German-Ottoman Relations

Introduction to Historical Study Final Paper
German-Ottoman Relations in World War 1:
An Alliance of Opportunity
Henry Smith
Towson University
Spring 2015
0522169

HIST 300.003 Henry Smith2
Introduction
Germany and the Ottoman Empire allied in 1914, making up two thirds of the Central
Powers in the First World War. Studies related to these countries during World War 1 often
focus on their individual efforts and military battles. For Germany, much of attention has been
placed on their efforts in the heartland of Europe. The studies of the Ottoman Empire in this time
period either disregard the Turks as a weak minor player or as only relevant to the periphery of
the war. However the two empires were significant, not only to the development and legacy of
the War, but also to each other.
German and Ottoman relations during the beginning of the First World War, specifically
from August 1914 to January 1916, is a topic that deserves more analysis. This time period
constitutes the beginning of the alliance to the end of the Gallipoli Campaign. While research on
this or similar topics is not nonexistent, a comprehensive view on German-Ottoman relations is
lacking, and many of the sources that successfully tackled this subject are aging.1 The relations
1 For the scholarly research on Germany and the Ottoman Empire in World War One, refer to: Aksakal,
Mustafa,“ ‘Holy War Made in Germany?’ Ottoman Origins of the 1914 Jihad,” War in History 18:2
(April 2011); Atun, Ata & Aya, Şükrü Server,“Different Opinions on Ottoman and German Political
Military and Economic Relations,” International Journal of Academic Research 5:6 (November 2013);
Beşikçi, Mehmet, The Ottoman mobilization of manpowerin the First World War:between voluntarism
and resistance (Boston:Brill, 2012); Köroğlu, Erol, Ottoman propaganda and Turkish identity: literature
in Turkey during World War 1 (NewYork:Tauris Academic Studies, 2007); Krobb, Florian, “ ‘Welch’
unbebautes and riesengroßes Feld’: Turkey as Colonial Space in German World War 1 Writings,”
German Studies Review 37:1 (February 2014); McMeekin, Sean, The Berlin-Baghdad: the Ottoman
Empire and Germany’s bid for world power (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
2010); Stremmel, Fabian, “An Imperial German Battle to win over Mesopotamia: The Baghdad
Propagandaschule (1909-17).” Middle Eastern Studies 51:1 (August 2014); Trumpener, Ulrich, Germany
and the Ottoman Empire, 1914-1918 (Princeton:Princeton University Press,1968); “Liman von Sanders
and the German-Ottoman Alliance.” Journal of Contemporary History 1:4 (October 1966); “Turkey’s

between Germany and the Ottoman Empire are extensive and make up a timeline much larger
then this paper’s scope. In analyzing the political, military, and economic relations between the
two empires, their affect on each other can become evident, allowing for a better understanding
of this part of history in Germany, Turkey, and all that is involved between them.
Key research questions include: How did Germany and the Ottoman Empire interact with
each other in the political, military, and economic realms? How did these interactions influence
their affect on the war? What were the motivations of Germany and the Ottoman Empire in
making this alliance? Would any of these motivations come at the expense of the other ally?
The main standard secondary source used in this paper is Ulrich Trumpener’s Germany
and the Ottoman Empire 1914-1918. This monograph details the historical interactions made
between Germany and the Ottoman Empire using at the time new sources and reports from the
German National Archives. These address key issues in the alliance building and maintaining.
Trumpener’s book provides a definitive account of the German-Ottoman Alliance and is useful
for understanding the narrative that makes up the relations. There are several flaws to this source
material however, as it is an older book, meaning it may be outdated in its interpretation and
research. Additionally, the book tends to lean towards a German perspective on the proceedings
between the two empires, which lead to questions on bias and objectivity. Partially to meet these
needs, additional scholarly articles from more recent times were crucial to creating a more
comprehensive academic analysis on the subject. While these are not as comprehensive, they are
more detailed and varied, giving a balanced historical analysis on the major connections between
the two Empires. The New York Times provides a balance to these secondary sources by
including primary accounts of the Great War as it happened. Articles related to either Germany,
Entry into World War 1: An Assessment of Responsibilities,” The Journal of Modern History. 34:4
(December 1962)

the Ottoman Empire, or both printed during this time period give more specific and trivial
actions or events that built up the relations. The secondary sources use academic and scholarly
interpretations of events, programs, and decisions to create an analysis on the various subjects
that exist within the topic of German and Ottoman cooperation. They help to shape the direction
that this paper structure by providing an academic basis to guide my arguments and research.
Additionally, the primary sources serve not only as interesting facts that give flavor to the
narrative, but also as the backbone that the arguments lie on, both my own and the authors of the
secondary sources. Comparing the two can show how they work together and sometimes at odds.
My preliminary assumption on the nature of the relations between the Germans and the
Turks was that the Empires were two almost independent forces that had all of their own goals
and reasons for fighting, and aside from a few minor military collaborations, there was little
interaction. An early, erroneous, hypothesis of German-Ottoman relations was that the alliance
was simply in name, and was a matter of two separate forces operating under the same name, but
not the same ambitions. Like many things in history, the truth is much more complicated, and
shows that the German and Ottoman Empires were more than simply two armies helping each
other, but nations and governments intertwined.
German-Ottoman relations were a product of opportunity with both sides seeing
advantages in the alliance. Neither had intentions for sustained friendship, but each looked
instead to advance their own goals. Their ally in war could provide the means to achieve these
goals.
Political Relations: Interests and Motivations

