Amb. Japaridze Final PDF - Tbilisi's Relevance

This article was downloaded by: [184.75.48.74]
On: 08 October 2013, At: 13:06
Publisher: Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House,
37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
American Foreign Policy Interests: The Journal of the
National Committee on American Foreign Policy
Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/uafp20
Tbilisi's Relevance to Washington: What Is, Where Is,
and What Can Be
Tedo Japaridze & Ilia Roubanis
Published online: 07 Oct 2013.
To cite this article: Tedo Japaridze & Ilia Roubanis (2013) Tbilisi's Relevance to Washington: What Is, Where Is, and What Can
Be, American Foreign Policy Interests: The Journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, 35:5, 272-282
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10803920.2013.838861
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained
in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no
representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the
Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and
are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and
should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for
any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever
or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of
the Content.
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic
reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any
form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://
www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Tbilisi’s Relevance to Washington:
What Is, Where Is, and What Can Be
Tedo Japaridze
and Ilia Roubanis ABSTRACT This article reflects on the disparity of perceptions in the West
over Georgia’s political trajectory since its first-ever peaceful transfer of
power in October 2013. Going beyond current affairs, the authors examine
the significance of Georgia, primarily to Washington, in the context of great-
er developments in the diplomatic landscape. They argue that while the
post-Soviet space has become increasingly multipolar and less convincingly
multilateral, there is a need to go beyond a ‘‘reset’’ between former foes and
a ‘‘reload’’ of the structure of regional alliances.
KEYWORDS Moscow; Silk Road; South Caucasus; Washington
From President Reagan’s legendary ‘‘Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!’’ to
the mock ‘‘reset’’ button presented in March 2009 by Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton to her counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, one would be excused
for noting a ‘‘full circle’’ effect in U.S. foreign policy in the post-Soviet era:
from affirmative unilateralism to cautious multilateralism. From ‘‘the end
of history’’ to ‘‘reset,’’ the nature and style of engagement in the South
Caucasus inevitably changes. Of course, since the middle of the 1990s, the
Baltic states have been decoupled from the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) framework and have moved on to complete the process of both
European and Atlantic integration. Since then, for many in the post-Soviet
space, the quest has been ‘‘making it to Estonia.’’ Meanwhile, Russia was
instrumentalizing its energy policy into a harder-than-soft power tool, draw-
ing often harsh geopolitical red lines in the Caucasus, a region that along
with the entire post-Soviet space is known to Moscow as ‘‘Near Abroad.’’
And, as Cold War rhetoric was revived, Georgia was found to be firmly
and reliably anchored to the West, seeking a rather dim European engage-
ment while pursuing a clear(er) Atlantic trajectory. Alas, in the summer of
2008, it became clear that Georgia was effectively in a buffer zone. But,
Georgia’s commitment to following a Western path persisted. This persist-
ence is part of the argument of why Georgia is significant to U.S. foreign
policy—for what it is, where it is, and what it could be.
Washington has three principal reasons to continue to support, engage
with, or even deepen cooperation with Georgia:
1. Washington has already invested in Georgia. Washington’s aid was, in
many ways, instrumental in building Georgia’s institutional apparatus,
The views expressed in this article are the
authors’ own and do not necessarily
reflect those of any other organization or
government.
Ambassador Tedo Japaridze is a member
of the Georgian Parliament and the
chairman of the parliamentary Commit-
tee on Foreign Affairs. He has formerly
served as a foreign minister; as an
ambassador of Georgia to the United
States, Canada, and Mexico; as national
security adviser to the president of
Georgia; and as the secretary general of
the Black Sea Economic Cooperation
Organization (BSEC).
Ilia Roubanis, Ph.D., is a lecturer at the
School of Public Administration in
Athens, Greece. He is an area studies
expert with both policy development
and academic experience in the Black
Sea region.
American Foreign Policy Interests, 35:272–282, 2013
Copyright # 2013 NCAFP
ISSN: 1080-3920 print=1533-2128 online
DOI: 10.1080/10803920.2013.838861
272
Downloadedby[184.75.48.74]at13:0608October2013

its normative foundations, its economic outlook,
and, not least, its human resources. Following
nearly a generation of nation-building, Georgia’s
Western trajectory at this time has less to do with
carrots or sticks and more to do with national
identity. In this sense, Georgia can be important
for what it is.
2. Georgia is located in a region that does and will
continue to play a geo-economic role as a
bridge between Europe and Asia. As such,
Georgia is a significant component of and, in
some respects, is ‘‘a hub’’ of economic and diplo-
matic ‘‘games’’ in several geopolitical systems:
the ‘‘European Neighborhood,’’ the ‘‘broader
Middle East,’’ and Central Asia; or, the totality of
all the above regions—a space known to Russia
as ‘‘Eurasia.’’ In sum, Georgia can be important
for where it is.
3. Georgia is part of a changing diplomatic and
security landscape—a piece, so to speak,
that may not be always central to the picture
but, nonetheless, completes many puzzles. Thus,
Georgia can be important as an ally because of
what it could be.
AN INVESTMENT MADE: GEORGIA
IN THE AGE OF RESET
Recently, U.S.–Georgia relations appear to be
tested by skepticism voiced both in Washington
and in Europe. Paradoxically, this skepticism grew
out of the first-ever peaceful electoral transfer of
power in Georgia in October 2012. Skepticism had
been surging for some time, but it became blatantly
evident in June 2013, when Congressman Turner of
Ohio sponsored an amendment to the U.S. National
Defense Authorization Act, adopted by the U.S.
House of Representatives (House Report 113-108,
Sec. 1244). The amendment stated that the new
Georgian government ‘‘has taken a series of mea-
sures against former officials and members of the
current political opposition that appear to be moti-
vated by political considerations,’’ noting that the
arrest of the former prime minister, Vano Merabish-
vili, was ‘‘especially troubling.’’ The case made
against Georgia can be summarized as the abuse
of the legal process for the purposes of retribution.
And, the threat made against Georgia was that this
course of action ‘‘may have a significant negative
impact on cooperation’’ between the two allies.
Most significant, the amendment was phrased so
as to contain an implicit threat to what Tbilisi has
come to regard as an independent variable, namely
Washington’s endorsement of Georgia’s bid to
join North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
Whether or not this amendment passes through
the House and Senate by the end of this year is
one issue. What is important is the substance of
the message.
Perceptual Chasms
The U.S. government is prone to frame its policy
in a manner that is informed by realities in both
chambers of Congress, but with executive wisdom.
During her confirmation hearing, Victoria Nuland,
the current U.S. assistant secretary of state for
Europe and Eurasia, was asked about the ‘‘prose-
cutions issue’’ in Georgia, to which she gave a
response that concluded with the catchphrase
‘‘we want Georgians to look forward, not back-
ward.’’ In this single phrase, Ms. Nuland framed
the issue at hand in a manner that resonates with
challenges encountered by the first Obama admin-
istration.1
The sophistication of this framing and
the implicit analogy between Georgian and U.S.
dilemmas did justice to the problem, domesticat-
ing, so to speak, the challenge faced by Tbilisi in
terms Washington could understand. Concretely,
the Georgian Dream (GD) administration must
respond to a demand for democratic consoli-
dation, instilling the rule of law, while managing
to tame calls for restorative or—depending on
one’s point of view—retributive justice. However,
one cannot fail to observe the perceptual chasm
on Georgia between Ms. Nuland and Congressman
Turner.
The bottom line is that the U.S. executive branch’s
view on Georgia is not in tune with that of particular
members of the U.S. Congress. True, certain circles in
Washington have come to see in President Saakasvili
personally and in his administration more broadly a
dependable ally, or even a prote´ge´. Ultimately,
however, the U.S. government and the policy devel-
opment community seem to be in agreement about
certain facts, such as Georgia not being Ukraine
or that substantial steps toward rule of law are
being taken by the present Georgian government.2
Volume 35, Number 5, 2013 273

