2016 09-19 - stephan jou - machine learning meetup v1

© 2016 Interset Software Inc. 1
© 2016 Interset Software Inc.
CATCHING BAD GUYS WITH MATH:
REAL WORLD DATA SCIENCE USE CASES FOR
CYBERATTACK DETECTION AND PREVENTION
Machine Learning Ottawa Meetup
Ottawa, September 2016
For internal use only. Confidential.

Hey. I’m Stephan Jou. I like analytics.
• CTO at Interset
• Previously: Cognos and IBM’s Business
Analytics CTO Office
• Big data analytics, visualization, cloud,
predictive analytics, data mining, neural
networks, mobile, dashboarding and
semantic search
• M.Sc. in Computational Neuroscience
and Biomedical Engineering, and a dual
B.Sc. in Computer Science and Human
Physiology, all from the University of
Toronto

Enterprise Threat
Detection Through The
Science Of
Behavioral Analytics
What I Do

About Interset
At Interset, we catch bad guys with math.
• Data science and machine learning on big data
analytics technologies
• Cover multiple cybersecurity use cases
• Based in Ottawa, ON
• Award winning threat detection platform
• Successful deployments across multiple verticals
• Clients include US Intelligence Communities.
And a leader in security analytics.

Effective and Principled Math

Highly Scalable

Intuitive and Consumable

What Do These Attacks Have in Common?

Lessons:
• Make sure your partners are secure
– Hacked (SQL Injection) a partner with a weak
network
– Stole user names and passwords
• Identities & machines are “entities”
– They acted in highly anomalous ways
– Moved large amounts of data
– Moved data to exfiltration points
– At four companies and the US Army!
There was plenty of evidence
and time if only it was visible!
“if we do this right, we will make a million
dollars each…” “we could have already sold
them for Bitcoins which would have been
untraceable if we did it right. It could have
already been easily an easy 50 grand.”
Who Are These Guys?

Lessons:
• Disgrunted insiders employees can be
at risk
• What were the anomalies?
– Copied 16,000 documents within five
days of receiving severance
There was plenty of evidence and time if
only it was visible!
Who Are These Two?

Lessons:
• Most attacks are from users/identities
with proper access
• Attacker stayed under the radar for
years
• Third parties (US Intelligence) most
often uncovers the attack
• What were the anomalies?
– Accessing data not related to his job
– Moving data in ways that same role users
were not – over time
– Money problems
There was plenty of evidence and time
if only it was visible!
And This Guy?

Attackers are Fast
Defenders are Slow
Alert Overload
AV-test.org, 2015
64% of US companies
face 10,000+ alerts
per month
203 Days - Breaches
take on average 80
days to discover and
123 days to resolve
60%
of data is
stolen in hours
54%
Of breaches
remain
undiscovered
after 6 months
Ponemon Institute, 2015
Missed Incidents
8% of incidents are
detected by
endpoint, firewall &
network solutions
Verizon DBIR,2014
Drowning In Data And Missing Incidents

Advanced Threats = Enterprise Where’s “Bad” Waldo

Kung Fu Move #1: (Big) Data

Mandiant APT Attack Lifecycle

Standard Approach: Active Directory and Firewall
Identity Store:
Unusual login behavior
Geo-velocity
Network Flow:
High risk exfiltrations

Better Data = Faster and Better Detection
Identity Store:
Unusual login behavior
Geo-velocity
Identity Store:
Unusual machine logins
Endpoint:
Unusual data transfers, access
Large local data storage
Endpoint:
Unusual scheduled tasks
Unusual registry writes
Endpoint:
Unusual command line tools
Unusual registry reads
Endpoint:
Unusual network share access
Identity Store:
Unusual machine access
Endpoint:
Unusual use of compression
Unusual, large data transfer
Endpoint:
Unusual command line tools
Data Repositories:
Unusual or dangerous access
Unusual lateral movement
Dangerous behavioral changes
Network Flow:
High risk exfiltrations

