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Daniel Vasquez Political Science 12/12/2014
Vasquez 1
Border Enforcement: A Unilateral Policy Response to a Multifaceted Issue
In response to the recent (two decades) influx of unauthorized immigration into the
United States, the U.S. government has drastically increased the scope of its border
enforcement policy. Predicated under the goal of creating a system where only those legally
permitted by the government can enter the United States, the policy of border enforcement
has prompted federal, state, and local leaders to disincentivize unauthorized immigration by
creating an apparatus of apprehension amongst migrants. In order to accomplish this, political
actors have enacted legislation that a) builds nearly 700 miles of fences along the border, b)
“criminalizes undocumented workers”, c) increases the size of Border Patrol from about
3,000 agents to 21,000, and d) subsidizes the employment of expensive technology such as
drones and sensor cameras (Alden, 107 and Correa Cabrera, 37). Given the objective of the
border enforcement policy, the efficacy of such policy should be delineated by examining
whether the augmentation of border enforcement has led to a decrease in unauthorized
immigration (Reyes, Johnson, Van Swearingen, 8).
I argue that the efficacy of border enforcement as a policy designed to curb
unauthorized immigration is compromised because a) there is no evidence to prove that a
buildup in border enforcement contributes to a decrease in unauthorized immigration, b) the
emphasis on border enforcement has created an apparatus of fear that precludes our political
actors from exuding cooperation and communication with leaders of Mexico and Central
America, and c) economic opportunities and state protection mechanisms play a larger role in
shaping the quantity of unauthorized immigration than does the presence of Border Patrol
(Ibid). I am not, however, suggesting that the border enforcement policy is frivolous and
completely ineffective. To the contrary, border enforcement has “increased the probability of
apprehension, changed the crossing places of migrants, and increased the costs associated
with crossing the US-Mexican border” (Ibid, 10). Despite these accomplishments, however,
Daniel Vasquez Political Science 12/12/2014
Vasquez 2
border enforcement has done little to combat the influx of undocumented immigrants into the
nation, thus rendering it ineffective. The inadequacy of border enforcement as a policy
response illuminates its problematic nature: border enforcement is a unilateral policy
response to a multifaceted issue. Such an issue demands coordination with political actors in
Mexico and Central America and understanding on the causal factors of economic, political,
and social corruption.
Proponents1 of our approach towards combating unauthorized immigration argue that
the success of the policy emanates from increases in coyote prices, “higher rates of
discouraged migrants who give up trying to cross the border,” and changes in the migrant
crossing patterns (Orrenius, 10). These arguments, however, are flawed. For example, the
premise that enforcement has led to increases in coyote prices disregards the fact that from
1965 to 1994, “increases in the supply of smugglers outpaced increases in the demand for
smugglers” thus lowering median coyote prices from $900 in 1965 to $300 in 1994 (ibid, 8).
In other words, the implementation of Operation Hold-the-Line in 1993 and Operation
Gatekeeper in 1994 began the gradual process of cutting the supply of smugglers, thus,
increasing the price of coyotes for the first time in thirty years (Ibid). Nevertheless, the
notion that enforcement is successful because it has increased the prices of coyotes is
problematic for presuming that increasing coyote prices deters unauthorized immigration in a
statistically significant manner. Such rationale also fails to explicate how migrants are willing
to pay more, in terms of coyote fees, if the demand to escape conditions of violence and
poverty is high enough. For instance, according to the Mexican Migration Project’s data on
smuggler use rates and fees from 1965-1997, about 93% of undocumented immigrants in
1996 hired coyotes despite an increase in prices, which was a 20% increase in undocumented
immigrants from 1995 (Ibid,7). Such argument also fails to explicate surges in undocumented
1 For the purpose of this paper, proponents ofborder enforcement are solely those who believe that border
enforcement is an effective policy to curb unauthorized immigration.
