1. The CIA in Afghanistan
9/11 to Tora Bora
Annotated briefing prepared by Jeremiah Granden for
Dr. Michael Salomone: August 4, 2012
2. Afghanistan from the Soviet Invasion to the
Mujahideen Civil War: 1979-1996
• Marxist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan
coup in 1979
– Attempt to establish communist vanguard prompts popular
rebellion
– Soviet invasion in support of new client state
• U.S./Saudi/Pakistani Aid to Mujahideen
– American anti-Soviet strategy
– Religious war for oil-rich Saudi donors and young Arab
fighters
– Pakistan’s geopolitical strategy
• Soviet Retreat in 1987
– Power struggle between mujahideen factions
3. The Taliban and al-Qaeda: 1996-2001
• Taliban Movement
– Born out of madrassas in western Pakistan
– Promotes radical version of Salafist Islam
– Gained power because of pervasive instability
– Repressive control of everyday life with religious
fatwas and severe punishment
– Resisted by Northern Alliance
• Al-Qaeda enters Afghanistan
– Bin Laden driven out of Sudan, uses massive wealth
to “purchase” Afghanistan as safe haven.
4. Life in a Terrorist Training Camp in
Afghanistan
• Most recruits access country through Pakistan
• Key features of training regimen
– Physical training in the form of mountain runs
– Standard features of military life such as guard duty
– Highly egalitarian environment
– Extensive weapons, explosives, and tactical training
– Some discussion of chemical and nuclear weapons
– Brief, specialized training for some camp visitors
– Religious instruction in evenings
• Recruits and Trainers
– Men hailing from throughout the Arab world
• Mainly young males, but ages range from children to older
Saudi “tourists”
– Pervasive dislike for their Taliban hosts
5. Dealing With the al-Qaeda Threat Prior to
9/11
• Options restricted by capabilities and attitudes
– Northern Alliance tracking bin Laden, unclear what to
do when he was found
• Cruise missile strike? Kidnapping?
– Concern about overcommitment to Northern Alliance
• Northern Alliance’s lack of moral legitimacy
• Risk of alienating Pakistan
• Terrorism not significant part of popular political
discourse in lead up to 9/11
6. 9/11 and the Policy Response
• Difficulties of retaliating against al-Qaeda
– Didn’t want to rely on cruise missiles (pound sand)
– Afghanistan landlocked/no bases nearby
– Conventional military preparations would take months
• CIA director George Tenet’s plan
– Send in small paramilitary teams to link up with NA
and support bombing campaign.
– Expansion of intelligence agency power and activity
• Multiple risks involved
• The Iraq Question
7. The CIA National Clandestine Service: A
Brief Overview
• Mission
– Collect human intelligence worldwide, usually under
diplomatic cover
– Perform other functions
• CIA effectiveness depends on disposition of
POTUS
– Fared well under JFK, LBJ, Reagan, G.H.W. Bush
– Fared poorly under Nixon and Carter
– Clinton relied on Agency in war against al-Qaeda but
didn’t seem to trust in its capabilities, rarely displayed
the “stomach” for high risk clandestine operations
9. The Jawbreaker Team: September 26th to
October 6th
• Team composition
– Five case officers, a medic, and a communications
specialist, all veteran operators
– Led by Gary Schroen
• Mission
– Distribute money
– GPS mapping and intelligence gathering
• Strategy
– Break the Taliban with massive bombing
– Split the north and south
10. The Bombing Campaign, Problems on the
Ground, and Bureaucratic Battles: October 7-
October 21
• Limited success in initial bombing
– Several off-limit targets
– Taliban showed no signs of weakening
• Lack of focus on Kabul
– Bombing focused on north, possibly to delay problem
of Northern Alliance taking capital
– Reckless insertion of Special Forces “A-Team,”
problem with military uniforms
• Bureaucratic battles
– Struggle for control between DOD and CIA
11. Slow Progress: October 22-October 31
• The Kabul front
– Despite laser targeting, Kabul bombing hadn’t improved
– Tajiks stayed dug in
• Mazar-e Sharif
– Cavalry charges and precision bombing driving Taliban
north
• The South
– Karzai begins operating in Pashtun south
• Qandahar
– Ranger attack on airport, series of raids
• Schroen’s cable to headquarters
12. Victory in Kabul and the North: November 1-
November 14
• CENTCOM starts bombing Kabul front
– Northern Alliance ultimatum
– Heavy bombing on November 12 shatters Taliban line
• Mass panic and despair
• Victory in the north
– Mazar-e Sharif and Talaqan taken, Konduz surrounded,
Bimiyan on the verge, gains in Herat and Ghowr province
• Northern Alliance marches on Kabul
– Close fighting for several hours
– Taliban mass retreats
– Laser targeting remaining pockets of resistance
– Kabul under Northern Alliance control by November 14
13. The Demise of the Taliban and the High
Cost of War: November 15- December 5
• Kunduz
– Trapped Pakistani ISI and Frontier Corps airlifted out
• Qandahar
– Taliban force sent to kill Karzai destroyed as it leaves city
– Mullah Omar flees, Qandahar falls
• Prison riot at Qala-I Jangi fortress
– Death of Mike Spann
• Cost on Afghan people
– Noncombatant bombing casualties, Pashtuns targeted by
warlords, displacement, famine
14. The Battle of Tora Bora: December 1-
December 16
• Caves of Tora Bora
• The Combatants
– Three separate Afghan militias
– Limited U.S. troop presence
– Pakistan to secure AfPak border
• The Assault
– Snow, fierce resistance, intergroup rivalry, Ramadan
– Cease fire negotiations allow estimated 800 al-Qaeda fighters to
escape into Pakistan
– Only twenty holdouts found when all caves were cleared
• Bin Laden’s Escape
– Bernsten - CIA intercepted radio transmission of UBL’s voice
– Smucker – Bin Laden walked into Pakistan in late November
– Tommy Franks and CENTCOM blamed
15. Conclusions
• Reasons for success
– Strengths of the CIA
– Laser targeting
– Side switching
– Northern Alliance
• Main point of failure
– Reliance on local forces and Pakistan in the pursuit of bin Laden
• Viability as a case study
– Tactical and strategic measures can be reapplied
– Conditions specific to Afghanistan cast doubt on universality
– Potential for backfire, inherent limitations
• Why the operation was a success
– Low cost way to fight an urgent war in a challenging environment
