1. The Problemof Evil makesGod’sexistencelogicallyimplausible - Discuss
The Problemof Evil isessentiallyalogical paradox that formany impliestheism’sirrationality.Its
premise is thatthe inconsistencyof God’s definitional attributes–omnipotence,omniscience, and
omnibenevolence –withthe existence of evil makesGod’sownexistence logically implausible.
Theism’s self-contradictorydoctrinesmust therefore be reconciled forfaithtobe rationally
defensible.
Monistscircumventthe paradox’spremisesbychallenging the conceptof evil itself, claimingthatthe
universe isagrand,harmoniousunityinwhich everythingfromadivine macro-perspective is
ultimatelygood. Indeed, if Godisbothomnipotentandomnibenevolentthenoursmustbe the best
of all conceivableworlds. Itexceedsourlimitedperceptionstorecognise the whollypositive depthof
our experience, andsothe Problemof Evil ispredicated solely onahumanfailure toappreciate the
universe’spervasive goodness.
Monismcertainlyhas a pleasantaestheticdimension,inthatitdictatesthatbeautyandgoodnessare
perceptiblewhere manywouldsimplybeholddarkness.ThinkerslikeSpinoza - “do notweep,do not
wax indignant.Understand.”- have assertedthatthe universe isorganicallybetterfor everythingin
it,includingwhatwe call evil.Everydetail expresses divine creativity andissuffusedwithrighteous
purpose.Proponentsfrequentlyrefertothe analogyof how contrastingdiscordsandmelodies can
accentuate a musical piece’s fullbeauty.
However,there remainsthe unresolvedissue of God’sdecisionto make thisessential goodnessso
epistemically obscure.Byamonisticaccount,humans have still been fashioned such thatfully
positive comprehension isimpossible, andbyextension humansufferinginevitable.This merely
reiteratesthe paradox.Furthermore, itfeelsintuitivelywrong,evencondescending,to depreciate
evil asa mere misapprehension. Were the HolocaustJewswrong to“wax indignant”abouttheir
hideous misery,because they failedtoconsidertheirpersecution’seventual aggregate benefits orto
discern some grandsilverlining?Toaffirmsucha position wouldseemtonegate ourexperience of
the world.
Finally, crucial totheismisthe idea thathumanshave beendesigned in imago dei.This isnot to say
that we physicallyresemble God, whoisnotspatiallydefined,butratherthatwe possess moral
sensitivitiesthatshould make God’s moral architecture appreciable,ratherthan arcane.Indeed,
monismseemstoadvocate a mystical “God movesin mysteriousways”principle,one that ultimately
impliesthatwe donotaccord our ordinary significance of the word good toourdescriptionof Godas
good – that such a descriptionis justtraditionalor,inMackie’swords,“honorific”.Insuchcases “God
is being called good butdescribed as bad,depicted in somecaseslike a malevolentdemon…a
petulanttyrant,ora thoughtlessand capriciouschild.”
Perhapsone can invoke some sortof cycle of opposites argumenttodemonstrate that,justasheat
couldonlybe conceivable inrelationtocold, evil’sexistence islogicallynecessitatedby good’s.The
conceivability of varyingdegreesof goodness impliesaspectrum, andwhateverliesatone endof
thisspectrumwill inevitably be evil.Therefore the absolute purgationof evil wouldimplythe
purgationof the whole metaphysical spectrumandso of all goodness.
However,thissetof affairscouldonlyeverjustify the courtesy iotaof evil necessaryto “placatethis
odd metaphysicalprinciple”- not the monstrousstandard of our own experience. Tocontinue with
the temperature analogy,evenif Godhadmade the universe’s coldestpossibletemperature much

2. warmer, sayto -150 kelvinasopposedto -273, one mightstill assume thatthe conceptsof hot and
coldwouldnotthereby become meaningless.Arguablythe cycle of oppositesdefence therefore fails.
Insteadof denyingevil asanillusion bredbyignorance,some theodiciestreatitas real but necessary
for the developmentof moral goods. Touse a traditional analogy,adoctor’simperativetosave his
patient’slifeoccasionallyrequireshimtoresorttotreatmentsthatentail that patient’ssuffering,
such as chemotherapy. The patient’ssufferingistherefore intrinsicallyundesirablebut
instrumentallynecessary forthe sake of the goodthat ishis recovery.Sufferingcan thereforebe
justifiedinthe right context.
Certainlyone canconcede thatour capacity forsufferinghas historically hadindirectbenefits.
