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HoneyPots
Malware Class Presentation
Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen
November 2nd 2004
Problems
Why?
Problems (2)
• The Internet security is hard
– New attacks every day
– Our computers are static targets
• What should we do?
• The more you know about your enemy, the better
you can protect yourself
• Fake target?
Solutions? Air Attack
Real Fake
A Detected….
Honeypots?
• Fake Target
• Collect Infomation
Agenda
• Honeypots: an whitepaper
• Honeyd
• Honeynet
• Discussion
History of Honeypots
• 1990/1991 The Cuckoo’s Egg and Evening
with Berferd
• 1997 - Deception Toolkit
• 1998 - CyberCop Sting
• 1998 - NetFacade (and Snort)
• 1998 - BackOfficer Friendly
• 1999 - Formation of the Honeynet Project
• 2001 - Worms captured
Definition
A honeypot is an information system resource
whose value lies in unauthorized or illicit
use of that resource.
• Has no production value; anything going to/from a
honeypot is likely a probe, attack or compromise
• Used for monitoring, detecting and analyzing
attacks
• Does not solve a specific problem. Instead, they are
a highly flexible tool with different applications to
security.
Classification
• By level of interaction
• High
• Low
• Middle?
• By Implementation
• Virtual
• Physical
• By purpose
• Production
• Research
Level of Interaction
• Low Interaction
• Simulates some aspects of the system
• Easy to deploy, minimal risk
• Limited Information
• Honeyd
• High Interaction
• Simulates all aspects of the OS: real systems
• Can be compromised completely, higher risk
• More Information
• Honeynet
Level of Interaction
Operating system
Fake
Daemon
Disk
Other
local
resource
Low
Medium
High
Physical V.S. Virtual Honeypots
• Two types
– Physical
• Real machines
• Own IP Addresses
• Often high-interactive
– Virtual
• Simulated by other machines that:
– Respond to the traffic sent to the honeypots
– May simulate a lot of (different) virtual honeypots at the
same time
HoneyPot A
Gateway
Attackers
Attack Data
How do HPs work?
Prevent
Detect
Response
Monitor
No connection
Production HPs: Protect the systems
• Prevention
• Keeping the bad guys out
• not effective prevention mechanisms.
• Deception, Deterence, Decoys do NOT work against
automated attacks: worms, auto-rooters, mass-rooters
• Detection
• Detecting the burglar when he breaks in.
• Great work
• Response
• Can easily be pulled offline
• Little to no data pollution
Research HPs: gathering information
• Collect compact amounts of high value
information
• Discover new Tools and Tactics
• Understand Motives, Behavior, and
Organization
• Develop Analysis and Forensic Skills
• HONEYNET?
Building your HoneyPots
• Specifying Goals
• Selecting the implementation strategies
• Types, Number, Locations and Deployment
• Implementing Data Capture
• Logging and managing data
• Mitigating Risk
• Mitigating Fingerprint
Location of Honeypots
• In front of the
firewall
• Demilitarized
Zone
• Behind the
firewall
(Intranet)
Capturing Information
• Host based:
• Keystrokes
• Syslog
• Network based:
• Firewall
• Sniffer
• IP not resolve name
Logging and Managing Data
• Logging
architecture
• Managing data
Maintaining Honeypots
• Detection and Alert
• Response
• Data Analysis
• Update
Honeyd: A Virtual Honeypot
Framework
By Zhanxiang Huang
November 2nd, 2004
Physical V.S. Virtual Honeypots
 PH (Real machines, NICs, typically high-
interaction)
 High maintenance cost;
 Impractical for large address spaces;
 VH (Simulated by other machines)
 Multiple virtual services and VMs on one machine;
 Typically it only simulate network level
interactions, but still able to capture intrusion
attempts;
What is Honeyd?
 Honeyd: A virtual honeypot
application, which allows us to create
thousands of IP addresses with virtual
machines and corresponding network
services.
 Written by Neil Provos available at
http://www.honeyd.org/
What can honeyd do?
 Simulates operating systems at TCP/IP stack
level, supporting TCP/UDP/ICMP;
 Support arbitrary services;
 Simulate arbitrary network topologies;
 Support tunneling and redirecting net traffic;
Illustration Simple
How it attracts worms?
