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Cosimo Gunaratna
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1 Cosimo Gunaratna 220035736 Faculty of Economics, Business and Public Policy ECON498: Honours Dissertation Supervisor: Dr Alfons van der Kraan Honours Co-ordinator: Dr Mahinda Siriwardana Due Date: 15/10/2012 Word Count: 19,426 excluding footnotes and bibliography
2 The Failure of Pembangunan in East Timor
3 Acknowledgements Thisthesiswouldnothave beenpossible withoutthe effortsof anumberof people whomIwould like tothank.My supervisor,DrAlfonsvanderKraan,forhisencouragement,guidance andsupport; the honourscoordinator, Dr MahindaSiriwardana,forthe understandingandefforthe hasshownin accommodatingmylongstandingbattle withRSI; myfriend, JasonBarr,for the invaluable research skillshe hassharedwithme; andlast of all my father,RohanGunaratna, forhissupportand efforts withproofreading.
4 Contents Cover Sheet………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 1 Title Page……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 2 Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 3 Contents ………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………. 4 Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 5 Chapter 1: East Timor’s Education System……………………………………………………………………… 15 Chapter 2: East Timor’s Health Care System……………………………………………………………………. 32 Chapter 3: East Timor’s Agriculture Sector………………………………………………………………………. 55 Conclusion……………………………………………….……………………………………………………………………… 80 Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 82
5 Introduction Pembangunan Duringits24 yearoccupationof East Timor from1975 to 1999, the Indonesiangovernment attemptedto“camouflage”itsgenocide of the indigenouspopulationandplunderof the half island’seconomicresourcesbehindwhatSteve Cox andPeterCareyhave describedasthe “showy conceitof development (pembangunan)”.1 AsCox andCareyhave suggested,the effortmade bythe Governmentof Indonesia(GOI) anditsministriestoextoll the virtuesof Indonesiandevelopment programmesinEast Timorwas a tactic employedtodisarmWesterncriticspre-emptingany “close…enquiry”thatcouldforce itsmajorsponsors(includingthe UnitedStates,Britainand Australia) towithdrawtheirsupportforthe occupationorevensevertieswiththe Soehartoregime.2 Thispublicrelationseffortwasbestexemplifiedbythe GOI’spublicationof tworevisionistbooks, ‘EastTimor After Integration’ and‘TheProvinceof East Timor’,whichwere bothdedicatedto provingthatthe livesof the EastTimorese hadimprovedimmeasurablyasa resultof integration withIndonesiathroughthe developmentprogrammesithadinitiated.3 1Steve Cox and Peter Carey, ‘Generations of Resistance: East Timor’, London, 1995,p.45 2Ibid, p. 45. For analyses of western complicity in and sponsorship of the occupation atvarious stages between 1975 and 1999, see for example John G. Taylor, ‘East Timor: The Price of Freedom’, London and New York, 1999 pp. xxxii-xxxv,120-123,168-182;S.Cox and P. Carey, ‘Generations of Resistance’, pp. 7-11,17-20,24-25, 29-30,43-44, 52 Matthew Jardine, ‘East Timor: Genocide in Paradise’, Tucson AZ, 1995,pp.7-15,36-50, 71; Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, ‘The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism’, The Political Economy of Human Rights, (1), Cambridge MA, 1979,pp. 130-203;Jill Jolliffe, ‘East Timor: Nationalism and Colonialism’, St Lucia,1978,pp. 4, 86,231, 248, 251,255, 295; James Dunn, ‘Timor: A People Betrayed’, Milton Qld,1983, pp. 141-164,343-384 3The Indonesian government’s consciousnessof international opinion in regards to the occupation was reflected in both publications.Here, it is noteworthy that ‘East Timor After Integration’ was published by the Department of Foreign Affairs despitethe author’s “objection to the inclusion of the question of EastTimor and its discussion in any international forum” and any “interference in matters fallingwithin the domestic jurisdiction of Indonesia”.See ‘East Timor After Integration 2nd ed.’, Department of Foreign Affairs,Republic of Indonesia,March 1984,p.84. Furthermore, in the firstchapter of ‘The Province of East Timor’, a stinging rebuke is given to the repeated “ad nauseum…fantastic accusationsand unfounded allegationsrelati ngto East Timor” by members of the IV Committee of the General Assembly. See ‘The Province of East Timor: Development in Progress’, Department of Information,Republic of Indonesia,p. 9. For a brief overview of both publications,seeM. Scott Selders, ‘Development and its Discontents: The Indonesian Government, Indonesian Opposition and the Occupation of EastTimor’, IAGS 9th Biennial Conference Buenos Aires,July 2011,p.3. Retrieved 3 Oct 2012 from http://www.genocidescholars.org/sites/default/files/document%09%5Bcurrent- page%3A1%5D/documents/IAGS%202011%20SCOTT%20Selders.pdf
6 Spending Thisdevelopmentrhetoricwasreflectedingovernmentspendingdatawhichshowsthatmore capital was extendedtowarddevelopmentprojectsinEastTimorthanseveral otherprovinces throughoutthe entire occupationera:Overthe 20 yearperiodfrom1974/75 to 1993/94 East Timor was allocatedmore thanRp.1.29 trillionindevelopmentcapital fromthe central governmentin Jakarta where incontrast,East NusaTenggara,West NusaTenggara,and WestPapua were each grantedlessdevelopmentcapital intotal overagreaterlengthof time.Between1969/70 and 1993/94 theirrespectiveallocationsfromthe central governmentwere Rp.857.8, 620.73 and 912.259 billion.4 Moreover,Indonesiangovernmentdatarevealsthatasignificantpercentage of the developmentcapital allocatedtowardEastTimorduringthe occupationerawentdirectlytoward projectsinthree areas(vis.,education,healthandagriculture)thatare the focusof thisstudyon account of theirwidelyrecognisedimportance forlongtermsocial andeconomicdevelopment. East Timor’sallocateddevelopmentcapital wasdistributedtowarddevelopmentprojectsinhealth, educationandagriculture throughmultiple avenueswhichwere all controlleddirectlybythe central governmentinJakartaincluding“Presidential instructionProjects”(P.I.P.’s),and“routine”and “sectoral”spendingunderthe umbrellaof the “Income andExpenditureBudget” (or“development budget”) .5 Developmentcapital wasalsoallocatedtoEastTimorthrough BudgetPost16 (BP-16) between1979 and 1988 before itwasabolishedasaseparate entityandabsorbedintothe Income and ExpenditureBudget.6 While P.I.capital wasfocusedspecificallyonrural development(i.e. agriculture),education(specificallyelementaryschools)andhealthcare,7 capital spendingthrough BP-16 and the Income and ExpenditureBudgetcentredmore onphysical infrastructure andthe 4For all spendingdata cited on EastTimor, EastNusa Tenggara, West Nusa Tenggara, and West Papua between 1969 and 1994, see Rui Gomes, East Timor’s Socio Economic Development under Indonesia:(1976-1998),Phd Thesis,London South Bank University,2002, p.18 cited in Table 1, Allocation of Funds in Five Year Development Plans (Repelita) for East Timor and Selected Provinces 1969/70-93/94 (Rp b),‘Chega! Final Report of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor’, United Nations Transitional Administration in EastTimor (UNTAET), Chapter 7.9 Economic and Social Rights,October 2005,p. 8 5See Joao Mariano de Sousa Saldanha, ‘ThePolitical Economy of East Timor Development’, Jakarta,1994, p. 154. Also refer to Table 4.3 Income and Expenditures Budget for the region of EastTimor 1976/1977 – 1992/1993 (Rp 000,000),p.160 6J. Saldanha,‘ThePolitical Economy’, p. 160,175 7Ibid., p.159
7 civilianbureaucracy.8 Nevertheless,itshouldbe recognisedthatduringthe 1983 to 1993 period, education,healthandagriculture all rankedhighlyamongmultiple competingsectorsbothinterms of theirrelative andabsolutesharesinall capital allocatedthroughBP-16andthe Income and Expenditure Budget.9 Evidence of Investment There isevidence tosuggestthatthisinvestmentspendingdidproduce factsonthe ground inEast Timorgiventhe expansionineducation,healthandagricultural extensionserviceswhichtookplace. Thisexpansionwasdemonstratedbyimprovementstovarious quantitative andqualitative input measuresacrossall sectors.Ineducation,forexample,thisincludedthe openingof new institutions, increasesinstudentparticipationandthe employmentof more teachersacrossthe primary, secondaryandtertiarylevels.Inhealth,thiswasmarkedbythe extensionof vaccinationcoverage, the openingof additional hospitalsandclinics,andthe employmentof more doctors,nursesand midwives.Meanwhileinagriculture, the territory’sfishingfleetwasexpanded,livecattle imports were commenced,outlaysof mechanisedequipmentwere increasedandwetrice fieldsreceived additional supportthroughthe constructionof simple irrigationnetworksandthe rehabilitationof emergencyirrigationchannels.Furthermore,the GOImade attemptstointroduce more efficient agricultural practicesreferredtoas“techniquesof massguidance”. Outcomes While thisexpansioninserviceswouldappeartolendthe GOI’sdevelopmenteffortssomedegreeof substance,the historical record stronglysuggeststhatfew,if anytangible benefitswerederivedby the indigenouspopulationasa result.Thisiswhere the rhetoricandrealityof pembangunanbegan to separate.Ineducation,scantprogresswasmade inimprovinglearningoutcomeswithindicators pertainingtoratesof literacy,numeracy,grade repetition,schoolcompletionandgraduate employabilityremainingpoorthroughoutthe 24year occupation.The healthcare systemalsofailed to deliverpositiveoutcomesforthe populationwithextremelyhighinfant,childandoverall 8Refer to Table4.4 Allocation of Special Budget Post(16) by Sector duringthe Fourth Development Plan (Rp 000,000) in J. Saldanha, ‘ThePolitical Economy’, p.161 and Table 4.6. Allocation of Development Budget by sector in Income and Expenditure Budget for EastTimor 1988/1989-1992/1993 in J.Saldanha, ‘ThePolitical Economy’, p. 166 9This will beshown in the chapters of this thesis.
