解剖科學變遷的整體圖像 4[1]

管理經典名著選讀
Dissecting the Holist Picture
of Scientific Change
指導教授:李元德教授
莊立民教授
博班預修生:劉熒燕

剖析科學變遷的整體圖像
Dissecting the Holist Picture of Scientific Change
 Thomas Kuhn: The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
That book made a powerful difference. It
mattered, because it posed in a particularly vivid form
some direct challenges to the empiricism.
 科學革命的結構一書讓我們做了長足的改變，此書的
重要性在於生動地呈現對於實證主義直接的挑戰。

 自從1960年以來，Kuhn的大部分哲學寫作都致力於釐
清科學革命的結構第一版中語言所造成的模糊與困惑
之處。
 Since 1962 most of Kuhn’s philosophical writings have
been devoted to clearing up some of the ambiguities
and confusions generated by the language of the first
edition of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.

 但這並不完全公平，因為如果Kuhn的釐清確實是會把
我們曾經一度認為Kuhn之地位的囊刺(缺點)給拿掉的
話，在這之後的Kuhn是否讓人清楚明瞭與富爭議性會
出現幾項議題。
 But that is not entirely fair, for if many of Kuhn’s
clarifications have indeed taken the sting of what we
once thought Kuhn’s position was, there are several
issues about which the later Kuhn is both clear and
controversial.

 Kuhm 因而成為我當下的目標，因為Kuhn是科學變遷
最著名的作者，也由於他犯了幾個明顯的錯誤，本章
將主要著重在討論他的觀點。
 Kuhn, then, will be my immediate target…because he
is the best-known account of scientific change, and
because he mostly overtly makes several mistakes I
want to discuss, this chapter focus chiefly on his views.

Kuhn中心概念的三層典範
 1. 一個分類與解釋自然客體的概念架構。
 A paradigm offers a framework for classifying and
explaining natural objects.
 2. 說明研究相關應用領域中客體的適當探究方法、技
巧與工具
 Specify the appropriate methods, techniques, and
tools for studying the objects in the revelant domain of
application

 Kuhn堅稱在任兩個典範間存在方法學與價值論上的差
異。確實，Kuhn主要失敗之一就是將古典階層途徑完
全內化，他的途徑並未提供關於理性選擇的可能性。
 Kuhn asserts that there are methodogical and
axiological discrepancies between any two paradigms.
Indeed, one of the core failings of Kuhn’s position is
that it so fully internalizes the classical hierarchical
approach…, Kuhn’s approach has nothing more to offer
concerning the possibility of rational choices.

 重點是Kuhn勾勒的典範改變的方式，是讓這些典範在
科學社區生活中，看起來是唐突且是有全球的不和諧
感。
 The immediate point to stress is that Kuhn portrays
paradigm changes in ways that make them seem to be
abrupt and global ruptures in the life of scientific
community.

Kuhn 的論述缺失
 我之前抱怨Kuhn不僅無法正規地獲理性地記述理論改
變，如我以下所show出來的，Kuhn甚至無法精確地
描述或敘述大規模的科學改變內容。
 My complaint with Kuhn is not merely that he has
failed to give any normatively robust or rational
account of theory change, as I show below, he has
failed even at the descriptive or narrative task of
offering an accurate story about the manner in which
large scale changes of scientific allegiance occur.

Kuhn 的論述缺失
 Kuhn 根本層面呈現出對理論改變動力理解的障礙，
尤其，透過堅持個別典範都有整體與靜態的特色，
Kuhn已經失去科學的單一特色，也就是允諾要緩和與
合理地說明從一個世界觀/典範轉換到另一個的方式/
內容。
 A more fundamental respect in which Kuhn’s
approach presents obstacles to an understanding of
the dynamics of theory change.

Kuhn的世界觀模式
 1. 科學社區內的團體接受某特定「大圖像」
 One group in the scientific community accepts a
particular “big picture”.
 2. 當科學改變被全球性地解釋時，把科學改變視為(信
仰..)轉變以外的經驗就成了極大的挑戰。
 When scientific change is construed so globally, it is
no small challenge to see how it could be other than a
conversion experience.