Daniel Vasquez Political Science 12/12/2014
Vasquez 3
immigrants despite increasing coyote prices. Take, for example, the recent spike in
unaccompanied migrant children from Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala in the summer
of 2013. Why was there a surge in unaccompanied migrant children from these nations
despite the fact that median coyote fee averaged anywhere from $3000 to $4000 (Mexican
Migration Project)? Predicating the success of the border enforcement policy on increasing
coyote prices is dubious for assuming that a) increasing coyote prices automatically means
curbing unauthorized immigration and b) undocumented immigrants only rely on coyotes to
enter the United States.
The idea that border enforcement has fostered “higher rates of discouraged migrants”
is misleading for a few reasons. It fails, for instance, to consider the differences between new
migrants, or migrants with no prior migration experience, and experienced migrants, who
have attempted migration before. A comprehensive study conducted by Reyes, Johnson, and
Van Swearingen (2002) found a decrease in the probability of first-time migration for both
men and women during the last 1990s, but an increase in the probability of migration from
experienced migrants (37-38). As for new migrants, Reyes, Johnson, and Van Swearingen
found that a decline in the probability of first-time migration is “statistically unrelated to the
number of hours spent guarding the U.S.-Mexican border” (ibid). The claim that border
enforcement has led to “higher rates of discouraged migrants” fails to account for the fact that
“border build-up appears to have no effect on the probability of migration for migrants, or
(that) the effect is too small to be captured in this model” (39). Rather than attributing the
probability of unauthorized immigrants entering the United States to the number of border
patrols present, Reyes, Johnson, and Van Swearingen argue that changes in the conditions of
the U.S. and Mexican economies has a stronger influence on the influx of unauthorized
immigrants, a position that this paper will further explore.
Daniel Vasquez Political Science 12/12/2014
Vasquez 4
Out of all justifications to the efficacy of the border enforcement policy, the claim that
border enforcement has been successful because it has contributed to changes in migrant
crossing partners is the least compelling argument. While it is true that migrants are choosing
to cross through the deserts of El Centro in California and through Laredo/Brownsville in
Texas rather than the traditional paths of San Diego and El Paso, respectively, there is no
evidence to suggest that changes in crossing sites has led to a decrease in unauthorized
immigration. What this new enforcement strategy has fostered is an all-time high number of
crossing-related deaths and injuries along the border (Orrenius, 9). The increase in crossing-
related deaths illuminates how migrants will continue to enter the United States despite rising
difficulties. The demand to escape persecution and pursue economic opportunities transcends
a border enforcement strategy to “eliminate illegal alien traffic from city centers” (Ibid).
The effectiveness of the border enforcement policy is also compromised by the
inability for our political actors to tackle the casual factors of unauthorized immigration. The
perception of Mexico and Central America as societies ridden with violence and excessive
drug use has perpetuated a politics of fear within the United States (Correa-Cabrera, 37). This
politics of fear has concocted a distorted view of undocumented immigrants as “enemies that
hurt low-skilled Americans, burden(s) taxpayers, create(s) an unassimilated underclass,
encourage(s) law breaking, [and] compromise[s] border security” (Griswold, 1). This
political paradigm has also been erroneously substantiated by the conflation between
unauthorized immigration and terrorism where migrants are viewed as terrorists seeking to
perpetuate acts of terrorism against Americans. This attitude towards undocumented
immigrants as unassimilated underclass terrorists creates the impression that border
enforcement and apprehension is the only means to protect the nation. As a result, a
humanitarian crisis is transformed into a matter of national security, thus prompting the U.S.
to act unilaterally on an issue that transcends national boundaries. Such reframing of the issue
Daniel Vasquez Political Science 12/12/2014
Vasquez 5
of unauthorized immigration deters political actors from both sides (U.S. and Mexico/Central
America) from communicating and coordinating to address the issues of insecurity, family
reunification, and economic corruption that are prompting migrants to pursue entry into the
United States (Correa-Cabrera, 46). For example, the United States’ unilateral approach of
border enforcement has impeded Mexico and the United States from a) renewing “bilateral
migration agreements” to create a border “that would allow for the freer movement of both
people and goods and b) creating temporary worker programs to allow Mexican migrants
from maintaining their residences while being able to cycle freely between both countries
(Orrenius 9). The unilateral approach purported by the United States impedes the United
States from working with Central American nations to curb the prevalence of gang violence,
concentration of economic power into the few, and the lack of political will. Politically, the
policy of border enforcement is costly for precluding our political actors and citizenry from
understanding the grander scope of the unauthorized immigration issue and the coordination
necessary to address the issue.