Indeed,the fearof physical pain enabled Homo sapiens toemerge fromthe evolutionaryprocessin
the firstplace,byconstituting astrong impetusforfight-or-flightdangerresponses.One mightalso
argue that since then our capacity for sufferinghasgreatly incentivisedmuchhuman advancement,
as undeniably muchscientific,social and philosophical developmenthasbeen achievedwiththe
primaryaimbeingthe alleviation of suffering.Similarly,greatworksof poetry,music,art,and
literature have been createdaspassionateexpressions of suffering.Humanflourishingseems defined
by humanhardship,andsopain can be saidto fulfil animportantanthropicfunction.Perhaps ina
worldof careless blisshumanitywouldhave growncomplacentandstagnated,andsosuch a world
mightbe considered amorallyinferioralternative to thisone.
However,one maydebate the relevancyof sucharguments.AsMackie writes:“They explain only
why agentsof limited power,constrained by independently existing causallawsand antecedents,
may reasonably tolerateevil for the sakeof associated goods.”God’sdivine status wouldimply his
authorityovercausal laws.Thismeansthat,despite these arguments,Godwouldstillbe responsible
for the seemingly arbitrary andsadisticdecisiontoengineer acruel systemwhereby evil isoften
necessary forgood.
Indeed,one mightfurtherargue thatthis arbitrarily cruel systemfails eventoyieldmoralprofitasit
should,asthe morallypositive eventsproducedbyevil are onlyoccasional,whereasconverselythe
sufferingitproducesisuniversal andhorrific.The wholedesignitself couldbe describedas notonly
utterly unnecessary butalsodisproportionately morally negativeoverall.
The theistmusttherefore demonstrate thatthe goodsevil producesare of sufficientmagnitudeto
make the universe betterratherthanworse – thatall evilseverywhereare fully“absorbed”notjust
partiallymitigatedbytheirgoods,andindeedthatsuchgoodswouldbe inconceivablewithouttheir
antecedentevils. The paradox therefore recursasthe Problemof “Unabsorbed”Evils.
Some thinkers like PeterVanInwagen have attemptedtodemonstrate thataperfectmoral agent
could,withoutlogical contradiction, permitevenpurposeless orexcessiveevil. VanInwagen proposes
that there could be no precise amountof evil necessary forthe fruitionof God’s righteous design for
humanity,justasthere could be no precise numberof raindrops necessaryto make the countryside
fertile ratherthan barren. Of course,some numberof raindropsis certainly required;yetitwouldbe
impossible to calculate the exactquantityof rain forwhichaddingor subtractinga singleraindrop
wouldmake the countryside eitherfertileorbarren.Thiswouldbe impossibleevenforan
omnipotententity;therefore Godisjustifiedindecidinguponan arbitrary amountof evil forthe
world. Thisunfortunatelybutinevitably resultsin episodesof purposelesssuffering.
However,evenif one concedesthatprecise knowledge of some minimumamountof necessaryevilis
unattainable evenforan omniscientbeing,whichone mightnot,manywouldrejectthis defence on
the basisthat it seemstoimplyadeisticGodwho,havingestablishedthe world’s thresholdforevil

3. arbitrarily,ignitesthe cosmicmatch,retires,andletsthe suffering ensue.SuchaGod would notbe
the God of traditional theism,whopassionately lovesandparticipatesin hiscreation. How could
such a lovingGodnot be impelled,byhisownnature,to interveneinepisodes of purposelessagony,
such as that of Rowe’sunfortunate roastedfawn?
VanInwagenresponds thatsuchserial intervention wouldconstitute a“MassiveIrregularity”inthe
cosmicorder,whichmightbe more morallydefectivethanthe evil itprevented.Therefore evena
lovingGodmustresignhimself toinaction.
Despite whateverissuesone mayhave withthe notionof constantregularity’ssupposedintrinsic
value, by suggestingthateven an arbitraryamountof evil wouldalways have justified the actual
moral goodsachieved,the vagueness defence seemsratherto shootitself inthe foot. There isthe
simple truththatif the minimumamountof evil necessaryto make certaingoodspossible was
logicallyincalculable andtherefore hadtobe arbitrary,thenby extension the ultimate moral
positivityof the wholesystem itself couldneverhave beencalculable.Certainty thatthe amountof
evil includedinthe world wouldbe “worthit”,that the standardof evil wouldn’tbe wildly
disproportionatetothe goodsproduced – byanalogy that the arbitrary numberof raindrops
wouldn’tflood anddestroy the countryside –would have been correspondingly logically impossible.
