Nationalism

Scientists have claimed to recognize behavioral patterns in chimpanzees and other
primates that qualify as primitive cultural indicators. A quick look at the discovery channel on
almost any day would provide sufficient evidence of power struggles among packs of dogs,
prides of lions and herds of elephants. To some extent, we project elements of our own reality on
to animals, but there is little doubt that culture, ideology and politics are as old, or nearly so, as
the human species. Moreover, as long as the three have coexisted, there has been a complex
interplay between the three. Politics has long been focused on culture. Culture has been
repeatedly made and remade by politics. Ideology has long been an important element of both.
Any one, in fact, can give birth to another. A culture can grow out of a political movement as
easily as a political movement can originate in a certain culture. A group may initiate a political
movement to further an ideology and a political movement may search for a unifying ideology
after it is underway.
Not only do the lines of influence between the three go in all directions, but none of the
three exists without the other. Cultures are largely made up of ideological beliefs and political
attitudes that have accumulated over time. Even art, and this is true across genre and media, is
largely dependent on politics and ideology to create meaning. Without them, a painting might be
nothing more than a pretty picture. Try explaining exactly why almost any joke is funny without
referring to politics or ideology in some way. Likewise, ideologies are created by people who
are, in many ways, slaves to the cultures in which we grow. Politics are dictated by culture and
ideology. Every action we take – from what we eat, to what we wear, to who we marry, to
whether we go to school – is a decision based on value judgments. Our values are shaped by, of
course, ideology, culture and politics.
1

To speak of the politicization or ideologization of culture is nearly impossible. The three
concepts are completely and forever intertwined. I am incapable of defining in a consistent way
where one ends and another begins. Actions, moreover, may at once be political, ideological and
cultural. They may be none of the above. I may eat a salad rather than a hamburger simply
because I feel like it. Likewise, an Indian, a strict Hindu, may do so in protest in a country where
his beliefs are suppressed. In this case, his action would be political in that it is a protest,
ideological in that it reflects his beliefs as a Hindu and cultural in that Hinduism is a unifying
element in his ethnic group. Which came first? Which is most significant? Does this reflect the
politicization or ideologization of culture or the incorporation of ideology into culture? The
nature of this act would vary depending on the individual, on what he was thinking when he
decided to eat the salad. My assignment, however, is to discuss the politicization and
ideologization of culture in Iran before and after the Islamic Revolution of 1979 as it relates to
the building of national identities and gender relations. As it is impossible in most cases to
determine the intentions underlying an individual’s actions, it is equally impossible to determine
whether culture, for example, is being ideologized or whether there is simply a link between a
certain ideological beliefs and a corresponding cultural characteristic. My approach, then, will
be to identify and discuss the interplay between these three ideas. I will not, however, use the
terms ideologization, politicization, or political or ideological instumentalization of culture – or,
at most, I will use them sparingly – as these terms imply the presence of artifice in the
relationship between culture, ideology and politics.
If politics, ideology and culture are inherently linked, if ideologization and politicization
are inappropriate terms, that is not to say that the relationship of culture to both politics and
ideology did not change in important ways in the middle of the 19th
century, in the early 20th
2

