1. Project Number: 39467
Loan Number: 2257 (SF)
Grant Numbers: 0054 and 0135
JFPR Number: 9097
September 2013
Afghanistan: North–South Corridor Project
Completion Report

2.
CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
Currency Unit – afghani (AF)
ABBREVIATIONS
ADB – Asian Development Bank
EIRR – economic internal rate of return
EMP – environmental management plan
IEE – initial environmental examination
JFPR – Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction
LARP – land acquisition and resettlement plan
MOF – Ministry of Finance
MOPH – Ministry of Public Health
MPW – Ministry of Public Works
NGO – nongovernment organization
NPV – net present value
O&M – operation and maintenance
PCR – project completion review
PMO – program management office
TA – technical assistance
UNICEF – United Nations Children’s Fund
VOC – vehicle operating cost
WEIGHTS AND MEASURES
km – kilometer
km2
– square kilometer
NOTES
(i) The fiscal year (FY) of the Government of Afghanistan ends on 20 December.
“FY” before a calendar year denotes the year in which the fiscal year ends,
e.g., FY2012 ended on 20 December 2012. Before FY2012, the fiscal year
ended on 20 March.
(ii) In this report, “$” refers to US dollars.
At Appraisal At Project Completion
(1 September 2006) (30 April 2013)
AF1.00 = $0.02017 $0.0182
$1.00 = AF49.578 AF54.870

3.
Vice-President X. Zhao, Operations 1
Director General K. Gerhaeusser, Central and West Asia Department (CWRD)
Director X. Yang, Transport and Communications Division, CWRD
Team leaders F. Fierst, Transport Specialist, CWRD
S. Khan, Lead Portfolio Management Specialist, CWRD
Team members N. Sahibzada, Associate Project Analyst, CWRD
A. Ignacio, Operations Officer, CWRD
A. Silverio, Senior Operations Assistant, CWRD
M. Thiruchelvam, Transport Specialist, CWRD
In preparing any country program or strategy, financing any project, or by making any
designation of or reference to a particular territory or geographic area in this document, the
Asian Development Bank does not intend to make any judgments as to the legal or other status
of any territory or area.

4.
CONTENTS
Page
BASIC DATA I
MAP V
I. PROJECT DESCRIPTION 1
II. EVALUATION OF DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 2
A. Relevance of Design and Formulation 2
B. Project Output 3
C. Project Cost 5
D. Disbursements 5
E. Project Schedule 6
F. Implementation Arrangements 7
G. Conditions and Covenants 7
H. Consultant Recruitment and Procurement 8
I. Performance of Consultants and Contractors 8
J. Performance of the Borrower and the Executing Agency 9
K. Performance of the Asian Development Bank 10
III. EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE 10
A. Relevance 10
B. Effectiveness in Achieving Outcome 11
C. Efficiency in Achieving Outcome and Output 11
D. Preliminary Assessment of Sustainability 12
E. Impact 12
IV. OVERALL ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 13
A. Overall Assessment 13
B. Lessons 14
C. Recommendations 15
APPENDIXES
1. Project Framework (Appraisal versus Actual) 16
2. Achievements against the Results Framework 18
3. Chronology of Major Events 19
4. Contract Awards and Disbursements Funded by the Asian Development Bank 21
5. Project Implementation Schedule 27
6. Status of Compliance with Loan and Grant Covenants 28
7. Status of Utilization of Consulting Input 36
8. Economic Analysis 37
9. Risk Mitigation 42
10. Disbursements by Loan and Grants 44

5.
BASIC DATA
A. Loan and Grants Identification
1. Country
2. Loan and Grants Numbers
3. Project Title
4. Borrower
5. Executing Agencies
6. Amount in Financing Agreement
Loan 2257
Grant 0054
Grant 9097
Grant 0135
7. Project Completion Report Number
Afghanistan
Loan 2257 (SF), Grant 0054, Grant 9097, and
Grant 0135
North–South Corridor Project
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
Ministry of Public Works, Ministry of Finance, and
Ministry of Public Health
SDR52,567,000 ($78,200,000)
$40,000,000
$20,000,000
$60,000,000 (supplementary)a
1409
a
A total amount of $60 million was approved under Grant 0135-AFG. Of this total, $41.772 million was allocated for
the project, and the remaining $18.228 million for the Andkhoy–Qaisar Road Project under Loan 2140-AFG (SF).
B. Loan and Grants Data
Item Loan 2257 Grant 0054 Grant 0135
1. Appraisala
(not required) (not required) (not required)
2. Loan and grants negotiations
-Date started 25 Aug 2006 25 Aug 2006 3 Nov 2008
-Date completed 25 Aug 2006 25 Aug 2006 3 Nov 2008
3. Date of board approval 26 Sep 2006 26 Sep 2006 2 Dec 2008
4. Date of financing agreement 2 Nov 2006 2 Nov 2006 1 Feb 2009
5. Date of effectiveness of financing
agreement
-In Financing Agreements 90 days after
date of
agreement
(31 Jan 2007)
90 days after
date of
agreement
(31 Jan 2007)
30 days after
date of
agreement
(2 Mar 2009)
-Actual 11 Jan 2007 11 Jan 2007 4 May 2009
-Number of extensions 0 0 0
6. Closing dateb
-In loan or grant 30 Jun 2017 30 Jun 2011 30 Jun 2012
-Actual Not yet closed 19 August 2013 Not yet closedc
-Number of extensionsd
0 2 2
7. Terms of loan
-Interest rate 1% … …
-Maturity (number of years) 40 years … …
-Grace period (number of years 10 years … …
8. Terms of relending (if any) … … …
… = not applicable.
a
In view of a comprehensive fact-finding mission from 30 April to 10 May 2006, no appraisal mission was required.
b
The capitalization of interest charge during the loan grace period, which is part of loan disbursement, is ongoing
and will end by 30 June 2017, the loan closing date.
c
The physical completion date under Grants 0054 and 0135 was extended twice until 30 June 2013. Actual
physical completion of the project including also the works under Loan 2257 was on 30 April 2013.
d
Final withdrawal application was processed on 4 September 2013 and the grant account closing is planned
within September 2013.

6. ii
9. Disbursements
a. Dates
Component
Road
Initial Disbursement
18 Dec 2007
Final Disbursement a
September 2013 b
Time Interval
69 months
Project management 20 Nov 2007 23 May 2013 66 months
Loan 2257
Grant 0054
Grant 9097
Grant 0135
Effective Date
11 Jan 2007
11 Jan 2007
17 Dec 2006
4 May 2009
Original Closing Date
30 Jun 2017 c
30 Jun 2011
31 Dec 2010
30 Jun 2012
Time Interval
126 months
53.5 months
48.5 months
38 months
a
As of 2 September 2013.
b
The final withdrawal application of about $1.228 million from Loan 2257, was under process as of 6 September 2013.
c
The capitalization of interest charges during the loan grace period, which is part of loan disbursement, is ongoing and
will end by 30 June 2017, the loan closing date.
b. Amount ($ equivalent)
Category
Original
Allocation
Last
Revised
Allocation
Increased/
(Decreased)
a
Net Amount
Available
Amount
Disbursedb
Undisbursed
Balance
Civil works 100,700,000 159,891,367 59,191,367 159,891,367 155,022,918 4,868,449
Cross-border facilities 4,000,000 2,961,226 1,038,774 2,961,226 2,961,226 0
Project management
and monitoring 5,400,000 7,595,453 2,195,453 7,595,453 6,247,629 1,347,824
Incremental project
management support 1,200,000 2,700,000 1,500,000 2,700,000 2,569,142 130,858
Land acquisition 1,000,000 0 0 0 1,900,000 0
Resettlement 1,000,000 3,860,000 2,860,000 3,860,000 2,504,931 1,355,069
HIV/AIDS and anti–
human trafficking public
campaign 1,500,000 820,000 (680,000) 820,000 471,467 348,533
Interest charge 4,800,000 4,940,225 140,225 4,940,225 2,366,443 2,573,782
Unallocated 19,600,000 0 (19,600,000) 0 0 0
Taxes and duties 1,700,000 0 0 0 1,090,000 0
Total 140,900,000 182,768,271 44,568,271 182,768,271 175,133,756 10,624,515
( ) = negative.
Notes:
(i) The breakdown of disbursements for each loan or grant is in Appendix 10.
(ii) The final withdrawal application of about $1.228 million had been submitted for processing. There is enough undisbursed
balance to cover this amount.
a
Supplementary financing had to be provided for the project because of a change in scope and price escalations.
b
As of 2 September 2013.
10. Local Costs (Financed): not applicable
- Amount ($) 0
- Percentage of Local Costs 0%
- Percentage of Total Cost 0%

7. iii
C. Project Data
1. Project Cost ($ million)
Cost Appraisal Estimate Actuala
ADB loan (Loan 2257)
ADB grant (Grant 0054)
JFPR grant (Grant 9097)
ADB grant (Grant 0135)
Government (Land acquisition)
Government (Taxes and duties)
78.20
40.00
20.00
0.00
1.00
1.70
76.41
37.67
20.00
38.06
1.90
1.09
Total 140.90 175.13
ADB = Asian Development Bank, JFPR = Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction.
a
As of 2 September 2013.
2. Financing Plan ($ million)
Cost Appraisal Estimate Actuala
Implementation costs
Borrower-financed 2.70 2.99
ADB-financed 113.40 149.77
JFPR 20.00 20.00
Total 136.10 172.76
Interest during grace period
Borrower-financed 0.00 0.00
ADB-financed 4.80 2.37
Total 140.90 175.13
ADB = Asian Development Bank, JFPR = Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction.
a
As of 2 September 2013.
3. Cost Breakdown, by Project Component ($ million)
Component
Appraisal
Estimate Actuala
Civil works 100.70 155.02
Land acquisition 1.00 1.90
Resettlement 1.00 2.50
Cross-border facilities 4.00 2.96
Project management and monitoring 5.40 6.25
Incremental project management support 1.20 2.57
HIV/AIDS and anti–human trafficking public campaign 1.50 0.47
Interest during grace period 4.80 2.37
Unallocated 19.60 0.00
Taxes and duties 1.70 1.09
Total 140.90 175.13
Note: Figures may not add up to the totals given because of rounding.
a
As of 2 September 2013.