A similar striking divergence of perceptions or rhet-
oric is echoed in Brussels.
Georgia and the European Union concluded
negotiations for a Deep and Comprehensive Free
Trade Agreement (DCFTA) at a pace that was unin-
terrupted by the transfer of power in Georgia since
October 2012, that is, in 17 months and five rounds.3
In the European Parliament, the European People’s
Party (EPP), in particular, nonetheless continues to
place Georgia with Ukraine into a single frame of
‘‘reactionary governments’’—with the implicit and,
at times, explicit threat to obstruct the Vilnius Summit
in November 2013. This summit is associated with
the expectation of kick-starting Association Agree-
ment negotiations with Georgia.4
Again, the issue
of prosecuting former officials is raised, despite
detailed explanations and repeated calls for monitor-
ing missions issued by the Georgian government.
The European Commission’s tone, however, is more
measured, less simplistic, and gives hope for sticking
to an admittedly vague commitment by Brussels on
the European anchorage of the South Caucasus.5
Perceptions versus Facts
These perceived vast differences between the U.S.
president and the Congress or the European Parlia-
ment and the Commission seem to be more about
perception rather than facts. Apparently, doubts
linger about the democratic credentials of the new
administration. This is surprising given that President
Saakasvili’s legacy left a lot to be desired in terms of
checks and balances or rule of law6
and that
these shortcomings are now being dealt with, item-
per-item, by the present Georgian administration.
In less than 10 months, the Georgian Parliament
took measures to establish stronger checks and bal-
ances: stripping the president of the power to fire a
democratically elected government and appoint a
new one without parliamentary approval; creating
an independent High Council of Justice in which
judges elect their peers, rather than have judges
appointed by the president; adopting a law on per-
sonal data protection; and taking measures to restore
media freedom. The next step is curbing the powers
of the prime minister.
On the rule of law front, a series of bold initiatives
were undertaken for the protection of lesbian, gay,
bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) persons and
religious and ethnic minorities. Meanwhile, a series
of bills are transforming the criminal code: expand-
ing the scope for jury trials; creating a process of
judicial review; creating a penal code for juveniles;
allowing for concurrent sentencing; increasing the
representation of victims in criminal proceedings;
allowing the media in the courtroom.7
These factual reforms are inevitably challenged.
When monitoring Georgia, there is a single relevant
‘‘fact’’: this is a government with the mandate to
facilitate a transition within a transition. The first tran-
sition is political, since the GD administration is a
‘‘new political force’’ that came to power through
elections; the second transition is institutional, since
GD is obliged to also be ‘‘a new kind of govern-
ment,’’ willing to lose elections. Should both transi-
tions come to fruition, this should allow Georgia to
move toward democratic consolidation, which
among other things implies.
These transitional challenges give rise to an
‘‘uneasy cohabitation’’ with the previous administra-
tion, which is better described as ‘‘parallel and thinly
balanced coexistence.’’ In practical terms, the burden
of proof for Georgia’s democratic consolidation lies
exclusively with the GD administration: the prime
minister must prove that he is relinquishing a tra-
dition of personal omnipotence in favor of ‘‘rule of
law’’; the GD administration must deal with demands
voiced by torture victims for retributive justice. In
sum, this new government must simultaneously be
‘‘of all Georgians’’ and ‘‘a radical reformer,’’ convinc-
ing the electorate that voting does make a difference.
Framing the challenge as such creates ample room
for different interpretations of ‘‘facts.’’
In responding to this challenge, the new Georgian
administration has been very cautious. Throughout
this reform process, both the administration and
the parliament followed Venice Commission recom-
mendations, largely emulating the precepts of the
European acquis. And, in the spirit of ‘‘looking for-
ward rather than backward,’’ the new government
proposed a near-blanket amnesty for all former
administration officials, except in cases of serious
and violent crimes or cases of large-scale embezzle-
ment of state assets by senior government officials.
When such serious cases against former officials
were initiated, the EU’s special adviser, Thomas
Hammarberg, and the U.S. Justice Department pro-
secutors stationed in Georgia did provide advice to
274 American Foreign Policy Interests