 Honey!~ But technically they need to
advertise themselves;
 Three methods:
 Create special routes;
 Proxy ARP;
 Network tunnels.
How it works?
routing
routing
Packet Dispatcher
TCP UDP ICMP
Services
Personality
Engine
Configuration
DataBase
Network
Why Personality Engine?
 To fool fingerprinting tools
 Uses fingerprint databases by
 Nmap, for TCP, UDP
 Xprobe, for ICMP
 Introduces changes to the headers of
every outgoing packet before sent to
the network
Why Routing topology?
 Simulates virtual network topologies;
 Some honeypots are also configured as routers
 Latency and loss rate for each edge is configured;
 Support network tunneling and traffic
redirection;
Why Redirect Connection?
:D
How to Configure?
 Each virtual honeypot is configured with a template.
 Commands:
 Create: Creates a new template
 Set:
 Assign personality (fingerprint database) to a template
 Specify default behavior of network protocols
 Block: All packets dropped
 Reset: All ports closed by default
 Open: All ports open by default
 Add: Specify available services
 Proxy: Used for connection forwarding
 Bind: Assign template to specific IP address
Show Time!~
 Real Demo by Zhanxiang
 This simplified configuration was used with
attract the MSBlast worm over the Internet:
create default set default personality "Windows XPPro"
add default tcp port 135 open
add default tcp port 4444 "/bin/shscripts/WormCatcher.sh
$ipsrc $ipdst"
set default tcp action block
set default udp action block
Applications
 Worm detection and blocking
 Combine with automated its post-
processing tools, like NIDS signature
generation tool honeycomb[1];
 Network decoys
 Spam Prevention
Simulation Results of Anti-Worm
How real is it?
 Traceroute to a virtual host
 Path of the hosts according to the configuration
 Latency measured double the one specified
 Correct because packets have to travel each link twice
 Fingerprinting to the
 Router personality
 Nmap and Xprobe detected Cisco router
 NetBSD personality
 Nmap detected NetBSD
 Xprobe listed a number of possibilities including NetBSD
Risks?
 Some smart worms may wake up! The
honeyd will be snubbed;
 We might become accessary if our
honeyd is compromised and used as
bounce;
Are attackers nuts?
In theory:
 Remote actions
 Local actions
 Cloaking issues
 Breaking the Matrix
Practical ways:
 layer 2
 Sebek-based Honeypots
 Fake AP
 Bait and Switch
Honeypots
(From securityfocus paper on Sep. 28, 2004 :
“Defeating Honeypots: Network Issues”,
by Laurent Oudot and Thorsten Holz)
http://www.securityfocus.com/infocus/1803
Questions?
Honeynet
By Xiang Yin
November 2nd, 2004
What is a Honeynet
• High-interaction honeypot designed to:
– capture in-depth information
– learn who would like to use your
system without your permission
for their own ends
• Its an architecture, not a product or software.
• Populate with live systems.
• Can look like an actual production system
What is a Honeynet
• Once compromised, data is collected to
learn the tools, tactics, and motives of the
blackhat community.
• Information has different value to different
organizations.
– Learn vulnerabilities
– Develop response plans
What’s The Difference?
• Honeypots use known vulnerabilities to lure attack.
– Configure a single system with special software or
system emulations
– Want to find out actively who is attacking the system
• Honeynets are networks open to attack
– Often use default installations of system software
– Behind a firewall
– Rather they mess up the Honeynet than your production
system
How it works
• A highly controlled network where every
packet entering or leaving is monitored,
captured, and analyzed.
• Any traffic entering or leaving the Honeynet
is suspect by nature.
Diagram of Honeynet
Diagram of Honeynet
Data Control
• Containment of activity
– Mitigate risks
– Freedom vs. risk
• Multiple mechanisms – layers
– Counting outbound connections
– Intrusion prevention gateways
– Bandwidth restrictions
• Fail closed!
• Minimize risk, but not eliminate!
Data Control
Data Capture
• This is the reason for setting up a honeynet.
• Hidden kernel module that captures all activity
– monitoring and logging
• Challenge: encryption
– Activities over encrypted channels (IPSec, SSH, SSL, etc)
• Multiple layers of data capture
– Firewall layer, network layer, system layer
• Minimize the ability of attackers to detect
– Make as few modifications as possible
– Store data on a secured remote system
– Also, reduce risk but not eliminate!
