Dissertation Monte Cassino Final

To what extent did Allied Intelligence influence the decision to
bomb the Benedictine Abbey at Montecassino on 15 February
1944?
Derek W James
On
14th
January 2011
A dissertation presented in the University of Salford in
partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of MA Intelligence and
Security Studies (MAISS-DL)

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION....................................................................................................5
CHAPTER ONE - THE ROAD TO CASSINO......................................................13
CHAPTER TWO- THE DECISION TO BOMB THE ABBEY OF
MONTECASSINO................................................................................................26
CHAPTER THREE - THE SOURCES OF INTELLIGENCE AVAILABLE
TO ALLIED COMMANDERS AT MONTE CASSINO..........................................43
CHAPTER FOUR – TO WHAT EXTENT DID INTELLIGENCE PROVIDE
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE BOMBING AS A MILITARY
NECESSITY........................................................................................................55
CHAPTER FIVE- PICKING UP THE PIECES – THE AFTERMATH TO
THE BOMBING...................................................................................................61
CONCLUSIONS..................................................................................................64
TABLE OF APPENDICES
A. TIMELINE OF EVENTS....................................................................... 72
B THE ABBEY AT MONTECASSINO....................................................
C. ALLIED CHAIN OF COMMAND..........................................................
D. GERMAN DEFENSIVE LINES…………………………………………... 79
ii

E. OPERATIONAL INSTRUCTION 32 – 2 JANUARY 1944................. 80
F. SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER MEDITERRANEAN ORDER
CONCERNING HISTORIC MONUMENTS – 29 DECEMBER 1943...
G. MAJOR-GENERAL TUKER’S FIRST MEMORANDUM TO
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL FREYBERG – 12 FEBRUARY 1944........... 83
H. MAJOR-GENERAL TUKER’S SECOND MEMORANDUM TO
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL FREYBERG – 12 FEBRUARY 1944.......... 85
I. COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTION 400/2 – USE OF
US STRATEGIC BOMBERS............................................................... 87
J. THE ORDER TO BOMB THE ABBEY AT MONTECASSINO............... 88
K. MEDCOS 64 - AFHQ’S IRREFUTIBLE EVIDENCE............................. 90
TABLE OF FIGURES
1. MONTE CASSINO AND THE BENEDICTINE MONASTERY – 6
FEBRUARY 1944................................................................................ 7
2. MAP OF FIFTH ARMY STRATEGY – JANUARY 1944...................... 17
3. MAP OF BRITISH X CORPS ATTACK ACROSS LOWER
GARIGLIANO – 17 JANUARY 1944................................................... 19
4. MAP OF US 36TH
DIVISION ATTACK ACROSS THE RAPIDO – 20-
22 JANUARY 1944.............................................................................. 19
5. MAP OF ATTACK BY US 34TH
DIVISION AND FRENCH
EXPEDITIONARY CORPS NORTH OF CASSINO – 24-31
JANUARY 1944................................................................................... 20
6. MAP OF THE THE EXTENT OF THE US ADVANCE TOWARDS
THE ABBEY – 8-12 FEBRUARY 1944............................................... 21
7. MAP OF THE ANZIO BEACHHEAD – EARLY FEBRUARY 1944...... 24
8. 4000LB HIGH CAPACITY ‘BLOCK BUSTER’ BOMB......................... 32
9 ‘BLOCK BUSTER’ BOMB AND 500LB GENERAL PURPOSE
BOMBS ............................................................................................... 32
10 NZ CORPS PLAN OF ATTACK -15-17 FEBRUARY 1944.................. 33
11 BOMBS FALLING ON MONTE CASSINO – 15 FEBRUARY 1944..... 56
iii

12 THE ABBEY AT MONTECASSINO..................................................... 76
BIBLIOGRAPHY.............................................................................................. 93
Main Text = 13,174 words.
iv

To what extent did Allied Intelligence influence the decision to bomb the
Benedictine Abbey at Montecassino on 15 February 1944?
For, as the valley from its sleep awoke,
I saw the iron horses of the steam
Toss to the morning air their plumes of smoke,
And woke, as one awaketh from a dream.
“Monte Cassino”
Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, 1875.1
INTRODUCTION
It was a clear Italian winter’s day on 15 February 1944 as Major Bradford Evans led
his aircraft on that morning’s mission. It was a short hop, a ‘milk run’ with no
opposition expected.2
Evans led 12-B-17s from the United States Army Air Force’s
96th
Bombardment Squadron and another 130 aircraft from the 5th
Bombardment
Wing. His aircraft released 12-500lb bombs at 0928hrs. He rushed from the pilot’s
seat to the bomb-bay to see the first bombs strike the target some18,000ft below; the
first of 432 such bombs and 69-tons of incendiaries followed by, 283 -1000lb bombs
dropped by 89 medium bombers.3
Less than three hours after take-off, Evans’
1
Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, Monte Cassino, 1875.
http://www.hwlongfellow.org/poems_poem.php?pid=231 [10 October 2010].
2
Bradford Evans, The Bombing of Monte Cassino (Cassino, Italy: Pubblicazioni Cassinesi, 1988), 16-
17.
3
C J C Molony, The Mediterranean and Middle East, Volume V, Part II, The Campaign in Sicily 1943
and The Campaign in Italy 3rd
September 1943 to 31st
March 1944 (Uckfield, UK: The Naval & Military
Press Ltd, 2004), 713. Only 89 Medium bombers from 112 reached the target. Report to the British
Official Historian by G R M Hartcup, The Bombing of Cassino Abbey 15th
February 1944, CAB
101/229, 1965. According to Hartcup, 23 returned to base without expending ordnance.
5

aircraft and the remainder of the B-17s were on the ground in Foggia, suffering no
losses.4
That day, 576-tons of bombs were dropped on a single building.5
The target was unusual. Normally, the Mediterranean Allied Strategic Air Force
(MASAF) conducted missions for the Combined Bomber Offensive, attacking targets
in Europe unreachable from Britain.6
On this day, however, they supported the
struggling Allied ground forces south of Rome. Their target was the mother-house of
Western Monasticism, the famous Abbazia di Montecassino.7
On the ground
soldiers saw the bombs fall ‘like little black stones... the ground all around us shook
with gigantic shocks as they exploded.’8
The military theorist Fuller referred to the destruction of the Benedictine Abbey as
‘not so much a piece of vandalism, as an act of sheer tactical stupidity’.9
Nevertheless, the great abbey, originally built in 529 by St Benedict on the 1700ft hill
overlooking the Roman town of Casinum was a great treasure of Christianity. In
early 1944, the German Tenth Army had prepared this place, now called Cassino, to
make its stand. Like a sentinel perched in its lofty eyrie, the building had a
4
96th
Bombardment Squadron was based at Amendola Airfield, part of the Foggia airfield complex.
5
Harold L Bond, Return to Cassino (London: J M Dent & Sons Ltd, 1964), 116
6
Part of Operation POINTBLANK. See, Max Hastings, Bomber Command (London: Michael Joseph
Ltd, 1979), 187.
7
The Abbazia di Montecassino will be referred to as the Abbey throughout the dissertation. It was
also widely referred to at the time by Allied reporting as the Monastery, but will only be referred to as
such in direct quotations. The hill upon which the Abbey is built is referred to as Montecassino, Monte
Cassino, Monastery Hill or Point 516. This dissertation will use Monte Cassino to refer to the hill upon
which the Abbey stands unless otherwise quoted directly. Cassino refers to the town or area and will
be suffixed accordingly. A Short history of the Abbey may be found at Appendix B.
8
Bond, 115.
9
J F C Fuller, The Second World War (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1962), 272.
6

magisterial perspective on the surrounding battlefield (Figure 1). The hill upon which
the Abbey stood, along with the surrounding terrain, was an ideal defensive position,
considered virtually impregnable by the Italian Staff College.10
Surely this stone
edifice, labelled a ‘modern fortress’ by the Allied general tasked to conquer it, would
be used by the Germans?11
Its fate rested upon the validity of two words – military
necessity.
Why did some Allied commanders, mostly British, judge that this building’s
destruction was necessary? It was stated at the time12
, and in post-war publications
such as the 1949 British Air Historical Branch (AHB) report and in a 1965 report for
the official historian by the AHB’s G R M Hartcup, that German occupation of the
Abbey was not the main catalyst, but that its location on the main line of resistance
and its potential for use were more important.13
Majdalany, a British officer at
Cassino and author on the battles, calls occupation ‘the great red herring.’14
General
10
Hartcup, 5.
11
Memorandum No.433/1/G Operations, from Major-General Tuker, General Officer Commanding 4th
Indian Division to New Zealand Corps Headquarters, 12 February 1944.
12
Memorandum No. 433/1/G.
13
Hartcup, 12 & 23. G.260700/VFW/2/50, RAF Narrative – The Italian Campaign 1943-1945 –
Volume 1 – Planning and Invasion to the Fall of Rome, British Air Historical Branch, 281. Also see
John Strawson, The Italian Campaign (London: Secker & Warburg, 1987), 150.
14
Fred Majdalany, Cassino – Portrait of a Battle (London: Longmans,Green and Co, 1957), 118.
7
Figure 1. Monte Cassino and the Benedictine Monastery – 6 February 1944, M Blumenson, Salerno to
Cassino, United States Army, Center of Military History (Washington DC, 1993) 325.

Sir Bernard Freyberg asserts that the building was defended and therefore a valid
target whether occupied or not.15
Yet to fulfil the International Humanitarian Law
definition of ‘military necessity’, the target must have been ‘defended’ according to
legal definition, not military opinion. According to the US Field Manual FM27-10, The
Rules of War, published in 1940, a defended place was defined as:
A place that is occupied by a combatant military force or through which such a
force is passing.16
Further, FM27-10 states that:
In sieges and bombardments, all necessary steps must be taken to spare, as
far as possible, buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable
purposes, historic monuments, hospitals... provided that they are not being
used at the time for military purposes.17
This document articulates the requirements of the Hague Convention of 1907, to
which the US, Britain and Germany were signatories.18
The key phrases within
15
Letter from General Freyberg to Major General Kippenberger, 11 August 1950. Letter found in CAB
106/699, Report by Major F Jones, Cabinet Office Historical Section, The Bombing of Cassino Abbey
15 February 1944, (London: Cabinet Office, 1949), 180.
16
War Department Field Manual FM27-10, The Laws of War (Washington DC: United States War
Department, 1940), 12, Paragraph 47c. http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/rules_warfare-
1940.pdf [5 May 2010]. This Field Manual, although relevant to US forces only is relevant in this case
as even through the destruction of the building was requested by a British unit and authorized by a
British Supreme Commander, the force that carried out the attack was US and the commander of the
Mediterranean Allied Strategic Air Force, Lieutenant General Ira Eaker, was also American. The
British officers would have been subject to the British Manual of Military Law, Chapter XIV (The Laws
and Usages of War on Land), revised in 1940, which is also based upon the Hague Convention IV,
1907. It should be noted that neither of these manuals constitute International Humanitarian Law, but
are guides to the rules laid down in the Hague Convention.
17
FM27-10,14 para 58.
18
Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations
concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 18 October 1907. International
Committee for the Red Cross. http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/195?OpenDocument [5 May 2010].
Article 27 of The Hague Conventions of 1907 was the latest in a number of international treaties
dealing with the destruction of culturally important property. According to Bugnion, the principle of
sparing religious or cultural property dates back to the Eighteenth Century, but was first laid down in
treaty in the Brussels Declaration of 1874. The Hague Conventions of 1899 and updated in 1907
were what governed hostilities in Europe in the Second World War. The US, however, were also
8