century, and again in 1979. It certainly did. These changes, however, are best understood as
changes in the political and ideological meaning of culture. In her essay, Iran’s turn to Islam:
From Modernism to a Moral Order, Afsaneh Najmabadi refers to the redefinition of these
cultural elements in 1979 as a paradigm shift. According to Najmabadi, the political narrative
before 1979 largely sought the “material transformation of a backward society.” In 1953 the
focus began to shift to “the moral purification of a corrupt society.” 1
The change in political and
ideological emphasis necessarily led to a redefinition of the significance of certain cultural
symbols and practices.
Specifically, men’s headgear was a preoccupation of the Pahlavi regime. In 1927, the
Pahlavi hat became the official hat of Iran.2
Significantly, however, men’s headgear had political
significance before Pahlavi’s reforms. One’s headgear often signified one’s ethnicity, and Reza
Shah sought to eliminate these ethnic differences in forging an Iranian nation.3
The idea behind
the Pahlavi hat was homogenization and, therefore, unification. By replacing visual reminders of
difference, Reza Shah hoped to forge a unified Iranian society. The Pahlavi, then, was a symbol
of unity, conformity, and modernity. At the same time, however, the Pahlavi hat was modeled
after the French kepi, indicating a drive not only toward a national identity for Iranians, but a
European national identity.4
1 Afsaneh Najmabadi, “Iran’s Turn to Islam: From Modernism to a Moral Order,” Middle East Journal 41, no. 2
(1987): 203.
2 Houchang E. Chehabi, “Staging the Emperor’s New Clothes: Dress Codes and Nation-Building under Reza Shah,”
International Society for Iranian Studies 26, no. 3 (1993): 212.
3 Chehabi, “New Clothes,” 224-5.
4 Chehabi, “New Clothes,” 212, 224-5.
3

The veil was another item whose political and ideological significance was transformed.
Seen as a religious requirement before the push for modernization, it became a symbol of
backwardness to the elite in early 20th
century Iran, culminating in Reza Shah’s decision to
outlaw the veil in 1936.5
It was redefined in the 1960’s and 1970’s in light of the change in
emphasis in the political discourse. It came to signify a resistance to the oppressive Pahlavi state
under Muhammad Reza Shah, adherence to God’s laws, and the rejection of Western influence,
depending on whom one asked. After the revolution of 1979, it underwent yet more changes, as
it came to be forced on all women by the new, oppressive Islamist state. A properly worn veil,
then, signified submission to or approval of the state’s Islamist vision of society. A few strands
of hair, meanwhile, were all that was needed to advertise one’s resistance, nonconformity, even
longing for secular freedoms (consider striking?).6
Possibly more interesting than what the veil meant to the women that were either forced
or forbidden to wear it, however, is what the veil meant to the government. For Reza Shah,
forced unveiling and forced integration of women into society – through social events like parties
– was a means of creating more modern, nationalistic women. There is a scene in Satrapi’s book,
meanwhile, where she is discovered with her hair only mostly covered, wearing a blue jean
jacket, nikes and a Michael Jackson button and is almost brought before the committee.
Significantly, her American clothes were what initially drew the ire of the women and received
more attention than her scarf.7
Hijab, then, meant more in the context of 1980’s Iran than simply
covering one’s hair. For the Islamist government after the revolution, forcing the veil – and
5 Chehabi, “New Clothes,” 209, 210-212, 218.
6Marjane Satrapi. The Complete Persepolis. (Paris: Pantheon, 2007), 75.
7 Satrapi, Persepolis, 133-4.
4

forbidding makeup, certain haircuts, and American music – was a way to purify society of the
same European and American values Reza Shah had encouraged.8
In wearing American-inspired
clothing, Satrapi is rejecting the revolutionary government’s idea of purity. What the Pahlavi and
the revolutionary government had in common was the desire to control the values of Iranian
women by controlling their public appearance and behavior. They sought to realize their
respective ideals of Iranian womanhood and motherhood. In both cases the idea was to ensure
the transmission of these values to the next generation.
This line of thinking emphasizes the role of women as mothers and keepers of culture.
Further evidence of the importance of these roles may be found in the film Women’s Prison by
Manijeh Hekmat. Women in this film are treated brutally for their violation of societal norms –
though we do not see a male prison and, therefore, cannot be sure if their treatment is especially
brutal. More surprisingly, many of the women in this prison are raising small children.9
That
women condemned so fiercely by society would nevertheless be entrusted with raising young
children – many of which have fathers living free on the outside – is perhaps the strongest
evidence possible of the pervasiveness and importance of women’s role as mothers in Iran (In the
U.S., these children would sooner be put in foster care).
Women, however were not the only battleground on which the state fought to reshape the
ideological and political associations of cultural practices. Children were of paramount
importance as well. In Satrapi’s book, we see that gender integrated, secular, French-language
schools have come to be segregated, religious and taught in Farsi. The change may seem to be
superficial, but to change the language in which a child learns is to fundamentally change the
8 Najmabadi, “Iran’s Turn,” 207.
9 Manijeh Hekmat Women’s Prison DVD (2002).
5