the Office of the Chief Prosecutor on how best to
meet international standards throughout the process
of investigation and prosecution. And, to assure
transparency, international organizations (Organiza-
tion for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Office
for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights [OSCE=
ODIHR]), foreign diplomats, the media, and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) were invited
to witness the trials. Alas, one can never be cautious
enough even when addressing informed audiences.8
The former United National Movement (UNM)
administration does have among its ranks individuals
willing to discredit the process of democratic consoli-
dation in Georgia. At the same time, the GD is a
coalition, with diverse experiences and appealing
to different constituencies, with spokesmen eager
and sometimes too eager to introduce ‘‘a breath of
fresh air.’’ Not surprisingly, this is a recipe for all
kinds of blunders of which some can be tamed and
others have to be mended. In the West, people are
often more willing to listen about blunders and less
willing to show good faith, mainly because a UNM
government has been a long-standing partner and
it is easier to work with people you have already
worked with. However, this does give rise to certain
substantial concerns.
The Bearing of Perceptions on Facts
The main concern is that Georgia’s road to
Euro-Atlantic integration continues to be seen as a
linear and evolutionary path, clearly marked with
milestones, to be evaluated in terms of success or
failure, ‘‘carrots and sticks.’’ This perception is not
only wrong but also potentially harmful. Presumably,
what is expected or even desired in certain circles in
Tbilisi, Brussels, and Washington is a series of ‘‘stick
messages,’’ like the one stemming from the Turner
amendment. Two comments on this tactic:
First, turning a foreign policy consensus into an
artificial domestic political cleavage is wrong, mis-
guided. Anyone who knows anything about Georgia
is fully aware that the Euro-Atlantic trajectory is
uncontested both in terms of popular support and
in terms of political consensus. This fact has nothing
to do with either ‘‘sticks’’ or ‘‘carrots.’’ In March
2013, the Georgian Parliament, confirming Georgia’s
long-term vision of joining both the EU and NATO,
passed a bipartisan 14-point resolution unanimously.9
In the context of a less-than-amicable parallel coexist-
ence between UNM and GD, this bipartisan consen-
sus largely reflects the realities of public opinion in
Georgia. Put simply, for Tbilisi, a Euro-Atlantic trajec-
tory is, for better or worse, ‘‘the only game in town.’’
One reason has been the embedded Atlantic identity
of Georgia, which is to a great extent the fruit of
sustained commitment by a number of people in
Washington. Bluntly speaking, the United States has
been a ‘‘mentor state,’’ providing lavish development
assistance since the first days of Georgia’s inde-
pendence as well as consulting and training, which
has resulted in an institutionalized ‘‘Atlantic bias.’’10
Another reason is a series of wars that have elimi-
nated any good will vis-a`-vis Moscow that might
have been expected in Stalin’s homeland.
Second, it is wrong to retract an offer that has not
been made. Georgia is the highest per capita con-
tributor of troops in Afghanistan,11
a commitment
that enjoyed unanimous support prior to and follow-
ing the transfer of power in October 2012. These are
not auxiliary troops; they are serving side by side
with U.S. marines in volatile regions and have suf-
fered casualties. Of course, this policy might be asso-
ciated with the implicit expectation of ‘‘a reward’’
in the form of NATO membership (i.e., ‘‘a carrot’’).
A non-expert, upon the reading of Congressman
Turner’s amendment, might come to the conclusion
that Georgia’s failure to secure a clear path for NATO
membership is, or will be, a punishment (‘‘a stick’’)
against the current Georgian administration.
This line of argumentation would be in accord
with that of UNM officials who, time and again, have
claimed that Georgia’s NATO membership was not
only imminent but would also constitute an instru-
mental exit strategy from its current strategic dead-
lock.12
Of course, the reality is that, for Russia,
Georgia’s NATO membership was a red line13
that
the West, in effect if not in principle, was willing to
acknowledge in 2008. This reality has not changed
nor has the basic UNM position that NATO member-
ship will counterbalance the Russian threat. This
hope has proved elusive. First, Vice President Biden
made clear in no uncertain terms that the reinstate-
ment of Georgian sovereignty would not come
through force or NATO membership.14
Then the
EU commissioned the Tagliavini Report,15
which
apportioned the blame for the 2008 war and
condemned ‘‘evil unilateralism’’ be it Georgian or

Russian. Bottom line: the West is not prepared to go
to war over Georgia and Tbilisi cannot hope to forge
a cohesive multilateral ‘‘exit strategy’’ from the cur-
rent status quo.16
To the degree that this assessment is accurate, the
danger arises that a series of strategic options dic-
tated by a multivariable reality will be presented as
‘‘a stick’’ vis-a`-vis the current Georgian administra-
tion. The UNM would benefit, but not Georgia or
its Western foreign policy trajectory. And, on the
domestic front, the assumption that Georgia took a
‘‘wrong turn’’ and is thereby ‘‘the loser’’ feeds into
a winner-takes-all political culture framed as an ‘‘East
versus West’’ divide.17
This perception is in harmony
with the revived Cold War rhetoric of the mid-2000s,
when color revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine
(2003) and Kyrgyzstan (2005) apparently triggered
a seemingly positive process of transatlantic trans-
formation. There was of course the downside of
renewed and Cold War–like confrontation with the
NATO–Russian dialogue suspended, the G-8 format
put on hold, and Russian strategic bombers practi-
cing off Venezuela. Yet it looked as if this was a con-
frontation the West was winning. At this point in
time, retriggering this escalation will no doubt be
emotionally gratifying in certain parts of Europe
and certain circles in Washington. But, for all practi-
cal purposes, escalation limits the room for ‘‘reset
maneuvering,’’ undermining Georgian and, arguably,
U.S. national interests.
Why Getting Things Right Matters
U.S. national interests are here defined as sustain-
ing the status quo in the region for at least as long as
compartmentalized cooperation with Russia may be
necessary. If this reality does indeed reflect U.S.
national interests, two points of substance must be
made, one political and one strategic.
In political terms, branding the GD administration
as ‘‘reactionary,’’ or even ‘‘pro-Russian,’’ a point
repeatedly made by the UNM and its partners in
the West, is misguided. For those who base their
assessments on facts alone, the 10-month track
record of the GD administration provides ample
evidence that this government does not wish to ‘‘go
red.’’ For those in quest of a hidden agenda, it should
be pointed out that most of the individual parties and
persons behind the GD coalition, including the
prime minister, supported President Saakasvili.
Indeed, one of the authors of this article was the first
Foreign Minister of the Revolution of the Roses. That
they abandoned Saakasvili has more to do with his
abandoning the countryside, creating a repressive
security system, molding an abusive system of presi-
dential authority without checks and balances and
less to do with a dramatic shift in Georgia’s foreign
policy trajectory.18
Calling a spade a spade, in our
opinion, the Revolution of the Roses was not about
finding freedom and keeping it for one’s self.
In any event, even the most skeptical of regional
analysts concede that the new administration
almost certainly has no plans to derail Georgia’s
Euro-Atlantic trajectory; these analysts find a suspicion
of ‘‘paradigm-shift’’ only within regional policies.19
The strategic point that has been made is that
Georgia rather than Russia is now the de facto, albeit
not de jure, revisionist power. On the one hand
because what was sought by Moscow has largely
been achieved: Russia did make headway in military
presence in the Caucasus with installations and infra-
structure; did gain access to ports on both sides of
the Black Sea; did drive home the point of how res-
olute Moscow can be in the region it regards as Near
Abroad. On the other hand, these Georgian terri-
tories are now de facto Russian client states, which
would not be as straightforward if Georgia and other
Western states had extended their recognition.20
Russia does apply pressure—but is fully aware that
too much pressure can be counterproductive. It is
one thing to have the Embassy of Venezuela located
in Sukhumi and quite another to have the Embassy
of the United States of America there. In sum, there
is a threshold that Moscow knows better than to
cross. Recognition is existentially impossible for
Tbilisi, but also impractical for Moscow. For better
or worse, the status quo will not be challenged by
force for the foreseeable future.
In view of the above, Tbilisi’s Western trajectory
remains unchallenged, although Washington, or at
least the Hill side of it, often fails to understand that
beyond being ‘‘a symbol’’ of confrontation in geopol-
itical terms, Georgia is also a democracy, however
flawed, where public opinion matters. To the sys-
tematic observer, clearly the GD administration in
general and Prime Minister Ivanishvili in particular
are trying to temper calls for retribution; the govern-
ment strives to facilitate due process proceedings,