The alliance to bring the two empires together was never definite, and took the strenuous
work of several politicians often working against their own peers. Chief among these were
German ambassador Hans Freiherr von Wangenheim and Ottoman military commander Enver
Pasha. The negotiations were sparked by geography as Turkey commanded the Bosphorus Strait,
a strategic waterway connecting the Sea of Marmara and the Black Sea. German Real Admiral
Wilhelm Souchon intended to move his Mediterranean Squadron into the Black Sea to begin an
offensive against Russia.2 Turkey was hesitant in agreeing to this, as a show of solidarity with
Germany would jeopardize unsure loyalties in Bulgaria and Rumania. Undeterred, Souchon took
the initiative despite orders from Berlin, and sailed into the Marmara through the Dardanelles
Strait on August 6, 1914.3 This impressed the Ottoman command, known as Sublime Porte, and
they agreed to allow passage for Germany and Austria-Hungary as long as the fighting did not
include Turkish forces.4 Souchon knew an offensive against Russia’s Black Sea would be crucial
in defending Germany’s Eastern front and also give the Ottomans a reason to enter the war
militarily.
This was accepted along with a list of obligations that Germany would owe to Turkey,
including protection of Ottoman land and territorial claims to Greek islands in the Aegean Sea.
This is significant as it shows progress and continued interest by both parties in the continuation
of the alliance. The two Empires came together on August 2, 1914 in a signed Treaty created by
Wangenheim and Said Halim, the Grand Vizier of the Ottoman Empire.5 The Treaty mentioned
that should Russian military become active, Germany would have reason to enter the war in
alliance with Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire would have the same justification. This
2
Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman Empire,26.
3
Ibid, 27.
4
Ibid, 28.
5
Baron v. Wangenhiem & Said Halim“Treaty of Alliance Between Germany and Turkey 2 August,
1914,” The Avalon Project http://avalon.yale.edu/20th_century/turkgerm.asp

explains the Porte’s reluctance to let Germany proceed with placing troops near Russia’s ports.
Admiral Souchon utilized this diplomatic commitment in his movement into the Black Sea,
pressuring Turkey to uphold their casus belli. Russia could use this as provocation to wage war,
compelling the Ottomans to join. Turkey was not yet mobilized, and feared entering the war now
would lead to failure.6
Also outlined in the Treaty was that the agreement and negotiations would be kept secret.
Unwilling to be marked down as enemy by any one nation, Enver Pasha was in correspondence
with Russia discussing an Ottoman’s effort against Austria, and two Ottoman battleships were
being constructed and held in an English shipyard.7 Turkey had no interest yet in a complete
declaration of alliance with either the Triple Entente or the Central Powers. There may have been
plans to join with Germany in the future of the war, but in early August of 1914 foreign political
interests and relations were too important to end in a declaration of war. Germany and Turkey’s
ability to keep the secret agreement quiet was successful as seen as late as September, 1914
when an alliance between Rumania, Greece, and Bulgaria was formed in preparation for a
possible German allied-Ottoman Empire.8 An alliance was already made, but its secrecy was
upheld to the neighbors of Turkey. These additional political pressures from Turkey’s neighbors
expedited their official involvement in the war and strengthened their commitment to a German
alliance.
Germany’s political motivations in creating an alliance came from the geographic
advantages the Ottoman Empire possessed. Aside from their control of the Dardanelles and
Bosphorus Straits, they were also in close proximity to Russia and British Egypt. Turkey had a
6
7
Ibid, 24.
8
Correspondent of the Daily Telegraph, “Combine Against Turkey,” The New York Times,September 12,
1914, 4.

