Effects of Politics on Security in Bungoma

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF EASTERN AFRICA
FACULTY OF ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
EFFECTS OF POLITICS ON SECURITY IN KENYA
(A Case Study of Bungoma)
A Research Project submitted to the Catholic University of Eastern Africa in
partial fulfillment for the requirements of an award of the degree of Bachelor of
Arts in Social Sciences
BY
LUKHOBA, EDWARD WENYA
REG.NO.1020661
FEBRUARY, 2015
i

DECLARATION
This project report is my original work and has not been submitted for any award in any other
institution.
Name: Edward Wenya Lukhoba
Signature: ________________________
Date: ____________________________
This project report has been submitted with my approval as the university supervisor
Name: Mr. Solomon Onyango
Signature: ________________________
Date: ____________________________
This project has been submitted to the department of Social Sciences with my approval as the
Head of Department
Name: Mr. Samuel Wakanyua
Signature: ________________________
Date: ____________________________
ii

DEDICATION
I wish to dedicate this work to my parents Mr. and Mrs. Lukhoba and my siblings- Anne, Ezekiel
and Antony for their encouragement and love.
iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I wish to thank the Catholic University of Eastern Africa for enabling me conduct this research.
My particular thanks go to my supervisor Mr. Onyango, Solomon for his guidance and
encouragement, my friends and colleagues in the programme. I would like to acknowledge the
support of my parents and most of all to the Almighty God for giving me the strength and health
to endure.
iv

ABSTRACT
The study set out to investigate the effects of politics on security in Kenya focusing particularly
on Bungoma District between the period 1992 and 2007. As its hypothesis, it relied on the
question of whether the cases of insecurity in Bungoma were as a result of political factors. In
answering this hypothetical question, the study aimed to determine the numbers of people who
victimized during the clashes. The particular regions of Bungoma that were most affected were
also identified. The narratives and testimonies of the people that affected by the insecurity in
Bungoma were also recorded. The study also sought to respond to questions such as the causes
of insecurity in Bungoma, its intensity in terms of the profile and number of people most
affected, the period of its occurrence and the areas most affected.
The study reviewed literature by analyzing reports by human right, humanitarian agencies and
other Non-Government Organizations as well as the media. It also undertook analyses of
historical and contemporary accounts, information, reports and other forms of data connected
with insecurity in Bungoma and Mount Elgon areas in the period between 1992 and 2007.
Testimonies, case studies and narratives of victims of violence in the region were assessed and
some of them included for evidential purposes.
The study concluded that insecurity in Bungoma District and its surrounding areas was as a
result of factors such as ethnicity, the question of historical injustices, the nature of electoral
politics and criminal elements; all which worked in combination to aggravate the problem.
In offering solutions and making recommendations, the study suggested several ways in which to
tackle the question of violence perpetrated by criminal elements during electioneering periods
including effective law enforcement by the respective responsible agencies. The study suggested
constitutional solutions in resolving the question of land, made a case for building a Kenyan
society that was cohesive and suggested support programs for victims of violence by government
entities and civil society.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Contents Page
DECLARATION .............................................................................................................................................ii
DEDICATION................................................................................................................................................iii
ABSTRACT....................................................................................................................................................v
TABLE OF CONTENTS...................................................................................................................................vi
Contents Page....................................................................................................................................vi
LIST OF FIGURES........................................................................................................................................viii
CHAPTER ONE .............................................................................................................................................1
1.0. BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY..........................................................................................................1
1.1. INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................................1
1.2. PROBLEM STATEMENT......................................................................................................................6
1.3. MAIN OBJECTIVE...............................................................................................................................7
1.4. SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES........................................................................................................................7
1.5. RESEARCH QUESTIONS......................................................................................................................7
1.6. THE SCOPE OF THE STUDY................................................................................................................8
1.7. JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY..........................................................................................................8
CHAPTER 2.................................................................................................................................................11
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW............................................................................11
2.0. INTRODUCTION...............................................................................................................................11
2.1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK...........................................................................................................11
2.2. LITERATURE REVIEW.......................................................................................................................14
CHAPTER 3.................................................................................................................................................23
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY.......................................................................................................................23
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3.0. INTRODUCTION...............................................................................................................................23
3.1. RESEARCH DESIGN..........................................................................................................................23
3.2. LOCATION OF THE STUDY..............................................................................................................24
3.3. TARGET POPULATION ....................................................................................................................25
3.4. SAMPLING TECHNIQUES.................................................................................................................25
3.5. DATA COLLECTION..........................................................................................................................26
3.6. DATA ANALYSIS...............................................................................................................................26
CHAPTER 4.................................................................................................................................................27
DATA PRESENTATION AND INTERPRETATION............................................................................................27
4.0. INTRODUCTION...............................................................................................................................27
4.1. THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE KILLED AND DISPLACED IN BUNGOMA AS FROM 1992 UNTIL 2007 ......27
4.2. THE PEOPLE MOSTLY AFFECTED BY THE INSECURITY IN BUNGOMA FROM 1992 TO 2007............29
4.3. THE CAUSES OF INSECURITY IN BUNGOMA FROM 1992 TO 2007..................................................33
CHAPTER 5.................................................................................................................................................42
SUMMARY DISCUSSIONS OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMEDNATIONS.................................42
REFERENCES..............................................................................................................................................48
vii