Therefore,by imposingacompletely arbitraryamountof evil onthe universe, Godwould still have
beenguiltyof utterrecklessness.
VanInwagenwould mostlikely rebutthat, while the precise amountof evilnecessarymighthave
beenlogically incalculable,Godmuststill have known vaguely whatamountwouldproduce an
overall morally positiveuniverse.However,toconcede thatGodhad any suchintuition,suchpartial
knowledge, wouldarguably be self-defeating,andsosuchdefencesfail.
Arguablythe strongestdefence atthe theist’sdisposal isthe Free Will Defence,whichdictatesthat
many if notall “unabsorbed”evilsare due entirelytothe free decisionsof immoral humans, andso
cannot be directlyascribedtoGod. By virtue of our free will we are capable of malice and brutality,
but alsodecency andcompassion.Godisresponsibleonlyforfashioningmanasan autonomous
agentwiththe freedom tomake moral choices. The value of such freedom justifiesall the evilsit
allows,bothactual and conceivable.
However,itis vital todistinguish betweenmoral andnatural evil inconsideringthisposition.Moral
evil consistsof the atrocitiesman freelycommits;natural evilexistsinthingsliketsunamisand
diseases,andsocannotbe attributedto any humanmoral error. One musttherefore askwhether
natural evil mightbe addressedbythe Free Will Defence,aquestion thatconnectsseamlessly with
the Augustiniantheodicy’sFall narrative.
Accordingto Augustine,Manwasoriginallycreatedinastate of righteousperfection.Creationwasa
flawlessparadise,devoidof all evil.However,Manabusedhisdivinelygrantedfreedomandnatural
perfectionwascorruptedbyhumansin.Humandisobedienceconstitutedanawful, malignant
catastrophe that rupturedthe natural order’sbalance andso resultedin natural evil.Worldly
sufferingistherefore caused entirely byprimal Man’srejectionof God’sgoodness.Augustineadded
that, because we inheritourguiltviathe concupiscentmechanismof sexual conception,we are all
infectedby acongenital sinfulness.Ourconditionof moral squalouristhereforeself-perpetuating.
Thisis knownasthe Doctrine of Original Sin.The only escape istoaccept the salvationofferedby
God throughfaithful adherence toChrist’sdoctrine;acceptance isrewardedinheavenandrefusal
punishedwitheternal damnation.
Like monism, thistheodicyhasdiscernableaestheticelements,suchas itsnotionof the individual’s
free self-determination,anditsgrandvisionof eschatological justice balancingoutworldlyevil. Yet

4. above all itallowsforthe Free Will Defence toencompassnatural evil andsoletsGodoff the moral
hook.
Nevertheless,the account seemssomewhatproblematic–primarily foritsdubious premises thata
state of original humanperfection somehow wentawry (andthatMan alone wouldhave been
responsible forsucha deterioration),andthatgeneticinheritance of moral guiltcanbe rationally
justified.Topunish descendantsforanancestor’scrime, whenthey hadnoinfluence toexertonhis
crime’scircumstanceswhatsoever, wouldseemvindictive andmorally unintelligible.
More than this however, the discoveriesof geology, archaeology andgenomicscience thatindicate
the precedence of natural evil toman by hundredsof millionsof years,plusthose of evolutionary
biologyand anthropology thatreveal agenerallypositive trajectoryinthe developmentof human
moral awareness,seemtocontradict the Fall narrative onan empiricallyverified basis.
Finally,the Augustiniantheodicydependsonthe Doctrine of Hell forits viability,anotherunsavoury
doctrine withitsown serious difficulties.One mightargue that the conceptof an infinite human
transgression isnonsensical,whichwouldmean thateternaltorture as a punishment couldonly be
infinitely disproportionate andsowould offendagainstthe conceptof God’sperfectjustice. Another
pointisthat Hell’sagonies couldnotbe justifiedby some positive reformativeeffect,asitis
understoodthatonce condemnedtoHell redemptionisimpossible.Finally,one mustalso
acknowledge thatmoral characteris affectedbythe conditionsinwhich itdevelops.Thismeansthat,
interms of the probabilityof whetherone ends upinHell ornot, a childthat learned itsmoral
principlesfromadecentfamily - incontrastto a childwhoarbitrarilyhappenedtobe borninNazi
Germanyand be conditionedbyits despicable regime - wouldbenefitfromatotallyunfair
advantage.One’safterlifedestination wouldbe determined byfactors completely outside one’s
control. Thiswoeful injustice –pluswhateverqualms(bothlogical andemotional) one mighthave
withthe ideathat an infinitelylovingGod could bothwashhis handsof hissinful creations and
indeed spitefullytorture themforeternity –make the Doctrine of Hell andthe Augustiniantheodicy
somewhatunpersuasive.
