Div. of Administrative Hearings Final Order awarding fees based upon agency non-rule policy.PDF

STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
DAVE TAYLOR,
Petitioner,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND
FINANCE, OFFICE OF THE
COMPTROLLER,
Respondent.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Case No. 02-2135RU
FINAL ORDER
The parties having been provided proper notice,
Administrative Law Judge John G. Van Laningham of the Division
of Administrative Hearings convened a formal hearing of this
matter in Tallahassee, Florida, on June 27, 2002, which hearing
was adjourned on June 28, 2002.
APPEARANCES
For Petitioner: H. Richard Bisbee, Esquire
Law Office of H. Richard Bisbee
124 Salem Court, Suite A
Tallahassee, Florida 32301-2810
For Respondent: Cynthia K. Maynard, Esquire
James H. Harris, Esquire
Department of Banking and Finance
Fletcher Building, Suite 526
101 East Gaines Street

2
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
In this proceeding pursuant to Section 120.56(4), Florida
Statutes, Petitioner Dave Taylor (“Taylor) alleges that various
purported “statements” which he attributes to Respondent
Department of Banking and Finance (the “Department”) constitute
rules-by-definition that were not adopted under, and therefore
violate, Section 120.54(1)(a), Florida Statutes.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Procedural History
On May 22, 2002, Taylor filed his Petition to Determine the
Invalidity of Agency Statements (“Petition”) with the Division
of Administrative Hearings pursuant to Section 120.56(4),
Florida Statutes. Taylor alleged that the Department had
developed, and was using, various statements (including policies
and forms) in violation of Section 120.54(1)(a), which statute
requires that each “agency statement defined as a rule” must be
“adopted by the rulemaking procedure . . . a soon as feasible
and practicable.”1
The challenged statements are all part of the
Department’s attempts to regulate the appointment of “principal
representatives” by mortgage lenders in accordance with recently
enacted legislation.
The case was called up for final hearing on June 27 and
28, 2002, as scheduled. At the hearing, Taylor testified in his
own behalf and presented the following additional witnesses:

3
James Richard Morgan, Financial Control Analyst for the
Department; Robert Pursell, Financial Analyst Examiner
Supervisor for the Department; Margaret Karniewicz, counsel for
the Department; and Robert Arthur Tedcastle, II, Financial
Administrator for the Department. He also offered the
deposition testimony of Donald B. Saxon, Director of the
Department’s Division of Securities and Finance; Mark A.
McDougald, president of Firstrust Mortgage; and David C. Harder,
president of Mountain Pacific Mortgage.2
Taylor introduced 25
exhibits, numbered 17; 22-A through 22-R inclusive; 25; 26-A;
26-B; 29-A; 29-B; and 30, each of which was admitted.
The Department’s witnesses were: Kathy Dunn Culpepper,
Financial Examiner Analyst II; Donald B. Saxon; Sandra Green,
Financial Examiner Analyst I; and Karen Wordell-Smith, Executive
Director of the Florida Association of Mortgage Brokers (whose
testimony on legislative intent, having been ruled inadmissible,
was received as a proffer). The Department successfully moved
four exhibits into evidence, numbered 1, 2, 4, and 5.3
The four-volume final hearing transcript was filed on
July 9, 2002. Each party timely filed a Proposed Final Order,
and the undersigned considered these papers in the preparation
of this Final Order.

4
A Word on Terminology
To facilitate the discussion and avoid needless repetition
of frequently used terms and phrases, the following
abbreviations will be used in this Final Order, except when the
context requires (or the author prefers) the full expression.
“PR” will stand for “principal representative.” A
principal representative-designee——that is, an individual who
has been designated by a licensee or applicant for licensure to
serve as its PR——will be referred to as a “PRD.” A person who
is already serving as a PR for another licensee will be called
an “XPR” (for “existing PR”). An individual who is nominated
for PR by more than one licensee or applicant at a time will
sometimes be referred to as a “dual designee.”
“Licensee” will be used to refer to an entity currently
holding a license under Part III of Chapter 494, Florida
Statutes; the term is intended, therefore, to encompass all
Florida-licensed mortgage lenders, correspondent lenders, and
“saving clause” mortgage lenders. “Applicant” shall mean any
entity that has applied for licensure under Part III of Chapter
494. Similarly, the term “application” will refer exclusively
to an application filed by such an applicant. The general term
“lender” will be used to refer collectively to licensees and
applicants, when a distinction between them is unnecessary. The
term “Designation,” when capitalized, means the form that

5
applicants and licensees must file with the Department for the
purpose of naming a PR.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The evidence adduced at final hearing established the facts
that follow.
1. The Department of Banking and Finance is the state
agency charged with the administration of Chapter 494, Florida
Statutes, titled “Mortgage Brokerage and Mortgage Lending.” As
such, it is responsible for regulating all persons, including
mortgage brokers and lenders, licensed under that chapter.
2. Taylor is licensed under Chapter 494 as a mortgage
broker and as a “continuing education school.” His firm,
Florida Compliance Specialists, Inc., provides consulting
services to Chapter 494 licensees.
3. The present dispute stems from amendments to Chapter
494 that the legislature enacted during the 2001 regular
session. See Ch. 2001-228, Laws of Florida. These amendments
were contained in a bill (CS/HB 455) approved by the governor on
June 13, 2001, and became effective on October 1, 2001; they
created a new position called “principal representative.”
4. As defined by the legislature, the term “principal
representative” means “an individual who operates the business
operations of a licensee under part III.” Section 494.001(29),
Florida Statutes (2001) (emphasis added).4
This statutory

6
definition is amplified in a mandate that requires all licensees
(and applicants) to designate a “principal representative who
exercises control of the licensee’s business[.]” Sections
494.0061(8) and 494.0062(11), Florida Statutes. (Emphasis
added). Notably, the terms “operates” and “exercises control
of” are not defined.
5. As mentioned, the statute requires all licensees and
applicants to designate a PR. Although PRs do not engage in a
licensed occupation (i.e. there is no PR license), an individual
appointed to the post of PR after October 1, 2001, must satisfy
certain educational and testing requirements (the details of
which are not important here), and the designating lender must
submit documents showing that its PRD has complied with those
requirements.5
6. After the governor signed CS/HB 455 into law but before
the amended statutes took effect, the Department began making
rules to implement the new provisions. Before long, proposed
rules were published in the August 31, 2001, issue of Florida
Administrative Weekly. One provision of these proposed rules
instructed that “[a]n individual can only be a principal
representative for one [lender].” This “one lender to a PR”
proposal did not implement an explicit statutory directive but
arose from the Department’s then-prevailing interpretation of
the statutory description of a PR as one who “operates” and