LIST OF FIGURES
Content Page
viii

CHAPTER ONE
1.0. BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY
Security, according to Steans (2006), is a state of being safe, free from danger, injury and harm
of any sort. He further acknowledges that security has been understood in terms of the protection
of the national communities from violence- actual or potential. Huysman (2006) interpreted
insecurity threats or dangers to someone and therefore views it is a socially and politically
constructed phenomenon.
Sharma and Sharma (2000) define politics as the concern with the description and analysis of the
manner in which power is obtained, exercised and controlled, the purpose for which it is used,
the manner in which decisions are made, the factors which influence the making of those
decisions and the context in which those decisions take place.
The purpose of this research is to investigate how politics influences security using the case of
Bungoma County in Kenya. The research is confined to the period between 1992 and 2007.
1.1. INTRODUCTION
Insecurity in Africa can be traced from the colonial era where the anti-colonialists and freedom
fighters mobilized communities to liberate their countries from colonialism. This was followed
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by a great number of coups, many characterized by the individualistic nature of civil-military
relations in Africa (Liebenow, 1989). One such case is the 1971 coup in Uganda which occurred
when General Idi Amin grabbed power in a military coup against President Milton Obote
because Amin was afraid Obote might dismiss him. On the other hand, President Obote had
given orders for the arrest Amin because he posed a threat to his government (Mwakikagile,
2012).These state of affairs resulted into prolonged insecurity and a general state of instability in
Uganda spanning more than fifteen years from 1971 to 1986. Another case of insecurity in
Africa was witnessed in Libya in 1969 when Muammar Gaddafi spearheaded a military coup de
tat that led to the overthrowing of the government of King Idris 1 causing chaos in Libya.
African countries also experienced enormous incidents of insecurity during the periods of their
liberation struggle for independence from colonial rule. One example is the Algerian War of
Independence that t was led by National Liberation Front against the French between 1954 and
1962 which saw an end to the French rule that had begun in 1830 (Evans and Phillips, 2007).
The experience of insecurity in Kenya can similarly be traced back to the pre-independence
period. For instance, the Mau Mau guerrilla war of 1952-1955 was an unstructured violent revolt
amongst Africans mostly Kikuyu, against land alienation, political and economic inequality. The
war was fought mainly in the northern Kikuyu districts of Nyeri and Fort Hall and the
mountains, particularly the dense bush of the Aberdares Forest. The war led to the death of at
least 14,000 Africans most of whom were Mau Mau supporters, 29 Asians and 95 Europeans
bringing insecurity in that region of Kenya (Hornsby, 2012).
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Although Kenya remained fairly secure during a significant part of its post-independent history,
its first and by far the most significant experience of insecurity was witnessed during the reign of
President Jomo Kenyatta with the assassination of Tom Mboya in 1969 sparking ethnic unrest
that culminated into the banning of Kenya People’s Union (KPU) party and the arrest of
Jaramogi Oginga Odinga. This left Kenya African Union (KANU) as the only political party to
contest elections.
During the reign of President Daniel Arap Moi, Kenya also witnessed political tensions which
spilled over into violence starting with the bombing of Norfolk Hotel in Nairobi’s Central
Business District on New Year’s Eve on the 31st
December 1980. The hotel was partially
destroyed, fifteen people killed and more than eighty others wounded. The regime of President
Moi reigned in and suppressed political opposition by first officially declaring Kenya a one-party
state in June 1982. These would lead into an attempted coup two months later on Sunday 1st
August 1982. In early morning, of that day at around 2 am., non-commissioned officers mainly
of the Luo ethnicity from the Kenya Air Force rebelled and took over Embakasi, Eastleigh and
Nanyuki Airbases before seizing Jomo Kenyatta Airport, the Post Office and the Voice of
Kenya, the only broadcasting station at the time. The coup aborted because the coup leaders
failed to get the support of the bomb loaders and other pilots (Hornsby, 2012). The events
immediately after, created extensive insecurity, mostly in Nairobi but also in other parts of
Kenya.
In more recent history, insecurity also manifested itself in Kenya during the 1992 ethnic violence
which pitted the Kalenjin and Maasai who were supporters of the Moi government on one hand,
3

against the Luo, Luhyia and the Kikuyu communities who were mostly associated with
opposition politics. This particular episode of insecurity that was politically triggered led to the
loss of more than 1,500 and the displacement of more than 300,000 people (Ahluwalia et al.,
2007) causing much tension in the country.
More recently, insecurity was witnessed in Kenya after the 2007 general elections when the
country experienced large scale violence whose consequences were devastating. Violence
erupted because of the wide spread anger expressed by supporters of Raila Odinga of the Orange
Democratic Movement when President Kibaki was declared the winner of the presidential
elections held on 27th
December 2007. Supporters of Kibaki’s opponent alleged electoral
manipulation. The violence led to the death of 1,300 people and the displacement of more than
600,000 (Njogu, 2009).
Some incidents of political violence have been confined to particular areas. In the 2000s,
Marsabit district, in the North Eastern part of Kenya witnessed insecurity as a result of political
differences and inter-clan rivalry between the Gabra, then led by the late Bonaya Godana, a
Member of Parliament for North Horr, and the Borana led by the late Guracha Galgalo, an
Member of Parliament for Moyale. Causes of rivalries between these two communities were
based on several ranging from policy to border demarcations between the two constituencies and
the use of common range resources. The Borana claimed that the Gabra had become arrogant and
provocative to their neighbors as a result of the immense political influence that the Gabra had
acquired within government circles. This led the Borana attacking Turbi village, killing close to
100 people and driving away with hundreds of animals in what became known as the Turbi
4

Massacre of August 2005 (Baregu, 2011).
Most recently, insecurity in Kenya was observed in Tana River in August 2012 during fighting
between the agriculturalist Pokomo and the pastoralist Orma communities in which at least 180
people died and more than 34,000 were displaced. Issues of these conflicts were linked to
struggles for political power and in particular competition to gain control of the devolved system
of government (Commonwealth Observer Group, 2013).
In the case of Bungoma, which is the subject of this research, insecurity was experienced from
January to April 1992 when ethnic clashes escalated in the district and its neighboring Trans
Nzoia district. This resulted into deaths, burning of houses and stealing of livestock as the clash
victims fled for their lives. This conflict between the Bukusu and Sabaot tribes had strong
political undertones which among other things culminated in the carving out of Mt. Elgon
District from the old Bungoma District. However one effect of the conflict was that many people
were displaced from Bungoma into the neighbouring Trans Nzoia District (Oucho, 2002),
escalating tensions in the region.
The waves of politically instigated violence and insecurity in Bungoma are visible not only
during the 1992 period but also in the years 1997, 2006 and 2007. Although some of the factors
of insecurity in Bungoma are probably as a result of ethnic clashes, unemployment and poverty
especially among the youth, political party contests, incitement, coffee smuggling among others;
there is no scientific data to support those assertions. This study therefore seek to carry out an
empirical investigation to determine whether political factors are the potential triggers or causes
of insecurity in Bungoma.
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1.2. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Insecurity in Kenya has a historical context. It began when the colonialists forcefully evicted
Kenyans from their fertile highlands to settle on the land to grow cash crops such as coffee and
tea for export to the European markets (Kumssa, et al., 2011). This led to conflicts in protest
against land alienation and the abuse of social and civil liberties of the indigenous. One such
example is the Mau Mau rebellion of 1952-1955 that led to the death of over 14,000 people
(Hornsby, 2012). These colonial conflicts created political and economic instability that
continued to influence subsequent conflict and insecurities experienced in Kenya from 1992 to
2007. In the most recent case of insecurity in Kenya-that following the 2007 general election, the
pockets of violent conflicts were witnessed in various hotspots such Nairobi, Kisumu, Eldoret,
Naivasha, Nakuru and Bungoma. The violence, sparked by rival political and ethnic differences
pitted the groups lead by opposition leader who had just lost the general elections against those
groups considered to support the winner. It led to 1,500 people killed and over 300,000 displaced
(Kumssa, et al., 2011).
The waves of politically instigated violence and insecurity in Bungoma, which played out in the
years 1992, 1997, 2006 and 2007, can also be traced to the early colonial setups in the area.
Although some of the factors such as unemployment and poverty, especially among the youth,
political party contests, incitement, coffee smuggling contribute toward these conflicts, there is
no scientific data to support one those assertions. This study therefore seeks to determine
whether political factors are the potential triggers of insecurity in Bungoma.
6