8. iv
4. Project Schedule
Item Appraisal Estimate Actual
Date of contract with consultant
Completion of engineering designs
Civil works contract
Q1 2007
Q2 2007
Q1 2008–Q2 2008
Q2 2008
Date of award
Contract 1 Q2 2007 Q3 2007–Q4 2007
Contract 2 Q1 2007 Q3 2007–Q4 2007
Contract 3 Q1 2007 Q3 2007–Q4 2007
Completion of work
Contract 1 Q2 2010 Q3 2011–Q4 2011
Contract 2 Q2 2010 Q1 2013–Q2 2013
Contract 3 Q4 2010 Q1 2012–Q2 2012
Cross-border facility Q2 2007 Q1 2011
HIV/AIDS and anti–human trafficking public campaign Q2 2007 Q1 2011
a
On 1 January 2011, the eOperations system replaced the PPR system.
D. Data on Asian Development Bank Missions
Name of Mission Date
No. of
Persons
No. of
Person-
Days
Specialization of
Membersa
Loan reconnaissance 23 Feb–2 Mar 2006 3 24 a, b, c
Fact finding 30 Apr–10 May 2006 7 77 a, c, d, e, f, g, h
Loan inception 15–20 May 2007 3 18 i, c, j
Review 1 4–9 Nov 2007 2 12 i, k
Review 2 22–29 Apr 2008 3 24 l, i, m
Review 3 21–25 Oct 2008 2 10 m, n
Review 4 10–18 Mar 2009 3 27 e, n, o
LAR 11–18 Jun 2009 2 16 p, e
Review 5 20–28 Jun 2009 7 56 o, c, f, k, n, q
Review 6 1–4 Mar 2010 2 8 r, l, s
Midterm review 9–17 Jun 2010 7 63 e, h, n, q, r, s
Review 7 13–21 Oct 2010 5 40 e, c, h, n, t
Review 8 20 Nov–1 Dec 2011 5 60 l, e, e, j, u
Project consultation 6–17 Feb 2012 2 24 i, e
Review 9 28 Feb–1 Mar 2012 3 9 e, h, s
Review 10 19 May–21 May 2012 3 3 e, s, v
Project completion review 29 Apr–11 May 2013 4 54 e, e, q, s
a
a = principal financial specialist; b = senior project implementation specialist (Afghanistan Resident Mission
[AFRM]); c = project implementation officer (AFRM); d = senior environmental specialist; e = transport specialist;
f = social development specialist; g = counsel; h = project/administration assistant (AFRM); i = principal transport
specialist; j = operations officer; k = deputy country director (AFRM); l = senior transport specialist; m = country
director (AFRM); n = portfolio management specialist; o = project officer; p = senior social development specialist;
q = consultant; r = PAU head; s = assistant project analyst (AFRM); t = assistant project analyst; u = project officer
(AFRM), v = security coordinator (AFRM).
Note: in each mission team, the member mentioned first was also the team leader.
5. Project Performance Report Ratings
Implementation Period
Rating
Development
Objectives
Implementation
Progress
1 January 2007–31 December 2010 Satisfactory Satisfactory
1 January 2011–30 April 2013 On tracka

10.
I. PROJECT DESCRIPTION
1. On 26 September 2006, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) approved a loan of
SDR52,567,000 ($78,200,000) and a grant of $40.0 million from ADB’s Special Funds
resources to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan for the North–South Corridor Project.1
The
Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction (JFPR) provided an additional grant of $20 million to fund
civil works for the project. In 2008, ADB approved supplementary financing2
of $60.0 million.3
2. Afghanistan is landlocked and largely mountainous, and road transport is the principal
means of travel. But the road network, first built in the 1960s and 1970s, deteriorated as a result
of poor maintenance, and in 2001 only 10% of the roads were in good condition. Since 2001,
international financial institutions have provided over $3 billion for the repair and expansion of
the road network. At a density of 4 kilometers (km) per 1,000 square kilometers (km2
) of land
and with only 7% of the roads paved, however, the network cannot spur economic growth
(footnote 2). More than 70% of the interprovincial and interdistrict roads are still in a poor state;
many roads are impassable to motor vehicles. Four provincial capitals remain unconnected to
the regional network and people in the mountainous central part of the country do not have
all-weather access to the main road network. Likewise, transport services are of low quality and
expensive. Rebuilding and rehabilitating the road network, especially national primary roads, is
therefore a top priority.
3. After rehabilitation of a major part of the national Ring Road, the government gave
priority to the development of the remaining sections of the north–south and east–west corridors
connecting to the Ring Road and thus to major cities like Mazar-e-Sharif and Kabul, to improve
access for the people living in remote areas at the center of the country. This was
recommended in the road master plan prepared by the government with ADB assistance.4
The
project roads were part of the north–south and east–west corridors.
4. The goal of the project was to help the government promote economic and social
development, and reduce poverty in the project area. The project had five components:
(i) rehabilitate the Mazar-e-Sharif–Dar-i-Suf road (140.3 km) and the Bamyan–Yakawlang road
(98.9 km),5
(ii) install cross-border facilities in Spin Boldak and Hairatan,6
(iii) support campaigns
to prevent HIV/AIDS and increase awareness of human trafficking, (iv) provide support for
project management and monitoring, and (v) provide project management support to the
Ministry of Public Works (MPW).
5. In 2006, before the project, its cost was estimated at $140.9 million, including taxes and
duties of $1.7 million. Loan 2257 was expected to finance (i) civil works for the Mazar-e-Sharif–
Dar-i-Suf road, (ii) cross-border facilities, and (iii) project management and monitoring; and
1
ADB. 2006. Report and Recommendation of the President to the Board of Directors: Proposed Loan to Afghanistan
for the North–South Corridor Project. Manila (Loan 2257-AFG [SF], approved in September 2006).
2
ADB. 2008. Report and Recommendation of the President to the Board of Directors: Proposed Multitranche
Financing Facility for the Road Network Development Investment Program to Afghanistan. Manila
(Grant 0135-AFG, approved in December 2008).
3
Of the total amount of $60 million approved under Grant 0135-AFG, $41.772 million was allocated for the North–
South Corridor Project, and the remaining $18.228 million for the Andkhoy–Qaisar Road Project under Loan 2140-
AFG (SF).
4
ADB. 2004. Technical Assistance to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan for Preparing the Master Plan for Road
Network Improvement Project. Manila.
5
As initially designed, the Mazar-e-Sharif–Dar-i-Suf road was 140.3 km, and the Bamyan–Yakawlang road, 98.9 km.
The final lengths were 133.94 km and 86.71 km, respectively, because of changes in road alignment between the
initial and final designs.
6
Cross-border facilities in Hairatan, which were to be funded by the European Union, were canceled.

11. 2
Grant 0054, (i) resettlement costs, (ii) civil works for the Bamyan–Yakawlang road,
(iii) campaigns to prevent HIV/AIDS and human trafficking, and (iv) incremental project
management support. The JFPR grant (Grant 9097) was to finance a portion of the civil works
for the Bamyan–Yakawlang road (see para. 9). The ADB loan and grant, originally amounting to
$118.2 million, were to finance 84% of the project cost, excluding $2.7 million in land acquisition
costs and taxes and duties, to be financed by the government. ADB later provided
supplementary financing (Grant 0135) to cover the project cost overrun of $41.772 million.
6. MPW implemented the project through the project management office (PMO)7
for
ADB-assisted road projects. The deputy minister (technical) was the project director and had
overall responsibility for project management. MPW assigned a team of two engineers, a land
officer, and an office administrator to the site offices of the project management consultants to
coordinate with the consultants, as well as with contractors, local governments, and project
beneficiaries. MPW’s field staff handled day-to-day project implementation. The customs
department under the Ministry of Finance (MOF) implemented the cross-border facilities
component, and the MOF director general was responsible for the implementation of this
component. The Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) implemented the HIV/AIDS and human
trafficking component.
II. EVALUATION OF DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
A. Relevance of Design and Formulation
7. ADB support was consistent with the government’s overarching objective of ensuring
economic growth by rebuilding and rehabilitating the country’s national roads. From start to
completion, project activities were aligned with the government’s priorities and sector and
country strategies, as expressed in the Afghanistan National Development Strategy for 2008–
2020, and with ADB’s country strategy and program update.8
The rehabilitation of the national
road network was the main focus of both documents.
8. However, some project goal, outcome, and output indicators were not clearly defined in
the initial project design and monitoring framework. For example, one outcome indicator was a
20% decrease in freight transport fares over the project roads, but the start and end points were
not defined, and the baseline freight cost was not established. Although significant progress
appears to have been made toward the planned goal and outcomes of the project, measuring
the extent of that progress was difficult without clearly defined indicators. Also, output targets
did not show the length of roads to be rehabilitated. The risks and assumptions in the project
framework nonetheless remain relevant.
9. The JFPR contributed $20 million for the construction of the Bamyan–Yakawlang road in
central Afghanistan, a very poor area of the country with few paved roads even today.9
This
output was in line with the goals of both ADB and the JFPR. Rehabilitation transformed the road
network. Road users indicated to the project completion review (PCR) mission that the road,
which was paved under the project, has already helped decrease travel time by 75%, freight
transport cost by 45%, and bus fares by 80%. Since the road now connects most of the main
agricultural regions to Kabul, the project goal of promoting economic and social development
and reducing poverty is likely to be reached.
7
MPW’s various project management units (PMUs) were reorganized into a single project management office in
July 2010.
8
ADB. 2004. Country Strategy and Program Update: Afghanistan, 2004–2006. Manila.
9
A separate implementation completion memorandum is being prepared for the JFPR grant.

12. 3
10. The initial design did not provide for adequate security. Serious security challenges
delayed project implementation. The security issues were eventually resolved by the
government and ADB through additional security arrangements.
11. The project design benefited from a feasibility study of the project road, under technical
assistance (TA).10
The study was done in two phases. The first phase comprised traffic studies,
preliminary technical and economic evaluation, the ranking of four possible road alignments,
and the selection of the preferred road alignment. In the second phase, preliminary engineering
designs and revised economic analyses based on refined cost estimates were prepared.
However, the feasibility study did not include an actual survey of the terrain, and its
recommended road alignment, with slopes of up to 14% in grade, proved to be too steep for use
in the mountainous and high-altitude central region. The final design used a road alignment with
slopes that were no steeper than 8% in grade. This change increased the project cost and
extended the construction schedule by 12 months.
B. Project Output
12. The project was implemented under extremely difficult security conditions. The
contractor underwent repeated attacks by militant groups, several of its staff members were
kidnapped and one died, and construction machinery was damaged. Despite these incidents
and implementation delays, the project output was fully achieved. (Appendix 1 summarizes the
status of compliance with the project framework; Appendix 2, the project achievements versus
the results framework; and Appendix 3, the major events related to the project.) The project
output was as follows: (i) rehabilitation of the north–south national highways, (ii) installation of
cross-border facilities, (iii) conduct of an HIV/AIDS prevention and anti-human trafficking
awareness campaign, (iv) project management and monitoring, and (v) incremental project
management support.
1. Rehabilitation of the North–South National Highways
13. At completion, the project had rehabilitated 133.94 km of the Mazar-e-Sharif–Dar-i-Suf
road in two contract packages, and 86.71 km of the Bamyan–Yakawlang road in one contract
package (footnote 5). The two roads are along the north–south corridor and connect to the ring
road through central Afghanistan. The contract packages were (i) Mazar-e-Sharif–Pul-i-Baraq
section (75 km, under Loan 2257 and Grant 0135), (ii) Pul-i-Baraq–Dar-i-Suf section (58.94 km,
under Loan 2257 and Grant 0135), and (iii) Bamyan–Yakawlang road (86.71 km, under
Grants 0054 and 9097). The project improved the roads to a two-lane asphalt-paved standard
that allows the smooth flow of vehicles. All three contract packages were awarded to the lowest
evaluated responsive bidder and supervised by a single consulting firm. The supervision
consultant and contractor were mobilized in 2008 and demobilized in 2013.
14. The use of the design–build contract modality reduced lead time. Preliminary design and
bid documents comprising concept design drawings and preliminary estimated bills of quantities
were prepared by the TA consultants (footnote 10). The contractor was responsible for the final
detailed design. The initial TA design called for a vertical alignment of up to 14% in grade in
mountainous areas. But after the terrain was surveyed during the final design, it was deemed
necessary to reduce the grade to 8% to allow the use of heavy vehicles. Earthwork under
package 2 increased over the originally estimated cut and fill volumes as shoulders were
widened to provide space for landslides. The required funding and construction time therefore
10
ADB 2006. Masterplan for Road Network Improvement Project in Afghanistan. Feasibility study component
prepared by Minconsult Sdn Bhd. Manila.

