:
The Business Law Resource for Latin America, accessed July 30, 2014,
http://latinlawyer.com/reference/topics/47/jurisdictions/8/colombia/.
78
Focus group with Resistance Committee against Lorito-1 in Guamal and Corpohumadea, Villavicencio,
Meta, July 22, 2014. Also confirmed by an interview with CORMACARENA, Villavicencio, Meta, July 23,
2014.
79
República de Colombia, Prosperidad para Todos, National Development Plan 2011-2014, 63.
80
OECD/ECLAC, “OECD Environmental Performance Review: Colombia 2014,” OECD Publishing, 2014, 5,
accessed April 30, 2014, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264208292-en.

21
that have taken up mining or allowed oil exploration, as traditional farming livelihoods are
abandoned.81
Lack of Effective State Institutions for Natural Resources Management
One of the principle obstacles to both preventing potential conflict and resolving current conflict
over natural resources extraction is the lack of effective state institutions dedicated to natural
resources management. In Colombia there is a cornucopia of national and departmental agencies
dedicated to natural resources management, previously discussed in the stakeholder analysis.
This includes, but is not limited to, the ANM, ANH, ANLA, the Ministry of the Environment
and Sustainable Development, the Ministry of Mines and Energy, and the CARs. However, these
agencies are uncoordinated, have unclear authority or responsibility, and often have competing
priorities. This is exacerbated by the fact that agencies are renamed or merge every few years as
Colombia continuously restructures to try to improve the system.
For example, the Environmental Secretary in the department of Antioquia refused to take
responsibility for environmental damage caused by mining, as regulating mining is the
responsibility of the CARs.82
However, interviews with various CARs revealed that they often
feel their hands are tied when implementing environmental regulations. An interview with
CORMACARENA, the CAR for the department of Meta, revealed that when they have refused
to give environmental licenses for extraction, they have been overruled by ANLA, which is
heavily influenced by the national government’s policy focus on promoting extraction. When
CORMACARENA fines extractive companies for committing environmental violations,
companies appeal the decision in courts and win their appeals about 50% of the time. 83
Furthermore, since the CARs lack financial and technical resources, they are unable to
effectively regulate companies and address local community concerns.
Lack of Capacity in Local Communities and Ethnic Groups
There is a long history of oppression of indigenous and Afro-Colombian groups, beginning with
the Spanish invasion 500 years ago. As Colombia developed over the centuries, traditional
indigenous ways of life were threatened. This was exacerbated by the armed conflict in
Colombia, which resulted in the displacement of many indigenous communities. Many were
forced to live on indigenous reservations where they could not practice their traditional nomadic
culture, and some indigenous found themselves trapped in guerilla strongholds, unable to leave
or move about freely.84
Afro-Colombian communities were originally brought to Colombia by the slave trade to mine
gold for the Spanish,85
and have historically been dismissed by the Colombian white or mestizo
81
Interview with a freelance journalist, Quibdó, Chocó, July 7, 2014; interview with Chocó Women’s Network,
Quibdó, Chocó, July 7, 2014.
82
Interview with Government of Antioquia Secretary of Environment, Medellín, Antioquia, July 10, 2014.
83
84
85
Interview with a freelance journalist, Quibdó, Chocó, July 7, 2014; interview with Chocó Miners Federation
(Fedemichoco), Quibdó, Chocó, July 7, 2014.

