MA DISSERTATION - Study of the Relationships Between Farmers and the Ghanaian Oil Palm Development Company (GOPDC) in the Eastern Region

Giorgio F. Garbetta MA Dissertation
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF COPYRIGHT RELATING TO E-COMMERCE
Study of the Relationships Between Farmers and the
Ghanaian Oil Palm Development Company (GOPDC)
in the Eastern Region
THESIS
submitted at the Graduate Institute
in fulfilment of the requirements of the
Master degree in programme
Anthropology and Sociology of Development
By
Giorgio Federico GARBETTA
Geneva
2016
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Abstract
Contract farming is a practice that has gained popularity amongst agribusinesses since the
past few decades. An outgrowers scheme’s objective is to engage local smallholders and integrate
them as part of the company supply chain. Companies provide certain inputs and benefits to the
farmers, who in return are supposed to deliver their production exclusively to them. Despite the
arrangements, outgrowers diverts often their production to third parties. This research address the
following research questions: 1. “Why do outgrowers join contract farming schemes?”; and 2.
“What are the factors that explain why under contract farmers divert some of their production to
third parties?”; and is based on the following hypotheses: H1. Contract farming provides tenants a
convenient way to secure land rights; H2. The abusa system [a particular sharecropping arrange-
ment] encourages tenants to divert their fruits in order to earn fast cash. To investigate these pro-
cesses, the Ghanaian Oil Palm Development Company has been analysed as a case study. GOPDC
is located in Kwae, in the New Abirem of the Eastern Region in Ghana.
Resume
L'agriculture contractuelle est une pratique qui a gagné en popularité parmi les entreprises
agricoles depuis les dernières décennies. L'objectif d'un système de plantation satellites est d'en-
gager les petits planteurs locaux et les intégrer dans le cadre de la chaîne d'approvisionnement en-
treprise. Les entreprises offrent certains intrants et avantages aux agriculteurs, qui, en retour,
livrent leur production exclusivement à eux. Malgré les arrangements, les petits planteurs détour-
nent souvent leur production à autres acheteurs. Cette recherche veut adresser les questions suiv-
antes: 1. “Pourquoi les outgrowers participent à des programmes d'agriculture contractuelle?”; et
2. “Quels sont les facteurs qui expliquent pourquoi les agriculteurs contractuels détournent une
partie de leur production à autres acheteurs?”; et formule ces hypothèses: H1. L'agriculture con-
tractuelle fournit aux locataires un moyen pratique de garantir les droits fonciers; H2. Le système
de abusa [à savoir un arrangement de métayage particulier] encourage les locataires à détourner
leurs fruits afin de gagner argent de façon rapide. Pour étudier les facteurs affectant le détourne-
ment de la production, le Ghanaian Oil Palm Development Company, situé à Kwae, dans le New
Abirem District dans la Region Est du Ghana, a été analysée comme étude de cas.
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Table of Contents:
I. Introduction 5
II. Land Tenure, Sharecropping and Contract Farming in Ghana: a
General Presentation 7
Customary Land Tenure in Ghana 7
Historical and Present Context of Cash Crops in New Abirem: Cocoa, Migrants and Palm Oil 11
Share-cropping: Abusa and Abunu Systems 14
Contract Farming 16
III. Research Design and Presentation of Data 21
Methodology, Data Collection and Limitations 21
IV. Case Study: the Ghana Oil Palm Development Company 23
Local Market for FFBs 25
Who are the farmers who work for GOPDC? 30
Presentation of the different types of farmers31
V. Research Questions and Hypotheses 37
VI. Analysis and Discussion of Results 42
VII. Conclusion 47
IX. Bibliography 55
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List Of Acronyms
• BDPs: Bio-Diversity Plots
• CPO: Crude Palm Oil
• FFBs: oil palm Fresh Fruit Bunches (i.e. the produce)
• GOPDC: the Ghana Oil Palm Development Company limited
• PKO: Palm Kernel Oil
• RBDO: Refined, Bleached and Deodorised Oil
• RSPO: Roundtable for Sustainable Palm Oil
• SIAT: Société d’Investissement pour l’Agriculture Tropicale
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I. Introduction
I remember one of my first times visiting Ghana: the hot humid climate, typical of the trop-
ics, inevitably provoked a quick reaction of condensation in contrast with the ice-cold glass of my
Belgian beer. I was sitting at the bar with friends who have spent their last twenty years living and
working in this beautiful country. They were discussing about the possibility of buying a plot of
land to expand the compound of the company. Throughout the discussion they began to make jokes
about Coca Cola. I was puzzled by this, as I failed to see the relevance, but I was soon informed. In
the early 1990’s, when Coca Cola decided to open a factory in the country, they surely had to pur-
chase a large plot of land. However, the company ended up buying the plot three times: first from
the government, secondly from the land owners appointed by the previous government and finally
from the chiefs of the communities who dwelled on this land in the past. As Coca Cola is a multina-
tional corporation with plenty of capital at their disposal, it is difficult to feel pity. Nevertheless, this
small anecdote perfectly illustrates the complex current situation of land ownership and land tenure
in Ghana.
The present context of a global economy is dominated by multinational corporations which
often invest in multiple sectors. The high demand for raw materials and processed goods, such as
palm oil, contributed to the industrialisation of agriculture which led to the rise of agribusinesses.
Palm oil is one of the most demanded refined material in our economy as it is frequently used in the
food sector but also, in the cosmetic industry and as biofuel. Oil palm is the tropical tree crop culti-
vated following a plantation model in order to produce crude palm oil (i.e. CPO), the unrefined pro-
duce from the trees’ fruit, which is then refined and fractionated to make a range of palm oil vari-
eties. Today, many agribusinesses integrate contract farming schemes into their production systems.
Contract farming is the practice of engaging local farmers in the business’ supply chain. Farmers
and companies sign a contract in which the company provides certain inputs (e.g. credit, seedlings,
fertilisers, tools etc.) and farmers agree to supply the entire yields of the cash-crop exclusively to
the company. Practices of contract farming have been heavily debated within the academic litera-
ture with two different views on it: some view it as a way to alleviate rural poverty by including
farmers into the supply chain of the global economy; others are doubtful that this practice helps the
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farmers’ economic situation. Nevertheless, contract farming is a strategy that has gained popularity
among agribusinesses since the past decades. However, outgrower schemes (i.e. contract farming)
can be difficult to manage and they may fail easily. In a continent, where land security is impacted
by multiple factors, land tenure systems are a critical aspect to be taken into consideration by
agribusinesses promoting contract agriculture. Thus, my first research question focuses on the most
influential factors playing a role into the decision of outgrowers (i.e. under-contract farmers) to par-
take into contract agriculture:
R.Q.1 :“Why do outgrowers join contract farming schemes?”
My project is focused on the outgrower scheme of the Ghanaian Oil Palm Development
Company ltd (i.e. GOPDC), the largest agribusiness focused on oil palm plantations and producer
of palm oil in Ghana. GOPDC is owned by the Belgian SIAT group (i.e. Société d’Investissement
pour l’Agriculture Tropicale). Since the outgrower program began in the 1980’s, GOPDC has con-
tracted over seven thousands outgrower farmers around the area of the nucleus estate in Kwae, an
area of the New Abirem District of the Eastern Region. However, the company estimates that
around 75% of the outgrowers divert part of their fresh fruit bunches (i.e. FFBs) to third parties.
This is the focal point of the following thesis’ second research question:
R.Q.2 : “What are the factors that explain why under contract farmers divert some of their
production to third parties?”
Section II. will focus on the presentation of topics necessary to the focus of this thesis: Land
Tenure, Sharecropping and Contract Farming in Ghana. Following, in section III., I will introduce
the research design, methodology and limitations of the study. Section IV. will be dedicated to the
presentation of data, focused and based on the case study of GOPDC. Section V will provide the
readers with the core concepts and theoretical framework which compose the rationale behind the
research questions and hypotheses of this piece of work. Next, the analysis of the qualitative data
and the results obtained are going to be presented and discussed in section VI. Finally, the conclu-
sion will be under section VII.
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II. Land Tenure, Sharecropping and Contract Farming in
Ghana: a General Presentation
One of the most complicated aspects that agribusinesses face in Africa is represented by the
relationship between land and the community. Land is not perceived as a commodity that can be
easily sold or purchased. Rather it possesses an intrinsic sacred value at a collective level. Land is
often under the jurisdiction of chiefs, elders or other traditional authorities. In some cases, the gov-
ernment may be the decisive authority concerning land tenure. Nevertheless, in order to set a busi-
ness based on any agricultural production in Africa, the local land tenure systems have to be taken
into serious consideration to avoid conflicts that, for example, could easily arise from land-grabbing
practices or from the general discontent of the autochthon communities. I will focus on previous
studies related to contract farming, share cropping and customary land tenure in Ghana. A great deal
of research concerning sharecropping in the Eastern Region will be illustrated by the work of pro-
fessor Kojo Sebastian Amanor, who could spare some time from his busy schedule to meet me at
Legon University. This has helped me a great deal in order to gain a good perspective on Ghanaian
land tenure systems and the extremely common practice of sharecropping. Moreover, I will provide
the historical and present context of oil palm production in the country. On a final note, throughout
this section, whenever the term smallholder is used, this refers to its broad and general definition,
which is that of farmers who possess small holdings, as adopted by the vast majority of the litera-
ture. This distinction is fundamental because the term holds a different meaning within the GOPDC
system (see section IV).
Customary Land Tenure in Ghana
“In much of the literature on land in Africa, land is viewed as a sacred commodity, which is tied up
with people’s communal identity. Land is seen as communal property administered by chiefs on be-
half of the whole community, including the interests of ancestors and of the unborn.” (Amanor,
2006b, p. 2)
Land tenure in Africa is a very complicated matter given the intricacy of the dynamics of
precolonial political structures, colonial administrations and postcolonial governments. According
to Catherine Boone (2014) it is possible to identify two regimes of land tenure in Africa: the neo-
customary or the statist. Neo-customary regimes are under the management of autochthon authori-
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ties while the statist ones are under the management of forms of authority that represent the state.
Statist regimes may allocate land through rural administrators or through politicians. Statist regimes
are more frequent in East Africa, whereas neo-customary ones are more prominent in the western
part of the continent, although it is possible to find both in certain countries independently of their
geographical location (Boone, 2014). The author argues that in a neo-customary regime, it is nor-
mally the first comers who are managing the land distribution process, which often may result into
the marginalisation of migrants or non-autochthon individuals. In facts, customary land tenure
regimes are shaped according to the local figures of authority determined by the customary norms
of the communities. Essentially, chiefs and sub-chiefs retain power over land and can distribute it
following the community’s customary laws, defined as the body of rules funded on tradition (Cotu-
la, 2006).
The author emphasises how the institution of stool lands (i.e. land under the prerogative of
the chieftaincy) has developed into its current form since the early colonial times in Ghana. In fact,
it is the results of the British indirect control over the territories:
“The British realized that chiefly prerogatives over land could be wielded to retain authority in the
rural areas and political leverage over their subjects […] These arrangements are the cornerstone
of a postcolonial political and legal framework for governing southern Ghana that has allowed
chiefs to extract tribute, rents, revenue, and profits from stool lands and also to accumulate proper-
ties on their own account - sometimes at the expenses of their subjects and the communities they are
supposed to represent. ” (Boone, 2014, p. 215)
According to Catherine Boone (2014) the Asante (i.e. from the kingdom of the Ashanti of
Ghana) chiefs and sub-chiefs exercised a complete control over the land in the region and could al-
locate access to unused land which could be kept by the stool (i.e. the chief), rented under share-
cropping arrangements to migrants or granted as individual landholdings to autochthon lineages and
family heads within the chief’s jurisdiction. Family landholders do not have to pay chiefly tributes
for the vested land and plots are then passed from generation to the next, usually through the matri-
lineal inheritance line. On the contrary, migrants have to pay tribute to the chiefs as they otherwise
would have no right to access land. Furthermore, the landholding granted to indigenous lineages
can also be sold or rented to other individuals outside the kin, though the modalities of landholding
transfer will be discussed in greater details later. With the development of cocoa plantations, a great
number of migrants began to populate the rural region and were given access to land under share-
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cropping arrangements with the chiefs and wealthy lineage heads, who sought to profit from land-
lord-stranger relationships by collecting a tribute payment from the migrants' labour on their land
(Boone, 2014; Amanor and Diderutuah, 2001). In 1969, the autochthonous youth grew discontent
for the lack of working opportunities, dominated by the migrants, leading to the Aliens Compliance
Act, which forced the strangers to leave the rural areas despite their sharecropping arrangements or
investments into the land (Boone, 2014; Amanor and Diderutuah, 2001). This historical context will
be further discussed in details in a later section. Nevertheless, Catherine Boone (2014) argues that
the exclusion of strangers from the agricultural sector was the result of the opportunistic actions of
chiefs at the village level, local notables and wealthy autochthon families in order to regain control
over ‘lost’ land which was now cultivated with cash-crops and very profitable. Hence, the author
claims that neo-customary tenure regimes advantage the indigenous populations as they are embed-
ded into a profound distinction between native and stranger (Boone, 2014). Furthermore, she men-
tions that the chieftaincy and the wealthy landholding lineages did not intervene nor addressed the
issue of migrants. The author suggests that instead they allowed strangers to be used as scapegoats
for the indigenous youth unhappy with the inequality in access to land in the region (Boone, 2014).
“Land regimes in this region left ethnic outsiders with no recognized moral claim to landed proper-
ty, even property that had been farmed by abusa sharecroppers [for an explanation, see below] for
many years (or to houses or other improvements on the farms).” (Boone, 2014, p. 113)
Today, natural resources in Africa are increasingly being commodified as the flow of capital
input keeps rising (Amanor, 1999). Land is not an exception. Amanor (2006b) argues that the major
factor influencing this phenomenon is to be attributed to the commodification of agriculture, which
according to the author, has heavily shaped the social life of rural communities via a series of eco-
nomic transactions (e.g. hire of labour, purchase of seedlings, purchase of fertilisers etc.). The
scarcity of land that has not been cleared before (i.e. forest) is also another factor, resulting in high-
er prices per plots (Amanor, 2006b). Although, in Ghana the state retains control over some of the
country’s land, usually the urban territories and their peripheries, 80-90% of agricultural soil is un-