including emblematic cases, by resisting rather than
taking advantage of the opportunity for retribution.21
Georgia today understands that neither NATO nor
the EU can or will descend as deus ex machina to
revise the status quo. Unlike the Baltic states,
European and Atlantic integration for Georgia are
likely to be destination points rather than stations
en route to a ‘‘Return to Europe.’’
This is not merely a matter of a semireligious drive
to meet destiny. Georgia can see a number of tran-
sition precedents and is fully aware that the quest
for a Euro-Atlantic utopia can be valued as a process
as much as an objective, delivering stable institu-
tions, economic growth, and social cohesion. In
any event, Georgia’s commitment to this vision boils
down to a matter of national identity. On the basis of
this ‘‘fact,’’ dealing with the present government in
Tbilisi does not constitute ‘‘abandoning’’ but, rather,
of putting the Revolution of the Roses project ‘‘back
on track.’’ If the two allies were to come to a consen-
sus, then Georgia’s significance could be argued on
the basis of ‘‘where it is.’’
THREE LESSONS TO LEARN, ONE
ASSET TO KEEP: GEORGIA IN THE
MULTIPOLAR NEXUS
For political and strategic reasons, the question to
pose in Washington and in Brussels is: Why should
Georgia be considered relevant at all? More often
than not, the discussion of U.S.–Georgia relations
appears to be a dependent variable of U.S.–Russia
relations.22
Perhaps this is an accurate description
for a journalist, but it reflects a shallow understand-
ing of the geopolitics at play. Bordering the Northern
Caucasus and in proximity to Iran, Georgia is part of
a sub-region or system of the ‘‘broader Middle
East.’’23
Positioned in the wider Black Sea area, bor-
dering Turkey and Azerbaijan, in proximity to Iran,
Georgia lies at the heart of a two-way corridor con-
necting Europe to Central Asia as an energy transit
corridor but, increasingly, also in terms of trade
and logistics. Thus, Georgia is part of both the
European Neighborhood24
and what has been envi-
sioned as the New Silk Road connecting Europe,
through Central Asia, with the Far East.25
Against this backdrop, Georgia can be treated
as ‘‘luggage,’’ from a period of renewed Russian–
American confrontation or as a solid foundation for
the exploration of alternative foreign policy framings
in a multipolar world order. The latter option is
bound to be more complex. Multipolar or ‘‘reset’’
complexity boils down to three lessons:
1. First, in a multipolar world, small scalable projects
with a vision prevail over grand master plans
because such plans require the alignment of too
many variables for success.
2. Second, alliances, especially tested relationships,
are less dispensable because when tasks are not
mundane, versatile problem-solving skills are
necessary, rather than the delineated protocols
of the production line.
3. Third, against the backdrop of a ‘‘reset,’’ agendas
also need to be ‘‘reloaded’’ and files ‘‘renamed’’
precisely because cooperation may be required,
even if no across-the-board foreign policy con-
sensus exists. Bottom line: in a unipolar world,
one designs the next step; in a multipolar world,
one prepares for the next step.
Lesson 1: Small but Scalable
The vision and scalability lesson should by now
have become obvious in the European dimension
of the South Caucasus—we are told it is ‘‘ebbing.’’26
Taking a step back to see how the Western trajectory
agenda was anchored in the South Caucasus through
energy projects, we will no doubt note that the
emphasis was on a relatively small but potentially
scalable project. Initially, the ‘‘hardware’’ of the
Tbilisi–Baku axis was inspired by a Turkish geopol-
itical vision and anchored by U.S. support. Primarily,
Baku and Tbilisi considered the cheapest option for
energy transfer to Europe via the Baku–Supsa route,
favoring sea transportation via the Turkish straits.
The sea route is cheap, but boat transfer is a trans-
action, not a relationship. Instead, Ankara pointed
out that the straits were a lifeline for the entire Black
Sea region, that increased traffic would be disruptive,
with a high risk for environmental disasters, and
raised questions about the viability of ‘‘the cheapest
of options.’’ And, considerable concessions by
Turkey were needed in guaranteeing possible cost
overruns for Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline
investors in order to kick off what was later hailed
as ‘‘the contract of the century.’’27