1.3. MAIN OBJECTIVE
The main objective of the study is to investigate the effects of politics on security in Kenya and
particularly in Bungoma.
1.4. SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES
1. To assess whether the cases of conflict and insecurity in Bungoma are as a result of
political factors.
2. To determine the numbers of people who were killed and displaced during the clashes
occurring in Bungoma between 1992 and 2007.
3. To determine the particular regions of Bungoma most affected
4. To explore the narratives and experiences of the people that affected by the insecurity in
Bungoma.
1.5. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The study responded to the following research questions:
1. What are the causes of insecurity in Bungoma?
2. How many people were killed and displaced in the Bungoma insecurity?
3. When did the insecurity in Bungoma occur?
4. Which areas of Bungoma were most affected by the state of insecurity?
7

5. Who were the most affected by the insecurity that took place?
1.6. THE SCOPE OF THE STUDY
This study focused on the region of Bungoma, an area covering 852 square miles (2,069 sq. km)
with a population of 1,37 million which was most affected by the chaos. The study focused its
interest in the period from 1992 to some months just before the 2007general elections commonly
referred to as the post-election violence. Of equal interest were the numbers of people affected
by the insecurity out of the entire population of the area. The study assessed the effect of
insecurity in Bungoma paying specific attention to the economy, the social well-being of the
people and the environment among other effects.
1.7. JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY
Bungoma has suffered from insecurity from April 1992 to date whereby the members of the
Sabaot, a Kalenjin sub-group who lived on the slopes of Mt. Elgon clashed with the local Bukusu
residents. Well-armed with AK-47 rifles which they had acquired from remnants of Obote's
Ugandan army, gangs operating from Mt. Elgon attacked Bukusu residents in the vicinity of
Sirisia, 35 miles from Bungoma town which led to 2,000 Bukusu fleeing, 120 houses destroyed
and the fleeing population's livestock seized by mid-April (Throup and Hornsby, 1998).
In the period between 1992 and 2007, the Bungoma region experienced dramatic changes in the
8

political party loyalties starting from Forum for Restoration of Democracy (FORD) led by
Jaramogi Oginga Odinga and Masinde Muliro. The leadership of the original FORD party was
handed over to Michael Wamalwa Kijana, who despite his representation of a constituency in
Trans Nzoia remained loyal to his original Bukusu roots in Bungoma. FORD then split into
several smaller entities before the creation of the Coalition for Restoration of Democracy
(CORD). Bungoma is uniquely the predominant part of Kenya where the remnants of the
original FORD party still exist. Therefore it is a unique region for a study in political allegiance
and loyalty.
During the period following the multiparty elections of 2007, violence was again witnessed
where property owned by people perceived to be foreigners was destroyed and the people evicted
from Bungoma town and onwards to Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps in Eastern
Uganda (Leonard, 2008). There is insufficient information and data on the relationship between
politics and insecurity in Bungoma. This calls for a research such as the one proposed in order to
gather and present empirical evidence on this relationship. It is therefore important to determine
whether the historical roots of ethnicity have any relationship with politics and insecurity in
Bungoma in order to avert future conflicts and violence in the area.
1.8. LIMITATIONS AND DELIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
This study was limited to a few areas given that the resources available could not allow for
coverage of all the regions in Bungoma. In this respect, the study focused on areas that were
mostly affected by the insecurity therefore limiting its scope.
9

This study was limited by the method used in collecting data. In this regard, the use of secondary
sources of data like books, magazines and journals was the predominant mode of data collection.
The study relied on secondary data like newspapers, government security reports for its primary
data.
This study is mitigated in the sense that it will be of use in future by social scientists and other
people who would want to know the history of insecurity in Bungoma district from 1992 up to
2007.
1.9. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
Chapter One of the study introduces the background, state the problem of study, describe the
specific problem addressed in the study, state the objectives of the study, its scope, justification
and its limitations. Chapter two presents a review of literature and the relevant sources of
research associated with the problem addressed in this study. Chapter three of the study presents
the methodology and procedures used for data collection and analysis. Chapter four contains an
analysis of the data and presentation of the results. Finally, Chapter five offers a summary and
discussion of the researcher’s findings, implication for practice and recommendations for future
research.
10

CHAPTER 2.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW
2.0. INTRODUCTION
This chapter deals with the conceptualization of the theoretical framework and a detailed review
of literature on effects of politics on security in Kenya and particularly in Bungoma district. The
research tries to find out how some authors view politics and security in Kenya. The chapter then
presents some views on the issue of politics and security in Kenya and finally it links the
theoretical perspectives of the situation under study.
2.1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
This study has identified various theories that could be applied in explaining the effects of
politics on security. Among these theories is the critical theory concerning the proliferation of
ethnic conflict, the liberal theory, realism theory and other theories that helped in explaining
insecurity in Bungoma.
The critical theory states that the realist preoccupation of the state focuses on the insecurity of
individuals, groups and communities (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007). The insecurity in
11

Bungoma occurred as a result of the ethnic clashes among the Sabaot, the Kalenjin sub-group
and the Bukusu residents in April 1992 (Throup and Hornsby, 1998).
The liberal theory notes that security does not compromise only military and material capacities
but also institutional, economic and political factors (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007). The
insecurity n Bungoma occurred as a result of the political factors for example the organizing,
planning and financing of the ethnic clashes by the KANU elites who used violence to displace
and disenfranchise opponents and mobilize an ethnic support base (Lynch and Anderson 2014).
Realism asserts that the state is considered to be the only unitary rational actors whose
aspirations are constant states always prefer maximum security. The state of Kenya failed to
prevent the insecurity in Bungoma that occurred in April 1992 because the five Bungoma MPs
were accused of remaining silent despite the attacks on their constituents. The local FORD
officials also criticized the District Commissioner, the local police chief and announced that they
would organize a demonstration against the security forces if the clashes did not end within a
week (Throup and Hornsby, 1998). The implication of these allegations was that the state of
Kenya was unable to prevent insecurity as it was supposed to have maximum security on the
region of Bungoma.
The contemporary competition theory states that the competition between two or more ethnic
groups for the same economic and political resources produces ethnic conflict (Yang, 2000). The
ethnic conflict between the Sabaot and the Luhyia in Bungoma was a result of the land shortage
12

(Oucho, 2002) which was a competition for the same economic resource leading to the insecurity
in Bungoma in 1992.
According to the human needs theory, the root cause of conflict is a lack of satisfying needs that
are universal (Scheffran et al., 2012). The insecurity in Bungoma was a result of the land
shortage which was a satisfying need for the Bukusu and the Sabaot.
The realistic group conflict theory emphasizes that inter-group conflict originates in the
perceptions of group members with regard to real competition for scarce resources, thus
suggesting that hostility between group results from real or perceived conflicting goals because
they generate inter-group competition (Cordell and Wolff, 2010). The conflict between the
Sabaot and Bukusu was a result of the land shortage which was a scarce resource leading to the
ethnic clashes in 1992 in Bungoma.
The internal colonialism perspective argues that the internal colonization of the minority groups
by the dominant groups is the major source of ethnic conflicts (Yang, 2000). Bungoma witnessed
insecurity when the Sabaot claimed that their subgroups which were the minority groups were
excluded and harassed by their Luhyia neighbours who were the dominant groups (Lynch and
Anderson2014).
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2.2. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.2.0. OVERVIEW
Literature review looked at the views of the authors concerning the insecurity in Bungoma. The
review explored issues such as such as the role of ethnicity on security in Kenya particularly
Bungoma, the role of the elections, effects of land issue among others in determining the
insecurity in Bungoma.
2.2.1. ROLE OF ETHNICITY ON SECURITY IN KENYA PARTICULARLY IN
BUNGOMA
In a systematic review conducted by Throup and Hornsby (1998), the members of the Sabaot, a
Kalenjin sub-group who lived on the slopes of Mount Elgon clashed with local Bukusu residents
which culminated in over 2,000 Bukusu fleeing from their homes, 120 houses destroyed and the
fleeing population's livestock seized. This conflict has similarities to the ethnic driven conflicts
along the Mau escarpment in Molo constituency where Kikuyu communities at places like
Olenguruone were interspersed with Kalenjin and Maasai. As the Bungoma conflict along the
ethnic frontier became increasingly serious during March-May 1992, discontent with the regime
14