der the jurisdiction of chieftaincies (Kasanga and Kotey, 2001). As previously mentioned, the land
is trusted to allodial title holders, the chiefs, who are in control of the land for the entire community.
Individuals may also obtain the ownership, or more accurately the right of use, of land plots through
different ways (Kasanga, 2001; Amanor and Diderutuah, 2001; Amanor, 2006b; 1998). The modali-
ties of land ownership present in the New Abirem district of the Eastern Region, will be discussed
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in detail in the following section. However, Kasanga (2001) remarks how today elders and land al-
location committees are also consulted by the chief in the process of decision-making regarding any
aspects of land distribution or land disputes. Ethnicity and family affiliation can be major factors
affecting an individual’s right to land allocation (Boone and Duku, 2012; Boni, 2005). Amanor and
Diderutuah (2001) illustrate the different scenarios of land tenurial arrangements occurring in the
area of New Abirem, in the Eastern Region of Ghana. Aside from stool land, the authors argue that
granted plots to autochthonous families can be distributed according to lineage inheritance dynam-
ics and used directly or indirectly (e.g. land lease, sharecropping and weeding contracts, Amanor
and Diderutuah, 2001; Boone, 2014).
“Land ownership involves a spectrum ranging from individual rights acquired through purchase or
through clearing mature forest, to rights to use a piece of land temporarily. Since economic rela-
tionships often take place in the context of kinship and social relations, these are frequently charac-
terised by notions of generalised reciprocity and service.” (Amanor and Diderutuah, 2001, p. 10)
In respect to privately owned plots of land by the family lineage, the concept of user-right is
a very influential notion for rural land arrangements in Ghana (Amanor and Diderutuah, 2001).
Young farmers offer their services to help an elder in his or her farming activity and, in-so-doing,
secure their right to a plot of land in the future (Amanor and Diderutuah, 2001). Amanor and
Diderutuah (2001) also remark how user-right may extend to extra-familial relationships. Although,
it is generally frowned upon, land can be sold in extreme circumstances, for instance, in case of ur-
gent need of cash for medical attention (Amanor and Diderutuah, 2001). In the past, when forest
was more abundant, farmers may claim any plots which they had cleared. Today, due to the lack of
such spaces in the region this scenario is a rare occurrence (Amanor and Diderutuah, 2001). Ac-
cording to the authors, leases of land plots occur mostly for subsistence crops and they normally last
around three years (Amanor and Diderutuah, 2001). Weeding contracts occur when a farm plot
owner doesn’t have enough capital to hire labour to weed it. Thus, the owner will set aside a small
plot of land for another farmer who will cultivate crops and retain all of the produce in exchange for
his weeding services (Amanor and Diderutuah, 2001; Lavigne Delville et al., 2002).
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Historical and Present Context of Cash Crops in New Abirem: Cocoa, Migrants and Palm Oil
“Oil palm was head-loaded to Accra from Akuapem and transported down the Volta river by boat
from Krobo. Agricultural export production in the interior of the forest was hampered by a lack of
infrastructure development.” (Amanor and Diderutuah, 2001, p. 4)
During the first half of the XIXth century, oil palm was the main export crop in Ghana
where it was mostly produced in the coastal regions of Krobo and Akuapem due to the favourable
climate and land properties (Amanor and Diderutuah, 2001). Amanor (1994) remarks how the no-
bilities of these regions developed an oil palm industry built on slave labour. In the early XIXth
century, once the trades of oil palm begun to bring high profits, the wealthier Krobo people slowly
replaced the theocratic ruling class and became secular chiefs (Amanor, 2006b). Furthermore, the
new Krobo chiefs expanded their authority on the territory by military power in order to develop a
greater number of oil palm cultivations (Amanor, 2006b). The Akuapem people also saw the lucra-
tive prospects of oil palm and sought extra land as well. By the 1850’s, the Krobo and Akuapem
people were purchasing land from the Akyem chiefs and slowly moved up the territory (Amanor,
1994; Boone, 2014). However, in the second half of the century, palm oil prices dropped due to in-
creasing competition with petroleum based products (Amanor and Diderutuah, 2001). Moreover,
large scale plantations in Southeast Asia began to emerge (today Indonesia and Malaysia are the
two export leaders of palm oil, producing around 85% of the global production). As a result, cocoa
farming became highly popular (Amanor and Diderutuah, 2001; Boone, 2014). Despite the many
influences of the colonial administration, the origins of plantation agriculture in West Africa can be
traced back to protestant missions at the end of the XIXth century (Gastellu, 1980). Due to its lucra-
tive perspectives, cocoa farming rapidly spread to other regions of the country. Amanor and
Diderutuah (2001) remark how the popularity of cocoa farming resulted in a high demand for land.
Moreover, the prospect of such profitable activity attracted migrants from other regions of Ghana
and from neighbouring countries (Amanor and Diderutuah, 2001; Boone, 2014). Issues started to
arise when local chiefs and traditional authorities began to sell plots to make money, regardless of
who was acquiring the land.
“Local people were aggrieved by the way in which chiefs were selling land to enrich themselves and
worried by the future consequences of this loss of land to migrants. In number of instances, chiefs
were destooled for selling land.” (Amanor and Diderutuah, 2001, p. 5)
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At the beginning of the XXth century, the Okyenhene, the paramount chief or king, con-
tributed to one of the most influential factors which determine land tenure practices in Ghana today.
According to Amanor and Diderutuah (2001), the Okyenhene, in fact, did not have the right to own
large areas of land in the Akyem Abuakwa, one of the three kingdoms of the Akan people in the
Ashanti region. Nevertheless, the Okyenhene wanted a share of the profits from land sales that were
increasingly occurring (Amanor and Diderutuah, 2001). Thus, he introduced the concept of abusa
to land distribution practices, used solely in the mining industry in precolonial times (Amanor and
Diderutuah, 2001). The abusa system is essentially a land arrangement which guaranties the owner
of a plot of land a fraction of the share of the goods obtained from the tenant's activity on the plot.
In 1912, the Okyenhene began to disapprove of land sales to migrants. As a result, migrants could
only access land through sharecropping arrangements. In facts, the abusa arrangement allowed the
local authoritative figures (i.e. chiefs and wealthy family heads) to provide access to land to mi-
grants while at the same time collecting a tribute for themselves, but most importantly retaining the
ownership of the land. On the other hand, many exceptions of land sales acquired by non-au-
tochthon farmers occurred if they would present the chief with a significant renumeration (Addo-
Fenning, 1997; Rathbone, 1993). Nevertheless, these exceptions would only benefit the most
wealthy migrants. Instead, those who did not dispose of enough capital to afford plots of land but,
wanting to pursue the opportunities offered by cocoa business, frequently became tenants on a land-
lord’s plantation (Amanor and Diderutuah, 2001; Boone, 2014). This scenario was also convenient
for some of the landlords who could not afford to buy seedlings or wage labour.
“Instead of selling off their land to migrants, farmers realised that they could come to an arrange-
ment with migrant labour to develop cocoa farms over which they retained ownership.” (Amanor
and Diderutuah, 2001, p. 5)
From the 1920’s onwards, the immigration flow kept rising and the sector of agriculture was
significantly changed by the dominance of migrant wage labour (Amanor and Diderutuah, 2001;
Boone, 2014). Migrants’ wages were cheaper than those for native labourers. Hence, migrants be-
came very convenient for local landlords who usually hired them as annual labourers, wage workers
or abusa tenants (Amanor and Diderutuah, 2001). According to Hill (1957) the majority of workers
in the cocoa belt in Akyem Abuakwa were migrants from the northern parts of the country, as well
as neighbouring countries. In the early 1960’s, Hunter (1963) claimed that around 98.6% of the
southern region of the Akyem Abuakwa was cultivated by migrants. Due to the combination of ex-
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cessive migration and land sales caused by the profitability of the cocoa industry, non cleared land
rapidly decreased (Amanor and Diderutuah, 2001). As result of the combination of scarcity of non
cleared land and rural activities dominated by migrant labourers, the authors remark how the youth
grew resentment towards the settlers and the local authorities, leading to the Aliens Compliance Act
in 1969.
““Aliens” were blamed for the malaise in the Ghanaian economy of the time, and accused of taking
jobs and filling opportunities that could be filled by Ghanaians. At the end of 1969, an Aliens Com-
pliance Act was introduced giving “aliens” without registration papers two weeks in which to leave
the country.” (Amanor and Diderutuah, 2001, p. 6)
Amanor (1998) remarks how the consequences of the legislation were not taken under seri-
ous consideration by the government who did not foresee the collapse of the country's agricultural
sector. Migrants, in facts, represented the majority of the rural labour force. Hence, once the policy
became active, Ghana’s agricultural system of labour rapidly fled. As a matter of facts, according to
Adomako-Sarfoh (1974) there were attempts from the government to exclude the rural labourers
from the Aliens Compliance Act but without success due to many protests and demonstrations from
the local indigenous youth. Eventually, Ghanaian workers from the northern region of the country
and local people from the forest zone replaced the foreigners within the sharecropping arrangements
(Amanor and Diderutuah, 2001). As a result, many young farmers preferred to become abusa ten-
ants for landlords outside of kin.
“Many rural youth are unwilling to work on their family farms, since they are not given sufficient
land for their own farming needs. They prefer to work as share tenants on other people’s land or to
gain an income through hiring themselves out as casual labour. Elders are reluctant to release land
to their sons and nephews since these young men are not working for them, and they will lose the
revenue they might have got through abusa.” (Amanor and Diderutuah, 2001, p.6)
Finally, cocoa farms in the Eastern Region have been affected multiple times by various
plant diseases which forced farmers to replant more resistant varieties (Amanor and Diderutuah,
2001). However the improved varieties were expensive and not affordable by everyone. What is
more, oil palm was gaining popularity once again and slowly replaced cocoa as the main cash-crop
in the region since the 1970’s (Amanor and Diderutuah, 2001). Another huge determinant for this
switch of crops ought to be attributed to the government. Back in the 1950’s, in fact, the govern-
ment began to promote oil palm production providing improved seedlings to outgrowers (Amanor
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and Diderutuah, 2001). State oil palm plantations and research centres (e.g. the Oil Palm Research
Centre at Kusi) started to be developed in this region since the 1960’s (Amanor and Diderutuah,
2001). At this time, the country was still importing a great amount of vegetable oil which raised the
concern of increasing the local production (Amanor and Diderutuah, 2001). In the early 1970s, the
government and the World Bank financed the construction of the Ghana Oil Palm Development
Centre (GOPDC) which was officially established in 1975. GOPDC is today the largest producer of
palm oil in the country. Oil palm is a capital intensive crop which grows best in low-land areas
(Amanor and Diderutuah, 2001). The average life span of an oil palm tree is around 25 years. The
crop is harvested throughout the entire year, however, most of the fresh fruit bunches (FFBs) are
produced during the peak season, lasting from February to June. In the peak season trees are har-
vested every two weeks, whereas in the lean season only once a month. Palm trees require around
three years to start yielding and about six to seven years to produce enough FFBs to make a signifi-
cant profit.
Share-cropping: Abusa and Abunu Systems
I have previously alluded to the concept of abusa. Abusa originated from the gold mining
industry during the precolonial time in Ghana (Amanor and Diderutuah, 2001). According to Men-
sah Sarbah (1968), the landlords of these regions authorised access to land to miners but they de-
manded one bag of ore out of three the mine produced. As previously mentioned the Okyenhene of
Akyem Abuakwa extended the abusa system to the agricultural sector, in order to make landlords
without access to labour gain a share of the profits from oil palm (Amanor and Diderutuah, 2001).
The development of the abusa tenant system encouraged the migrational flux caused by the attrac-
tive prospect of plantation agriculture, where landlord sought labour for their plantations (Amanor
and Diderutuah, 2001). After the Alien Compliance Act in 1969 most of the agricultural labour
force was gone and young autochthon farmers and migrants coming from the north of the country
replaced the international migrant abusa tenants (Amanor and Diderutuah, 2001). Since then, share-
cropping systems in Ghana have become a norm and are largely practiced today.
It is possible to observe three kinds of sharecropping arrangements in Ghana: the abunu, the
abusa tenant system and the abusa labourer (Amanor and Diderutuah, 2001). The abunu is a con-
tract where the landlord gives access to a plot of land to a tenant against the share of half earnings
or produce (Amanor and Diderutuah, 2001; Lavigne Delville et al., 2002). In the abunu system, the
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landlord is expected to contribute to the production of the farm by sharing the costs of labour,
seedlings and capital with his tenant (Amanor and Diderutuah, 2001). The abusa system differs
from abunu as it is characterised by a division of the share into thirds (Amanor and Diderutuah,
2001; Lavigne Delville et al., 2002). If the arrangement is following the abusa labourer system, ac-
cording to Amanor and Diderutuah (2001), the tenant has to provide his or her landlord with two
thirds of his revenue or produce. Following the abusa tenant system, the landlord receives only a
third (Amanor and Diderutuah, 2001). The abusa system that is described in the following project is
the tenant variant. The distinction between abunu and abusa and the two types of abusa has its ori-
gins with the initial capital which is invested in the crop and into the farm by the landlord.
“While farmers have different interpretations of the economic rationale behind the working of
abunu and abusa, the various accounts reveal that the relative shares of landlord and tenant are
determined by the provision of inputs and labour, and the relative costs of inputs and labour in cul-
tivating and weeding the various crops.” (Amanor and Diderutuah, 2001, p. 15-16)
The abusa tenant finances his or her farming completely, without any capital input from the
landlord (Amanor and Diderutuah, 2001). Similarly to the abunu arrangement, abusa labourers re-
ceive some kind of support, usually in forms of seedlings and inputs from the landlords (Amanor
and Diderutuah, 2001). According to Pogucki (1955) before the 1950’s contracts where predomi-
nantly associated to the abusa system. However, the abunu system became extremely popular in the
eastern region in the early 1950’s (Pogucki, 1955). Today, the abunu system is the most practiced
form of sharecropping arrangement in the Eastern Region (Amanor and Diderutuah, 2001). Abusa
or abunu systems also depend on the type of crop farmers intend to cultivate: cocoa, subsistence
crops and private oil palm plantation follow the abunu system; maize and oil palm plantation under
the GOPDC’s outgrower scheme follow an abusa system (Amanor and Diderutuah, 2001).
“The existence of the GOPDC out grower contract with abusa reflects both shortage of land and
cost of inputs. GOPDC is forced to use contract farmers who are sharecroppers because of the
prevalence of sharecropping in the local agrarian economy. Many landlords are unable to develop
their own land into plantations because they lack labour power or the capital to hire labour. They
look to contract their land out to tenants with capital to develop a plantation in which they can then
gain their share.” (Amanor and Diderutuah, 2001, p. 21)
!15