clear line of attack over the Black Sea to Russia’s holdings on the coast, an advantage Berlin
wished to exploit. Rear Admiral Souchon’s excursions against Russia needed Ottoman support,
and not just militarily. Naval bases and supply routes would have been difficult to impossible
had Germany only had the Austrian Navy to support them. Creating an alliance with the
Ottomans was crucial to establishing naval superiority against Russia in the Black Sea. In order
to keep appearances of neutrality, the Ottomans staged a fake purchase of two German cruisers,
Goeben and Breslau. The ships were renamed and the German crews were dressed up in
Ottoman fashion.9 When the war reached Turkey, a German military presence were already
there.
With Russia’s southern coast accounted for, Berlin needed to have a strategy for Great
Britain. An invasion of the British islands would be difficult against the superior British. Failed
attempts against setting mines on the River Thames and submarine excursions in the North Sea
would prove to the Germans that a direct assault on Britain was not yet possible.10 Germany
would only be successful at performing raids against England’s Northeast coast.11 If Britain
could not be attacked, then the colonies could provide a different target. One colony that would
have strategic importance was the Ottoman Empire’s former territory of Egypt. Germany’s plan
for Egypt was done less to expand the political boundaries of the Ottoman Empire but to disrupt
Britain, who controlled Egypt at the onset of the war. The Ottoman Empire annexed Egypt in
November of 1914, effectively ending all correspondence and alliance with Great Britain.12 The
German government backed this move, as it would take away not only the bountiful land of the
9
Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman Empire,31-32.
10 Girard Lindsley McEntee,A Military History of the World War: A Complete Account of the Campaigns
on all Fronts (New York:Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1937), 162.
11
Dispatch, “East Coast Scene of Raid,” The New York Times, December 17,1914, 1.
12
Unknown, “Britain Admits Turkish Break,” The New York Times,November 1, 1914, 1.

Pharaohs, but also cut off Britain from the trade routes into the Indian Ocean. It would also allow
access to the German colony of Zanzibar in East Africa
These decisions in the Black Sea and Egypt would lead to the Palestine and Dardanelles
Campaigns. These actions were not supported by the German embassy due to Ottoman military
strategy and success, but to better their situation back in Germany. Introducing the Ottomans to
the war would force the British and Russians to divert forces elsewhere, keeping Germany from
being overwhelmed. Their motivations lied in having the Ottomans as allies came from the Turks
creating a new front of the war, which provided the largest advantage to the Germans.
For the Ottoman Sultan and government, their political interests into forging an alliance
with Germany stemmed from the fact that Germany was doing the most to appease them. Aside
from Germany and the Central Powers, the other likely option would be Great Britain and the
Triple Entente. One large reason the Ottomans would join Germany is that part of Triple Entente
was Russia, who were at odds with Turkey for dominance over the Black Sea area. Additionally,
Enver Pasha believed “that the ‘Triple Alliance was stronger militarily than the Entente, and
would prove the victor in case of a world war.’”13 The Ottomans needed to choose a side, and
Germany proved to be the most viable candidate.
One aspect of World War One that is often neglected is the role of religion. Even more
rare is the role of Islam, as the majority of the soldiers in the war were Christian Europeans. The
Ottoman Empire held the responsibility and heritage of the Islamic Empires dating back to the
Prophet Muhammad. Likewise, the Turkish soldiers fighting for the Ottoman banner would have
been Muslim. This would have been a unique sight on the World War One battlegrounds, and the
13

Ottomans religious practices often surprised Western observers.14 Kaiser Wilhelm II did not
forget the power God could have, be it the Christian or Islamic God. The Kaiser played a
significant role in solidifying and maintaining the political relationship between the Germans and
the Turks. He was in charge of reforming the Turkish Army into the Prussian model in 1913,
introducing and establishing General Liman von Sanders, who would command Ottoman forces
in World War One.15 Kaiser Wilhelm II also made a personal visit to Constantinople and
Gallipoli on October 15th and 16th, 1917 to meet with several of the Turkish high command,
including Enver Pasha, to survey the city, meet with his allies, and award soldiers who fought in
the Dardanelles Campaign.16 He was committed to creating a formidable ally in Turkey.
This extended to the beginning of the War, when the Kaiser supported the Ottoman
proclamation if jihad, holy war or struggle, on November 11, 1914 by the Custodian of the
Fetva, Ali Haydar Efendi.17 Jihad has two meanings in Islam: greater jihad, the struggle within
the self, and lesser jihad, a military struggle. They were proclaimed by Islamic leaders as a call to
protect the religion and its people. It is interesting to note that the Ottoman leaders called for a
greater jihad to mobilize the army.18 The argument for why this was done is that the 1914 jihad
claimed that this jihad would unite imperial and personal struggles, unifying the Empire.19 This
also unified religious and government affairs, as personal religious values were now the concern
14 Alfred Ruhl, Antwerp to Gallipoli: A Year of War on many Fronts- and behind them (New York:
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1916), 196
15
Ata Atun & Şükrü Server Aya, “Different Opinions,” International Journal of Academic Research 5:6
(November 2013), 228-229.
16
Generalstab, der Kaiser bei unseren Türkischen Verbündeten (the Kaiser with our Turkish Allies),
Imperial War Musuem. http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/1060023280?bt=europeanaapi
17
Mustafa Aksakal, “ ‘Holy War Made in Germany’? Ottoman Origins of the 1914 Jihad,” War in
History 18:2 (2011), 186.
18
Ibid, 188.
19
Ibid.