8 mortalityrates.Similarly,infectiousdiseasesincludingTBand malariawere endemic,lifeexpectancy remainedshort,malnutritionwaswidespreadanddeepreservoirsof mental illnesspervadedthe country. In agriculture,pooroutcomeswere highlighted moststrikingly overthe course of the occupation bythe staticstructure of the East Timorese economywhichwascharacterisedbythe dominantcontributionof agriculturetoemploymentanditscomparativelyweakcontributionto GDP. Thisresultedinsevere andpervasive poverty,andadistinctlackof progressinthe developmentof secondaryindustriesapartfromthose whichhadbeenthe targetof Indonesian largessonaccount of political andsecurityconsiderations. For the vast majorityof the East Timorese population,life underoccupationmeantbeingdeprivedof access to effective healthand educationserviceswhileekingoutameagre existence insubsistence agriculture orbeingusedasvirtual slavesoncommercial plantationssothatIndonesianbureaucrats, militaryofficersandbusinessmencouldprofithandsomelyfromthe “unsustainableanddestructive extractionof [the territory’s] natural resources”.10 Resource Misallocations stemming from Corruption, Waste and Mismanagement Ultimatelyahostof factorswere responsible forcollectivelyunderminingIndonesia’sinvestmentsin education,healthandagriculture.The firstsetrelatestoresource misallocations(i.e.,the waste of resources) stemmingfrommismanagementandcorruptioninthe deliveryof education,healthand agricultural extensionprogrammes. Mismanagementwashighlightedforexample,inthe education and healthcare systems,bythe over-ridingemphasisplacedon“bricksandmortar” expansion of facilitieswhichleftinstitutions,viz.,schoolsandhospitals,under-resourced.Furthermore little attentionwasgiventothe qualityandrelevance of the servicesprovided.Inthe case of the secondaryeducationcurriculumforinstance,the developmentof vocational andtechnical skills applicable toagriculture were neglectedwhilethe developmentof clerical andadministrative skills were heavilyemphasised.Thiscame about despite agriculture beingthe dominantsectorof employmentonwhich the vastmajorityof studentsfromthe indigenouspopulationwouldgoonto dependfortheirlivelihoodsandsurvival.Incontrast,positionsinthe civilianbureaucracywere relativelyscarce andmainlyheldbyexpatriatesfromJavaandotherIndonesianprovinces.11 10For the quote, see ‘Chega!’, Chapter 7.9, p. 3. 11For elaborations and supportingevidence,see Chapter 1, The Failureof Pembangunan in Ea stTimor: East Timor’s Education System Under Indonesian Occupation,p.19-21
9 By outliningthe cloudedarrangementsmade betweenthe governmentagenciesmostdirectly responsible forprojectimplementationandthirdpartiesincludingsubcontractors,Saldanha sheds lightonthe corruptionthatfrequentlyaccompaniedthe deliveryof developmentprogrammes.He contendsthatit wascommon practice forprojectleaderstotake a significantcutfromproject finance forthemselvesandforsub-contractorstoabandon theirworkafterreceivinganadvance of up to 40 to 50% of the project’scapital. 12 Underfalse pretences,the subcontractorswouldoften cite excusesfornotbeingable tocomplete the projectandthenuse the fundstoindulge themselves withconsumergoodsincludingvideorecorders,refrigeratorsandaudiotapes.13 Inthe bodyof this thesismore exampleswill be givenof corruptionandmismanagementinthe deliveryof education, healthandagricultural extensionprogramsandexplanationswill be givenforhow theyundermined boththe quantityandqualityof servicesprovided. Use of Development Programs as Instruments of Plunder and Social Control The secondsetof factors responsible forthe pooroutcomesengenderedbydevelopment programmesrelates totheirunstatedfunctions,viz.,theiruse asinstrumentsof plunderandsocial control.The use of developmentprogrammesforthe purpose of social control wasmostnotoriously exemplifiedbythe coercive birthcontrol programme carriedoutthroughthe healthcare system, whichincludedaccusationsof systematicsterilisationof EastTimorese women.14 Thisemphasison social control wasalso reflectedinseveral featuresof the GOIruneducationsystemincludingthe hegemonicuse of BahasaIndonesianas the language of instructioninclassroomsandtextbooksand the indoctrinationof primaryandsecondarystudentsinthe ideologyof Pancasila.Inagriculture,the GOI’sfocus oninternal securityandthe plunderof EastTimor’snatural resourceswere best illustratedthroughitseffortstodevelopthe commercial plantationsectorandpopulation resettlementpolicieswhichformedpartof a widerprogramof economicandsocial restructuring. Usingdevelopmentprogrammestoserve the interestsof social control andinternal securityhad several negativeconsequencesfor outcomesineducation,healthandagriculture.One wasthe disaffectionandmistrustthat wasinstilled inthe indigenouspopulation.Thisbroadlydiscouraged theirparticipationandengagementwithgovernmentprogrammes,andmeantthatmanyof the 12Joao Mariano deSousa Saldanha, ‘The Political Economy of East Timor Development’, Jakarta,1994, p.165 13Ibid., p.165 14For a listof sources in which this allegation has been made allegation,seefootnote 148 in Chapter 2, The Failureof Pembangunan in East Timor: EastTimor’s Health System Under Indonesian Occupation,p.46
10 benefitsthatcouldhave beenderivedfromconsuminghealth,education,andagricultural extension serviceswere notrealised.Thiswasdemonstratedinrelationtothe healthcare systemforinstance, by the large numberof birthsinthe territorynotattendedbymedical professionalsonaccountof thembeingdistrustedbythe manyEastTimorese womenwhowere fearful of the birthcontrol programme.15 Anotheradverse consequenceof usingdevelopmentprogrammesforpurposesof social control and the plunderof natural resourceswasthe diversionincapital thisnecessitatedfromsociallybeneficial activities.Forexample,these opportunitycostscanbe illustratedusingthe example of the coercive birthcontrol programme.Thisprogramme placeda significantdrainoncapital fromfrontline health care serviceswhichmeantthatthe population’smostpressingneeds,whichincludedthe treatment and preventionof infectiousdiseasessuchasTB and malariathat were leadingcausesof deathand illnessinthe territory,couldnotbe adequatelyaddressed. Social and Economic Conditions in East Timor A thirdsetof factorswhichcontributedtothe failure of the GOI’sdevelopmentprogrammesto deliverbenefitsforthe populationrelatedtothe prevailingsocial andeconomicconditions. Foremostamongthemwasthe extreme violence thatmarkedthe 24 yearsof Indonesian occupation.16 Amongthe litanyof atrocitiescommittedbythe Indonesianmilitaryanditsproxies againstresistance members,suspectedsympathisersandmembersof the widerpopulationwere unlawful killings,enforceddisappearances,the use of torture andarbitrarydetention,andactsof sexual violence.17 Meanwhile collectivepunishmentwasinflictedonthe indigenouspopulationby mass conscriptionsinmilitaryoperations,resettlementprogrammesandwholesaleslaughter 15For elaborations and supportingevidenceon EastTimorese women’s distrustof the health caresystem and avoidanceof medical professionals,seeChapter 2, EastTimor’s Health CareSystem, p. 48 16In ‘Chega!’, the UN has carefully documented the various acts of violencethat occurred in EastTimor during the 24 year occupation.A cursory analysisof this report reveals that whileatrocities were committed by both sides (viz.,the Indonesian military and its proxies on one, the Falintil/CNRresistanceon the other), it was the extraordinary scaleand cruelty of the violenceof committed by the Indonesian military thatultimately inflicted harmon the civilian population as was intended. 17 For unlawful killings and enforced disappearances carried outby Indonesian security forces and their proxies againstresistancemembers and suspected sympathisers as well as randommembers of the wider population, see ‘Chega!’, Chapter 7.2 Unlawful killings and enforced disappearances.For the arbitrary detention and torture of resistancemembers, suspected sympathisers and randommembers of the population by Indonesian security forces and their proxies see ‘Chega!’, Chapter 7.4 Arbitrary detention, torture and ill-treatment. For acts of sexual violenceperpetrated by Indonesian security forces and other institutions against resistance members and suspected sympathisers as well as randommembers of the wider population includingchildren, detainees and pregnant women, see ‘Chega!’, Chapter 7.7 Sexual violence, 2005.