framework, the lens through which they see the world. It changes the way they interpret every
stimulus. There was also a shift in ideology. We see, for example, in Satrapi’s book, that
children during the Pahlavi era are taught that the Shah was chosen by God.10
A few months
after the revolution, children are instructed to tear the Shah’s picture from their books.11
Later, as
the regime goes to war with Iraq, children are taught to beat themselves on the breast to mourn
soldiers that had come to be called martyrs.12
This is a perfect example of the point that this was
not an ideologization of culture, but rather a redefinition of the ideological and political
meanings elements of the culture already had. Before the revolution, a nationalism centered on
the persona of the Shah was taught. After a nationalism centered on Islam was the dominant
message. Both were ridiculed by Satrapi’s friends and family in practice. Still, the change was
significant. A child taught from to think from a certain ideological point of view, even if they
never make it their own, will see things differently from a child who is taught to be objective or
to conform to another point of view. Moreover, a relationship between a man and woman who
have lived segregated from the opposite sex is inherently different from one between a couple
from an integrated society. The youth of Iran were to be transformed. The government was not
content, however, with merely influencing young children. They tested for ideological purity
before admitting young adults to universities.13
They restricted the curriculum.14
They
monitored the production of art, the training of artists.15
They controlled the cultural capital of
10 Satrapi, Persepolis, 19.
12 Satrapi, Persepolis, 95, 97.
14 Nesta Ramazani, “Women in Iran: The Revolutionary Ebb and Flow,” Middle East Journal 47, no. 3 (1993): 412-
13.
15 Satrapi, Persepolis, 299, 304, 331.
6

their country. The transformation of schools in post-revolutionary Iran was envisioned as a
transformation of thought, of the culture as a whole. This transformation was to be exemplified
by the transformation of the central relationship in almost any culture – marriage.
Satrapi portrays men and women’s relationships in post revolutionary Iran as completely
transformed. Virginity was an obsession. It probably was before the revolution, but the means
used to enforce it after the Islamist takeover were new. Couples, as Satrapi herself experienced,
were liable to be stopped and interrogated on the street. Failing to establish a familial or marital
relationship one was subject to fines and whipping.16
The institution is so transformed that
Satrapi portrays marriages conforming to the government’s ideal in Iran as marriages between
strangers, even prostitution.17
There were further changes. Divorce was made more difficult for
women.18
Birth control was outlawed for a time and polygyny was encouraged, leading to a
population boom.19
Returning to Satrapi’s wardrobe and her rejection of the Islamists’ notions of purity, this
is a common theme in the book. The women in Satrapi’s family resist the pressure to wear
hijab.20
The adults have parties where they drink, dance, and listen to European and/or American
music.21
Satrapi later takes birth control and has premarital sex.22
She talks to God as a child
(her portrayal of this relationship does not conform to most Islamic beliefs), but she does not
16 Satrapi, Persepolis, 282, 288-9.
18 Ramazani, “Women in Iran,” 417.
7

pray, at least not in an Islamic fashion.23
Her family embraces a Eurocentric, modernist version
of Iranian culture. This contrasts sharply to the culture the state looked to encourage after the
revolution. The state looked for a complete rejection of any connection to European and
American values.24
This rejection included clothing, language, art, music, ideas and religion.
Ultimately, however, the government began to change many of its policies. Individual
Iranians adjusted adjusted their rhetoric to take advantage of the new ideology and purported
decision-making criteria of the government.25
By committing themselves so fervently to an
ideology, they unwittingly set themselves up to become reformers. The government also became
more pragmatic as it felt the need to solidify its control and as it engaged in war.26
Early on in
the war effort, Satrapi shows the government relying on anti-Islamist pilots for its raid on Iraq,
allowing them to play the old national anthem on T.V. to secure their assistance.27
The
government was forced to back down from many of the harsh stances it had taken in the early
1980’s. As the war with Iraq occupied Iran’s men and it felt the need for women to replace them
in the workforce, Iran began to enact measures to encourage their education and facilitate their
participation in the workforce.28
Women’s literacy increased dramatically under Islamist
governance – though not nearly enough.29
As Iran’s women gained importance, the government
23 Satrapi, Persepolis, 13, 14 16, 25, 284.
24 Najmabadi, “Iran’s Turn,” 207.
27 Satrapi, “Persepolis,” 82-5.
8