Kuhn的世界觀模式
 Kuhn文章中暗指在跨典範的論辯不見得是有定論的，
也因此從未有理性的結尾。
 The clear implication of Kuhn’s writings is that inter-
paradigmatic debate is necessarily inconclusive, and
thus can never be brought to rational closure.

彌補Kuhn非理性主義的方法
 1. 我們必須以網狀的圖像取代辯解的階層式觀點，讓
認知的價值變得「可談判」。
 We must replace the hierarchical view of justification
with the reticulated picture, thereby making cognitive
values “negotiable”.
 2. 我們應該簡單地停止讓Kuhn堅持世界觀或是典範的
整體特質。
 We must simply drop Kuhn’s insistence on the integral
character of world views or paradigms.

彌補Kuhn非理性主義的方法
 更精確地說，面對科學家持有的世界觀下所做的選擇
並不需要像圖1所勾勒般死板，而是要像修正核心元素
般，方會帶來決定性的進步。
 To be more precise, the choice confronting a scientist
whose world is under strain in his manner need to be
nothing like as stark as the choice in figure 1, but
rather a choice where the modification of one core
element may bring a decided improvement.

選擇
 在所有的例子中，在對手間有足夠的共同基礎來產生
發現「阿基米德式」的希望，也就是理性上能夠緩和
該選擇。
 In all these examples there is enough common ground
between the rivals to engender hope of finding an
“Archimedean standpoint” which can rationally
mediate the choice.

理論轉變的高度理想化版本
 透過鋪陳出一個更漸進主義的科學轉變圖像的核心特
色，我將描繪一個高度理想化的理論轉變版本。
 By way of laying out the core features of a more
gradualist picture of scientific change, I will sketch a
highly idealized version of theory change.

科學轉變
 既然現在我們面前有假設的序列，讓我們想像一位叫
做Tom的歷史學家，他決定在多年以後去研究這段插
曲。他無疑將會受到一群科學家的打擊，因為這些科
學家曾經接受過價值觀A1，規則M1，還有理論T1，他
們說一二十年後我們會完全捨棄這些，去接受一個新
的也更為複雜的價值觀A2、規則M2與理論T2。
 Now that we have this hypothetical sequence before us, let us imagine a
historian called Tom, who decides many years later to study this episode. He
will doubtless be struck by the fact that a group of scientist who once accepted
values A1, rules M1, and theory T1 came over the course of, say, a decade or two
to abandon the whole lot and to accept a new complex, C2, consisting of
A2, M2, and T2.

轉變的重點
 當然，重點是一種信念之所以會轉變，看起來似乎是
一種完全合理與理性的事件後果，就像是世界觀的轉
變是根本性且難以理解般。
 The point, of course, is that a sequence of belief
changes appears to be a perfectly reasonable and
rational sequence of events may appear, as a
fundamental and unintelligible change of world view.

世界觀的轉變
 更有趣、且更有挑戰性的是多傳統典範的問題在改變，
也就是說，出自於對手典範間的競爭的世界觀具有基
本的變動性質。
 More interesting, and more challenging, is the
problem of multitraditional paradigm shifts, that is,
basic changes of world view which arise from
competition between rival paradigms.

複合體Complex
 這裡，我們必須想像已經發展良好且具有強烈差異的
兩個複合體。
 Here, we need to imagine two of our complexes
already well developed, and radically divergent.

複合體Complexes
 一但我們開始經由網狀模型把玩允許的轉化時，就會
看到從一個典範或世界觀到另一個的轉換本身是能夠
成為逐步進行的過程，不需要Kuhn分析中所要求各階
層亦步亦趨地大規模地照規則轉變。
 Once we begin to play around with the
transformations permitted by the reticulational
model, we see that the transition from one paradigm
or world view to another can itself be a step-wise
process, requiring none of the wholesale shifts in
allegiance at every level required by Kuhn’s analysis.

