2. Edwardsville
(Madison County)
130 N. Main St.
(618) 656-0184
Chicago
30 N. LaSalle
Suite 2900
(312) 230-9100
Springfield
(General Liability)
4340 Acer Grove
(217) 528-3674
Springfield
(Environmental)
3150 Roland Avenue
(217) 523-4900
St. Louis
211 N. Broadway
Suite 2700
(314) 241-6160
PROVEN LAWYERS
IN THE RIGHT PLACES
www.heplerbroom
3. Glenn E. Davis glenn.davis@heplerbroom.com
Partner
HeplerBroom LLC
Successfully serving clients with challenging, complex
legal matters for over 33 years domestically and internationally.
Deep experience with antitrust and distribution matters, securities litigation, corporate
litigation and compliance, internal investigations, and intellectual property litigation.
Recognized leader in business litigation in court and in law firm management: experience
that matters. Published author in ABA Antitrust Section publications and In the Mind Series
on Antitrust Litigation Winning Strategies and Missouri Bar Deskbooks on Antitrust and
Securities litigation.
Client Value. Thrives on efficiently helping clients achieve their objectives and move their
business forward, as an integral part of their team.
4. Glenn E. Davis
• Licensed in Missouri & Illinois
• ABA, Antitrust Section
• Charter Member, Litigation Counsel of America, Trial lawyer honorary
society.
• Missouri & Kansas Super Lawyer since 2011/ Top 100 Super Lawyers for the
Missouri/Kansas region and Top 50 in St. Louis.
• Best Lawyers’ in America since 2003.
• Best Lawyers’ 2014 St. Louis Franchise Law “Lawyer of the Year.”
• Best Lawyers’ 2015 Missouri Antitrust Litigation “Lawyer of the Year.”
• Best Lawyers' 2016 Missouri Antitrust Law "Lawyer of the Year."
• AV Preeminent® Attorneys by Martindale-Hubbell.
5. Our Goals Today
Learn About Antitrust Laws
Consider Key Concepts for Manufacturers
Enforcement and Litigation Trends
Discuss the Importance of Antitrust Compliance
6. About the Antitrust Laws
In 33 words or less, what are antitrust laws about?
Their purpose is to promote consumer welfare through
effective competition. Competition is protected by
prohibiting conspiracies in restraint of trade, undue
restrictions on purchasers, excessive concentrations of
economic power and other anticompetitive practices.
7. Basic Antitrust Laws
Promote Competition
Protect Consumers
Establish Rules to Prohibit Anticompetitive Conduct
Legal Penalties to Punish Violators and Deter Future
Violations
8. Who Do Antitrust Laws Apply To?
Individuals
Business Organizations
Trade and Professional Associations
Non-Profit Organizations
Standard Setting Organizations
9. The Basic Economics of Antitrust
• Free enterprise economy uses competitive
markets to allocate goods & services
• When the forces of supply and demand work
freely in open markets, consumers receive:
• The best quality products/services
• At the lowest possible prices
• Competition spurs economic performance
• Promotes efficiency, creativity, and innovation
• Monopolies, Market Concentration & Collusive
Conduct inhibit competition and reduce market
performance
11. Intent and Effect May Not Matter
Conduct May be Illegal Regardless of motive or intent
May be Illegal Even if Conduct is Unsuccessful or Fails to Meet Goal
Certain Conduct is Always Illegal
Price Fixing
Customer or Geographic Market Division
Certain Boycotts and Tying Arrangements
Bid Rigging
Mergers/Joint Ventures that create risk of sustained higher prices,
reduced output, market coordination
12.
13. Penalties Are Severe
Companies convicted of antitrust violations pay very large fines
Individuals convicted serve actual jail time and pay substantial fines
Debarment from Federal and State Programs
Defending antitrust claims is very costly and a drain on organizations
Civil actions may result in 3X actual damages plus payment of
adversaries’ attorneys fees
14.
15.
16.
17.
