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Tracking Hackers
By Tyler Hudak
tyler@hudakville.com
What we will cover
 There are many ways to track “hackers” back to
learn more about them
 Will go over some easy methods that may
produce fruitful results
 Will not cover every single way
 Two real life examples of using these techniques
will be covered
Tracking Hackers
 Attackers often leave various unique calling
cards that you can use to track them back
 These include email addresses, names, IP
addresses, tool names, images, techniques, etc.
 Various tools on the Internet can be used to find
more information on them
 Can sometimes figure out how good they are
with the information you find.
Note: Your mileage may vary.
Emails
 Emails provide more information than you may
realize.
 Mail headers
 Who sent the email (IP address, name)?
 Web-based email often has creator's IP address
 What mail software were they using?
 Who does the email go back to?
 Mail content
 Plain text or HTML?
 HTML comments? Image locations, links?
Names
 Once you've found some information (name,
address, etc) what can you do with it?
 Search for it on the Internet!
 Many different places on the Internet to get
information
 Google – search for other occurences of names,
other people seeing the same thing
 Member directories – many large websites have
directories with information on their members
 Yahoo, ICQ, myspace, youtube, etc.
Names
 Domain Names – Who owns it? What else do
they own? What is their contact information?
 http://www.completewhois.com
 IP Addresses – Where is the IP address located?
Is there anyone else seeing attacks from this
address?
 http://www.arin.net - look up IP information
 http://www.dshield.org - Internet DB of attacks
Example 1
eBay Phish
eBay Phish
 Received an eBay phish attempt in my email
eBay Phish
 Header shows originating IP address as 216.66.20.82
 WHOIS lookup on address shows owned by Hurricane
Electric
 Reverse DNS lookup: servidor8.hgmnetwork.com
 Spanish ISP/Hosting Provider
 No more information – probably open relay
 Google search of jessman335 finds a few
message board spam
eBay Phish
 All images in email link back to eBay
 One interesting link for “respond here”:
http://signinebaycomwsebayisapdllsgd.pop3.ru/BayISAPIdllSig
nInUsingSSLpUserIdcopartnerId2siteid77ruhttpAF2Fcontacteb
aycouk3A802Fws2FeBayIS711eBayISAPIdllSignInUsingSSLpUs
erIa.txt
Notice anything unusual about the link?
eBay Phish
 The link went to an HTML file with a txt extension
 Therefore, not rendered in browser as an HTML file
 Typical phish would try to mimic eBay login page and
email results to phisher
 We now have an address – bad_boy_maf@yahoo.com
 Look it up in Yahoo Profiles
Dramatic Pause Here
eBay Phish
 Now we have a picture, name, age and other websites
to look at
 Two of the websites are down but one is still active
 Last website gives his birth date, real name, astrological
sign, IRC nick and channels he frequents, Yahoo
messenger ID, favorite links, etc.
 Download section on the webpage has links to various
scanners, bots and attacker scripts
Example 2
Hacked Honeypot
Honeypot - Background
 Linux 7.1 honeypot was put up for my GCFA
certification in May 2004
 Hacked, analyzed and written about*
 In early 2006 Robert Wright and I started
looking into the group which hacked the
honeypot to see how much info we could find.
 This is what we found…
*The paper can be found at http://www.hudakville.com/infosec
Email Address
 In the compromise, the attacker downloaded a
rootkit named l1tere.tgz and sent emails to
l1tere@yahoo.com
 Profiles.yahoo.com shows no information
 Google search of email address finds 2 reports
of compromises
 Another hacked honeypot
 ID Theft trojan
 Neither provide more information
Another search
 Changed Google search to “l1tere”
 Bingo! Found web page at
http://www.l1tere.5u.com
 Contained pornographic cartoons and
photos
 Email address link to
l1tere@yahoo.com
 Looking in /images/ directory find
index with more images
 Many of them other people
What now?
 L1tere homepage has no more info
 Try Googling the images we found
 Specifically the ones with people in them
 One of the images: d4r3ck.jpg
 A name?