7
“exercises control of” the lender’s business. Further
illuminating the Department’s understanding of these terms were
the Designation forms that it proposed to adopt, wherein the PRD
was required to acknowledge that he or she would be “in full
charge, control, and supervision of the [lender’s] business.” A
person, the Department reasoned, could be “in full charge,”
etc., of but one company at a time.
7. In the course of rulemaking, however, the Department
receded from its original interpretation. As a result, revised
proposed rules——from which the bright line, “one lender to a PR”
directive had been deleted——were published in the October 5,
2001, Florida Administrative Weekly.6
An amended Designation,
which unlike earlier versions lacked language requiring a PRD to
confirm (with his or her signature) having “full charge,
control, and supervision” of the applicant’s or licensee’s
business, was proposed as well.7
By the end of January 2002, the
Department’s proposed rules relating to PRs had been adopted
and, at the time of this Final Order, were among the agency’s
duly promulgated, existing rules. See Rule 3D-40.242, Florida
Administrative Code.
8. Although the Department does not presently have a
bright line rule or policy that flatly forbids an individual
from serving simultaneously as PR to more than one licensee, the
Department continues to be skeptical that a dual designee can

8
effectively perform, for more than one lender at a time, the
responsibilities that it believes inhere in the office of PR.
Accordingly, whenever a lender or applicant nominates an XPR for
PR, the Department without exception subjects that lender’s
Designation to stricter scrutiny than would be given if its PRD
were not an XPR. (Indeed, if the PRD is not an XPR, then the
Department presumes that he or she will be able to carry out the
duties of a PR and hence makes no inquiry as to how the PRD will
function as PR.)
9. The first outward manifestations of the Department’s
internal decision to scrutinize any Designation in which an
applicant’s PRD is an XPR emerged in late November 2001 after
the agency had received four separate applications naming Taylor
as PR.8
As the Department had discovered upon review of these
four applications, Taylor was already serving as PR to an
existing licensee. This situation had given rise to a dilemma
for which the Department was not fully prepared, as evidenced by
a November 26, 2001, e-mail message from an agency attorney to
the responsible policy makers in which she (the attorney) had
advised that:
There are two pending applications in which
there are no deficiencies and we need to
decide how will [sic] we will proceed since
we took out the language in the rule that
specifically stated an individual could only
be a PR for one company at a time. Let me

9
know what times you would be available [for
a meeting to decide what to do].
10. The Department quickly decided what to do. Between
November 27 and November 29, 2001, the Department issued four
nearly identical letters, one sent by certified mail to each
applicant who had chosen Taylor as its PR, which provided, in
pertinent part:
We are in receipt of your company’s
application to become licensed as a mortgage
lender in the State of Florida. A review of
the application materials indicates that
[applicant’s name] has designated Dave
Taylor at [address] as the company’s
Principal Representative.
[The next four paragraphs quote Sections
494.001(29); 494.0062(11); 494.0062(1)(f);
and 494.0062(12), Florida Statutes, which
pertain to PRs.]
Sections 494.0072(1) and (2)(c), Florida
Statutes, provide as follows:
(1) Whenever the department finds a
person in violation of an act specified
in subsection (2), it may enter an
order imposing one or more of the
following penalties against that
person:
(a) Revocation of a license or
registration.
(b) Suspension of a license or
registration, subject to reinstatement
upon satisfying all reasonable
conditions that the department
specifies.
(c) Placement of the licensee or
applicant on probation for a period of
time and subject to all reasonable

10
specifies.
(d) Issuance of a reprimand.
(e) Imposition of a fine in an amount
not exceeding $5,000 for each count or
separate offense.
(f) Denial of a license or
registration.
(2) Each of the following acts
constitutes a ground for which the
disciplinary actions specified in
subsection (1) may be taken:
(c) A material misstatement of fact on
an initial or renewal application.[9
]
Dave Taylor has already been designated as a
principal representative for another
licensed lender under part III of Chapter
494, Florida Statutes. Please advise in
detail how Mr. Taylor will operate and
exercise control over your business.[10
] We
request that your response be submitted to
the Department within 10 days of the date of
this letter. If you have any questions
regarding this matter, please call me at
[phone number].
11. On or about November 30, 2001, the Department created
a new deficiency code, DF 416, the description of which is
“principal representative is designated to more than one
entity.” This is an active deficiency code and is used
consistently as a “red flag” on all applications to which it
applies. When an application is tagged with a DF 416, the
applicant is sent a letter in the form of the letters quoted in
the preceding paragraph. This letter will hereafter be referred
to as the “DF 416 Inquiry Letter.”11
It is important to

11
emphasize that all applicants whose PRD is an XPR are sent the
DF 416 Inquiry Letter, without exception.12
12. It is undisputed that Taylor has met all of the
educational and testing requirements necessary to serve as a PR,
and that the Department has no objection, based on facts and
circumstances unique to Taylor, to Taylor’s being a lender’s PR.
(In fact, he is presently a PR to one lender,13
under a
designation to which the Department, consistent with its policy
and practice of making no inquiry concerning PRDs who are not
XPRs, raised no objection.) The Department’s concern about
Taylor’s having been designated a PR by more than one company is
indistinguishable from the concern that it expresses regarding
all dual designees. This is why, although the contents of the
DF 416 Inquiry Letter were developed to resolve a problem that
specifically involved Taylor and his clients, the Department
decided (and was able) to implement its Taylor-made solution on
a generally applicable basis by sending the DF 416 Inquiry
Letter to all applicants whose PRD is a dual designee.
13. Each of the four applicants that had designated Taylor
as its PR declined the Department’s November 2001 invitation to
submit detailed information regarding the manner in which Taylor
would operate and control the licensed business. Each applicant
chose, instead, to designate someone else as PR. Thus, whatever
advantages or considerations Taylor expected to receive in