Data Analysis
• All activity within Honeynet is suspicious
• 30 minutes of blackhat activity is about 30
to 40 work hours of data analysis
• Less than 10 MB of logging per 24 hours is
typical.
Data Collection
Honeynet – Gen I
Honeynet – Gen I
• Counts the number of outbound connections.
• Systems initiate a certain number of
outbound connections and then block any
further links once the limit is met.
• Useful for blocking denial of service attacks
scans, or other malicious activity
• But, gives attacker more room to attack.
Honeynet – Gen II
Honeynet – Gen II
• Layer-two bridging device (called the honeynet
sensor) isolates and contains systems in the
honeynet.
• Easier to Deploy
– Both Data Control and Data Capture on the same
system.
• Harder to Detect
– Identify activity as opposed to counting connections.
– Modify packets instead of blocking.
Data Control – Gen II
• Implemented on gateway
• Connection counting (with IPTables)
SCALE="day"
TCPRATE="15"
UDPRATE="20"
ICMPRATE="50"
OTHERRATE="15"
• NIPS (Network Intrusion Prevention System)
– Works with only known attacks
– Modify and disable detected outbound attacks instead of blocking
them
– Snort-inline
Data Control - Snort-Inline
alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET 53
(msg:"DNS EXPLOIT named";flags: A+;
content:"|CD80 E8D7 FFFFFF|/bin/sh";
replace:"|0000 E8D7 FFFFFF|/ben/sh";)
Data capture elements
• Honeynet Project has developed kernel modules to
insert in target systems.
• These capture all the attacker's activities, such as
encrypted keystrokes.
• The IDS gateway captures all the data and dump
the data generated by the attackers without letting
attacker know.
• multiple layers of data capture help ensure that
they gain a clear perspective of the attacker's
activities.
Data capture elements
• Layer 1: the firewall log
– packet-filtering mechanism to block outbound
connections once a connection limit is met.
• Layer 2: network traffic
– The IDS gateway that identifies and blocks attacks
passively sniffs every packet and its full payload on the
network.
• layer 3: system activity
– Capturing the attacker's keystrokes and activity on the
system.
Virtual Honeynets
• All the elements of a Honeynet combined
on a single physical system.
Accomplished by running multiple
instances of operating systems
simultaneously. Examples include
VMware and User Mode Linux. Virtual
Honeynets can support both GenI and
GenII technologies.
Issues
• High complexity.
– Require extensive resources and manpower to properly
maintain.
• High risk
– Detection and anti-honeynet technologies have been
introduced.
– Can be used to attack or harm other non-Honeynet
systems.
• Legal issues
– Privacy, Entrapment, Liability
Honeypots’ Issues
Discussion
Honeypot Advantages
• High Data Value
• Small Data
• Low Resource Cost
• Weak or Retired system
• Simple Concept, Flexible Implementation
• Return on Investment
• Proof of Effectiveness
• Catch new attacks
Disadvantages
• Narrow Field of View
• Fingerprinting
• Risks?
• If being detected?
• If being compromised?
• If being mis-configured?
Mitigrating Risks?
• Being Detected?
• Anyway honeypots can be detected
• Modifying is a good solution, but not perfect
• Fingerprinting?
• Being Exploited?
Building Honeypots for specific
purpose?
• Bigger fish  Specific trap?
Legal Issues
• Privacy
• No single statue concerning privacy
– Electronic Communication Privacy Act
– Federal Wiretap Statute
– The Pen/Trap Statute
• Entrapment
• Used only to defendant to avoid conviction
• Applies only to law enforcement?
• Liability
• If a Honeynet system is used to attack or damage other non-
honeynet system?
More Information about Legal Issues
• Computer Crime Section
• E-Mail: anthony.teelucksingh@usdoj.gov
• Computer Crime Section’s Web page:
Conclusion
• Honeypots are not a solution, they are a
flexible tool with different applications to
security.
• Primary value in detection and information
gathering.
• Just the beginning for honeypots.