Contract Farming
Wage labour is still one of the strategy most widely employed by agribusinesses and inde-
pendent farmers due to the fact that the majority of agriculture in West Africa is represented by
smallholding farms. Nevertheless, one of the most effective way to engage smallholder farmers is
by creating a bridge between them and large agribusinesses. This gave rise to the creation of out-
growers schemes (i.e. contract farming) which has gained more and more popularity as a strategy
amongst foreign multinationals (Felgenhauer and Wolter, 2009; Eaton and Shepherd, 2001). Out-
grower schemes are extremely beneficial to agribusinesses, while their impact on the farmers liveli-
hood is still debated. Throughout the following paragraphs I will briefly illustrate what outgrower
scheme are, how they function, the benefits that they bring to agribusinesses and the debate over the
benefits and disadvantages they present to the outgrower farmers.
Contract farming consists of a series of different types of contract between agribusinesses
and farmers. Generally, farmers partake into an outgrower scheme which establishes a commitment
on their behalf to produce a given produce. At the same time, the companies commit to continually
acquire the produce of the farmers over the previously established duration of the contract and de-
liver some inputs to the farmers (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001). Contract farming can be beneficial to
all parties involved, if practiced in an ethical and efficient manner. According to Eaton and Shep-
herd (2001), the most beneficial advantages offered by outgrower schemes to agribusinesses are the
following: political acceptability; overcoming land constraints; production reliability and shared
risk; quality consistency; and promotion of farm inputs. Contract farming is a way to avoid criti-
cism directed to large agribusinesses for grabbing land and hiring wage labour. With the adoption of
outgrower scheme strategies, the agribusinesses allow local farmers to maintain control over their
land, while at the same time engaging them in a continuous business relationship for the duration of
the contract (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001). Thus, the author remark how contract farming offers the
company the option of extending their production by hiring the already existing operational farms,
without any legal complication derived by un-ethical practices of land grabbing and by avoiding
complication raised by customary land tenure systems:
“Contract farming, therefore, offers access to crop production from land that would not otherwise
be available to a company, with the additional advantage that it does not have to purchase
it.” (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001, p. 19)
!16