these rules are, ‘a place that is occupied’ [emphasis added] and ‘not being used at
the time for military purposes’ [emphasis added]. It is clear that for Allied
commanders to justify ‘military necessity’, they must have been able to prove that the
Germans were occupying the building and using it for military purposes. No other
reason would be permissible. It is insufficient to point to potential, location or its
psychological effect. The Rules of War, as they existed at the time, made no
allowance for psychological or political necessity. Moreover, the Abbey’s destruction
was not incidental to an attack on adjacent German units. All evidence clearly states
that it was the target for attack. Contrary to De Lee, its destruction could not be
viewed as ‘collateral damage’,19
proportional to the military advantage accrued, for
two reasons: firstly, its destruction was not incidental to an attack on a military target
– it was the target. It is this that sets its destruction apart from other bombings of
religious or cultural sites. In bombing offensives by both sides, sites such as
Cologne or Coventry Cathedrals were badly damaged by bombing. However, these
were not the target of the attack, but were incidental to it.20
Damage may be judged
bound by the Roerich Pact of 1935, but this was not customary and only applied to cultural property in
the Americas. The Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armaments in 1923 commissioned a
Committee of Jurists in The Hague to draft a Treaty for the Rules of Air Warfare, under which Article
24 details the rules of air bombardment. This Treaty was not adopted, but defined a military objective
as ‘an objective whereof the total or partial destruction would constitute an obvious military advantage
for the belligerent’. According to the International Committee for the Red Cross, much of the 1923
ruling is considered Customary International Law. According to Nurick ‘A resolution was adopted by
the General Commission of the League of Nations Disarmament Conference in 1932 which provided
that "air attack against the civilian population shall be absolutely prohibited."’ This only applied to
Britain as the US was not a member of the League and Germany left the League upon Hitler’s
accession to power.
19
Nigel De Lee, ‘Moral Ambiguities in the Bombing of Monte Cassino’, Journal of Military Ethics 4,
No.2, (2005): 133. Collateral damage is a modern term, not used in the Second World War, but is
defined as: ‘Unintentional or incidental [emphasis added]injury or damage to persons or objects that
would not be lawful military targets in the circumstances ruling at the time. Such damage is not
unlawful so long as it is not excessive in light of the overall military advantage anticipated from the
attack. Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, United States Department of Defence, Joint Publication 3-
60 – Joint Targeting, dated 13 April 2007, GL-6. www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_60.pdf
[15 July 2010].
20
The target of the RAF’s night area bombing offensive was the morale of the German population.
Whether this was a valid target set under the Hague Convention IV, 1907, is beyond the scope this
dissertation, but the aim was not to destroy Germany’s cultural and religious infrastructure. See Arthur
Harris, Bomber Offensive (London: Greenhill Books, 1998), 77.
9

against the military advantage accrued by the raid in general. This is not the case at
Monte Cassino. Secondly, there was no military advantage gained as the Germans
quickly occupied the ruins, thereby improving their defence. That they would do so
was apparent beforehand. The Rules of War stated:
The measure of permissible devastation is found in the strict necessities of
war. As an end in itself, as a separate measure of war, devastation is not
sanctioned by the law of war. There must be some reasonably close
connection between the destruction of property and the overcoming of the
enemy's army. 21
For their actions to be legal, Allied commanders must have proven occupation, and
then once the building was attacked taken immediate steps to destroy the enemy.
They did neither. Jones compared Monte Cassino with the bombing of road
communications within the Papal estate at Castelgandolfo on 2 February stating that
the same principles applied and therefore precedent was set. Again, although both
were protected sites, the estate was not the target. This was the road junction within
it, the interdiction of which accrued a definite military advantage.22
In his account, Major Evans, who commanded the Monte Cassino mission,
afterwards questioned the basis upon which he was ordered to carry it out. He asks,
‘On what military intelligence estimates did Generals Tucker[sic] and Freyberg base
their requests for the bombing’?23
It is this question that this dissertation will attempt
to answer.
21
FM27-10, 82 para 324.
22
Jones, 15-18.
23
Evans, 25.
10

The first chapter examines the strategic background to the Italian campaign placing
the decision to attack the Abbey into context. What were Allied strategic aims? This
chapter culminates with the actions of the US Fifth Army at Cassino prior to mid-
February 1944 when the provisional New Zealand Corps occupied American
positions near the Abbey. Prior to this point, there had been no apparent necessity
to destroy the Abbey and, apart from in newspaper articles, no requests to attack it.
The next chapter, therefore, focuses on the circumstances leading up to the attack.
When was it decided to attack the building and why? Were any alternatives
considered? As has been stated, the judgement to bomb the Abbey was made
largely by British officers. This chapter discusses the Allied decision-making process
and the differing views of Allies towards the question of military necessity.
Despite post-attack assertions that occupation was not necessary to meet the
military necessity criteria, it is clear that proof of occupation was a key requirement in
law, and was a major factor at the time. What sources of information were available
to determine whether the Germans were using the Abbey for military purposes?
This chapter describes the intelligence sources available to US Fifth Army, and also
to 15th
Army Group.24
The following chapter then examines the evidence available to
commanders at the time and assesses whether intelligence had the clarity to justify
the decision. It is now beyond reasonable doubt that the Germans were not using,
and never had used, the Abbey. Yet much of the evidence supporting this
conclusion only became apparent after the bombing. In assessing the evidence it is
important to bear hindsight in mind. Only the evidence available prior to 15 February
1944 will be used to draw final conclusions.
24
15th
Army Group became Allied Central Mediterranean Force (ACMF) and then Allied Armies in Italy
(AAI) during 1944, reverting back to 15th
Army Group by early 1945. For clarity, the organisation in
command of British Eighth and US Fifth Armies will be called 15th
Army Group throughout this
dissertation.
11

Finally, this dissertation concludes by judging that the intelligence prior to the
decision to destroy the Abbey was insufficient to meet the criteria laid down by the
Rules of War for military necessity.25
It is then necessary to briefly describe how the
attack was justified when the German propaganda machine focused on the event,
and when complaints from the Vatican arrived in Allied capitals. The responses from
Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ) clearly exposed as untrue Allied assertions that
occupation was not necessary to justify military necessity. The sparseness of the
evidence and the unwillingness of General Wilson, the Supreme Allied Commander,
to release this evidence to the Holy See are illuminating.
25
British Manual of Military Law, Chapter XIV dated 1940.
12

CHAPTER ONE - THE ROAD TO CASSINO
A. Grand Strategy
The Trident Conference in May 1943 ordered the Supreme Commander in the
Mediterranean, General Eisenhower, ‘to plan such operations...as are best
calculated to eliminate Italy from the war and to contain the maximum number of
German forces’.26
The decision to carry the war onto mainland Italy at Salerno was
taken by Eisenhower on 16 August 1943.27
This decision was approved by Allied
leaders at the Quadrant conference held in Quebec in August 1943 after bitter
debate.28
Although geographically adjacent, the campaigns in Sicily and Italy served different
functions. The former was an extension of the North African campaign; its objectives
were victory in North Africa and the opening of the Mediterranean to Allied shipping.
Victory in Sicily saw this strategy fulfilled.29
The continuance of operations into Italy
had broader, yet less defined aims and the decision came after much disagreement
between US and British leaders. Animosity between the allies plagued operations in
Italy at all levels. The US strongly favoured a direct approach, attacking Germany
decisively through Northern France at the earliest opportunity. The British, although
supportive of a cross-channel attack feared German strength, and favoured a
26
Ralph Bennett, ULTRA and Mediterranean Strategy 1941-1945 (London: Hamish Hamilton Ltd,
1989), 239.
27
Martin Blumenson, Salerno to Cassino (Washington DC: Center of Military History, United States
Army, 1993), 24.
28
Arthur Bryant, The Turn of the Tide 1939-1943 (London: Grafton Books, 1986), 706.
29
Harold Alexander, Supplement to the London Gazette -The Allied Armies in Italy from 3 September
1943 to 12 December 1944 (London, His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1950), 2879.
13

broader strategy, to weaken Germany peripherally, with campaigns in Italy and the
Balkans before delivering the decisive blow.30
The resulting compromise saw Italian operations proceed, but become secondary as
preparations for Operation OVERLORD developed. The Combined Chiefs of Staff
(CCS) stated on 19 August 1943 that the cross-channel operation was the main
effort with a target date of 1 May 1944; other operations would only receive
resources that did not interfere with it.31
This disappointed the British, increasingly
playing second fiddle to US wishes. General Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General
Staff, in his diary wrote ‘We have not really arrived at the best strategy, but I suppose
that when working with allies, compromises, with all their evils, become inevitable.’32
Allied strategy was Italy’s defeat and support to OVERLORD by occupying the
maximum numbers of German divisions in Italy. As Hunt states, ‘its aim was to draw
German strength away from the Channel coast’.33
There was no geographical
objective, beyond securing airfields for the bomber offensive. Rome was a tertiary
political objective for AFHQ.34
At no point did Italy, which was highly conducive to a
defence against head-on attack, receive sufficient resources to achieve
commanders’ ambitions via the seaborne flanks.
B. Fifth Army Operations – The Winter Campaign
Although the potential for effective resistance to the Salerno landings existed had the
Italians not capitulated, and had German reinforcements been despatched from the
north, Allied intelligence expected Hitler to order withdrawal to a delaying line
30
Winston S Churchill, The Second World War Volume V - Closing the Ring (London: The Reprint
Society, 1952), 78 Bryant, ‘Turn of the Tide’, 700.
31
Churchill, 79.
32
Bryant, ‘Turn of the Tide’,715.
33
David Hunt, A Don At War (London: Frank Cass, 1990), 203.
34
WO 70/55, AFHQ Appreciation of the Situation in Italy on 7 Feb 44.
14

between Pisa and Rimini and then to the Po Valley. Much of this plan was known to
the Allies through ULTRA, although it had not been definitely established when the
US Fifth Army, commanded by Lieutenant-General Clark, landed on 9 September
1943.35
These intentions were confirmed through ULTRA the next day. German
strategy wavered until around 8 October 1943, when ULTRA revealed that the
German Tenth Army was to retire sparingly to a final defence line, the winterstellung
south of Rome.36
Yet even now Hitler had not definitely decided to defend Italy.
This line, the Bernhardt or Winter Line contained a switch line known as the Gustav
Line that ran through Cassino.37
It was an ironic change of heart by Hitler, to follow
Field-Marshal Kesselring’s optimistic strategy, rather than Rommel’s advice that the
peninsula was indefensible from amphibious turning movements. Rommel was
correct, but the Allies had not bargained on the Germans trying, expecting to be in
Rome by October.38
They had assigned insufficient amphibious forces, leaving the
only alternative of battling the difficult terrain and appalling winter weather head-on; a
battle of attrition that culminated at Cassino. Nevertheless, by deciding to defend
south of Rome, Hitler played into Allied hands. Ambrose points out that Eisenhower,
by October 1943, had fulfilled his strategic task of defeating Italy and tying down
German divisions, 24 of which were deployed in Italy, plus denying use of those
taking over from the Italians in southern France and the Balkans.39
Even so,
pressure needed to be maintained to keep them there and away from Normandy.
35
F H Hinsley, E E Thomas, C F G Ransom and R C Knight, British Intelligence in the Second World
War Volume 3 Part 1(London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1984), 107-8.
36
Bennett 250, Hinsley et al, 173.
37
See Appendix D.
38
Stephen E Ambrose, The Supreme Commander-The War Years of Dwight D Eisenhower (Jackson
MS: University Press of Mississippi, 1999), 282.
39
Ambrose, 283.
15