Worm propagation speed sim
 Simulate worm spreading
 Parameters
 i(t): Fraction of infected hosts
 s(t): Fraction of susceptible hosts
 r(t): Fraction of immunized hosts
 β: Worm contact rate
 γ: Immunization rate
 Worm propagation formulas
 ds/dt = − β * i(t) *s(t)
 di/dt = βi * (t) * s(t) − γ * i(t)
 dr/dt = γ * i(t)

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honeypots.ppt

  • 1. HoneyPots Malware Class Presentation Xiang Yin, Zhanxiang Huang, Nguyet Nguyen November 2nd 2004
  • 3. Problems (2) • The Internet security is hard – New attacks every day – Our computers are static targets • What should we do? • The more you know about your enemy, the better you can protect yourself • Fake target?
  • 4. Solutions? Air Attack Real Fake A Detected….
  • 5. Honeypots? • Fake Target • Collect Infomation
  • 6. Agenda • Honeypots: an whitepaper • Honeyd • Honeynet • Discussion
  • 7. History of Honeypots • 1990/1991 The Cuckoo’s Egg and Evening with Berferd • 1997 - Deception Toolkit • 1998 - CyberCop Sting • 1998 - NetFacade (and Snort) • 1998 - BackOfficer Friendly • 1999 - Formation of the Honeynet Project • 2001 - Worms captured
  • 8. Definition A honeypot is an information system resource whose value lies in unauthorized or illicit use of that resource. • Has no production value; anything going to/from a honeypot is likely a probe, attack or compromise • Used for monitoring, detecting and analyzing attacks • Does not solve a specific problem. Instead, they are a highly flexible tool with different applications to security.
  • 9. Classification • By level of interaction • High • Low • Middle? • By Implementation • Virtual • Physical • By purpose • Production • Research
  • 10. Level of Interaction • Low Interaction • Simulates some aspects of the system • Easy to deploy, minimal risk • Limited Information • Honeyd • High Interaction • Simulates all aspects of the OS: real systems • Can be compromised completely, higher risk • More Information • Honeynet
  • 11. Level of Interaction Operating system Fake Daemon Disk Other local resource Low Medium High
  • 12. Physical V.S. Virtual Honeypots • Two types – Physical • Real machines • Own IP Addresses • Often high-interactive – Virtual • Simulated by other machines that: – Respond to the traffic sent to the honeypots – May simulate a lot of (different) virtual honeypots at the same time
  • 13. HoneyPot A Gateway Attackers Attack Data How do HPs work? Prevent Detect Response Monitor No connection
  • 14. Production HPs: Protect the systems • Prevention • Keeping the bad guys out • not effective prevention mechanisms. • Deception, Deterence, Decoys do NOT work against automated attacks: worms, auto-rooters, mass-rooters • Detection • Detecting the burglar when he breaks in. • Great work • Response • Can easily be pulled offline • Little to no data pollution
  • 15. Research HPs: gathering information • Collect compact amounts of high value information • Discover new Tools and Tactics • Understand Motives, Behavior, and Organization • Develop Analysis and Forensic Skills • HONEYNET?
  • 16. Building your HoneyPots • Specifying Goals • Selecting the implementation strategies • Types, Number, Locations and Deployment • Implementing Data Capture • Logging and managing data • Mitigating Risk • Mitigating Fingerprint
  • 17. Location of Honeypots • In front of the firewall • Demilitarized Zone • Behind the firewall (Intranet)
  • 18. Capturing Information • Host based: • Keystrokes • Syslog • Network based: • Firewall • Sniffer • IP not resolve name
  • 19. Logging and Managing Data • Logging architecture • Managing data
  • 20. Maintaining Honeypots • Detection and Alert • Response • Data Analysis • Update
  • 21. Honeyd: A Virtual Honeypot Framework By Zhanxiang Huang November 2nd, 2004
  • 22. Physical V.S. Virtual Honeypots  PH (Real machines, NICs, typically high- interaction)  High maintenance cost;  Impractical for large address spaces;  VH (Simulated by other machines)  Multiple virtual services and VMs on one machine;  Typically it only simulate network level interactions, but still able to capture intrusion attempts;
  • 23. What is Honeyd?  Honeyd: A virtual honeypot application, which allows us to create thousands of IP addresses with virtual machines and corresponding network services.  Written by Neil Provos available at http://www.honeyd.org/
  • 24. What can honeyd do?  Simulates operating systems at TCP/IP stack level, supporting TCP/UDP/ICMP;  Support arbitrary services;  Simulate arbitrary network topologies;  Support tunneling and redirecting net traffic;
  • 26.