of the Sultan and the Young Turks leaders.20 These decisions would be crucial to the
Islamization of the Ottoman Empire up until the civil war, or War of Turkish Independence, in
1923.
Wilhelm believed his support of this call to arms would strengthen their relations.
However, the Kaiser’s support had little real affect. His support of a Muslim practice caused jests
in Europe to label him as “Kaiser Hajji Muhammad Wilhelm II” by enemy propagandists.21 And
in between Germany and Turkey, the support was more symbolic than actual religious
cooperation. Jihads had been called many times in the Ottoman’s previous recent wars as a
method of uniting the Muslim forces in the Empire.22 Enver Pasha even advised Wilhelm against
declaring a jihad, due to Germany being a Christian nation.23 A declaration of jihad might create
tensions between the Christian Germans and Muslim Turks. Kaiser Wilhelm believed that such a
call could motivate the Turkish people to mobilize and play their part in Germany’s larger plans
for this theater of the war, but this ignored the Muslim-Christian divide in the Ottoman Empire
that would be so crucial in its collapse.24 Enver Pasha remarked that a jihad is more than a call to
arms of the citizens of the Empire, despite Wilhelm’s understanding. It is a hoy war, where the
enemies of Islam would be defeated.25 The Kaiser’s understanding of jihad was not complete,
and could cause a religious divide between the Central Power allies. Additionally, the Ottoman
command was not committed to military interference on October 22, 1914, when these talks
between Enver and Wilhelm were being held.26 Eventually though, it was clear to both leaders
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid, 184.
22
Ibid, 190-191.
23
Ibid, 195-196.
24
Ibid, 199.
25
Ibid, 196.
26
Ibid, 195.

that Ottoman mobilization must be enacted, and a declaration of jihad would be the most
effective way to produce this.27
The Kaiser was genuinely interested in having Turkey as an ally and making sure the
Ottomans stayed strong and on their side. While his overall contributions may have been less
than groundbreaking, he was directly involved in the political relations. These relations were
diplomatic, and in most cases had advantages to each. However, these political missions and
documents were all done with the one side’s own interests in mind. Germany agreed to the
alliance because it allowed them access to the Black Sea, and the Ottoman’s allowed it for
military and political support. The alliance was done not as an ideological unity or common
cause against a like enemy. Opportunity was presented for both Empires, and they both seized
the chance. Their motivations were their own, and even if they announced they had shared
motives, it was in name only. The political relations of Germany and the Ottoman Empire were
based on interest in what the ally could provide, and motivations the ally could improve.
Military Relations: Command and Strategy
Many battles fought in the Great War are still discussed today in detail. They have shaped
our understanding of the war, the time period, the culture, and war in general. While the majority
of this study tends to focus on the battles and trench warfare in Central Europe, the Allied
Campaign to take Constantinople is also widely studied. The so-called Dardanelles Campaign is
relevant and important as it showcases the largest German-Ottoman joint military operation of
the war. The German Admiral von Tirpitz noted the strategic importance of holding the Strait in
27
Ibid, 196.

1915 that, “Should the Dardanelles fall, then the World War has been decided against us.”28
Should the Turks lose this position, the Ottoman capital of Constantinople would be exposed to
the Triple Entente, proving a major threat to Germany’s ally and war plans.
The plan for the defense of the Dardanelles Strait and the Gallipoli Peninsula was to
centralize all weaponry and forces to the narrowest part of the Strait and the forts on either side
of the mouth of the Dardanelles.29 The defensive forces, which were modernized by Germany
two years prior, consisted of mine fields and artillery, as well as the garrisoned forces and
artillery already in place at the forts.30 The Turkish High Command and the German Admiral
Usedom, who presided as general supervisor of Gallipoli’s defense, established these defensive
strategies.31 The defenses would hold, and Constantinople would not be captured by
conventional military means.
The German presence in the Ottoman military was mostly administrative. Admirals
Souchon and Usedom were incorporated into the Ottoman Naval command, and they were given
the same power, at least in name, as the Turkish commanders, creating a joint military command.
In total, about forty German military commanders were placed in Turkey either before or at the
onset of the alliance.32 Perhaps most notable was General Otto Liman von Sanders. Relocated
south to the Ottoman Empire in 1913, the role of von Sanders supports the idea that the German
military commanders had little influence on the relations between Germany and Turkey. During
the political negotiations between Wangenheim and Enver, von Sanders was often not consulted,
or was not informed of developments in the alliance.33 Von Sanders often felt neglected and was
28
McEntee,A Military History of the World War, 224.
29
Ibid, 228.
30
Ibid.
31
Ibid.
32
Trumpener, Liman von Sanders,179.
33
Ibid, 181-184.