12
exchange for serving as these lenders’ PR were lost; the
Department’s letters (the letters that became the form for the
DF 416 Inquiry Letter) were the proximate cause of that loss, in
that but for the letters, the lenders would not summarily have
severed their respective business relationships with Taylor.
14. After deciding how to deal with applicants whose PRDs
are XPRs, the Department turned its attention to the dual
designees of existing licensees. This was, in a sense, a bigger
problem because, in their respective Designations, more than 50
licensees had selected an individual for PR who was a dual
designee. Beginning around December 12, 2001, the Department
sent all these lenders a letter similar to the DF 416 Inquiry
Letter. This letter stated:
We are in receipt of the principal
representative designation forms for the
following companies: [lender’s names]. A
review of the principal representative forms
indicates that [PRD’s name and address] has
been designated the Principal Representative
for both companies.
[The next two paragraphs quote statutory
provisions pertaining to PRs.]
Sections 494.0072(1) and (2)(p) state as
follows:
(1) Whenever the department finds a
person in violation of an act specified
in subsection (2), it may enter an
order imposing one or more of the
following penalties against that
person:

13
(a) Revocation of a license or
registration.
(b) Suspension of a license or
registration, subject to reinstatement
upon satisfying all reasonable
specifies.
(c) Placement of the licensee or
applicant on probation for a period of
time and subject to all reasonable
specifies.
(d) Issuance of a reprimand.
(e) Imposition of a fine in an amount
not exceeding $5,000 for each count or
separate offense.
(f) Denial of a license or
registration.
(2) Each of the following acts
constitutes a ground for which the
disciplinary actions specified in
subsection (1) may be taken:
(p) Failure to comply with, or
violations of, any other provision of
ss. 494.001-494.0077.
Please advise in detail how you will operate
and exercise control over both of the above-
mentioned businesses. We request that your
response be submitted to the Department
within 14 days of the date of this letter.
If you have any questions regarding this
matter, please call me at [phone number].
This form letter will be referred to as the “Compliance Inquiry
Letter.”
15. The evidence is unequivocal that the Department has
sent, and plans to send, the Compliance Inquiry Letter to all

14
licensees whose Designation names a person determined to be a
dual designee, without exception.14
Taylor’s Description of the Alleged Rules-by-Definition
16. In his petition, as required by Section 120.56(4)(a),
Florida Statutes, Taylor described the alleged rules-by-
definition. Here, in his words, are the Department’s alleged
statements:
a) Only one person can realistically
“operate the business operations” of a
licensee and “exercise control over the
licensee’s business.” Therefore, only one
(1) individual shall prima facie be
designated as principal representative for
only one mortgage lender.
b) The above rule shall not apply,
however, to mortgage lenders which the
Department deems to be “grand-fathered”
i.e., such companies who designated their
principal representative on or prior to
October 1, 2001, the effective date of the
statutory amendments. In such instances, an
individual will be permitted multiple
designations without further departmental
scrutiny or inquiry as to how that
individual will “operate” or “exercise
control over each business.”[Footnote
omitted].
c) Except for “grand-fathered” companies,
if an individual once designated principal
representative by a mortgage lender is
similarly designated principal
representative by a separate mortgage
lender, the Department based upon the agency
statement recited in (a) above, will require
the subsequent mortgage lender(s) (i.e., the
lender(s) other than the one first
designating that individual) to provide in
writing a detailed explanation to the

15
Department, subject to potential sanctions,
describing how that individual will operate
and exercise control over that second
mortgage lender.
d) The Department considers as a
“licensing deficiency” any mortgage lender
application or principal representative
designation submitted to the Department
where the individual designated as the
mortgage lender’s principal representative
has previously been and continues to be
designated principal representative by
another mortgage lender. The Department,
based upon this “deficiency,” shall not deem
the application(s) “complete” for purposes
of section 120.60, Florida Statutes. Such
application(s) shall be subjected to the
licensing procedures set forth in paragraphs
(e) and (f) hereafter. In conformity with
the agency statement set forth in (a) above,
the Department will not undertake an inquiry
of the principal representative designation
submitted by the mortgage lender who first
designated the individual as its’ principal
representative.
e) The Department will require mortgage
lenders to provide the information referred
to in section c above, through the use of a
form, [i.e., the form letters attached as
EXHIBITS “14”, “15”, & “16”, to this
Petition]. Further, this form created for
the purpose of soliciting information [not
specifically required by statute or an
existing rule] will require mortgage lenders
to provide a response, specifically subject
to announced sanctions, of details not
otherwise required under the applicable
statutes or rules.
f) The Department, though requiring
mortgage lenders to comply with the agency
statements through the threat of announced
sanctions, shall not provide to mortgage
lenders or their designated principal
representatives any clarifying or defining

16
circumstances or criteria the Department
will deem as acceptable——contractual or
otherwise——for a person to be designated as
principal representative for more than one
mortgage lender. Any responses provided by
such mortgage lenders in response to the
Department’s written form shall be submitted
by the applicant “at their peril.”
Ultimate Factual Determinations
17. In his just-quoted statements “a,” “c,” “d,” and “e,”
Taylor described, with reasonable particularity, the essence of
policies that, in fact, fall within the statutory definition of
the term “rule.” Statement “a” describes (albeit somewhat
imprecisely) a Departmental mindset, the view that a person is
likely to have difficulty simultaneously serving more than one
master as a PR; the last sentence of statement “d” accurately
describes the Department’s related policy of not inquiring as to
how a PRD who is not a dual designee will operate and control
the lender’s business (because the agency presumes that a person
will probably have no difficulty serving as PR to one lender at
a time). Taken together, these views, in fact, constitute the
Department’s interpretation of the PR statutes.15
18. Taylor’s statement “c” and the third sentence of “d”
(all of which, of course, he attributes to the Department)
correctly describe, for the most part,16
the Department’s policy
of requiring additional information from all licensees and
applicants whose Designations nominate an XPR for the position

17
of PR. This policy is plainly driven by the Department’s
interpretation of the PR statutes, and it leads, in turn,
directly to statement “e.” Restated to conform to the evidence,
statement “e” holds that the Department will send either the DF
416 Inquiry Letter or the Compliance Inquiry Letter, whichever
is applicable, to any lender whose PRD is an XPR.
19. It is the form letters——the DF 416 Inquiry Letter and
the Compliance Inquiry Letter——that have emerged as the most
visible, most readily identifiable unadopted rules of the
Department, for they solicit information not specifically
required by statute or by an existing rule.
20. By the end of December 2001 at the latest, rulemaking
was both feasible and practicable with regard to the above-
described statements, but no effort was made to adopt them as
rules. Thus, the Department failed timely to commence
rulemaking with regard to these statements in accordance with
Section 120.54(1)(a), Florida Statutes.17
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
21. The Division of Administrative Hearings has personal
and subject matter jurisdiction in this proceeding pursuant to
Sections 120.56, 120.569, and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes.
22. The Department contends that Taylor lacks standing to
maintain this proceeding because, according to the Department,
he has failed to prove that he is “substantially affected” by