  • 27. How it attracts worms?  Honey!~ But technically they need to advertise themselves;  Three methods:  Create special routes;  Proxy ARP;  Network tunnels.
  • 28. How it works? routing routing Packet Dispatcher TCP UDP ICMP Services Personality Engine Configuration DataBase Network
  • 29. Why Personality Engine?  To fool fingerprinting tools  Uses fingerprint databases by  Nmap, for TCP, UDP  Xprobe, for ICMP  Introduces changes to the headers of every outgoing packet before sent to the network
  • 30. Why Routing topology?  Simulates virtual network topologies;  Some honeypots are also configured as routers  Latency and loss rate for each edge is configured;  Support network tunneling and traffic redirection;
  • 31.
  • 33. How to Configure?  Each virtual honeypot is configured with a template.  Commands:  Create: Creates a new template  Set:  Assign personality (fingerprint database) to a template  Specify default behavior of network protocols  Block: All packets dropped  Reset: All ports closed by default  Open: All ports open by default  Add: Specify available services  Proxy: Used for connection forwarding  Bind: Assign template to specific IP address
  • 34. Show Time!~  Real Demo by Zhanxiang  This simplified configuration was used with attract the MSBlast worm over the Internet: create default set default personality "Windows XPPro" add default tcp port 135 open add default tcp port 4444 "/bin/shscripts/WormCatcher.sh $ipsrc $ipdst" set default tcp action block set default udp action block
  • 35. Applications  Worm detection and blocking  Combine with automated its post- processing tools, like NIDS signature generation tool honeycomb[1];  Network decoys  Spam Prevention
  • 37. How real is it?  Traceroute to a virtual host  Path of the hosts according to the configuration  Latency measured double the one specified  Correct because packets have to travel each link twice  Fingerprinting to the  Router personality  Nmap and Xprobe detected Cisco router  NetBSD personality  Nmap detected NetBSD  Xprobe listed a number of possibilities including NetBSD
  • 38. Risks?  Some smart worms may wake up! The honeyd will be snubbed;  We might become accessary if our honeyd is compromised and used as bounce;
  • 39. Are attackers nuts? In theory:  Remote actions  Local actions  Cloaking issues  Breaking the Matrix Practical ways:  layer 2  Sebek-based Honeypots  Fake AP  Bait and Switch Honeypots (From securityfocus paper on Sep. 28, 2004 : “Defeating Honeypots: Network Issues”, by Laurent Oudot and Thorsten Holz) http://www.securityfocus.com/infocus/1803
  • 42. What is a Honeynet • High-interaction honeypot designed to: – capture in-depth information – learn who would like to use your system without your permission for their own ends • Its an architecture, not a product or software. • Populate with live systems. • Can look like an actual production system
  • 43. What is a Honeynet • Once compromised, data is collected to learn the tools, tactics, and motives of the blackhat community. • Information has different value to different organizations. – Learn vulnerabilities – Develop response plans
  • 44. What’s The Difference? • Honeypots use known vulnerabilities to lure attack. – Configure a single system with special software or system emulations – Want to find out actively who is attacking the system • Honeynets are networks open to attack – Often use default installations of system software – Behind a firewall – Rather they mess up the Honeynet than your production system
  • 45. How it works • A highly controlled network where every packet entering or leaving is monitored, captured, and analyzed. • Any traffic entering or leaving the Honeynet is suspect by nature.
  • 48. Data Control • Containment of activity – Mitigate risks – Freedom vs. risk • Multiple mechanisms – layers – Counting outbound connections – Intrusion prevention gateways – Bandwidth restrictions • Fail closed! • Minimize risk, but not eliminate!
  • 50. Data Capture • This is the reason for setting up a honeynet. • Hidden kernel module that captures all activity – monitoring and logging • Challenge: encryption – Activities over encrypted channels (IPSec, SSH, SSL, etc) • Multiple layers of data capture – Firewall layer, network layer, system layer • Minimize the ability of attackers to detect – Make as few modifications as possible – Store data on a secured remote system – Also, reduce risk but not eliminate!