11 includingseveral notoriousmassacres.18 Actsof violence were alsocarriedoutthatcontributedto famine andsickness.Theyincludedthe impositionof restrictionsonsubsistence farming,effective bans onthe performancesof ritualsandceremoniesassociatedwithtraditional agricultural practices,the deliberatepoisoningof watersupplies,andthe targetingof cropsandlivestockin aerial bombardmentsinvolvingthe use of chemical weapons.19 While the CommissionforTruthand Reconciliationdeterminedthatactsof violence were directlyresponsible foronly18 percentof the 102,800 conflict-relatedfatalitiesitestimatedinthe 24 yearoccupationperiod;itisevidentthat violence playedasignificantpartinthe remaining82 percent of conflict-relatedfatalitiesthatwere variouslyattributedtochronichungerandillness.20 One socioeconomicconditionwhichshouldbe highlightedasacontributingfactorto East Timor’s failuresineducationandhealthwasthe severityandpervasivenessof povertyinthe province.The severityof povertywas reflectedinthe coincidence of low average percapitaincomes(i.e.,GDPper capita) on the one hand,21 and highlevelsof personal andspatial incomeinequalityonthe other.22 18 Coercion was used by the Indonesian military to mobilisemasses of civiliansin military campaignssuch as Operasi Kikis (the final cleansing of 1981-192) in which at least80,000 men and boys participated in the encirclement of Fretilin defensive positions.Conscriptions of this scalehad a devastatingeffect on the population.Many of those who were conscripted in Operasi Kikis died of starvation or returned in a severely weakened state havingbeen given meagre rations and prevented from taking supplies with them. Furthermore, severe episodes of faminewere induced amongst the wider population by cripplingagricultural production through the associated loss of farmlabour.See J. Taylor, ‘The Price of Freedom’, pp.117-120 Details on the GOI’s forced resettlement program will begiven under the subsection heading‘Resettlement Policies’in Chapter 3,‘The Failureof Pembangunan in East Timor: East Timor’s AgricultureSector and Rural Economy Under Indonesian Occupation and Genocide’,pp.76-80. Notorious examples of massacres includethe Kraras villagemassacrein 1983 where “nearly all the village’s inhabitants –between 200 and 300 people - were murdered” in a “terrible actof revenge” committed by the Indonesian military in responseto the defection of a hansip unitthat had been stationed there. See S. Cox and P. Carey, ‘Generations of Resistance’, p. 31. See also J. Taylor, ‘The Price of Freedom’, p.102. Another example was the Santa Cruz massacreon the 12th of November 1991 which gained widespread publicity in the international media.Details of this massacrehavebeen corroborated by multiplesources.See for example, J. Taylor,‘The Priceof Freedom’, pp.xii-xv;S. Cox and P. Carey, ‘Generations of Resistance’,pp. 48-52;M. Jardine,‘Genocide in Paradise’,p.15-16 ; ‘Chega!’, Chapter 3: History of the Conflict,pp. 115-117 19For restrictions on subsistencefarmingand the performances of ritualsand ceremonies associated with traditional agricultural practices,seeunder the subsection heading‘Resettlement Policies’in Chapter 3, East Timor’s Agriculture Sector, p. 78. The deliberate poisoningof water supplies can beinferred from Cox and Carey’s statement that “many wells [were] poisoned…by the Indonesians”.See S. Cox and P. Carey, ‘Generations of Resistance’, p.34. For the deliberate use of chemical weapons to destroy crops and livestock, see J. Taylor,The Price of Freedom’, p. 85 20‘Chega!’, Chapter 6: The Profileof Human Rights Violations in Timor-Leste, 1974-1999,p. 3 21Several statisticsindicatethatper capita incomes remained low in EastTimor duringthe occupation.For example, in the 1983 to 1986 period, GDP per capita in EastTimor only approximated 38.3 per cent of Indonesia’s national averagemakingitthe country’s second poorest provinces comingin ahead of only Nusa Tenggara Timur. See Table5, Comparative Economic Indicators:EastTimor and Indonesia, ‘Chega!’, Chapter 7.9, pp. 10-11. In 1996 East Timor had a GDP per capita of Rp.998,000; the second lowest GDP per capita among 27 Indonesian provinces.See Table4: Per Capita Gross Regional Productby Province(1996),in ‘The Indonesian Context: Economic and Social Disadvantage of Remote Island Communities’, The United Nations Social
12 Meanwhile,the pervasivenessof povertyinEastTimorwasreflectedinstatisticsfromthe mid- 1990’s whichshowthat East Timor’spovertyrate was appreciablyhigherthaninanyother Indonesianprovince.In1993 forexample,EastTimor’spovertyrate (referringtothe percentage of the populationlivingbelowthe official poverty line) was36.2%,the nexthighestbeingKalimantan Barat’s at 25.05%.23 By 1996 East Timor hadthe highestpovertyrate of Indonesia’s27provincesat 31.2%, withthe nexthighestpovertybeingWestKalimantan’sat21.98%.24 While contributingtothe pooroutcomesthatwere experiencedinagricultural developmentover the course of the occupation,the prevalence of extreme povertywasalsosymptomaticof inhibited agricultural development.Here,agricultural production,whichwasconcentratedinrural areasand employedthe vastmajorityof EastTimor’sworkforce,contributedrelativelylittle toGDPoverthe course of the occupation.Incomparison, othersectorssuchas the civilianbureaucracythatwere basedinurban areaslike Dili andemployedrelatively few personnel,contributeddisproportionately Commission for Asia and the Pacific,p.12.Retrieved 7 Oct 2012 from http://www.unescap.org/ttdw/publications/tfs_pubs/pub_2017/pub_2017_ch2.pdf 22Several statisticshighlightthe presence of marked personal incomedisparities in EastTimor duringthe occupation era.For example, in 1993 EastTimor produced an inequality index scoreor Gini coefficient(where 0 = min inequality,1 = max inequality:scores vary between 0 and 1 ) of 0.339,the second highest of five Eastern Indonesian provinces which also included WestNusa Tenggara Timor, East Nusa Tenggara Timor, Malaku and Irian Jaya (WestPapua).Their respective scores in 1993 were 0.274,0.254, 0.3 and 0.37. By 1996 East Timor’s inequality index had increased to 0.363,remainingthe second highestamong the five Eastern Indonesian provinces;the indexes of West Nusa Tenggara Timor, East Nusa Tenggara Timor, Malaku and Irian Jaya (West Papua) havingrisen respectively to 0.286, 0.296, 0.269 and 0.386. See Table15.3, Gini Coefficient of Per Capita Consumption Expenditure, 1993 and 1996a, in Anne Booth, ‘Poverty, Equity and Livingstandards in East Timor’, in Hal Hill and Joao M. Saldanha (eds), ‘East Timor: Development Challenges for the World’s Newest nation’, Singapore, 2001,p. 244. Saldanha notes that personal incomeinequality in EastTimor had been even more severe duringthe late1980’s before narrowingduringthe 1990’s.In 1986,the gini ratio had been 0.43 and dropped to 0.346 in 1990.See J. Saldanha, ‘The Political Economy’, p. 197 Similarly,several statisticsareavailableto highlightthe presence of marked spatial incomedisparitiesin East Timor duringthe occupation.This includes thediscrepancies thatwere observed in rural and urban poverty rates in both the years 1993 and 1996.In the former year, East Timor’s urban poverty and rural poverty rates were 20.78% and 37.74% respectively.At 16.96%, this was the greatest disparity in urban and rural poverty rates seen for any Indonesian provincein 1993.In the latter year, EastTimor’s urban poverty and rural poverty rates were 13.6% and 33.08% respectively. At 19.43%, this was similarly the greatest disparity in urban and rural poverty rates seen for any Indonesian provincein 1996.For the difference in urban and rural poverty rates in East Timor in 1993,see Columns ‘(2)’ and ‘(4)’, Row ‘54. Timor Timur’ in Table 4. Poverty Incidenceby Province,1993-1996 (%) in ‘Poverty Measurement: the Case of Indonesia’, The United Nations Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific,p.12.Retrieved 7 Oct 2012 from http://www.unescap.org/stat/meet/povstat/pov7_ido.pdf. For the difference in urban and rural poverty rates in East Timor in 1996,see Columns ‘(3)’ and ‘(5)’, Row ‘54. Timor Timur’ in Table 4. Poverty Incidenceby Province,1993-1996 (%) in ‘Poverty Measurement’, p. 12. 23For EastTimor’s poverty rate in 1993,and other selected provinces see Table15.1, Populati on Below the Official Poverty Line, 1993 and 1996,A. Booth, ‘Poverty, Equity and Livingstandards’,p.242;For EastTimor’s poverty rate in 1993 and all other Indonesian provinces,seeColumn (6) Urban + Rural 1993,Row 54. Timor Timur in Table 4. Poverty Incidenceby Province,1993-1996 (%) in ‘Poverty Measurement’, p. 12. 24See Table 4: Per Capita Gross Regional Productby Province(1996), in ‘The Indonesian Context’, p.12.