22
elite. The research team witnessed many interviewees refer to the local population in Chocó as
lazy or wanting social services without having to work.
The result of this history is that many indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities are located
in places that have been “left behind” by the state, either because they were never developed in
the first place or because they were abandoned during the height of the armed conflict. Chocó
consistently ranks as the worst department in Colombia in terms of health outcomes, sanitation,
education levels and literacy. This has resulted in the extremely low capacity of these
populations to advocate for their own needs, and act on an equal footing when engaging with the
national government or multinational extractive corporations.
Instability Resulting from Colombia’s Civil War
The effect of Colombia’s decades long civil war cannot be discounted. The effects of the armed
conflict are directly tied to the other root causes discussed in this analysis, and the immediate
triggers of conflict to be discussed in the next section. The continuation of the civil war and poor
security means there is a continued presence of armed actors in areas where natural resources are
abundant. Abundant natural resources actually increase the likelihood of the presence of illegal
armed groups, who seek a foothold in these locations because they provide the opportunity to
conduct their own mining operations or extort local miners for new revenue streams as cocaine
production has fallen. It is estimated that 30% of the FARC’s revenue now comes from illegal
mining activities.86
It is also directly correlated with the historically low state presence in many
regions where extractive industries operate. This low state presence has created power vacuums,
where social services can be taken over by either the armed groups or MNCs.
Triggers
National Government Policy that Favors Multinational Corporations
One of the principle triggers of local social conflict is rooted in the national government policy
that declares extractive industries, and particularly multinational extraction, as a primary driver
of the economy. This establishes a system where national government policy is constructed to
favor the interests of MNCs. This can be seen clearly in the Mining Code of 2001, which fails to
differentiate between artisanal, small, medium and large-scale industrial mining. All actors are
subject to the same regulations and licensing systems, but the infrastructure of the system is built
so that only large companies have the capacity to comply.87
Artisanal and small-scale miners,
many of whom have relied on mining to sustain their livelihood for decades, are suddenly
deemed illegal because they operate without a title. This creates a direct confrontation between
local community miners and MNCs over who has the right to mine on titled land. It also sets up a
direct confrontation between local communities and the government, because under Colombian
86
Briefing by a Security Expert, United Nations Development Programme in Colombia, Bogotá, D.C., June 20,
2014; Edward Fox, “Illegal Mining Colombia’s Biggest Challenge: Police Chief,” InSightCrime, April 23,
2012, accessed July 30, 2014, http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/illegal-mining-colombias-biggest-
challenge-police-chief.
87

23
law the national military and police are obligated to protect whoever holds the title to the land.88
As a result, the Colombian government has actively and violently displaced local miners from
their home territory.89
A similar state-citizen confrontation occurs in the oil producing regions of
Meta, where campesinos who wish to deny oil companies access to their communities, are forced
to allow exploration by national courts.90
National, Departmental and Local Level Corruption
National, departmental and local level corruption related to resource extraction run rampant in
Colombia. The 2010 revision of the 2001 Mining Code, both of which were developed with
extensive industry participation,91
was rescinded by the Colombian courts in 2011 for being
unconstitutional because it was not subjected to prior consultation with indigenous and Afro-
Colombian communities as required by law.92
At the local level, many interviewees spoke of concerted efforts by MNCs to bribe local
community leaders and mayors. These local government figures often participate in employment
agency schemes where they contract with companies to provide local employees, receiving
kickbacks from both the companies and portions of workers’ salaries in exchange for helping
them find jobs.93
This corruption can even threaten the lives of community activists working
against oil companies. Our investigation revealed one case where community activists were
arrested and accused of being guerilla members.94
This, once again, creates a direct confrontation
between local communities and government representatives who are not acting in their best
interests.
Multinational Corporations Fulfilling the Role of the State
The potent combination of a national government policy that promotes MNC investment, low
local citizen capacity to create basic social services infrastructure (such as health, sanitation, and
education facilities), and the fact that many extractive companies are operating in places that
have historically been abandoned by the state, has meant that in many communities, MNCs have
had to fulfill the role of providing public services traditionally held by the government. This
triggers multiple types of conflict in local communities. (1) There is conflict between the
community and the companies because community members who hold very high expectations
believe companies are not doing enough to address their dire needs, while benefiting from their
immense natural resources. (2) Communities themselves become divided between those who
want the MNCs to extract and those who do not. While some members (particularly farmers) see
multinational extraction as a direct threat to their livelihood, others view it as an opportunity to
earn higher salaries and gain the social services they desperately need.
88
Interview with National Mining Agency in Chocó, Quibdó, Chocó, July 8, 2014.
89
90
91
Interview with The Environmental Research Institute of the Pacific, Quibdó, Chocó, July 9, 2014.
92
Diana Maria Ocampo and Sebastian Agudelo, “Country Study: Colombia,” Americas Quarterly, Spring
2014, accessed July 31, 2014, http://www.americasquarterly.org/content/country-study-colombia.
93
Interview with a journalist, Llano 7 Dias, Villavicencio, Meta, July 17, 2014; Interview with a human rights
lawyer, Villavicencio, Meta, July 22, 2014.
94
Interview with the Human Rights Committee of Vista Hermosa, Vista Hermosa, Meta, July 17, 2014.