grew deeper among the Abaluhya inside Western province. The Abaluhya-Kalenjin violence
represented a serious threat to Moi’s Abaluhya’s allies, undermining support for KANU in this
vital swing province.
These “ethnic clashes” were also organized, planned and financed by KANU elites who sought
to use violence to displace and disenfranchise opponents and mobilize an ethnic support base.
Lynch and Anderson (2014) noted that the local disputes had largely pitted Sabaot against their
Bukusu neighbours. In the study by Oucho (2002), the Bukusu-Sabaot conflict had strong
political undertones which among other things culminated in the carving out of Mount Elgon
district from Bungoma district and which displaced population from the Bukusu community into
the neighbouring Trans-Nzoia district, also settled by the Luhyia, Kalenjin and smaller numbers
of other ethnic groups.
Ochieng (2002) demonstrated that the continuation of ethnic identity and the negative
connotations it may have was clearly illustrated by the 1991-92 conflict or ethnic clashes. The
violence that was associated with these clashes brought considerable death and the destruction of
the region. Not only were violent attacks directed against those alleged outsiders in Western
Kenya, such as the Luhyia of Bungoma, the Luo of Nyanza District, and the Gusii of Kisii and
Nyamira districts. The clashes left a legacy of ethnic bitterness and suspicion that continued to
exist a decade later to say nothing of the extensive economic losses associated with those
affected in the region.
15

2.2.2. EFFECTS OF LAND CONFLICT
Lynch and Anderson, 2014) found that, the land allocation process was mired by controversy; it
moved ahead extremely slowly, dogged by allegations of favouritism and corruption. The most
common complaint was that local politicians and their associates, along with these working in
the Provincial Administration, had used their positions to gain plots either for themselves or for
their friends and relatives. This left many potential beneficiaries those from Chepkitale and
landless Sabaot from lower down the mountain without land and therefore means of livelihood
and identity.
The Chepyuk Settlement scheme had more recently become the focus of conflict on Mount
Elgon. Violence and displacements began in the 1990s, worsening after 2000 and then escalating
into a sustained campaign of assassinations and targeted attacks during 2006. By March 2008,
the Chepyuk area had been placed under military rule as the Kenyan army moved in to flush out
alleged perpetrators. However, the military intervention quickly became the subject of great
controversy, first over accusations of political manipulation of the intervention and then over
reports of the army's gross and systematic abuse of human rights.
It is apparent that the Mount Elgon community remained deeply divided around the politics of
land allocations on the Chepyuk scheme and that this was the key political issue of the election.
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2.2.3. ROLE OF ELECTIONS
Lynch and Anderson (2014).noted that the parliamentary and presidential elections of 27th
December 2007 took place in Mount Elgon region amidst a heavy presence of state security
forces. Due to the displacements of residents because of violence, the turnout for the ballot was
expected to be lower than in other constituencies, but with over 39,000 votes cast at 68 per cent
of the registered electorate only two other constituencies in Western province saw a larger
proportionate turnout. By then, much of Kenya's Western highlands had exploded into violence
in response to the allegations made by the ODM national leadership that the result was
fraudulent.
According to Gona and Wa-Mungai (2014), the violence in Western province began prior to the
elections with some switches of the province’s territory being taken over by the SLDF whose
activities had accounted for the death of more than 700 people and the displacement of thousands
in Mt. Elgon district.
In Western province, modes of violence began through narratives that identified what people
called ‘agents of PNU’ who were accused of hoarding election materials. For instance, violence
began on 27th
December 2007 in Mumias when youths surrounded the house of Joseph Mbacio
Thiru on allegations of ballot hoarding.
17

2.2.4. EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS OR MILITIA
Lynch and Anderson (2014) demonstrated that the Sabaot Land Defence Forces (SLDF)
continued its campaign of assaults, assassinations and intimidation after the December polls,
killing 22 people at Kimama village on 31st
December. Within the district, the SLDF continued
to carry out murders, estimated to be two a week by the Kenya Red Cross. It was also reported
that the militia was still intimidating families into “allowing” their sons to join the SLDF and
extorting protection money and food from villagers.
The SLDF was set up to defend the claims to Chepyuk Settlement Scheme that local politics was
transformed into a matter of life and death for local Sabaot. Hornsby (2013) argued that the
February 18th
Revolution Army (FERA) was the rationale for another bout of repression by the
security forces and the death or imprisonment of 300 Bukusu and a few Luo in Bungoma and
Trans-Nzoia in 1994-5.’
Gona and Wa-Mungai (2014) explained that over a period of two years, SLDF’s activities had
spread into Bungoma and Trans Nzoia districts. SLDF’s agitations and intentions of reversing
historical agrarian injustices had resonance among many groups in the Rift Valley. Its very
existence pointed not only to the absence of political will by the state to deal with agrarian
18

issues, but also to the apparent ineptitude and institutional crises within security organs in the
province.
Rawlence (2008) asserted that the SLDF promoted its favoured candidates in the 2007 general
election in a vicious campaign that, according to local residents, amounted to a campaign of
terror. The candidates favoured by the SLDF were all contesting on an ODM ticket. A chief from
the area told Human Rights Watch that the incumbent councilor for Emia ward, Nickson Manyu,
was warned at gunpoint not to contest against the ODM candidate. He also reported widespread
intimidation and election violence. The view of many was that the electoral commission was not
fully in control of the elections in Mt. Elgon. Nearly all witnesses described the SLDF
controlling polling stations, inking the fingers of voters while casting their ballots for them. Forty
six polling stations up the mountain were transferred to the district headquarters in Kapsokwony
because of insecurity.
Some reports alleged that the Sabaot Land Defence Force, a shadowy militia group active in and
around the Mt. Elgon region of western Kenya, had joined with their Kalenjin cousins. It had
been engaged in its own campaigns against the so called non-indigenous tribes.
2.2.5. ROLE OF POLITICS
19