13 to GDP.25 Thishighlightsthe interactioneffectsthatoccurredbetweenthe social andeconomic conditionsthathave beenoutlined(viz.,violence andpoverty)andthe pooroutcomesthatwere experiencedineducation,healthandagriculture.Forexample,itisevidentthatviolence underminedagricultural developmentandindoingsocontributedtothe poor outcomesthatwere experiencedinhealthandeducation.Similarly,itcanbe reasonedthatthe poor outcomes documentedinhealthandeducation,producedbyviolence andthe failuresthathave beenoutlined inhealthand educationprogrammes,contributedsignificantlytothe inhibitionof agricultural development. These interactioneffectswerealsonotedbythe UN CommissionforReception,Truthand ReconciliationinEastTimor: “Among theside-effectsof extremeviolations, [including] tortureand forced recruitmentwere ill-health and the disruption of education.Theskewed economicdevelopmentpromoted by theIndonesian authoritiescreated a self-perpetuating cyclein which poverty,on theone hand,and poorhealth and low educationalachievement,on the other,fed on each other.”26 Thus,rather thanviewingthe presence of adversesocial andeconomicconditionsasmitigating factors inthe poor outcomesengenderedbyhealth,educationandagricultural extension programmes,theyshouldbe viewedinsteadaspartof a widersystematicfailure bythe Indonesian government.This wasthe failure toview development holisticallyinwhichthe outcomes experiencedinanyone andall areasof development(includingviolence,poverty,andoutcomesin education,healthandagriculture),wereinter-dependent.However,giventhatdevelopment programmeswere intendedtoprovide Westernsponsorswitharationale forcontinuingtheir supportof the occupationandservedIndonesia’smore nefariouspurposesof pillage,social control and genocide,the failure of pembangunantodeliverpositiveoutcomesforEastTimor’sindigenous populationseemsperfectlyunderstandable. 25For data on the contribution of agricultureto GDP, see footnote 206 in Chapter 3, East Timor’s Agriculture Sector, p. 60 For data on agriculture’s employment share,see footnote 205 in Chapter 3, East Timor’s AgricultureSector, p. 60 For data on the contribution of the administrativesector (civilian bureaucracy) to GDP, see footnote 208 in Chapter 3, East Timor’s Agriculture Sector, pp.60-61 For data on the administrativesector’s employment share,see footnote 52 in Chapter 1, East Timor’s Education System, p. 21 26‘Chega!’, Chapter 7.9, p. 48
14
15 Chapter 1 The Failure of Pembangunan in East Timor: East Timor’s Education System Under Indonesian Occupation Introduction Duringthe periodinwhichitoccupiedEast Timor,the Indonesiangovernmentmade substantial investmentsinthe half island'seducationsystem.Whilethese investmentsdidtranslate intoarapid expansionof the educationsystem(reflectedthroughthe openingof new institutions,increasesin studentparticipationatall levelsof educationandthe employmentof more teachers),resources were broadlymisallocatedwithinsufficientemphasisplacedonthe qualityandrelevance of the educationprovided.Thiswashighlightedthroughseveralaspectsof the educationsystemincluding the under-resourcingof servicesandfacilitiesandthe emphasisplaced onthe developmentof academicskillsthatwere irrelevanttothe needsof vital economicsectorsandeverydaylife. Furthermore,several aspectsof the education systemsuggestthatitsprimaryfunctionwastoserve as an instrumentof social control ratherthanas an avenue forimpartingessential knowledgeand individualheuristics. Consequently,scantprogresswasmade inimprovinglearningoutcomesduring the occupationwithindicatorspertainingtoratesof literacy,numeracy,grade repetition,school completionandgraduate employabilityremainingpoor. Itshouldalsobe notedthatthere were several factorsrelatedtothe poorsocial and economicconditions prevalentinEastTimorduring occupationandgenocide thathad negative implicationsforlearningoutcomes.
16 Expenditure Throughoutthe perioditoccupiedEastTimor,Indonesiamade substantialinvestmentsinthe half island’seducationsystemof increasingscale overtime.Inthe periodspanningfromthe fiscal year 1982/83 to the fiscal year1988/89, East Timor’seducationsectorwasallocatedatotal 3.3 billion Rupiahindevelopmentcapital bythe Indonesiangovernment.27 ThiscoincidedwithIndonesia's fourthdevelopmentplan(RepelitaIV) whichranfrom1984/1985 to 1988/89 inwhichthe developmentof the East Timor’seducationsystemwasclearlyapriority,receivinga3.8 percent share in BP-16 capital;the jointfifthhighestallocationof BP-16financingamongseveralcompeting economicsectors.28 Duringthe fifthdevelopmentplanwhichranfrom1988/89 to 1992/93, the IndonesiansextendedtheireffortstodevelopEastTimor’seducationsystem,grantingit 7.2 billion Rupiahrepresentinga5.6 percentshare inthe province’sallocationof developmentbudgetfunds (the fifthhighestallocationamong 19competingsectors) inatotal of 129.7 billionRupiah.29 Bythe endof the occupation,the share of East Timor’sdevelopmentbudgetbeingspentoneducationhad risento 25 percent accordingto an analysisof the budgetfor9 districts(Kabupatens) inEastTimor conductedin1999.30 The magnitude of these outlayscanbe bettercomprehendedwhentakinginto account the level of vertical fiscal imbalancethatexistedbetweenEastTimor’srevenue raising capacitiesonthe one hand andJakarta’s spendingpoweronthe other.In1999, the contributionof 27‘Chega!’, Chapter 7.9, p.42. 28The 3.8 per cent sharein East Timor’s BP-16 capital duringthefourth development plan translated to 1 billion in a total allocation of 26.1 billion rupiah.This gavethe education sector the the 5th highestallocation of fundingthrough BP-16 among 15 designated sectors. However, becausesubstantially more(3.3 billion Rupiah) was spent in total on education over the 1982 to 1989 period with the remaining2.2 billion comingfromother sources e.g. Presidential Instruction projects,then it is probablethateducation’s sharein total development spendingon East Timor may have been higher relativeto other sectors duringthe fourth development plan. For Saldanha’s figures on education spendingduringthe fourth development plan (Repelita IV) see Table 4.4 Allocation of Special Budget Post (16) by sector duringthe Fourth Development Plan (Rp. 000,000) in Joao M.D.S. Saldanha,‘The Political Economy of East Timor Development’, Jakarta,1994, p.161. 29For education’s sharein EastTimor’s development budget between 1988/89 and 1992/93, see J. Saldanha, ‘The Political Economy’, p.167. For the sizeof East Timor’s development budget in the 1988/89 to 1992/93 period see Table 4.6 Allocation Development Budget by Sector in Income and Expenditure Budget for East Timor 1998/1989-1992/93 (Rp.000,000) in Saldanha,‘The Political Economy’, p. 166. 30Jon Pedersen and Marie Arneberg (editors), ‘Social and Economic Conditions in East Timor’, International ConflictResolution ProgramSchool of International and Public Affairs,ColumbiaUniversity,New York, 1999,p. 88
17 the East Timorese economytothe province’sallocatedbudgetwasonly15per centthus makingit insufficienttocoverjustthe educationbudgetforthatyear. 31 Evidence of Investment: The Expansion of East Timor’s Education System There are numerousstatisticshighlightingthe expansionof EastTimor’seducationsystematthe primaryschool level duringthe occupation.Forinstance,there was anincrease inthe numberof primaryschool teachersworkinginEastTimor between1976/77 and 1990/91, from 499 in the formeryearto 4,574 inthe latter.32 Thiswasfollowedbyanincrease duringthe 1990’s withthe estimatednumberof primaryschool teachersinEastTimor reaching6,672 by 1998. 33 Absolute levelsof studentparticipationalsoimprovedduringthe occupationwiththe numberof children enrolledrisingfrom13,501 studentsin1976/77 to 95,850 in 1990/91.34 Furthermore,itshouldbe notedthat the periodfrom1976/77 to 1990/91 saw the establishmentof anadditional 512 primary schoolsbythe Indonesiangovernmentfrom47schoolsat the start of the periodto 559 at its end. 35 In spite of thisdevelopmentandthe observationthatby1985 virtuallyeveryvillageinEastTimor had itsownprimaryschool,itis interestingtonote thatin the periodfrom1991 to 1998, the constructionof evenmore primaryschoolstookplace inthe territorywiththe numberreaching788 inthe latteryear. 36 31Ibid, pp.88. 32Calculationsbased on data taken from Table 5.34 Development of Elementary, Junior and Senior High Schools,EastTimor Schoolyear 1976/77-1990/91 in J.Saldanha,‘The Political Economy’, p. 249 33For the number of primary school teachers employed in East Timor in 1998 see ‘Chega!’ Chapter 7.9, p. 42. 34Calculationsbased on data taken from Table 5.34 Development of Elementary, Junior and Senior High Schools,EastTimor Schoolyear 1976/77-1990/91 in J.Saldanha, ‘The Political Economy’, p .249. For supportingevidence see J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p. 85. Pedersen and Arneberg put the number of pupils in primary schoolsat130,000 in 1986. 