24
Environmental Damage
Environmental damage is the primary trigger of direct conflict between communities and MNCs,
and was discussed in every community visited by the research team. Many environmental
concerns, such as air pollution and its health affects, particularly on children, were discussed by
local communities. However, the primary concern of all communities interviewed was access to
clean water. In Chocó, the Río Quito was described to the research team as “toxic” due to the use
of mercury, cyanide, and other chemicals by both artisanal and small-scale industrial miners.95
In
Jericó, a campesino coffee-producing area in Antioquia with possible gold resources, the
Environmental Roundtable has actively organized to fight potential extraction.96
AngloGold
Ashanti claims they are not yet exploring, but are only establishing a presence in Jericó.97
However, according to the Roundtable, AngloGold Ashanti is actively exploring and is already
diverting water supplies meant for coffee farms. There are signs all over town that read “yes to
water, no to mining.”98
The campesino communities in Meta express similar concerns regarding
the contamination of rivers that provide water to farms, and can be seen conducting
demonstrations and road blocks while wearing T-shirts that say “water or petroleum?”99
Presence of Armed Groups
Finally, the presence of armed groups can be a direct trigger for conflict in places where they
have an active presence, such as in Meta and Chocó. There are many ways in which the
combination of active mining operations and the presence of armed actors create conflict. (1)
Extractive industries fuel the national armed conflict, as illegal armed groups extract minerals
themselves, extort small-scale miners,100
and extort Colombian subcontractors in the supply
chain of multinational oil companies.101
(2) Tension is created between the state and local
artisanal miners who are termed “illegal” because of their mining practices. “Illegal” is a loaded
term in Colombia because its use conjures up associations with illegal armed groups. Oftentimes,
its use to describe someone, even for an unrelated activity, can put his or her life in danger. (3)
Conflict can occur between armed groups, paramilitaries, or organized criminal drug trafficking
networks as they compete for control over resource-rich territory.102
Effects of Social Conflict
Destruction of Economic Livelihoods of Local Populations
95
Interview with a freelance journalist, Quibdó, Chocó, July 7, 2014.
96
Focus group with Environmental Roundtable of Jericó, Jericó, Antioquia, July 3, 2014.
97
Interview with AngloGold Ashanti, BogotáBogotá, D.C., July 31, 2014.
98
Focus group with Environmental Roundtable of Jericó, Jericó, Antioquia, July 3, 2014.
99
Resistance Committee Against Lorito-1, Guamal, Meta, July 19, 2014.
100
101
Elyssa Pachico, “FARC Step Up Extortion: Multinationals Targeted,” InSightCrime, September 6, 2011,
accessed August 1, 2014, http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/farc-step-up-extortion-multinationals-
targeted.
102
Interview with a freelance journalist, Quibdó, Chocó, July 7, 2014; Interview with Chocó Miners
Association (Asomichoco), Quibdó, Chocó, July 8, 2014; anonymous interviews.

