1. Court of Appeal of Louisiana,SecondCircuit.
STATE of Louisiana,Appelleev.JermainePeayre CARTER,Appellant.
Nos.46,710–KA, 46,711–KA.
Decided:November2,2011
Before BROWN,WILLIAMSand GASKINS,JJ.Before BROWN,WILLIAMS,STEWART,GASKINSandLOLLEY,
JJ.JamesE. Beal,Jonesboro,LA,forAppellant.Jermaine Peayre Carter,prose.J.SchuylerMarvin,
DistrictAttorney,JohnM.Lawrence,EdwardC. Jacobs,AssistantDistrictAttorneys,forAppellee.
The defendant,Jermaine Peayre Carter,waschargedbybill of informationwithdistributionof a
Schedule Icontrolleddangeroussubstance (“CDS”),i.e.,marijuana,aviolationof LSA–R.S.40:966(A),
and aggravatedflightfromanofficer,aviolationof LSA–R.S.14:108.1.1
Followingajurytrial,he was
foundguiltyof distributionof aSchedule ICDSand flightfroman officer,alesserincludedoffense tothe
charge of aggravatedflightfromanofficer.He was sentencedtoserve 28yearsat hard laborfor the
distributionof marijuanaconvictionand6monthsfor the flightfromanofficerconviction.The
sentenceswere orderedtobe servedconsecutively.Forthe followingreasons,we affirmthe
defendant'sconvictionsandsentences.
FACTS
On February5, 2009, OfficerGene Hillenof the BentonPoliceDepartmentconductedatrafficstopin
Benton,Louisiana.The femaledriverappearedfrightenedwhenthe officerobservedtracesof marijuana
inher vehicle.Topreventbeingarrested,the womaninformedthe officerthatshe “couldgetdope from
Shreveport.”Shortlythereafter,the BentonPolice Departmentarrangedacontrolleddrugbuy,using
the womanas a confidential informant.The drugtransactionwasscheduledtotake place at a Dixie
Mart conveniencestore inBenton.
OfficerHillentestifiedasfollows:he accompaniedthe informantasshe made a telephone call toan
unknownindividual;he listenedasthe informantarrangedtopurchase marijuanatobe deliveredtothe
north side of the Dixie Martparkinglot;after the conversationbetweenthe informantandthe other
party,OfficerHillenparkedhispolice vehicleacrossthe streetfromthe store to awaitthe completionof
the drug buy;usingbinoculars,OfficerHillenobservedasilversportsutilityvehicle turnintothe parking
lotof the store;two individualswere inthe vehicle;the defendant,Jermaine Peayre Carter,waslater
identifiedasthe passengerof the vehicle;QuionSmithwasidentifiedasthe driver;the informant
approachedthe driver'sside of the vehicle,talkedtoSmithforseveral secondsandgave Smithmoney;
Smithgave the informant“something”inreturn;the informantthenexecutedaprearrangedsignal to
indicate tothe officerthatshe had purchasedthe drugs.
Afterthe drug transactionwascompleted,the defendantexitedthe vehicle andenteredthe store.
Whenthe defendantleftthe store,OfficerHillen,whowasdressedintactical police clothing marked
“POLICE,”approachedthe defendant,identifiedhimself as“police”andinstructedthe defendantto
“Stop,don't move.”The defendantlookedatthe officerandthenlookedatthe vehicle.The defendant
thenran to the vehicle andjumpedinside,asOfficerHillencontinuedtoyell,“Stop.”Bythistime,the
officerhadhisweapondrawnandpointedatthe defendant.Smithdrove awayanda high-speedchase
ensued.The vehicletraveledtowardBossierCityatapproximately115 mph.OfficerHillenandother

2. police officerspursuedthe vehicleinmarkedpolice carswithlightsandsirensactivated.Atleast20
markedpolice vehicleswereinvolvedinthe pursuit,all withactivatedlightsandsirens.
BentonPolice Chief CharlesL.Pilkintontestifiedasfollows:he participated“asabackup” inthe
controlleddrugbuy;he observedOfficerHillenattempttostopthe defendant;he alsoobservedOfficer
Hillendrawhisweapon.ChiefPilkintonwasthe leadmarkedpolice carinthe pursuit.He observedas
Smithpulledoutof the parkinglotinfront of trafficand ran multiple redlightsduringthe chase.He
pursuedthe vehicle withhislightsandsirensactivated,drivingapproximately111–123 mph.He
observedthe defendantthrowaplastic-coveredpackage outof the passengerwindow;the package hit
the windshieldof Chief Pilkinton'spolice carand splattered,leavingasubstance onthe windshield;the
remainderof the substance went“all over”the highway.The chase concludedwhenSmithturnedona
dead-endstreetinCaddoParish.Smithexitedthe vehicle andfledonfoot.2
The defendantwasfound
sittinginthe frontpassengerseatof the vehicle.The substance thatwasthrownoutof the windowwas
recoveredandtestedpositive formarijuana.