However,the Irenaeantheodicyusesthe Free WillDefence somewhatdifferently. JohnHick,who
revived the theodicy, distinguished betweenthe predicates of “in theimage of God” and “in the
likeness of God”. AccordingtoHick, we are all bornin the image of God,as flawedrepresentationsof
the moral perfectionmanifestin hisdivinity.Byfreely exercisingwisdom andmoral sensitivityinour
dealingswithsufferingandadversity,we can developthe sacredvirtuesof compassion,mercyand
courage and, indoingso, progressively fulfill ourlatentspiritual potentialand mature intothe
likeness of God.
Crucially, the world’spurposeisnottomaximize happiness;thisis“nota toy world forGod’spets”,
as mere humancontentmentcouldnotbe valuable initself.
The worldis insteadintendedasthe testtube thataccommodatesthe developmentof afree and
lovingrelationshipwithGod,a“soul-making”processthatrequiresthe catalystof suffering.
Thistheodicyis foundedonthe ideathatthe bestconceivable design forthe worldwouldbe
teleological ratherthan staticallyperfect. Evil’sexistenceallowsforevil’s defeat, whichismore
valuable than good’s “eternalsovereignty”mighthave been. Itisostensiblyforthisreasonthatwe
are notdesigned originally inthe likenessof God. However,thisprinciple –thatsinplusrepentance is
infact preferableto sinlessness –whichfeaturessoheavily inthe Bible,seemsformanyirrational
and difficulttoswallow.The theistmightof course respondthattheirsisa personal andlovingGod,
not one enslavedby some platonicformsof reason.Yetthe atheistmayinturn respond thatsuch a
claimreinforceshisownposition, bydevolvingtheist’sGodfroman entity of sublimeabsolutes toan

5. anthropomorphicbeing withthe passionsandcaprices thatcharacterizedZeusandOdin. Discussion
of God’sattributescan evidently leadone downahighlythornyrabbithole.
Nonetheless,there are otherissueswiththe theodicy,suchasits assumption thatsufferinginvariably
improvesthe suffererinthe longterm,whichisnotnecessarilytrue.Indeed, painhasledmanyto
spiritual decline –bitterness,mental illnessandapathy –and so can clearly have a dysteleological
effect. Hickconcludedthatourspiritual developmentmusttherefore continueintothe afterlife, so
that all sufferingcanbe universally redeemedbythe universalfulfillmentof man’sspiritual essence.
Yet far fromresolvingthe problem,thisconclusion arguably only raisesfurtherquestions,suchas
why thismortal life,asa precursorphase to an afterlife thatachievesthe same ends, iseven
necessaryatall.One mightalsosay that the wickedindividual’sincentive toactmorallyin this life
dissolves withsuch reassuringuniversalism –the criminal can simplysubscribetoan“I’ll repent
later” ideal. Hickwouldof course maintainthatwe are all ultimatelyonthe same spiritual path,and
that to act wickedly merelyputsmore arduous spiritualdistance betweenoneself andone’s glorious
final destination;one shouldwanttobe good forgoodness’sake. Nevertheless,some mayfindthis
rebuttal dissatisfying.
Moreover,howsuccessfully one mightderive moral principlesandvirtues fromone’ssufferingwould
mostlikelybe proportionatetothe level of one’sabilitytoreflect intellectually uponthat suffering.
Yet there are some,suchas youngchildrenandthe severelymentallydisabled,whoseemincapable
of interpretingandbenefittingfrom suffering’ssubtlerspiritual aspectsinthisway.The implicationis
that theirsufferingisfutile. ThatGod’sdesigncouldbe intellectually elitist inthissense seems
completelyabsurd.
The theodicy alsofailsto provide asufficient accountforanimal suffering.Are animal speciesmerely
aestheticfurnishingsforamorallyanthropocentricuniverse?Evenif one acceptsthataestheticmerit
can morally outweighmassive animalsuffering,andfurtherthatanimalsthatcan sufferhave greater
aestheticmeritthananimalsthatcannot,the 300 millionyears forwhichanimal specieswent
aesthetically unappreciatedbyhumanity would still have beenaperiodof massive,wasteful
suffering.