25
Social conflict has substantial and multifaceted effects. First, social conflict generated by
extractive industries has significantly impacted economic livelihoods of local populations. Local
farmers leave their jobs to become small-scale gold miners or work for multinational oil
corporations due to the high wages the industry provides. Farm and agri-business owners often
lose their employees, as they cannot compete with the high salary that MNCs pay their
workers.103
Because extractive work is often temporary in nature, but other industries are
crowded out, many workers are often left unemployed for months at a time. As a result, local
populations have become highly dependent on the extractive industries for employment.
For example, in the town of Puerto Gaitán in Meta, rural farmers are paid $2-3 a day, whereas oil
workers for large companies are paid up to $100 a day.104
However, these are short-term
assignments; employees working for oil companies work in oil fields for 25 days and then they
would have to leave and work in cities for 7 days.105
Moreover, these jobs are often taken by
outside migrants, and locals end up with worse jobs where they can work for one month but are
left jobless for the next 6 months.106
Despite the fact that Puerto Gaitán receives $50 million a
year in oil royalties, oil workers work in dire conditions and social services remain depressed.107
In the municipality of Guamal in Meta, local citizens must work for the state oil company,
Ecopetrol, because there is no work available elsewhere. They work for Ecopetrol despite their
awareness that the company employs damaging environmental practices. 108
Some local
landowners sell their land to MNCs at discounted rates in order to make money because the land
is no longer suitable for farming.109
Others, especially vulnerable populations such as the Afro-
Colombian communities in Chocó and the indigenous communities in Meta, are displaced from
their lands due to historically ambiguous land titles and corporations entering their lands.110
Destabilization and Fragmentation of Societies
The social conflict has also destabilized and fragmented societies. The discovery of gold and oil
has resulted in the massive migration of outsiders into small towns which do not have the
capacity, nor the resources, to provide essential public social services, such as health, education,
and infrastructure, to the growing population. For example, in Puerto Gaitán, the population of
the town doubled from 17,500 in 2005 to 30,000 in 2014,111
putting enormous pressure on the
municipal government’s provision of public services to the population. Family units are often
destroyed as parents who work for oil companies leave their children at home alone for weeks at
103
Interview with Pastoral Society of Puerto Gaitán, Puerto Gaitán, Meta, July 23, 2014.
104
Primary interview with IOM in Meta, Villavicenvio, Meta, July 14, 2014.
105
Ibid.
106
Ibid.
107
Daniel Trotta, “Feature: Labor Unrest Taking Shine Off Colombia’s Oil Boom,” Reuters, November 24,
2011, accessed January 4, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/24/colombia-oil-
idUSN1E7A505O20111124.
108
109
Resistance Committee Against Lorito-1, Guamal, Meta, July 19, 2014.
110
Interview with Chocó Miners Federation (Fedemichoco), Quibdó, Chocó, July 7, 2014; Interview with
Government of Meta Office of Indigenous Affairs, Villavicencio, Meta, July 15, 2014; Interview with
Humanitarian Roundtable of Meta (MACUPAZ), Villavicencio, Meta, July 21, 2014.
111
Interview with Municipal Government of Puerto Gaitán Ombudsman, Puerto Gaitán, Meta, July 23, 2014.

26
a time. Local populations complain of the bad influences outsiders bring to their communities,
including alcoholism, drug use, prostitution, child labor, and teen pregnancy, all of which further
destabilizes societies.112
For example, Buritica, which was a sleepy farming village in Antioquia
only a few years ago quickly became a gold rush frontier town with mines, makeshift huts,
prostitutes, drugs, and narco-paramilitaries now engaged in illegal gold mining.113
Communities are also divided over their stance toward the MNCs. Some community leaders
receive funding from MNCs, which results in their support of these companies. Other leaders
make money by extorting both local populations and outside workers. These people are forced to
pay a fee and in return are offered help in obtaining employment with oil companies.114
Violence and Displacement
The brewing social conflict has resulted in violence and displacement of populations. In gold
mining, small-scale and artisanal miners are lumped together with the illegal miners whom are
associated with illegal armed groups, and the national government has sent the military to clear
their mining sites and destroy their equipment.115
The extent to which these small-scale miners
are associated with illegal armed groups is unclear. While there is broad consensus that artisanal
miners are independent miners whose historical way of life should be protected, the case for
small and medium-scale industrialized miners is ambiguous at best. Several interviewees
suggested that given the financial resources required to purchase mechanized mining equipment,
the most likely scenario is that these actors are relying on illegal funds, provided by either armed
actors or criminal networks.116
Corporate interviewees expressed their willingness to work with
artisanal miners to help them modernize their practices and sustain their way of life. However,
they were not willing to compromise on working with illegal small and medium-scale miners
working on their land without a title.117
Regardless of the extent to which these actors should be considered illegal, the situation has
resulted in small-scale miners being injured and losing highly valuable property, which has
created strong resentment against the way that the national government has intervened in the
situation.118
These practices undermine the state-citizen relationship, causing local communities
to call into question whether or not the government is “on their side,” or merely acting as an
extension of MNCs whom they believe are taking resources that should belong to the local
community. Stigmatization of the local population for being associated with armed groups by the
112
Interview with Esperanza Minera of Buriticá, Buriticá, Antioquia, July 2, 2014; interview with Chocó
Miners Association (Asomichoco), Quibdó, Chocó, July 8, 2014; focus group with Environmental and
Agricultural Association Committee of Puerto Gaitán (ACAAC), Puerto Gaitán, Meta, July 23, 2014
113
James Bargent, “Colombia’s Wild West: Gold, Prostitutes, and Urabeños,” InSightCrime, November 19,
2013, accessed January 4, 2015, http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/the-illegal-gold-rush-and-
colombias-new-wild-west.
114
Interview with a journalist, Llano 7 Dias, Villavicencio, Meta, July 17, 2014; Interview with a human rights
lawyer, Villavicencio, Meta, July 22, 2014.
115
116
Anonymous interview.
117
Interview with Ashmont Resources Corp, Bogotá, D.C., July 31, 2014.
118
Interview with Chocó Miners Federation (Fedemichoco), Quibdó, Chocó, July 7, 2014; interview with
Chocó Miners Association (Asomichoco), Quibdó, Chocó, July 8, 2014.