Kung Fu Move #2: Math
Source: Competing on Analytics, Davenport and Harris, 2007
Standard Reporting
Ad hoc Reporting
Query/Drill Down
Alerts
Forecasting
Simulation
Predictive Modeling
In memory data, fuzzy search, geo spatial
Causality, probabilistic, confidence levels
High fidelity, games, data farming
Larger data sets, nonlinear regression
Rules/triggers, context sensitive,complex events
Query by example, user defined reports
Real time, visualizations, user interaction
Traditional
Optimization Decision complexity, solution speed
NewData
Entity Resolution
Annotationand Tokenization
Relationship, Feature Extraction
People, roles, locations, things
Rules, semantic inferencing, matching
Automated, crowd sourced
Optimization under Uncertainty Quantifying or mitigating risk
Adaptive Analysis
Continual Analysis Responding to local change/feedback
Responding to context
NewMethods
Today.

Standard Approach – Rules and Thresholds
A Pattern for Increased Monitoringfor Intellectual Property Theft by
Departing Insiders, Andrew Moore, Carnegie Mellon 2011

The Threshold Approach Challenge
Abnormal
Normal

Abnormal
Normal

A Probabilistic Approach
• Computes probability that a value in
a given hour is anomalous
• Bayesian approach
• Explicitly models both normal and
abnormal distributions
• Gaussian, Gamma
• Estimators for both normal and
abnormal based on observation

USB drives are marked as
high risk method
Method
The volume of copying is large, compared
to John’s past 30 days and
compared to other sysadmins
Activity
John Sneakypants is a
contractor and sysadmin
with privileged access
User/Machine
These files have a high risk
and importance value
Asset
Behavioral Risk
John Sneakypants is copying an unusually large number of
sensitive files to an external USB drive.

Aggregating Behaviors for Entity Risk
Activity
User/Machine Asset Method
Behavioral
Risk Score
Rentity = importance(t)×vulnerability(t)
User
Asset
Machine
Rbehavior = P(event | y)× wy ×
wu 2−i
⋅ Ru[i]
u∈U
∑ + wf 2− j
⋅ Rf [ j]
f ∈F
∑ + wm 2−k
⋅ Rm[k]
m∈M
∑
&
'
(
(
)
*
+
+
wu + wf + wm

Activity
User/Machine Asset Method
Behavioral
Risk Score
Rentity = importance(t)×vulnerability(t)
User
Asset
Machine
Rbehavior = P(event | y)× wy ×
wu 2−i
⋅ Ru[i]
u∈U
∑ + wf 2− j
⋅ Rf [ j]
f ∈F
∑ + wm 2−k
⋅ Rm[k]
m∈M
∑
&
'
(
(
)
*
+
+
wu + wf + wm
Aggregating Behaviors for Entity Risk
• John Compromised is accessing an unusual, important network share 25
• … at a time of day he was almost never active at before 46
• … and took from a source code project that has been inactive for months 80
• … and just copied an unusual amount of sensitive files to a cloud service 96

Example of a Story

Data Feature Derivation
Roybatty had 30 login failures on Sharepoint-Finance
Roybatty logged into Corp32_ActiveDirectory
Roybatty took 2.5GB from Sharepoint-Finance
Roybatty launched telnet from the command line
Roybatty launched psexec from the command line
(other features)
(other features)
(other features)
Active Directory Logs
SharePoint Logs
Endpoint Logs
Anomaly Detection
Login failure anomaly model
Destination access anomaly model
Story Aggregation
∑
𝑝"
𝑝#
𝑝$
𝑝%
𝑝&
𝑤"
𝑤#
𝑤$
𝑤%
𝑤&
0.80Volumetric models
Executable
Anomaly Models
Multi-Level Risk Scoring for Reduced Noise and False Positives