13. 4
also increased.
15. The quality of civil works under all packages was satisfactory. Implementation was,
however, delayed by (i) security issues, specifically along the Pul-i-Baraq–Dar-i-Suf section;
(ii) severe weather conditions and long winters; (iii) abnormal rains and flash floods; (iv) MPW’s
weak management capacity and slow response to the contractor’s requests; and (v) slow
implementation of the land acquisition and resettlement plan (LARP).
2. Installation of Cross-Border Facilities
16. The project financed the installation of cross-border customs facilities (under
Loan 2257), including gamma-ray scanners and computers with internet connections. In
addition, cargo-handling equipment, including forklifts, container stackers, pallet trolleys, and
large weighing scales, was provided to help with the rehabilitation of border crossing facilities at
the Spin Boldak border crossing point, along a road that had previously been rehabilitated with
ADB assistance. The cross-border facilities are now in operation. The throughput of the facility
improved with the provision of these facilities. Facilities were also to be installed at the Hairatan
border, but this portion, which was to be funded by the European Union, was canceled.
3. Conduct of an HIV/AIDS Prevention and Anti–Human Trafficking Awareness
Campaign
17. The project supported the implementation of an evidence-based communication strategy
for HIV/AIDS prevention and control in Afghanistan that was developed by MOPH with the
assistance of the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). The campaign successfully
reached more than twice the number of targeted beneficiaries, including construction workers
and truckers, and their partners. Almost 700 clients with sexually transmitted infections were
treated, 2,897 clients with high-risk behavior underwent professional counseling, and 955 with
high-risk behavior were tested for HIV. The behavior change communication strategy
implemented among the targeted groups, through outreach and a peer approach, proved to be
very effective. Over 5,600 people attended health education sessions in the basics of HIV/AIDS
and human trafficking awareness; 2,735 of these joined HIV awareness sessions at the road
construction health centers. The condom promotion campaign was effective: 45,065 condoms
were distributed to clients working along the corridor. Though behavior change was not
instantaneous, it is expected that safe-sex behavior, consistent use of condoms, and voluntary
counseling and testing for HIV/AIDS will increase and that there will be a reduction in the
number of those with multiple sex partners. The HIV/AIDS and human trafficking awareness
messages reached over 900 community members, including migrant workers, women, and girls,
the highest-risk populations along the corridor, and in the process achieved community
mobilization.
4. Project Management and Monitoring
18. A single firm won all the supervision contracts. Two teams were formed, as the project
had two separate geographic locations. The teams coordinated closely with the PMO under
MPW and were responsible for (i) overseeing overall project management; (ii) supervising
construction and the installation of equipment, including reviewing the detailed designs prepared
by the contractors; (iii) supervising the implementation of the HIV/AIDS component;
(iv) certifying the completion of works by contractors; (v) providing on-the-job training to MPW
staff assigned to the consulting team, and implementing and supervising the training component
of the project; and (vi) undertaking project performance monitoring and evaluation. An individual
consultant assisted MPW and the Afghan Reconstruction and Development Services in
evaluating technical and financial proposals for the supervision consultants, evaluating

14. 5
proposals for the civil works contracts, and preparing the final bid evaluation reports. Another
consultant also helped the customs department of MOF in supervising the procurement and
installation of cross-border facilities. The PMO undertook regular visits to the sites, had monthly
progress review meetings on site with the consultants and contractors, and submitted monthly,
quarterly, and annual progress reports to ADB.
5. Incremental Project Management Support
19. Individual international consultants specializing in project management, finance, highway
engineering, environment, and resettlement were hired to work in the PMO. These consultants
worked with the MPW employees and helped build their capacity. As required under the project,
ADB financed the additional salary of MPW staff and consultants assigned to the PMO. The
PMO’s operating costs were included in the development budget of the MPW and the budget
was allocated through the government’s annual budgeting process.
C. Project Cost
20. In 2006, the total cost of the project was estimated at $140.90 million, including taxes
and duties of $1.7 million. At project completion, the total cost amounted to about $176.36
million. This amount was financed as follows: (i) $77.64 million from ADB Loan 225711
;
(ii) $37.67 million from ADB Grant 0054; (iii) $20.00 million from JFPR Grant 9097; (iv) $38.06
million in supplementary financing from ADB Grant 0135; and (v) $2.99 million from government
resources. The project cost overrun of $38.06 million, which was covered by supplementary
financing in 2008, was mainly attributed to (i) the change in road grade, which substantially
increased the earthwork; (ii) security incidents, which led to a force majeure claim and increased
security costs; and (iii) civil works extensions, which led to extensions in the consulting
contracts. Moreover, the new road alignment in the final design affected more people and
resulted in a small increase in resettlement costs.
21. The ADB loan has a term of 40 years, including a grace period of 10 years, and carries
an annual interest rate of 1%. The total amount of the interest charge during the grace period
will be capitalized and charged to the loan account. Details of the awarded contracts and the
respective disbursements are in Appendix 4.
22. Two cost reallocations were processed during the project. The first reallocation was
required to provide for the additional resettlement costs; the second, to pay for the force
majeure claim ($5.22 million), additional security arrangements, and contract variations related
to the change in road grade.
D. Disbursements
23. Loan 2257 and Grant 0054 were approved on 26 September 2006, signed on
2 November 2006, and took effect on 11 January 2007. The disbursement of loan proceeds,
including reimbursement, direct payment, and the imprest account, conformed to ADB’s Loan
Disbursement Handbook (2012, as amended from time to time). Some minor delays in loan
utilization arose at the outset because of the delay in appointing the supervision consultant and
awarding the civil works contract. The slow approval of claims by MPW caused some delays in
payments during implementation and resulted in unnecessary interest claims by contractors.
Once the contract was under way, some delays occurred because of the timing of
11
The final withdrawal application of about $1.228 million from Loan 2257 was under process as of 6 September
2013.

15. 6
disbursements by MOF. Each year there was a 3-month hiatus in disbursements from the end
of the fiscal year on 21 March until the end of June, when the budget was approved by the
President. As the government follows the Solar Hijri calendar, the start of the fiscal year
coincided with the peak construction season. The fiscal year now starts on 21 December;
presidential approval of the budget could therefore happen in winter.
24. All civil works were completed by 30 April 2013. As of 2 September 2013, $76.40 million
(94%) had been disbursed from Loan 2257, $37.67 million (94%) from Grant 0054, and $38.06
million (91%) from Grant 0135. The application for final withdrawal of about $1.228 million had
been submitted for disbursement from Loan 2257 in September 2013. The loan will close on
30 June 2017, whereas the account for Grant 0054 had been closed on 19 August 2013 and
Grant 0135 is expected to close by the end of September 2013.
25. An imprest account was established at the Da Afghanistan Bank in November 2007
with an initial advance of $100,000, to pay for salaries and other expenditures of the PMO. The
fund was liquidated and then replenished as required. The imprest account turnover ratio is 1.89
and the account had been closed. The capitalization of interest charges during the project grace
period, which is a part of loan disbursement, is ongoing and will continue until the loan closing
date of 30 June 2017.
E. Project Schedule
26. Civil works. The project was originally envisaged to be implemented over 42 months
and completed by December 2010. However, it was physically completed only in April 2013. All
civil works contracts were awarded by the second quarter (Q2) of 2007 as planned, but serious
security issues and other problems caused delays in all contracts, as explained in the following
paragraph.
27. Package 1 was completed in Q4 2011, 18 months later than the estimated completion
date of Q2 2010. Slow mobilization accounted for 6 months of delay, and serious security
problems, for a further delay of 12 months. Package 2 was to have been completed by Q2 2010
but was completed only in Q2 2013, after being delayed for 36 months. A third of this delay was
due to a suspension of works under the force majeure clause of the contract following a brutal
security attack that resulted in the death of one member of the contractor’s staff; another third,
to the increase in contract scope following the design changes; and the remaining third, to slow
mobilization, an unexpectedly long winter, and slow implementation. Package 3 was completed
18 months behind schedule, in Q2 2012, because of slow mobilization (6-month delay) and
serious security problems (12-month delay).
28. Project management and monitoring. The consulting service contracts were to be
awarded in Q4 2006 but were awarded only in Q4 2007 because MPW did not take advance
action to select the supervision consultants, although this move had already been approved by
ADB. The contracts were signed in the first two quarters of 2008 and were completed in
Q2 2013, when the final road section was completed.
29. Cross-border facilities. The customs department of MOF was tasked to procure
equipment for the border crossing point at Spin Boldak. Procurement was scheduled to start in
Q2 2008 but was repeatedly delayed until Q2 2010 because of the low capacity of the customs
department. This activity was finally completed in Q2 2011 with the assistance of consultants
under a United States Agency for International Development (USAID) program.
30. HIV/AIDS prevention and anti–human trafficking awareness campaign. MOPH,