共識形成
 在效應上，共識形成的問題解決途徑在多典範情境中
不過是非傳統轉變的特別或退步的例子。
 The solution of the problem of consensus formation in
the multiparadigm situation to be nothing more than
a special or degenerate instance of unitraditional
change.

零碎與整體模式
 形成零碎與整體模是對比的一個讓人震驚的方式，也因此
來設計一個測驗讓人來在兩者間作選擇，就是去問一個關
於歷史紀錄很直接的問題：科學方法學規則與科學家認知
價值觀在主要歷史上的轉變是否在同時期發生?
 One striking way of formulating the contrast between the
piecemeal and the holistic models, and thus designing a
test to choose between them, is to ask is it true that the
major historical shifts in the methodological rules of
science and in the cognitive values of scientists have been
contemporaneous with one another?

一個主要潮流
 從培根到19世紀早期，大多數的科學家認同各種與培
根與牛頓的學理。
 From the time of Bacon until the early 19th century
most scientists subscribed to variants of the rules of
inductives inferrence associated with Bacon and
Newton.

轉變
 到了19世紀晚期，這個方法論上的輕像大多已經從主
要科學家與方法論學者的著作上消失。
 By the late 19th century, this methodological
orientation had largely vanished from the writings of
major scientists and methodologists.

轉變的重要性
 在科學社區中方法論上是重要的轉變– 從列舉和刪去
的歸納法轉為假設法。
 We have a shift in the history of methodology of the
scientific community as significant as one can
imagine– from methods of enumerative and
eliminative induction to the method of hypothesis.

19世紀的學術
自從亞里斯多德起，科學家或多或少都尋求可以證明或是明
白確定的理論。雖然實證主義者和理性主義者不認同如何
能確定知識是確定且無須矯正的，大家卻都同意科學是單
獨為了產生這類知識而存在。
More or less from the time of Aristotle onward, scientists had
sought theories that were demonstrable and apodictically
certain. Although empiricists and rationalists disagreed
about precisely how to certify knowledge as certain and
incorrigible, all agreed that science was aiming exclusively
at the production of such knowledge.

整體途徑
 整體途徑導致歷史紀錄所造成的期望亂象。價值觀的
轉變與實質本體論或方法論的轉變並未表現出任何同
形性。
 The holistic approach leads to expectations that are
confounded by the historical record. Changes in values
and changes in substantive ontologies or
methodologies show no neat isomorphism.

影響
 結果就是了解科學轉變歷程之絕對決定性的重要性。
 This result is of absolutely decisive importance for
understanding the processes of scientific change.

要記住的重點
 我們也要一直記得一個重點，就是即使當理論是被一
套規則或是標準以不充足的證據來說明時，基本上還
是會被相關規則所排除，且如果科學辯論中的某方碰
巧推動顯然違反這些規則的理論，那個規則就會將理
論從爭論中排除。
 We must constantly bear in mind the point that, even when theories
are underdetermined by a set of rules or standards, many theories will
typically be ruled out by the relevant rules; and if one party to a
scientific debate happens to be pushing for a theory that can be shown
to violate those rules, then the rules will eliminate that theory from
contention.

信念是一直在變動的
 人們進一步發現在事實、方法論和價值論三個層面的
信念是一直在變動的。在這種條件下，去猜想這些改
變可能是彼此互相關聯是非常自然的。
 One notice further that beliefs at all three levels shift
through time. Under the circumstances it is quite
natural to conjecture that these various changes may
be inter-connected.

異中求同
 大多數的科學改變– 包含大多數我們稱之為科學革命
的是建– 都是發生在相抗衡的各方具有一定共識的各
層面上。例如，科學家可能不同意某特定理論，確認
同鑑定該理論的適當規則。
 Most instances of scientific change– including most of
the events we call scientific revolutions– occur amid a
significant degree of consensus at a variety of levels
among the contending parties. Scientists may disagree
about specific theories yet agree about the appropriate
rules for theory appraisal.