Perhapsthe mostobvious question isthatof why God doesnotchoose simply tozap us intohis
likeness,andtherebyskipthispainfulprocess.YetHick insiststhata lovingrelationshipwithGod
mustbe freely andindividually chosen inordertobe authentic,andthat therefore the spiritual
journey fromimage tolikenessis valuablein itself, ratherthan purely byvirtue of itsends.Suchthing
as trust,love and respect inrelationtoGodare more valuable whenfreely andpassionately
developedthan whenartificially instilled.HickillustrateswithhisHypnotistmetaphorthatsuch
divine zappingwouldamounttodivine lobotomisation,andthatthe relationship withGodso
produced couldneverbe superiortoitsnatural alternative.
The most powerful challengetothispositionisthe question,advancedbyMackie,of whyGod could
not simplyhave fashionedhumans such thattheyalwaysfreelychose the good,oratleastchose the
goodfar more oftenthantheycurrentlydo.Arguably anyfree choice isonly freeinthe sense thatit
isan expression of itsagent’sown nature.Therefore, hadmenbeenfashionedsuchthattheir
natures dictatedthattheyalwaysact morally,humanfreedomwould have arguablyremained
uncompromised.Thisideaisnaturallyunderstandable tous inthe modernage withour appreciation
of how personality isinfluencedby physiology - bysubtle differencesinneurologyand hormone
levels–whichare in turnlargelyinfluencedbygenetics. However,Hickwouldavow thatsuch
humanswould,bybeing innately more conscientiousandvirtuous,have farlessto learnandso
wouldenjoy aneasierbutbyextension lessmorally valuablespiritualjourney towards the splendid
likeness of God.

6. Some theistsdispense withall attemptsattheodicyandmaintainthatthe universe’soverall moral
positivitycanbe derived fromitstwo-tieredstructure of life andafterlife alone.Theyfeel thattheir
miseriesare thussomehowjustifiedbythe biggerpicture,andseekstoical solace inthe expectation
of a cheeriereternity.However,suchbeliefsnotonlyseemreminiscentof naturalisticexplanations
for religionasan opiatefor themasses,butalsorather ironicallyacknowledge the possibilityof a
betteralternative worldinwhichfree will remainsintactwhilemoral andnatural evil become
impossible.
Perhapsthe most sophisticateddefence against the Problemof Unabsorbed Evils isthe argument
propoundedbyJohnHick that spiritual receptivitytosufferingis relative.Indeed,one cannot
reasonablyspeakintermsof “amountsof evil”,as sufferingistoosubtle a phenomenontobe so
quantifiable.The same evilepisodemightaffecttwoindividualsverydifferently,if atall.Consider,for
example,thatone developsagreatersense of empathyforthe painof othersupon enduringan
excruciatingtoothache.The atheistmightargue thatenduringtwosuchtoothaches simultaneously
couldhardly add to that empathy’sdevelopment. Thismeans thatthe episode’sgoodswouldnot
necessarily increase proportionatelytoitssuffering,andthat any such disproportion wouldimply an
unabsorbedexcessevil.
Yet,for some, two simultaneoustoothaches mightwellbe necessaryforthe developmentof such
empathy,while otherswouldneed only one.Indeed,there wouldbe others stillforwhom no
numberof toothaches couldhave any positive spiritual effect.Thispointisnotmerelythatphysical
paintolerance canvary - althoughthatis obviouslyaconsideration - butmore thatthere can be
great variationin freehumanemotional andintellectual responsestothe same morallysignificant
events,thatthe same painful episode thatforsome isexcessive isforothersjustright.
Because of this Goldilocks principle,sotospeak,one cannot as an individual wax indignant aboutthe
level of evil inthe universe,notbecause evilitself isanillusion,but because there isnosuchthingas
quantifiable, objectiveevil.
Wouldan all-lovingGodinflictmiseryonhisbelovedchildren?Perhaps,justasa fathermust
occasionallyreprimandhisimmature childreninawaythat distressesthem sothattheydevelop
character and integrity, GodhassimilarlyallowedEvil’sreign.We learnthroughpain,becomegreat
throughpain.It isonlythroughsorrowthat profoundhappinesscantrulybe appreciated,anditis
onlythroughcommonsufferingthatwe cantruly understandandsympathise withone another. A
hedonisticparadisewould,inmyopinion, be inferiortothis perfectly imperfectworld.
Bibliography:
J.L Mackie:The Miracle of Theism
P.VanInwagen:TheProblemof Evil
J.Hick:Evil & The God of Love
KennyBoyce & JustinMcBrayer: Van Inwagen on theProblemof Evil: the Good,theBad and the Ugly
ThomasTalbott:Review of Charles Seymour’sA Theodicy of Hell
Wikipedia:TheProblemof Evil page