Clearly, the BTC agreement cemented a triangular
relationship that is and will remain one of the few
‘‘independent’’ political variables in an ever-fluctuating
region; it became the ‘‘hardware’’ of the region’s
Western trajectory. Meanwhile, the pharaoh-like
Nabucco pipeline plan never mastered the multivari-
able equation required to come to life, not even in
its scaled down Nabucco-West version. By opting for
the expedient construction of the Trans Anatolian
Pipeline in June 2012, Azerbaijan and Turkey effec-
tively noted that the ‘‘grand plan’’ was no substitute
for real infrastructure.28
The Trans-Anatolian Natural
Gas Pipeline Project (TANAP) paid tribute to Nabucco
in following almost precisely the original ‘‘master
plan,’’ omitting minor components of the project
that were and are likely to remain politically
trivial,29
with deviations that were informed by a
bottom line–driven approach in terms of market
growth potential.30
The grand vision is still there:
the project is scalable and potentially expandable.
What takes precedence, however, in a multilateral
and thus multivariable diplomatic landscape is
anchorage, not leverage;31
while moving on to the
next step, Europe will have secured a steady rela-
tionship and diversification of supply for south-
eastern Europe, a region overwhelmingly dependent
on a single energy source. Anchorage you build,
leverage you gain.
Lesson 2: Working ‘‘With,’’ Not
Only ‘‘Through,’’ Partners
The ‘‘hold on to tested relationships’’ creed is
less certain in a multilateral and multivariable
environment where the effective predictability of
the diplomatic landscape is waning. When control
over unfolding events is absent, then actors must
be ready for every eventuality. Not being present
and ready have an opportunity cost—assuming, as
has been suggested, that the vision for revitalizing
the Silk Road is ‘‘ebbing’’ as NATO forces are gradu-
ally withdrawn from Afghanistan.32
The question is
whether this means that the West can afford not
to be present or even withdraw from the Caucasus
frontier.
Economically, not being regionally present incurs
an opportunity cost. For example, in Azerbaijan, con-
sensus seems to be growing on the need to use the
revenue realized from the oil and gas sector for a
wider macroeconomic portfolio, focusing mainly
on the logistics and transport sector.33
In this plan,
Azerbaijan has built on its corridor-focused strategic
alliance with Georgia, promoting railway links from
Baku via Tbilisi to Kars—a European arterial link in
the making. This ‘‘scalable vision’’ provides for
combined transport systems that can turn Baku into
a logistics hub, which, of course, also necessitates
complementary infrastructure development on the
other side of the corridor (i.e., Georgia) in terms of
roads, ports, and so on. This strategic direction calls
for ‘‘an ever-closer corridor’’ forged between the two
states, which is consonant with the greater vision for
the reinvigoration of the historic ‘‘Silk Road’’ route
between China and Europe. This vision has captured
imaginations in Tbilisi.34
In security terms, not being regionally present
also has an opportunity cost. Most analysts would
agree that Russia encounters an ethnic and religious
nation-building challenge in the North Caucasus.35
The spillover implications have been clear to U.S.
analysts since 9=11;36
these spillover effects are still
apparent today following the Boston Marathon
bombings.37
In any event, the presence of Chechen
fighters in Syria should provide ample evidence
that the region constitutes a global security
threat.38
Obviously, in the South Caucasus, the fear
of spillover hits closer to home. With an obvious
scope for regional and global security cooperation,
with regional and global challenges at hand,
Washington must be present to be relevant and to
have influence. And, in the South Caucasus, most
prominently Georgia, Washington’s presence is
welcome.
The bottom line: as in the case of energy projects,
perceptions on the spot will differ from outside
monitoring evaluations. These perceptual differences
need to be negotiated. For instance, the vision of a
logistics hub is in the making, attracting interest and
raising concern.39
One thing is clear: global powers
must be globally present but increasingly with—
rather than through—local partners. Grand master
plans move from design to implementation—with a
clear division of tasks to be done. This policy devel-
opment protocol does not apply in a multipolar
environment. Instead, moves are made through
small, bankable, but scalable projects with partners
adjusting plans while retaining focus on the
objective.

Lesson 3: Always Move, When and
Where You Can
The final lesson to be learned in a multipolar con-
text is that relationships must be compartmentalized.
Given that policies are, at least in part, dictated by
geography and historical and institutional legacies,
expectations that Georgia can become ‘‘America in
the Caucasus’’ are misplaced.40
Indexing the nature
of relations between allies and foes is a dynamic pro-
cess that ultimately must be responsive to regional
realities.
Georgia and Azerbaijan have an interest in
‘‘echoing’’ the Obama administration’s ‘‘reset’’ policy
on security cooperation with Moscow.41
For instance,
developments in the North Caucasus and, especially,
Dagestan have made abundantly clear that Russia has
every interest in security cooperation with Georgia.42
Azerbaijan already has a mutually beneficial co-
operation with Russia in the energy sector; a similar
relationship has been established with Iran.43
And,
what goes without saying is that Turkey has pursued
a similar approach in its ‘‘zero-problems-with-
neighbors’’ strategy. This approach very much reso-
nates with the call for a wider strategic engagement
of interest consolidation, expressed within the
Euro-Atlantic community.44
In a multilateral environment, engagement is
taken for granted, while states work to accommodate
and interlink agendas. In a multipolar environment,
engagement is an objective rather than an operating
assumption: when you can open trade negotiations,
you must; when you can open the security agenda,
you must. Deep and comprehensive agreements
are too complex and are increasingly hard to con-
clude. In sum, not compartmentalizing relations
means engaging in diplomacy without an agenda
or priorities, which, in effect, ends diplomacy. This
is an impractical and unsustainable position.
Georgia, for instance, has both Azeri and Armenian
minorities. Although Armenia’s foreign policy trajec-
tory diverges completely from that of Georgia,
Tbilisi must, nevertheless, engage Yerevan. And,
the Nagorno-Karabakh has such spillover potential
that if Georgia can play a positive role in conflict
management, it must and it will. These are the
regional realities.
While focusing on issues rather than ‘‘comprehen-
sive agreements,’’ it is of course important to draw
‘‘red lines.’’ These are not only significant for rela-
tions between states in protracted conflict, but also
between allies. Only the decisions that are binding,
irreversible, and enduring must be clearly designated
as ‘‘game changing.’’ Georgia will not join the
Eurasian Union, it has just signed a DCFTA; Georgia
fervently seeks NATO membership, it will not join
the Collective Security Treaty Organization.
Georgia ‘‘Where,’’ ‘‘What,’’
and ‘‘What Will Be’’: Future Plays
of Relevance—‘‘Where’’
The strength of Georgia is also its weakness,
namely its geographic location. As a heavily
‘‘over-symbolized’’ frontier, the negative aspects of
its position tended to make the headlines, oversha-
dowing inherent strengths. For better or for worse,
Georgia is the key to Europe and the world for
Azerbaijan and Armenia. For better or for worse,
the land route from Turkey to the Caspian region
passes through Georgia. For better or for worse,
trade between Europe and the Caspian region and
thereon to Central Asia (at least as long as Iran is con-
sidered a rogue state) can only pass through Georgia.
This location delineates Georgian options into a set
of threats and opportunities. This is, in essence, the
value of Georgia.
‘‘What’’
Georgia is clearly a country committed to future
EU and NATO membership. But, it is hard to see
when or if this commitment can be reciprocated,
irrespective of legitimate concerns of democratic
consolidation. At this time, NATO is constrained from
offering membership to a country that has two
regions declaring independence. If NATO should
exclude these territories and admit the rest of
Georgia, this would be, in effect if not in principle,
an acceptance of the permanent secession of the
occupied territories. If NATO were to include
Georgia while in ‘‘occupation,’’ it would have to
invoke Article V upon admission.
EU membership is also a long-term goal and
vision. Georgian EU membership is highly unlikely
prior to Turkey’s being admitted to the EU. The
issue is not one of normative alignment alone,
although this rationale underlines both the European

Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and the Eastern
Partnership (EaP). As the European economic crisis
unfolds, visions of a ‘‘greater Europe’’ are simply
not on the table. The conclusion of the DCFTA will
keep Moscow’s pressure to join the Eurasian Cus-
toms Union (ECU) at bay, although this was hardly
ever an issue for Georgia. But, this does not mean
that the prospect of EU membership is closer—and
a negative outcome in Vilnius may make the project
seem altogether elusive.
‘‘What Will Be’’
Nonetheless, the fear in Tbilisi is not that public
opinion will abandon the Euro-Atlantic vision; on
the contrary, the fear is that Georgia’s allies will
choose their battles and, finally, that the South Cau-
casus will cease to be a priority. Clearly, Georgia’s
allies have reasons to remain committed, chiefly
what this country ‘‘could be’’—that is, the center of
a ‘‘leap region’’ that can look both East and West,
thus facilitating the flow of energy, internationally
traded goods, and human capital.
This vision requires overcoming the curse of
volatility of ‘‘frontier regions,’’ while exploiting their
potential. In the short run, this means harnessing a
type of capacity-building that makes the most out
of limited human and capital resources, avoiding
national overlaps and duplications, creating mar-
kets, widening the portfolio of goods and services
produced, and ultimately distributing the benefits
on the basis of capital inputs: in sum, it requires
small and scalable projects with a vision. In the
medium term, this vision requires a structure that
attracts international stakeholders to place their bids
in a regional project rather than a totality of national
projects. In the long run, the objective is to create a
situation where the challenge will no longer be for
individual states to ‘‘sit on the fence,’’ but to realize
the potential of the South Caucasus to bridge
Central Asia, the Middle East, and Europe as a ‘‘leap
region.’’
The context of negotiating this kind of regionaliza-
tion is global. How broad or deep a ‘‘reset’’ with
Russia can be achieved is still unclear. Chances are
that among Euro-Atlantic partners, opinions differ
on this matter. What is clear is that zero-sum relations
with Moscow are increasingly failing the cost-benefit
analysis in Washington and Brussels as well as in
Moscow. If this assessment is true, Georgia need
not become a New Berlin Wall.
Compared with the other BRIC (Brazil, Russia,
India, China) countries or even Turkey, the Russian
economy has stalled, largely because it is founded
on a narrow portfolio, both in terms of sectors and
in terms of market access.45
The former effective
stranglehold over Europe’s energy security is now
matched by an increasing realization that Moscow’s
effective supply oligopoly is matched by Europe’s
effective monopsony.46
Europe’s crisis is also a
Russian crisis, as indeed it is a global crisis. Insofar
as this assessment is correct, Russia is and will
continue to be hard-pressed to sustain levels of pro-
duction and diversify sources of revenue, thus the
basis for an imperial policy of leverage through
direct or indirect energy subsidies—tolerance of
deficits, below-market pricing—is not sustainable.47
This is not an unprecedented strategic dilemma for
Russia.48
If Moscow sustains its current policy vis-
a`-vis the non-state entities in the region, it would
need to continuously outbid its rivals in an environ-
ment of ‘‘negative tribute’’ to local feudal lords. At
the very least, Russia would have to spend resources
to suppress regional challengers to its authority. This
argument could create some scope for interest con-
vergence in the long run, with Tbilisi not seeking
Finlandization but ‘‘Austrianization’’—that is, a type
of regional nonalignment with open-ended Euro-
Atlantic options. Besides, as has been noted, Tbilisi’s
‘‘nuclear option’’ is to accept the status quo, at once
making Russia less dominant in the non-state entities
and removing many barriers to NATO membership.
To drive this argument for convergence of contextual
interest, Tbilisi needs outside support. Georgia can-
not rebalance without its allies; arguably, Georgia
needs to rebalance for its allies.
At all times, given the structure of the Russian
political system, the Kremlin needs to be provided
with ‘‘golden bridges’’ rather than zero-sum triumph-
alist rhetoric. A scalable move of goodwill is to
engage economically and show a positive response
to Moscow’s need to make the 2014 Sochi Games a
success. In this sphere, Georgia is already making
progress. What needs more serious strategic reflec-
tion is whether Russia should be engaged or kept
at arm’s length in the positive vision of building a
transport and logistics hub in the Caucasus. Russia
can be enticed to make headway in new sectors,