27
government is also common in towns where gold and oil are extracted.119
The absence of space
for local communities to voice their concerns, the lack of municipal and departmental
government’s capacity to address their concerns, and the national government’s inertia to create
policy change has resulted in protests and road blockades by local communities.120
Some are
peaceful protests, while others have turned violent, leading to clashes between the local
population and military forces.
In both gold mining and oil extraction, armed groups and paramilitaries continue to extort money
from the MNCs as well as the local populations, maintaining their control of territories and
increasing their funding for the ongoing armed conflict.
Finally, the entrance of multinational gold and oil companies has exacerbated the displacement
of local, Afro-Colombian, and indigenous populations, which was already a severe problem
caused by the presence of illegal armed groups.121
Indigenous and Afro-Colombian populations
are assigned 30 million and 7 million hectares of protected lands respectively.122
However, as
mining continues to expand, the Colombian government has issued subsoil titles in indigenous
and Afro-Colombian reserves. In 2011, 168 mining titles were granted in indigenous reserves
and requests for 978 more were pending.123
Similarly, 236 mining titles were granted in Afro-
Colombian territories with 1,868 pending requests.124
With respect to crude oil, 8.8 million
hectares of indigenous reserves are designated oil areas.125
Many of these titles were issues
without prior consultation with the indigenous groups on social and environmental issues.126
As a
result, indigenous and Afro-Colombians are being forcefully displaced directly because of the
demands of oil or mining projects, or indirectly because of the environmental degradation and
increased presence of armed groups as extractive activities take place in these territories.127
Just
in 2012, 44 cases of mass displacement of indigenous communities occurred throughout
Colombia, displacing a total of 12,304 people.128
One Sikuani representative of UNUMA in
Puerto Gaitán in the department of Meta summed up that the Sikuani community has been
displaced first by the guerillas during the armed conflict, second by the evangelicals coming into
their reserves, and third by the oil industry.129
119
Interview with Esperanza Minera of Buriticá, Buriticá, Antioquia, July 2, 2014; Interview with Chocó
Miners Association (Asomichoco), Quibdó, Chocó, July 8, 2014; Resistance Committee Against Lorito-1,
Guamal, Meta, July 19, 2014.
120
Protests (both peaceful and violent) have occurred in each of the case studies researched.
121
Interview with a freelance journalist, Quibdó, Chocó, July 7, 2014,
122
Andrea Armeni, “Mining: The Risks for Afro-Colombians and the Indigenous,” Americas Quarterly, Fall
2011, accessed January 4, 2015, http://www.americasquarterly.org/node/3040.
123
Ana Vincente et al., Mining in Colombia: At What Cost?, PBI Colombia, Newsletter No. 17, November
2011, 15, accessed January 4, 2015,
http://www.peacebrigades.org/fileadmin/user_files/projects/colombia/files/colomPBIa/111203_mining_in_col
ombia_web.pdf.
124
Ibid.
125
Ibid.
126
Ibid.
127
Leila Kazemi, Mining in Colombia: A Background Brief, Submitted to the Social Science Research Council
and The Ford Foundation, June 2013, 23.
128
WOLA, “Rights of Colombian Indigenous Groups Under Threat,” April 5, 2013, accessed January 4, 2015,
http://www.wola.org/commentary/rights_of_colombian_indigenous_groups_under_threat.
129