35Calculationsbased on data taken from Table 5.34 Development of Elementary, Junior and Senior High Schools,EastTimor Schoolyear 1976/77-1990/91 in J.Saldanha, ‘The Political Economy’, p.249. For supporting evidence see Republic of Indonesia,Department of Foreign Affairs, ‘East Timor: Building for the Future, 1992, pp.13-16 cited in Stephen Sherlock, ‘Political Economy of the East Timor Conflict’, Asian Survey, 36,1996, p. 836. See also ‘see UN General Assembly WorkingPaper (A/AC.109/1154), 1993 and UN General Assembly WorkingPaper (A/AC.109/1187), 1994 cited in Alberto Arenas, ‘Education and Nationalismin EastTimor’, Social Justice, 25,1998, p. 139. Whilethe Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs report places the number of primary schools established by the Indonesian government in East Timor in the period from annexation up to 1992 at579, the UN General Assembly workingpaper places the number of primary schools established by the Indonesian government from annexation through to 1993 at565. 36For the observation that by 1985 virtually every villagein EastTimor had its own primary school seeGavin W. Jones, ‘Social Policy Issues in EastTimor:Education and Health’, in East Timor: Development Challenges for the World’s Newest Nation, eds. Hal Hill and Joao M. Saldanha,2001,p.256.See also ‘Chega!’, Chapter 7.9, p.42. For the number of primary schools in EastTimor in 1998 see ‘Chega!’, Chapter 7.9, p.42.
18 At boththe juniorsecondaryandseniorsecondarylevelsof educationinEastTimor,a similarpicture of expansioninservice deliveryandaccesswasevidentthroughoutthe occupation.Intermsof staffinglevels,the numberof juniorsecondaryteachersemployedinthe province increasedfrom just10 in 1796/1977 to 1245 in 1990/91, while the numberof seniorsecondaryschoolteachers employedinEastTimorincreasedfrom18 in the fiscal year1979/80 to 967 in1990/91.37 In termsof attendance levels,the numberof juniorhighschool studentsattendinghadrisenfrom315 in 1976/77 to 31,482 in1990/91 while the numberof seniorhighschool studentsincreasedoverthe same periodfromjust64 in 1979/80 to 19,665 in 1990/91.38 By 1998, the numberof studentsin juniorsecondaryschoolshadreached32,179.39 Anotherindicationof expansionwasthe openingof newinstitutions.Where therehadbeenonly2juniorsecondaryschoolsoperatingin1976/77, there were 94 runningby1990/91.40 Similarly,the numberof seniorsecondaryschoolsoperatinginEast Timorincreasedfrom2 in 1979/1980 to 47 in 1990/91. 41 The IndonesiansalsopresidedoverarapidexpansioninEastTimor’stertiaryeducationsystem duringthe occupation.Where notertiaryeducationservicesorinstitutionshadexistedinEastTimor underPortuguese rule,the Indonesianswere the firstoccupyingpowertoestablishatertiary educationsysteminEastTimor,albeitof limitedscope. 42 The year1986 saw the inaugurationof East Timor’sfirstuniversity, TheUniversitasTimor-Timur(UNTIM),providingcoursesinagriculture 37See Table 5.34 Development of Elementary, Junior and Senior High Schools,EastTimor Schoolyear 1976/77- 1990/91 in J. Saldanha, ‘The Political Economy’, p. 249. 38Ibid, p. 249. 39‘Chega!’, Chapter 7.9, p.42 40See Table 5.34 Development of Elementary, Junior and Senior High Schools,EastTimor Schoolyear 1976/77- 1990/91 in J. Saldanha, ‘The Political Economy’, p. 249. 41Ibid, p. 249. Itshould be noted that there are other sources of evidence confirmingthe expansion of secondary school systemin East Timor. Accordingto a 1992 report from the Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs,integration with Indonesia resulted in the establishmentof an additional 88 middle/juniorsecondary schools and 38 senior secondary schools.See ‘East Timor: Building for the Future’, cited in S. Sherlock, ‘Political Economy of the East Timor Conflict’,p. 836. Furthermore, a UN working paper puts the number of senior secondary schools established by the Indonesian’s in EastTimor between 1975 and 1993 at 29 - see UN General Assembly WorkingPaper (A/AC.109/1154), 1993 and UN General Assembly WorkingPaper (A/AC.109/1187), 1994 cited in A. Arenas, ‘Education and Nationalism’,p. 139. The UN Report of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in EastTimor documents further expansions in the secondary school systemduringthe 1990’s with the numbers of lower secondary schools,academic senior secondary schools and vocational senior secondary schoolsoperatingin EastTimor reaching114,37 and 17 respectively by 1998. See ‘Chega!’, Chapter 7.9, p.42 42When EastTimor was ruled by Portugal,successful secondary school graduates had to rely on the offer of scholarships to Portuguese universities to progress into tertiary education. By all indications,thesescholarship offers could only be described as tokenistic and piecemeal. See Bill Nichol,‘Timor:The Stillborn Nation’, Camberwell, 1978,p.24. The limited scope of EastTimor’s tertiary education system in the period of Indonesian occupation was indicated by the fact that only 20 per cent of secondary school graduates in EastTimor went on to tertiary education duringthe late 1990’s compared to 40% on average in Indonesia.See J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p.86
19 and educationaswell associal andpolitical science.43 Althoughitsstudentsinitiallynumberedonly inthe hundreds,by1998/99 the Universityof EastTimorhad an estimated3500 students. 44 In additiontothe openingof UNTIM, 1500 scholarshipplacesatIndonesianuniversitieswere granted to East Timorese studentsin1989, and in1990, the governmental Dilipolytechnicwasestablished offering two-yearcoursesinfoursubjects;namelymachine engineering,civil engineering,electrical engineeringandaccountancy. 45 The final positive developmentinthe expansionof EastTimor’s tertiaryeducationsystemunderthe Indonesianswasthe openingof itsthirdtertiaryeducation institutionin1991.46 Resource Misallocations:Mismanagement inthe Delivery ofEducation Services One of the primaryfactorsin the poor qualityof educationservicesprovidedbythe Indonesian governmentwasthe under-resourcingof institutionsandfacilitiesowingtoa governmentpolicythat had clearlyprejudicedthe expansionof the educationsystemaheadof improvingservicesand facilities. 47 Manifestationsof thispolicyincludedclassroomsthatresembledpoorlyconstructed barrack rooms fittedwithonlybenches,blackboardsandtableswhile lackingbasicteacheraideslike charts and diagramsandamenitiesincludingaccesstoelectricity. AusterityinEastTimorese schools and universitieswasalsohighlightedbythe general absence of auxiliaryfacilitiesandessential capital includinglaboratories,photocopiers,librariesandresource booksthatwere alsopoorly maintainedinthe rare instancestheywere provided.48 Furthermore,schoolswere frequentlyunable 43 For the opening of UNTIM in 1986 see A. Arenas, ‘Education and Nationalism’,p.139 44For the number of students enrolled at UNTIM atits inception,see G. Jones ‘Education and Health’, p.257. For the number of students attending UNTIM in the late 1990’s see J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p.86. 45For the establishmentof the polytechnic see D. Sousa, O Programa de educacao na face de transicao/Education in the Transition Phase”, Strategic Development Planningfor EastTimor Conference, Melbourne, 5-9 April,1999 cited in J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p.87. For tertiary education scholarshipsseeA. Arenas, ‘Education and Nationalism’,p. 139 46J. Saldanha, ‘ThePolitical Economy’, p.245 47 This policy was reflected in education budgets from that era which showed a bias in the distribution of funds toward development rather than routine categories. Here, development expenses were aimed atproviding additional capital outlays(in terms of new school buildings,newinstitutions,extra staff etc) whereas routine or recurrent expenses were directed toward the maintenance and improvement of existingeducational facilities and services.In the late 1990’s more than 80% of the education budget was deployed under the category of development expenditures whileless than 20 per cent of the education budget was deployed under the category of routine expenses. See J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p. 88. 48For conditions insideclassrooms,and theabsence and poor maintenance of auxi liary facilities see‘Chega!’ Chapter 7.9, p. 43; D. Odling-Smee, ‘Future Planning:Language and Education in East Timor’, Darwin: East Timor International SupportCentre, 1998;cited in J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic
20 to supplytextsbooksineithersufficientquantityorqualitytotheirstudents.49 Another manifestationof under-resourcinginEastTimor’seducationsystemwithsignificant,adverse implicationsforeducationqualitywasthe low teachingstandard.Sourcesvariouslydescribed employeesof the provincialschool systemduringthe occupationasyoung,inexperiencedand unskilledwhile lackinginmotivationandincentives.50 These attributesreflectedthe factthata significantnumberof these teachershadjustcompletedtrainingandlackedminimumqualifications; that theywere poorlypaid;and that manyfeltalienatedfromboththe socio-culturalenvironmentin whichtheywere workingandfromthe studentstheywere teaching.51 Conditions’, p.90; and OxfamGB, ‘Para o bem de Timor’, East Timor Human Resource Development Programme Research Report, London, 1999 cited in J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p.90 49Estimates from the 1998 census confirmed deficiencies in the quantity of textbooks supplied to students at three levels of education in EastTimor. In primary school, roughly half of all students had access to a maths book whilein junior secondary school, two thirds of students had a math-book, but only half had an English book and one third a physics book.In senior secondary schools,two thirds of students had maths and English books, but only one third had physics texts.See SUSENAS 1998 cited in J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p.90. For the quality of textbooks provided see J. Saldanha, ‘The Political Economy’, p.246. This sourcenotes that the learningmaterials supplied to students were often out-dated and inappropriatewhere for instance,in several districts firstgradetextbooks were being given to the other elementary school forms. 50The significanceof lowteaching standards to poor education outcomes in East Timor is reinforced by c ross country evidence which indicates thatteacher quality and education is a more importantfactor in student achievement than teacher to pupil ratios.See Hanushek, 1995 cited in J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p. 92. For descriptions of teachers employed in the East Timorese school systemduringthe occupation,see S. Sherlock, ‘Political Economy of the EastTimor Conflict’,p. 838; and A. Arenas, ‘Education and Nationalism’,pp. 139. Low teaching standards havealso been attributed to the fact that military personnel were often used as teachers in EastTimorese schools.See ‘Secret military report,Komando Pelaksana Operasi Timor Timur’, Dili (8452). Appendix B (Intelligence) Rencana Operassi No 1/Bayu. 261,500/ 1984 cited in ‘Chega!’, Chapter 7.9, p.44. See alo R. Brahmana and U. Emanuel, “The Book of 20 Years of Development of East Timor”, Dili:Corps of the Indonesian Civil Serviceof the East Timor Province”, 1996,p.109 cited in J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p.85 51For the inexperience of teachers in EastTimor see ‘Chega!’, Chapter 7.9, pp.43. This report notes that “many…teachers were assigned to East Timor immediately after graduatingcolleges in Indonesia.” For the lack of formal qualifications held by teachers in East Timor see J. Saldanha, ‘The Political Economy’, pp.246; ‘Chega!’, Chapter 7.9, p.43; and J. Carvalho, Strategic Development Planning for East Timor; Education, Culture, Environment (un pub.), Strategic Development Planningfor East Timor Conference, Melbourne 5-9 April 1999,cited in J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p.92. Carvalho notes for instancethat in 1999,more than 90% of teachers in East Timor did not have minimum qualifications. For the low pay of teachers in East Timor see Oxfam GB, “Para o bem de Timor”, EastTimor Human Resource Development Programme Research Report, London, 1999, pp.26 cited in J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, pp.90; and ‘Chega!’, Chapter 7.9, p.43. It is noted in the latter sourcethat the low salaries granted to teachers lead to high rates of absenteeism where many would seek extra work to supplement their incomes. Reasons for teacher alienation and disengagement included the fact that many were brought in by the Indonesians formother provinces includingJava and Sulawesi.In the late 1990’s over 50 per cent of East Timor’s school teachers came from areas outsideof EastTimor, see J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, 1999, p.90. Another reason why teachers felt disengaged from the educati on system was the antipathy displayed toward them by EastTimorese students who perceived them to be functionaries
21 Anotherfailure of EastTimor’seducationsystemduringthe occupationwasitsoveremphasison skillsthatwere notuseful invital economicsectors(viz.,agriculture) thatthe vastmajorityof studentswouldgoonto dependfortheirlivelihoodsandsurvival.Instead,the educationsystem focusedprimarilyonthe developmentof skillsthatwere useful foremploymentin administrative capacitiesdespite the factthatthe administrative sectoremployedarelative smallpercentageof the labourforce and that the majorityof administrativepositionsinoccupiedEastTimorwere givento expatriatesfromJavaandotherIndonesianprovinces.52 Thisfocusonthe developmentof administrativeoveragriculturalandtechnical skillswasreflectedindataonthe educationsystem fromthat era: among19,000 seniorsecondaryschool students inthe late 1990’s, 77% were in academiceducation programs,whileonly23% were enrolledinvocational educationprograms. Correspondingtothe higherpercentageof studentsenrolledinacademiceducationprogramswas the greaternumberof institutionsprovidingacademiccoursesincomparisontovocational courses (Inthe late 1990’s there were 37 of the formertype and17 of the latter). It isapparentthat these vocational programswere notadequatelyaddressedtothe developmentof agricultural and technical skills,giventhatthe majorityof studentsinvocational educationwere enrolledin commercial orsecretarial courseswhileonlyone quarterof studentsundertookcourseswitha technical focus.Moreover,amongvocational institutions,there wasonlyone dedicatedagricultural school,locatedinCovalimaaccommodating300students,andonlya handful of dedicated mechanical schoolsfoundinurbancentreslike Dili.Consequentlythe educationprovidedlacked relevance toeverydaylife (impliedbythe mismatchbetweenthe skillsemphasisedbythe education systemonthe one hand, andthose requiredbythe dominantsectorsof employmentonthe other), leavingstudentsandtheirfamiliesfeelingapatheticanddisengagedfromthe educationsystem. Thisclearlyhadnegative implicationsforlearningoutcomesgiventhe vital role thatstudentand parental attitudesplayinthisregard.53 of a socially and culturally repressivestateapparatus.Several sources noted that teachers were frequent targets of violent attacks by youths. See Oxfam, 1999,Sousa,1999, OdlingSmee, 1999 cited in J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p.98 52The comparatively small percentageof the labour forceemployed in administrativecapacities was highlighted in the 1990 National Labour Survey. The survey data indicated thatwhere 83.49 per cent of East Timor’s labour force was employed in “Agriculture’, only 9.12 per cent of the work force was employed in ‘Social Services’,a proxy for the administration and defence, over the 1989/1990 period.See J. Saldanha, ‘The Political Economy, p. 259 and Table 5.39, Labour Force Accordingto Major Employment Field 1989/1990,in J. Saldanha,‘The Political Economy’, p. 261. Jones maintains thatUnder Indonesian rule,employment in professional,administrativeand clerical occupations was dominated by non -East Timorese claimingthatwhere “over 80 per cent of East Timorese worked in agricultural occupations,58 per cent of non-East Timorese males worked in professional, administrativeand clerical occupations.See G. Jones, ‘Education and Health’, p.257 53For the relativenumber of students enrolled in vocational and academic education programs duringthe late 1990’s,the proportion of students in vocational education enrolled in technical courses v’s secretarial or
22 Use of the Education System as an Instrument of Social Control There were several featuresof the state runeducationsystemthatrelatedtoitsuse as an instrumentof social control whichofferfurtherindicationsof pooreducationquality. Ratherthan viewingeducationasa strategicinvestmentinthe productivityof EastTimor’slabourforce andthe island’slongruneconomicviability,the Indonesiansviewededucationasa mechanismthrough whichEast Timor’syouthcould be re-socialised,assimilatedandultimately‘Indonesianized’;the objective being‘toinstil inchildren,arespectandadmirationforIndonesianpractices,beliefsand values’.54 One of the primaryfeaturesimbuedinEastTimor’seducationprogramsaimedatthe realisationof these objectives wasinstructioninthe Pancasilaideology –the supposedideological basisof Indonesiansociety.55 Thiswasachievedinprimaryandsecondaryschoolsthroughboot camp style physical educationprograms,the performanceof ritualsinvolvingthe Indonesianflag and the singingof the Indonesiannational anthem,the versingof studentsinalimitedand nationalisticnarrative of Javanese history,andthroughpromotionof the Pramuka –the state controlledscoutorganisation –thatstudentswere stronglyencouragedtoparticipate in.56 Since the educationsystem’sresourceswere principallydevotedtothe indoctrination of studentsin nationalisticpropaganda, little roomwasleftinthe curriculumforthe teachingof essentialacademic letalone technical skillsaswell aslocallyorientedcontentincluding Timorese history,geography, arts and oral literature.57 Consequently,EastTimor’sindigenouspopulationbecame disaffectedin commercial courses,and the number of mechanical and agricultural schools,seeJ. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p.86. 54 For the quotation – “to instil in children,a respectand admiration for Indonesian practices,beliefs and values”- see A. Arenas, ‘Education and Nationalism’,p. 131.It should also benoted that the Inonesians sought to instil the samevalues in adults through community education programs. See KORPRI Timor Timur, 1996, p.145 cited in ‘Chega!’, Chapter 7.9, p.45 55There is evidence to suggest that the inculcation of students in the Pancasilaideology featured in both the Catholic and privateschool systems in addition to the state school system. This comes from the fact that all schools were forced to adopt the same curriculum.See J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, pp.85. The goal of the education system to indoctrinatestudents in the Pancasilaideology was formally enshrined in Indonesian lawNo.2 1989.The specific objectives stipulated were: 1. Formation of Pancasila citizens who have a high quality and would be ableto stay independent. 2. Contribution to the development of the Indonesian community, nation and state that is materialised in a solid national resilience. 3. Increasethe People's capacity to protect the nation from the intrusion of any ideology, concept and teaching that is againstPancasila. See KORPRI Timor Timur, 1996,pp.145 (official translation) cited in ‘Chega!’, Chapter 7.9, pp.44 56 For the emphasis on physical education and the singingof patriotic songs includingtheIndonesian national anthem, see Jardine,‘Genocide in Paradise’, Tucson, 1995,pp.61-62. For the flagrituals and forced participation in thePramuka see refugee testimony cited in A. Arenas, ‘Education and Nationalism’,p. 140 57One of the UN truth and reconciliation commission's findingson education in EastTimor was that “the use of schools for propaganda and indoctrination severely interfered with the education of an entire generation of East Timorese youth. Education was used in this way as partof an integrated security approach whose overridingobjectivewas to ensure that pro-independence sentiment did not take root in a new generation. In
23 theirattitude towardthe provincial educationsystem, comingtoview itasan instrumentof cultural genocide.58 Reinforcedbythe perceivedirrelevance of the educationcourses,suchattitudes contributedsignificantlytothe poorlearningoutcomesthatwere characteristicof the occupation periodinrecognitionof the factthat the abilityof studentstolearnonlyextendsasfaras theirwill. Anothermechanismof social control incorporatedintothe provincialeducationsystem,intendedto facilitate the inculcationof Pancasila,washegemonicuse of BahasaIndonesianasthe language of instruction.59 Indeed,officialdocumentssuchasthe Act respectingthe National EducationSystem made it clearthat the “teaching[of] the Indonesianlanguage wastobe a core taskof the education system,bothas a meansto communicate the benefitsof integrationandasa wayof establishing control.”Consequently,the teachingof the Indonesianlanguageassumedthe highestpriorityinEast Timorese education,takingprecedence (indescendingorder) overeducationin administrative/clerical,academic,vocational andlocallyorientedcontent.Thiswasdemonstrated throughthe breakdownof textbooksprocured inclassroomsbetween1984 and 1989 which included161,560 textbooksonthe IndonesianLanguage,39,926 on Indonesiangovernmental and administrativesystems,andonly9,398 on natural historyand physics.60 While the emphasisgiven to instructioninBahasaIndonesiandidhave aprofoundeffectonthe numberof Timorese whowere able to speakthe language,the implicationsforlearningoutcomeswere broadlynegative.61 Thiswas due firstlytothe significantopportunitycoststhatwere incurredbyconstrainingthe resources available forteachingothercontent;secondly,because itmeantthatstudentswere being introducedtoformal educationinalanguage otherthantheirnative tongue;62 andthirdly,because this context, teaching children the skills thatwould enhance their prospects and enable them to fulfil their human potential was secondary.” See ‘Chega! Chapter 7.9, p.48. For the absence of local contentin East Timorese education see D. Odling-Smee, ‘Future Planning:Language and Education in EastTimor’, Darwin:East Timor International SupportCentre, 1998 cited in J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, 1999,p.94 58For EastTimorese perceptions of the education system M. Viegas,Tetun Literacy (un pub). Strategic Development Planningfor EastTimor Conference, Melbourne 5-9 April 1999,p.2 cited in J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, 1999,p.94 59From 1976 through to the mid 1990’s,Bahasa Indonesian was theonly languagespoken in Indonesian schools.However, in the later years of the occupation, Indonesian authorities permitted local languages to be taught for three hours a week. See, M. Viegas,Tetun Literacy (un pub). Strategic Development Planningfor East Timor Conference, Melbourne 5-9 April 1999 cited in J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p.93 60For the Act Respecting the National Education System and the breakdown of school books procured between 1984 and 1989 see ‘Chega!’, Chapter 7.9, pp.44-45 61The number of East Timorese ableto speak Bahasa Indonesian increased dramatically throughoutthe occupation becauseof the emphasis that was placed on teachingthe languagein the province’s formal education programs. For evidence see J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p.93. See also ‘Chega!’, Chapter 7.9, p.45 62Due to the great diversity of languages spoken in EastTimor duringthe occupation (In addition to Tetum, the Lingua Franka,there were 12 Austronesian and non-Austronesian languages encompassing35 dialects and sub-dialects),and the factthat 94% of the population did not speak Bahasa Indonesian athome (accordingto
24 it discouragedIndigenouscommitmenttoeducation byreinforcingnegativeperceptionsamong studentsandtheirparentsof the educationsystemasalien,irrelevant,andculturallyhostile.63 Education Outcomes In consequence of the poorqualityandirrelevance of educationthatwasprovided,the mostreliable evidence suggeststhatlearningoutcomesremainedpoorthroughoutthisperiod.One indicatorof thiswas the absence of significantimprovementinratesof functional literacyduringthe Indonesian occupationoverlevelswhichhadprevailedatthe endof Portuguese rule.Where the rate of functional literacyinthe province hadonlybeen7% inthe province in1974, accordingto the Jarkarta Post,ithad onlyreached8% by 1989 markinga 1% improvementover15 years.64 This picture of weakprogressduringthe first15 yearsof occupationisconfirmedbyJoneswhocontends that in1990, “illiteracyrateswere extremelyhigh,particularlyatagesover40 and amongwomen” withonlythe 15 to 24 yearsage groupshowinganilliteracyrate below 50per cent.65 However,the UN Truth and Reconciliationreportcitesevidence of a32% improvementacrossall demographicsin ratesof functional literacyoverthe followinghalf decade,withthe rate havingreached40% in 1995/96. 66 Despite amarkedincrease ineducationspendingduringthe fifthdevelopmentplan the 1990 census),the overwhelming majority of children were not introduced to the school environment in their mother tongue “contrary to what is recognised as optimal for learningachievements”. See J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, pp.92-93. 63This is suggested by Pedersen and Arneberg, who note that “the selection of an official languagehas more implications for the education system than for any other sector of the society” where “it is of high importance that the language is considered relevantby the population,sinceparent’s attitudes toward the school play a crucial rolein the educational achievement of a child.”See J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions in East Timor’, 1999, p.93. 64For the 7% rate of functional literacy in 1974 seeJohn G. Taylor, ‘East Timor: The Price of Freedom’, London and New York, 1999,p.34. For the 8% rate of functional literacy in 1989 seethe Jakarta Post, 5 August 1989 cited in J. Taylor, ‘East Timor: The Price of Freedom’, p.129. In comparison,Saldanhaplaced therate of functional literacy in EastTimor at 47.5% in 1990. See Table 5.47 Indicators of education and health per provincein Indonesia 1990 in J. Saldanha, ‘The Political Economy’, p.275. The discrepancy between these two estimates can likely be attributed to Saldanha’s relianceon data from the Indonesian government which had a vested interest in inflatingstatistics pertainingto aspects of social and economic development. Such distortions weremade in an effort to counteract negative perceptions of the occupation that were forming amongst members of the international community duringthe 1990’s precipitated by the increasingly frequentand well documented reports of violenceand other atrocities being committed by the Indonesian Military in EastTimor atthat time (e.g., the Santa Cruz massacreof 1991.) Pedersen and Arneberg concur that official Indonesian statisticson rates of functional literacy and numeracy were “severely inflated”. See J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p.84 65G. Jones, ‘Education and Health’, East Timor: Development Challenges, p.257 66 Rui Gomes, EastTimor's Socio-Economic Development under Indonesia:(1976-1998) ,[unpublishedPhD Thesis],South Bank University, London, 2002,p. 155 cited in ‘Chega!’, Chapter 7.9, p.43. Official Indonesian government statistics do lend some supportto Gome’s contention of a 40 per cent functional literacy rateduringthe mid-1990’s where it is claimed for instancethat 30,000 persons in East