18
the challenged agency statements. See Section 120.56(4)(a),
Florida Statutes (“Any person substantially affected by an
agency statement may seek an administrative determination that
the statement violates s. 120.54(1)(a).”). In particular, the
Department argues that Taylor has failed to demonstrate, first,
a “causal connection” between his alleged injury and the DF 416
Inquiry Letters that were sent to his clients in November 2001;
and, second, that he “factually qualifies” to be a PR by making
a “showing” that he would operate and control a lender’s
business.
23. When standing is resisted, the burden is on the rule
challenger to demonstrate his right to proceed. See Department
of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Alice P., 367 So. 2d
1045, 1052 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). As the Department correctly
maintains, Taylor must show, one, that the alleged rules-by-
definition cause him a real and immediate injury-in-fact; and,
two, that the interest invaded is arguably within the zone of
interests to be protected or regulated. E.g. Lanoue v. Florida
Department of Law Enforcement, 751 So. 2d 94, 96 (Fla. 1st DCA
1999).
24. To satisfy the injury-in-fact element, “the injury
must not be based on pure speculation or conjecture.” Ward v.
Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund, 651
So. 2d 1236, 1237 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). On the zone of interests

19
element, the test is met when a party shows that a statute or
rule "encroaches upon an interest protected by a statute or the
constitution." Id. at 1238. "In the context of a rule
challenge, the protected zone of interest need not be found in
the enabling statute of the challenged rule itself[,]" but may
arise from the operation of other statutes. Id.
25. Here, a painstaking analysis of standing is not needed
because the challenged statements regulate Taylor’s business——if
not directly then at least through collateral effect——which is a
sufficient basis for concluding that he is substantially
affected by them. See, e.g., Florida Board of Medicine v.
Florida Academy of Cosmetic Surgery, 808 So. 2d 243, 251 (Fla.
1st DCA 2002).
26. Further, the Department’s contention that Taylor has
failed to prove an injury is unpersuasive. First, Taylor did
establish a causal link between the inquiry letters and the
termination of his relationships with several clients; in fact,
the former led directly to the latter. Second, and more
important, Taylor is “injured,” for purposes of standing, simply
by virtue of the fact that the challenged statements are a
barrier to his business plan of serving as PR to more than one
lender.18
27. The Department’s argument that, to establish his
standing under the “interests-zone” prong, Taylor must show that

20
he is qualified “factually” to be a PR by proving that he is
operating and exercising control over a licensee’s business also
misses the mark. First, Taylor meets all of the educational and
testing requirements prescribed for PRs; he is, in fact, serving
as PR to Gulf Coast Mortgage Solutions (and has served two other
lenders in that same capacity) without objection from the
Department, which is fully aware of his service. Second,
whether the Department would be justified in disapproving of
Taylor’s serving as PR to another lender while continuing to
serve as Gulf Coast Mortgage Solutions’ PR——which would be a
pertinent question in a proceeding under Sections 120.569 and
120.57 to determine Taylor’s substantial interests——is
irrelevant in this Section 120.56(4) case. For present standing
purposes, it is enough that Taylor has a business plan, which is
not merely a pipe dream but an immediately realizable goal (as
shown by his success in lining up clients), to serve multiple
lenders as a PR, and that the challenged statements exert a
regulatory effect on that planned business.
28. For the above reasons, Taylor has met his burden to
demonstrate standing.
29. Turning to the merits, the burden of proof is on the
party seeking to prove the affirmative of an issue unless a
statute provides otherwise. Florida Department of
Transportation v. J.W.C. Company, Inc., 396 So. 2d 778, 786-87

21
(Fla. 1st DCA 1981). In a proceeding under Section 120.56(4) to
determine a violation of Section 120.54(1)(a), Florida Statutes,
therefore, the burden is on the petitioner to establish by a
preponderance of evidence: (1) the substance of the agency
statement; (2) facts sufficient to show that the statement
constitutes a rule-by-definition; and (3) the agency’s failure
to adopt the statement as soon as feasible and practicable
according to the rulemaking procedures. See Section
120.56(4)(a), Florida Statutes. Because the petitioner is
entitled to the benefit of a rebuttable presumption that
rulemaking is feasible and practicable, see Section
120.54(1)(a), Florida Statutes, he makes a prima facie showing
on prong (3) merely by establishing that the challenged
statement is not a duly promulgated rule, which will typically,
if not always, be undisputed.
30. If the petitioner meets his burden, then the agency
must carry the burden of proving that rulemaking is infeasible
or impracticable as provided in Section 120.54(1)(a). See
Section 120.56(4)(b), Florida Statutes.19
31. Section 120.52(15), Florida Statutes, defines the term
“rule” to mean
each agency statement of general
applicability that implements, interprets,
or prescribes law or policy or describes the
procedure or practice requirements of an
agency and includes any form which imposes

22
any requirement or solicits any information
not specifically required by statute or by
an existing rule.
The statutory definition excludes three classes of agency
statements from its operation, but none of these exclusions is
applicable here.
32. A statement is a rule if it has the effect of a rule
regardless whether the agency calls it a rule. In determining
whether a statement meets the statutory definition of a rule,
the important question is: What consequences does this
statement cause within its field of operation? As the Court of
Appeal, First District, explained, the
breadth of the definition in Section
120.52(1[5]) indicates that the
legislature intended the term to cover
a great variety of agency statements
regardless of how the agency designates
them. Any agency statement is a rule
if it "purports in and of itself to
create certain rights and adversely
affect others," [State Department of
Administration v.] Stevens, 344 So. 2d
[290,] 296 [(Fla. 1st DCA 1977)], or
serves "by (its) own effect to create
rights, or to require compliance, or
otherwise to have the direct and
consistent effect of law." McDonald v.
Dep't of Banking & Fin., 346 So. 2d
569, 581 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
State Department of Administration v. Harvey, 356 So. 2d 323,
325 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); see also Amos v. Department of Health
and Rehabilitative Services, 444 So. 2d 43, 46 (Fla. 1st DCA
1983). Because the focus is on effect rather than form, a