given its developed railway system. Railway politics
are complex, however.
A line from Yerevan via Abkhazia to Moscow must
inevitably pass through Georgia; Tbilisi, as much as it
values its relationship with Yerevan, will not jeopar-
dize its relationship with Baku. If Moscow has a stake
in conflict resolution, rather than merely status quo
maintenance, then this vision could become the
platform for a regional ‘‘reset’’ that will, in turn, facili-
tate greater cooperation. To sustain this vision, Tbilisi
must rely on the support of its allies—to negotiate in
an asymmetrical bilateral framework without the tacit
or even explicit support of its strategic allies is politi-
cally unviable. This is not merely a ‘‘regional game.’’
Ultimately, the greater discussion is about access to
the Far East, which, either through the land route or
through the Arctic Circle, necessitates a reflection on
engagement with Russia. Once this decision is made,
scalable projects can be tailored to the realities.
Another point to be made is that for all the talk of a
pivot to Asia, U.S. leadership in the European Neigh-
borhood may be most urgently needed at this point.
Fervently seeking anti-Russian anchorage will no
doubt create some clout in Warsaw, Tallinn, Prague,
and Vilnius. But, the EU’s relationship with Moscow
is at least as complicated as its relationship with
Ankara. Berlin, Paris, Rome, Amsterdam, and London
have a ‘‘complex relationship’’ with Moscow that
clearly defies the categorical certainties of the Cold
War. There are few, if any, ‘‘either or’’ questions.
Financial services, real estate, tourism, oil and
gas, shipping, and logistics—all are sectors that
create imperceptible webs with Russia and various
EU member states. If the West is to turn Russia into
a partner and neighbor, the West needs a greater
strategic narrative that cannot add up to individual
chapters for the 28 EU members. That is why U.S.
leadership is as important as it has ever been.
Notes
1. Joshua Kucera, ‘‘Georgian Delegation in Washington Battles
Perception of Selective Justice,’’ EurasiaNet.org, July 22,
2013, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/67283.
2. DFWatch staff, ‘‘Ukraine and Georgia Went Different
Ways,’’ DFWatch.net, July 10, 2013, http://dfwatch.net/
ukraine-and-georgia-went-different-ways-82119.
3. ‘‘EU and Georgia Conclude Negotiations on Deep and
Comprehensive Free Trade Area,’’ July 23, 2013, http://
www.wired-gov.net/wg/wg-news-1.nsf/0/A551D52DDDAF81
D780257BB10043A9DA?OpenDocument.
4. ‘‘European People’s Party, Georgia and Ukraine: Leading
Members of the EPP Express Concerns over Political Develop-
ments,’’ July 13, 2013, press release, http://www.epp.eu/
georgia-and-ukraine-epp-expresses-concerns-about-political-
developments; Tedo Japaridze, ‘‘Georgia and Geopolitics
at Stake,’’ European Voice, July 7, 2013, http://www.
europeanvoice.com/article/2013/july/georgia-and-geopolitics-
at-stake/77804.aspx.
5. Sˇtefan Fu¨ le, ‘‘European Neighborhood Policy: Priorities and
Directions for Change’’ (speech delivered at the Annual
Conference of Polish Ambassadors, Warsaw, July 25, 2013).
6. International Bar Association, ‘‘Strengthening the Rule of
Law: Challenges and Opportunities for the Georgian Bar’’
(London: Human Rights Institute, 2012); Human Rights
Watch, ‘‘World Report 2013,’’ 441–447, https://www.hrw.
org/sites/default/files/wr2013_web.pdf.
7. Government of Georgia, ‘‘Reform in Action: Nine Months
Report,’’ 2013, 6–13.
8. Denis Corboy, William Courtney, Richard Kauzlarich, and
Kenneth Yalowitz, ‘‘Changing Strategic Interests in the
South Caucasus,’’ The American Interest, May 31, 2013,
http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=
1432.
9. Kornely Kakachia, ‘‘Georgia and Russia: From Uneasy
Rapprochement to Divorce,’’ PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo,
no. 264 (July 2013): 3–4.
10. Kornely Kakachia, ‘‘The Caucasus: A Changing Security
Landscape’’ (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Inter-
national Studies, Russia and Eurasia Program, September 14,
2012), http://csis.org/multimedia/video-caucasus-changing-
security-landscape-panel-1.
11. NATO, ‘‘Georgia: Now the Top Non-NATO Troop Contribu-
tor in Afghanistan,’’ June 26, 2013, http://www.nato.int/
cps/en/natolive/news_101633.htm.
12. Tedo Japaridze, ‘‘What Are Georgia’s Chances of NATO
Membership?,’’ Democracy and Freedom Watch, January
31, 2012, http://dfwatch.net/what-are-georgias-chances-of-
nato-membership-11824.
13. RIA Novosti, ‘‘Russia Says Georgia’s Entry into NATO Could
Lead to War,’’ December 8, 2011, http://en.rian.ru/world/
20111208/169485481.html.
14. Paul Reynolds, ‘‘Clouds Still Hang over Georgia,’’ BBC
News, August 5, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/
8172126.stm.
15. Heidi Tagliavini, ‘‘Independent International Fact-Finding
Mission on the Conflict in Georgia (IIFFMCG),’’
September 30, 2009, http://www.ceiig.ch/Media.html; Heidi
Tagliavini, ‘‘Lessons of the Georgian Conflict,’’ New York
Times, October 1, 2009, http://www.ceiig.ch/pdf/nytimes_
20091001.pdf.
16. Neil MacFarlane, ‘‘Georgia National Security Concept versus
National Security’’ (paper REP PP, London: Chatham House:
Russia and Eurasian Programme Paper), 20–25.
17. Tedo Japaridze and Ilia Roubanis, ‘‘Gas Security in the
Transitional European Market: Tendencies, Events and Alter-
natives for Russia in Europe,’’ Russia in Global Affairs, June
2012, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Gas-Security-in-the-
Transitional-European-Market-15585.
18. Thomas de Waal, ‘‘No America in the Caucasus,’’ Foreign
Affairs, December 5, 2012, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/
articles/138491/thomas-de-waal/no-america-in-the-caucasus?
page=show.