18. ACTIVE CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT
2014- 19 Jurisdictions levied cartel fines $16 Billion (US)
20 Dawn Raids in US, China and the EU annually
Expanding Charges (i.e., criminal fraud, tax evasion)
Representative investigations/prosecutions
Auto Parts Industry (60 individuals/40 separate companies)($2.6 Billion in fines)
Flat Panel Screen Manufacturers
Financial Services Industry Market Manipulation/ Currency Exchange Rates
Real Estate
19. NEW (HEIGHTENED)FOCUS
ON INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY
The Impact of the DOJ Yates Memo on antitrust crime
DOJ Plea Deals no longer release former employees
Impact on leniency program and
requirements for credit for cooperation
Non-Prosecution Agreements
20. Specific Relevant Conduct for Manufacturers
Agreements among Competitors
Relations with Distributors & Customers
Trade & Professional Associations
21. Section 1 of the Sherman Act
Prohibits agreements that restrain competition
Elements:
Two or more entities
An express or implied agreement
An unreasonable restraint on competition
• Proved – Rule of Reason (actual and substantial lessening of competition)
• Presumed – Per Se (Automatic) liability
22. Doctrine of Per Se Illegality
Inherently anticompetitive agreements are:
Presumed to restrain competition unreasonably
Are ILLEGAL without the need to prove the relevant
market or any anticompetitive effect
May be punished criminally
Can subject firms to enormous liability
Individuals at risk too; criminal liability severe
23. Red Flags: Per Se Agreements
Agreements to fix or maintain prices
• All agreements with competitors to fix or maintain
prices, price levels or terms and conditions of sale are
illegal
Boycotts, customer allocations, bid rigging
Agreements between competitors to boycott (refuse to
deal with) a customer or supplier, allocate or share
customer or geographic markets, or to bid a price or
coordinate bids are illegal
Some tying arrangements
Tie-in sales are illegal per se when there is sufficient
power in the tying product market to force the sale of
the the tied product
24. Rule of Reason Conduct
Vertical customer and territorial restrictions
Exclusive dealing and requirement agreements
Tie-in sales where market power in tying product is insufficient to
warrant per se treatment
Reciprocal dealing – the use of purchasing power to obtain sales
25. Section 3 of the Clayton Act
Deals with three types of arrangements:
Exclusive Dealing Arrangements
Tying Arrangements
Requirements Contracts
Common issues are extent and length of foreclosure
“Incipiency Standard”
• Proof of actual adverse competitive effects not required
• Only requires proof of reasonable probability of anticompetitive effects
26. Section 5 of the FTC Act
Government (FTC) enforcement only
FTC expanding application and theories of liability
Broadly proscribes acts of unfair competition
Concurrent with other antitrust laws
Examples:
Commercial disparagement
False Advertising
Industrial espionage
Commercial bribery
27. Robinson – Patman Act
Prohibits discrimination in pricing and promotional
allowances and services
Price discrimination may be illegal where
Two or more contemporaneous sales
Commodities of like grade & quality
Different prices
Substantial adverse effect on competition
Defenses
Cost justification
Meeting Competition
Availability
Changed Conditions
28. Competitor Relations—Price/Output
Agreement or conspiracy to restrain competition
Price Fixing and Agreements to Restrict Output Always Illegal
All price, discount, rebates, bids, RFP responses, terms and
conditions of sale, capacity and resources, marketing or promotions
are problematic
Determine Independently
No discussion with Competitors
30. Resale Price Agreements
Vertical price-fixing – an agreement between a
manufacturer and a customer/distributor that fixes the
minimum resale price of a product – may violate state
antitrust laws or become a rule of reason violation.
Area evolving after recent Supreme Court Case; but State
and International rules differ
The antitrust laws, however, give a manufacturer latitude
to adopt a policy regarding desired resale prices and to
deal only with customers/distributors who independently
decide to follow that policy.
31. Resale Price Agreements (continued)
A manufacturer is permitted to stop dealing with a buyer
who breaches the manufacturer’s resale price maintenance
policy.
The manufacturer can adopt the policy on a “take it or
leave it” basis.
The key: No agreement, express or implied, between the
manufacturer and the buyer to fix specific minimum resale
prices.
Agreements on maximum resale prices are less likely to be
found unlawful because in most situations these
agreements can benefit consumers by preventing non-
competitive high prices.
32. Termination for Pricing Policy
Violations
The “Pricing Policy” must be followed.
If a buyer advertises or sells pre-announced
suggested resale price products below minimum they
must be terminated immediately.
No structured or staged terminations;
e.g., no progressive penalties prior to termination
No second chances;
e.g., no grace periods, extensions or acceptance of
temporary reprieves
No threats of termination or pressure to adhere;
e.g., no pressuring distributors to agree to prices
No communications with outsiders about it;
33. Distributor Communications
Complaints or information from other distributors may be received
and considered, but not encouraged. Distributors supplying such
information should be informed:
will exercise its unilateral judgment with the information.
will not take any specific action based on the communication.
will not enter into any Agreement with one distributor concerning
manufacturing relationship with any other distributor.
will not engage in extensive or ongoing discussions with one distributor
concerning relationship with any other distributor.