The ordeal of the US Fifth Army started with a skilful withdrawal by the Germans to
the north of Naples, where they were ordered to hold the Volturno River crossings
until at least 15 October 1943 whilst Kesselring prepared the defences further
north.40
He had planned his scheme of withdrawal only days after the landings and
kept to them with little change.41
Hitler stopped vacillating over Italian strategy,
decided to defend south of Rome and appointed Kesselring to the task on 21
November 1943.42
This decision, apparent to the Allies through ULTRA, brought an
end to the German withdrawals and made inevitable the battles at Cassino.43
On 16 January 1944, soldiers from the 34th
Infantry Division of the US II Corps
clambered to the summit of Monte Trocchio, the last peak before the Gustav Line. It
had been abandoned, the Germans having retired into their main defensive
positions.44
The Campaign had been hitherto expensive, with 37,773 casualties in
Fifth Army alone.45
The Gustav Line ran across the narrowest part of Italy from the
Garigliano River in the west, through Cassino, across the Abruzzi Mountains to the
River Sangro on the Adriatic. It had taken the Allied armies four months to reach it; it
would take them five more to break through the stubborn defences to Rome, 80
miles to the north-west.
40
Blumenson, ‘Salerno to Cassino’, 191-192. Albert Kesselring, The Memoirs of Field Marshal
Kesselring (London: Greenhill Books, 2007), 187.
41
Kesselring, 186-7.
42
Kesselring, 191. Blumenson, ‘Salerno to Cassino’, 245.
43
Hinsley et al, 179.
44
John Breit, Phase VIII 135th
Infantry Regiment History, 8
http://www.34infdiv.org/history/135inf/135inf_jb4312.pdf [4 June 2010].
45
Fifth Army History Part IV- Cassino and Anzio,188.
16

C. The First Attempt to Force the Gustav Line
The Commander of the 15th
Army Group, the overall land commander, was General
Alexander. His plan to overcome the defences was his favourite ‘double-punch’ laid
out in Operations Instruction No.32 of 2 January 1944.46
The initial punch was to be
delivered at Cassino. Despite the hardships already endured, Clark’s exhausted
Corps were to attack immediately across the Garigliano and Rapido rivers between
Cassino and the sea. The newly arrived French Expeditionary Corps (FEC),
comprising North African mountain troops, was to attack through the high ground
north of Cassino, swinging south, bisecting the Liri valley behind the Gustav Line.
Alexander hoped that these moves would force Kesselring to commit his reserves,
easing the path for his second punch, a 2-division amphibious assault at Anzio 35-
46
Headquarters 15th
Army Group, Operations Instruction Number 32, 2 January 1944. Appendix E
17
Figure 2: Map of Fifth Army Strategy - January 1944. Fifth Army History Part IV, 26.

miles south of Rome on 22 January.47
Time, however, was of the essence as the
assault shipping was needed for OVERLORD. It was therefore impossible for
Alexander to allow Fifth Army sufficient rest and reorganization if he was to take
advantage of Churchill’s efforts to retain the assault craft.48
With the FEC attacking north of Cassino from 12 January, the British began their
assault on the lower Garigliano on 17 January (Figure 3).49
. This attack caught the
Germans by surprise, threatening to roll-up their line from the south.50
It prompted
the German XIV Panzer Corps commander, Lieutenant-General von Senger-und-
Etterlin, to request the release of reserve divisions on 18 January, a request to which
Kesselring acceded.51
The anti-amphibious assault defences were removed and the
door to Rome through Anzio was opened. Following the attack on the flanks, Clark
planned to attack in the centre to open up the Liri valley for exploitation by a US
Armoured Division. This attack across the Rapido River was carried out by the US
36th
Infantry Division, each side of the village of Sant Angelo in Theodice, 3-miles
south of Cassino (Figure 4).52
47
Operation SHINGLE conducted by US VI Corps, commanded by Major-General John Lucas and
comprising 3rd
US Infantry Division and 1st
British Infantry Division.
48
Churchill, 335-342. Rick Atkinson, The Day of Battle – The War in Sicily and Italy, 1943-1944 (New
York: Henry Holt and Company, 2007), 330.
49
Fifth Army History Part IV, 30. British X Corps.
50
Frido von Senger Und Etterlin, Neither Fear Nor Hope (Novato CA: Presidio Press, 1989),189-90.
51
Senger, 192. These were the 90th
and 29th
Panzer-Grenadier Divisions
52
A US Army Regimental Combat Team was commanded by a Colonel and was approximately the
same size as a British Brigade ie around 4000 men. See Martin Blumenson, Bloody River: The Real
Tragedy of the Rapido (College Station TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1998), 139-140.
18

Launched on the night of 20 January 1944, it was an unmitigated disaster, resulting
in 1681 casualties.53
This was the first action fully visible from the Abbey; there was
a general assumption that observers in the building were responsible for the
accuracy of the enemy’s artillery during the attempted crossing.54
As Blumenson
suggests, the commanding heights, ‘crushed the troops psychologically and made
them feel helpless.’55
53
Blumenson, ‘Bloody River’, 110. (casualties from 20-22 Jan 44)
54
Bond, 39.
55
Blumenson, ‘Bloody River’, 72.
19
Figure 3: Map of British X Corps on the Lower
Garigliano, 17 January 1944, Fifth Army History Part
IV, 38.
Figure 4: Map of US 36th Division Crossing of the
Rapido River, 20-22 January 1944, Fifth Army
History Part IV, 49.

D. General Clark Attacks in the Mountains
20
Figure 5: Map of the attack by the US 34th Division and the
FEC to the North of Cassino, 24-31 January 1944, Fifth Army
History Part IV, 58

Having failed to breach the Gustav Line directly, Clark decided that the 34th
Infantry
Division would attack across the Rapido to the north of Cassino, with the FEC
shifting its axis of attack to the north of II Corps, closer to Cassino than hitherto.56
The objectives for the 34th
Division were to thrust west to secure high ground around
Monte Castellone, and also south to attack Cassino town from the north (Figure 5).57
The initial attacks, beginning late on 24 January, made little headway over the
flooded and heavily mined Rapido floodplain. It was not until 30 January that 34th
Division, reinforced by a regiment from 36th
Division began to make substantial
advances.58
Significant progress was made in the hills north-west of Cassino in the
first few days of February 1944; it appeared to the German commander that his
position was threatened and he reinforced it with higher quality panzer-grenadiers
and paratroopers.59
At this time he was losing the equivalent of one or two battalions of infantry every
day, and requested withdrawal to another defence line in the Alban Hills south of
Rome. His request was denied.60
Yet, the attacking Americans were also exhausted
and although one patrol reached the Abbey walls on 5 February, this was as far as
56
Fifth Army History Part IV, 50.
57
Blumenson, ‘Salerno to Cassino’, 367-368.
58
Blumenson, ‘Salerno to Cassino’, 373.
59
Senger, 195.
60
Senger, 196.
21
Figure 6: Map Showing the
Extent of the US advance on
the Abbey - 8-12 February
1944, Fifth Army History, Part
IV, 101.

they got (Figure 6).61
The arrival of these high quality German reinforcements
succeeded in halting further progress.
At the end of January, Alexander ordered New Zealand and Indian divisions, both
from Eighth Army, to redeploy to the Fifth Army sector as Army Group Reserve.62
Their initial task was to exploit success when US II Corps broke into the Liri Valley.63
Both units were, on 3 February, formed into a temporary corps, the New Zealand
(NZ) Corps, under the command of Freyberg and subordinated to Clark.64
Freyberg
was known to be temperamental and ‘hard to handle’; Alexander, fully aware of
these difficulties, was reluctant to place him under the already overstretched Clark.
It was only after complaints from Clark about unity of command that he agreed to do
so, but Alexander and Freyberg maintained personal communications throughout,
often bypassing Clark.65
US II Corps’ final efforts to break through at Cassino began on 11 February with 34th
Division tasked to attack Cassino town and Monte Cassino, with 36th
Division
attacking the key terrain of Point 593 and Albaneta Farm, 500m to the north-west.66
The NZ Corps, specifically 4th
Indian Division, commanded by Major-General Tuker,
was either to exploit success, or, take over from the Americans if they were
unsuccessful. US II Corps was given until nightfall on 12 February to capture the
61
62
Headquarters 15th
Army Group, Operations Instruction No.34, 12 January 1944. 2nd
NZ Division and
4th
Indian Division to be followed later by 78th
British Infantry Division.
63
64
65
Martin Blumenson, Mark Clark (New York: Congdon & Weed Inc, 1984), 180-181. John Ellis,
Cassino: The Hollow Victory (London: Andre Deutsch, 1984), 161-162.
66
Fifth Army History Part IV, 94. Hartcup, 2.
22

Abbey.67
The attack failed. Having driven them to the edge of destruction,68
Clark
reluctantly accepted that final victory would elude the Americans and handed
responsibility to Freyberg.
E. The Abbey – A Drain on Allied Morale
Throughout, the Abbey was assumed by the rank and file as being used as an
observation post. It was the ‘source of all their misery’. It undoubtedly contributed,
with the enemy and the appalling weather, to deteriorating morale within Allied ranks.
Bond experienced troops with self-inflicted injury, sickness became rife and
desertion commonplace. Bodies of dead Americans lay unrecovered on the slopes
in full view of the Abbey. Officers were placed on exit trails to intercept deserters
and malingerers.69
Early in February, Alexander, concerned over American morale,
sent his Deputy Chief of Staff, Brigadier-General Lemnitzer to make an assessment.
He reported that morale was ‘becoming progressively worse’ and that soldiers were
‘so disheartened as to be almost mutinous.’70
This effect was not restricted to
Americans. Majdalany makes the case of its draining psychological effect:
In the cold desolation of winter and the fatiguing travail of unresolved battle,
the spell of its monstrous eminence was complete and haunting...To the
soldiers dying at its feet, the Monastery had itself become in a sense the
enemy.71
Was it the psychological effect, countering what Bloch calls a ‘mass psychosis’ of
Allied troops, the ‘military necessity’ for Alexander’s agreement to the request to
67
RAF Narrative – The Italian Campaign 1943-1945 – Volume 1, 273.
68
Clark states that by 11 February II US Corps was at 25% strength. Mark Clark, Calculated Risk
(New York: Enigma Books, 2007), 250.
69
Bond, 82-92.
70
Atkinson, 406.
71
Majdalany, 121.
23

destroy the Abbey?72
Steinhoff, however, suggests that this moral reasoning is
insufficient justification in law for destroying the building.73
F. The Imperative to Rescue Anzio
Another clear reason to break the deadlock at Cassino was that Operation
SHINGLE, at Anzio was in trouble. Although achieving tactical surprise, at the
operational level Kesselring was ready and quickly initiated Plan RICHARD to isolate
72
Herbert Bloch, The Bombardment of Monte Cassino (Cassino: Montecassino, 1979), 14.
73
Uwe Steinhoff, ‘Moral Ambiguities in the Bombing of Monte Cassino’, Journal of Military Ethics 4,
No.2, (2005), 143.
24

and destroy the beachhead with reinforcements from northern Italy and elsewhere.74
The window of opportunity to drive towards Rome was small and was not taken.
Arguments over whether the Allies should have shown audacity or prudence are
beyond the scope of this dissertation, but the beachhead remained shallow and
vulnerable. General Mackenson’s German Fourteenth Army had made preliminary
preparations to counterattack by the beginning of February (Figure 7), and ULTRA
revealed that their main effort, Operation FISCHFANG, would be launched north of
Anzio town.75
This counterattack was scheduled for 16 February.76
Clark received
Kesselring’s orders for the attack on 3 February from ULTRA.77
The operation
designed to assist the breakthrough on the Gustav Line was now in mortal danger
and its best hope of survival was rapid success at Cassino.
74
Siegfried Westphal, The German Army in the West (London: Cassell, 1951),156-158.
75
AFSC:I 282/9, Chief Of Staff ,15th
Army Group, Message 718 to General Wilson, 9 February 1944.
76
Hinsley, 192.
77
Bennett, 267-8.
25
Figure 7: German Fourteenth Army Prepares to attack Anzio beachhead from the Campoleone
Salient, Early February 1944.