In theory, contract farming provides companies with a steady supply of the produce (Fel-
genhauer and Wolter, 2009). Issues about the necessary amount and quality of the purchased pro-
duce could be easily avoided or better controlled through contract farming than from acquisition of
goods from the local or international market:
“Distinct varieties of produce in the desired quality and quantities are often not available on the
open market […] Also contract farming makes quarantine controls more manageable. It is easier
for quarantine authorities to inspect a limited number of exporters of a single commodity, who
closely supervise farmers, than to inspect hundreds, or sometimes thousands, of individual produc-
ers selling through open markets.” (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001, p. 21).
Obviously, contract farming may also result in certain disadvantages. According to Eaton
and Shepherd (2001), investors who employ outgrower schemes strategies may fall into issues con-
cerning land availability and suitability, social and cultural constraints, farmers discontent, extra-
contractual marketing and input diversion. As previously mentioned, land in West Africa is subject
to various dynamics derived from the customary land tenure regimes. Thus, companies may suffer
losses due to conflicts between landlords and tenants (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001). In addition, the
authors emphasise how the concept of a contract is based on European representations of responsi-
bility. Hence, complications between African societies and western agribusiness might arise as the
farmers might hold different views of such concept (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001). Also, if contract
farming is organised inefficiently, farmers might get easily dissatisfied with the arrangement and, as
a consequence, withdraw from the program.
“A number of situations can lead to farmer dissatisfaction. Discriminatory buying, late payments,
inefficient extension services, poor agronomic advice, unreliable transportation for crops, a mid-
season change in pricing or management’s rudeness to farmers will all normally generate
dissent.” (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001, p.23)
Although farmers are committed to sell exclusively to the investor, it is often the case that
they might also sell their produce to third parties (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001). The reason behind
extra-contractual sales can be attributed to many factors. One of the most influential is the availabil-
ity of alternative buyers offered by the local market. Market competition can be a fundamental in-
fluence on the success of an outgrower scheme (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001). As this is a key aspect
of my research, I will further develop this issue in the following section IV by analysing the
GOPDC’s outgrower scheme.
!17

What about the impacts of contract farming on the outgrowers, and how do farmers perceive
these programs from their perspective? The effects of contract farming on outgrowers have been
widely debated within the academic literature. From the farmer’s point of view, outgrower schemes
may offer a range of important advantages and benefits. First of all, contract farming can be
summed as an agreement in which the investors undertake a continuous business relationship with
the smallholder farmers in order to purchase their products (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001). As a result,
farmers who comply with the program should generally have a stable source of income, which sta-
bilises their economic position. According to Minot (1986) and Miyata (2009) contract farming can
aid smallholders to overcome market shortages, allowing them to integrate better into the value-
chain and, consequently, have a prospect of a higher income. According to the study focused on
GOPDC’s outgrower scheme by Susanne J. Väth and Michael Kirk (2014), contract farming has
significantly positive long-term effects concerning the farmers perceived food security and asset
endowment. Eaton and Shepherd (2001), list the major advantages of contract farming as following:
provision of inputs and production services; access to credit; introduction of appropriate technolo-
gy; skill transfer; guaranteed and fixed pricing structures; and access to reliable markets.
“Many contractual arrangements involve considerable production support in addition to the supply
of basic inputs such as seed and fertilizer. Sponsors may also provide land preparation, field culti-
vation and harvesting as well as free training and extension” (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001, p. 11)
 
According to the authors, fertilisers and seedlings are often not accessible to outgrowers due
to the prices out of their economic range (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001). Moreover, in certain cases
the inputs are not offered free of charge but are added to the farmer’s credit. Another advantage of
contract farming is represented by the possibility for farmers to access credit, high value inputs and
extension services through rural banks and the sponsors themselves (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001;
Glover, 1984). In addition, farmers may be able to access credit loans more easily by using the land
contract as a collateral (Feder, and Nishio, 1999; Carter and Olinto, 2003). Also, farmers may learn
valuable skills from the agribusinesses agricultural practices, though these might contrast with in-
digenous practices. Such skills may be fundamental for the future of outgrowers who might engage
more easily into the global market.
“The skills the farmer learns through contract farming may include record keeping, the efficient use
of farm resources, improved methods of applying chemicals and fertilizers, a knowledge of the im-
!18

portance of quality and the characteristics and demands of export markets.” (Eaton and Shepherd,
2001, p. 13)
In respect to the disadvantages that smallholders may find by joining the practice of contract
farming, Eaton and Shepherd (2001) observe the following major ones: increased risk; unsuitable
technology and crop incompatibility; manipulation of quotas and quality specifications; corruption;
domination by monopolies; indebtedness and over reliance on advances. Farmers may be subject to
higher risks, for instance, if the company introduces a new crop to the region, the expected results
might be compromised by unforeseen circumstances, such as plant diseases, which could result in
serious crop losses in the case of a plantation (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001). Moreover, the new cash-
crop introduced by the company will inevitably affect the previously established crop systems dis-
rupting the production of other agricultural goods. Robert Badouin (1985) claims that traditional1
crop systems are inevitably changed by the inclusion of cash-crops, especially when these are culti-
vated for export, namely in terms of land employed for subsistence produce. Furthermore, African
systems of production and systems of labour will also change to accommodate a cash-crop agricul-
ture (Badouin, 1985). According to Badouin (1985) African farmers tend to prefer a model based on
extensive agriculture. This is characterised by low capital inputs and a relatively small labour force
required, generally adapted for subsistence agriculture and applied on large surfaces (Badouin,
1985). Cash-crops are rather following a model of intensive agriculture due to their capitalistic na-
ture, thus influencing the agricultural practices of the outgrowers. Another issue can be attributed to
corruption, especially in statist land tenure regimes, where access to land can be negotiated between
the more powerful and richer individuals through bribe payments or in exchange for political fa-
vours (Boone, 2014; Dunn, 1975) resulting into the marginalisation of the poorest. Eaton and She-
pherd (2001) also mention how market fluctuations concerning the global prices of the final pro-
duce at the base of the outgrower scheme also may represent a huge risk factor to the farmers as it
will directly influence the revenue of their harvest. By joining an outgrower scheme, farmers tend to
invest completely into the necessary crop to join the program, hence ‘putting all their eggs in one
basket’ and consequently having fewer or no alternative sources of income. Furthermore, if the lo-
According to Robert Badouin, African tropical agricultural production systems are composed by three fundamental1
systems: systems of crops (i.e. système de culture), systems of production (i.e. système de production) and labour sys-
tems (i.e. système d’exploitation). The author defines the three as follows: “Le premiere aspect du système productif
reside dans le système de culture. Il se rapporte aux combinaisons culturales et représente l’ensemble plus ou moins
structurés des productions végétales et animales retenues par les agriculteurs. Le second aspect du système productif
est constitué par le système de production. Il est relatif aux combinaisons productives, aux dosages retenus entre les
quatre principales ressources productives: la terre ou capital foncier, le travail, les consommations intermédiaire ou
capital circulant, les biens d’équipement ou capital fixe. Le troisième aspect du système productif a trait au système
d’exploitation. Il se définit comme le mode de fonctionnement des unités des production.” (Badouin, 1985, p.99).
!19

cal market is dominated by a monopolistic agribusiness established in the region, it can also be pro-
blematic for the farmers. In facts, the agribusiness would have none or very little competition, thus
could decide at what price to buy the product as farmers would have no third party to turn to if dis-
satisfied with the standards of the renumeration (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001). The author suggest
that when this is the case, it would be better if the government set the prices for the market, in order
to protect the interests of the outgrowers (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001). Finally, Eaton and Shepherd
(2001) claim that contract farming may expose smallholder farmers to heavy debts, especially if
farmers rely on advances on their payment from the company. Advances may be requested in order
to sustain certain unforeseen events, such as weddings, funerals, children education or medical ex-
penses etc. The risk is that the farmers could demand advances that overtake their gross income. As
a result, farmers might end up in heavy debt and might even think they had been cheated (Eaton and
Shepherd, 2001). Nevertheless, contract farming is a growing practice within the agricultural sector
and it is fundamental to research it further. 
!20

III. Research Design and Presentation of Data
Throughout the following section, I will present my research design and methodology. The
limitations of my research will also be described within the methodological section.
Methodology, Data Collection and Limitations
In order to carry out my research I used a qualitative methodology. During my field work I
was able to live with farmers and observe their daily lives. Participant observation is a key aspect of
ethnographic research, which has provided me with multiple insights regarding the challenges of oil
palm farming. Furthermore I was able to observe the routines of the families who hosted me and get
the perspective of the community. My entire field work lasted for two months and three weeks be-
tween the 27th of February and the 20th of May 2016. During this period of time, I alternated be-
tween staying at the village and on the company’s nucleus estate in the Kwae area of the New
Abirem District, which allowed me to understand the operations of GOPDC. In order to do so, I
conducted a few interviews with selected employees, namely the managing director, the chief oper-
ational officer, the outgrower manager, the corporate social responsibility manager and the head of
the legal department.
In order to collect the data I decided to use semi-structured interviews. This particular style
of data collection, has allowed me to focus on specific issues I needed to discuss, while at the same
time leaving a certain degree of openness to other topics and arguments that might have been over-
looked. Employing this data collection method has revealed to be a valuable choice. As a matter of
facts, I was able to collect critical information by diverting interviews from their focused aim. Sam-
pling of the interviewees was partially done at random by simply interviewing who came to the
FFBs collection centre. Moreover, I conducted the rest of the interviews via my main informants on
site who helped me to meet other outgrowers and who guided me throughout Ofoase Kuma (i.e.
Small Ofoase), the village, and the plantations. The informants who helped me the most were four
men. The first, S., is the farmer representative of the village and pastor of the village pentecostal
church, a 63 year old man born in the area. The second was J., the owner of the house I was ac-
commodated to, 56 year old. The third was A., 53 years old, the outgrower who has the highest
number of farms by familial holdings and inheritance among the sample. Finally K., 43 years old,
who is the company’s District head, in charge of the Ofoase District. All outgrowers who were sub-
!21

ject of the study are living in the Ofoase district. Furthermore, I conducted a focus group with the
council of the village elders of Afoase Panin (i.e. Greater Ofoase). Thus, the body of the data is
composed of thirty-five interviews (i.e. 23 outgrowers, some of which have been interviewed more
than once, 5 GOPDC employees, a caretaker of the local CPO presses and the owner of a private
collection centre), one focus group, and participant observation on the field.
One of the limitation presented by my project is the village bias. What I mean by this, is that
I conducted fieldwork only in Ofoase Kuma and, even though I had the opportunity of meeting out-
growers who were living in nearby villages, they were still within a reasonable distance from the
Brenase collection centre. This centre is one of the main collection centres under the jurisdiction of
the Ofoase District, one of seven districts of GOPDC’s outgrower scheme. Therefore, my result can
only be truly representative for this area. Another issue which I have encountered was the fact that I
was often treated and thought of as a GOPDC’s employee. This has probably influenced the inter-
view responses of the outgrowers. Despite the fact that I have mentioned multiple times I was an
independent researcher and that I had no affiliation with the company, the outgrowers still perceived
me as a GOPDC’s employee. Therefore, it is unlikely that if the farmers were diverting their pro-
duce they would openly discuss the facts to me. Finally the most influential bias I faced, is repre-
sented by GOPDC's delayed payment to the outgrowers in this particular time I was staying for my
fieldwork which certainly encouraged them (more than ever!) to find alternatives sources of income
by diverting their FFBs to other parties. This event will be discussed in further details later in the
text.
!22