According to Lynch and Anderson (2014) it is the sense of ethnic indifference and communal
injustice that fed into electoral politics. In 1963, the leading Sabaot politician Daniel Moss stood
on a West Kalenjin Congress (WKC) ticket against a Luhyia Kenya African Democratic Union
(KADU) candidate. Prior to the election that year, tensions rose, and a number of houses owned
by suspected KADU supporters were burnt down and their livestock stolen
A more recent account suggests that the conflict erupted around disagreement over the
nomination of parliamentary candidates on the basis of their ethnicity. Violence was used as a
pre-election strategy to disrupt local campaigns and then to affect voting, and later to evict
Bukusu from good agricultural land on the mountain's slopes.
On Mount Elgon, the mobilization for violence included the Local Member of Parliament (MP)
Wilberforce Kisiero, local councilors, and other prominent Sabaot who “were instrumental in
bringing ill feeling towards the non-Sabaot and were indeed advocating their removal from
Mount Elgon.” The local MP came under particularly heavy fire, as witnesses accused him of
being at the “forefront of calling for the expulsion of non-Sabaot from the area as long as they
refused to support KANU” and even continuing to incite violence after the clashes were over by
declaring that Sabaot would not allow strangers to buy land in the district.
20

The ethnic clashes of the early 1990s were promoted across the Rift valley and parts of Western
province by advocates of President Moi's “KANU zone” politics in response to calls for, and
then return to multi-party politics.
A local political culture characterized by debates about ethnic citizenship or indigenousness and
marked by violence dated back to the late colonial period. Up until 1993, these local disputes had
largely pitted Sabaot against their Bukusu neighbours. The Sabaot hoped that the creation of a
separate administrative area would improve their situation, while a popular narrative of forced
removal from the rightful ownership to grazing pastures in Trans Nzoia, to which the Luhya also
claim, reinforced the perceived importance of Sabaot political unity.
In a systematic review conducted by Oucho (2002) the Sabaot Land Defence Forces (SLDF) was
organized and funded by local politicians although the actual politicians in control have changed
over time. The SLDF drove out the non-Kalenjin groups in Mt Elgon who were unlikely to vote
for the KANU party which took place in the elections of 1992 and 1997 (Rawlence, 2008). The
Bukusu-Sabaot conflict had a strong political undertone which among other things culminated in
the carving out of Mt. Elgon district from Bungoma district and which displaced population from
the latter in the neighbouring Trans-Nzoia district also settled by Luhyia, Kalenjin and smaller
numbers of other ethnic groups.
21

2.3. CONCLUSION
To a smaller extent the role of politics has contributed to the insecurity in Bungoma as compared
to other factors such as ethnicity, criminal organizations or militia groups. The biggest
contributor to the insecurity in Bungoma is the ethnic conflict between the Bukusu and the
Sabaot communities witnessed in 1992 which shook the regions of Mount Elgon, Bungoma,
Trans-Nzoia among other regions.
22

CHAPTER 3.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
3.0. INTRODUCTION
This chapter outlines the research methodology of the study and it covers research design,
location of the study, target population, sampling techniques, data collection and data analysis.
3.1. RESEARCH DESIGN
Research design is a logical and systematic plan prepared for conducting a research study
(Verma, 1989).
The type of research design used in this study is the secondary data analysis whereby the data of
the investigation of the problem of insecurity in Bungoma from 1992 until 2007 especially in
Sirisia, Mt. Elgon and Kimilili constituencies collected and tabulated is analyzed using other
sources like government agencies for example Kenya Bureau of Statistics, newspaper reports,
pronouncements by government officials, analysis of insecurity status conducted about Bungoma
by non-government organizations and internet research.
23

3.2. LOCATION OF THE STUDY
The area of the study was Bungoma district which is a border district in Western Kenya. It
borders the Republic of Uganda to the west and lies between latitude 0 25.3' and 0 53.2' north
and latitude 34 21.4' and 35 04 East. To the north, it borders Trans-Nzoia district. To the east, it
borders Kakamega district and to the south Mumias Butere district. Its southwest neigbouring
districts are Busia and Teso. It covers a land area of 2,068.5 sq. km or a quarter of Western
province. The district had ten administrative divisions, comprising 44 locations. The population
of the district was estimated at 1.2 million in 2006. The population is evenly distributed with an
average density of 482 persons/ sq. km. The constituencies of Bungoma are Sirisia, Kimilili,
Webuye, Kanduyi, Bumula and Mt. Elgon.
The land in Bungoma generally slopes from the foot of Mt. Elgon from the north where the
altitude is over 2000 meters above sea level falling to the lower lying south and south west of
altitude 1200 meters. Four main rivers drain the land, river Nzoia forms the boundary to the West
with Lugari and Butere Mumias, river Lwakhakha forms another boundary with Uganda to the
West while Kuywa and Chwele and Khalaba River drain the middle areas.
On infrastructure, Bungoma district has a road network of 1,313.4 km with 990.1 km of
classified roads and 323.2 km of unclassified roads. Of the classified roads, 165.6 km are
tarmacked. Most of the classified roads in the district are either murrum or earth roads. This
makes them impassable during the rainy seasons, making transportation of agricultural produce
24

and other goods difficult. The district also has two airstrips at Bungoma and Webuye towns
which are under-utilized and mostly vandalized.
3.3. TARGET POPULATION
The target populations for this study were members residing in Bungoma district especially in
Sirisia. Data sources like newspapers, government and non-government security reports were
used to assess the number of people displaced, killed during the insecurity in Bungoma from
1992 until 2007
3.4. SAMPLING TECHNIQUES
Kothari (2004) defines non-probability sampling as that sampling procedure which does not
afford any basis for estimating the probability that each item in the population has of being
included in the sample The type of sampling used in this study was non-probability sampling
especially the use of purposive sampling whereby the researcher selected the sample based on
what would be appropriate for the study. The sample the researcher used were four government
security reports from 1992, some websites explaining the number of people killed and displaced
during the clashes that took place from 1992 until 2007 in Sirisia constituency Bungoma district.
25

3.5. DATA COLLECTION
Secondary data is the data which has been collected by someone else and which has already been
passed through the statistical process (Kothari, 2004). Data was collected using secondary means
especially the use of literature based survey like newspapers, analysis of insecurity status
conducted about Bungoma, pronouncements by government officials indicating the numbers of
people who were killed and displaced
To sum it all, the researcher used secondary means to infer opinion from the opinion leaders,
government security apparatus for their take on the effects of politics on the security of Bungoma
from 1992 until 2007. Using secondary sources, the researcher reviewed the statistical records of
the number of people killed, displaced or otherwise affected by the state of insecurity.
3.6. DATA ANALYSIS
Data analysis is the process of computing various summaries and derived values from the given
collection of data (Mirkin, 2011).The study used qualitative and quantitative data analysis which
showed the effects of politics on security in Bungoma and the number of people displaced and
killed as from 1992 until 2007.Data was entered into a excel spreadsheet, and presented using
bar diagram.
26

CHAPTER 4.
DATA PRESENTATION AND INTERPRETATION
4.0. INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents and discusses the findings of the study with the aim of establishing the
effects of politics on security in Kenya particularly in Bungoma. This chapter further examines
the number of people killed and displaced in Bungoma. This study assesses insecurity as a result
of political factors taking place. The presentation and discussion of findings are in accordance
with the objectives of the study and are discussed in details as here below:
4.1. THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE KILLED AND DISPLACED IN BUNGOMA AS FROM
1992 UNTIL 2007
27