CHAPTER TWO- THE DECISION TO BOMB THE ABBEY OF MONTECASSINO
A. Who Could Issue the Orders?
Before examining events leading up to the decision to bomb the Abbey,
Mediterranean command and control arrangements in February 1944 must be
described.78
Accounts of the Abbey’s destruction often place the final decision for
the attack with Alexander.79
In fact, Tuker, Freyberg, Clark and Alexander could only
request strategic support. In AFHQ, following the British pattern, the Air Forces were
independent, not within the chain of command of ground forces. Only Lieutenant-
General Eaker, commander of the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces (MAAF) could
order air support. He commanded three air commands, of which only the
Mediterranean Allied Tactical Air Force (MATAF) is relevant to the bombing.80
Comprising 12th
Air Support Command (ASC), commanded by Major-General
Cannon, MATAF provided tactical support to ground forces, including the use of light
and medium bombers. The MASAF, or 15th
Air Force, was commanded by Major-
General Twining; its role was defined by the CCS at the Sextant conference in
December 1943, to conduct ‘Operation POINTBLANK as the air operation of first
priority.’81
Eaker had only nominal control and could not divert MASAF from this
78
Command and Control map can be found at Appendix C.
79
For Example: Rupert Clarke, With Alex At War: From the Irrawaddy to the Po – 1941-1945
(Barnsley UK: Leo Cooper, 2000), 135-6. J H Green, Cassino 1944 (Cassino: Lamberti Editore,
1989), 43. Peter Singleton-Gates, General Lord Freyberg VC (London: Michael Joseph, 1963), 278-
9.
80
The others were the Mediterranean Allied Coastal Air Force (MACAF) which maintained sea-lane
integrity and the Tactical Bomber Force (until March 1944). MATAF was the Allied command and
comprised the national elements, Desert Air Force and 12 ASC. MASAF was again an Allied
command with 205 Group RAF and 15th
USAAF. Eaker and Slessor had administrative responsibility,
but AOC Middle East and Spaatz had operational responsibility.
81
CCS 387/3 (Sextant) dated 5 December 1943. Operation POINTBLANK is the Allied Combined
Bombing Offensive aimed at destroying the German air capability in order to seize air superiority over
the Luftwaffe in preparation for OVERLORD. See Appendix I for full text
26

CHAPTER TWO- THE DECISION TO BOMB THE ABBEY OF MONTECASSINO
A. Who Could Issue the Orders?
Before examining events leading up to the decision to bomb the Abbey,
Mediterranean command and control arrangements in February 1944 must be
described.78
Accounts of the Abbey’s destruction often place the final decision for
the attack with Alexander.79
In fact, Tuker, Freyberg, Clark and Alexander could only
request strategic support. In AFHQ, following the British pattern, the Air Forces were
independent, not within the chain of command of ground forces. Only Lieutenant-
General Eaker, commander of the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces (MAAF) could
order air support. He commanded three air commands, of which only the
Mediterranean Allied Tactical Air Force (MATAF) is relevant to the bombing.80
Comprising 12th
Air Support Command (ASC), commanded by Major-General
Cannon, MATAF provided tactical support to ground forces, including the use of light
and medium bombers. The MASAF, or 15th
Air Force, was commanded by Major-
General Twining; its role was defined by the CCS at the Sextant conference in
December 1943, to conduct ‘Operation POINTBLANK as the air operation of first
priority.’81
Eaker had only nominal control and could not divert MASAF from this
78
Command and Control map can be found at Appendix C.
79
For Example: Rupert Clarke, With Alex At War: From the Irrawaddy to the Po – 1941-1945
(Barnsley UK: Leo Cooper, 2000), 135-6. J H Green, Cassino 1944 (Cassino: Lamberti Editore,
1989), 43. Peter Singleton-Gates, General Lord Freyberg VC (London: Michael Joseph, 1963), 278-
9.
80
The others were the Mediterranean Allied Coastal Air Force (MACAF) which maintained sea-lane
integrity and the Tactical Bomber Force (until March 1944). MATAF was the Allied command and
comprised the national elements, Desert Air Force and 12 ASC. MASAF was again an Allied
command with 205 Group RAF and 15th
USAAF. Eaker and Slessor had administrative responsibility,
but AOC Middle East and Spaatz had operational responsibility.
81
CCS 387/3 (Sextant) dated 5 December 1943. Operation POINTBLANK is the Allied Combined
Bombing Offensive aimed at destroying the German air capability in order to seize air superiority over
the Luftwaffe in preparation for OVERLORD. See Appendix I for full text
27

purpose as it answered primarily to General Spaatz, the commander of US Strategic
Air Forces in Europe.
Some control, given at the same conference, was allotted to the Supreme
Commander Mediterranean only, and only ‘should a tactical or strategic emergency
arise.’82
At the time this was Eisenhower, but by February 1944 General Maitland-
Wilson had replaced him. Although no documentary evidence has been discovered,
it is impossible that the strategic bombers were used without Wilson’s approval. It is
puzzling that, considering his final decision was one of the most controversial of the
Second World War, it is hardly mentioned in his memoirs.83
In his official despatch,
occupation is an important justification. He stated that the Abbey was ‘occupied and
fortified...and formed the pivot on which the German defensive system was based.’84
B. Measures to Protect Cultural Sites
Concern over the Abbey’s fate began in October 1943, when two German officers
arranged for the evacuation of the Abbey’s treasures.85
According to one of these
officers, Captain Becker, Kesselring had promised the Abbot that the Abbey would
not be used for military purposes.86
President Roosevelt had written to the Pope in
July 1943, and although not specifically referring to the Abbey, stated that ‘Churches
and religious institutions will, to the extent that it is within our power, be spared the
82
CCS 387/3 (Sextant) dated 5 December 1943. This caveat was possibly in response to the
difficulties that arose in securing strategic bomber support of ground forces in the most difficult phase
of Operation AVALANCHE at Salerno. Strategic bombers were employed against German thrusts
against the beachhead at Battipaglia and Eboli on 13 September 1943. See Ambrose, 270.
83
Henry Maitland-Wilson, Field-Marshal Lord Wilson of Libya – Eight Years Overseas 1939-1947
(London: Hutchinson, 1951), 195.
84
Henry Maitland-Wilson, Report by The Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean to the Combined
Chiefs of Staff on The Italian Campaign 8th
January 1944 to 10th
May 1944 (London: His Majesty’s
Stationery Office, 1946), 30-1.
85
David Hapgood and David Richardson, Monte Cassino: the Story of the Most Controversial Battle of
World War II (New York: Da Capo Press, 2002),31.
86
Hapgood and Richardson, 9.
28

devastation of war.’87
In a message to 15th
Army Group on 4 November 1943,
Eisenhower added the Abbey to his list of protected places.88
The next day he
informed US Army Chief of Staff, General Marshall, that ‘consistent with military
necessity all precautions to safeguard works of art and monuments are being
taken.’89
The order adding the Abbey to the protected list was sent to Fifth and
Eighth Armies by 15th
Army Group on 5 November.90
On that day AFHQ received correspondence from the British Minister to the Holy
See, Sir Francis D’Arcy-Osborne, stating that the Vatican had asked the British to
ensure the safety of the Abbey. He added that requests had also been sent to the
German Ambassador, Baron Von Weizsaecker.91
Osborne postulated that ‘the
Germans have already occupied Monte Cassino and sent the monks away’. He
added that ‘if the Germans make use of the Monastery the Allies will be obliged to
take whatever counter-measures, aerial or otherwise, that their own military interests
may require.’92
The first statement possibly referred to the evacuation of art and
inmates in October; the second placed the use of the building by the Germans as the
diplomatic line in the sand. On 7 November, Osborne sent a telegram to the Foreign
Office stating that the Vatican had received an assurance that ‘Abbey of Monte
Cassino “will not be occupied by regular German troops”’.93
This information
reached 15th
Army Group on 15 November 1943, although Osborne had asked for a
87
Quoted in Combined Chiefs of Staff message R-8408/7777. FAN 322. to Supreme Commander
Mediterranean, 22 January 1944.
88
Folio No 02003 AFHQ to 15 Army Group, 4 November 1943. Montecassino, unlike Castelgandolfo
was not Papal property, but belonged to the Italian state. Under the Lateran Treaty of 1929, Papal
property attracts extraterritoriality and should be treated as neutral territory.
89
Folio No 02542 AFHQ to US War Department,5 November 1943.
90
Message Ref 0-1478 Date Time Group 051910A November 1943.
91
JCH/DW/jw, MGS 619.3 – Monuments and Fine Arts – Monastery of Monte Cassino, AFHQ Military
Government Section, 5 November 1943.
92
JCH/DW/jw, MGS 619.3 – Monuments and Fine Arts – Monastery of Monte Cassino, AFHQ Military
Government Section, 5 November 1943.
93
Telegram No. 410, HM Minister to Holy See to Foreign Office, 7 November 1943.
29

clarification of what was meant by ‘regular German troops’.94
A similar message was
given to the US Charge d’Affaires, Harold Tittman, on 8 January 1944.95
On 29 December, Eisenhower issued an order regarding historical monuments and
military necessity. He was clear that, where possible, monuments were to be
spared, but that military necessity was paramount. He warned, however, that
necessity was not the same as convenience.96
Nothing more was heard from the
Vatican, but by 10 February journalists were beginning to report that the Abbey was
being used for military purposes. A Times correspondent reported ‘wireless aerials
established on the roofs and telescopes at the windows.’97
The same correspondent
upped the ante the next day, claiming that Fifth Army troops had ‘seen machine-
guns along the abbey walls’.98
Osborne referred to an undated BBC report when
sending the following message on 11 February:
I have thought it well to remind the Vatican, both verbally and in writing, that I
had warned them that if the Abbey or its territory were used by the Germans
for military purpose, the Allied military authorities would be obliged to take
necessary counter measures; also that I have never received any reply to my
suggestion...that the Vatican should ascertain from the Germans whether their
assurance that the Abbey would not be occupied by German troops covered
occupation or utilisation of the Abbey or its territory for any military purpose.99
This message clearly inferred that, from HM Government’s point of view, the issue of
occupation remained paramount.
94
Folio No.05697, AFHQ to 15th
Army Group,15 November 1943.
95
Raleigh Trevelyan, Rome 44:The Battle for the Eternal City (London: Secker & Warburg, 1981), 25.
96
AG.000.4-1, Allied Force Headquarters, Office of the Commander-in-Chief, Historical Monuments,
29 December 1943. See Appendix F for full text.
97
The Times, Monastery Used as an Observation Post, 10 February 1944.
98
The Times, Monastery Used as Gun-Post, 11 February 1944.
99
Telegram No. 87 HM Minister to Holy See to Foreign Office,11 February 1944.
30