IV. Case Study: the Ghana Oil Palm Development Company
The Ghana Oil Palm Development Company was established in 1976 as a joint program be-
tween the Ghanaian government and the World Bank. In 1995 the company was privatised and be-
came part of the Belgian SIAT group. GOPDC is the largest palm oil producer of the country gener-
ating around 35’000 tons of palm oil and palm kernel oil each year. GOPDC includes industrial in-
frastructures (photograph 1), core plantations of oil palm (photograph 2) and hevea, an outgrower
scheme (at the moment only for oil palm) spreading within a thirty kilometres radius from the core
plantation (figure 1), and a livestock breeding programme.
!23
Figure 1. Map of the GOPDC’s Outgrowers Scheme (Amanor and Diderutuah, 2001).

FFBs (photograph 3) are transported to the company farm’s gate, sterilised and crushed in
the mill infrastructure providing the final products: crude palm oil (i.e. CPO), palm kernel oil (i.e.
PKO), empty FFBs and nutshells (i.e. the waste produce). However, the waste produce is, in fact,
not wasted as the empty shells and extra fibres are burned in the boiler infrastructure which pro-
vides the power necessary to run the mill. In the lean season or in case of low amounts of waste
produce the boiler can also run on diesel fuel. The water to be heated in the boiler is taken from two
large boreholes in the area, although first it has to be processed in the water treatment plant.
GOPDC has also a refinery and fractionation plant. The CPO and PKO obtained from the FFBs are
then refined, bleached and deodorised resulting into a blend product (i.e. RBDO) which can also be
sold alone. However, the RBDO is also fractionated into olein (i.e. liquid) and stearin (i.e. solid).
The olein product is simply cooking oil whereas the stearin product is then sold as a complementary
product in the food industry (e.g. margarines, bakery goods, stock cubes etc.) but also in the cos-
metic industry (e.g. soaps, creams, beauty products etc.). GOPDC also produces its own brand of
cooking oil sold on the local market: Kings’. The industrial complex of the company ultimately in-
cludes tank facilities for the storage of the final products, a palm kern pallet cake plant which is sold
as livestock feed and a biomethanation plant to reduce the gas emissions produced. Also, GOPDC
has recently announced a new project for the construction of a rubber processing infrastructure to be
operational by 2020, when farmers, who wish to join the outgrower scheme by cultivating hevea,
should begin to harvest the trees. Finally, the company has proved itself to be able to face its social
responsibilities, financing many projects focused on the local community, such as schools, sanitary
facilities, power lines etc.
The nucleus of the operations is at the Kwae concession where the offices, employees and
guests accommodations, social infrastructures (e.g. a bank, a clinic and a bar), as well as the indus-
trial facilities such as the mill and the palm oil refinery are situated. In addition to the two main in-
dustrial plantations where smallholders are working, GOPDC has launched an outgrower scheme
since 1986, which primary objective was to run the mill in an economic efficient manner by in-
creasing production. The company also relies on a well established network of private holders who
are not bound to sell their FFBs exclusively to the company by any contract, but often do due to the
pricing of the local market. Finally, the Kwae estate also accommodates sacred forests and BDPs
plots (photograph 4) nursery for seeds purchased in Benin and Ivory Coast, as well as, new green
house for the improved seedlings which are imported from Belgium.
!24

Local Market for FFBs
The local market for FFBs can be very competitive in the Eastern Region. In addition to
GOPDC, there many other alternatives which allow outgrowers to easily divert their production
(graph 1). As previously stated, the pricing per ton decided by GOPDC according to the global
prices of palm oil amounted to 420 cidies per ton (i.e. outgrowers category). During the current
peak season of 2016, the local market prices from other FFBs buyers were lower, around 380 cidies
per ton. The local FFBs market buyers include: GOPDC (either at mill-gate or collection centres);
an Indian competitor palm oil company; private collection centres and women using local CPO
presses.
!25
Graph 1. FFBs Circulation and Possible Destinations
Company or Private/ Hired Transportation
Private/ Hired Transportation
Harvested FFBs in
Outgrower’s Farm
Collection Point
Private Collection
Centre
GOPDC Collection
Centre
Household
GOPDC
Mill-Gate Facility
Women
Indian Company
Local CPO Presses

GOPDC Collection Centre: The collection centre, where much of the fieldwork took place,
is the Brenase centre (photographs 5 and 6) , taking its name from a village near by, despite the fact
that it is right out of Ofoase Kuma. The district includes the villages of Ofoase Kuma, Ofoase Panin
(i.e. Greater Ofoase), Brenase, Asuoboa and Bontodiase.
Every day the collection centre is populated by four categories of individuals: outgrowers,
loading boys, the ‘collect’ and company representatives which constitute the system of labour of the
outgrower scheme. The loading boys are mostly composed by the local youth, although it is not rare
to find adult men as well in this category. Due to the heavy nature of the job, this position is gener-
ally filled with young and strong individuals. Their task is simple: loading the truck at the farm-gate
(photograph 7), unloading the harvest once it arrives at the collection centre, weighting the FFBs
(photograph 8) from the outgrower’s farm and, once again, loading the recorded produce on the
truck going to the mill. This is an extremely exhausting job, loading boys use a metal pick on a stick
to lift the FFBs (photograph 9), this is not made any easier by the hot temperature under the Ghana-
ian sun. In facts, many breaks are taken, especially between the arrival and the departure of lorries
(photograph 10) and the loading boys take their job in turn. Loading boys are wage workers paid by
GOPDC.
At the collection centre, outgrowers mostly supervise the loading, unloading and weighting
operations and often help the loading boys, especially if they want to finish the working day early.
Once the FFBs are weighted they are officially GOPDC’s, thus once the last FFBs load is recorded,
their business at the centre is over for the day. Nevertheless, the entire procedure can take hours and
the centre becomes some kind of social setting. While waiting their turn, outgrowers socialise with
each others or find ways to spend their time. They talk about football, laugh about the obruni (i.e.
white person - me.) who got sick by eating fufu (i.e. a local dish), listen to music on the radio, talk
or text on their phones, nap on improvised benches, purchase drinks from local sellers who take ad-
vantage of the heat to sell refreshing fruit juices or sachet waters. The ‘collect’ is an outgrower who
is in charge of keeping the records of the FFBs tonnage intake, thus taking a company representa-
tive position of a care-taker of the centre. However, the collect for one centre is not always the same
person as they rotate every two weeks. During my fieldwork I have met three collects. Other com-
pany employees are also often visiting the centre. For instance, K. the Ofoase district head was al-
ways moving on his motorcycle between collection centres and, during the peak season is normally
based in the same household as I was, visiting his family on the estate in the weekends.
!26

In order to pay the outgrowers, GOPDC transfers the money to each outgrower’s bank ac-
count. As previously mentioned, this also allows farmers to access loans and credits from the bank
as they can use the contract as collateral. According to farmers this is an enormous benefit, as they
can also pay their children school fees from the same account. In addition, farmers think that bank
transfer is a more secure payment method than cash which could be stolen. Outgrowers have also
mentioned to me that they would prefer to be paid via mobile money. This is an immediate method
of money transfer, which is directly linked to the individual’s phone contract. Farmers would re-
ceive a text with a code. Then outgrowers would bring the code to the bank and collect the amount
of money which has been wired. According to the MD, GOPDC is most likely to undertake this
technology in the near future. At the time of my field work (i.e. March to May, 2016), GOPDC was
paying 400 cidies (i.e. roughly Chf. 97.28; $100.93) per ton for smallholders (i.e. within the Kwae
concession), 420 cidies (i.e. roughly Chf. 102.15; $105.98) per ton for outgrowers and 440 cidies
(i.e. roughly Chf. 107.02; $111.03) per ton if FFBs were delivered at the mill gate. However, at the
time of my fieldwork, a peculiar situation had occurred: GOPDC had not paid the outgrowers for
two months. Farmers complained repetitively to me about this, as they would not grasp the fact that
I was not a company employee. Though the delayed payment was a one time event, which justifies
the fruit diversion, even when GOPDC regularly payed the outgrowers, the company has recorded
much lower FFBs intake than expected, indicating that the process of produce diversion is structur-
al. Nevertheless, aside from the delay of the income, outgrowers tend to think of GOPDC as a good
business partner.
The Indian Company: It (Photograph 11) is much smaller than GOPDC. It includes only a
FFBs mill and CPO refinery. Nevertheless it is one of the main competitors of GOPDC and is often
at the basis of FFBs diversion. According to village sources, the indian company buys FFBs at 380
cidies per ton. However, despite lower prices, the company pays farmers immediately in cash, ac-
cording to the GOPDC’s district head (i.e. K.). While visiting oil palm plantations with K., we no-
ticed many trucks loaded with FFBs entering the gate of the company. GOPDC’s transportation cars
are registered, however, it is always possible to hire private trucks. There are also private famers
who have no contractual bond with GOPDC and could therefore sell their produce to whomever
they wish. Finally, according to the owner of a private collection centre, the indian company may
have certain arrangements with farmers who are loyal to them. The arrangement concerns the price
fixed for FFBs ton: if the farmer constantly supplies the company with his harvest, the price is
slightly increased.
!27