Insecurity in Bungoma is not new in the history of Bungoma. Since the early 1990s to 2007,
Bungoma has suffered from insecurity as there are various people killed and displaced. Figure 1
shows the number of people killed in Bungoma as from 1992 until 2007.
Figure 1. Total number of persons killed between the years 1992 and 2007. (Data collated
from government security reports).
28

Figure 2. Total number of persons displaced between 1992 and 2007. (Data collated from
government security reports).
From Figure 1, it is observed that the year 2006 witnessed the highest number of killings (253
pax), which is more that half of all deaths during the period under study. Noticeably is that this is
the year preceding the 2007 elections. Figure 2 depicts the number of displacements within the
same period and shows that 1997 recorded the highest number of displacements that is 15,000. It
is clear that the highest levels of insecurity in Bungoma took place in the years related to or
coming shortly before the elections.
4.2. THE PEOPLE MOSTLY AFFECTED BY THE INSECURITY IN BUNGOMA
FROM 1992 TO 2007
29

This part of the Chapter presents the accounts and testimonies of the people who were most
affected by the insecurity in Bungoma from 1992 to 2007 for example women, youth and the
elderly. These are women and men who suffered as a result of sexual violence, recruitment into
the militia, maimed or mutilated, beaten by the members of the SLDF searching for the
husbands, killed when trying to return to their land among other form of oppression. It used the
stories of the people mostly affected as from 1992 to 2007.
Story 1: The man who was abducted by the SLDF
I was woken up by a knocking door. I opened it and there were guns and torches staring at me.
They rounded up my cows, beat me and stabbed me as we walked. When we reached the bush
they tied me by my feet to a tree, my head hanging down. They were others hanging also. They
beat me very badly and said: ‘choose: either surrender all your possessions including your land
or you die now.’ I told them to take it. They cut off my ear as a mark, then they made me eat it. I
crawled home; I could not walk (Human Rights Watch, 2011).
Story 2: The woman whose neighbor was raped by security forces in March 2008
“At night (the officers) steal food, destroy homes and rape women. I heard a commotion next
door. I woke up and came outside. I hid in the bushes. I saw my neighbor there on the ground
outside the house. Three soldiers all took their turns” (Human Rights Watch, 2011)
30

Story 3: The Man who was harassed by the Kalenjins
One Luhya man told Africa Watch that he had been harassed by Kalenjins when he has tried to
return to his land in April 1992 (Africa Watch, 1993).
Story 4:The old man who fled his land when trying to return in Sirisia, Bungoma district
An elderly Luhya man had fled his land in April 1992 along with other Luhyas from the area
after being attacked by approximately one hundred Kalenjins, dressed in skins and shorts with
clay on their faces, who burned and looted the Luhyas’ homes. When he had tried, he heard
gunshots and fled (Africa Watch, 1993).
Story 5: Teacher found dead on March 30 1993
A teacher, Francis Juma na Mayengo, who had moved into the old man’s house to take care of it
on his behalf was found hacked to death on March 30 1993 .(Africa Watch, 1993).
Story 6: Helen raped by the SLDF soldiers
Helen recounts the day of horror; at around 5pm, Helen was home when the men came to her
compound. They asked her for her husband, but he was not home. They demanded to know how
many of the SLDF she knew; since they alleged that she went round talking about them. She
31

declined and that is when they kidnapped her and brought her to an unknown place. There, they
blindfolded her, raped her in turns and even beat her for almost 24 hours. The following day she
was unconscious, but they did not let her go. She was told to open her mouth where one of them
urinated and yet another forced her to eat human feces. After all this they left her, but she was
unable to walk home because of the pain she had suffered. She forced herself up because she
believed that if she continued to stay there, others might come and continue the torture. She tried,
and thankfully, a person helped her home. When she made it home, her husband took her to
hospital where she was treated and tested for HIV/AIDS. Later on that husband rejected her,
alleging that she was infected with HIV/AIDS and other venereal diseases. In that domestic
dispute, she lost her child as a result of family negligence and the stigmatization she underwent
(MSF, 2008).
Story 7: The 75 year old woman whose ear was cut off by the SLDF in 2007
I was coming from the market. The SLDF stopped me and asked, “Do you want us to cut off
your head or your ear?” Then they talked amongst themselves. I was silent while they cut off my
ear (Human Rights Watch, 2011).
Story 8: 234 Pupils who were clash victims
32

The headmistress of Kapkateny Primary School told Africa Watch that they had 234 pupils who
had been clash victims. “Sometimes the children have to leave school to go look for food
because they are always hungry,” she observed. “They also often get malaria and are sick”
(Africa Watch, 1993).
4.3. THE CAUSES OF INSECURITY IN BUNGOMA FROM 1992 TO 2007
This part of the chapter discusses the causes of insecurity in Bungoma which are political factors,
criminal organizations or militia, ethnicity, land issue, elections among others as explained
below.
4.3.1. The Political Factors
According to Lafargue (2009), political rivalry and inter-ethnic tensions between the Sabaots and
the neighbouring Bukusu, a sub tribe of the numerically larger Luhya ethnic community led to
the creation of an electoral constituency for the Sabaot (Elgon) from 1963 and later on, in 1993,
a district (Mount Elgon) which are co-extensive. This did not seem to diminish the inter-tribal
fighting. This situation characterized the political atmosphere in the coming years.
33

Outbreaks of violence between the Sabaot and Bukusu sub tribes pitted the two key politicians in
the region namely Elijah Mwangale and Wilberforce Kisiero in the 1970s. Both Kimilili and
Mount Elgon Constituencies had been hit by the wave of violence. Mwangale had condemned
Sabaot raids into Bukusu territory, while Kisiero claimed that the Minister’s anti-Sabaot remarks
had exacerbated the troubles. Mwangale’s speeches, Kisiero protested, spread confusion and
hatred between the two communities. As a result, Kisiero switched sides in the power struggle,
leaving Mwangale isolated, supported only by Wa Mang’oli, the MP for Webuye, Alfred
Sambu’s opponent (Throup and Hornsby, 1998).
The parameters of recent conflict on the mountain began to take place in 1993, when Mount
Elgon District was hived off from the larger Bungoma district yet a local political culture
characterized by debates about ethnic citizenship or autochthony and marked by violence dates
back to the late colonial period. Up until 1993, these local disputes had largely pitted Sabaot
against their Bukusu neighbours. The Sabaot hoped that the creation of a separate administrative
area would improve their situation, while a popular narrative of forced removal from the rightful
ownership to grazing pastures in Trans Nzoia to which the Luhya also claim, reinforced the
perceived importance of Sabaot political unity (Lynch and Anderson (2014).
The sense of ethnic difference and communal injustice soon fed into electoral politics. In 1963,
the leading Sabaot politician Daniel Moss stood on West Kalenjin Congress (WKC) ticket
against a Luhya Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) candidate. Prior to the elections,
tensions rose and a number of houses owned by suspected KADU supporters were burnt down
34