28
Existing laws and institutions do not appear to be improving the situation. For example, the
Victims and Land Restitution Law 1448 of 2011 was introduced to return or replace lands which
were seized or abandoned during the armed conflict in Colombia, and indigenous populations
were intended to be some of the primary beneficiaries of the law. 130
However, since the
government does not coordinate land restoration and issuing subsoil titles, some of the lands
being returned have already been designated for extractive projects.131
Furthermore, it has been
reported that Afro-Colombian victims were denied to participate in the construction of Law
1448, despite the Colombian Constitution recognizing Afro-Colombians’ right to free, prior,
informed consultation and consent before the implementation or approval of any legislation or
public policy that would potentially affect them.132
For Colombia, which already has the largest population of internally displaced persons in the
world, the expansion of extractive industries in protected territories is exacerbating the already
dire situation.
130
Ibid.
131
Ibid.
132
WOLA, “Afro-Colombian Victims Ignored in Development of Victims’ Law,” November 22, 2011,
accessed January 4, 2015,
http://www.wola.org/publications/afro_colombian_victims_ignored_in_development_of_victims_law.

29
RECOMMENDATIONS
Colombian Government
The Colombian government is well equipped to correct cleavages in its national policies without
deterring from its goal of economic prosperity through natural resource extraction. To do so,
however, it will have to address inconsistencies. As a result of our research, we recommend the
following:
Increase efficiency, coordination, and communication amongst all relevant ministries and
agencies by:
- Expanding the physical presence of national authorities in cities outside of Bogotá,
particularly by establishing ANH, ANM, and ANLA joint field offices in regions with
high extractive industry activity, and delegating authority to address issues raised by
members of society and local governments. For example, if there is a community concern
about methods of oil extraction in Meta, it should be handled by the regional offices of
ANH, ANM, and ANLA in Villavicencio, the capital city of Meta, not Bogotá. This way,
local governments (departmental and municipal) and CARs can easily coordinate with
these field offices, and do not have to travel to or take time for correspondence with
Bogotá. Since ANLA and CARs both issue environmental licenses to companies
conducting exploitation work, having an ANLA office in the filed will increase
coordination with the local CAR and eliminate overlap in responsibilities.
- Streamlining the responsibilities of government agencies in Bogotá specifically ANH,
ANM, ANLA, the Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development, the Ministry
of Mines and Energy, and the Ministry of the Interior to improve management of
Colombia’s natural resources. This should include addressing the uneven distribution of
regulatory authority and overlapping mandates which often leads to “baton-passing” and
accountability failures. In addition, we recommend the above agencies to hold a weekly
meeting spearheaded by the Ministry of Mines and Energy to report and discuss cases
and issues that require interagency coordination, and to discuss ways to improve current
policies.
- Improving and expanding the technical capacity of government employees tasked with
extractive industry oversight by hiring and training a significantly expanded corps of in-
house technicians and field experts to evaluate and analyze short-term and long-term
effects of corporate projects and their effects on local communities. Such hiring and
training of personnel should be especially strengthened in the departmental and municipal
government. This will fill a capacity gap in the local agencies tasked with oversight,
which, at times, must rely on extractive industry companies they are supposed to evaluate
for technical assessments of impact.