16. 7
with support from UNICEF, was to develop an evidence-based communication strategy for
HIV/AIDS prevention and control by Q1 2007 and this project component was to be
implemented intermittently over a period of 3 years. MOPH recruitment of an international
nongovernment organization (NGO) was delayed. Action Aid was hired in Q3 of 2010, and the
task was completed in Q3 2011.
31. The original completion dates for major milestones in the project implementation plan
were overly optimistic and did not consider the serious security problems in the country and
particularly in the project area. The planned and actual implementation schedules for all
components are compared in Appendix 5.
F. Implementation Arrangements
32. The project was implemented according to the originally designed implementation
arrangements, which were deemed adequate.
33. MPW, MOF, and MOPH were the executing agencies for the project. The civil works
components were implemented by MPW’s existing PMO, which had already gained experience
in other ADB-assisted projects in the country, such as the Andkhoy–Qaisar, Qaisar–Bala
Murghab, and Kandahar–Spin Boldak road projects. The PMO consisted of a director, two
project managers, on-site project implementation and trainee engineers, and administrative
staff. The civil works sites had project implementation units, in which MPW engineers were
stationed to handle day-to-day project implementation. The project augmented the capacity of
the PMO by funding the services of a finance officer and two accountants, engineers, and
experienced administrative staff to work with the PMO. The cross-border facilities component
was implemented by MOF’s customs department, and the director general of the department
was responsible for day-to-day project implementation. MOPH implemented the component
pertaining to HIV/AIDS prevention and anti–human trafficking awareness campaign.
G. Conditions and Covenants
34. The loan and grant covenants in the financing agreement were relevant. Out of 30
covenants, 29 were complied with and one was partially complied with. (Details of the
covenants and the status of compliance with those covenants are found in Appendix 6.) Broadly
speaking, the government ensured: (i) adequate security in all work sites for smooth and
uninterrupted project implementation; (ii) counterpart funding; (iii) implementation of the
mitigation measures proposed in the initial environment examination (IEE) report and the
environmental management plan (EMP) to minimize any adverse impact; (iv) compliance by the
contractor with the safety measures during construction and operation; and (v) inclusion of
specific implementation milestones and targets in the civil works contract, with appropriate
reward and penalty provisions to provide reasonable economic motivation for the timely and
high-quality completion of the project. MPW kept separate accounts and records for the project
and had them audited annually by an independent auditor hired with ADB’s consent. The yearly
audit reports were submitted to ADB as required in the financing agreement, although they were
submitted late on two occasions. The management letters noted no issues and the executing
agency complied with ADB’s Anticorruption Policy (1998, as amended to date). The quality of
the completed roads met the standards specified in the project documentation. The specific
covenants related to land acquisition and resettlement were complied with, although compliance
was delayed by the first-time implementation of land acquisition and resettlement under an
ADB-funded road project. Previous road projects on the Ring Road followed existing alignments
with a clear right-of-way.

17. 8
35. The covenant that was only partially complied with related to road maintenance
financing. The government canceled its tolling policy in 2010 because MOF and MPW could not
agree on how to collect the toll. Instead, the government decided to collect a tax on fuel imports.
However, according to estimates, funds from the fuel tax are sufficient to meet only about 50%
of the estimated needs for operation and maintenance (O&M) (see further details in para. 54).
H. Consultant Recruitment and Procurement
36. Consultant recruitment conformed to ADB’s Guidelines on the Use of Consultants (2002,
as amended from time to time). There were two consultant supervision packages. The selection
of the consulting firms followed the quality- and cost-based selection procedure, with full
technical proposals. The first-ranked firm was invited for contract negotiations and was awarded
the consulting assignments. Consulting services (215 person-months international and 476
national) were provided, compared with the estimated 181 person-months of international and
740 national. A breakdown of the consulting services as planned and as actually used is in
Appendix 7.
37. Goods, services, and civil works were procured in accordance with ADB’s Procurement
Guidelines (1999, as amended from time to time). MPW did not take advance action to select
supervision consultants and procure civil works, although this was approved by ADB. The three
civil works contracts were procured through international competitive bidding. A single-stage,
two-envelope procedure (without prequalification) was used. Equipment for cross-border
facilities was similarly procured through international competitive bidding. All international
procurement was undertaken by the government procurement unit operating under the
Afghanistan Reconstruction and Development Services.
38. The project was located in the northern and central part of the country, where ADB
nonmember countries provide competitive sources of bitumen for road pavement. To maximize
the project’s development impact and economic efficiency, ADB approved on an exceptional
basis the procurement of bitumen for road pavement from ADB nonmember countries by civil
works contractors under the project.
I. Performance of Consultants and Contractors
39. Performance of consultants. The performance of the supervision consultant was
satisfactory, given the delivery of services according to the requirements of the contracts and
the terms of reference. The consultant supervised the civil works in a challenging environment
with serious security problems. At the start, key personnel were fielded late because of the
government’s slow approval of visas for international staff. At the midterm review, the
consultants’ performance was deemed unsatisfactory because of the frequent replacement of
the team leader. However, as the project progressed, the consultant overcame its staffing
issues and managed to help MPW in resolving contractor’s performance issues and consistently
providing adequate reporting on site-specific issues and solutions. The PCR mission noted that
the consultant had a cordial relationship with the local communities and government, which
helped in the timely resolution of several implementation issues, given the tenuous security
environment.
40. Five individual international consultants specializing in program management, finance,
resettlement, environment, and project management were hired to work in the PMO. The
performance of all the individual consultants was satisfactory and according to the requirements
of their contracts and individual terms of reference. The finance specialist introduced a financial

18. 9
control system at the PMO. The resettlement specialist helped the PMO complete the first
full-scale implementation of LARP in Afghanistan.
41. Performance of contractor. All three civil works contracts were awarded to one
international contractor. Overall, the contractor’s performance was satisfactory and the good
quality of the roads was noted by the PCR team, the government, and other local stakeholders.
The contractor’s work suffered early delays because the contractor mobilized insufficient
equipment and manpower and made inadequate security arrangements. It should be noted that
the contractor did not follow the advice, guidance, or security plans provided by the Afghanistan
Resident Mission (AFRM) security team, which would have prevented or mitigated many of the
security problems encountered. During implementation, the contractor also suffered setbacks
because of severe weather events, shortened construction seasons due to the cold
temperatures at high elevations, and various security incidents that affected the project. The
contractor demonstrated seriousness by continuing its involvement in the project despite the
serious security incidents, which resulted in equipment and site damage, injuries, the
kidnapping of the contractor’s staff, and the death of one staff member. Despite these
challenges, the civil works were completed and they were of good quality. The contractor
completed the road construction as required, albeit with significant delays mainly due to security
issues and design changes.
J. Performance of the Borrower and the Executing Agency
42. The performance of the borrower and the executing agencies is rated satisfactory
because the project was completed even under serious security risks and despite the limited
capacity of the agencies. The implementation of the civil works was monitored by MPW. At the
start of project implementation, MPW established a project management unit. Its structure was
later changed to that of a PMO in July 2010.12
The bimonthly implementation review meetings
for the project, however, were not consistently held and MPW’s slow response and ineffective
remedial actions had an adverse impact on the progress of the contracts. The very slow
implementation of the LARP initially delayed the construction of affected sections of the road.
The PCR team noted that the contractor brought up five unresolved contract modification and
payment issues during the PCR mission. Some of these issues had been pending for nearly
2 years.
43. However, in the course of the project and with the help of consultants, the PMO staff
gained valuable experience and became familiar with ADB policies and practices in international
contracting, financial management, procurement, and LARP implementation. MPW improved its
performance over time through experience and by increasing the number of professional staff in
the PMO. MPW met the expected project output, and project covenants were fully complied
with, with the exception of maintenance funding, which was inadequate. The MPW staff is now
more qualified to undertake similar duties in future project operations, but MPW still has room
for improvement in project management, procurement, social safeguards, and quality
assurance.
44. The MOF’s customs department procured equipment for the border crossing at Spin
Boldak. Initially the department lacked procurement capacity and this lack delayed the start of
procurement activities for 2 years. This activity was completed in Q2 2011 with the assistance of
consultants under a USAID program. Counterpart financing covered land acquisition, and taxes
and duties. There were some budget issues related to the payment of the cost of land
12
With the increasing number of projects with ADB, MPW decided to reorganize its project management units into
one PMO for better-coordinated management of all ADB-assisted projects.

19. 10
acquisition and the payment of business receipt taxes. The government had a budget shortfall
but eventually the MOF approved funds to cover these costs as stipulated in the loan
agreement. MOF in general provided timely administrative support.
45. The MOPH implemented the HIV/AIDS prevention and anti–human trafficking campaign
with help from UNICEF. Although the activity started almost 3 years behind schedule, ultimately
the project output was achieved. The project reached over 9,500 beneficiaries (239% of the
goal) by using the innovative approach of integrating human trafficking awareness issues with
HIV/AIDS prevention activities. With the implementation of this component, the MOPH
developed sufficient capacity to administer similar tasks independently in the future.
K. Performance of the Asian Development Bank
46. The project, by its very nature, required close monitoring and supervision. Several
portions of the road were located in dangerous areas and the road implementation suffered from
many security incidents and project delays. Despite the tough environment, a total of 14 review
missions were fielded over the project implementation period of about 5 years to provide
adequate guidance and support to the project teams. Additional security arrangements made
through ADB’s intensive follow-up with the borrower allowed the contractor to complete the
construction. ADB’s timely help enabled MPW to resolve the critical issue of payment to
subcontractors through direct payment and expedited project implementation.
47. Another complicating factor was the preparation and implementation of the LARP, which
was a new experience for MPW. ADB helped MPW in (i) undertaking a revised census and
detailed measurement surveys, (ii) conducting public consultations, and (iii) appointing an NGO
to play the vital role in finalizing the resettlement impact and identifying the affected households
and people. MPW thus developed adequate capacity to manage social safeguards. Although
the implementation of the LARP was considerably delayed, it was successfully completed and a
total of 1,764 affected households were adequately compensated.
48. The project was originally managed from ADB headquarters, but later, when there was a
need for more frequent follow-ups and field visits, and for the urgent resolution of critical security
issues, ADB tasked the AFRM to administer the project with continued support from
headquarters. Through close coordination, ADB promptly resolved several complicated issues
relating to contract administration, security, construction supervision, and LARP implementation.
Therefore, ADB’s input and overall performance is rated satisfactory.
III. EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE
A. Relevance
49. The project is rated highly relevant, both at appraisal and at completion, to the
government’s objectives and policies, as well as to ADB’s country strategy and program13
and
country strategy and program update (footnote 8). During appraisal, the government was
preparing its priority road development program for the next 10 years (2006–2015), in line with
the road master plan prepared with ADB assistance (footnote 4). Since 2002, Afghanistan had
received extensive external assistance for the rebuilding of about 3,100 km of regional
highways, including the ring road around the country. The government’s next priority was the
north–south and east–west corridors. These corridors constitute links between the people living
in the central region and the rest of the country. These two road corridors also provide access to
13
ADB. 2002. Initial Country Strategy and Program (2002–2004): Afghanistan. Manila.