While the political ramifications of border enforcement are a testament to the
inefficiency of the policy, the most compelling argument against border enforcement as a
successful deterrent against unauthorized immigration is how it fails to consider the
inextricable link between the economic conditions in the United States and Mexico/Central
America and the quantity of unauthorized immigration into the United States. For instance,
during the economic recession that plagued Mexico during the mid-1980s, decline in the real
incomes, increase in unemployment rates, and decreases in agricultural sector outputs
corresponds to a surge in Mexican emigration (Ibid, 5). During this recession, the presence of
underdeveloped capital markets made it difficult for Mexicans to obtain the means to “start a
business, build a house, repay a loan or fund medical procedures,” which are some of the
main push factors for Mexican migrants. Conversely, when the gross domestic product of
Daniel Vasquez Political Science 12/12/2014
Vasquez 6
Mexico increased by 10 percent in 1994, the probability for migration amongst men
decreased by 0.5 percent. A 0.5 percent decrease in the probability of migration amongst men
means that 78,400 men would be discouraged from migrating to the United States (Ibid). As
for the influence of economic conditions in the United States, unemployment rate has a
strong correlation to the quantity of unauthorized immigration into the United States. For
example, the Mexican Migration Project estimates that “a 10 percent increase in U.S.
unemployment rate will discourage 28,800 males from crossing illegally to the United States
(Ibid). According to the study conducted by the Mexican Migration Project, people described
a persistent need to migrate, which they felt could not be diminished by an increase in the
number of agents at the border (43). The demand for a job that provides a livable wage
transcends the level of border enforcement. Undocumented migrants are focused more on
finding a job to support their families than on being caught at the border. To diminish the
amount of unauthorized immigration, it is imperative to implement initiatives that foster the
growth of Mexican/Central American economies to disincentivize migration.
The U.S. policy of border enforcement, alone, is incapable of altering the economic
conditions that plague migrants in their country of origins. Increasing the quantity of border
patrols does nothing to tackle the ubiquitous gang violence and political corruption that
plagues Mexico/Central America. While the increased funding in border enforcement has
increased the probability of apprehension, the economic, political, and social needs of
migrants will ultimately compel one to migrate into the United States. The efficaciousness of
border enforcement, thus, is dismantled by its narrow focus on the issue, a focus that treats an
international phenomenon as a matter of national security.
Daniel Vasquez Political Science 12/12/2014
Vasquez 7
Works Cited
Alden, Edward. "Immigration and Border Control." Cato Journal 32 (2012): 107-24. Print.
Correa-Cabrera, Guadalupe, Terence Garrett, and Michelle Keck. "Administrative Surveillance and
Fear: Implications for U.S.-Mexico Border Relations and." Revista Europea De Estudios
Latinoamericanos Y Del Caribe 96 (2014): 35-53. Print.
Orrenius, PIa M. "Illegal Immigration and Enforcement Along the U.S.–Mexico Border: An
Overview." Illegal Immigration and Enforcement Along the U.S.-Mexico Border: An
Overview - Economic and Financial Review, First Quarter, 2001 - Dallas Fed (2001): 1-
11. Dallas Fed. 2001. Web. 13 Dec. 2014.
Reyes, Belinda I., Hans P. Johnson, and Richard Van Swearingen. "Holding the Line? The Effect of
the Recent Border Build-up on Unauthorized Immigration." Population Research and Policy
Review 23.3 (2004): 235-57. PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE OF CALIFORNIA. PUBLIC
POLICY INSTITUTE OF CALIFORNIA, 2002. Web. 13 Dec. 2014.