  • 51. Data Analysis • All activity within Honeynet is suspicious • 30 minutes of blackhat activity is about 30 to 40 work hours of data analysis • Less than 10 MB of logging per 24 hours is typical.
  • 54. Honeynet – Gen I • Counts the number of outbound connections. • Systems initiate a certain number of outbound connections and then block any further links once the limit is met. • Useful for blocking denial of service attacks scans, or other malicious activity • But, gives attacker more room to attack.
  • 56. Honeynet – Gen II • Layer-two bridging device (called the honeynet sensor) isolates and contains systems in the honeynet. • Easier to Deploy – Both Data Control and Data Capture on the same system. • Harder to Detect – Identify activity as opposed to counting connections. – Modify packets instead of blocking.
  • 57. Data Control – Gen II • Implemented on gateway • Connection counting (with IPTables) SCALE="day" TCPRATE="15" UDPRATE="20" ICMPRATE="50" OTHERRATE="15" • NIPS (Network Intrusion Prevention System) – Works with only known attacks – Modify and disable detected outbound attacks instead of blocking them – Snort-inline
  • 58.
  • 59. Data Control - Snort-Inline alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET 53 (msg:"DNS EXPLOIT named";flags: A+; content:"|CD80 E8D7 FFFFFF|/bin/sh"; replace:"|0000 E8D7 FFFFFF|/ben/sh";)
  • 60. Data capture elements • Honeynet Project has developed kernel modules to insert in target systems. • These capture all the attacker's activities, such as encrypted keystrokes. • The IDS gateway captures all the data and dump the data generated by the attackers without letting attacker know. • multiple layers of data capture help ensure that they gain a clear perspective of the attacker's activities.
  • 61. Data capture elements • Layer 1: the firewall log – packet-filtering mechanism to block outbound connections once a connection limit is met. • Layer 2: network traffic – The IDS gateway that identifies and blocks attacks passively sniffs every packet and its full payload on the network. • layer 3: system activity – Capturing the attacker's keystrokes and activity on the system.
  • 62. Virtual Honeynets • All the elements of a Honeynet combined on a single physical system. Accomplished by running multiple instances of operating systems simultaneously. Examples include VMware and User Mode Linux. Virtual Honeynets can support both GenI and GenII technologies.
  • 63. Issues • High complexity. – Require extensive resources and manpower to properly maintain. • High risk – Detection and anti-honeynet technologies have been introduced. – Can be used to attack or harm other non-Honeynet systems. • Legal issues – Privacy, Entrapment, Liability
  • 65. Honeypot Advantages • High Data Value • Small Data • Low Resource Cost • Weak or Retired system • Simple Concept, Flexible Implementation • Return on Investment • Proof of Effectiveness • Catch new attacks
  • 66. Disadvantages • Narrow Field of View • Fingerprinting • Risks? • If being detected? • If being compromised? • If being mis-configured?
  • 67. Mitigrating Risks? • Being Detected? • Anyway honeypots can be detected • Modifying is a good solution, but not perfect • Fingerprinting? • Being Exploited?
  • 68. Building Honeypots for specific purpose? • Bigger fish  Specific trap?
  • 69. Legal Issues • Privacy • No single statue concerning privacy – Electronic Communication Privacy Act – Federal Wiretap Statute – The Pen/Trap Statute • Entrapment • Used only to defendant to avoid conviction • Applies only to law enforcement? • Liability • If a Honeynet system is used to attack or damage other non- honeynet system?
  • 70. More Information about Legal Issues • Computer Crime Section • E-Mail: anthony.teelucksingh@usdoj.gov • Computer Crime Section’s Web page:
  • 71. Conclusion • Honeypots are not a solution, they are a flexible tool with different applications to security. • Primary value in detection and information gathering. • Just the beginning for honeypots.
  • 72. Worm propagation speed sim  Simulate worm spreading  Parameters  i(t): Fraction of infected hosts  s(t): Fraction of susceptible hosts  r(t): Fraction of immunized hosts  β: Worm contact rate  γ: Immunization rate  Worm propagation formulas  ds/dt = − β * i(t) *s(t)  di/dt = βi * (t) * s(t) − γ * i(t)  dr/dt = γ * i(t)