Process Pipeline
Use Case Data
Exploratory
Data
Analysis
Production
Deployment
Results
• Acquisition
• Cleanup
• Normalization
• Semantics
• Feature engineering
• Model design
• Model validation
• Object model
• Data ingest
• Model development
• Test and performance

Exploratory Data Analysis
• 30 days of historical log data
from a new data source
• Interview and validate with
stakeholders
• Validate or tune existing
models
• Design and apply new models
• Dataset management
• Feature engineering
• Documentation
• R and R Studio
• R Markdown
Data
Acquisition
Data
Exploration
Feature
Engineering
Model
Design
Model
Validation

Production Deployment
• Update ingest and object
model
• R to Spark and Phoenix
code
• Models to batch and real-
time
• Model efficacy
• Scalability and performance
• Flume and Kafka
• Spark, Phoenix and HBase
• Elastic Search and Kibana
Object Model
Data Ingest
Model
Development
Model
Development
Test and
Performance

ANALYTICS REPORTING
Technology Stack for Big Data Analytics
S3
nginx
Cassandra
Flow
Ingest
(Flume)
Kafka
Active
Directory
Workflow
(Storm)
HDFS
Analytics
Phoenix +
HBase
Spark
Index
Elasticsearch
Auth DB
(H2)
Investigator
nginx
Kibana
AgentsSensors
(real-time)
Connecto
rs
Connectors
(batch)
ZooKeeper/reports
/v1
/v2
/rules
/webadmin
/api
/api/es
/api/flow
/login
/investigator
Endpoint events
Endpoint entities
Analytics
Models
Stories
Risk scores
Events

Use Case #1: $20B Manufacturer
X
2 Engineers
stole data
1 Year
$1 Million Spent
Large security
vendor failed to
find anything
2 Weeks
Easily
identified the 2
Engineers
Found 3
additional users
stealing data in
North America
Found 8
additional users
stealing data in
China