Remember . . .anything you say or write about distributors may come out in any
future disputes.
34. Conduct that Invites Liability
Refusals to deal mid-relationship;
e.g., a manufacturer under a written dealer agreement cannot impose
price controls without pre-announcing its terms prior to the
agreement.
Pulling territories until distributor adheres to prices;
e.g., a manufacturer cannot force a retailer to sell a widget in Kansas at
X price to supply the retailer with widgets for Oklahoma.
Structured termination (three strikes you’re out) policies;
e.g., manufacturer cannot have a series of suspensions or penalties
prior to termination.
Threats, intimidation, or coercion;
e.g., manufacturers cannot harangue or threaten distributors to induce
pricing compliance.
35. Conduct that Invites Liability
Enlistment of third parties to enforce;
e.g., manufacturers should not use customers, trade groups, or any one else
to enforce its policies.
Conditioning special allowances or price breaks on acquiescence;
e.g., conditioning valuable promotional allowances on price agreements may
be seen as coercion.
Terminations at behest of competing distributors.
e.g. manufacturers decisions must be independent and not look like they are
part of any Agreement with competing distributors.
(continued)
36.
37. Trade & Professional Associations
Meetings of actual and/or potential competitors—may evidence
agreement
But pro-competitive and lawful normally
Conduct is a problem if activity or focus is on coordinating price,
output, or other unlawful agreements
Potential for exclusion to disadvantage competitors of members
Reason for compliance sensitivity
38. Trade Association Topics
Do Not Discuss
Prices
Profits or margins
Discounts
Terms and conditions
Allocation of customers and markets
Refusals to deal with others
OK To Discuss
Product/Technology standards
Benchmarking Best Practices
Lobbying
Codes of Ethics
Data collection and dissemination if
properly managed (aggregated and de-
identified)
39. Association Safeguards—Meetings
Prior Written Agenda Distributed and Followed
Avoid off-agenda discussion topics
Maintain accurate minutes
Seek legal guidance when needed
Respect concerns of participants who fear topics are off-limits
Avoid discussion of sensitive topics at social gatherings or in side discussions
before, after or during meetings
Keep accurate, factual minutes
If Policy disregarded leave meeting and note your departure memorably
40. Association Safeguards—Issue Planning
Joint Lobbying and Advocacy
Historical (not future) Price Data Reporting
Statistical Programs
Development of Standards
Certification Programs
Design and Management of Member Entry
41. Antitrust-IP Intersection
Past Hostility
Current “Harmonization”/ “Complemetarity”
Seeking proper balance of competition and patent law and policy
Intersection? Or Collision Course?
Licensing
Refusals to Deal
Boycotts
Single Firm Conduct
Remedies
42. MERGERS ACQUISITIONS & JOINT VENTURES
Increasing enforcement activity emerging from economic recovery
HSR Notified transactions increased by 25% in 2014
Challenges occur for mergers reducing competitors from 4-3, 3-2 or 2-1 and between competitors with large market
shares
Gun jumping
Marked by large strategic transactions
Transactions reported with values over $1B increased 58%
Agency standards for assessment continue to evolve
Challenging consummated transactions
Refined econometric analysis
Primacy of market definition and potential entry
Remedies
Divestiture
Structural modification
Agencies showing increased willingness to litigate
44. KEY TREND TAKEAWAYS
Government Enforcement
Class Action Litigation
International Exposure
Industry focus on healthcare/pharma/defense/national
retail/manufacturers with high market share and ability to engage in
exclusionary practices
46. Response to Government Inquiries
If anyone approaches you asking questions about the affairs of the
Association notify the President immediately
Respectfully express wish to cooperate but decline interview until
review of situation
If agents of state or federal law enforcement present a search
warrant, call President and counsel immediately
You have the right to consult with your counsel or association
antitrust counsel before submitting to any interview
47. THANK YOU (and let’s be careful out there)
Glenn E. Davis
HeplerBroom LLC
One Metropolitan Sq.-2700
211 N. Broadway
St. Louis, MO 63102
314.241.6160
glenn.davis@heplerbroom.com