C. The Efforts of General Tuker
Prior to the NZ Corps moving into the Fifth Army sector there had been no
discussions by General Officers concerning the Abbey’s destruction. In fact the
opposite was the case; ‘Every effort will continue to be made to avoid damaging the
Abbey in spite of the fact that it occupies commanding terrain which might well serve
as an excellent observation post’.100
[Emphasis added], was the order to Fifth Army
as they approached Cassino. There was no doubt that the rank and file supported
bombing it, but as Bond stated in the account of when he used the building to zero
mortars in the first week of February, ‘someone at Army was hot about it’.101
When it
was bombed the soldiers that had suffered in its shadow ‘were to cry for joy as bomb
after bomb crumbled it to dust.’102
It was not until the 4th
Indian Division were
planning to assault the position that bombing it was raised. The genesis of this idea
came from the Indian commander, Major-General Tuker.
Tuker, however, was far from keen to see the Abbey bombed. ‘I went through hell
on earth during the early days urging desperately that no attack on Monte Cassino
be contemplated.’103
A student of manoeuvre, he did not want his Division anywhere
near Monte Cassino, preferring an outflanking movement to the north, similar to that
started by the FEC in January. He stated after the war that:
I could never understand why the US Fifth Army decided to batter its head
again and again against this most powerful position, held by some of the
finest troops in the German Army.104
100
Folio No.02112, Fifth US Army, 6 January 1944.
101
Bond, 91.
102
Bond, 114.
103
Quoted in Trevelyan, 132.
104
Quoted in Ellis, 164.
31

Tuker was sceptical about the military intellect of many British officers. Highly critical
of British generals’ tactics in the Desert War, he called the period between the wars
when these commanders rose to prominence the ‘Ice Age of military thought’.105
For
a military intellectual and ‘a scholar of war’106
he appeared to have little time for
officers such as Freyberg –‘brave as a lion but no planner of battles and a niggler in
action’, he said of him. 107
Some said that Tuker was ‘the brains that the brawny
Freyberg lacks’.108
He thought of Alexander as ‘indolent’.109
He was in good
company; Brooke struggled to hide Alexander’s weaknesses from Churchill, his poor
grasp of strategy and inability to control his subordinates.110
Churchill had to remind
Alexander that he could give orders to Americans.111
Despite sickness resulting in his replacement as divisional commander in early
February, Tuker continued to lobby changes to NZ Corps’ orders for direct attack,
suggesting an outflanking manoeuvre in his first memorandum on 12 February112
and
in a meeting with Freyberg on the same day.113
Tuker’s second memorandum of 12
February has been condemned by Bloch as the justification for the destruction of
105
Francis Tuker, The Pattern of War (London: Cassell, 1948), 11.
106
Majdalany, 104.
107
108
Frank Gervasi. The Violent Decade – A Foreign Correspondent in Europe and the Middle East
1935-1945 (New York: W W Norton, 1989), 552.
109
Trevelyan, 133.
110
Alex Danchev and Daniel Todman, War Diaries 1939-1945 – Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke
(London: Wiedenfeld & Nicholson, 2001), 519. Dominick Graham and Shelford Bidwell, Tug of War –
The battle For Italy 1943-45 (Barnsley UK: Pen & Sword Military Classics, 2004), 244.
111
Churchill Undated Special Unnumbered Message to Alexander in Alexander’s Papers WO214/14.
This letter is undated but contemporaneous as Churchill mentions Freyberg;s upcoming attack and
remarks on Lucas in command at Anzio, putting it definitely in February 1944. Special Unnumbered
Messages were personal messages sent via Special Liaison Units by secure one-time-pad.
112
Main HQ 4 Ind Div No 433/G – Operations dated 12 Feb 44. See full text at Appendix G
113
Ellis, 164.
32

Figure 8 & 9: 4000lb ‘Cookie’ or ‘Blockbuster High-Capacity bomb. A
Blockbuster and 500lb General Purpose bombs in bomb-bay of a RAF
Lancaster. 4000lb Blockbusters had a very thin casing that when exploded
produced blast. Blast is the main force that knocks buildings down. The 500lb
has a much thicker casing with a lower ratio of explosive to weight, thereby
producing less blast and more fragmentation. Fragmentation is not as effective
at knocking down buildings.
the Abbey.114
An alternative analysis is that Tuker’s demand in paragraph 5 to use
‘Blockbuster’ bombs was a subtle attempt to dissuade Freyberg.115
If he could not
114
Bloch, 18-19.
115
‘Blockbuster’ bombs were 4000lb canisters known as ‘cookies’ or High Capacity bombs. These
weapons were mostly used by the RAF in the Bombing Offensive over Germany to create blast waves
that would remove roofs allowing access to buildings for incendiaries. They could not be carried by
the USAAF aircraft of MASAF and MATAF and the only aircraft in the Italian theatre that could carry
this weapon was the Wellington bombers of the Desert Air Force and MASAF No205 Group RAF.
The former were employed largely in medium bomber support to Eighth Army. Cookies were
available to the Wellingtons of 205 Group, but could only be carried on modified aircraft. There is no
doubt that Blockbusters were used in Italy as in April 2001, 77,000 inhabitants of the northern town of
Vicenza had to be evacuated whilst a 4000lb HC bomb was defused in the town’s central cemetery.
Only 2 aircraft per squadron were modified, which added up, according to RAF Official History, to a
33

use ‘Blockbusters’, he said, the 1000lb bomb would be ‘next to useless’.116
Tuker, or
members of his staff, had knowledge of these bombs and their capabilities; the
4000lb ‘Blockbuster’ (Figures 8 & 9) is explicitly mentioned in a memorandum to NZ
Corps a few days after the bombing.117
It is possible that he knew these bombs were
not immediately available in sufficient numbers in the Italian theatre and that if he
convinced Freyberg that only these would do, then the venture could be proven as
wasted effort.
Instructions to take-over the assault on Monte Cassino were issued by the NZ Corps
on 9 February in Operation Instruction No.4; a contingency plan should US II Corps
fail. 4th
Indian Division was tasked to capture Monte Cassino, cut Highway 6 and
capture Cassino town from the west (Figure 10).118
Figure 10: NZ Corps Plan of Attack 15-17 February 1944.
total of 12 aircraft. Hilary St.G. Saunders, Royal Air Force 1939-45, Volume III – The Fight Is Won
(London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1954), 223.
116
Memorandum No. 433/1/G. See full text at Appendix H.
117
Memorandum No 410/G, Main HQ 4 Indian Division to Main NZ Corps– Direct Air Support, 18
February 1944.
118
NZ Corps Operation Instruction No.4, 9 February 1944.
34

There is no mention of bombing the Abbey, although Clark stated that Freyberg
brought up the subject on the same day.119
It is clear that 4th
Indian Division was
given a Warning Order regarding entry into the Abbey, as 8-hours prior to
Operational Instruction No.4, the Division’s Commander Royal Engineers,
Lieutenant-Colonel Stenhouse, had been informed of the possible task.120
Stenhouse lacked information about the Abbey’s construction and despatched a
subaltern to Fifth Army for information.121
Returning empty-handed from G-2, the
officer went to Naples on 10 February to scour bookshops, returning with some
useful material. In the resulting mission analysis Stenhouse concluded that his
engineers could not handle a building of this size. In its Operational Instruction No.3
dated 11 February, the following statement appears in the Air paragraph:
Requests have been made for all buildings and suspected enemy
strongpoints on and in vicinity of the objectives incl the MONASTERY to be
subjected to intense bombing from now on.122
This is the first written request to bomb the building. The next day Tuker expanded
on the Operational Instruction with the two memoranda to NZ Corps. In the second
he stated that he did not believe the Abbey was within the capability of divisional
assets.123
His demand of Freyberg on 12 February ‘not to compromise’ with Clark
over the direction of the attack indicated that the idea of continuing direct assault,
was Clark’s.124
Freyberg, in conversation with Fifth Army Chief of Staff, Major-
General Gruenther, rated his chances as ‘not more than fifty-fifty’.125
Tuker,
119
Clark, 251.
120
RAF Narrative – The Italian Campaign 1943-1945 – Volume 1, 273.
121
Jones, 24.
122
4th
Indian Division Operation Instruction No.3, 11 Feb 44.
123
124
Trevelyan, 133.
125
Majdalany, 107.
35

however, lacked confidence in Freyberg’s ability to influence Clark – he later wrote, ‘I
feel sorry for Freyberg, but he should never have been put in command of a corps.
He had not the tactical understanding and certainly not the experience of the
mountains.’126
In the second memo, he outlined requirements for bombing the
building; as Ellis points out, these are his requirements for a head-on attack, rather
than a statement of his favoured course of action.127
This memorandum is written in
a bitter, recriminatory style, critical of intelligence and poor forethought by
commanders.128
Jones’ post-war report asserts that Freyberg ‘agreed to General Tuker’s request’.129
The inference is that Tuker was the driving force behind the attack, which he was
not. He was, as well as a believer in manoeuvre, convinced of an unchanging
pattern of war.130
If forced, he saw the Abbey as a ‘modern fortress’ that must be
‘dealt with by modern means.’131
A great supporter of airpower to support ground
forces, Tuker viewed the heavy bomber as the ‘great arm of siege bombardment’,132
the modern trebuchet. He never claimed the Abbey was being used by the
Germans, only its potential as a last redoubt.133
Once the decision had been made
for a head-on assault, Tuker was pugnacious in his demands that the position should
receive a proper softening-up and that the defenders be reduced to ‘imbecility’.134
After the war he stated that the Abbey was exposed to too little attention, rather than
too much.135
126
Quoted in Trevelyan, 134.
127
Ellis, 167.
128
129
Jones, 26. This report was written at the request of Brigadier Latham of the Cabinet Office. Why it
had been requested or what action was taken upon it is unknown.
130
Tuker,1.
131
132
Tuker, 96.
133
134
Trevelyan, 133.
135
F S Tuker, Bombing of Cassino, Letter to The Times, 21 October 1950.
36