23
statement need not be in writing to be a rule-by-definition.
See Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Schluter,
705 So. 2d 81, 84 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).
33. Given the circumstances of this case, it is
instructive that the definition of “rule” expressly includes
“any form which imposes any requirement or solicits any
information not specifically required by statute or by an
existing rule.” In pausing to consider this provision, it will
be seen that the definition does not say “specifically
authorized” but “specifically required.” Thus, generally
applicable forms are not exempt from rulemaking merely because
they request information that the agency is authorized to
collect; such forms are outside the definition of “rule” only
when a statute or existing rule requires the agency to obtain
(or affected parties to provide) the specific information
solicited.20
34. Also of importance here is that the definition of the
term “rule” specifically includes statements of general
applicability that implement or interpret law. An agency’s
interpretation of a statute that gives the statute a meaning not
readily apparent from its literal reading and purports to create
rights, to require compliance, or otherwise to have the direct
and consistent effect of law, is a rule. See Beverly
Enterprises-Florida, Inc. v. Department of Health and

24
Rehabilitative Services, 573 So. 2d 19, 22 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990);
St. Francis Hospital, Inc. v. Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Services, 553 So. 2d 1351, 1354 (Fla. 1st DCA
1989).
35. The Department’s DF 416 Inquiry Letter and its
Compliance Inquiry Letter are forms that solicit detailed
information concerning how a PRD will operate and exercise
control over a lender’s business. This is not information that
the Department is specifically required, either by statute or
existing rule, to collect. The only information that the
statutes specifically require a lender to provide regarding a
PRD is the person’s name, address, and proof that he or she has
completed the prescribed educational and testing requirements.
See Section 494.0061(1)(f), (8), (10); and Section
494.0062(1)(f), (12), (13).21
(In addition, a PR must, by rule,
notify the Department of his termination as PR within 30 days of
such termination. See Rule 3D-40.242(5), Florida Administrative
Code.) Thus, the DF 416 Inquiry Letter and the Compliance
Inquiry Letter are rules-by-definition.
36. The Department’s interpretation of the PR statutes, as
described in paragraph 17, supra, gives the statutes a meaning
that is not readily apparent on the face thereof and has the
direct and consistent effect of law. Thus, it is a rule-by-
definition.

25
37. Finally, the Department’s policy and implementing
practices, as described in paragraph 18, supra, operate to carry
out the Department’s statutory interpretation. Having the
direct and consistent effect of law, they, too, are rules-by-
definition.
38. Consideration has been given to the Department’s
argument that the challenged statements are not “generally
applicable” because they do not affect an entire “statutory
class” of regulated entities (all licensees) but only a subset
thereof (those who designate an XPR as PR). In support of this
proposition, the Department relies upon Florida League of
Cities, Inc. v. Administration Commission, 586 So. 2d 397 (Fla.
1st DCA 1991), and Department of Highway Safety and Motor
Vehicles v. Schluter, 705 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). This
argument is rejected for reasons that follow.
39. In Florida League, the court did indeed hold that a
sanctions policy under which economic penalties could be imposed
against a municipality that failed timely to submit its growth
management plan to the state for review was not a generally
applicable “rule” because, while all municipalities were
potentially subject to the sanctions policy, the policy would be
applied only to those whose plans were late. Id. at 406. This
decision, however, is the product of a different era of
administrative law, a time when courts adhered to the view that

26
“[r]ulemaking cannot be forced upon an agency[.]” Id. Much
legislative water has flowed under the APA bridge since Florida
League was decided in 1991. As the first district observed
seven years later, in Schluter,
the 1991 legislature expressed, in no
uncertain terms, its selection of rulemaking
over adjudication as the primary means of
policy development. By enacting section
120.535, Florida Statutes, [the pertinent
language of which was subsequently
transferred to present-day Section
130.54(1)(a)], the legislature clearly
disapproved of the judiciary’s
interpretation of the [Administrative
Procedure] Act, which had indicated that
rulemaking was primarily a matter of agency
discretion. The statute required each
agency statement that met the definition of
rule to be adopted as soon as feasible and
practicable. [Footnote omitted.] As a
result of these recent legislative
amendments, it clearly appears that it was
the legislature’s intention to remove from
agencies the discretion whether or not to
adopt rules.
Schluter, 705 So. 2d at 86. While the narrow vision of “general
applicability” expressed in Florida League is explicable in
light of the deference that courts were then giving agencies in
the area of rulemaking, such reasoning is out-of-step with
current law.
40. That Florida League is no longer good law on this
particular point is shown by Schluter. There, the court
reviewed six policies——each of which applied only to law
enforcement officers under investigation——to determine if some

27
or all were rules-by-definition. It concluded that three were
and three were not. The three that were deemed not rules-by-
definition were distinguished from the others on the ground that
they applied only “in certain circumstances,” at a supervisor’s
discretion, and hence were not generally applicable. Schluter,
705 So. 2d at 82. The Department here does not contend,
however, that the challenged statements apply only in certain
circumstances at the discretion of a supervisor, and the facts
are otherwise; thus, this aspect of Schluter is inapposite.
41. The relevant decision in Schluter is that which found
the three generally applicable policies to be rules-by-
definition. Significantly, the three unlawful policies affected
but a subset of all law enforcement officers (i.e. those under
investigation); yet, they were determined to be generally
applicable because each policy operated consistently upon all
members of this subset regardless of the particular
circumstances surrounding any individual officer.22
Id. at 83.
Similarly, the challenged policies in this case operate
consistently upon all lenders in the affected subset (namely,
applicants and licensees that designate an XPR as their PR)
regardless of the particular circumstances surrounding any
individual lender.
42. At bottom, the key to “general applicability” is not
that a policy applies always to all persons who might

28
potentially be affected by it, but rather that the policy
applies always to all similarly situated persons upon whom, by
its terms, it intends to operate. (If by its terms a statement
is intended to apply to one person only, or to some but not all
similarly situated persons, depending on the particular
circumstances, then it should ordinarily be regarded as a case-
specific adjudication rather than a policy of general
applicability. Naturally, as a policy’s field of operation
expands and become more inclusive, the likelihood that it will
be found generally applicable increases.)
43. The challenged statements here meet the test of
general applicability.
44. As announced in the Findings of Fact above, the
Department failed to prove that rulemaking was either infeasible
or impracticable. See Section 120.56(4)(b), Florida Statutes.
Further, in any event, Taylor carried the ultimate burden of
persuasion, establishing by the greater weight of the evidence
that the Department failed to adopt the challenged statements as
soon as feasible and practicable.
45. Accordingly, the Department has violated Section
120.54(1)(a), Florida Statutes, in connection with the agency
statements that have been determined herein to constitute rules-
by-definition.