frustrated by the politicians’ elusiveness, and was openly combative against his Ottoman and
German peers. This escalated to when von Sanders, ignored by the Kaiser and Wangenheim,
threatened to duel Enver Pasha and Cemal Pasha for the control of the Ottoman forces.34 Liman
von Sander’s place in the Ottoman military hierarchy was tense, and he felt he deserved a more
influential in the army. These frustrations took their toll on von Sanders, and he even requested
to be recalled on August 19, 1914.35
Despite these difficulties in command, von Sanders did play a significant role in the
Ottoman army, and therefore German-Ottoman relations. He was responsible for the programs
that modernized and improved the Turkish Military, as well as convincing Berlin that the
Ottoman Empire had the capabilities for being a good ally. He and Enver Pasha made the reports
and arguments of the size and effectiveness of the Ottoman military, which was able to convince
Wangenheim and Berlin that Turkey could be useful.36 This was never an assurance, but von
Sanders was successful in swaying the German and Ottoman High Command to forge the
alliance. While several of von Sanders and Enver Pasha’s promises did not pan out, including the
military support of Bulgaria, they shared a goal in bringing the Ottoman Empire into an active
role in the war. Their motivations were von Sanders was frustrated with Ottoman inductiveness
in aiding Germany, and Enver Pasha was a member of the Ittihad ve Terakki (Union and
Progress) faction, who supported an alliance with Germany to improve Turkey’s global status.37
While von Sanders and the other German commanders may have had the title of military
leaders, few possessed real practical power. Many of the high roles occupied by Germans were
mostly ceremonial, or offered little in military strategy and tactics. Alfred Ruhl, an American
34
Ibid, 184.
35
Ibid.
36
Ibid, 182.
37
Ibid.

journalist touring war-torn Europe in 1915, was present at Gallipoli and witnessed an
unidentified German officer appear distinctly separate from the Ottoman soldiers he was
commanding.38 The officer could not speak Turkish and was without his interpreter, leaving him
“at best a civilian among soldiers.”39 Some of the Ottoman officers, like Essad Pasha, could
speak German and understood the German mentality, but there is no evidence that the common
soldier could say the same.40 In fact the direct opposite is more likely. In July of 1915, German
officers were killed by Turkish troops for the discipline and motivation tactics used by the
Germans, specifically shooting at the Turkish soldiers’ feet to make them march forward.41 The
Turkish soldiers, described by Alfred Ruhl as stoic and unflinching, broke out in an extreme
measure against their commanding officers. This supports the notion that the German military
officers did not have a strong relationship with the soldiers they were commanding, and perhaps
their powers extended only as far as the battle tents. The joint German and Turkish command
structure of the Ottoman forces had to not only battle the forces of Great Britain and the Triple
Entente but also deal with cultural and power differences within their own ranks.
The military operations of the joint German and Ottoman forces in the beginning of the
war were defensive in nature, and the higher command was a delicate balancing act of
incorporating German officers into Ottoman ranks. The Ottomans benefited from the advanced
weaponry from Germany and the military mastery their commanders possessed. However, this
military alliance was not smooth and brought difficulties to all parties involved. The German
commanders, of which few spoke Turkish, were in a far off land fighting for an Empire other
than their own, an Empire that was reluctant to enter the fight at all. And for the Ottomans,
38
Ruhl, Antwerp to Gallipoli, 202-203.
39
Ibid, 203.
40
Ibid, 209-210.
41
Special Cable, “Says Turks Kill German Officers,” The New York Times,July 9, 1915, 3.

foreigners were leading them to a fight that wasn’t theirs. These grudges were not exclusive to
the soldiers. The Ottoman President of Parliament, Halil Bey, stated in November of 1915 that
the German presence in Turkey is starting to feel more like a conquest than collaboration.42 The
military relations between the Central Powers was successful in holding a defense of the Turkish
capital, but issues and conflict in the hierarchy in command between German and Ottoman
officers threatened the alliance during their defense of the Gallipoli Peninsula
Economic Relations: Resources and Infrastructure
The alliance between Germany and the Ottoman Empire was as much a trade agreement
as it was a military partnership. Germany was blocked by the sea blockade and by war to trade
routes and food production. The Ottoman Empire was, economically and technologically, rapidly
decaying as an empire. The alliance provided a solution to these issues, and was integral to
maintaining relations between Germany and Turkey.
Germany and the German people were on the brink of a food crisis. Rationing was in
effect and the will of the people was strong, but could only last so long with the French, British,
and Russian forces surrounding the German heartland.43 The Ottomans provided a solution to
this problem. Anatolia, the Turkish heartland, was a large regional power in agricultural export,
and Germany wished to use this capacity to help feed its citizens.44 However, this was not so
simple. The grain production in the fields was diminished compared to previous seasons, and
Turkey did not have the manpower or the equipment to produce enough food to feed not just
themselves but Germans as well. Germany did have the agricultural technology to increase the
42
German Reports, “Turkey is Uneasy over German Army,” The New York Times,November 23, 1915, 1.
43
Ruhl, Antwerp to Gallipoli,98,100.
44
Private Advices, “Germany Reaching for Food in Turkey,” The New York Times,November 10, 1915,
3.