D. Freyberg Insists
If Tuker did not use occupation as a reason for the Abbey’s destruction, Freyberg
did. Like the soldiers with which he had a great affinity, Freyberg was convinced the
Germans were using the building. In his despatch to the NZ Government on 4 April,
he reported:
The Benedictine Monastery was destroyed by heavy air bombardment, a step
which was forced upon us because, despite enemy protests to the contrary, it
was being used as an observatory for military purposes.136
Freyberg’s formal request for air support was made late on 12 February, for the next
day. He said, disingenuously considering Tuker’s reluctance to attack the Abbey,
that: ‘The division commander who is making the attack feels that it is an essential
target and I thoroughly agree with him.’137
Freyberg was unusual for a subordinate
general in that he was also the representative of a Dominion Government, who could
recommend the withdrawal of his country’s contingent in the event of excessive
casualties. He was handled carefully by Alexander, and Clark claimed that ‘they
have always been given special considerations which we would not give to our own
troops’.138
In his diary he called it ‘political daintiness’.139
As Hapgood and
Richardson state, ‘this man of great bravery and limited intellect had been placed in
a position of great political subtlety.’140
Yet the national position of Freyberg was only
relevant when NZ forces were involved. There was no such involvement for the
attack on Monte Cassino, which involved Indian troops. Freyberg had no national
136
Singleton-Gates, 277.
137
Trevelyan, 131. Freyberg may have been referring to Brigadier H W Dimoline, the 4th
Indian
Division’s Artillery commander, who was in temporary command of the Division due to Tuker’s illness.
He had been on the massif that day to ascertain the Division’s requirements and had reported that
evening to Freyberg.
138
139
Atkinson, 435.
140
Hapgood and Richardson,149.
37

responsibility for these. Perhaps as relevant was that he was on first name terms
with Churchill, who had briefly considered appointing him as C-in-C Middle East in
1940.141
Oddly, in view of Tuker’s request for ‘Blockbuster’ bombs, Freyberg’s request to
Gruenther on the evening of 12 February was for 36-‘Kittybomber’ sorties, each
delivering only single-1000lb bombs.142
Gruenther doubted whether support would
be available on 13 February as the counterattack was expected at Anzio. All he
could offer was a squadron of A-36s each with single-500lb bombs.143
Neither
Freyberg’s request nor Gruenther’s offer was going to knock the defenders into
‘imbecility’. At this point Fifth Army learned that Freyberg wanted to attack the
Abbey itself. Gruenther could not find the Abbey on the target list, but Freyberg
argued, ‘I am quite sure it was on my list, but in any case I want it bombed.’144
As it
was on the list of protected sites, Gruenther could not approve the request without
consulting Clark, who was at Anzio. Unable to contact him, Gruenther stated that he
contacted Alexander’s Chief of Staff, Lieutenant-General Harding for the opinion of
15th
Army Group.145
Graham and Bidwell, however, suggest that Harding contacted
Gruenther following an appeal from Freyberg, rather than the other way around.146
This seems plausible as Gruenther did not ask Alexander’s permission, as he knew
that Clark did not view the Abbey’s destruction as a military necessity. Clark was
141
David Reynolds, In Command of History (London: Penguin Books, 2004) Amazon Kindle Location
4303-4308. Churchill’s acquaintance with Freyberg began when he was First Lord of the Admiralty in
1914 when Freyberg was commissioned as a Lieutenant (RN) in the Naval Division. He won his first
Distinguished Service Order as a Lieutenant Commander at Gallipoli in June 1915, carrying out
deception measures for the British landings in the Gulf of Saros. Singleton-Gates, 52. He won the
Victoria Cross as a naval officer at Beaucourt France in November 1916. Singleton-Gates, 66-72.
142
143
Blumenson, ‘Salerno to Cassino’, 404. The A-36 is the attack version of the P-51 Mustang, a very
light tactical aircraft for Close Air Support use.
144
145
Strangely, as with Wilson’s memoirs, Harding’s biographer (Field-Marshal, Lord) Carver fails to
account for the decision. Michael Carver, Harding of Petherton (London: Wiedenfeld and Nicolson,
1978),125-6.
146
Graham and Bidwell, 201.
38

supported by those American commanders most intimately associated with the
battle. These were Major-Generals Keyes, Ryder and Walker Commanding US II
Corps, 34th
and 36th
Divisions respectively as well as their G-2s.147
Juin, who
considered Monte Cifalco a far more important observation position, was also
opposed.148
According to the RAF official history, Eaker and his British deputy, Air-
Marshal Slessor, also shared Clark’s doubts.149
Before Harding received instructions from Alexander, Gruenther contacted Clark
who, as expected, judged there was no military necessity to destroy the Abbey.
Later on 12 February, Harding informed Gruenther that Alexander had decided the
Abbey should be bombed if ‘Freyberg considered it a military necessity.’150
In his
memoirs, Alexander’s opinion is that he had deliberately spared the Abbey ‘to our
detriment’, but also says, ‘whether the Germans took advantage of its deep cellars
for shelter and its high windows for observation, I do not know.’151
How the Abbey’s
continuing existence was disadvantageous to the Allies is explained by its morale
effect on his troops.152
Alexander‘s handling of the campaign was also under
constant scrutiny from an impatient Churchill, keen for success before the Americans
lost interest.153
To Gruenther, Alexander also judged occupation as important when
he stated, through Harding, that ‘if there is any reasonable probability that the
building is being used for military purposes, General Alexander believes its
destruction is warranted.’154
147
Blumenson, ‘Salerno to Cassino’, 404. Green, 44.
148
Ellis, 166, Hapgood and Richardson, 124.
149
Denis Richards and Hilary St.G Saunders, Royal Air Force 1939-45 Volume II – The Fight Avails
(London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1954),359. And Aileen Clayton, The Enemy is Listening
(New York: Ballantine Books, 1980),346.
150
151
Harold Alexander, The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Earl Alexander of Tunis 1940:1945 (London:
Cassell,1962), 119.
152
Alexander, ‘Memoirs’, 121.
153
Martin Gilbert, Churchill – A Life (London: Heineman, 1991), 767. Churchill, 380-1. Molony, 705.
154
39

Clark wilted under the pressure from above and below. He agreed ‘to defer to
General Freyberg’s judgement if General Freyberg had evidence that indicated that
the monastery should be bombed’.155
Gruenther was told not to order the bombing
before 1000hrs on 13 February to give Clark time to dissuade Alexander personally.
Freyberg told Gruenther that he had gone into the matter and was quite convinced of
the necessity. Clark, according to his memoirs, ‘was never able to discover on what
he based his opinion’.156
Nonetheless, Freyberg’s request was approved. Although
Gruenther approved the target, at this point only MATAF A-36s could be allocated,
as strategic bombers required higher levels of approval which had not been sought.
Weather and problems moving troops to a safe distance delayed the attack.157
On the morning of 13 February, Clark spoke directly to Alexander, explaining that he
did not support the bombing, and that the Germans were not using the Abbey.158
According to Blumenson, Alexander agreed with Clark, but said ‘if Freyberg wanted
the monastery bombed, the monastery would have to be bombed.’159
E. ‘We Will Whip It Out Like a Dead Tooth’160
The escalation from 36-single-engined fighter-bombers to an air armada may have
originated with Alexander’s desire to consult Wilson, although Freyberg credited
Clark.161
Clark confirmed that he made such a suggestion.162
Permission was
unnecessary for MATAF aircraft, but the request interested Eaker, who had been
155
156
Clark, 253.
157
Graham and Bidwell, 198.
158
Blumenson, ‘Clark’, 185.
159
160
General Cannon, MATAF Commander. Atkinson 433.
161
Letter from General Freyberg to Major General Kippenberger, 11 August 1950.
162
Clark, 254.
40

coming under pressure from the USAAF Chief of Staff, General Arnold, to make
better use of the 4500-aircraft under his command.163
Not only was there an
opportunity to relieve this pressure, but it gave Eaker, despite his reservations, an
opportunity to prove that strategic airpower could support ground operations. The
order to divert MASAF from its primary mission has not been discovered, but only
Wilson or Spaatz could have issued it.
It is not clear how Wilson justified this diversion as an ‘emergency’ and none was
declared to Spaatz, or whether he informed the CCS as his orders required; there is
no mention of it in Brooke’s diary.164
A letter sent by the British Chiefs of Staff to
Wilson on 4 March inferred that he informed them; that it was his decision; and that
occupation was the deciding factor.165
Alexander wrote a long letter to Churchill and
Brooke, which went into great tactical detail on 11 February.166
Yet he did not
mention, then or later, any intention to destroy the Abbey. Churchill specifically
asked Alexander about the NZ Corps attack in a letter of 14 February.167
Remarkably, there is no evidence that Churchill or Brooke were informed of what
undoubtedly was to be a highly controversial and politically sensitive act.
Jones suggests that the final decision was taken on the afternoon of 14 February,
but the issuance of a tasking message at 1230 on 14 February by the 5th
Bombardment Wing of MASAF points to the decision being taken on the morning of
163
AFSC N 1144/10 Message from General Arnold to Lieutenant-General Eaker, 10 February 1944.
164
Arthur Bryant, Triumph in the West (London: Fontana Books, 1965), 120. Danchev and Todman,
521. Nor is it mentioned in First Sea Lord, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham’s memoirs.
Andrew Cunningham, A Sailor’s Odyssey (London: Hutchinson & Co, 1952), 589-595.
165
Jones 35, Message from British Chiefs of Staff to General Wilson, COSMED 51, 4 March 1944.
See W G F Jackson, The Battle for Italy (London: B T Batsford Ltd, 1967), 194.
166
WO 214/14 Alexander’s Correspondence with Prime Minister and CIGS, letter time 111740A
February 1944.
167
WO 214/14 Alexander’s Correspondence with Prime Minister and CIGS, letter PM to Alexander 14
February 1944.
41

that day at the latest.168
The standard of intelligence issued to Evans and his fellow
B-17 crewmen can be judged by the Annex to Operation Order 341, issued by
Headquarters 5th
Bombardment Wing, A-2 Division:
The target is a huge ancient monastery which the Germans have chosen as a
key defense point and have loaded with heavy guns. It is located about 1 mile
West of Cassino on a hill and stands out as a perfect target for heavy
bombers. Those crew members who have served through the African
campaign will remember how we did not bomb mosques because of the
religious and humanitarian training all of us have received from our parents
and our schools. Because of that and because the Krauts and the Eyties
know this they lived in these mosques. They knew we would not bomb these
places. The Germans are still capitalizing on this belief in our avoiding
churches and hospitals. In the past few days this monastery has accounted
for the lives of upwards of 2,000 American boys who felt the same as we do
about church property and who paid for it because the Germans do not
understand anything human when total war is concerned. This monastery
MUST be destroyed and everyone in it as there is no one in it but Germans.169
The above intelligence report should be compared with an opinion about the same
building from an officer who commanded many of the ‘2,000 American boys’, Major-
General Walker of the 36th
Division:
This was a valuable historical monument, which should have been preserved.
The Germans were not using it and I can see no advantage in destroying it.
168
Jones, 29. HQ 5th
Bombardment Wing Operation Order 341, 14 February 1944. Order at Appendix
J.
169
Intelligence Annex to Operations Order 341, Headquarters Fifth Wing (US), 14 February 1944.
42

No tactical advantage will result since the Germans can make as much use of
the rubble for observation and gun positions as of the building itself.170
170
Walker diary entry, 16 February 1944 from Blumenson, ‘Salerno to Cassino’, 413.
43

CHAPTER THREE - THE SOURCES OF INTELLIGENCE AVAILABLE TO ALLIED
COMMANDERS AT MONTE CASSINO
A. Introduction
It is evident from the differences of opinion of Allied commanders at all levels, that no
consensus was reached as to whether the Abbey was occupied. That it had a
psychological effect was not in doubt, but did its destruction meet Eisenhower’s
definition of necessity or merely convenience? The claimed irrelevance of the
Abbey’s occupation is largely a post-bombing phenomenon. Apart from Tuker,
occupation was a key factor in the opinions of all the Allied commanders. On what
basis were these opinions formed? Lewin contends that ‘no previous commander
was informed so extensively and so accurately as Alexander.’171
Were there sources
of intelligence available to Alexander and Wilson that were not available to Clark and
lower level commanders that had a bearing on the decision?
B. Signals Intelligence
The first source to be examined is SIGINT, divided into two parts. ULTRA
intelligence was derived from German high-grade ciphers transmitted via wireless-
telegraphy over the Enigma encryption system. Additional high-grade ULTRA
intelligence was gained from non-morse teleprinters that connected headquarters
with Berlin, codenamed FISH. Lower-level tactical messages were transmitted
either in the clear or using less secure cryptographic means and were intercepted
and exploited by the ‘Y’-Service.
171
Ronald Lewin, ULTRA Goes To War – The Secret Story (London: Book Club Associates, 1978),
286-287.
44