Private Collection Centres: These centres function exactly like the ones established by the
GOPDC. There are only two in the proximities of Afoase. One of them regularly delivers to
GOPDC. The other private collection centre rather delivers its FFBs to the indian company due to
some discontent with the GOPDC. Private collection centres can have different rates, but they pay
generally always around at 380 cidies per ton and they also pay in cash. The owner of the business I
interviewed (i.e. F.) sells the FFBs to GOPDC making a discrete profit. F. has informed me that he
is currently saving in order to open two more collection centres. In fact, this particular activity is
capital intensive as the owner needs to have enough cash to pay any farmer who might bring their
fruits to his centre. Moreover, additional costs to be covered are the rent of land plot where the col-
lection centre stands, the costs of construction of the infrastructure, transportation and labour (i.e.
the collect, loading boys, night guard).
Local Women and the Local Adwosuos: One of the most influential competitors for GOPDC
are the local women. Women purchase FFBs from farmers, bring it to one of the hundreds of local
CPO presses and sell the crude palm oil obtained to external buyers. The presses are called Depot or
Adwosuo. The women purchase FFBs from farmers paying them in cash. Once they obtain the
fruits, they bring them to the Depots where they are charged a service fee, also in cash, to use the
facility. The cost of using the Adwosuo, depends entirely on how much FFBs women need to
process. According to R. an estimate of the Adwosuo fee is roughly coming women 70 cidies (i.e.
Chf. 17.04; $17.69) to process one ton of FFBs. Processing the FFBs to obtain oil by hand is a long
procedure (figure 2). Firstly, the FFBs are chopped with axes or picked by hand to free all single
fruits. The fruits are left out in the sun to dry for a couple of days. Once the fruits are dry they are
boiled in huge squared tanks for three hours to soften them. Next, fruits are pressed in a mechanical
mill, which produces the uncooked oil. At this point, the uncooked oil is poured in cauldrons to be
cooked for an additional 3-4 hours. The waste material from the pressing is saved or sold on the
side as nutshells and fibres are used as burning materials to cook the oil. Once the oil is cooked is
then poured in jerrycans (i.e. 65.25 litres) or drums (i.e. 250 litres) and ready to be sold. This crude
palm oil, or red cooking oil, is heavily demanded by the local market as it is at the basis of the
Ghanaian diet (e.g. palm nut soup), like in much coastal countries in West Africa.
!28

However, the Adwosuo care-taker (R.) has informed me that business this year is not going
really well - “because of that sudan case, the price go down” -. The sudan R. was referring is a
chemical agent, Sudan IV, which is used in the depot as a colorant to make the red cooking oil red-
der. According to many agencies concerned with the health security of subsidiary products (e.g. the
FSA - Food Standards Agency, the FDA - Food and Drugs Administration and the European Par-
liament) Sudan IV has been found to be harmful. The breaking news occurred in the precedent peak
season, in 2015. As a consequence, women could not sell the cooking oil produced, which resulted
into a lack of cash to purchase FFBs from the farmers. Though, this year the business of unlabelled
red cooking oil is slowly improving because the local population is still skeptical about it and pre-
fers to purchase the product from secure sources, though these are difficult to identify. Many people
in facts, have their own manual presses in their household (photograph 12).
!29
Figure 2. The Adwosuo: Process for Red Cooking Oil
Phase 1. Women separate the bunches into loose fruits and dry them.
Phase 2. Dry loose fruits are cooked to be softened.
Phase 3. Softened loose fruits are pressed in the mechanical mill;
mill; waste produce is divided and retained.
Phase 4. Uncooked oil is cooked again and stored.

The women purchase FFBs directly from the farmers. R. describes the procedure - “Oh…
everybody has his own custom. So when the farmer have the fruits he uses the phone to call you.
[mimicking a phone call with of a farmer] I have harvested the fruits come in and take it or let the
cars come and take it.” -. The quantity of FFBs purchased by a woman is dependent to the cash at
her disposal. R. informed me that women generally hire private trucks to bring the fruits to the de-
pots. The fee price to use the machineries at the adwosuo I visited was 70 cidies per ton. The
presses may receive a maximum tonnage of 10 tons in one day by various women, usually 10 wo-
men bringing FFBs everyday. The minimum is around 4 tons a day. Once the red cooking oil is sto-
red it can be sold to potential buyers: the drums can be sold around 520 cidies (i.e. Chf. 128.80;
$134.20) in peak season and 800 (i.e. Chf. 198.16; $ 206.46) in the lean season; the jerrycans at 130
cidies in peak season or 200 cidies off season. The women business of red cooking oil production is
huge. Only in the Ofoase district there are roughly 200-300 Adwosuos which are habitually used by
the women. Hence, in a way, women are the greatest competitor of the company.
Who are the farmers who work for GOPDC?
The company is composed of two main estates, the outgrower scheme and a supply network
of private farmers in the region. In this section, I will distinguish the different categories of oil palm
farmers who engage with GOPDC. GOPDC purchases FFBs from three categories of farmers:
- GOPDC' Smallholders - the farmers working on the estates of the company. Their land was ex-
propriated by the statist regime of the Ghanaian military government in the 1970’s and the Kwae
and Okumaning concessions have been re-distributed by GOPDC in the 1980’s and 2000’s;
- Outgrowers (i.e. the main subjects of this research) - under contract farmers whose land access
and distribution dynamics are following the local neo-customary regime;
- Private Farmers - independent farmers who may sell their produce to any buyer. They are also
under the neo-customary land tenure regime, though often, they are representative of the largest
landholders of the area and their plantations follow an abunu system of sharecropping (e.g. three of
the interviewed elders belong to this category).
!30

Presentation of the different types of farmers
GOPDC' Smallholders: The two main estates of oil palm plantations are Kwae (around 8953
ha of which, 5205 ha are actually developed) and Okumaning (roughly 5200 ha of which, approxi-
mately 2500 ha are cultivated). There are 540.3 ha of smallholdings within the Kwae and Okuman-
ing concessions producing an approximate annual target of 3500 tons of FFBs and accommodating
208 GOPDC’ smallholder farmers. The majority of GOPDC’ smallholders are based in Kwae Town,
located within the Kwae concession. Under the country’s military regime in 1975, the Supreme Mil-
itary Council supported by the World Bank expropriated the land of the local communities in order
to build the initial project: the mill plant and the two nucleus estates. The outgrower scheme was
developed later. The company has allowed access to smallholders, as long as they cultivated oil
palm, in the 1980's on the Kwae estate and later in the 2000’s in the Okumaning concession. Plots
of land from the concessions were also given back to the communities in the case of these being
considered sacred or in the case of BDPs (biodiversity plots) to promote sustainable cultivation of
oil palm according to the RSPO’s standards, of which the company has become a member. GOPDC
smallholders are the farmers, or the offspring of those whose land was expropriated by the military
government. In terms of their role in GOPDC supply chain, the smallholders are in essence like
outgrowers. They receive the inputs provided by the company at credit, and in exchange they are
supposed to provide the entire harvest of FFBs to the company. However, the major difference be-
tween these two categories is the fact that smallholders have a lower chance of being able to divert
their produce. In fact, their land is within the perimeter of the two estates, thus transporting FFBs
out to other buyers would be quite difficult without the company noticing it. Furthermore, if small-
holders are caught diverting produce they risk loosing their right over the land, as GOPDC would
claim it back due to a breach of contract. It is also true, however, that FFBs theft is also frequent.
This is possibly a way through which GOPDC’ smallholders divert their produce, while not breach-
ing the contract as ‘someone else’ presumably stole them.
Outgrowers: The outgrower scheme engages 7279 farmers within roughly the 30 km radius
from the nucleus estate in Kwae. The outgrowers can be male or female, depending on who is the
landlord or tenant of the farm, though in Ofoase there is a clear majority of male farmers. With an
approximate total area of 13’900 ha, the outgrower scheme is the largest area cultivated by GOPDC
and, according to the company, produce an estimated 27000 tons of FFBs annually. GOPDC also
provides transportation from the farm-gate to the collection centres on site where the FFBs are re-
!31

covered by the company, weighted, recorded and eventually transported to the mill. The outgrower
scheme is divided into two zones (i.e. Kwae and Okumaning areas) composed by twelve districts
and a total of 31 collection centres. I had the chance to directly observe the outgrowers working un-
der the scheme of GOPDC. Outgrowers rise early, around 5 am, to take full advantage of the fresh
air of the morning. Depending on their daily tasks, they take a ‘bath’ (i.e. in a shower room with a
bucket as there is no running water), have breakfast and set to go out in the farm or the collection
centre. The working day usually ends around 5-6 pm, the collection centre closes down and out-
growers make their way home, take a bath and eat, usually together outside. In the evening they talk
for a while and around 8 pm retire to their bedrooms to watch television or listen to radio. Everyone
goes to bed latest by 11.00 pm, when quiet suddenly falls in the surroundings. The household where
I was hosted was medium-large size in comparison to other ones present in the vicinities. The land-
lord, J., had built it himself, a common practice in the region. He began constructions since 1991 -
“step-by-step” -. J. argues the house still requires some investments, as he still needs to paint it - “so
that everyone know it’s J. F. house!” - as well as tiling a few floors. The household accommodates
four families: the landlord’s, the families of two school teachers of the local primary school and the
GOPDC’s district head when is on the field.
In Amanor and Diderutuah study concerned with the oil palm and citrus belt in the Eastern
Region of Ghana, the authors observe:
“Under the outgrower contract, GOPDC undertakes to supply the contract farmer with various in-
puts: seedlings, two bags of fertiliser for the first three years, Wellington boots, implements, wire
nets to protect the young seedlings against rodents, Preruria seeds for establishing a cover crop un-
der the oil palm trees, and money for hiring labour. GOPDC also undertakes to collect farmers’
fruits at the farmgate. The farmers undertake to supply GOPDC with all the fruit the palm planta-
tion yields.” (Amanor and Diderutuah, 2001, p. 20)
Although the contractual arrangement between GOPDC and outgrowers was recently modi-
fied on a few points, Amanor and Diderutuah (2001) draw an accurate picture of the company’s
contract. Especially the significance of how the company charges the inputs provided to the farm-
ers, which take the form of loans with compound interests (Amanor and Diderutuah, 2001). Accord-
ing to the authors, this may confuse the outgrowers who, in some cases feel cheated, as they do not
fully comprehend the calculations computed on their earnings (Amanor and Diderutuah, 2001). Af-
ter six years into contract, every individual outgrower begins to repay the loans, which are subtract-
!32

