The argument asserts that the trial court erred in finding that Ms. Cobbs was not subjected to a custodial interrogation. It argues that under the totality of circumstances test used to determine if a custodial interrogation occurred, Ms. Cobbs' interrogation satisfies both prongs. First, the location, being a small windowless room, and duration, being several hours, of the interrogation satisfy two factors of the totality of circumstances test. Second, a reasonable person in Ms. Cobbs' situation would not have felt free to leave given the coercive environment of the isolated, prolonged interrogation. Therefore, the court should have suppressed her statements obtained without Miranda warnings.

1. ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT MS. COBBS HAD NOT
BEEN SUBJECTED TO A CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION BECAUSE THERE
WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF THE FACTORS COMPRISING THE TEST
COURTS APPLY TO DETERMINE WHETHER A CUSTODIAL
INTERROGATION HAS TAKEN PLACE.
Ms. Cobbs endured a custodial interrogation because there is sufficient evidence under
the factors that courts use to determine if a custodial interrogation has taken place showing that
she was indeed in custody for Miranda purposes. Furthermore, under the second prong of the test
used, a reasonable person in Ms. Cobbs’s place, given the circumstances presented under the
factor test, would have felt that she was not free to stop the interrogation and leave.
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution mandates that “No person shall…be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself…” U.S. Const. Amend. V. The
landmark Supreme Court opinion, Miranda v. Arizona, established that once an individual is
sufficiently restrained by law enforcement in an interview or interrogation predicament, they
must be informed of their rights under the Fifth Amendment. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
478-479 (1966). These are part of the “prophylactic procedural rules” that law enforcement must
adhere to when a custodial interrogation occurs. The test for whether an interrogation has
occurred revolves around whether a person is in custody. “Custody” is a term of art entailing
circumstances which give rise to a serious danger of coercion on the part of law enforcement that
would cause a person to self-incriminate without being advised of their rights, in violation of the
Fifth Amendment and the precedent set forth in Miranda. Howes v. Fields 132 S.Ct. 1181, 1189
(2012).
Courts have developed a two-pronged test for analyzing whether a person is in custody
for the purposes of a Fifth Amendment violation. First, a totality of the circumstances test

2. examines five factors: 1) the location of the questioning; 2) the duration of the questioning; 3)
statements made during the questioning; 4) presence or absence of restraints; and 5) whether the
interviewee was released after being questioned. Howes, 132 S.Ct. at 1189. The fifth factor is not
at issue in this case because Ms. Cobbs was in jail at the time of her questioning, so she could not
be formally released at the end of her interrogation; she was simply released back into the
general jail population.
The second prong of the analysis involves an objective inquiry as to whether “in light of
the objective circumstances of the interrogation” (Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322-
323, 325 (1994)) would “a reasonable person have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate
the interrogation and leave” (Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995)). The subjective
viewpoints of both the questioning officer and the interviewee are irrelevant. Id. Thus, it is
always true that if a defendant is found to be in custody under the totality test, and a reasonable
person in her shoes would not have felt free to leave, a violation of her 5th
Amendment rights has
occurred, and any statements obtained during the questioning at issue are inadmissible. Miranda,
384 U.S. at 476.
In this case, Ms. Cobb’s endured a lengthy, isolated interrogation where officers shut her
inside a small room within the jail and interrogated her for hours, failing to communicate directly
to her that she was free to leave, made coercive statements towards her, and left an officer by the
closed door with his hand on his holster to keep her from getting up. This not only meets the
totality of the circumstances case, but a reasonable person in Ms. Cobbs’s place would not have
felt free to leave. Therefore, the statements made during the questioning of Ms. Cobbs should
have been suppressed.

3. A. The trial court erred in holding that Ms. Cobbs was not subjected to a custodial
interrogation because there is sufficient evidence to show that Ms. Cobbs satisfies the
totality of the circumstances test for determining whether an individual is in custody.
1. Ms. Cobbs satisfies the “location” factor of the totality test because the room she was
interrogated in was small, windowless, and in general reflective of the “jailhouse” type of
rooms implicated in Miranda.
Because Ms. Cobbs was locked away into a small, windowless room where she was
interrogated for hours, she satisfies the “location” factor of the totality test. The location of
questioning establishes whether there was a restraint on the freedom of movement on the person
being questioned such that a custodial interrogation may be taking place. Maryland v. Shatzer,
130 S.Ct. 1213, 1224 (2010). The court in that case reasoned that a typical situation where a
custodial interrogation may be taking place is one where a person is taken from their normal life
and placed in isolation in a police-dominated environment while being questioned. Id at 1220-
1221. Furthermore, in Miranda the Court held that interrogation in an “unfamiliar”, “police
dominated” environment where the defendant was held “incommunicado” gives rise to the
inference that the defendant is in custody, and thus under the umbrella of protections that
Miranda mandates under the 5th
Amendment. Miranda, 86 S.Ct. at 467.
For example, in Miranda the defendant was held incommunicado in a room at the police
station where he was questioned by police officers, detectives and a prosecuting attorney. The
Court found that such a location implicated a custodial interrogation because the defendant was
separated from the outside world and his normal life. Miranda, 86 S.Ct. at 445. However, the
Court in Miranda also held that custodial interrogations may occur when a defendant’s “freedom
of action” is curtailed “in any significant way.” Id at 436. This is demonstrated in cases where a