According to Hunt ‘it was the greatest secret of the war.’172
ULTRA intelligence was
the ability of the Government Code and Cipher School (GC&CS) at Bletchley Park to
read messages encrypted on the Enigma machine. It would be wrong, however, to
assume that ULTRA was an all-Seeing Eye that allowed Allied commanders total
clarity on their enemy’s intentions. Firstly, the static nature of the Italian battlefield
reduced the need for wireless transmissions because landline communications could
generally be used. Secondly, the Germans used a number of Enigma ‘keys’, each
associated with its service or function. Each of these presented a separate puzzle to
GC&CS and each was broken at different times and with differing delay. Some keys
remained secure, especially those that were only sporadically used.
In Italy, Enigma communications within German Tenth Army used a key codenamed
ALBATROSS, and communications between Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH) in
Berlin and Kesselring used a key codenamed PUFFIN.173
Neither of these keys was
regularly broken because of insufficient use due to landline availability. GC&CS
made a breakthrough in January 1944 when they succeeded in breaking a Tenth
Army key codenamed BULLFINCH, which reported order-of-battle information to
OKH.174
This source allowed Allied commanders full knowledge of the German order-
of battle at Cassino. Unfortunately, BULLFINCH became unbreakable on 6 February
resulting in a marked decline in high-level SIGINT.175
Two sources of ULTRA
continued uninterrupted throughout the period and provided considerable
intelligence. These were the Luftwaffe keys codenamed RED and PUMA, issued to
172
Hunt, x.
173
Hinsley et al, 175fn. OKH was German Army Command located at Zossen outside Berlin.
174
Hinsley et al 185-6.
175
Hinsley et al, 190.
45

air liaison officers (flivos) at army units, and the FISH link between Kesselring’s
headquarters and OKH, codenamed BREAM.176
Because of its great value, and the inherent fragility of SIGINT sources, ULTRA was
retained in a very restricted compartment, with great care taken over its distribution
and use. It was distributed to formations no lower than Army level. However, in Italy
some commanders at lower levels were aware of ULTRA. For instance, Freyberg
had commanded Crete in 1941 during the German assault and had been given
access.177
It is not clear whether he retained this informally, but NZ Corps had no
Special Liaison Unit (SLU). It is possible that Alexander would have divulged
relevant facts to Freyberg, at least verbally, in their numerous meetings.
Clark, as an Allied Army commander had formal access to ULTRA through the Fifth
Army SLU (Station KQ).178
Although collocated with 15th
Army Group (Station SB)
briefly until late January when Clark moved his Command Post to Presenzano, the
Fifth Army SLU was separate.179
It received its ULTRA messages via a Secure
Communications Unit (SCU) directly from GC&CS. Both the SLU and SCU were
British manned in their entirety.180
Distribution of ULTRA during early 1944 was
limited to the SLU/SCU staff and just four Fifth Army officers; Clark, Gruenther;
Colonel Howard, the G-2 and his deputy, Colonel Wells.181
Unlike the Fifth Army
SLU, located in a truck, Alexander’s SLU was within the plusher surroundings of the
176
Hinsley et al, 175fn, 182.
177
Bennett, 53-54.
178
Detailed in Fifth Army History Tables of Organization & Equipment as ‘3 Special Intelligence (B)
Unit Type A’. Fifth Army History Part IV, 242. HW 49/1, The History of the Special Liaison Units –
Mediterranean and Western Europe, Government Codes and Cypher School, 36.
179
History of SLUs, 39.
180
Arthur Fournier, Thesis on Influence of ULTRA Intelligence Upon General Clark at Anzio, United
States Army Command and General Staff College, 1983, Combined Armed Research Library, Digital
Library, 152-154. http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/document.php?
CISOROOT=/p4013coll2&CISOPTR=1704&REC=15 [18 April 2010].
181
Fournier, 153. This list is correct as at December 1943. By July 1944, a fifth authorized person,
the G-3 Brigadier-General Brann had been added. It is not known whether Brann was added before
or after 15 February 1944.
46

Caserta Palace from mid-January.182
ULTRA was managed in the War Room, entry
to which was limited to a small number of indoctrinated persons. 183
Although, according to Fournier, Clark had been accused by Winterbotham in The
ULTRA Secret of not making best use of ULTRA, evidence suggests otherwise.184
Hinsley argues that Clark became convinced of the value of ULTRA when he
received, on 3 February, the message indicating Kesselring’s intentions to
counterattack at Anzio.185
In the decision to bomb the Abbey, it is the intelligence
relating to Anzio that is crucial, as ULTRA had nothing to say about the Abbey
itself.186
ULTRA intelligence added to the momentum to break through the Gustav
Line, and was possibly responsible for the abandonment on 4 February of the time-
consuming outflanking option, and of Clark’s insistence on a head-on attack.
Although suffering a slow start in Italy, lower-grade communication interception and
direction-finding or ‘Y’ was, by February, performing well after regaining its ability to
intercept German VHF signals. Fifth Army ‘Y’ was well established and carried out by
US Signals Intelligence Service (SIS) units and British Special Wireless/Telegraphy
units.187
In Fifth Army, direction-finding was also carried out by British and American
units, with detachments deployed to Corps level.188
Analysis of the collected signals
182
Lewin, 282.
183
Alexander; Harding, Brigadier Terence Airey, Assistant Chief of Staff Intelligence, Lieutenant
Colonel David Hunt, the General Staff Officer Intelligence; and possibly Captain Rupert Clarke,
Alexander’s aide-de-camp.
184
Fournier, 2., History of SLUs, 36.
185
Hinsley et al, 190.
186
DEFE 3 Jan-Feb 1944. W T Beckmann, G Church, W Coombs, L S Hawthorn, R Horstmann,
Norton, HW 11/5, Air And Military History, Vol.5, Italy 1943-1945 (Bletchley Park: Government Code
and Cypher School), 95-101.
187
US 849th
Signal Intelligence Service and until January 1944, the British 105th
Special W/T Section,
replaced by 3rd
W/T Section. HW 41/125 History of Signal Intelligence in the Field – Europe and
Africa – 1939-1945, 101-115.
188
Detachment A of 128th
Signals Company, Fifth Army History IV,248. 52 W/T Intercept Section,
History of Sigint in the Field, 102. 52 W/T Int Sec was replaced by Det H, 849th
SIS at US II Corps HQ
in January 1944. Also employed by Fifth Army was the 117th
Radio Intercept Company. History of
Sigint in the Field, 112.
47

was carried out at Fifth Army headquarters, US II Corps and a small team with the
FEC. At the beginning of February 1944, an ad hoc unit was established to support
the NZ Corps.189
British ‘Y’ units supported 15th
Army Group.190
‘Y’ was the source of the greatest amount of tactical intelligence, with 60% of Army
‘Y’ coming from the German VHF tactical radio net.191
That the Germans were using
radio, either in place of or in addition to, landlines to direct fire onto the Cassino
massif was confirmed when a German radio operator was captured on 1 February.192
All German divisions in the Cassino area were regularly intercepted.193
At times, as
much was known about German formations by the Allies as by the Germans.194
Tighter radio security procedures were introduced across German units on 15
February, which made ‘Y’ staffs’ task more difficult,195
but had no impact on the
decision to bomb the Abbey. Indeed, use of VHF increased in the days before the
bombing during the period of US II Corps activity in early February, with the
paratroopers who occupied Monte Cassino being ‘almost continually active’.196
C. Photographic Reconnaissance
189
History of Sigint in the Field, 113.
190
British 1st
and 3rd
Spec W/T Sections History of Sigint in the Field, 115.
191
Hinsley et al, 178-182. History of Sigint in the Field, 90.
192
Breit, ‘Phase VIII 135th
Infantry Regiment History’, 15.
193
Fournier 150, History of Sigint in the Field 105, 116. Until early February the Abbey area was the
responsibility of 44th
Infantry Division. From then onwards and at the time of the attack the Abbey and
Point 593 were the responsibility of the 3rd
Battalion, 3rd
Regiment, of the 1st
Parachute Division. 90th
Panzer Grenadier Division was in overall command of the Cassino Hill mass and was commanded
Major-General Ernst-Guenther Baade, an Anglophile who wore a kilt with a pistol instead of a sporran.
194
195
History of Sigint in the Field, 115-116.
196
48

The second primary source of intelligence was photographic reconnaissance (PR).
In a 1978 interview, Howard confirmed the importance of PR in determining the
Abbey’s status, ‘I had the place photographed every day. We studied the photos.
We pinpointed every single weapon and overprinted them on maps.’197
In March
1945, Clark wrote more generally to the commander of the 3rd
Photographic Group:
During our operations in Italy we have found aerial photography to be the
most accurate, rapid, and comprehensive means at our disposal for obtaining
information on the enemy. 198
The organisation of PR and its subsequent analysis in the Mediterranean Theatre
was complex, with collection being conducted by a number of MAAF units and
interpretation being carried out by different organizations at MAAF, 15th
Army Group,
Fifth Army and by subordinate formations.
Collection of PR was the responsibility of MAAF, and was conducted by an inter-
Allied organization formed by Colonel Elliot Roosevelt, the Mediterranean Air
Photographic Reconnaissance Wing (MAPRW).199
MAPRW was formed in January
1944 from the remnants of the North African PR Wing after a brief period when US
and British PR Wings operated independently.200
MAPRW was directly subordinated
to MAAF, not to the component air forces. USAAF PR in support of MAPRW was
carried out by the 3rd
Photo Group of the 90th
Photo Reconnaissance Wing flying F-5
aircraft.201
The USAAF also operated a squadron of P-51 aircraft, although these
197
Hapgood & Richardson, 168.
198
Foreword to Photo Recon for MATAF and 15th
Army Group – 3rd
Photo Group, 6 March 1945,
Combined Arms Research Library, Digital Library. http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/item_viewer.php?
CISOROOT=/p4013coll8&CISOPTR=3299&CISOBOX=1&REC=11#metajump [1 July 2010].
199
Roosevelt had been poached by Gen Carl Spaatz to run the US Strategic Air Forces in Europe PR
organization. He departed MAAF at the beginning of 1944.
200
Hinsley, 465.
201
F-5 is the PR version of the P-38 Lightning.
49