Kuhn的方法論批評
 幾位作者 (如 Quine, Hesse, Goodman) 堅稱科學鑑定
的規則或原理無法充分決定理論的選擇。這樣的觀點
是有嚴重缺陷的。
 Several writers (e.g. Quine, Hesse, Goodman) have
asserted that rules or principles of scientific appraisal
underdetermine theory choice. Such a view is badly
flawed.

無決定性Underdetermination
 Kuhn 舉出四個關於無決定性的不同論點，各論點都
設計來顯示雖然方法論的規則與標準的確會約束科學
家的選擇，但這些規則與標準從不足以強迫或擔保某
個典範是凌駕另一個典範的選擇。
 Kuhn offers four distinct arguments for
underdetermination. Each is designed to show
that, although methodological rules and standards do
constrain a scientist’s choices, those rules and
standards are never sufficient to compel or to warrant
the choice of one paradigm over another.

共同標準的模糊性 Ambiguity of Shared
Standards
 如Kuhn在之後的著作中所釐清的，假如(與傳統觀點
相比)是被削弱的角色，他要授予科學選擇的方法論標
準一個正面的角色。
 As he has made clear in later writings, he wants to
bestow a positive, if (compared with the traditional
view) much curtailed, role on methodological
standards in scientific choice.

共同標準的模糊性
Ambiguity of Shared Standards
 Kuhn顯然在心中有一個共同的原則，標準，與規則，即科
學家明顯且公開用來證明其對於理論與典範之選擇，而這
樣的原則、標準與規則基本上是「模糊」且「不精準」的，
以致於「分享相同標準的個人可能」會有合理但不同的實
例運用。
 What Kuhn apparently has in mind is that the shared
criteria, standards, and rules to which scientists explicitly
and publicly refer in justifying their choices of theory and
paradigm are typically “ambiguous” and “imprecise”, so
much so that “individuals may legitimately differ about
their application to concrete cases.

 Kuhn 總結，理論選擇的各個案必須涉及綜合的客觀
與主觀因素，因為在Kuhn的觀點中，共同的、且假定
客觀的原理過於模糊，以至於無法允許特定的偏好。
 Kuhn concludes that every case of theory choice must
involve an admixture of objective and subjective
factors, since the shared, and presumably objective
criteria are too ambiguous to warrant a particular
preference.

 這個模糊的主張，如果真的是真實不虛的，就會迫使
我們悲慘地去重新思考自己科學理性的觀點。在其他
方面，這會驅使我們到一個結論，就是每個科學家對
於理論的偏好都有和其他科學家不同的理由。
 This ambiguous claim, if true, would force us to
drastically rethink our views of scientific rationality.
Among other things, it would drive us to the
conclusion that every scientist has different reasons for
his theory preferences from those of his fellow
scientists.

 Kuhn並未建立這個共同標準的模糊性的結論，因為這
顯然是錯誤的，只要我們能做出一個廣為科學家所接
納的方法論規則，而且是沒有實際不精確或模糊性、
可以實際運用的例子。
 He has not established this result, because it is fause.
One need only produce a methodological rule widely
accepted by scientists which can be applied to concrete
cases without substantial imprecision or ambiguity.

 關於理論內部必須有一致性，就像理論必須與被接受
的信念有一致性是同樣的道理。此外，至少在某些情
況下，我們能分面某特定理論是否違反持續性的標準。
 A theory to be internally consistent, just as we
understand perfectly well what it means for a theory to
be consistent with accepted beliefs. Moreover, on at
least some occasions we can tell whether a particular
theory has violated the standard of (internal or
external) consistency.

 人們或可引用幾個合理且清楚、非模糊性的方法論規
則的例子。
 One could, incidentally, cite several other examples of
reasonably clear and unambiguous methodological
rules.