2014/02/12 04:30:10 954a270da18f628a3bc955feaefdc82c@e12fa0ef845ea7dbbbe95a383b18ed78 10.43.32.127/10.222.224.96 diff 279fe92803963ed2938bb3b9ae7627d9/1a6f0f1fa86a9f3bab6b0c45c08cb1b8
2014/02/12 04:30:10 954a270da18f628a3bc955feaefdc82c@e12fa0ef845ea7dbbbe95a383b18ed78 10.43.32.127/10.222.224.96 diff 279fe92803963ed2938bb3b9ae7627d9/1a6f0f1fa86a9f3bab6b0c45c08cb1b8
2014/02/12 04:30:13 aa97936fbf29c14e368bba98731b91cd@9e551a32654b80e97a6d13314e76d898 10.43.32.127/10.231.216.182 sync 01659aa0f0788e3bccd7820f597b57ea/702dc192ef623c4b3059081dbdfafdb8
2014/02/12 04:30:14 04f0663486333d41b1d3b74d6832b931@32e96546e5d6e3c7cd400d8248e8c763 10.43.32.127/10.222.224.128 diff 72c6e05c9738cf7c2ac4c4cbbbc24de4/562d059099b70ce2bdd561b73295f811
2014/02/12 04:30:14 04f0663486333d41b1d3b74d6832b931@32e96546e5d6e3c7cd400d8248e8c763 10.43.32.127/10.222.224.128 diff 72c6e05c9738cf7c2ac4c4cbbbc24de4/29946458dbc115c28d45c55fe697ad2f
2014/02/12 04:30:14 aa97936fbf29c14e368bba98731b91cd@9e551a32654b80e97a6d13314e76d898 10.43.32.127/10.231.216.182 sync 01659aa0f0788e3bccd7820f597b57ea/1fc3a0f36eaf8ea6775f1c1da6feb7f0
2014/02/12 04:30:20 322afe32500a00443f0485263cd5b35b@7df6e0320568c974862e030ec447e74c 10.43.32.127/10.43.84.90 print b26db004f30ff812cdeec33552f7e41a/726a29f7e17e53ef832839cc56293c26
2014/02/12 04:30:31 954a270da18f628a3bc955feaefdc82c@e12fa0ef845ea7dbbbe95a383b18ed78 10.43.32.127/10.222.224.96 diff 279fe92803963ed2938bb3b9ae7627d9/284d07c70388732120f16a478a461832
2014/02/12 04:30:40 322afe32500a00443f0485263cd5b35b@7df6e0320568c974862e030ec447e74c 10.43.32.127/10.43.84.90 print b26db004f30ff812cdeec33552f7e41a/18bdc00d72c208a40c40f9a195965a89
2014/02/12 04:30:40 322afe32500a00443f0485263cd5b35b@7df6e0320568c974862e030ec447e74c 10.43.32.127/10.43.84.90 print b26db004f30ff812cdeec33552f7e41a/726a29f7e17e53ef832839cc56293c26
2014/02/12 04:30:41 322afe32500a00443f0485263cd5b35b@7df6e0320568c974862e030ec447e74c 10.43.32.127/10.43.84.90 print b26db004f30ff812cdeec33552f7e41a/c8fdcc251ef840b873f478689700371c
2014/02/12 04:30:41 322afe32500a00443f0485263cd5b35b@7df6e0320568c974862e030ec447e74c 10.43.32.127/10.43.84.90 print b26db004f30ff812cdeec33552f7e41a/5ac41d116ced8a2fad2475d9c95340cd
2014/02/12 04:30:41 322afe32500a00443f0485263cd5b35b@7b9842f6dc6385575550abb52f49c3fc 10.43.32.127/10.43.84.71 print b26db004f30ff812cdeec33552f7e41a/726a29f7e17e53ef832839cc56293c26
2014/02/12 04:30:41 322afe32500a00443f0485263cd5b35b@7df6e0320568c974862e030ec447e74c 10.43.32.127/10.43.84.90 print b26db004f30ff812cdeec33552f7e41a/ca0d8e5cb51627a18583c2649a126f1a
2014/02/12 04:30:42 322afe32500a00443f0485263cd5b35b@7df6e0320568c974862e030ec447e74c 10.43.32.127/10.43.84.90 print b26db004f30ff812cdeec33552f7e41a/c05f02c9804108cc1221d9e76e39f604
2014/02/12 04:30:42 322afe32500a00443f0485263cd5b35b@7df6e0320568c974862e030ec447e74c 10.43.32.127/10.43.84.90 print b26db004f30ff812cdeec33552f7e41a/a1c7c11b8eaa260ee2abe1fbba926198
2014/02/12 04:30:42 322afe32500a00443f0485263cd5b35b@7df6e0320568c974862e030ec447e74c 10.43.32.127/10.43.84.90 print b26db004f30ff812cdeec33552f7e41a/d8d6ac09c3d92b1c013cc92e3ffb0dc7
Timestamp Engineer Account IP Address
Action
(diff, sync, print, etc.)
Resource
(project, folder, file, etc.)
The Data: IP Access Logs

The Math: 20+ Probabilistic Threat Models
Four classes of our threat models:
• Sneaking: Doing something out of pattern, unusual time
• Hoarding: Taking more than expected
• Mooching: Dangerous change in give versus take
• Wandering: Accessing unusual or unexpected IP

Model: Unusual times
• Monitor, for each user, activity of
interest (e.g. start times of when a
file or window is brought into focus)
• Active times used as input into
Gaussian kernel density estimators
• Times that contain 95% of activity
deemed to be “normal”
• P(y is bad) at a given time is ratio of
expected activity to 95% activity line

Model: Anomalous Activity Patterns
Engineer 1
• Regularly works six days a week (takes
Sundays off)
• Slight dip during lunches
Engineer 2
• Works five days a week
• Particularly active on Thursdays