ed from the earnings of the harvest (Amanor and Diderutuah, 2001). The loans have a grace period
of six years in order to allow the crop to fully mature and be profitable before being repaid. The au-
thors remark how locals have different opinions concerning GOPDC’s outgrower scheme, which is
perceived as negative from some and as a blessing from others (Amanor and Diderutuah, 2001).
The contract stipulated by the company establishes that GOPDC undertakes the provision of certain
agricultural inputs on credit to the farmers who in return agree to supply their entire harvest of FFBs
and to pay back their credit. The inputs provided include palm seedlings, organic fertilisers, techni-
cal assistance, basic farming equipment and organic pest management. The inputs are given on
credit, partially due to the issue of fruit diversion, the managers thinking that outgrowers will disci-
pline themselves and give their fruit exclusively to the company in order to pay their credit. It
doesn’t work like that though. In the past, seedlings used to be provided for free. The study of Su-
sanne Väth and Michael Kirk (2014) on the GOPDC’s Outgrower scheme show that in the short-
term, contract farming is often perceived as having a negative impact on the farmer’s livelihood,
measured by profit per acre and agricultural income. However, in the long term, contract farming
can become positive, especially in terms of asset endowment and perceived future security. The au-
thors conclude also that farmers who have complete property rights or sharecropping arrangements
under GOPDC's outgrower scheme may use the contract as collateral which has positive effects on
both short and long term.
All outgrowers that I have interviewed have multiple land plots (table 1). Subsistence agri-
culture is still commonly practiced, sometimes as a multi-crop model, as many farmers have plots
cultivated with cassava, plantain, banana, mango, avocado, cocoyam, yam, and maize. Cocoa is also
very popular amongst the outgrowers (Photograph 13) who think it is another good source of in-
come, but not as profitable as oil palm (Photograph 14). Only one farmer mentioned that his cocoa
farms were more profitable. However, this was quite understandable as he was comparing his six
cocoa farms (of these, the largest two were family landholdings) adding to a total of 14 acres to an
oil palm plot just slightly larger than a one and half acre. Oil palm is considered to be the most prof-
itable cash crop in the region, though cocoa is still commonly planted, sometimes providing a great
shaded location for the subsistence crop which is planted on the same plot. Another cash crop
present in the region is the citrus. S. my main informant used to have an 8 acres citrus farm but de-
cided to chop it down as it was not very profitable. Instead he will most likely plant oil palm. Origi-
nally he had told me he wanted to plant hevea. When I asked him why he had changed his mind he
replied: “I don’t like rubber. You see, one month no pay. If I plant rubber there is no market for it.”. 
!33

!34
Table 1. Number of Plots, Size and Sharecropping Arrangements amongst Outgrowers
(O) Landholding Outgrower (L) Sharecropper Landlord (T) Sharecropper Tenant
Outgrowers’ Sample
Number of Oil Palm Farms and
Acreage
(Abusa)
Number of Cocoa Farms and Acreage
(Abunu)
Other Subsistence Crops or Citrus
(Abunu)
S.
3 farms:
4 (O); 4 (L); 2 (T) acres
None
1 farm (T)
citrus: 8 acres
A.
4 farms:
2 (O); 2 (O); 3 (T); 2.5 (T) acres
1 farm:
2.5 (O) acres
1 farm (O)
plantain, cassava, cocoyam: 2 acres
D.
1 farm:
3.5 (T) acres
None
1 farm (T)
plantain and cassava:
> 1 acre
B.
1 farm:
1.5 (T) acres
None
1 farm (O)
cassava: > 1 acre
D.
3 farms:
3.5 (T), 6 (T); 2.5 (L) acres;
2 farms:
2 (T) ; 2 (T) acres
No additional farms, subsistence crop
planted on cocoa farms: cassava,
plantain
J.
2 farms:
7 (O); 3.5 (L) acres
1 farm:
3 (T) acres
planted on cocoa farms:
cocoyam, cassava, plantain
A.
2 farms:
5 (T); 2.5 (T) acres
1 farm:
2 (T) acres
None
O.
1 farm:
4.5 (T) acres
1 farm:
6 (T) acres
1 farm (T)
cassava: 2.5 acres
F.
1 farm:
5.6 (T) acres
None
1 farm,
citrus: 3 (T) acres
A.
3 farms:
5 (T); 1 (T); 1.5 (T) acres
2 farms:
1.5 (L); 2.3 (O) acres
cocoyam, cassava
D.
3 farms:
7 (T); 3.5 (T); 2.5 (T) acres
1 farm:
1 (T) acre
1 farm (T)
cassava: 3 acres
M.
2 farms
4.5 (T); 6 (O) acres
None None
B.
1 farm:
4 (O) acres
3 farms:
2 (T); 3.5 (T); 1 (T) acres
1 farm (O)
yam, cassava: 1.5 acres
K.
1 farm:
1.5 (O) acres
6 farms:
4 (O); 3.5 (O); 2 (T); 2 (T); 1.5 (T); 1
(T) acres
cocoyam, plantain, yam
A.
5 farms:
1.5 (L); 1.5 (L); 2 (T); 2.5 (T); 1 (O)
acres
None
1 farm (O)
yam, cassava: 1.5 acres
K.
2 farms:
3.5 (O); 1.5 (L) acres
None
1 farm (O)
plantain, yam: 1.5 acres
E.
3 farms:
4 (T); 5 (T); 1 (T) acres
4 farms:
3.5 (T); 2.5 (T); 1.5 (T); 2 (T) acres
yam, cassava
M.
1 farm:
7.5 (O) acres
None None
A.
3 farms:
2.5 (T); 4 (T); 1.5 (T) acres None
1 farm (O)
cassava: > 1 acre
S.
2 farms:
2.5 (O); 3.5 (L) acres
2 farms:
3.5 (L), 5 (T) acres
cassava
D.
5 farms:
2 (T); 5 (T); 2.5 (T); 3 (T); 1.5 (T)
acres
None
1 farm (T)
yam, plantain, cassava: > 1 acres
F.
2 farms:
4 (L); 6.5 (T) acres
3 farms:
4.5 (T); 6 (T); 3 (T) acres
None
T.
2 farms:
2.5 (O); 2 (O) acres
None None

S.’s citrus plot was under an abunu system, hence S. as a tenant had to pay an abunu tribute
equal to half of the produce revenue to his landlord. All the farmers interviewed were under share-
cropping systems, either following abusa for oil palm or abunu for other crops. There are many
landlords who own a low number of plots, which are usually small in size. The sharecropping
arrangements for land dedicated to oil palm plantations, abunu for private farmers or abusa for out-
growers under GOPDC’ scheme, lasts twenty-five years, the lifespan of palm trees. Sharecropping
is, as we have seen, widely spread. I have not met any farmer who was not involved in any of this.
As previously mentioned, all farmers I have talked to where either tenants, landlords or both. It is
not uncommon for farmers to have access to land inherited through the matrilineal line, as user right
or as gift from their relatives. Eight farmers had inherited their land through their mother’s brother
(i.e. matrilineal lineage); three from one of the grandparents whom they helped (i.e. user right) and
four inherited it from their patrilineage (i.e. gift).
Generally, if a farmer is young he does not dispose of much capital. As a consequence, the
family is likely to help the outgrower in the oil palm farming practices : harvesting (photograph 16),
carrying the FFBs to the farm’s collection point, pruning (i.e. the chopping of excessive, old and
dead foliage on the palm tree), weeding and fertiliser application. More mature outgrowers usually
can afford wage labour. Thus, oil palm farming often provide wage labour to carriers (20 cidies per
day), harvesters (50 pesues = 0.5 cidies per single FFB) and weeders. Carriers are generally local
women who carry the FFBs on metal bowls on their head, whereas harvesters are always men. Dur-
ing the peak season farmers harvest their plots every two weeks and one acre of oil palm produces
around a ton of FFBs.
Private Farmers: GOPDC has also developed a well established network of private oil palm
farmers. The company estimates to gather an approximate target of 12000 tons per annum from this
category. Private farmers are completely independent from GOPCD, hence do not receive any in-
puts or benefits from the company and are not under any form of contract. They may or may not
sell their produce to GOPDC, meaning that the prices of FFBs each year, directly influence the
number of private farmers engaging within the company supply chain. For the peak season of 2016,
as GOPDC was offering the best prices on the market, approximately 283 private farmers sold their
FFBs at the mill. Transportation may be provided at a cost deducted from the total FFBs intake if
farmers are not able to afford transportation themselves. The private farmers live in the areas sur-
rounding Kwae and Okumaning and, in all respects, this category is very similar to that of outgrow-
!35

ers. Hence, they also follow the neo-customary land tenure regime based on traditional authoritative
figures. However, the most critical difference is that they are not under GOPDC’s Outgrower
Scheme. As a result of this, the system in place is not that of abusa but rather the abunu. Therefore,
tenants will have to pay a tribute of half of the total earnings from their farm to their landlords. This
is a peculiar situation, which raises the question of why would private farmers follow an abunu sys-
tem whereas, farmers under the company contract would not? According to Amanor and Diderutuah
(2001), the abunu system is the most widely used sharecropping arrangement in the region. More-
over, the authors argue that GOPDC’ Outgrower Scheme is a variant of the abunu system since it is
not like traditional abusa: it is not the owner who gives the inputs to the tenant but the Company
(Amanor and Diderutuah, 2001). Traditional abunu system implies a lack of inputs given by the
landlord. However, because GOPDC provides the inputs to both landlords and tenants, the contract
system is still called abusa. Throughout my fieldwork, I did not come across many private farmers
with the exception of three individuals, who were all members of the elders council of Afoase
Panin. In all likeliness, the category might be dominated by the most influential individuals of the
community. For instance, if a farmer is descending from a wealthy lineage with many landholdings,
it is likely he will arrange sharecropping agreements with tenants in order to take full advantage of
the maximum potential of his land plots (abunu system). On the other hand, an individual who does
not possess enough land plots, it is more likely to join the outgrower scheme and, in so doing, un-
dertaking an abusa land tenure arrangement.
!36