 Google: inurl: d4r3ck.jpg = no
hits
 Google: inurl: d4r3ck = 
d4r3ck
 Two pages from search but only one active
 http://d4r3ck.8m.net/
 More images, pictures of family, friends
 Some of the same pics as l1tere
 Email address: d4r3ck@personal.ro
 List of IRC nicks and channels he frequents
 What happens if we try and Google just for
d4r3ck?
Carding
 Google search pulls up LOTS of IRC chat logs
related to #CCcards, #cardz
 IRC channels for trading credit card information
 D4r3ck is a channel OP
More on D4r3ck
 Further searches revealed
 other email addresses
 more CC trading information
 connections to other hackers
 Also appears to be former “European e-Commerce
Principal Assistant” for Hi-Tech Shells/IT e-solutions
World Company
 “Industry leader in providing web hosting services and shell
accounts to businesses in all 50 states”
 Located in Romania
What about the other pictures?
 With each new find, more information was uncovered
 All are Romanian
 Look to be around 16-19 at the time the pictures were
taken
 All pictures had time stamps of 2004
 Most of their home pages had the same images
 Did an MD5 hash of the images
 Most matched site to site, but one didn’t
 Upon further examination it appeared be steganographic
baietzasul22
 aka. baietzasu, Ba|3tzasu
 Email Addresses
 phainu@k.ro
 baietzasu@yahoo.com
 Mentioned in a lot of the same
IRC logs as the other members
alinus
 Email addresses
 sales@gsm-mania.ro
 alinus22@yahoo.com
 http://alinus.s5.com/index.html
 Posts a lot of cell phone/GSM hacking forums
 Speaks English
 Profiles say he lives in Pitesti Arges, Romania
 ICQ # 167213752
Summary
 You can use little tidbits of information found
within a phish, compromise, email to find more
information on who sent it
 The Internet is full of sources – use them
 Be creative! Look at names, images, logs, etc.
 Don’t always expect to find something.
 Sometimes there’s nothing out there.
 Lots of dead ends.
Questions/Comments?

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fdocuments.in_tracking-hackers-56ed6be29ae97.ppt

  • 1. Tracking Hackers By Tyler Hudak tyler@hudakville.com
  • 2. What we will cover  There are many ways to track “hackers” back to learn more about them  Will go over some easy methods that may produce fruitful results  Will not cover every single way  Two real life examples of using these techniques will be covered
  • 3. Tracking Hackers  Attackers often leave various unique calling cards that you can use to track them back  These include email addresses, names, IP addresses, tool names, images, techniques, etc.  Various tools on the Internet can be used to find more information on them  Can sometimes figure out how good they are with the information you find. Note: Your mileage may vary.
  • 4. Emails  Emails provide more information than you may realize.  Mail headers  Who sent the email (IP address, name)?  Web-based email often has creator's IP address  What mail software were they using?  Who does the email go back to?  Mail content  Plain text or HTML?  HTML comments? Image locations, links?
  • 5. Names  Once you've found some information (name, address, etc) what can you do with it?  Search for it on the Internet!  Many different places on the Internet to get information  Google – search for other occurences of names, other people seeing the same thing  Member directories – many large websites have directories with information on their members  Yahoo, ICQ, myspace, youtube, etc.
  • 6. Names  Domain Names – Who owns it? What else do they own? What is their contact information?  http://www.completewhois.com  IP Addresses – Where is the IP address located? Is there anyone else seeing attacks from this address?  http://www.arin.net - look up IP information  http://www.dshield.org - Internet DB of attacks
  • 8. eBay Phish  Received an eBay phish attempt in my email
  • 9. eBay Phish  Header shows originating IP address as 216.66.20.82  WHOIS lookup on address shows owned by Hurricane Electric  Reverse DNS lookup: servidor8.hgmnetwork.com  Spanish ISP/Hosting Provider  No more information – probably open relay  Google search of jessman335 finds a few message board spam
  • 10. eBay Phish  All images in email link back to eBay  One interesting link for “respond here”: http://signinebaycomwsebayisapdllsgd.pop3.ru/BayISAPIdllSig nInUsingSSLpUserIdcopartnerId2siteid77ruhttpAF2Fcontacteb aycouk3A802Fws2FeBayIS711eBayISAPIdllSignInUsingSSLpUs erIa.txt Notice anything unusual about the link?