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Evaluating the Efficacy of Border Enforcement as a Policy Response to the Influx of Immigrants

  • 1. Daniel Vasquez Political Science 12/12/2014 Vasquez 1 Border Enforcement: A Unilateral Policy Response to a Multifaceted Issue In response to the recent (two decades) influx of unauthorized immigration into the United States, the U.S. government has drastically increased the scope of its border enforcement policy. Predicated under the goal of creating a system where only those legally permitted by the government can enter the United States, the policy of border enforcement has prompted federal, state, and local leaders to disincentivize unauthorized immigration by creating an apparatus of apprehension amongst migrants. In order to accomplish this, political actors have enacted legislation that a) builds nearly 700 miles of fences along the border, b) “criminalizes undocumented workers”, c) increases the size of Border Patrol from about 3,000 agents to 21,000, and d) subsidizes the employment of expensive technology such as drones and sensor cameras (Alden, 107 and Correa Cabrera, 37). Given the objective of the border enforcement policy, the efficacy of such policy should be delineated by examining whether the augmentation of border enforcement has led to a decrease in unauthorized immigration (Reyes, Johnson, Van Swearingen, 8). I argue that the efficacy of border enforcement as a policy designed to curb unauthorized immigration is compromised because a) there is no evidence to prove that a buildup in border enforcement contributes to a decrease in unauthorized immigration, b) the emphasis on border enforcement has created an apparatus of fear that precludes our political actors from exuding cooperation and communication with leaders of Mexico and Central America, and c) economic opportunities and state protection mechanisms play a larger role in shaping the quantity of unauthorized immigration than does the presence of Border Patrol (Ibid). I am not, however, suggesting that the border enforcement policy is frivolous and completely ineffective. To the contrary, border enforcement has “increased the probability of apprehension, changed the crossing places of migrants, and increased the costs associated with crossing the US-Mexican border” (Ibid, 10). Despite these accomplishments, however,
  • 2. Daniel Vasquez Political Science 12/12/2014 Vasquez 2 border enforcement has done little to combat the influx of undocumented immigrants into the nation, thus rendering it ineffective. The inadequacy of border enforcement as a policy response illuminates its problematic nature: border enforcement is a unilateral policy response to a multifaceted issue. Such an issue demands coordination with political actors in Mexico and Central America and understanding on the causal factors of economic, political, and social corruption. Proponents1 of our approach towards combating unauthorized immigration argue that the success of the policy emanates from increases in coyote prices, “higher rates of discouraged migrants who give up trying to cross the border,” and changes in the migrant crossing patterns (Orrenius, 10). These arguments, however, are flawed. For example, the premise that enforcement has led to increases in coyote prices disregards the fact that from 1965 to 1994, “increases in the supply of smugglers outpaced increases in the demand for smugglers” thus lowering median coyote prices from $900 in 1965 to $300 in 1994 (ibid, 8). In other words, the implementation of Operation Hold-the-Line in 1993 and Operation Gatekeeper in 1994 began the gradual process of cutting the supply of smugglers, thus, increasing the price of coyotes for the first time in thirty years (Ibid). Nevertheless, the notion that enforcement is successful because it has increased the prices of coyotes is problematic for presuming that increasing coyote prices deters unauthorized immigration in a statistically significant manner. Such rationale also fails to explicate how migrants are willing to pay more, in terms of coyote fees, if the demand to escape conditions of violence and poverty is high enough. For instance, according to the Mexican Migration Project’s data on smuggler use rates and fees from 1965-1997, about 93% of undocumented immigrants in 1996 hired coyotes despite an increase in prices, which was a 20% increase in undocumented immigrants from 1995 (Ibid,7). Such argument also fails to explicate surges in undocumented 1 For the purpose of this paper, proponents ofborder enforcement are solely those who believe that border enforcement is an effective policy to curb unauthorized immigration.