V. Research Questions and Hypotheses
In the following section I will further discuss the thesis research questions, the relative hy-
potheses and the rationale behind them. The work of Robert Badouin (1985) Le Développement
Agricole en Afrique Tropicale (Badouin, 1985) clearly illustrates how the rise of a global economy
shaped African agriculture and its practices. Badouin’s work helps our analysis with core concepts
which compose the context of African agriculture today and have been fundamental for my re-
search.
“ - la plasticité des systèmes de culture a été considérable; c’est surtout par l’adjonction de nou-
velles cultures à celles comprises dans le système antérieur que s’est réalisé l’accroissement du
volume de la production des produits agricoles.” (Badouin, 1985, p.99)
The systems of crops proper to subsistence agriculture began to accommodate cash crops
which are heavily demanded in today's global market. The author, remarks that traditional subsis-
tence systems are generally characterised by a dominant crop and complemented with secondary
ones (Badouin, 1985). However, since the 1960's, traditional crop systems have significantly
changed in order to accommodate cash-crops, mostly in terms of the land used to cultivate them.
This is also due to the general disinterest of western countries in respect to the most popular tradi-
tional African produce (e.g. cassava, plantain, millet, yam etc.) with the exception of a few other
crops (e.g. cocoa, coffee, peanuts, oil palm) which are, on the contrary, heavily demanded (Badouin,
1985). The introduction of cash-crops provided the farmers with a better access to the financial
economy, formerly only possible through the sales of excess subsistence crops which may also be
profitable, although generally not as much as export crops. The introduction of cash-crops also rep-
resented an opportunity for the emergence of western oriented agribusinesses. As a result of the in-
tensification of agriculture for cash-crops, production systems changed from an extensive produc-
tion, typical of subsistence agriculture (i.e. a lot of land, few investments in labour and inputs), to a
more intensive one (i.e. smaller space, bigger investments in labour and inputs), typical of a capital-
ist system (Badouin, 1985). The author argues that agricultural intensification occurs in many dif-
ferent forms, though all sharing the same principal objective: to improve the agricultural perfor-
mance, while at the same time, using the land most efficiently (Badouin, 1985). Thus, the basic aim
was often to increase the yield of the crop to the most optimal level while lowering the productivity
!37

of labour and minimising the amount of land plots cultivated. Consequentially, systems of labour
changed as well. In order to illustrate the complex world of African agricultural systems of labour,
Robert Badouin (1985) proposes three major general themes: the evolution of African systems of
labour, the implementation of new systems of labour and, the attempt of combining different sys-
tems. However given the vast range of systems of labour present in the continent and their intricacy,
this section will only consider the topics relevant to plantation agriculture. The author remarks how
changes occurring at the crop system level will inevitably affect the labour force and inputs required
for the new crop (Badouin, 1985). Considering that most of agricultural practices were solely cen-
tred around the production of subsistence crops, Badouin (1985) claims that generally, labour force
was composed by the family unit and, consequentially, following lineage links. Although this labour
system used to be a characteristic of subsistence agriculture, today the concept of lineage and its
importance is still very well embedded into the culture of African communities as it still plays a
fundamental role in agricultural practices, for instance, in the assignment of land plots and work
activities.
According to Badouin (1985), the majority of systems of labour present in subsistence agri-
culture are based on family lineage: elders and family heads are the ones in charge of the organisa-
tional tasks (i.e. what plots to cultivate and to who they may be assigned to; the choice of crops
etc.), whereas, the younger generations, would be in charge of the practical tasks (i.e. farming,
maintenance of crops, labour etc.). Catherine Boone (2014) concept of neo-customary land tenure
regime, and all the implications derived by this model, is also characterised by strong figures of au-
thority represented by the local allodial titles (i.e. chiefs) and wealthier indigenous lineages. The
regime, in facts, stresses the importance of family affinity and the traditional inheritance modalities,
favouring chiefs and autochthon individuals whose family had been granted with landholdings.
However, this tenure regime, may easily marginalise poorer native families, migrants or settlers
who could only be tenants. Furthermore, Badouin (1985) analyses the impact that plantation agri-
culture brought to the previous systems of labour occurring in subsistence agriculture. According to
the author, plantation agricultures characterised by the increasing opportunities represented by tree
crops (e.g. cocoa, oil palm, hevea, coffee etc.) offered farmers an alternative source of income be-
side subsistence agriculture (Badouin, 1985). Badouin (1985) argues that this type of agriculture
resulted into a series of changes into the previously ordinary systems of production and labour.
Hence, plantations required an abundance of land to cultivate the crops, resulting into a higher ne-
cessity of labour force. A clear example of the relation between the rise of plantation agriculture and
!38

the new demand for a larger working population may be represented by the boom of immigrant
wage workers occurring in many west african countries with the rise of cocoa plantation during the
first half of the XX century (Gosselin, 1970; Amanor and Diderutuah, 2001; Amanor, 1998;
Léonard, 1997; Chauveau and Léonard, 1996; Skinner, 1965). In terms of systems of labour,
Badouin (1985) argues that often plantations farmers employed family labour to undertake the re-
quired agricultural tasks. In certain cases, this has influenced the social norms on marriage, result-
ing into the wide spreading of polygamy as a strategy to increase the number of close relatives, thus
allowing the farmer to have a greater labour force (Badouin 1985). However, in other cases, like in
Ghana for example, farmers heavily relied on migrants as the main force labour to hire for wages.
This was due to the fact that migrant labour was simply cheaper than the local (Amanor, 2006).
“Large farmers and elders could also accumulate large areas of land for their own personal in-
vestment, hire migrant labour to work these lands, or place them under migrant sharecropping ten-
ants. Local youth began to experience land shortage and responded by opposing chiefs, or by de-
veloping anti-migrant sentiments.” (Amanor, 2006, p. 5)
Ultimately this particular situation resulted into conflicts between the local youth and the
migrant workers, the latter being accused of stealing the available jobs from the former (Amanor,
2006; Amanor and Diderutuah, 2001, see above). According to Adomako-Sarfoh (1974), since the
passing of the Aliens Compliance Act, the labour force in the agricultural sector has been assigned
to the local indigenous youth who have emerged as the main sharecroppers. Due to tensions be-
tween generations, Amanor (1999) and Gyasi (1994) argue that often young farmers would rather
prefer to enter sharecropping contracts than work on family land. Therefore as a result of the com-
bination between scarcity of uncleared land, labour force and the neo-customary land tenure regime
which advantage the more powerful members of the community it could be extremely difficult for
farmers to access land to cultivate. The contract offered by GOPDC establishes a secure (i.e. legal
contract in paper forms and documented) way to obtain access to land for the duration of the oil
palm farm, roughly twenty-five years. This is most likely one of the most attractive aspects of the
outgrower scheme, especially in the context of the Eastern Region, where landholdings are small-
sized, numerous and scattered, uncleared land is scarce and, finally where chiefs and wealthier fam-
ily heads are advantaged by their allodial titles determining land distribution.
Moreover, Robert Badouin (1985) remarks how different types of agricultural organisations
started to become more prominent after World War II, including various forms of enterprises and
!39

organisations focused the development of agriculture for economic values. Among these, Badouin
(1985) emphasises the huge impact that agro-industrial complexes have had on the systems of
labour present in the region. In facts, these generally hire thousands of people from various sectors
resulting into a great potential for the local economy. Eaton and Shepherd (2001) briefly observe
that the cause of the diversion of produce by farmers who sell to other parties is to be attributed
solely to the local market. It is undeniable that the local market is most likely one of the greatest
factors in play. Nevertheless, this is merely a brief shortcut to dismiss the phenomenon at hand. The
authors do not explore enough the possibility of other factors which may influence the choice of a
farmer to opt for a strategy of opportunism. Why should outgrowers enter the contract and cheat the
arrangement they agreed upon? This thematic is not very well studied in the literature, which is
what pushed me to investigate it (see below).
K. S. Amanor remarks how sharecropping is the most common land tenure arrangement
present in the region. The dynamics between crop systems, production systems and systems of
labour are fundamental to this issue. The current land tenure situation in Ghana has been deter-
mined by the interactions of these agricultural systems in relation to the introduction, intensification
and demand of the global market for export cash-crops. This is clearly illustrated by the historical
account provided by Amanor and Diderutuah (2001) who remark how in the Eastern Region, the
introduction of plantation like ventures for cash-crops (i.e. a change in the crop system and in the
production system) cultivation attracted a great number of migrants. As migrant labour was cheaper,
landlords would rather hire strangers than produce directly on their farm with the help of family
members (i.e. a change in the system of labour). The spread of migrant labourers also reinforced the
concept of sharecropping arrangements. Landlords, without enough capital to cultivate their land,
would allow a migrant with capital to invest in a plantation. Hence, the landlord would still retain
some share of the profits according to the sharecropping arrangement under which the tenant's plot
was agreed upon. As a result, sharecropping arrangements have been widely spreading even within
kin. The abusa system (i.e. a division into thirds of the harvest or of its renumeration) has been
adopted for oil palm plantations under the GOPDC’s outgrower scheme. An important distinction
has to be done between:
- the landhold outgrower, who holds the land and cultivate it himself, thus not having to pay tribute
to a landlord;
!40

- the landlord outgrower who holds a tract of land assigned to an abusa tenant in return for a tribute
equal to a third of the tenant’s revenue;
- the abusa tenant who has access to a farming plot against a tribute to the landlord.
The landhold outgrower is in the most advantageous position as he or she will earn the full
renumeration from his or her investment, but he needs to have access to labour (i.e. his or her fami-
ly members, or wage labourers: harvesters, carriers and weeders). On the other hand, a tenant out-
grower will have to present a third of his or her fruits or earnings to the landlord, remaining with
two thirds of the share. However, as observed by Amanor and Diderutuah (2001) in the tenant abusa
system, the landlord does not provide any inputs into the establishment of the farm. On the other
hand, the company provides substantial inputs, which help the tenants to face his costs of produc-
tion. In addition to plantation related expenses, farmers also have to pay for personal and familial
upkeep, namely children school fees and house rent. Though this applies to all farmers, the abusa
tenants will be the most affected, especially those who do not have family landholdings. It is then
possible to imagine that some farmers who are cash strapped may divert their produce in order to
get money as quickly as possible. .
!41

MA DISSERTATION - Study of the Relationships Between Farmers and the Ghanaian Oil Palm Development Company (GOPDC) in the Eastern Region

MA DISSERTATION - Study of the Relationships Between Farmers and the Ghanaian Oil Palm Development Company (GOPDC) in the Eastern Region

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