sought further reforms to gain their support.30
Women found in the Qur’an and sunna support for
a wide range of reforms.31
Birth control was made legal and widely available.32
Divorce was
made more accessible.33
By allowing unregistered temporary marriages, enforcement of the
prohibition against premarital relations became increasingly difficult.34
Even enforcement of
dress codes relaxed.35
A regime predicated on ideological purity, on the rejection of European
and American influence, of a return to the true, Islamic culture of Iran showed a great propensity
for reform.36
Still, the government’s use and redefinition of cultural elements was broad and powerful.
Satrapi is greeted, on her return to Tehran, with murals painted all over the city depicting the
martyrs. Streets had been renamed after them. 37
The government surrounded its citizens with
physical, ever-present reminders of the sacrifices made to the country, of how grateful the
country was, of how important it was to serve one’s country. Just as Americans are constantly
reminded of the brilliance and sacrifices of ‘the founding fathers,’ so Iranians were to be
reminded of the sacrifices and valor of young men that had died in their war. One may also see,
in Satrapi’s book, how tightly the production of art and artists was controlled and monitored. By
controlling the production of culture, they hoped to shape the reality of its citizens, their identity.
31 Ramazani, “Women in Iran,” 423-4.
36 Ramazani, “Women in Iran,” 1, 2.
9

Satrapi shows the mixed success of these policies. Her friends rebel against the prohibition of
Western fashion, but still ostracize her for having slept with multiple men.38
People are at least
outwardly submissive to the government, but flout its laws behind closed doors – drinking,
putting posters of American singers on their walls, etc.
Ultimately, a person’s culture is an aggregation of the many ideologies and political
attitudes of the many important people and institutions one has come into contact with. To
control even a single person to the point of erasing an important influence on their life would
prove difficult. To erase from an entire country, in a single generation, the influence, the
‘corruption’ of a family that ruled for over fifty years and to close that country off from the most
prosperous parts of the outside world is simply impossible. As Satrapi shows, the Islamists in
Iran were not successful in erasing the influence of the West on their country. They were,
however, able to profoundly alter the daily lives of its people, the way many people thought and
acted and even felt. Ultimately, they created an environment in which Satrapi could not live
comfortably. Her idea of freedom was not to be found in Iran.
Bibliography
Chehabi, Houchang E. “Staging the Emperor’s New Clothes: Dress Codes and Nation-Building
under Reza Shah,” International Society for Iranian Studies 26, no. 3 (1993): 212.
Hekmat, Manijeh. “Women’s Prison,” (2002).
Moghadam, Valentine M. “Revolution, Religion, and Gender Politics: Iran and Afghanistan
Compared,” Journal of Women’s History 10, no. 4 (1999): 172-195
10

Najmabadi, Afsaneh. “Iran’s Turn to Islam: From Modernism to a Moral Order,” Middle East
Journal 41, no. 2 (1987): 202-217.
Najmabadi, Afsaneh. “Veiled Discourse-Unveiled Bodies,” Feminist Studies 19, no. 3 (1993):
487-518.
Ramazani, Nesta. “Women in Iran: The Revolutionary Ebb and Flow,” Middle East Journal 47,
no. 3 (1993): 412-13.
Satrapi,Marjane. The Complete Persepolis. (Paris: Pantheon, 2007.)
11

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