The defendantwasarrestedandchargedby bill of informationwithdistributionof aSchedule ICDS
(marijuana),inviolationof LSA–R.S.40:966(A),and aggravatedflightfromanofficer, inviolationof LSA–
R.S.14:108.1. The defendantwaivedhisrighttocounsel.The trial courtgrantedthe defendant'smotion
to representhimself,afterwarninghimof the dangersof self-representation.3
Followingajurytrial,the
defendantwasfoundguiltyof distributionof aSchedule ICDSand flightfromanofficer.He was
sentencedtoserve 28 yearsat hard laboron the drug convictionand6 monthsonthe flightfroman
officerconviction,tobe servedconsecutively.The defendant'smotionstoreconsidersentence and“to
correct and vacate an illegal sentence”were denied.
The defendantappeals.
DISCUSSION
The defendantcontendsthe evidence wasinsufficientto supporthisconvictionforflightfromanofficer.
He arguesthat since the state stipulatedthathe wasnotthe driverof the vehicle involvedinthe high
speedchase,he shouldnothave beenconvictedof thatoffense.
A claimregardingsufficiencyof evidence isproperlyraisedbyamotionforpost verdictjudgmentof
acquittal.However,if the defendantfailstomake suchmotion,the issue will be reviewedonappeal
whenraisedbya formal assignmentof error.LSA–C.Cr.P.art.821 and art. 920; State v. Howard,31,807
(La.App.2dCir.8/18/99),746 So.2d 49, writdenied,1999–2960 (La.5/5/00), 760 So.2d 1190. In reviewing
the sufficiencyof the evidencetosupporta conviction,the reviewingcourtmustdeterminewhether,
afterreviewingthe evidence inalightmostfavorable tothe prosecution,anyrational trierof factcould
have foundthe essential elementsof the crime orcrimeschargedwere provedbeyondareasonable
doubt.Jacksonv. Virginia,443U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct.2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v.Tate,
2001–1658 (La.5/20/03), 851 So.2d 921, cert. denied,541U.S. 905, 124 S.Ct.1604, 158 L.Ed.2d 248
(2004); State v. Carter,42,894 (La.App.2dCir.1/9/08), 974 So.2d 181, writdenied,2008–0499
(La.11/14/08), 996 So.2d 1086.
The appellate courtdoesnotassessthe credibilityof witnessesorreweighevidence.State v.Smith,94–
3116 (La.10/16/95), 661 So.2d 442. A reviewingcourtaccordsgreatdeference toajury's decisionto
accept or rejectthe testimonyof awitnessinwhole orinpart.State v. Eason,43,788 (La.App.2d

3. Cir.2/25/09), 3 So.3d685; State v. Hill,42,025 (La.App.2dCir.5/9/07),956 So.2d758, writdenied,2007–
1209 (La.12/14/07), 970 So.2d 529.
The defendantwasconvictedof flightfromanofficerunderLSA–R.S.14:108.1. Thisstatute provides,in
pertinentpart:
A. Nodriverof a motor vehicle ․ shall intentionallyrefuse tobringavehicle ․ toa stop knowingthathe
has beengivenavisual andaudible signal tostopbya police officerwhenthe officerhasreasonable
groundsto believethatthe driverhascommittedanoffense.The signal shall be givenbyanemergency
lightanda sirenona vehicle markedasa police vehicle[.]
3
All personsconcernedinthe commissionof acrime,whetherpresentorabsent,andwhether they
directlycommitthe act constitutingthe offense,aidandabetinitscommission,ordirectlyorindirectly
counsel orprocure anotherto committhe crime,are principals.LSA–R.S.14:24. A principal isliable to
the same extentasthe personwhodirectlycommitsthe crime ormay be convictedof a lowerdegree of
the crime.State v. Youngblood,45,576 (La.App.2dCir.9/29/10), 48 So.3d 1122; State v. White,42,725
(La.App.2dCir.10/24/07), 968 So.2d 901. See also,State v. Wright,2001–0322 (La.12/4/02), 834 So.2d
974, cert. denied,540 U.S.833, 124 S.Ct. 82, 157 L.Ed.2d 62 (2003).