29
46. Section 120.595(4)(a), Florida Statutes, provides that
“[u]pon entry of a final order that all or part of an agency
statement violates s. 120.54(1)(a), the administrative law judge
shall award reasonable costs and reasonable attorneys' fees to
the petitioner, unless the agency demonstrates that the
statement is required by the Federal Government to implement or
retain a delegated or approved program or to meet a condition to
receipt of federal funds."
47. The Department has not proved the applicability of an
exception to the mandate that attorneys’ fees and costs be
awarded to the successful petitioner in a Section 120.56(4)
proceeding. Therefore, it is hereby determined that Taylor is
entitled to recover a reasonable sum for the attorneys’ fees and
costs it has incurred in the prosecution of this action. The
amount of the award shall be determined by separate order.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, it is ORDERED that the challenged statements of the
Department, as described in paragraphs 17 through 19, supra, are
rules-by-definition that have not been adopted under, and
therefore violate, Section 120.54, Florida Statutes.
Jurisdiction is retained to conduct further proceedings as
necessary to award attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to
Section 120.595(4)(a), Florida Statutes.

30
DONE AND ORDERED this 6th day of August, 2002, in
Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.
___________________________________
JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM
Administrative Law Judge
Division of Administrative Hearings
The DeSoto Building
1230 Apalachee Parkway
(850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675
Fax Filing (850) 921-6847
www.doah.state.fl.us
Filed with the Clerk of the
Division of Administrative Hearings
this 6th day of August, 2002.
ENDNOTES
1
/ The Petition also sought a determination that the alleged
statements were invalid exercises of delegated legislative
authority for reasons forth in Section 120.52(8), Florida
Statutes. Following briefing by the parties, however, the
Administrative Law Judge narrowed the issues for final hearing,
ruling that:
It is not necessary or permissible in a
Section 120.56(4) proceeding that has
not been consolidated with a proceeding
pursuant to 120.57(1)(e) to determine
whether a rule-by-definition is
“substantively” invalid for reasons set
forth 120.52(8)(b)–(g), Florida
Statutes.
Order on Pending Motions, June 25, 2002.
2
/ The depositions of McDougald and Harder were introduced
subject to all objections made in the respective records. Those
objections are hereby overruled. (While the trier reviewed and
considered the depositions, none was determinative in resolving
any dispute of material fact. The outcome of this case would
have been exactly the same in their absence.)

31
3
/ Additionally, on June 21, 2002, the Department filed a
request for official notice of Parts I and III of Chapter 494,
Florida Statutes. On June 25, 2002, Taylor filed a motion for
official recognition of Chapter 494, Florida Statutes; Chapter
2001-228, Laws of Florida; certain rules proposed by the
Department as published in Volume 27, Number 35 of the Florida
Administrative Weekly, August 31, 2001; certain revised proposed
rules as published in Volume 27, Number 40 of the Florida
Administrative Weekly, October 5, 2001; and present Chapter 3D-
40, Florida Administrative Code. At the final hearing both the
Department’s request for official notice and Petitioner’s motion
for official recognition were granted.
4
/ Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory citations are to
the 2001 Florida Statutes.
5
/ Licensees who made their designations before the new law’s
October 1, 2001, effective date were not required to prove that
their respective PRDs had completed 24 hours of classroom
instruction and passed a prescribed test. In his Petition,
Taylor labeled these licensees “grand-fathered companies” and
alleged that the Department “apparently” had not applied the
alleged rules-by-definition to them——at least not until after
Taylor had complained, in December 2001, about what he perceived
as disparate treatment. Based on the evidence presented at
final hearing, however, the undersigned has concluded that the
term “grand-fathered company” draws a distinction that need not
be made in disposing of this case; hence, that particular term
will be avoided.
6
/ Notwithstanding this change in the proposed rules, the
Department proceeded internally to create a “deficiency code”——
namely DF 410, which meant “principal representative can only be
assigned to one lender at a time”——for use in its automated
license processing system. Deficiency codes are used by the
Department’s analysts as a means of attaching a computerized
“red flag” to license application files that are deemed
incomplete because of errors or omissions, as well as to those
raising questions for which additional information is needed.
See generally Section 120.60, Florida Statutes. When the
analyst inputs a deficiency code, the Department’s computer
system automatically generates an appropriate “deficiency
letter” for delivery to the applicant, the purpose of which is
to apprise the applicant of the problem and provide an
opportunity to correct such problem. An application that has

32
been tagged with a deficiency code is ordinarily considered
incomplete for purposes of Section 120.60, Florida Statutes.
The evidence is conflicting as to whether the Department
actually used DF 410, which code, though obsolete even before it
was created, still exists in the Department’s computer system.
Whether or not the Department used DF 410 makes no material
difference, however, because a successor deficiency code (DF
416) was finally created about two months after the Department
revised its proposed rules to delete the “one lender to a PR”
mandate, see infra at paragraph 11, and DF 416——which is very
similar to DF 410——is an active code that has been, and will
continue to be, used by the Department.
7
/ Like its predecessors, the Designation, as revised and
adopted, does not require the licensee or applicant (or the PRD)
to explain in detail how the PRD will operate and exercise
control over the designating lender’s business.
8
/ The four applicants were European-American Mortgage Corp.
(“European-American”); Mountain Pacific Mortgage Company;
Mortgage Bankers Service Corp.; and Firstrust Mortgage, Inc. At
or around the time European-American applied, this lender became
the subject of a Departmental investigation as the result of a
complaint unrelated to Taylor or to any issues associated with
the designation of a principal representative. During this
investigation, the Department obtained a letter which described
Taylor’s proposed business relationship with European-American.
At hearing, the Department claimed that this letter fueled its
suspicions that Taylor either could not or would not carry out
the duties of a PR for that company. The Department’s concern
about Taylor’s relationship with European-American apparently
was a factor in shaping the Department’s subsequent actions.
The fact remains (as will be seen), however, that, in dealing
with Taylor’s situation, the Department developed policies of
general applicability. Further, it is clear that the
Department’s dim view of dual designees was (and is) the product
of its interpretation of the relevant statutes——not a response
to factual circumstances unique to any particular lender or PRD.
9
/ The Department’s quotation of these disciplinary and
penalty provisions in a letter requesting additional information
from an applicant is unusual, and Taylor has complained about
it, calling the Department’s motives into question. Based on
the evidence presented, it is reasonable to infer that one
purpose of quoting the statutory penalty language is to
“persuade” the applicant to name another PRD——someone who is not