harvests, but for the time being were content in taking granaries on the Bosphorus. This includes
food packages marked for foreign destinations, like New York in the neutral United States.45
While neither the sale to nor acquisition by the Germans is confirmed, their reliance on Turkey
for food is evidenced by soldier’s rations including dates from Anatolia. Turkey’s food
production would be a vital asset to Germany’s maintenance of its population and proves to be
one of the most important advantages the Ottomans offered to Germany.
This is not to suggest that the relationship is one-sided. In fact, the Supreme Porte agreed
to the alliance since it knew all the opportunities Germany could offer. The Ottoman Empire was
decaying, losing money and control over its territories. Its emergence as a gunpowder empire
was now in the past, and was fast being eclipsed by the industrial powers of Europe. One of the
largest and most significant effects Germany had was the continuation and construction of the
Berlin-Baghdad Railroad. Germany was the driving force behind connecting Constantinople to
Baghdad, once the proclaimed greatest city in the world, but now a ghost of empires past.46 The
construction efforts were lead by the German engineer Wilhelm von Pressel in 1878, but
bankruptcy of the weary Ottomans and a lack of investors by German banks delayed
construction.47 Von Pressel was invigorated by the Turkish culture and Anatolia, and his own
personal motivations for restoring the Ottoman Empire to its former glory.48 The Germans were
able to get the Sultan’s support by agreeing to build the railroad towards the east. This appeased
the Sultan over the British and French propositions, which were also attempting to access the
region, because it allowed the Ottomans to mobilize in case of Armenian or Russian threats.49
Germany secured the rights in 1899 to build by the Sultan for 200,000 lira, which is the modern
45
Ibid.
46
McMeekin, The Berlin-Baghdad Express,33-34.
47
Ibid, 37-39.
48
Ibid, 37-38.
49
Ibid, 40.

equivalent of 100 million dollars.50 Included in these rights was prospecting, and the German
mining companies were able to secure copper and coal deposits.51
Construction of the railroad began in 1903 with the plan to connect the Turkish city of
Konya to Basra in modern day Iraq. The Reichstag and the Supreme Porte both believed that
Mesopotamia held potential, if for different reasons. Germany saw it as one of the last
conquerable and colonizable places left on the world, and also gave better access to the Persian
Gulf and Indian Ocean by means of Basra.52 Connecting Constantinople to the Arabian Peninsula
by means of rail would spread German colonial and economic influence to this region.
Expanding the German Empire was a long-term goal for Kaiser Wilhelm II, and also one of the
causes for the buildup to the First World War. Had the Central Powers proved victorious, the
economic investments made in creating this rail would have improved their global standing as
well as relations to the Ottomans.
One aspect that is of note and is so common in modern scholarly research of the Middle
East is the role of oil in the economies of Middle Eastern countries. This ties in to the topic of
German-Ottoman relations because the first discoveries of oil in the Middle East occur in 1908, a
few years before the start of the War.53 This discovery changed the potential of the Middle East
from being a land of desert and mountains to one of strategic importance. A pipeline was built
three years later near Basra to access the oil that was in high demand for the industrialized
European powers that used the resource to fuel their naval craft.54 This extended into World War
50
Ibid, 42.
51
Ibid, 43.
52
Ibid, 34.
53
E. Roger Owen, “One Hundred Years of Middle Eastern Oil,“ Middle East Brief 1:24 (January 2008),
1.
54
Ibid.

1 when German and Ottoman forces fought the British for control over the pipeline.55 The high
demand would cause the Ottomans to invade the prosperous Baku oilfields in Azerbaijan in
1918.56 This would constitute the Battle of Baku, and with the now Bolshevik Russians retreating
from the Caucasus and Armenian and Azerbaijani conflicts begging, the Ottomans saw an
opportunity to take the region and its valuable oil resource.57 Having control over large oilfields
would gives the Ottomans an economic advantage over virtually all modern empires in the
world, and could elevate them in global power. However, this was not to be, as the war ended in
a Central defeat, and Britain and France annexed much of the Ottoman territories, especially the
oil rich lands.58 But during the war, it did provide the Ottoman Empire with a valuable economic
tool that raised their importance, and Germany’s alliance with the Ottomans gave the European
power access to this resource. Oil was of high importance for the preservation of the naval war,
and the Ottoman Empire’s access to it would be important to both Turkish and German navies.
The construction of the Berlin-Baghdad Railroad provides a prelude to the economic
relations and negotiations between Germany and the Ottoman Empire during the First World
War. Germany had interests in the Ottoman Middle East in terms of empire building and
resource extraction. Germany also intended to protect their large and expensive investment in the
region, which would be threatened by British, French, and Russian takeover should the Ottomans
fall. Alternatively, the Ottoman Empire was becoming desperate for an ally that could support
them from utter collapse. They needed investors and strong economic relations, which could be
preserved in allying with the German Empire, who in turn saw possibilities in the Middle East
55
Ibid.
56
Erik-Jan Zürcher, “The Ottoman Empire 1850-1922 – Unavoidable Failure?” Turkology Update Leiden
Project (May,2009): 5, http://edoc.bibliothek.uni-halle.de/servlets/DocumentServlet?id=6864
57
Bülent Gökay, “The Battle for Baku (May-September 1918): A Peculiar Episode in the History of the
Cauasus,” Middle Eastern Studies 34:1 (January 1998), 37.
58
Zürcher,“The Ottoman Empire,” 5.