規則的集體不一致性
Collective Inconsistency of Rules
 Kuhn認為共同的規則與標準成為集合體時，「會重複
地彼此衝突」。
 Kuhn goes on to argue that the shared rules and
standards, when taken as a collective, “repeatedly
prove to conflict with one another.”

規則的集體不一致性
 由於許多方法論的標準方向都不一樣，所以Kuhn認為
科學家會各自有個人喜愛的理論路線。不過卻不是任
何自己喜愛的路線都行，即使是Kuhn這麼自由的規則，
他也認為科學家走一個毫無約束的方向是不合理的。
 Because many methodological standards do pull in different directions,
Kuhn thinks that the scientists can pretty well go whichever may he
likes. Well, not quite any direction he likes– even by Kuhn’s very liberal
rules– it would be unreasonable for a scientist to prefer a theory (or
paradigm) which failed to satisfy any of the constraints.

規則的集體不一致性– Kuhn 的錯誤
 假如Kuhn強調當我們有一個以上的標準在運作時，可能會
因好幾個方向在拉扯而感到疲乏，那麼他的這個規格集體
不規則性論點可能會大大強化。 Kuhn在聲稱所有方法論
規則是無可避免地模糊，且科學方法論包含整組永遠甚至
通常表現出高度內在「緊張」的規則錯誤的。
Kuhn could have strengthened his argument considerably, if he had noted
that whenever one has more than one standard in operation, it is
conceivable that we will be torn in several directions. I have shown that
Kuhn is wrong in claiming that all methodological rules are inevitably
ambiguous and in claiming that scientific methodologies consisting of
whole groups of rules always or even usually exhibit a high degree of
internal “tension”.

不同的標準
不同的典範可能會有不同的方法論規則或評估準則。當
「典範改變」發生時。這個過程會產生「管理問題、
概念、與解說之標準的改變」。意即，在其他事情
上，倡議不同的典範一律會對構成科學解釋或甚至構
成相關事實的解釋上會產生不同的觀點。
Different paradigms may subscribe to Different methodological rules or
evaluative criteria. This process produces “changes in the standards
governing permissible problems, concepts, and explanations. The
advocates of different paradigms invariably have different views about
what constitute a scientific explanation and even about what
constitutes a the relevant facts to be expained.

不同的標準
 簡而言之，方法論上的歧見與關於基本理論的事實歧
見顯示不令人訝異的、規定去支持Kuhn關於跨典範辯
論之複雜且不可分解的協方差。
 In short, methodological disagreements and factual
disagreements about basic theories show no striking
covariances of the kind required to sustain Kuhn’s
argument about the intrinisic irresovability of
interparadigmatic debate.

不同的標準—質疑
 假如不同的科學家有時會支持不同的鑑定標準，那麼
我們怎麼可能去把這類的歧見的解決之道說成任意的
終止(爭論)呢?假如有理性上關於方法論規則與認知價
值觀的機制，科學家時常對於規則與價值觀有歧見的
事實，確實就不應該被列出來顯示有任何關於這種歧
見解決方法的任意性。
 If different scientists sometimes subscribe to different standards of
appraisal, then how is it possible for us to speak of the resolution of
such disagreement as anything other than an arbitrary closure?

不同的標準—兩個要點
 在這個篇幅上，Kuhn有兩個獨立的議題：一個是關於
科學家是否有解釋或解決的不同標準的問題；另一個
是聲稱研究不同典範的科學家想解決不同的問題，且
因為這麼做，他們對於理論優點的鑑定基本上會是不
同的。
 In this passage Kuhn runs two issues which it is well to separate:
one concerns the question about whether scientists have
different standards of explanation or solution; the other is the
claim that scientists working in different paradigms want to solve
different problems and that, because they do, their appraisal of
the merits of theories will typically differ.