20. 11
the mining and mineral resources in the central region.
50. According to the Initial Country Strategy and Program (2002–2004), roads were needed
to rebuild the economy by establishing major economic linkages domestically and with
neighboring countries. As rehabilitation of regional highways was supported by many
development partners, ADB focused on connecting the Ring Road through the north–south
corridors as recommended in the road master plan. This was also in line with the government’s
priority investment projects identified for the national transport program. Accordingly, the project
was included in the Country Strategy and Program Update (2006–2008). Considering these key
factors, the project is rated highly relevant to the government’s national transport development
plan, as well as ADB’s country partnership strategy, both of which focus on transport sector
development in Afghanistan.
B. Effectiveness in Achieving Outcome
51. The project is rated highly effective in achieving its outcomes. The travel time was
reduced from 6 hours to 1.5 hours between Bamyan and Yakawlang, and from 8 to 2 hours
between Dar-i-Suf and Mazar-e-Sharif. Before the project, for nearly 3–4 winter months each
year, Yakawlang and Dar-i-Suf regions did not have any connection to major towns. Vehicle
traffic has improved by over 10% on the road sections and, most importantly, vehicle operating
costs have been reduced by over 45%. For example, transportation costs have gone down from
AF2.2/kg to AF1.2/kg in the Bamyan to Yakawlang region. This reduction has been achieved
despite an increase in fuel prices in Afghanistan. The PCR mission observed that the road
constructed was of good quality and had sufficient road safety and environmental protection
arrangements. Furthermore, the local administration, civil societies, and community informed
the mission that the project roads were among the best roads in Afghanistan. It was also noted
that Yakawlang, a predominantly agricultural area with high poverty, is now connected to
markets through Bamyan. With the completion of a road link between Yakawlang and Dar-i-Suf
under a future ADB-funded project, this region will be connected to larger national and
international markets through Mazar-e-Sharif. Civil society members confirmed that because of
the shorter travel time, women are now allowed by their families to commute from Yakawlang to
attend university in Bamyan. The cross-border component reduced the transaction time at the
Spin Boldak border crossing between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The HIV/AIDS component
raised awareness among more than 9,500 seminar participants. Hence, the project’s rating of
highly effective in achieving its outcomes is justified.
C. Efficiency in Achieving Outcome and Output
52. The project is rated less than efficient in achieving most of its outcomes and output
owing to the implementation delays and cost overruns. Project completion was delayed because
the period available for construction was limited by (i) harsh weather in the project area
(Bamyan’s elevation is 2,800 meters and the winter season is from November to May),
(ii) design changes, and (iii) poor security. The total project cost was 20% higher than the
appraisal estimate. The increase was mainly due to a design change from a grade of 14% to 8%
in mountainous areas. The additional funds were provided through supplementary financing
(Grant 0135-AFG) in 2008. Planning, design, and implementation followed the government’s
requirements and procedures.
53. Despite the time and cost issues, the economic internal rate of return (EIRR) for the
Mazar-e-Sharif–Dar-i-Suf road section, based on current data, is 26.55%, with a net present
value (NPV) of $114.13 million, compared with an EIRR of 29.80% and an NPV of $79.68

21. 12
million at appraisal. The EIRR for the Bamyan–Yakawlang section is 17.79% and the NPV is
$27.54, compared with an EIRR of 20.70% and an NPV of $29.30 at appraisal. The difference
between the appraisal and completion EIRRs and NPVs is marginal. Sensitivity analysis
indicates that a 20% increase in maintenance costs together with a 20% decrease in vehicle
operating cost would still result in EIRRs higher than the cutoff level of 12% for both road
sections. However, with the major cost overruns and time delay, the project’s rating of less than
efficient is justified. Details of the economic and financial evaluations are in Appendix 8.
D. Preliminary Assessment of Sustainability
54. The project is rated less likely to be sustainable, given the current shortfall of funds for
O&M. The government allocates funds from the central budget for road maintenance, although
this allocation alone is not sufficient. The government has tried to increase the O&M funds by
collecting tolls on national highways. However, the government canceled its tolling policy in
2010 because MOF and MPW could not agree on how to collect the toll. Instead, the
government decided to collect a tax on fuel imports. As part of the road fund, the government
issued gazette 965 dated 13/9/1386 (November 2012) on “Transitional Law on Toll.” The law
allows the collection of AF1 from the price of each liter of fuel imported into the country. MOF is
responsible for collecting these funds. Article 3 of the law states that the funds collected will be
deposited into a special account and will be used for the maintenance of highways, the repair of
roads, the construction of new highways and large and small bridges, and the construction of
the entry and exit gates of cities. However, according to estimates, the funds from the fuel tax
are sufficient to meet only about 50% of the estimated needs for O&M. The fuel tax and the
current budget allocations are not enough to meet the government’s expected O&M
expenditures.
55. Sustained O&M. Furthermore, MPW is responsible for the planning, construction, and
O&M of transport infrastructure in Afghanistan. Maintenance is provided by MPW’s force
account structure, on the basis of current laws and policies. At present, an O&M directorate
under a deputy minister of MPW carries out routine maintenance. MPW has regional offices in
all 34 regions. In addition, provincial and local shuras are involved in the maintenance of rural
roads. MPW recently prepared an O&M strategy as part of its institutional reform program. The
O&M strategy envisages the use of the private sector for the O&M of regional and national
roads through performance-based contracts. Once the O&M strategy is approved by the
Cabinet of Ministers, it will be implemented by MPW.
56. Institutional development. MPW is currently working to establish an Afghanistan road
authority. The concept was approved by the economic subcommittee of the Cabinet of Ministers
in April 2013 and awaits the final approval of the Cabinet. The road authority will initially function
under the MPW for about 3–5 years and then will be made an independent entity. Through the
continued support of ADB and other development partners, the road authority will be
strengthened with the required staff. This will increase the government’s capacity to plan,
develop, and manage the road sector in Afghanistan.
E. Impact
1. Environmental Safeguards
57. The project was classified under environment category B. Mitigation measures were
implemented during project implementation to minimize impact, and maximum safety was
provided during construction. The impact was short term, site specific, and temporary; there was
no long-term impact as identified in the IEE report prepared according to ADB’s Environment

22. 13
Policy (2002) and Environmental Assessment Guidelines (2003). Mitigation measures for
temporary impact were implemented as covered in the EMP, and the government ensured that
all activities complied with the principles and objectives of ecologically sustainable development.
The environmental expert of the design review and construction supervision consultants
monitored the implementation of the EMP. Instances of noncompliance were reported to, and
corrected by the contractor. The environmental monitoring reports indicate that the project did
not cause any significant adverse environmental impact.
2. Social Safeguards
58. The project involved land acquisition and resettlement (category A). The LARP was
prepared according to the initial road design and ADB’s Involuntary Resettlement Policy (1995).
When the final alignment was approved, an updated resettlement plan was prepared after a
revised census and detailed measurement surveys and public consultations carried out from
15 November 2010 to 31 January 2011. The appointed NGO played a vital role in finalizing this
resettlement impact and identifying the affected households and people. This being the first
LARP implemented under MPW, it constituted a learning curve for the ministry and the
government. However, once the approvals were obtained on 22 July 2012, the LARP
implementation proceeded quickly and the payments were made into the bank accounts of the
affected individuals, thereby avoiding bureaucratic delays associated with the payment. None of
the affected people were classified as indigenous people under ADB’s Policy on Indigenous
Peoples (1998). The project was therefore classified under category C in this regard.
3. Socioeconomic Impact
59. The project’s overall impact is positive. Almost 90% of the people in the project area are
farmers living in rural areas. Without roads, the rural population was constrained in transporting
their crops and livestock to market. The project roads have linked these rural areas to markets
in their provincial capitals and beyond, cut transport time by 75%, and reduced transport costs
by up to 40%. Traffic volumes were more than four times higher in 2012 than in 2005. These
improved roads will lead to a shift from subsistence agriculture to market-based production,
enabling farmers to grow perishable commercial products like vegetables and fruits and to
transport them more quickly to markets. In addition to agriculture, the project provides
opportunities for industrial and commercial development, mainly the mining and mineral sector.
The PCR mission also noted some positive impact for women, especially quicker access to
medical facilities and markets, and opportunities for higher education.
60. When the missing road section from Yakawlang to Dar-i-Suf is completed under other
projects, travel between north and south, north and east, and north and central provinces will
become much safer and less time consuming than the current route through the Salang tunnel.
The completed road will serve as an alternate route to the Salang tunnel for northwest–
southeast traffic, in addition to providing access to the central provinces. The traffic from east
and south via Kabul going toward Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan will use this road because of
the time and distance savings. This will connect the region to national as well as international
markets, further enhancing the region’s trade and economic opportunities.
IV. OVERALL ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Overall Assessment
61. The project’s overall performance is rated successful. The project is considered highly
relevant to the government’s overall development objectives and ADB’s country partnership

23. 14
strategy. The completed road links have improved connectivity in the project area, facilitated the
transportation of agricultural and perishable goods, and significantly supported the
socioeconomic development of the central highland region and the country as a whole. Despite
the highly challenging circumstances under which the works were executed, the civil works were
completed and they were of good quality. Most importantly the project set a benchmark for the
quality of road construction in Afghanistan. Potential risks identified at appraisal were managed
effectively, as detailed in Appendix 9. The results of the economic analysis indicate the strong
viability of the project. The project was highly effective in achieving its impact and outcomes.
The government’s efforts to implement the other sections of the north–south and east–west
corridors will further enhance the benefits of the project.
B. Lessons
62. The main lessons, which may need to be incorporated into ongoing and future ADB
projects in Afghanistan, are listed below:
(i) Project readiness. Adverse security issues and project start-up delays are two
main factors that have adversely affected and delayed almost all previous
projects in Afghanistan, except those where these issues were carefully handled
in advance. Furthermore, insufficient surveys during project processing, and
major changes in the technical design parameters during project implementation,
can also cause serious implementation delays and significant cost overrun. The
project suffered security issues until the situation was fixed with the help of
additional security arrangements. This caused about 12 months of delay as the
project area was prone to major terrorist attacks. It also delayed the contractor’s
mobilization. Further, because the area was remote and insecure, the initial
project design was done through geospatial analysis, eventually resulting in a
significant design change and cost increases. Follow-on projects should carefully
address these factors up front during loan or grant processing. Advanced
contracting must be executed to avert start-up delays. Extensive security
measures should be planned and budgeted for from the start.
(ii) Quality of consultants and contractor. Scrutiny of contractors and consultants
before their selection is critical to the success of any project. In particular, in
projects like this, which draw minimum interest because of security hazards, lack
of oversight may jeopardize project implementation. Therefore, in Afghanistan,
specifically in projects like this, such risks may be averted by giving more
emphasis to quality and the performance record of both the consultants and the
contractors, and not just the lowest price. Afghanistan is a tough place to work,
and picking a company that is not equipped to deal with the harsh geography,
climate, and security environment can easily result in both cost and time
overruns. The PCR mission noted that the consultant had a cordial relationship
with the local communities and government, which helped in the timely resolution
of several implementation issues, given the tenuous security environment.
(iii) Realistic estimation of project and contract duration. In future projects, both
the government and donors should prepare realistic project schedules by
carefully taking into account (a) the security situation and the time and resources
required to carry out remedial actions for the safety of project teams throughout
the projects; (b) actual construction period available in a year considering the
altitude of the project areas and inclement weather conditions; (c) probability of