19. Konrad Zasztowt, ‘‘Georgian Dream’s Foreign Policies: An
Attempt to Change the Paradigm?,’’ policy paper no. 3
(51), Polish Institute of International Affairs, February 2013,
http://www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=12830.
20. Paul Globe, ‘‘Russia’s New Thorns: South Ossetia and
Abhazia,’’ New York Times, September 9, 2009, http://topics.
blogs.nytimes.com/2008/09/19/russias-new-thorns-south-
ossetia-and-abkhazia/.
21. Michael Cecire, ‘‘Seeing Georgia Plain,’’ The American
Interest, July 11, 2013, http://www.the-american-interest.
com/article.cfm?piece=1462.
22. Marcus Papadopoulos, ‘‘Georgia’s Geopolitical Significance,’’
The Voice of Russia, July 19, 2013, http://ruvr.co.uk/2013_
07_19/Georgias-geo-political-significance/.
23. Olga Oliger and Natasha Yefimova, ‘‘Carnegie–RAND Work-
shop on the Future of the Greater Middle East and the
Prospects for U.S.–Russian Partnership’’ (occasional paper no.
118, Moscow: RAND Center for Russia and Eurasia, 2004);
Andrew Kutchins, Matthew Malarkey, and Sergei Marke-
donov, ‘‘The North Caucasus: Russia’s Volatile Frontier’’
(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International
Studies, March 2011).
24. Lara Piccardo, ‘‘The European Union and Russia: Past,
Present, and Future of a Difficult Relationship,’’ in European
Union: Assessing Europe’s Role in the World, ed. Bindi
Federiga (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press,
2010), 125–127; Tracey German, ‘‘Corridor of Power: South
Caucasus and Energy Security,’’ Caucasian Review of Inter-
national Affairs 2, no. 2 (Spring 2008): 64–72, http://
www.cria-online.org/3_1.html.
25. Taleh Ziyadov, Azerbaijan as a Regional Hub in Central
Asia (Baku: Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy, 2011), https://
www.wikileaks.org/gifiles/attach/37/37202_Azerbaijan%20as
%20a%20Regional%20Hub%20in%20Central%20Eurasia_
TZiyadov_new.pdf.
26. Corboy et al., op. cit., 1–7.
27. Zeyno Baran, ‘‘The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline: Implica-
tions for Turkey,’’ in The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline: Oil
Window to the West, ed. S. Frederick Starr and Svante
E. Cornell (Washington, DC, and Uppsala: The Central
Asia-Caucasus Institute, Silk Road Studies Program, 2005),
103–118.
28. SOCAR Turkey, ‘‘Agreement for the Trans-Anatolian Natural
Gas Pipeline Project (TANAP) Has Been Signed,’’ June 26,
2012, press release, http://www.socar.com.tr/en/content/
tanap-press-release-26062012.
29. Natural Gas Europe, ‘‘Turkey to Cooperate in Transport of
Turkmen Gas,’’ May 30, 2013, http://www.naturalgaseurope.
com/turkey-to-co-operate-in-transport-of-turkmeni-gas; Natu-
ral Gas Europe, ‘‘The Conundrum of the Southern Gas
Corridor: What Are the Risks for Europe and Azerbaijan?,’’
May 20, 2013, http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/southern-
gas-corridor-risks-for-europe-azerbaijan.
30. Radio Free Europe, ‘‘Consortium Turns Down Nabucco
West Pipeline,’’ July 31, 2013, http://www.rferl.org/content/
nabucco-west-pipeline-rejection/25028589.html.
31. Natural Gas Europe, ‘‘The Conundrum of the Southern Gas
Corridor.’’
32. Corboy et al., op. cit.
33. Ziyadov, op. cit.
34. Andrew Rettman, ‘‘Georgia’s Prime Minister Lays Out European
‘Dream,’’’ Euobserver, July 29, 2013, http://euobserver.com/
foreign/120991.
35. Kutchins et al., op. cit.
36. Oliger and Yefimova, op. cit.
37. ‘‘Islamists in Russia: The Boston Bombs Have Put New Focus
on Russia’s Islamist Republics,’’ The Economist, April 27,
2013, http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21576728-
boston-bombs-have-put-new-focus-russias-islamist-republics-
islamists-russia.
38. ‘‘Lavrov Says Syrians Must Unite to Expel ‘Terrorists,’’’ Moscow
Times, July 22, 2013, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/
news/article/lavrov-says-syrians-must-unite-to-expel-terrorists/
483478.html.
39. Zasztowt, op. cit., 5.
40. de Waal, op. cit.
41. Ariel Cohen, ‘‘Azerbaijan and U.S. interests in the South
Caucasus Twenty Years after Independence,’’ Caucasus
International 2, no. 1 (Spring 2012): 25–51.
42. MacFarlane, op. cit.
43. G. Rzayeva, ‘‘Azerbaijan: Eurasia’s New Energy Nexus?,’’
Turkish Policy Quarterly 9, no. 2 (Summer 2010): 56–68.
44. Igor Ivanov, Wolfgang Ischinger, and Sam Nunn, ‘‘Toward a
Euro-Atlantic Security Community,’’ Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, February 2012, http://carnegieen
dowment.org/2012/02/03/toward-euro-atlantic-security-
community/9d3j.
45. Philip Hanson, ‘‘On Europe’s Fringes: Russia, Turkey and
the European Union’’ (briefing paper, Russia and Eurasia
Programme, London: Chatham House, July 2011).
46. Tedo Japaridze and Ilia Roubanis, ‘‘Independence, Democ-
racy and the Russian Taboo,’’ Caucasus International 2, no.
1 (Spring 2012): 141–156.
47. Leon Aron, ‘‘The Political Economy of Russian Oil and Gas,’’
The American Enterprise Institute, May 29, 2013, http://
www.aei.org/outlook/foreign-and-defense-policy/regional/
europe/the-political-economy-of-russian-oil-and-gas/.
48. Valerie Bunce, ‘‘The Empire Strikes Back: The Evolution of
the Eastern Bloc from a Soviet Asset to a Soviet Liability,’’
International Organization 39, no. 1 (Winter 1985): 1–46.

Amb. Japaridze Final PDF - Tbilisi's Relevance

Recommended

Recommended

More Related Content

What's hot

What's hot (20)

Viewers also liked

Viewers also liked (14)

Similar to Amb. Japaridze Final PDF - Tbilisi's Relevance

Similar to Amb. Japaridze Final PDF - Tbilisi's Relevance (14)

Amb. Japaridze Final PDF - Tbilisi's Relevance