不同的標準—
Kuhn的觀點看似有理
 乍看之下，Kuhn的論點似乎有理：特定問題之不同重要性
的解決途徑經由對手典範的倡議，可能會顯明地導致對手
典範所倡議的情境能各自聲稱其典範是最好的，因為他們
精準地解決了這些自己認為是最重要的問題。
 At first glance, Kuhn’s argument seems very plausible: the
differing weights assigned to the solution of specific
problems by the advocates of rival paradigms may
apparently lead to a situation in which the advocates of
rival paradigms can asset their respective paradigms are the
best because they solve precisely those problems they
respectively believe to be the most important.

不同的標準– 了解Kuhn的謬誤所在
 問題因何重要?
 1. 可能因為科學家對問題感興趣而顯得重要。
 2. 可能因為急迫的社會或經濟因素需要去解決這問題
而顯得重要。
 1. It may be important to a scientist in the sense that he
is particularly curious about it.
 2. Equally, it may be important because there is some
urgent social or economic reason for solving it.

 假如Kuhn的點對於科學知識論具有重要性，我們就必
須想像一個情境，即不同典範的支持(倡議)會產生知
識論對於某問題之解決造成衝擊。
 If Kuhn’s point is to be of any significance for the
epistemology of science, then we must imagine a
situation in which the advocates of different
paradigms assign conflicting degrees of epistemic
import to the solution of certain problems.

 在理性分配具有特定程度重要性的問題時，必須要視
人們能夠以提出可行的方法論與知識論的基礎來分配
問題之重要性而定，而不是看典範的支持者多想解決
該問題而定。
 The rational assignment of any particular degree of
probative significance to a problem must rest on one’s
being able to show that there are viable
methodological and epistemic grounds for assigning
that degree of importance rather than another, not
simply a matter of how keenly the proponents of that
paradigm wants to solve the problem.

不同的標準– Example
 Daltonian 在化學的「革命」。因為Dalton的化學無法
傳達許多由老一代化學典範所回答的問題，Kuhn認為
接納Dalton的途徑會剝奪化學的某些實際與潛在的解
釋力量。簡而言之，「兩種典範尋求解釋不同的觀察
資料，以回應不同的問題」。
 Daltonian “revolution” in chemistry. The pre-
Daltonian chemistry failed to address many of the
questions answered by the older chemical paradigm.
In short, “the two paradigm seek to explain different
kinds of observational data, in response to different
agendas of problems.”

不同的標準– 假設
 人們所解釋的問題中心基本上意味著再決定要如何善
加支持某理論或典範時，人們將經高度知識論或證明
的重要性分配給該問題。
 The centrality of a problem on one’s explanatory
agenda necessarily entails one’s assigning a high
degree of epistemic or probative weight to that
problem when it comes to determining how well
supported a certain theory or paradigm is.

不同的標準– 結論
 科學家間不同觀點的存在，也就是哪些問題是有趣的
這件事情上，顯然並不意味這些科學家在知識論鑑定
上是不相容或不可比較。這也意味著這些實際上在對
手典範主張中的問題解決差異，並沒有「無決定」理
論比較評估方法論的可行性。
 The existence of conflicting views among scientists about which
problems are interesting apparently entails nothing about
incompatibility or incommensurability of the epistemic appraisals that
these scientists will make. That in turn means that these real
differences of problem solving emphasis between advocates of rival
paradigms do nothing to undeterdemine the viability of methodology
of comparative theory assessment.

不同的標準– 結論
 Kuhn所說的是-- 追求對手的典範是受到務實與知識論考量所影
響，這可能是有趣且完整的論述，但是對於蠶食科學知識論的
核心假設卻顯得無力。這邊的假設也是指我們周遭存在著既非
特定典範、非毫無希望地模糊、也非各自具有特質的實證原理
或證據。更重要的是，這些原理有時就足以清晰且毫不模稜兩
可地指引我們。
 Kuhn … the pursuit of rival paradigms is influenced by pragmatic as well as
by epistemic considerations. That is interesting as well as sound, but it
does nothing to undermine the core premise of scientific epistemology:
that there are principles or evidential support which are neither paradigm-
specific, hopeless vague, nor individually idiosyncratic. More
important, these principles are sometimes sufficient to guide our
preferences unimbuously.

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