4. police domination occurs even in a person’s home, such as when police enter a defendant’s
apartment and hold him at gunpoint, subsequently restraining his movement with weapons
lowered. U.S. v. Fautz, 812 F.Supp.2d 570, 619 (D.N.J. 2011). In that case, the court found that
the defendant’s freedom of action was sufficiently curtailed by police actions to such an extent
that custodial interrogation was implicated because the armed officers prevented the defendant
from moving at all. Id.
In contrast, police do not have to issue Miranda warnings during routine traffic stops
because the public nature of the stop imposes less of a coercive atmosphere on an individual.
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437-438. The court there reasoned that because a motorist
is typically able to continue on their way after a brief stop, and they are in view of the public
rather than restrained in an incommunicado manner or held in a highly restrictive manner, they
are not in custody for purposes of a Miranda inquiry. Id.
In this case, the location of the interrogation took place in the “break-out room”, which
was an 8x8 foot room with no windows and a flickering light. (R-13, ll. 11-14). This is like the
“jailhouse” setting in Miranda, where a defendant feels the coercive effects of a police
interrogation more readily, and contrasts sharply with a routine traffic stop in view of the general
public, such as that in Berkemer. Furthermore, the fact that Ms. Cobbs was outnumbered by
armed police, one of whom had his hand on his holstered weapon, makes her situation similar to
the defendant in Fautz, and the court there found the defendant was not free to leave even when
he was in his own home. Ms. Cobbs’s situation sufficiently meets the location factor because she
was taken into a small interrogation room where she was outnumbered by armed officers. Thus,
custodial interrogation was implicated because Ms. Cobbs’s freedom of action was limited in a
significant way due to the location she was placed in.

5. 2. Ms. Cobbs was held for a sufficient duration to satisfy the “duration” factor of the
totality test because she was held for several hours in the room she was questioned in.
The “duration” factor is satisfied in this case because Ms. Cobbs was held for what
appears to be many hours during the period of questioning. Courts have determined that longer,
jailhouse-type interrogations that are demonstrated in Miranda are more conducive to an
interrogation than an encounter which only lasts a few minutes. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S.
420, 437-438 (1984). This characterization helps to determine whether a person may be in
custody for the purposes of a Fifth Amendment inquiry. Id.
For example, a routine customs inquiry that lasts fifteen minutes is too short a duration to
be considered in the totality test. U.S. v. Pratt, 645 F.2d 89, 91 (1st
Cir. 1981). In that case, even
though the questioning had some other circumstances that could have implied a person was in
custody, the duration of the questioning on its own was too short for the court to consider it a
factor in its analysis. Id. On the other hand, “at least an hour” appears to be long enough to
consider an in custody for the purposes of a duration analysis. U.S. v. Garcia, 496 F.2d 670, 672-
673 (5th
Cir. 1974). In that case, the defendant was detained for an hour or more during a border
crossing stop by border patrol agents. The court found that her being detained for as long as she
was constituted a border patrol search that was not routine, and reasoned she was in custody. Id.
Furthermore, in Howes the defendant was held for five to seven hours in a prison setting, in a
separate room similar to the one Ms. Cobbs was held in. Howes, 132 S.Ct. at 1193. The Court
reasoned that because the defendant was held for such a long time, the possibility that he was
under custodial interrogation was implicated. Id.
In this case, Ms. Cobbs was held in the room she was questioned in for well over an hour.
Officer Reynolds stated it was not “brief”, and went from the afternoon to well after the dinner

6. hour. (R-13, ll 34-36). This easily fits within the framework offered by the Fifth Circuit in
Garcia. Moreover, she seems to have been held for several hours, rather than simple “at least one
hour”, similar to the defendant in Howes, and the Court there reasoned that the defendant had
been held long enough to implicate custodial interrogation. Thus, Ms. Cobbs has sufficient
evidence to satisfy the duration factor of the totality test.