and livestock stolen. Violent clashes erupted following the election and within two weeks 142
houses had been burnt down, over 200 heads of cattle had been stolen or slaughtered and
property and crops destroyed. The Sabaot claimed “that they had been provoked by the Bukusu
who intended to suppress them and rob them of their land.” In contrast, intelligence reports
suggested that Sabaot supporters of the Kenya African National Union (KANU) aligned WKC
had sought “to expel KADU supporting Bukusu tribesmen from parts of the district as a result of
the proposal that a portion of the adjoining Trans Nzoia District including Kitale Township
should be transferred from the Rift Valley Region to the Western Region.” The critical juncture
in this dispute was thus exploited by the WCK to mobilize support and demonize the KADU
candidate.
These tensions continued to colour local politics into the postcolonial period as evidenced by
repeated calls by Sabaot for a separate district, “ethnic clashes” of the early 1990s were
promoted across the Rift Valley and parts of Western province by advocates of President Moi’s
“KANU zone” politics in response to calls for, and then return to, multi-party politics.
On Mount Elgon, this mobilization for violence included the local Member of Parliament
Wilberforce Kisiero, local councilors and other prominent Sabaot who “were instrumental in
bringing ill feeling towards the non-Sabaot and were indeed advocating their removal from
Mount Elgon.”The local MP came under particularly heavy fire, as witnesses accused him of
being at the “forefront of calling for the expulsion of non-Sabaot from the area as long as they
refused to support KANU,” and even continuing to incite violence after the clashes were over by
declaring that strangers would not be allowed to buy land in the district.
35

The ethnic clashes were also organized, planned and financed by KANU elites who sought to use
violence to disenfranchise opponents and mobilize an ethnic support base. Violence has been
used in Mount Elgon to assert rights to the ownership and political control of territory, with
political actors and their followers manipulating ethnic signifiers and historical narratives to
justify their actions. Over time, local disputes here shifted from a conflict between Sabaot and
Bukusu to one between Sabaot-speakers depending on the political alignments of the various
candidates.
It is apparent that the Mount Elgon community remained deeply divided around the politics of
land allocations on the Chepyuk scheme and that this was the key political issue of the election.
Although the election came and went, the crisis provoked by the land allocations at Chepyuk
rumbled on.
4.3.2 Land Issues
Traditionally, the Sabaot and the Luhya had uneasy co-existence in the area, largely due to land
shortage but it never reached the scale of the 1991-93 ethnic clashes. (Oucho, 2002). The
Chepyuk Settlement Scheme has more recently become the focus of conflict on Mount Elgon.
Violence and displacements began in the 1990s worsening after 2000 and then escalating into a
sustained campaign of assassinations and targeted attacks during 2006 (Lynch and Anderson
2014).
36

The land allocation process was mired by controversy; it moved ahead extremely slowly, dogged
by allegations of favouritism and corruption. The most common complaint was that local
politicians and their associates, along with those working in the provincial administration had
used their positions to gain plots either for themselves or for their friends and relatives. This left
many potential beneficiaries-those from Chepkitale and landless Sabaot from lower down the
mountain without land.
The second allocation process, directed by the Provincial Commissioner Francis Lekoolol and
Mount Elgon Commissioner Changole, was dogged by even more serious allegations of
systematic nepotism, corruption and favouritism than the first. Consequently, a third reallocation
process was began in 1990, but abandoned in 1992 amid the “ethnic clashes” that had broken out
with the return to multi -party politics and which led to “an influx of people into the settlement
scheme, most of whom were not original inhabitants of the area.” By 1992 Phase 1 of the scheme
was in chaos with no proper allocation of plots resolved.
Phase 2 began in 1994 but was characterized by complaints of mismanagement and nepotism. By
1996, local Ndorobo were insistent that illegal land allocations to “outsiders” in Chepyuk be
nullified and Kisiero was accused of manipulating the allocation process to boost the chance of
re-election.
37

In early 1999 the government degazetted another part of Mount Elgon forest “to settle more than
1,000 landless Dorobo families,” when the local District Commissioner insisted that “land would
be allocated to genuine Dorobo squatters.” In the run-up to the 2002 election, the scheme became
the focus of local politicking. The fact that the allocation of land and issuance of title deeds had
not been completed enabled parliamentary candidates to promise that they would finally bring
the scheme to completion in favour of one community or another.
Phase 3 began in 2003, with a total of 2,157 five acre plots given to registered beneficiaries. It
was also decided that settlement in the first two phases was to be determined “in the proportions
of 60:40 as between the Ndorobo and Soy,” that is between those from Chepkitale and those
from the lowlands. However it was Phase 3 in Chepkurkur that posed the greatest problems.
Lowland Sabaot who were dissatisfied with 40 per cent allocation given to them on the first two
phases argued for a larger proportion of the land in this final area. An agreement was finally
reached to divide the Phase 2 allocations on a proportion of 50:50 between those from
Chepkitale and those from the lowlands.
As these debates rolled on, Chepyuk was hit by organized, though at first only sporadic violence.
By early 2004 it was clear that the violence was taking on a more systematic and organized
pattern. Activists who supported the claim of those from Chepkitale to the land increasingly
argued that there was a malevolent political purpose in the attacks, and simultaneously came to
argue that Ndorobo, Ogiek or Mosop were not simply Sabaot speakers who had lived above the
forest belt but were actually members of a distinct ethnic group as indigenous residents.
38

4.3.3. Criminal Organizations or Militia
Wycliffe Komon Matakwei formed the Sabaot Land Defence Forces to fight for land at the
Chepyuk Settlement Scheme after his family was evicted from Phase 3 of the scheme.
The Sabaot Land Defence Forces set out to defend the interests of the lowland Sabaot against the
Mosop and their political supporters, and resist government attempts to evict squatters in the
Chepyuk areas. During 2006 and 2007 the violence escalated: the SLDF killed around 600
people, terrorizing “the local population through physical assaults and threats” and committing
“murder, torture, rape and the theft and destruction of property.” Within an 18 month period
these activities displaced over 66,000 people.
The violence in Western Kenya began prior to the elections with some swatches of the
province’s territory being taken over by the SLDF whose activities had accounted for the death
of more than 700 people and the displacement of thousands in Mount Elgon district. Over a
period of two years SLDF’s activities had spread into Bungoma and Trans Nzoia districts.
Another peak in the violence began in late October 2007, ahead of the electoral polls at the end
of December. The first attack saw the murder of another chief, while a few days later three
people were beheaded in the Kamneru area of Kapsokwony Division. The following day there
were a major gun battle between police and militiamen (Lynch and Anderson2014).
39