  • 3. Daniel Vasquez Political Science 12/12/2014 Vasquez 3 immigrants despite increasing coyote prices. Take, for example, the recent spike in unaccompanied migrant children from Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala in the summer of 2013. Why was there a surge in unaccompanied migrant children from these nations despite the fact that median coyote fee averaged anywhere from $3000 to $4000 (Mexican Migration Project)? Predicating the success of the border enforcement policy on increasing coyote prices is dubious for assuming that a) increasing coyote prices automatically means curbing unauthorized immigration and b) undocumented immigrants only rely on coyotes to enter the United States. The idea that border enforcement has fostered “higher rates of discouraged migrants” is misleading for a few reasons. It fails, for instance, to consider the differences between new migrants, or migrants with no prior migration experience, and experienced migrants, who have attempted migration before. A comprehensive study conducted by Reyes, Johnson, and Van Swearingen (2002) found a decrease in the probability of first-time migration for both men and women during the last 1990s, but an increase in the probability of migration from experienced migrants (37-38). As for new migrants, Reyes, Johnson, and Van Swearingen found that a decline in the probability of first-time migration is “statistically unrelated to the number of hours spent guarding the U.S.-Mexican border” (ibid). The claim that border enforcement has led to “higher rates of discouraged migrants” fails to account for the fact that “border build-up appears to have no effect on the probability of migration for migrants, or (that) the effect is too small to be captured in this model” (39). Rather than attributing the probability of unauthorized immigrants entering the United States to the number of border patrols present, Reyes, Johnson, and Van Swearingen argue that changes in the conditions of the U.S. and Mexican economies has a stronger influence on the influx of unauthorized immigrants, a position that this paper will further explore.
  • 4. Daniel Vasquez Political Science 12/12/2014 Vasquez 4 Out of all justifications to the efficacy of the border enforcement policy, the claim that border enforcement has been successful because it has contributed to changes in migrant crossing partners is the least compelling argument. While it is true that migrants are choosing to cross through the deserts of El Centro in California and through Laredo/Brownsville in Texas rather than the traditional paths of San Diego and El Paso, respectively, there is no evidence to suggest that changes in crossing sites has led to a decrease in unauthorized immigration. What this new enforcement strategy has fostered is an all-time high number of crossing-related deaths and injuries along the border (Orrenius, 9). The increase in crossing- related deaths illuminates how migrants will continue to enter the United States despite rising difficulties. The demand to escape persecution and pursue economic opportunities transcends a border enforcement strategy to “eliminate illegal alien traffic from city centers” (Ibid). The effectiveness of the border enforcement policy is also compromised by the inability for our political actors to tackle the casual factors of unauthorized immigration. The perception of Mexico and Central America as societies ridden with violence and excessive drug use has perpetuated a politics of fear within the United States (Correa-Cabrera, 37). This politics of fear has concocted a distorted view of undocumented immigrants as “enemies that hurt low-skilled Americans, burden(s) taxpayers, create(s) an unassimilated underclass, encourage(s) law breaking, [and] compromise[s] border security” (Griswold, 1). This political paradigm has also been erroneously substantiated by the conflation between unauthorized immigration and terrorism where migrants are viewed as terrorists seeking to perpetuate acts of terrorism against Americans. This attitude towards undocumented immigrants as unassimilated underclass terrorists creates the impression that border enforcement and apprehension is the only means to protect the nation. As a result, a humanitarian crisis is transformed into a matter of national security, thus prompting the U.S. to act unilaterally on an issue that transcends national boundaries. Such reframing of the issue