24. 15
rebidding due to lack of interest, competition, or exorbitant costs (beyond
acceptable limits) offered by some interested bidders; (d) delays in contractor
mobilization; (e) longer-than-expected time spent by government agencies in
procurement matters due to their limited capacity or lengthy internal approval
procedures; and (f) possible flaws in the initial designs that may require
additional surveys and increase the scope of the contract.
(iv) Intensive donor involvement. In a project of this nature, where there are
serious security risks, and a potential for contractors’ or consultants’ suspension
of works, or expected contract variations due to type of terrain, prompt decision
making becomes critically important. This can be achieved through exceptional
involvement of donors. ADB provided enhanced supervision both from
headquarters and AFRM. Staff were closely involved in identifying and promptly
resolving issues. Any matter requiring ADB’s internal approval was expedited
and funds releases were processed quickly. Furthermore, AFRM’s site
supervision, despite security hazards, helped in precisely assessing the field
issues. All these factors contributed to the timely resolution of implementation
issues and the completion of this challenging project.
C. Recommendations
1. Project Related
63. Policy initiatives. ADB should continue to press the government to implement the O&M
policy including creating a road fund to maximize the sustainability of the road assets created
with assistance of ADB and other development partners. Further, the O&M of the regional and
national highways should be outsourced to the private sector through performance-based
contracting.
64. Social safeguards. ADB should assist MPW in institutionalizing LARP implementation
practices. ADB should also encourage the development of organizations that can be hired to
implement such work on behalf of the government. Strengthening MPW and local organizations
in LARP issues will improve future project performance.
2. General
65. Creation of a road authority. The government should ensure that a road authority is
approved by the Cabinet of Ministers and strengthened immediately with the required staff and
expertise in all functional areas. An autonomous road authority is needed to manage
Afghanistan’s road network through oversight of private sector contractors that carry out both
maintenance work and new construction. The staff trained under ongoing projects, especially in
the PMO, should be absorbed into this entity.
66. Coordination of multiple government agencies. For projects where several agencies
are involved in decision making, it is important to establish an executive committee made up of
representatives of the concerned agencies, chaired by a high-level government official or
champion. Such a committee can facilitate the provision of overall guidance, ensuring
expeditious approvals from various agencies, and in places where security is a major concern, it
could ensure that the project is implemented without interruption and with sustained security
arrangements.

25. 16 Appendix 1
PROJECT FRAMEWORK (APPRAISAL VERSUS ACTUAL)
Design Summary
Performance Indicators and Targets Data Sources and
Monitoring
Mechanisms
Assumptions and
Risks
(Appraisal)Appraisal Actual
Goal
Economic and
social development
and poverty
reduction in the
project areas
A 10% decrease per year
in poverty incidence for 3
years after project
completion
A 50% increase in
production and trade of
major farm products in the
project areas over 3 years
after project completion
A 50% increase in use of
transport services in the
project areas over 3 years
after project completion
Less likely to be achieved:
Progress made, but it is too
early to arrive at a conclusive
assessment
Likely to be achieved:
Progress made but no
evidence of achievement yet;
it is too early to arrive at a
conclusive assessment
Likely to be achieved:
Interviews indicate the
increase of bus services in
the project area. Bus fares
have dropped by 80% so
services are affordable to
more people.
National, provincial,
and district
socioeconomic
statistics from the
Central Statistics Office
Assumptions
Political and security
situation improves and is
stable.
Transport services are
increasingly available,
following the
improvement of the
project road,
Complementary
assistance from other
development agencies
and nongovernment
organizations continues,
so that other economic
infrastructure is
rehabilitated and basic
social services are
provided.
Road maintenance
financing is adequate and
institutional capacity
improves.
Outcome
Loan and Grant
Improved road
transport services in
the project areas
A 50% decrease in travel
time on the project roads
for all types of vehicles
immediately after project
completion
A 10% increase per year
in freight and passenger
traffic on the project roads
for 3 years after project
completion
A 20% decrease in freight
and passenger transport
fares passing through the
project roads within 1 year
of project completion
Average 30% reduction in
travel time to the nearest
health, primary education,
and other essential
services from the project
areas within 3 months of
completion
Achieved: Average of 75%
decrease in travel time per
trip over the entire project
road in good weather
Achieved: Traffic volumes
were more than four times
higher in 2012 than in 2005.
Mazar-e-Sharif to Dar-i-Suf
(2005 traffic count 891; 2012
traffic count 4,466). Bamyan
to Yakawlang (2005 traffic
count 266; 2012 traffic count
1,766).
Achieved: Freight transport
fares reduced from AF2.2/kg
to AF1.2/kg (45%) in the
Bamyan to Yakawlang
region. Bus fares decreased
by 80%.
Achieved: Travel times in
the project area had been
reduced by 75% by project
completion.
Statistics compiled by
the Ministry of Public
Works (MPW) and the
interview conducted
during PCR mission
Socioeconomic
surveys, ADB review
missions, project
completion report
Impact monitoring
result conducted by the
loan-financed
consultants including
traffic counts, survey
on transportation costs,
and origin–destination
survey
Assumption
MPW has the capacity to
implement the project.
Risks
Trafficking of narcotics
increases along the
improved roads.
HIV/AIDS transmission
increases as a result of
improved road
connectivity.

26. Appendix 1 17
Design Summary
Performance Indicators and Targets Data Sources and
Monitoring
Mechanisms
Assumptions and
Risks
(Appraisal)Appraisal Actual
Outputs
1. Improvement of
national highway
sections from:
a. Mazar-e-Sharif to
Dar-i-Suf
b. Bamyan to
Yakawlang
2. Cross-border
facilities at Spin
Boldak and Hairatan
3. Improvement of
public awareness of
HIV/AIDS
Project road to be
improved to a standard that
allows smooth passage of
all types of vehicles with
improvement of
International
Roughness Index (IRI) to 5
Functional border crossing
point at Spin Boldak
Completion of public
campaign for HIV/AIDS,
with 5,000 people
sensitized
Achieved: Completed as
required with some delays.
About 133.94 km of road
from Mazar-e-Sharif to Dar-i-
Suf and 86.71 km from
Bamyan to Yakawlang
a
was
completed and formally
opened to traffic in 2013. IRI
is under 5. Both of the road
sections were open to traffic
during construction.
Achieved: Office equipment
and material handling
equipment were procured
and installed at Spin Boldak
and the border crossing is
fully functional. Project
component at Hairatan
border crossing point, which
was to be funded by the EU,
was canceled.
Achieved: The public
awareness campaign
reached more than 6000
people.
ADB missions to
monitor project
implementation
Consultant’s progress
report
Project completion
report
Updated resettlement
plan
Involuntary
resettlement
external monitoring
report
Assumptions
The government provides
adequate security in the
project area.
Provision of counterpart
resources is timely.
Risks
Mobilizing equipment and
materials on the project
site from across the
border is difficult.
Bad weather conditions
affect the project areas
(longer winter and
drought).
Actual Milestones
1. Civil works implemented
1.1 Bamyan–Yakawlang, completed in Q2 2012 (Grants 0054 and 9097)
1.2 Mazar-e-Sharif–Pul-i-Baraq, completed in Q4 2011(L2257 and G0135
1.3 Pul-i-Baraq–Dar-i-Suf, completed Q2 2013 (L2257 and G0135)
2. Cross-border facilities – Equipment was procured and installed in Q2 2011
(Loan 2257)
3. HIV/AIDS prevention and anti–human trafficking awareness campaign –
Project was successfully completed in Q3 2011 (G0054)
4. Project management and monitoring – The supervision consultants provided
services from Q1 2008 to Q2 2013 (Loan 2257 and Grant 0135)
5. Incremental project management support – Payments to staff and
consultants provided from Q3 2010 to Q2 2013 (Grant 0054)
Input at Appraisal
ADB: Loan of $78.2 million and grant of $40.0
million
Government: Financing of $2.7 million
JFPR: Cofinancing of $20 million
Actual Input
ADB: Loan of $77.64 million
b
and grant of
$37.67 million; supplementary financing of
$38.06 million
Government: Financing of $2.99 million
JFPR: Cofinancing of $20 million
ADB = Asian Development Bank, ADF = Asian Development Fund, EU = European Union, JFPR = Japan Fund for Poverty
Reduction, km = kilometer, MPW = Ministry of Public Works, PMO = project management office, VOC = vehicle operating cost.
a
In the initial design, the Mazar-e-Sharif─Dar-i-Suf road was 140.3 km and the Bamyan–Yakawlang road was 98.9 km. The final
lengths were 133.94 km and 86.71 km, respectively, because of changes in road alignment between the initial and final designs.
b
The amount includes last withdrawal application of $1.228 million which was under process as of 6 September 2013.

27. 18 Appendix 2
ACHIEVEMENTS AGAINST THE RESULTS FRAMEWORK
Results Framework Indicator
a
Target
b
Achieved
c
Methods or Comments
Expressways and national highways
built or upgraded (km)
239.2 220.65 The reduction in road length is due to
changes in road alignment between the initial
and final designs.
a
Indicators used are standard explanatory data of transport sector for level 2 (output and outcome) of ADB’s
results framework.
b
The target values are those listed in the report and recommendation of the President for Loan 2257-AFG.
c
The achieved values show the aggregate lengths of the sections rehabilitated or constructed during the project.
Source: Asian Development Bank.