Model: Anomalous Activity Patterns
Engineer 1
• Starts work fairly early in morning
• Early lunch break
• Sometimes works past midnight
Engineer 2
• Doesn’t work as long hours as User 1
• 9 to 5’er
• Has occasionally worked a little bit after
8pm

Model: Unusual IP Access
• Nodes: source code projects
• Edges: engineers accessing
projects
• Edge length: probability of project
access
• Louvain clustering surfaced four
large software groups or teams
• Access between team clusters is
quantifiably abnormal

Use Case #2: Defense Contractor
High Probability Anomalous Behavior
Models
• Detected large copies to the portable
hard drive, at an unusual time of day
• Bayesian models to measure and detect
highly improbable events
High Risk File Models
• Detected high risk files, including
PowerPoints used to collect large
amounts of inappropriate content
• Risk aggregation based on suspicious
behaviors and unusual derivative
movement

Use Case #3: Life Sciences Company
• Models detected and alerted security that
an IT Administrator was sending
anomalously large amounts of data in
Gmail attachments
• Further investigation determined that the
employee’s behavior was that of
someone planning to leave the company
• Employee admitted to be planning to
leave for a competitive company
• Employee was fired and all data
recovered

Use Case #4: Media Company
• Analyzed cloud repository activity
of 1300 employees and 6000
external clients
• Detected anomalies including:
• Unusual collaborations
• Unusual internal and external
behaviors
• Out-of-country / out-of-city anomalies
• High risk download location
• Unexpected ISP/carrier usage
• Moocher and hoarder models
• High risk file take models
• Administrator and new device
classifiers
• Detected several suspect activities,
including a probable account
takeover
Multiple new device
registrations in non-
home country
Out-of-country takes
(only download,
previews – no uploads)
concurrent with home
country activity
Every downloaded file
had a high age (have
not been touched in a
long time)
1
2
3

2014
Top 15 IT Company
Predicting Leaving
Developers by
Analyzing Source
Code Use
Use Cases Covered by Interset
2013
Leading
Life Science Co
Finding Employees
Leaving with
Company Research
2013
ITSec Product &
Service Provider
Watching Sensitive Co
Data Assets &
Customer Information
2015
Fortune 1000
Gaming Company
Monitoring for
Inside/Outside
Targeted Attacks on IP
2014
Fortune 200
Pharmaceutical
Surfacing Anomalies
Between Geo
Development Teams
2014
Global Capital
Management Co
Tracking Unpublished
Research & Protecting
Future Positions
2014
Premier Hedge
Fund Co
Monitoring
Compliance &
Tracking Source Code
Trading Algorithms
2014
Fortune 500
Defense Contractor
Tracking Sensitive
Docs & Verifying
Data Classifications
2014
Regional Savings
Bank
Identifying At-Risk
Employees Planning
to Quit with Data
2014
Intelligence
Agency
Predict &
Investigate Insider
Threats
2014
Large RX Network
Provider
Monitoring
HIPAA Compliance &
High Risk Users
2014
Top 50
Financial Firm
Tracking Users
That download Then
Take Their Laptop
Home
Insider Threat
Continuous
Monitoring
Insider Threat Insider Threat Insider Threat Insider Threat
Continuous
Monitoring
Continuous
Monitoring
Compliance Insider Threat
2015
Global Security
Software Company
Detect and Alert on
Anomalies Touching
Sensitive IP/Source
Code
2015
Global Security
Software Company
Monitoring & Alerting
to Anomalous activity
touching IP/Source
Code
Insider Threat Targeted Attack
Threat
Targeted Attack
Threat
Targeted Attack
Threat

Conclusions
Two Kung Fu Moves
• The right data
• The right math
Data Science Implementation
• Define the data and IP sources
you are most concerned with
• Determine the source data that
captures the related events
• Data science can help prioritize
and focus

2016 09-19 - stephan jou - machine learning meetup v1

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