were subordinated to 12th
ASC rather than MAPRW, flying armed reconnaissance.202
The RAF contributed three squadrons of PR Spitfires from Foggia.203
Coordination of
demands for PR was made through the inter-Allied Mediterranean Photographic
Intelligence Centre.204
The 3rd
Photo Group was equipped with three squadrons, two of which were
assigned to 12th
ASC, and one, the 12th
Reconnaissance Squadron, assigned directly
to Fifth Army. Each squadron was equipped with 16-aircraft.205
In order to support
Fifth Army, 3rd
Photo Group deployed liaison officers to the Fifth Army Photographic
Intelligence Centre (FAPIC).206
Counter-battery operations were generally
considered the highest priority PR targets followed by rear area observation to
determine enemy lines of communication and activity that may reveal future
intentions.207
The Air Liaison Officers at the FAPIC were in direct contact with PR
squadrons, issuing tasking via telephone without going through official chains of
command.208
In addition to the PR squadrons, Fifth Army also employed liaison and
spotter aircraft in the tactical reconnaissance role with handheld cameras up to an
altitude of 6000ft.209
Central management of interpretation of the photographs was attempted, with the
establishment of the Mediterranean Army Interpretation Unit (MAIU) to support
202
Chris Staerck, Allied Photo Reconnaissance of World War Two (San Diego CA: Thunder Bay
Press, 1998), 71. This was 111th
Tactical Recon Sqn which remained with 12th ASC until June 1944,
when it was subordinated to Seventh US Army for Operation ANVIL.
203
Richards and Saunders, 395-6. 682 Sqn appears to be the main Sqn supporting Italian operations.
204
Hinsley et al, 465. MPIC worked directly for MAAF Operations and Intelligence, James Parton,
The History of the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces – 10 December 1943 to 1 September 1944
(Caserta Italy: Headquarters Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, 1945), 117-118.
205
3 Photo Group, 9.
206
A Military Encyclopaedia Based on Operations in the Italian Campaigns 1943-1945. Prepared by
G-3 Section, Headquarters Fifteenth Army Group, Italy, Chapter 2 – Intelligence, 57-58. Military
History Network, http://www.milhist.net/docs/milencyc/MilEncyc.02G2.pdf [15 July 2010].
207
3 Photo Group, 17.
208
3 Photo Group, 18.
209
Fifteenth Army Group Encyclopedia, 62.
50

MAPRW. This appears to have met only mixed success as evidence exists of
interpretation of tactical PR going down to at least divisional level in Fifth Army. The
FAPIC, which was generally responsible for interpretation, was manned with British
photo-interpreters from MAIU (West), and Americans from 3rd
Photo Interpretation
Detachment of the 3rd
Photo Group.210
The streamlined system of control often
resulted in the interpreted photographs being delivered within 24-hours of the
demand and verbal results could be delivered within 6-hours of the photography
being taken. Interpretation was also carried out by Divisional photo-interpreters
detached from FAPIC whose analysis of minor defensive positions was accepted by
Army out to about 5000yds.211
The disadvantages of PR in the case of the Abbey
were twofold. Firstly, the weather was often poor, which precluded the relatively
high-level PR sorties from taking pictures. In addition, the photo-light in the Italian
winter only allowed effective photography from 1000hrs to1400hrs each day.212
Secondly, the chances of observing German activity, especially an observation
position within the Abbey on PR images were extremely small.
D. Human Intelligence
The final major source of intelligence used to determine whether the Germans were
using the Abbey was Human Intelligence. This incorporates a number of sub-
sources including: agents, escaped or rescued Allied POWs, refugees, partisans,
prisoners and friendly force patrolling.
According to the Fifth Army history, between January and March 1944 a total of 1535
prisoners were captured by the Allies from the three German divisions defending the
210
3 Photo Group, 18.
211
Fifteenth Army Group Encyclopedia, 57-58.
212
3 Photo Group, 22.
51

Monte Cassino area.213
The vast majority of these were from the 44th
Infantry
Division, responsible until 7 February for the defence of Monte Cassino and the
surrounding hills. The large number of prisoners captured by Fifth Army, a total of
over 8,500 between January and March 1944, meant that not all could be
interrogated by the Fifth Army Interrogation Center.214
Nevertheless, interrogation
was carried out by US II Corps down to regimental level.215
This allowed
interrogators to benefit from the initial shock of capture, under which prisoners were
most likely to talk.216
Information gleaned was then passed through subsequent
levels to assist divisional, corps and army interrogators to sift the most likely subjects
of intelligence value. There was considerable use of aerial photography to assist
prisoners in providing information on enemy dispositions.217
In addition, a captured
document exploitation team was attached from AFHQ to examine every scrap of
paper.218
The 15th
Army Group Encyclopaedia makes it clear that German prisoners
were generally willing to speak. It seems likely, therefore, that from the 1300 or so
prisoners captured on the Cassino massif from a non-German, lesser quality
division, gaining an accurate picture of dispositions, and occupation or otherwise of
the Abbey itself should have been a routine task.219
The British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) established itself in Italy at Bari by
October 1943.220
Its task was twofold; firstly to establish an independent network of
213
Fifth Army History Part IV, 226-7. Totals: 1st
Parachute Division- 116, 44th
Infantry Division- 1303
and 90th
Panzer Grenadier Division – 166.
214
215
Fifteenth Army Group Encyclopedia ,36.
216
Lessons in Combat, November 1942 to September 1944, Headquarters 34th
Infantry Division,
Chapter VII – Intelligence, PW Interrogation, September 1944.
http://www.34infdiv.org/history/34div/LessonsLearned.pdf [15 July 2010].
217
Fifteenth Army Group Encyclopedia, 36. Lessons in Combat 34th
Infantry Division, Chapter VII.
218
219
44th
Infantry Division was an Austrian Division (Hoch-und Deutschmeister) only partially trained in
Mountain Warfare. See Jackson, 156. Doubts about its reliability may also be found in Ellis, 114-5
and Senger, 186.
220
Hinsley et al, 178. This unit was known as No1 Intelligence Unit and was run by James Bruce
Lockhart. Keith Jeffrey. MI6 – The History of the Secret Intelligence Service 1909-1949 (London:
52

agents, and secondly to establish a relationship with Italian Military Intelligence
(SIM).221
Its focus was penetrating Northern Italy, Central Europe and the Balkans
rather than supporting the Allied armies in Southern Italy.222
By the beginning of
1944, most SIS staff had relocated to Naples.223
By the end of 1943, the Bari unit
had established about 5 agents and wireless-telegraphy operators in enemy-held
territory. At AFHQ, SIS was known as the Inter-Service Liaison Department
(ISLD).224
Hinsley states that although little survives of what SIS produced, its
‘intelligence on German order-of-battle and troop movements was well received by
15th
Army Group.’225
Unfortunately, this assertion is flatly rejected by Hunt, an
intelligence staff officer in 15th
Army Group at the time. On intelligence received from
‘various special organizations’, he bluntly stated:
Results were miserable and never looked like being anything else. The
trouble is that the organizers, more often than not, had no military background
and did not realize what sort of rubbish they were purveying.226
Another of what Hunt called ‘these naive and useless organizations’, was the
American Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Despite SIS’ hand in establishing
OSS, the two organizations had, according to Hinsley, a strained relationship.227
OSS acted independently, often in competition with SIS despite the ‘necessity for
harmonious collaboration’ emphasised by their respective Chiefs.228
They worked
alongside, but would not merge. In one important aspect OSS had a great
Bloomsbury Publishing, 2010), 500.
221
Jeffrey, 500.
222
Jeffrey, 500-501.
223
Hinsley et al, 178.
224
Max Corvo, OSS Italy 1942 – 1945 (New York: Enigma Books, 2005), 333.
225
Hinsley et al, 178fn.
226
Hunt, 241.
227
Hinsley et al, 464.
228
Jeffrey, 499.
53

advantage in that it could make use of Italian Americans who often spoke Italian
fluently and retained familial and business contacts. Following victory in Sicily the
Italian OSS was divided with a unit concentrating on Italy in general, and another
providing support to Fifth Army G-2.229
Elements of this unit landed on the Salerno
beaches.230
By January 1944, OSS had 46-agents behind enemy lines in Italy.231
At
least one, Peter Tompkins in Rome, was passing valuable military data.232
According
to Corvo, the Fifth Army OSS unit was not harmonious, with individual rivalry being
rife. Within three weeks of landing, the commander had been changed and was
changed again several times thereafter.233
It was commanded by Captain Abrignani
in February 1944; his investigation following the bombing could find no evidence of
German occupation, inferring that they had none before.234
Intelligence was
transmitted daily from field agents all over Italy to Fifth Army, much of which
concerned German order of battle at Cassino.235
In addition to OSS and SIS
collaboration with SIM, Fifth Army established direct contact through its G-2 Italian
Liaison Section.236
Finally, from the middle of January 1944, Fifth Army soldiers were in close proximity
to the Abbey. Contact with the enemy in the days leading up to its destruction was
constant and patrolling and direct observation was fundamental to discovering
German dispositions and intentions. The historical account of the 135th
Regiment of
the 34th
Infantry Division is typical and recounts how, on 3 February, its 2nd
Battalion
229
Corvo, 100.
230
Corvo, 112.
231
WO 204/12836 OSS Operations, Letter Off Special Detachment G-2, Fifth Army to Colonel Glavin
Commanding Officer OSS, AFHQ, 12 January 1944.
232
Trevelyan 106-7
233
Corvo, 139.
234
Corvo, 209. OSS Memorandum from Major Holler to Colonel Ordway at MAAF, 11 March 1944.
Located in Jones, 78.
235
Corvo, 162.
236
Fifteenth Army Group Encyclopaedia, 46-48.
54

observed large numbers of enemy gathering for a counter-attack and how ‘Cannon
Company observers expose themselves to great peril to direct fire upon the
enemy.’237
On 4 February, a patrol was despatched to the Abbey to ask the monks
whether there were Germans inside. They returned having failed to reach their
objective.238
The next day a sergeant and 14 soldiers reached the walls of the
Abbey. This patrol captured 14 German soldiers in a cave dug into the mountain
close to the Abbey.239
In addition to the infantry, artillery observation positions
surrounded Monte Cassino and spotter aircraft were used regularly to observe the
battlefield.
237
Infantry Regiment History’ 20-21
238
Infantry Regiment History’ 23
239
Infantry Regiment History’ 24
55

CHAPTER FOUR – TO WHAT EXTENT DID INTELLIGENCE PROVIDE
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE BOMBING AS A MILITARY NECESSITY
A. Evidence from the Major Sources
If Lewin is correct about Alexander’s pre-eminent position regarding intelligence,
determining who occupied a single building in full view should not have proved
difficult. With the possible exception of intelligence from either SIS or OSS, there
was no difference between the intelligence received by Alexander and Clark. Why
then was there disagreement as to whether the case for military necessity could be
proven? From the numerous sources of information listed in the previous chapter it
would be remarkable if the Germans could occupy the building without Allied
intelligence knowing it – Clark stated in a post war interview, ‘I knew everyone who
went in that abbey’.240
What evidence existed at the time that could have influenced
the decision? Firstly, as has already been stated, ULTRA gave no indication of
German occupation.241
Only two ULTRA messages, decrypted from the RED key
mention the Abbey. Both were intercepted after the bombing on 19 February.242
There is no evidence from high-level human intelligence sources from either SIS or
OSS that the Abbey was being used for military purposes. There was also no
evidence from PR that the Germans were using the Abbey.243
240
Hapgood and Richardson, 169
241
Hinsley et al, 193fn
242
DEFE 3/140 VLs 6650 and 6655.
243
Staerck, 72. 4th
Indian Division Intelligence Summary No.20 Annex B, 12 February 1944, lists all
German defences identified by PR. No position that corresponds with the Abbey is amongst these
positions. 4th
Indian Division War Diary.
56

Dissertation Monte Cassino Final

Dissertation Monte Cassino Final

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