30
Reassess Colombia's extraction policies and constitutional provisions, noting in particular:
- Those provisions that create foreseeable or unforeseeable effects on local populations,
particularly in the areas of physical and economic livelihood, health, education, and
environmental preservation.
- The divisive relationship between "topsoil" and "subsoil" and how the distinction allows
for social and economic unrest between local communities and the state.
- The relative ease for ANH and ANM to distribute land titles and ANLA to distribute
environmental license without consulting local communities or authorities, which results
in potential social conflict. We recommend the government to implement stricter
prerequisites for extractive companies to operate. Specifically, we recommend that before
ANH and ANM issue land titles to companies for exploration, extractive companies must
obtain an environmental license from ANLA as well as conduct prior consultation with
local communities to obtain a social license from the Ministry of the Interior, and repeat
this process once more when companies want to move onto the exploitation phase.
- The lack of differentiation between artisanal, small-scale, medium-scale, and large-scale
mining regulations in the current Mining Code of 2001. The government should devise a
system that provides support to artisanal miners who have low capacity to comply with
regulations, rather that applying a one-size-fits-all standard. Specifically, national
agencies in Bogotá should delegate authority to joint offices of ANH, ANM, and ANLA
in the fields to conduct the formalization processes of artisanal and “illegal” miners, so
that the process is conducted in a more rapid and efficient manner. With respect to
“illegal” miners who do not comply with the regulations, both the local government and
the national government must coordinate with the police and the military to enforce
penalties.
Revise the current policy governing prior consultations with local communities to better
accommodate the needs of all relevant stakeholders by:
- The Ministry of the Interior mandating prior consultations not just for constitutionally
protected groups (indigenous and Afro-Colombian populations), but for all Colombian
groups including campesinos, to increase transparency and ensure that all Colombian
stakeholders have been consulted and informed on the economic, social, and
environmental impacts of natural resource extraction before exploration work is
undertaken. All communities, regardless of protected status, have a stake in the entrance
of extractive industries to their communities.
- As mentioned above, requiring any and all extractive corporations seeking land in
Colombia to obtain a social license, in addition to environmental licenses, before both the
exploration or exploitation phases of extraction, to demonstrate a commitment to
accountable extraction and the acknowledgement of potential social conflicts that could
result (this includes, but is not limited to, conflicts over health services, school systems,
police services, housing, and food resources).

31
Reassess the evaluation and compliance assessment mechanism for corporate actors to:
- Implement a system of checks and balances to monitor corporate adherence to national,
regional, and local level extraction policies, particularly in the protection of the
environment and human rights. This system should incorporate periodic reviews for
compliance throughout the term of the extraction title, and have built-in mechanisms for
instituting sanctions when violations are observed.
Corporations
MNCs have obtained land titles and environmental licenses from the government to extract
natural resources in Colombia. Current regulatory policies and company goals, however, have
led to increased environmental degradation and local-level social conflicts that will harm
communities and hinder corporation progress as long as they go unresolved. As a result of our
research, we recommend the following:
Thoroughly researchtargeted exploitation areas before acquiring land titles in order to:
- Ensure they do not overlap with legally protected lands owned by protected
communities.
- Foresee potential barriers to amicable relationships between companies and local
communities in the short-term. We recommend companies to conduct a detailed conflict
analysis to better understand the history of previous commitments made by the extractive
industries with the community, as well as ongoing points of contention.
- Plan accordingly to avoid current and future social conflicts stemming from
miscommunication or disagreements over community and corporate rights to land.
Develop a two-pronged community needs assessment strategy that:
- Plays an active role in the prior consultation process by demanding in-depth studies of
all extraction sites to assess the social, economic, and developmental needs of the
relevant community and discuss the services that the company can provide in a
sustainable manner.
- Pursues two lines of corporate social responsibility and development projects. One line
should be devoted to addressing short-term development needs in the community so the
community can see the direct benefits to the entrance of extractive companies, such as
providing employment, financing the building of infrastructure, and investing in water
sanitation and sewage system. This will also mitigate social unrest stemming from the
belief that extractive companies are taking resources without bringing benefits to the
community. The second line should be devoted to building long-term sustainability
projects that hone technical skill development and build local capacity, such as providing
education and technical training programs, and investing in the agricultural industry.

32
These social investment projects by the extractive industries must be more integrated in
local development plans initiated by the local government.
Development of a transparent hiring process that:
- Provides sustainable employment opportunities to local citizens. This system should be
wholly owned and managed by representatives of the corporation to prevent potential
bribery and corruption by local leaders, as well as payment of overly inflated salaries that
destroy employment in other sectors such as agriculture and manufacturing.
Civil Society
It is imperative that civil society plays a greater role in ensuring the protection of local
communities within the framework of current extractive policies. As a result of our research, we
recommend the following:
Strengthen the effectiveness of existing roundtable platforms by:
- Consolidating those of similar nature (i.e. environmental, gender-based, violence-based,
etc.) to develop specific and quantifiable goals to express to national and corporate level
representatives.
Prioritize the education of citizens in their constitutional role, responsibilities, and
extraction rights, particularly to:
- Effectively object to harmful extractive projects that directly or indirectly affect the
community's social, economic, physical, and personal wellbeing.
- Be more informed of constitutional rights in the prior consultation process as well as
appropriate mechanisms for expressing dissent.
Develop sustainable networks of communication between local communities and
government and corporate representatives in Bogotá to ensure community concerns are
properly transmitted to the national authorities. This will mean:
- Holding community level group leaders accountable for effective communication with
national and local government officials as well as extractive companies.
- Encouraging commitment by civil society organizations to staying engaged in policies
and decisions made in Bogotá .
United Nations Development Programme
UNDP should be commended on its involvement in the peace process. It should also, however,
be looking ahead to the potential threat that natural resources pose to that peace. The research