Lafargue (2009) asserts that at a time when fortunes were progressively diminishing for the
Ndorobo militia in November 2007, the SLDF effectively took control of Chepyuk and stamped
its authority locally. The SLDF continued its campaign of assaults, assassinations and
intimidation after the December polls, killing 22 people at Kimama village on 31 December. By
7 January the post election death toll in the district stood at 50.
4.3.4. Ethnicity
Lynch and Anderson (2014) argue that the clashes of the early 1990s framed the development of
more recent conflicts in a number of ways. First, they brought about a concentration of ethnic
communities in the area, as many Bukusu and Teso residents moved down and away from the
mountain while many Sabaot moved back to their homeland in the newly formed district.
Oucho (2002) stated that in Western province itself, there were ethnic clashes between the
Sabaot Kalenjin and the Bukusu Luhya in Bungoma district. The clashes reminisced the pre-
colonial traditional animosity between the two groups, though in 1991-92 seemed to be state-
sponsored.
The Sabaot, who live on the border of Kenya and Uganda, around the slopes of Mt.Elgon,
clashed with the Bukusu not over land or political differences but apparently because they
wanted to assert their distinctiveness in order to eventually have their own district. Historically
40

the White settlers evicted the Sabaot from their original home in Trans Nzoia district around
Kitale. They were pushed into the forests around Mount Elgon where, like many other Africans
like the Nandi and the Kikuyu for instance became squatters in a “foreign” land of the Bukusu
who forced the Sabaot to work for them. In the race towards multi-party politics, the Sabaot
sparked an already volatile situation, in the end convincing the KANU government to carve a
Sabaot district out of the former Bungoma district.
Conclusion,
The political factors to a larger extent contributed to the insecurity in Bungoma as opposed to
land issue, criminal militia or organizations as they have led to the instability from 1992 until
2007.
41

CHAPTER 5.
SUMMARY DISCUSSIONS OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND
RECOMMEDNATIONS
This Chapter five offers a summary and discussion of the researcher’s findings, implication for
practice and recommendations for future research.
Evidence presented in Chapter Four of this study indicates a clear link between politically
instigated insecurity and the electioneering seasons in the wider Bungoma region. It would seem
that politicians have, repeatedly, used violence as a selfish tool of intimidation to their opponents
during electioneering periods. In the case of Bungoma, such practices have also fed off long and
deep held historical grievances over land.
The convoluted phases of land allocation in the wider Mount Elgon area especially in such
places as the Chepyuk Settlement Scheme have amply demonstrated vested ethnic interests as
well as the corrupt tendencies of the provincial administration. Land that was meant to resettle
the landless never achieved those purposes and ended up creating full blown out ethnic and inter-
ethnic violence among the Sabaot Kalenjin, the Bukusu Luhya, the Ndorobo and other
communities.
In a context of fluid and highly charged political party campaigning periods, it is very easy for
42

criminal elements to hijack these situations to commit atrocious crimes such as murder, rape and
other gender-directed forms of violence. As shown by the various narratives and testimonies
cited by human rights groups, individual victims are often helpless and continue to be
traumatized by these crimes, more so where there is no investigation and punishment of the
perpetrators. These kinds of situations fester and breed more crimes and a general state of
impunity.
The military intervention in operation with the police called “Operation Okoa Maisha” that was
deployed in Mount Elgon in March, 2008 which crushed the Saboat Land Defence Force militia,
though laudable, appears to have been a short term remedy. In order to bring about sustained and
long term solutions to the problems of land related ethnic violence in the Mount Elgon area, the
root causes which include justice and transparency in land adjudication and issuance must be
addressed.
The study made the following recommendations:
1. Dealing with the Politics of Violence
Successive KANU governments in Kenya perfected the art of using violence to intimidate
political opponents and zone off some regions in order to acquire power. In successive election
years, violence became the tool of preference in driving away voters that were deemed to be
opponents of what was seen as the ethnic political position of a given region. Article 88 (4) (j) of
43

the Constitution provides for the Independent Elections and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) to
develop a code of conduct for candidates and parties contesting elections and to monitor and
sanction non-compliance to that code of conduct. IEBC should fully apply the provisions of the
law in hedging in and punishing the perpetrators of political violence and thereby send a strong
signal that it is intolerant to criminal acts aimed at disenfranchising voters in Kenya.
2. Land Issues
The Constitution of Kenya that was promulgated in August 2010 took cognizance of the question
of land and how historical maladministration and other improper policies and practices in the
land sector have continued to disenfranchise many Kenyans causing ethnic anger. The Ministry
of Lands, Environment and Natural Resources together the National Land Commission have
been tasked with addressing the question of historical injustices in the sector. In particular,
Article 67 (2) (e) of the Constitution provides the National Land Commission with the powers to
initiate investigations, on its own or on a complaint, into present or historical land injustices, and
recommend appropriate redress. This is a function the National Land Commission and other
government entrusted agencies must fulfill expediently in the case of Bungoma so as to remedy a
situation that has been a powder keg in Kenya’s fractured ethnic history.
3. Criminal Organization or Militia
44

Poverty, landless, unemployment, negative ethnicity, political sponsorship, impunity and lack of
punishments for those who commit criminal acts has bread an environment in Kenya where
criminal organizations or militia has been allowed to grow. In the case of Bungoma, the Sabota
Land Defence Force and other groups were allowed space and time to grow into a network that
was brutalizing ordinary citizens with impunity. The law enforcement agencies including the
provincial administration, the Criminal Investigations Department, the National Intelligence
Services and others proved inept in pre-emptying these types of organizations. This is not the
case of Bungoma alone. Criminal enterprise has arisen in many parts of Kenya as a result of this
kind of lethargy and it is time for citizens and civil society to demand accountability from the
agencies charged with the protection of human lives and property. This is a standard provided for
constitutionally. Citizen lobbies should file in courts of law suits to demand that heads of such
agencies serve and play their roles or they be removed from office for abdication of
constitutional duty.
4. Ethnicity
Negative ethnicity has been associated with elections periods and used as a basis to discriminate
and intimidate political opponents. Fortunately, the government has organs responsible for
advocacy of national cohesion and unity which must be pressurized to do their part on
confronting negative ethnicity. The Ministry of Education, Science and Technology together
with the Kenya Institute of Curriculum Development should also put into place a curriculum that
promotes national cohesion and integration. For example, the composition of the student
45

population in schools should be as inclusive as possible to reflect national diversity and thereby
contribute to national cohesion.
In conclusion, the study makes a case for the establishment of advocacy programs that promote
reconciliation including the full implementation of the report on Truth and Justice which has
remained pending for many years. In addition, counseling programs by the Government and
NGOs should be extended to the victims of violence and their families so as to enable them de-
traumatize and bring about closure to heinous crimes that were committed in Bungoma, Mount
Elgon and the adjacent communities.
As already indicated in Chapter One of the study, the research had certain limitations arising out
of its design as a desk study. It is therefore proposed that a longitudinal study be considered by
other researchers in future. Such a study would employ household survey methodologies to
determine the progress made in pacifying the Bungoma and Mount Elgon areas since 2008 after
the military intervention in the area. Such a study would also assess the cohesion of the
ethnicities in that region and draw lessons for other parts of Kenya in national reconciliation and
integration.
46

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Africa’s Great Lakes Region. Foundation Publishers. Kampala. Uganda.
Lynch, Gabrielle and Anderson, David M. (2014). Democratization and ethnic violence in Kenya
electoral cycles and shifting identities. In: Jacques Bertrand and Oded Haklai (Eds)
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