33
an XPR. While this might be considered a heavy-handed tactic,
an agency’s quoting of a statute in a letter to an applicant (or
licensee) does not, at least without more, violate Section
120.54(1)(a), Florida Statutes.
10
/ The letter to European-American uniquely included the
following sentences here: “Please note that we are in receipt
of a letter from Mr. Taylor addressed to you, indicating that
for a fee. [sic] Mr. Taylor will temporarily let your company
use his license in an attempt to comply with the principal
representative requirement. Chapter 494, Florida Statutes
requires more than perfunctory compliance.” The Department
offered some testimony at hearing, and has argued, that the
purpose of the four letters of November 2001 was to determine
whether Taylor’s proposed PR relationship with European-American
was the model for all of his PR relationships and, if so,
whether this arrangement would pass statutory muster. It is no
doubt true that the letters were motivated, at least in part, by
such a desire. The greater weight of the evidence shows (and it
is hereby found), however, that the letters would have been sent
even if the European-American situation had not arisen——and,
more important, that the same form letter has been, and will be,
sent to any applicant who has named, or later names, an XPR as
PR.
11
/ Unlike other so-called “deficiency letters,” the DF 416
Inquiry Letter is not automatically computer generated upon
entry of the deficiency code but, rather, exists as a document
in a word processing program; thus, it must be manually prepared
for each use.
12
/ The evidence is in conflict concerning whether an
application tagged with a DF 416 is considered complete or
incomplete for purposes of Section 120.60, Florida Statutes. In
the final analysis, however, this turns out to be an interesting
non-issue. As will be further discussed in the text infra, the
DF 416 Inquiry Letter clearly solicits information not
specifically required by statute or by an existing rule and thus
falls within the definition of the term “rule” whether or not
the DF 416 tag makes an application incomplete.
On a related point, the Department says that no application
has been or could be denied on the basis of a DF 416 “red
flag”——which means that responding to the DF 416 Inquiry Letter
is purely voluntary——although it admits that no applicant has
been informed of this. (Additionally, no application has been

34
approved with an outstanding DF 416, which also weakens the
Department’s attempt to play down the significance of the DF 416
Inquiry Letter.) These facts, however, prove nothing of moment.
For one thing, the first four recipients of a DF 416 Inquiry
Letter (the applicants that had named Taylor as their PR)
responded by designating other persons for the post;
consequently, the Department did not need to deny their
applications due to, or approve them in spite of, the DF 416.
As for the three additional DF 416 Inquiry Letters that had been
sent as of the final hearing, none of the recipients had yet
responded, so the Department had not been required to approve or
deny their applications. (Indeed, the Department was unable at
hearing to articulate objective criteria for deciding whether
the degree of control that a PRD would exercise is sufficient to
satisfy the agency’s interpretation of the statutory description
of the PR’s role. It appears, therefore, that the Department
plans to decide what to do with the information it acquires in
response to DF 416 Inquiry Letters on a case-by-case basis.)
In any event, even if the Department, as it claims it
would, were to approve one or more of these pending applications
despite an applicant’s non-response to the DF 416 Inquiry Letter
or its submission of a response that the Department considered
unsatisfactory, that would not change the fact that the DF 416
Inquiry Letter is a form which solicits information not
specifically required by statute or by an existing rule——and
thus is a rule-by-definition.
13
/ Taylor is the PR of Gulf Coast Mortgage Solutions. At one
time he was the PR of Surety Mortgage and at another time that
of Winterwood Mortgage. He was not, however, a dual designee of
any of these lenders.
14
/ The Department draws attention to the fact that although
there were some 55 licensees whose PRD was a dual designee, only
approximately 25 Compliance Inquiry Letters were sent, the
implication being that the form letter was not consistently used
in the situation for which it was prepared. This argument is
unconvincing because (a) all similarly situated licensees were
sent the letter, and (b) the reason there were fewer letters
than licensees was simply that in many situations one letter
served notice on multiple lenders, the addressee being an
officer or employee of each.
The Department makes a related argument concerning the
relatively small number of licensees——only 55 out of a total

35
licensee population of approximately 2,450——and applicants
(seven to date) affected by the policies about which Taylor
complains. These numbers are so small, contends the Department,
that the actions taken towards the affected parties cannot be
considered generally applicable. As will be discussed in the
Conclusions of Law below, however, general applicability is not
measured by the size of the known affected class; rather, it is
determined by consistency of use under categorical conditions.
Thus, a policy that has been applied to seven persons will be
generally applicable if by its terms it is intended to operate
100 percent of the time on all persons whose situation is
categorically similar to that of the seven.
In addition, some rules are designed to discourage conduct
of which an agency disapproves or wants less of——by, for
example, entangling such activity in regulatory “red tape”——or
to deter misconduct, which is one purpose of administrative
sanctions. Such rules can exert a powerful prophylactic
(negative) effect; thus, the number of persons who comply with
(or are punished under) such rules may be far less significant,
in terms of measuring their impact, than the number who are
dissuaded from engaging in the conduct that would require
compliance or subject the actor to discipline. This is surely
true with regard to disciplinary rules; the number of licensees
punished thereunder, it is hoped, will be but a small percentage
of the number deterred from engaging in sanctionable misconduct.
It is probably true in the instant case as well. Because the
challenged policies are of the “red tape” variety, it is
reasonable to expect that, as awareness of the DF 416 Inquiry
Letter and the Compliance Inquiry Letter increases in the
regulated community, the number of dual designees will decrease,
as applicants and licensees, having a lower cost alternative,
act to avoid the burden of providing the Department with
additional, detailed information.
15
/ The reasonableness of the Department’s statutory
interpretation is not at issue, and no opinion on that subject
is expressed herein.
16
/ The proviso in statement “c” that excludes “grand-fathered
companies” is incorrect.
17
/ The Department’s policies that require inquiry about dual
designees——and the forms for doing so——are not “evolving” or
“exploratory” but, in fact, had solidified by the close of year
2001. To the extent Mr. Saxon suggested otherwise, his