In State v. Hines,465 So.2d 958 (La.App.2dCir.),writdenied467 So.2d 536 (La.1985), a Wildlife and
Fisheriesagent,alongwithtwosheriffs'deputies,attemptedtomake asafetycheckof a boat bypulling
behindthe boatand activatingablue signal light.The boatspedawayat a highrate of speed.Duringthe
chase,the officersobservedthe defendant,whowasapassengerinthe boat,throw several garbage
bags containingillegal game fish,fromthe boat.The defendant'sconvictionsincludedresistinganofficer
by flight.ThisCourtaffirmedthe conviction,stating:
[The officers'] actions,coupledwithdefendant'sreactiontotheirpresence,clearlyestablishdefendant's
knowledge thatthe agentwaspursuinghiminhisofficial capacityandintendedtoarresthim.Inthe
instantcase,[the officers] appropriatelyconveyedtheirintentiontodetaindefendantsbyturningto
pursue theminthe clearlymarkedWildlife andFisheriesboatwithitsblue lightflashing.The factthat
defendant'sflightdidnotbeginuntil OfficerMorristurnedonhisblue signal light,factuallysupportsour
conclusionthatthe defendantwasaware thathe was beingpursuedbyalaw enforcementofficial
attemptingtomake an arrestor detention.Althoughthe defendantwasnotthe driverof the boat, his
actionsinattemptingtodispose of evidence bythrowingthe bagsof fishoverboard,tendstoshowthat
the defendantwasanactive participantin the flightfromthe officers.Thus,hisactionsaidedand
abettedthe driverinfleeingfromthe officers,makinghimaprincipal underthe termsof La.R.S.14:24.
Id.at 962 (internal citationsomitted).
In the instantcase,the state'sevidence showsthatOfficerHillenconveyedhisintentiontodetainthe
defendantbyorderingthe defendanttostopand pointinghisweaponatthe defendant.The
defendant'sactionsof lookingfromthe officertothe vehicle showsthathe wasaware that the officer
was attemptingtodetainhim.The flightbeganwhenthe defendantrefusedtosurrender,jumpedinto
the vehicle andfledthe scene withhisaccomplice.The vehicle waspursuedbyapproximately20
markedpolice vehicles,all withlightsandsirensactivated.Althoughthe defendantwasnotthe driverof
the vehicle,hisactions—jumpingintothe vehicle andthrowingthe marijuanaoutof the window of the

4. speedingvehicle—supportsthe jury'sconclusionthathe wasan active participantinfleeingfromthe
officers.The defendantclearlyaidedandabettedSmithintheirattemptedescape,therebymakingthe
defendantaprincipal tothe crime.Consequently,we concludethatthe state presentedamplefactual
evidence tosupportanyrational jury'sfindingthatthe defendant knowinglyparticipatedinthe
commissionof the crime of flightfromanofficerbeyondareasonable doubt.Thisassignmentlacks
merit.
The defendantalsocontendshisrighttoa fairtrial was violatedbythe trial court'sfailure toissue a
subpoenato the confidentialinformantinvolvedinthe drugtransaction.He arguesthat he made
repeatedrequestsforthe subpoenatobe issued,buttono avail.
A reviewof the recordshowsthatthe defendantmade fourseparate requestsforasubpoenatobe
issuedtothe informant.Ina requestdatedJanuary25, 2010, the defendantidentifiedthe personas
“The Police SIDrugDeal Girl,” butprovidednofurtheridentifyingname oraddressforthe person.On
April 14, 2010, the defendantsubmittedasecondsubpoenarequestfor“The DrugBuy Female whothe
Drugs where [sic] soldtoo[sic]!”Intwootherrequests,July14 andAugust24, 2010, the defendant
identifiedthe informantas“The Drug BuyFemale SI‘Donna’whothe Drugs Where [sic] soldtoo[sic]!”
The defendant contendsexceptionalcircumstancesexistedbecause the “identityandappearance of the
undercoverconfidential informantwere crucial tothe defense of the case.”He arguesthat the
informantcouldhave corroboratedSmith'stestimonythatthe defendanthad noknowledgethata drug
transactionwasgoingto take place anddidnot participate inthe transaction.
The record showsthat the defendantdidnotfile anypretrial motionstoobtainthe disclosure of the
informant'sidentity.4
Nevertheless,the trial courtissuedthe subpoenasasrequestedbythe defendant.
Thus,the defendant'sargumentthatthe trial court failedtoissue the subpoenasiswithoutmerit,
particularlyinlightof the fact thatthe defendantneverrequesteddisclosure of the confidential
informant'sidentity.
CONCLUSION
For the reasonssetforthherein,we affirmthe defendant'sconvictionsandsentences.
CONVICTIONSAFFIRMED;SENTENCESAFFIRMED.
APPLICATION FORREHEARING
Rehearingdenied.
FOOTNOTES
1. The defendantwasalsochargedwithcriminal damage topropertyvaluedat$500 or more,butless
than $50,000. However,thatcharge was notpresentedattrial and isnot at issue inthisappeal.
2. Smithwasapprehendedshortlythereafter.
3. The trial court appointedanattorneyto assistthe defendantduringpretrial motionsandduringthe
trial.
4. Asstatedabove,priorto grantingthe defendant'srequesttorepresenthimself,the trial court
warnedthe defendantof the perilsof self-representationandinformedhimthathe wouldbe required

5. to followthe same standardsas an attorney.The trial court alsoappointedanattorneytoassistthe
defendantinfilingpretrialmotionsandduringthe trial.
WILLIAMS, J.
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