28. Appendix 3 19
CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS
Date Event
2006
23 February–2 March Loan reconnaissance mission
30 April–10 May Fact-finding mission
6 June Management Review Meeting
5 July Government of Japan approves JFPR grant proposal
6 July Staff Review Committee meeting
25 August Loan and grant negotiations
5 September Report and recommendation of the President to Board of Directors
26 September North–South Project approved for $138.2 million
2 November Loan signing, Loan 2257 and Grant 0054
17 December JPFR grant 9097 becomes effective with a closing date of 31 December
2010
2007
11 January Loan 2257 declared effective, with closing date of 30 June 2017
11 January Grant 0054 declared effective, with closing date of 30 June 2011
15 to 20 May Inception mission
20–21 August 2007 Afghanistan deputy minister of finance visits ADB in Manila
24 October Contract awarded for construction supervision
4 to 9 November Review mission
22 November Civil works contracts for all 3 civil works packages awarded to a single
contractor firm
2008
22–29 April Review Mission
5 May Civil works commenced on sections not affected by LAR
21– 25 October Review mission
December Supplementary financing of $41.772 million through Grant 0135 was
approved to accommodate cost overruns
2009
January HIV/AIDS NGO mobilized
24 January CSC contract for civil works package 3 signed between MPW and
consultant
10–18 March Review Mission
15 May CSC contract for civil works packages 1 and 2 signed between MPW and
consultant
11–18 June LAR mission
20–28 June Review mission, focusing on the HIV/AIDS prevention and anti–human
trafficking component of the project
September Updated LARP for civil works package 3 approved
8 and 13 October Attack on contractor’s equipment
November Updated LARPs for all 3 civil works packages approved by both the
government and ADB; LARPs disclosed on ADB website
2010
1–4 March Review mission
April Cancellation of road tolling facilities component under Loan 2140
A contract variation of $10.06 million with no time extension was approved
for civil works package 3
17 April Grant 0054 closing extended from 30 June 2011 to 4 November 2011
27 April Approval of variation order 1 for civil works packages 2 and 3
9–17 June Midterm review mission; the mission noted that civil works had started on
LARP-affected areas of all 3 road sections in violation of the loan
agreement

29. 20 Appendix 3
Date Event
21 June Contractor submits updated security plan
26 June Four contractor staff members on civil works package 2 are kidnapped
30 June JFPR 9097 closed and any further expenditure on civil works package 3
will be charged to G0054
29 July Contractor suspends work on civil works package 2 because of poor
security situation
5 August Four local road workers are kidnapped
13–21 October Review mission
26 October Grant 0054 closing extended from 4 November 2011 to 30 June 2012
29 November Two consultants and their driver are kidnapped
11 December Invitation for bids for procurement and installation of Equipment for Spin
Boldak border crossing checkpoints is released
13 December Two contractor staff members and their police escorts are kidnapped by
five armed insurgents
17 December Approximately 30 armed insurgents attack the contractor’s Boibaga
sub-camp in Keshindieh; one contractor staff member is killed and seven
others are kidnapped
18 December Contractor declares force majeure and suspends work
21 December Variation order to increase the contract amount and time period for
consultancy contract until 31 December 2011
2011
10 March LARP for civil works package 3 is updated
30 March Contract for procurement and installation of equipment for Spin Boldak
border crossing points is awarded to Amin Qasim Ltd.
4 August Civil works package 1 is substantially completed
11 October Ministry of Interior authorizes establishment of additional security
checkpoints along the road and 102 additional policemen
24 October Grant 0054 closing date is extended from 4 November 2011 to
30 November 2012
20 November–2 December Project consultation mission
19 December Civil works package 2 extended until 30 November 2012
20 December Contractor partially resumes work on civil works package 2
2012
24 January Contractor resumes civil works package 2
February Project administration handed over to ADB’s Afghanistan Resident Mission
22 July LARPs for all three civil works packages are finalized and signed by the
Government of Afghanistan
28 November Time extension for civil works package 2 granted until 30 April 2013
30 November Civil works package 3 is completed
2013
April Heavy rains and flash flooding hamper the completion of civil works
package 2
30 April Civil works package 2 is substantially completed
22 April–11 May PCR mission
ADB = Asian Development Bank, CSC = construction supervision consultant, JFPR = Japan Fund for Poverty
Reduction, LARP = land acquisition and resettlement plan, MPW = Ministry of Public Works, PCR = project
completion review, RFP = request for proposal, VO = variation order.
Sources: Project report and recommendation of the President; ADB project team’s review mission reports and
consultant’s reports.

30. 21Appendix4
CONTRACT AWARDS AND DISBURSEMENTS FUNDED BY THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK
Table A4.1: Loan 2257 (North–South Corridor Project)
Contract Issued Amount Disbursed
a
PCSS
No.
Category
No.
Contractor/
Supplier Description
Currency of
Contract
Contract
Amount $ Equivalent
Currency of
Contract
Amount
Disbursed
b
$ Equivalent
0001 01 Samwhan Construction, Mazar-e-
Sharif to Pul-i-Baraq
US$ 30,508,783 30,508,783 US$ 30,508,783 30,508,783
0002 01 Samwhan Construction, Pul-i-
Baraq to Dar-i-Suf
US$ 36,936,905 36,936,905 US$ 35,708,491 35,708,491
0003 03 Dongshin
Engineering
&
Consultants
Construction
Supervision, Package
1: Bamyan to
Yakawlang
US$ 2,558,447 2,558,447 US$ 2,309,716 2,309,716
0004 03 Dongshin
Engineering
&
Consultants
Construction
Supervision, Package
2: Mazar-e-Sharif to
Dar-i-Suf
US$ 3,189,202 3,189,202 US$ 2,548,341 2,548,341
0005 02 Amin Qasim Equipment, Lot 1 US$ 1,356,075 1,356,075 US$ 1,356,074 1,356,074
0006 02 Amin Qasim Equipment, Lot 5 US$ 1,605,152 1,605,152 US$ 1,605,152 1,605,152
04 Interest Charge 1,999,592
PCSS = procurement contract summary sheet.
a
As of 2 September 2013.
b
The final withdrawal application of $1.228 million from Loan 2257 was under processed as of 6 September 2013.
Note: Category 01: Civil Works, Category 03: Project Management and Monitoring, Category 02: Cross Border Facilities, and Category 04: Interest Charge.
Sources: Asian Development Bank financial information system and eOperations.

31. 22Appendix4
Table A4.2: Grant 0054 (North–South Corridor Project)
Contract Issued Amount Disbursed
a
PCSS No.
Category
No. Contractor/Supplier Description
Currency
of
Contract
Contract
Amount $ Equivalent
Currency
of
Contract
Amount
Disbursed $ Equivalent
G01163 3201 Samwhan Construction,
Bamyan to
Yakawlang
US$ 32,128,969 32,128,969 US$ 32,128,969 32,128,969
G02428 3901 Various Staff salaries US$ 91,492 91,492 US$ 91,492 91,492
G03178 3901 Various Staff salaries US$ 91,395 91,395 US$ 91,395 91,395
G04057 3901 Purnendu Pathak Program
management
consultant
US$ 395,920 395,920 US$ 391,435 391,435
G04135 3901 Anil Kumar Ray Financial
management
specialist
US$ 105,000 105,000 US$ 100,024 100,024
G04136 3901 Md. Mizanur
Rahman
Resettlement
specialist
US$ 105,000 105,000 US$ 97,310 97,310
G04137 3901 Dr, Mohsin Almaji Environmental
specialist
US$ 98,000 98,000 US$ 91,274 91,274
G04148 3901 Various Staff salaries US$ 82,051 82,051 US$ 82,026 82,026
G04592 3901 Alok Kumar Project
management
specialist
US$ 101,000 101,000 US$ 97,767 97,767
G04732 3901 Various Staff salaries US$ 79,315 79,315 US$ 79,290 79,290
G05006 3901 Various Staff salaries US$ 44,741 44,741 US$ 44,741 44,741
G05337 3901 M/S Afghan Bureau
Collaboration Office
LARP
Package 1
AF 3,594,250 76,336 AF 2,817,892 61,742
G05338 3901 M/S Afghan Bureau
Collaboration Office
LARP
Package 2
AF 3,594,250 76,336 AF 2,817,892 62,205
G05339 3901 M/S Spring of
Construction
Rehabilitation
LARP
Package 3
AF 2,875,592 57,757 AF 1,409,040 31,063
G05477 3901 Various Staff salaries US$ 189,792 189,792 US$ 189,331 189,331
G05501 4802 ActionAID
Afghanistan
HIV
Consultant
US$ 550,760 550,760 US$ 471,467 471,467
G05508 3901 Mohammad Isa
Ansari
International
resettlement
specialist
US$ 73,500 73,500 US$ 23,227 23,227
G05697 3901 Various Staff salaries US$ 125,237 125,237 US$ 125,237 125,237
G06191 3901 Various Staff salaries US$ 166,116 166,116 US$ 165,991 165,991
G06440 3901 Various Staff salaries US$ 108,488 108,488 US$ 108,122 108,122
G06912 3901 Various Staff salaries US$ 165,542 165,542 US$ 165,505 165,505
G07366 3901 Various Staff salaries US$ 124,995 124,995 US$ 124,995 124,995

32. 23Appendix4
Contract Issued Amount Disbursed
a
PCSS No.
Category
No. Contractor/Supplier Description
Currency
of
Contract
Contract
Amount $ Equivalent
Currency
of
Contract
Amount
Disbursed $ Equivalent
G07676 3901 Various Staff salaries US$ 132,369 132,369 US$ 132,369 132,369
G08596 4801 Various Resettlement
cost
US$ 3,237,000 3,237,000 US$ 2,484,447 2,484,447
G08791
I07013
I07013
I07013
3901
3901
3901
3901
Various
Various
Various
Various
Staff salaries
Various
Various
Various
US$
US$
US$
US$
159,476
100
719,170
73,509
159,476
100
719,170
73,509
US$
US$
US$
US$
159,476
100
719,170
73,509
159,476
100
719,170
73,509
AF = afghani; PCSS = procurement contract summary sheet.
a
As of 2 September 2013.
Note: Category 3201 = Civil Works; Category 3901 = Incremental Project Management Support; Category 4802 = HIV/AIDS & Anti-Human Trafficking Public
Campaign; and Category 4801 = Resettlement.

33. 24Appendix4
Table A4.3: Supplemental Financing from Grant 0135-AFG (North–South Corridor Project)
Contract Issued Amount Disburseda
PCSS
No.
Category
No.
Contractor/S
upplier Description
Currency
of
Contract
Contract
Amount
$
Equivalent
Currency
of
Contract
Amount
Disbursed
$
Equivalent
G03162 3202 Various Price variation,
contract 3
US$ 16,059,525 16,059,525 US$ 13,521,762 13,521,762
G04389 3202 Samwhan Construction,
Pul-i-Baraq to
Dar-i-Suf
US$ 9,274,313 9,274,313 US$ 7,881,893 7,881,893
G04390 3202 Samwhan Construction,
Mazar-e-Sharif to
Pul-i-Baraq
US$ 8,816,932 8,816,932 US$ 8,765,723 8,765,723
G06649 3102 Dongshin
Engineering &
Consultants
Construction
supervision,
package 2:
Mazar-e-Sharif to
Dar-i-Suf
US$ 400,000 400,000 US$ 359,031 359,031
G08058 3102 Dongshin
Engineering &
Consultants
Feasibility study:
Yakawlang-Dar-i-
Suf
US$ 1,083,915 1,083,915 US$ 1,025,965 1,025,965
PCSS = procurement contract summary sheet.
a
As of 2 September 2013.
Note: Category 3202 = Civil Works; and Category 3102 = Consulting Services.
Table A4.4: Financing from JFPR 9097-AFG (North–South Corridor Project)
Contract Issued Amount Disburseda
Contract
No.
Category
No. Contractor/Supplier Description
Currency
of
Contract
Contract
Amount
$
Equivalent
Currency
of
Contract
Amount
Disbursed
$
Equivalent
V-07-399 5100 Samwhan Construction,
Bamyan to
Yakawlang
US$ 20,000,000 20,000,000 US$ 20,000,000 20,000,000
a
As of 2 September 2013.
Note: Category 5100 = Civil works.