  • 5. Daniel Vasquez Political Science 12/12/2014 Vasquez 5 of unauthorized immigration deters political actors from both sides (U.S. and Mexico/Central America) from communicating and coordinating to address the issues of insecurity, family reunification, and economic corruption that are prompting migrants to pursue entry into the United States (Correa-Cabrera, 46). For example, the United States’ unilateral approach of border enforcement has impeded Mexico and the United States from a) renewing “bilateral migration agreements” to create a border “that would allow for the freer movement of both people and goods and b) creating temporary worker programs to allow Mexican migrants from maintaining their residences while being able to cycle freely between both countries (Orrenius 9). The unilateral approach purported by the United States impedes the United States from working with Central American nations to curb the prevalence of gang violence, concentration of economic power into the few, and the lack of political will. Politically, the policy of border enforcement is costly for precluding our political actors and citizenry from understanding the grander scope of the unauthorized immigration issue and the coordination necessary to address the issue. While the political ramifications of border enforcement are a testament to the inefficiency of the policy, the most compelling argument against border enforcement as a successful deterrent against unauthorized immigration is how it fails to consider the inextricable link between the economic conditions in the United States and Mexico/Central America and the quantity of unauthorized immigration into the United States. For instance, during the economic recession that plagued Mexico during the mid-1980s, decline in the real incomes, increase in unemployment rates, and decreases in agricultural sector outputs corresponds to a surge in Mexican emigration (Ibid, 5). During this recession, the presence of underdeveloped capital markets made it difficult for Mexicans to obtain the means to “start a business, build a house, repay a loan or fund medical procedures,” which are some of the main push factors for Mexican migrants. Conversely, when the gross domestic product of
  • 6. Daniel Vasquez Political Science 12/12/2014 Vasquez 6 Mexico increased by 10 percent in 1994, the probability for migration amongst men decreased by 0.5 percent. A 0.5 percent decrease in the probability of migration amongst men means that 78,400 men would be discouraged from migrating to the United States (Ibid). As for the influence of economic conditions in the United States, unemployment rate has a strong correlation to the quantity of unauthorized immigration into the United States. For example, the Mexican Migration Project estimates that “a 10 percent increase in U.S. unemployment rate will discourage 28,800 males from crossing illegally to the United States (Ibid). According to the study conducted by the Mexican Migration Project, people described a persistent need to migrate, which they felt could not be diminished by an increase in the number of agents at the border (43). The demand for a job that provides a livable wage transcends the level of border enforcement. Undocumented migrants are focused more on finding a job to support their families than on being caught at the border. To diminish the amount of unauthorized immigration, it is imperative to implement initiatives that foster the growth of Mexican/Central American economies to disincentivize migration. The U.S. policy of border enforcement, alone, is incapable of altering the economic conditions that plague migrants in their country of origins. Increasing the quantity of border patrols does nothing to tackle the ubiquitous gang violence and political corruption that plagues Mexico/Central America. While the increased funding in border enforcement has increased the probability of apprehension, the economic, political, and social needs of migrants will ultimately compel one to migrate into the United States. The efficaciousness of border enforcement, thus, is dismantled by its narrow focus on the issue, a focus that treats an international phenomenon as a matter of national security.
  • 7. Daniel Vasquez Political Science 12/12/2014 Vasquez 7 Works Cited Alden, Edward. "Immigration and Border Control." Cato Journal 32 (2012): 107-24. Print. Correa-Cabrera, Guadalupe, Terence Garrett, and Michelle Keck. "Administrative Surveillance and Fear: Implications for U.S.-Mexico Border Relations and." Revista Europea De Estudios Latinoamericanos Y Del Caribe 96 (2014): 35-53. Print. Orrenius, PIa M. "Illegal Immigration and Enforcement Along the U.S.–Mexico Border: An Overview." Illegal Immigration and Enforcement Along the U.S.-Mexico Border: An Overview - Economic and Financial Review, First Quarter, 2001 - Dallas Fed (2001): 1- 11. Dallas Fed. 2001. Web. 13 Dec. 2014. Reyes, Belinda I., Hans P. Johnson, and Richard Van Swearingen. "Holding the Line? The Effect of the Recent Border Build-up on Unauthorized Immigration." Population Research and Policy Review 23.3 (2004): 235-57. PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE OF CALIFORNIA. PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE OF CALIFORNIA, 2002. Web. 13 Dec. 2014.