and Anatolia. The Ottoman Empire’s holdings in in the Middle East could prove to be an
economic boon, but they would need to be developed. Germany saw the mutual gain both
empires potentially could have, and made the investment into the development of the Ottoman
Empire. A strong Ottoman Empire could better assist Germany both during the conflict and in
times of peace. This was investment Germany expected to see a return on.
Cultural Influences: Colonies and Programs
A final note should be made about the cultural influences that Germany instituted on the
Ottoman Empire. As mentioned before, Germany was looking to expand their empire, which is
one of the origins of the tensions leading up the beginning of the War. Germany had colonies in
East Africa, the East Indies, China, and the Pacific, but this was still small compared to the
extent of the British and French Empires. While direct colonizing of the Ottoman Empire by the
Germans seems unlikely, there is evidence that Berlin had plans for Turkey similar to colonial
processing.
This section was not included in the overall framework for understanding German-
Ottoman relation because it does not provide a direct relation between the two governmental
bodies. Additionally, the cultural influences spread were notably one sided, with Germany
influencing Turkish culture with little Ottoman influence on Germany. However, understanding
the cultural influences can be useful in analyzing the dynamics between the countries as a whole.
Germany’s first excursion into instilling German lifestyle was in the creation of the
Propaganda School in Baghdad. The Propagandaschule was in place from 1909 to 1917, and
was an extension of Reich Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg’s Schulreferat
programs. These were School and Education Units placed around the world that would serve

German migrants overseas.59 These would not only provide a German place of education for
German migrants, but also improve diplomatic relations with the countries the schools were
situated. Cultural exchange and political unity were the motivations for establishing these
schools, and would carry over for the decision to create one in Baghdad.60 These schools, while
designed for Germans, would accept any one into their classrooms, especially the local
populations, who would learn the German language and culture.61 Baghdad was home to one of
these schools due to its strategic location, naturally, on the Berlin-Baghdad Railroad.62 Securing
German interest in Baghdad would connect Germany to the Persian Gulf and all that laid in-
between. Germany wanted control and influence over this region, and introducing the German
culture into these Ottoman owned lands would allow them to do so without offending
Constantinople.
Turkey was not ignorant to German plans. Some within the Ottoman command were
uneasy with the alliance and negotiation with Germany, which was one of the reasons the official
alliance and intervention was stalled. President of Parliament Halil Bey was uneasy with the
proposition for German troops to enter Turkey fearing an eventual German takeover.63 Halil Bey
was one of the three most powerful leaders in the Ottoman Empire, and his reservations on
German involvement show that Germany’s advances into Turkish culture would not go
unopposed.
This section will focus on the German colonial pressures being placed upon the Ottomans
and the people within. The main focuses will be the German efforts to install German
establishments in the Ottoman Empire and the reactions from Turkish government and other
59
Fabian Stremmel, “The Baghdad Propagandaschule,” 49, 52.
60
Ibid, 54.
61
Ibid, 55.
62
Ibid, 58.
63
German Reports, “Turkey is Uneasy over German Army,” The New York Times,November 23, 1915, 2.

Turks being placed under the German pressures. The German efforts were the Propaganda
School set up in Baghdad to teach the German language and lifestyle. They also offered a
destination for German colonists. Additionally, the German perspective of the Turkey as not a
future ally but the possibility of a future colony is important to seeing the motivations of the
Reichstag in conducting affairs in Turkey.
Germany had colonial spaces in several different parts of the world, and although one
was never established in the Ottoman Empire, this time period provided the most effort in
creating one. In Germany, the propaganda publication Der Deutsche Krieg, Germany at War,
circulated literature devoted to explaining and detailing the Ottomans’ homeland and military
and the work Germany has done in modernizing Turkey.64 The aim here was to create a sense of
Orientalism in the German people, making Turkey appear as an enticing destination for future
German migrants. They may not claim Anatolia and Mesopotamia in the name of the Kaiser, but
they could spread the German way of life in a manner similar to colonialism. The Ottoman
Empire was seen as a land of opportunity and potential, and the German hand could shape the
land and people to create a strong German ally in the same way they would create a German
colony.65
The lasting effects of German cultural influence into Turkey and the Ottoman Empire are
few, as the Propaganda Schools and Berlin-Baghdad Railroad were not in place long enough to
make any lasting impact. The end of the war saw the end of German foreign lands and Britain
and France carved up the Ottoman Empire after the armistice. Britain and France were sure to
remove any established German influence and institute their own. Despite the long-term failings,
64 Florian Krobb, “Turkey as Colonial Space,” 2.
65
Ibid, 5-6.