34. 25Appendix4
Table A4.5: Projected and Actual Disbursements, by Year
($ million)
Item 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013a
Annual projection 8.9 34.5 28.3 32.9 26.0 26.3 16.6
Cumulative projection 8.9 43.4 71.6 104.5 130.5 156.8 173.4b
Annual, actual 13.3 11.3 24.2 50.2 25.6 33.7 13.8b
Cumulative, actual 13.3 24.6 48.8 99.0 124.6 158.3 172.1c
a
As of 2 September 2013
b
Including disbursements from JFPR Grant 9097 and supplemental financing under ADB Grant 0135.
c
The final withdrawal application of $1.228 million submitted for disbursement from Loan 2257 was under process as of 6 September 2013.
Sources: ADB project performance report system, financial information system, and eOperations.
Figure A4: Cumulative Disbursementsa
a
As of 2 September 2013.
Source: Asian Development Bank estimates.
0.0
20.0
40.0
60.0
80.0
100.0
120.0
140.0
160.0
180.0
200.0
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 a
Annual Projection Cummulative Projection
Annual Actual Cummulative Actual

35. 26Appendix4
a
As of 2 September 2013.
b
The final withdrawal application of about $1.228 million had been submitted for disbursement from Loan 2257,
which was under process as of 6 September 2013 is not yet included in the actual disbursements.
c
Actual disbursements are being done to supplementary financing provided for cost overrun.
Source: Asian Development Bank estimates.
Table A4.6: Projected and Actual Disbursements, by Component
Item Total Cost
Appraisal Estimate Actuala
A. Base cost
1. Land acquisition 1.00 1.90
2. Resettlement 1.00 2.50
3. Civil works 100.70 155.02 b
4. Cross-borrder facility 4.00 2.96
5. HIV/AIDS and anti–human trafficking 1.50 0.47
6. Project management and monitoring 5.40 6.25
7. Incremental project management support 1.20 2.57
8. Taxes and duties 1.70 1.09
Subtotal (A) 116.50 172.76
B. Contingencies
1. Physical 15.20
2. Price 4.40
Subtotal (B) 19.60 0
C. Interest during grace period 4.80 2.37
Total Project Cost 140.90 175.13c

36. 27Appendix5
PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
0
0
2.148 3.222 3.222 3.222 3.222 3.222 3.222 3.222
3.511254589
5.267 5.267 5.267 5.267 5.267 5.267 5.267 1.755627294
0.150804157 0.226 0.226 0.226 0.226 0.226 0.226 0.226 0.075402079
0.180891234 0.271 0.271 0.271 0.271 0.271
0.033896566 0.051 0.051 0.051 0.051 0.051
0.389003667 0.584 0.584
Original Implementation ScheduleImplementation Period
1 Civil Works Package 1
2
Extended Implementation Schedule
No Project Component
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
3 Civil Works Package 3
Civil Works Package 2
5 Cross-border facilities
4 Consultant Services
6 Incremental cost
2012 2013
8 Resettlement Program
7 HIV/AIDS and Anti-Human Trafficking
Original Schedule
Actual Progress

37. 28 Appendix 6
STATUS OF COMPLIANCE WITH LOAN/GRANT COVENANTS
Covenant
Reference in
Financing Agreement Status of Compliance
In the carrying out of the Project and operation
of the Project facilities, the Beneficiary shall
perform, or cause to be performed, all
obligations set forth in Schedule 5 to this
Financing Agreement.
Article IV, section 4.01 Complied with. The executing agency
carried out all obligations set forth in
schedule 5.
The Beneficiary shall (i) maintain, or cause to
be maintained, separate accounts for the
Project, including separate accounts for the
Loan and the Grant; (ii) have such accounts
and related financial statements audited
annually, in accordance with appropriate
auditing standards consistently applied, by
independent auditors whose qualifications,
experience and terms of reference are
acceptable to ADB; (iii) furnish to ADB, as
soon as available but in any event not later
than 6 months after the end of each related
fiscal year, certified copies of such audited
accounts and financial statements and the
report of the auditors relating thereto (including
the auditors' opinion on the use of the Loan
proceeds and the Grant proceeds and
compliance with the financial covenants of this
Financing Agreement as well as on the use of
the procedures for imprest account and
statement of expenditures), all in the English
language, provided that the Beneficiary may
submit such certified copies (A) not later than
8 months after the end of the fiscal year 2007,
(B) not later than 7 months after the end of the
fiscal year 2008, and (C) not later than 6
months after the end of the fiscal year 2009
and thereafter; and (iv) furnish to ADB such
other information concerning such accounts
and financial statements and the audit thereof
as ADB shall from time to time reasonably
request.
Article IV, section 4.02a Complied with:
(i) MPW maintained separate accounts
and records for the project.
(ii)The accounts were subjected to
yearly audits by an independent,
qualified auditor engaged with the
concurrence of ADB and the accounts
were found to be in order. No issues
were noted in the management letters.
(iii) The yearly audit reports were
submitted to ADB as required in the
grant agreement, although in 2011 the
reports were submitted 2.7 months late.
The Beneficiary shall enable ADB, upon ADB's
request, to discuss the Beneficiary's financial
statements for the Project and its financial
affairs related to the Project from time to time
with the auditors appointed by the Beneficiary
pursuant to Section 4.02(a) Here above, and
shall authorize and require any representative
of such auditors to participate in any such
discussions requested by ADB, provided that
any such discussion shall be conducted only in
the presence of an authorized officer of the
Beneficiary unless the Beneficiary shall
otherwise agree.
Article IV, section 4.02b Complied with. The executing agency
allowed ADB to discuss the beneficiary's
financial statements for the project as
needed.

38. Appendix 6 29
Covenant
Reference in
Financing Agreement Status of Compliance
The Beneficiary shall enable ADB's
representatives to inspect the Project, the
goods financed out of the proceeds of the
Loan and the Grant, and any relevant records
and documents.
Article IV, section 4.03 Complied with. ADB was able to inspect
the project and records as needed.
Imprest Account, Statement of Expenditures:
(a) The Beneficiary shall establish immediately
after the Effective Date, an imprest account at
Da Afghanistan Bank. The imprest account
shall be established, managed, replenished
and liquidated in accordance with ADB's "Loan
Disbursement Handbook" dated January
2001, as amended from time to time. The
initial amount to be deposited shall not exceed
the lower of (i) the estimated expenditure for
the first six months of Project implementation,
or (ii) the equivalent of ten (10 percent of the
Grant amount.
(b) The SOE procedure may be used for
reimbursement of eligible expenditures and to
liquidate advances provided into the imprest
account, in accordance with ADB's Loan
Disbursement Handbook dated January 2001,
as amended from time to time, and detailed
arrangements agreed upon between the
Beneficiary and ADB. Any individual payment
to be reimbursed or liquidated under the SOE
procedure shall not exceed the equivalent of
$50,000.
Para. 5, schedule 3 Complied with. Imprest account was
established under the related
Grant 0054 at Da Afghanistan Bank in
November 2007, with an initial advance
of $100,000, and it was managed,
replenished, and liquidated in
accordance with ADB's Loan
Disbursement Handbook (2001, as
amended from time to time).
Project Executing Agency:
MPW shall be the Project Executing Agency,
and shall be responsible for overall
supervision and execution of all parts of the
Project, except that (a) MOPH shall be the
Project Executing Agency for Part B(iii), and
(b) MOF shall be the Project Executing
Agency for Part A(ii).
Para. 1, schedule 5 Complied with. MPW was the executing
agency for all roadworks. MOPH for the
HIV/AIDS component, and MOF for the
cross-border facilities.
Project Management Unit; Implementation
arrangements:
Established, Staffed, and Operating project
management unit (PMU) or project
implementation unit (PIU)
Para. 2, schedule 5 Complied with. The project was
implemented through the existing PMU.
In addition, a program management
office (PMO) was also established with
separate teams to oversee technical and
engineering functions under each
contract, legal matters, due diligence on
new projects, safeguards, finance and
administration, evaluation, monitoring
and reporting, and results measurement
and capacity development (training,
policy advisory, management
information systems and procedures).
Project Management Unit; Implementation
arrangements:
The deputy minister of MPW shall have the
overall responsibility for Project management
as the Project director of the PMU. The
Para. 3, schedule 5 Complied with. MPW implemented the
project according to the loan agreement.
The deputy minister exercised overall
responsibility for the project and the
PMU.

39. 30 Appendix 6
Covenant
Reference in
Financing Agreement Status of Compliance
existing staff of the PMU (three engineers, one
accountant, and an office administrator) shall
continue to support the Project. MPW shall
assign a team of two engineers, one
land/revenue officer, and one office
administrator to the site office/s of the Project
management consultants within two months of
the site office/s being set up. MPW staff,
stationed in the field, shall handle day-to-day
Project implementation.
Project Management Unit; Implementation
arrangements:
Part A (ii), of the Project, Provision of Cross-
Border Facilities, shall be implemented by the
Customs Department of MOF.
Para. 4, schedule 5 Complied with. The director general of
the customs department administered
the day-to-day implementation of this
part of the project. The project was
successfully completed.
Security:
The Beneficiary shall provide adequate
security for the smooth and uninterrupted
implementation of the Project.
Para. 6, schedule 5 Complied with. Some security incidents
occurred in the civil works package 2
area of the project and works were
affected. MPW addressed the matter
with the Ministry of Interior to provide
additional security at the site for the
implementation of the project.
Security:
The Beneficiary shall ensure that (i) all civil
works contracts contain requirements to
prepare an action plan for adequate security
for the smooth and uninterrupted
implementation of the project, (ii) the cost of
implementing such a plan is included in the
budget for civil works, and (iii) such a plan is
fully implemented.
Para. 7, schedule 5 Complied with. The project faced serious
security challenges, which delayed
implementation and affected progress,
but the security issues were resolved
through discussions between the
government and ADB and the provision
of additional security not envisaged
originally. In October 2011, the Ministry
of Interior authorized the establishment
of additional security checkpoints along
the road and assigned 102 additional
policemen. The revised plan allowed the
project to be successfully completed.
Security:
The Beneficiary shall work with local
communities to ensure that poppy cultivation
does not take place in the Project areas, and
measures are introduced to detect and prevent
opium smuggling along the Project roads.
Para. 8, schedule 5 Complied with. This is not a traditional
poppy-growing area. The UN Office on
Drugs and Crime declared the provinces
poppy free since 2007. However, the
government continues to monitor the
situation in the project areas.
Road Master Plan:
Within three months of the effective date, the
beneficiary shall approve the Road Master
Plan for road network improvement, which will
guide the road development and maintenance,
and shall establish, sufficiently resource and
empower, the master plan unit in MPW to
program and implement the Road Master
Plan.
Para. 9, schedule 5 Complied with. The road master plan
(RMP) has been approved by the
government. The road network
development program is being
implemented according to the RMP.
MPW has established a road master
plan unit (RMPU) under the planning
department of MPW. Further, a planning
and programming unit (PPU) will be
created under the PMO.