  • 11. eBay Phish  The link went to an HTML file with a txt extension  Therefore, not rendered in browser as an HTML file  Typical phish would try to mimic eBay login page and email results to phisher  We now have an address – bad_boy_maf@yahoo.com  Look it up in Yahoo Profiles
  • 13.
  • 14. eBay Phish  Now we have a picture, name, age and other websites to look at  Two of the websites are down but one is still active  Last website gives his birth date, real name, astrological sign, IRC nick and channels he frequents, Yahoo messenger ID, favorite links, etc.  Download section on the webpage has links to various scanners, bots and attacker scripts
  • 16. Honeypot - Background  Linux 7.1 honeypot was put up for my GCFA certification in May 2004  Hacked, analyzed and written about*  In early 2006 Robert Wright and I started looking into the group which hacked the honeypot to see how much info we could find.  This is what we found… *The paper can be found at http://www.hudakville.com/infosec
  • 17. Email Address  In the compromise, the attacker downloaded a rootkit named l1tere.tgz and sent emails to l1tere@yahoo.com  Profiles.yahoo.com shows no information  Google search of email address finds 2 reports of compromises  Another hacked honeypot  ID Theft trojan  Neither provide more information
  • 18. Another search  Changed Google search to “l1tere”  Bingo! Found web page at http://www.l1tere.5u.com  Contained pornographic cartoons and photos  Email address link to l1tere@yahoo.com  Looking in /images/ directory find index with more images  Many of them other people
  • 19. What now?  L1tere homepage has no more info  Try Googling the images we found  Specifically the ones with people in them  One of the images: d4r3ck.jpg  A name?  Google: inurl: d4r3ck.jpg = no hits  Google: inurl: d4r3ck = 
  • 20. d4r3ck  Two pages from search but only one active  http://d4r3ck.8m.net/  More images, pictures of family, friends  Some of the same pics as l1tere  Email address: d4r3ck@personal.ro  List of IRC nicks and channels he frequents  What happens if we try and Google just for d4r3ck?
  • 21. Carding  Google search pulls up LOTS of IRC chat logs related to #CCcards, #cardz  IRC channels for trading credit card information  D4r3ck is a channel OP
  • 22. More on D4r3ck  Further searches revealed  other email addresses  more CC trading information  connections to other hackers  Also appears to be former “European e-Commerce Principal Assistant” for Hi-Tech Shells/IT e-solutions World Company  “Industry leader in providing web hosting services and shell accounts to businesses in all 50 states”  Located in Romania
  • 23.
  • 24. What about the other pictures?  With each new find, more information was uncovered  All are Romanian  Look to be around 16-19 at the time the pictures were taken  All pictures had time stamps of 2004  Most of their home pages had the same images  Did an MD5 hash of the images  Most matched site to site, but one didn’t  Upon further examination it appeared be steganographic
  • 25. baietzasul22  aka. baietzasu, Ba|3tzasu  Email Addresses  phainu@k.ro  baietzasu@yahoo.com  Mentioned in a lot of the same IRC logs as the other members
  • 26. alinus  Email addresses  sales@gsm-mania.ro  alinus22@yahoo.com  http://alinus.s5.com/index.html  Posts a lot of cell phone/GSM hacking forums  Speaks English  Profiles say he lives in Pitesti Arges, Romania  ICQ # 167213752
  • 27. Summary  You can use little tidbits of information found within a phish, compromise, email to find more information on who sent it  The Internet is full of sources – use them  Be creative! Look at names, images, logs, etc.  Don’t always expect to find something.  Sometimes there’s nothing out there.  Lots of dead ends.