this short time period did see the height of German interest into the Ottoman Empire as an ally,
potential power, and colonial space.
Conclusion
Germany and the Ottoman Empire forged an alliance of war, but their relations went
beyond the battlefield. Their political leaders, like Kaiser Wilhelm II and Enver Pasha, came
together to create diplomatic bonds. Military leaders like General von Sanders and Admiral
Souchon were integrated into the Ottoman military. Economic decisions like the creation of the
Berlin-Baghdad railroad showed investment in a successful alliance. But this alliance was not
one of friendship.
The nature of the German-Ottoman relations was one of opportunity rather than
necessity. Germany already had a strong ally in Austria-Hungary, so it was not Germany looking
for anyone to join the alliance. Instead, the Ottomans offered certain opportunities like food
supplies to rationed Germany, as well as geographic importance, as the Ottomans had access to
Egypt, the Mediterranean, and southern Russia, alleviating the pressure on the German army.
They also offered a potential colonial presence. On the Turkish side, Germany was not their only
choice, as Constantinople had relations to other nations, notable England. Germany offered the
industrialization of the decaying Empire and a chance to return to global importance. The
Ottomans saw a way to escape their increasingly likely destruction.
German-Ottoman relations were products of two Empires with different cultures and
histories seeking an advantage. Germany saw the Ottoman Empire as a way to grow, and the
Ottoman Empire saw Germany as a way to survive. Together they contributed to a turning point

in European and Middle Eastern history, but their mutual relations were not of friendship, but of
opportunity.
Bibliography
Primary Sources
The New York Times
 Correspondent of the Daily Telegraph. “Combine Against Turkey.” The New York Times,
September 12, 1914, 4.
 Dispatch. “East Coast Scene of Raids.” The New York Times, December 17,1914, 1.
 German Reports. “Turkey is Uneasy over German Army.” The New York Times,
November 23, 1915, 1.
 Private Advices. “Germany Reaching for Food in Turkey.” The New York Times,
November 10, 1915, 3.
 Special Cable. “Says Turks Kill German Officers.” The New York Times, July 9, 1915, 3.
 Unknown. “Britain Admits Turkish Break.” The New York Times, November 1, 1914, 1.
Memoirs
 Ruhl, Alfred. Antwerp to Gallipoli: A Year of War on many Fronts- and behind them
(New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1916).

Government Documents
 Halim, Salid & Wangenheim, Baron v. “Treaty of Alliance Between Germany and
Turkey 2 August, 1914,” The Avalon Project
http://avalon.yale.edu/20th_century/turkgerm.asp
Videos
 Generalstab. Der Kaiser bei unseren Türkischen Verbündeten (the Kaiser with our
Turkish Allies). Imperial War Musuem.
http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/1060023280?bt=europeanaapi
Secondary Sources
Journal Articles
 Aksakal, Mustafa. “ ‘Holy War Made in Germany?’ Ottoman Origins of the 1914 Jihad.”
War in History 18:2 (April 2011), 184-199.
 Atun, Ata & Aya, Şükrü Server. “Different Opinions on Ottoman and German Political
Military and Economic Relations.” International Journal of Academic Research 5:6
(November 2013), 225-232.
 Gökay, Bülent. “The Battle for Baku (May-September 1918): A Peculiar Episode in
the History of the Cauasus” Middle Eastern Studies 34:1 (January 1998), 30-50.
 Krobb, Florian. “ ‘Welch’ unbebautes and riesengroßes Feld’: Turkey as Colonial Space
in German World War 1 Writings.” German Studies Review 37:1 (February 2014), 1-18.
 Owen, E. Roger. “One Hundred Years of Middle Eastern Oil.“ Middle East Brief 1:24
(January 2008), 1-7.
 Stremmel, Fabian. “An Imperial German Battle to win over Mesopotamia: The Baghdad
Propagandaschule (1909-17).” Middle Eastern Studies 51:1 (August 2014), 49-71.

 Trumpener, Ulrich. “Liman von Sanders and the German-Ottoman Alliance.” Journal of
Contemporary History 1:4 (October 1966), 179-192.
 Zürcher, Erik-Jan. “The Ottoman Empire 1850-1922 – Unavoidable Failure?”
Turkology Update Leiden Project (May, 2009) http://edoc.bibliothek.uni-
halle.de/servlets/DocumentServlet?id=6864
Scholarly Monographs
 McMeekin, Sean. The Berlin-Baghdad: the Ottoman Empire and Germany’s bid for
world power (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010).
 Trumpener, Ulrich. Germany and the Ottoman Empire, 1914-1918 (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1968)
Synthetic Studies
 McEntee, Girard Lindsley. Military History of the World War: A Complete Account of
the Campaigns on all Fronts accompanied by 456 Maps and Diagrams (New York:
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1937).

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