36
testimony was undercut by an admission that he did not know
whether inquiry letters were being sent to all applicants whose
PDR is an XPR (as, in fact, they have been) and, in any event,
is overwhelmed by the greater weight of contrary evidence. Not
overlooked, either, is Mr. Tedcastle’s opinion that the policies
are “evolving.” He based this opinion on a prediction that
inquiry about dual designees might not be necessary in the
future. However, even a duly promulgated rule may be repealed;
thus, the fact that a policy might someday be rescinded cannot
be a basis for deeming such policy “evolving.” Mr. Tedcastle’s
testimony in this regard was unpersuasive and, ultimately, is
also against the greater weight of contrary evidence.
What is evolving is the Department’s policy concerning what
to do with the information it acquires in response to its
inquiry letters. The trier has determined, however, that this
matter, though related to the challenged policies, is not a
barrier to promulgating rules concerning the Department’s
decision to solicit information on dual designees. For one
thing, the two matters——the solicitation of information, on the
one hand, and the manner of acting upon such information, on the
other——are logically distinct and separable; and, the latter
need not be settled to firmly resolve the handling of the
former. For another, it is conceivable that the Department will
not be able to formulate rules regarding the treatment of such
information but instead will find it necessary to take
subsequent action based on individual circumstances.
18
/ Note that the issue in this case is not whether the
regulatory barrier erected by the Department is necessary, wise,
or authorized by the statutes; it may be some, all, or none of
these, but it is a barrier nonetheless.
19
/ If the agency proves that it has commenced rulemaking and is
proceeding therewith expeditiously in good faith, then the
presumption of feasibility is rebutted. See Section
120.54(1)(a)1.c., Florida Statutes. In that event, if the
petitioner were relying solely on the presumption, then the
agency would carry its burden with such proof, defeating the
petition; if, however, there were other evidence that the agency
had failed to timely commence rulemaking (“as soon as feasible
and practicable”), then the disputed issue would need to be
decided, as a matter of fact, as if the presumption did not
exist. Although the statute is a bit unclear as to which party,
in such situation, has the burden proof regarding the timeliness
of the agency’s rulemaking efforts, it has been held that the

37
petitioner, as the party seeking relief, has the ultimate burden
of persuasion on this point. See Broward County, etc. v.
Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Fla. DOAH Case
No. 00-4520RX, at 59-64 & n. 27, n. 28 (F.O. July 31, 2001),
aff’d per curiam, Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer
Services v. Broward County, 816 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).
It is not the case that an agency can avoid liability
altogether under Section 120.56(4) simply by commencing to adopt
the challenged statement as a rule, no matter when the
rulemaking process begins. That is, current rulemaking is not a
complete defense to a proceeding under Section 120.56(4). Id.
(Agency’s rulemaking efforts, which were ongoing at time of
final hearing, were insufficient to avoid liability under
Section 120.56(4)). The point is raised here because the
Department filed a post-hearing Motion to Dismiss, to which was
attached a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking respecting newly-
proposed rules that purportedly address the statements Taylor
has challenged, wherein current (meaning, in this case, post-
hearing) rulemaking was put forward as an absolute defense. The
motion, being untimely, based on matters outside the four
corners of the petition, and legally insufficient on the merits,
was promptly denied.
(No findings of fact have been made in this Final Order
concerning the Department’s putative rulemaking efforts because,
the Department having never moved to reopen the record to offer
proof of its post-hearing rulemaking activities, there is no
evidence in the evidentiary record upon which to make such
findings.)
20
/ If an agency adopts or seeks to adopt as a rule a form which
solicits information that the agency is not specifically
authorized to collect, then the form should be invalidated for
that reason, if challenged. See, e.g., Southwest Florida Water
Management District v. Save the Manatee Club, Inc., 773 So. 2d
594, 599 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000).
21
/ The Department is authorized to “require each applicant
. . . to provide any information reasonably necessary to make a
determination of the applicant’s eligibility for licensure.”
See Sections 494.0061(1), Florida Statutes. This grant of
authority arguably empowers the Department to ask for detailed
information concerning how a PRD will operate and exercise
control over an applicant’s business (though the question need
not be decided here). It does not, however, specifically

38
require the Department to request, or the applicant to submit,
such information.
22
/ While the court wrote that the three rules-by-definition
applied “uniformly to all law enforcement officers . . . without
exception,” id., what it plainly meant by this observation was
that all officers were potentially subject to the policies; none
of the policies, it was clear, applied directly to officers who
were not under investigation. In the same sense, the policies
under consideration here apply uniformly to all applicants and
licensees without exception, because all lenders are potentially
subject to them; the policies will be applied directly to any
lender who designates an XPR as PR.
COPIES FURNISHED:
H. Richard Bisbee, Esquire
Law Office of H. Richard Bisbee
124 Salem Court, Suite A
Cynthia K. Maynard, Esquire
James H. Harris, Esquire
Honorable Robert F. Milligan
Office of the Comptroller
The Capitol, Plaza Level 09
Robert Beitler, General Counsel

39
Carroll Webb
Executive Director and General Counsel
Joint Administrative Procedures Committee
Holland Building, Room 120
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW
A party who is adversely affected by this Final Order is
entitled to judicial review pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida
Statutes. Review proceedings are governed by the Florida Rules
of Appellate Procedure. Such proceedings are commenced by
filing the original notice of appeal with the Clerk of the
Division of Administrative Hearings and a copy, accompanied by
filing fees prescribed by law, with the District Court of
Appeal, First District, or with the District Court of Appeal in
the Appellate District where the party resides. The notice of
appeal must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to
be reviewed.

Div. of Administrative Hearings Final Order awarding fees based upon agency non-rule policy.PDF

Recommended

Recommended

More Related Content

What's hot

What's hot (19)

Viewers also liked

Viewers also liked (19)

Similar to Div. of Administrative Hearings Final Order awarding fees based upon agency non-rule policy.PDF

Similar to Div. of Administrative Hearings Final Order awarding fees based upon agency non-rule policy.PDF (20)

Div. of Administrative Hearings Final Order awarding fees based upon agency non-rule policy.PDF