33
team believes that the UN, and UNDP in particular, has the capacity to be an important and
effective actor in preventing social conflict associated with resource extraction. Community field
visits revealed that the UN is overwhelmingly respected and trusted, and believed to be capable
of assisting communities. For UNDP, creating a natural resources strategy that addresses the
potential for violence will bolster its peacebuilding agenda, while allowing it to begin engaging
on what is one of the key pillars of post-conflict development in Colombia. An effective strategy
that addresses the negative impact of extractive industries on conflict will protect the
peacebuilding accomplishments and gains that have already been established. As a result of our
research, we recommend the following:
To UNDP Bogotá:
Develop a natural resources strategy that addresses the potential for violence that could
undermine its peacebuilding agenda by:
- Addressing the issue of social conflicts stemming from extractive industries as a joint
project on post-conflict development and state building amongst the peace,
governance, and economic development departments in the office, and increase
coordination among these departments. The social conflict stemming from extractive
industries encompass all issues faced by Colombia – peacebuilding, economic
development, and state building. Therefore, this must be addressed by all the relevant
departments and experts involved. The peace process will not succeed if local
communities continue to face insecurity by MNCs and illegal armed groups and have
no trust in the government.
- Conducting a country-wide survey and developing a measurement tool to gather
information on effects of extractive industries on local communities with the help of
UNDP’s regional offices.
- Conducting conflict analysis on the impact of extractive industries on local
communities, particularly in the areas of: local governance, health, education,
environmental degradation, and human rights, with the assistance of UNDP’s regional
offices. Draw common issues across region and industry and focus work on
improving those issues.
Increase coordination with UNDP regional offices around the country by:
- Jointly conducting the above mentioned survey and conflict analysis on the impact of
extractive industries on local communities.
- Holding a weekly conference call to report and discuss the issue with all UNDP
regional offices in Colombia.
- Sending representatives from the Bogotá office to all regional offices once a month to
increase communication and coordination, and visit concerned local communities.

34
Facilitate dialogue between local communities and national government ministries as well
as MNCs by:
- Establishing connections with MNCs and national government ministries specifically
ANH, ANM, ANLA, Ministry of Mines and Energy, Ministry of Environment and
Sustainable Development, and Ministry of the Interior.
- Holding regular meetings with these actors and conveying concerns of the local
communities, as well as facilitating a constructive dialogue between the two sides.
To UNDP Antioquia:
Prioritize addressing the social conflict stemming from gold mining by:
- Designating more personnel in charge of addressing the issue, especially in Quibdó,
Chocó, to establish more connections with the local government, miners, and mining
companies.
- In Antioquia, establishing connections and increase dialogue with Antioquia
government and CARs.
- Increasing work on educating and informing gold miners of their rights and
regulations they are required to comply with, and facilitate dialogue with local
government and MNCs.
Increase communication and coordination with UNDP Bogotá Office by:
- Holding department level expressive forums for resource-rich communities to express
individual or group grievances regarding the effect of MNC presence in their
communities noting that local communities are looking to higher authorities to be a
source of understanding and action and are often ignored when trying to express
grievances and human rights violations.
- Conducting a survey to gather information on effects of extractive industries on local
communities and then conducting an analysis on the social conflict and its effects
particularly in the areas of: local governance, health, education, environmental
degradation, and human rights.
- Conveying the findings and information gathered from the above forums, surveys,
and conflict analysis to UNDP Bogotá Office, and jointly conduct analysis on the
social conflict stemming from gold mining in Antioquia.
- Receive representatives from the Bogotá Office and conduct visits and interviews
with local communities.
- Participate in weekly conference call with the Bogotá Office and other regional
offices, report developments, gain understanding on issues in other regions, and
develop ways to implement UNDP’s extractive industry strategy.

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