25 (whichranfrom 1988/89 to 1992/93) over levelsseenduringthe fourthdevelopmentplan(between 1983/84 and1988/89), thislateststatisticlackscredibilitygiventhe previouslycitedtrendof a1% improvementover15 years.67 Evenif it were true thata 32% improvementacrossall demographics inrates of functional literacyhadbeenachievedinthe 6yearsfrom 1989/90 to 1995/96, East Timor wouldstill have hadthe worstrate of functional literacyamongstall Indonesianprovincesandall countriesinthe AsiaPacificregionduringthe mid-1990s.68 Whenan educationsystemfailstoprovide studentswiththe skillsandabilitiesnecessarytomaster subjects,passexamsandprogressintohighergrades,highratesof grade repetition canprovide furtherindicationof poorlearningoutcomes.However,becauseof anunwrittenpolicythatexisted inEast Timorduringthe 1970’s and80’s enablingstudentstomove onto the nextgrade irrespective of performance,statisticspertainingtoratesof grade repetitioninthe first15years of the occupationgive little insightintothe qualitiesof EastTimorese studentsandthe broadereducation systemduringthisperiod.Itwasonlyafterthe abolishmentof thispolicyinthe early1990’s, that it became possible tointerpretevidence of pooreducationqualityfromstatistical evidence demonstratinghighratesof grade repetition.69 Forexample,Indonesiangovernmentdatarevealed that where approximately21,000 pupilshadenteredprimaryschool in1990, only9,000 students graduatedsix yearslaterincludingrepeaterswhohadstartedpriorto1990. Thismeantthat less than 50% of school age children(aged7-18) were on track to complete their schoolingontime in 1996.70 Moreover,by1998, around 30 percent of primaryschool studentsinEast Timorwere more than twoyearsbehindscheduleproducinganage distributioncharacterisedbythe numberof pupils ingrade 1 beingfourtimesgreaterthan the numberof pupilsingrade 6. Inaddition,close to40% of seniorsecondaryschool studentswere more than2 yearsbehindscheduleinthatyear.71 Itis also Timor learned to read and write Indonesian in the scholastic year 1996/97.See Ministry of Education cited in J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’,p.87. However, “this seems likean unreasonably high figure even if itdoes includeschool children”.See J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p.87. 67See the section on expenditure in this chapter for comparativelevels of education expenditure in East Timor duringthe fourth and fifth development plans. 68 Rui Gomes, EastTimor's Socio-Economic Development under Indonesia:(1976-1998) ,[unpublishedPhD Thesis],South Bank University, London, 2002,p. 155 cited in ‘Chega!’, Chapter 7.9, p.43 69 The significanceof this data is reinforced by the fact that a high rate of failurein school exams was documented in East Timor duringthe late1990s.See OxfamGB, “Para o bem de Timor”, East Timor Human Resource Development Programme Research Report, London, 1999 cited in J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p.94. For the informal policy on gradeprogression duringthe 1980s and its abolition in the1990s,see J. Saldanha, ‘The Political Economy’, pp.245-246 70For data on repetition rates between 1990 and 1996,see Ministry of Education 1999, BPS 1996 and 1997, Provisional Government of East Timor 1996 cited in J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p.97 71 For the percentage of primary and secondary school students more than two years behind schedulein 1998 see SUSENAS, 1998 cited in J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p.97. For the
26 worthnotingthat the peculiarage structure inEast Timor’seducationsystemwaslikelytohave producededucational inefficienciesarisingfromtypicallyhigherratesof absenteeismthatare seen amongstoverage pupilswhose timemustincreasinglybe spentattendingtoworkresponsibilities. 72 Alongside highratesof grade repetition,itcanbe arguedthat low ratesof school completion provide furtherevidencethatlearningoutcomeswere poorduringthe Indonesianoccupationwhere achievingproficiencyinessential academicskills,suchasliteracyandnumeracy,requiresstudentsto complete agivenquantityof schoolingatdifferentgrade levels.73 Althoughthereare statistics showingmarkedincreasesinratesof school completionacrossthe primary,juniorsecondaryand seniorsecondarylevelsof educationinthe periodupto1991, itonce againneedstobe recognised that such statisticsare renderedmeaningless(withrespecttoanyqualitative analysisof learning outcomes) inlightof the policywhichexistedinEastTimorupto the early1990’s, enablingstudents to progressthroughthe systemirrespective of performance.74 Inspite of the aforementionedpolicy, it isneverthelessinterestingtonote thatdata fromthe Intercensal PopulationSurveyin1995 shows that of those whohad grownup entirelyunderIndonesianadministrationtothatpoint,lessthan half had completedprimaryeducationorprogressedfurther.75 Additionally,censusdatafrom1998 indicatesthat85 and 25 percent of the respective tertiaryandseniorsecondaryschool graduatesin East Timor at that time were notnatives of the province,andthat 7 per centof 15 to 19 year olds and 4 percentand 10 to 14 oldshadleftschool before completing the fourth grade.76 Inadditionto implyingpoorlearningoutcomes,itshouldbe emphasisedthatthese statistics(namelythose pertainingtocompletionratesinprimaryeducation) show thatEastTimor’seducationsystemwas relativenumbers of primary school agestudents in grades 1 and 6 in 1998 see J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p.86. Additional evidence confirmingthe high rate of the grade repetition in the East Timorese primary school systemin the late 90s is also found in the significantdisparity thatexisted between the province’s respective net primary enrolment ratio and gross primary enrolment ratio as well as the significantdifferencethat existed between Indonesia’s national netprimary enrolment ratio and East Timor’s net enrolment ratio atthe time. These findings were extrapolated from J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, pp.86-94. 72Kelly,1995 cited in J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p. 97 73It has been argued for instance,that four years of schoolingarenecessary for the acquisition and retention of functional literacy.See Mehrotra, 1998, pp.8 cited in J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p.97. 74 For statistical evidenceshowingabsoluteincreases in numbers of primary school,junior high school and senior secondary school graduates between 1976 and 1991,see Table5.34, Development of Elementary, Junior and Senior High Schools,EastTimor Schoolyear 1976/77-1990/91 in J.Saldanha, ‘ThePolitical Economy’, p.249 75For data from the 1995 Intercensal Population Survey,see Table 16.1 Educational Attainment of Population Aged 15-69 Living in Household with Head Born in East Timor, 1995 (%) in G. Jones, ‘Education and Health’, East Timor: Development Challenges, p.257 76For data on school completion rates in 1998 see SUSENAS 1998 cited in J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, pp.96-100
27 wastingvaluable resourcesduringthe latterpartof the occupationon the educationof students whowere leavingschool before acquiringeventhe mostbasicacademicskills. Accordingto Saldanha,the highunemploymentrate of graduatesfromthe East Timorese school systemduringthe early1990’s, providesfurtherevidenceof poorlearningoutcomeswhere graduatesof East Timorese schoolsanduniversitieswere notbeingequippedwithnecessaryskills and abilitiestocompete inthe domesticinthe domesticlabourmarket. 77 While there isample evidence fromthe lastdecade of the occupationdemonstratingabiasagainstgraduatesof the provincial school system infavourof those educatedelsewhere inskilledformal sector employment,78 itisdifficulttoattribute thisphenomenonexclusivelytothe poorqualityof the educationthatwasprovidedunderIndonesianrule.Otherfactorsneedtobe consideredincluding consciousdiscriminationagainstindigenousEastTimorese bymajoremployers(inparticular, Indonesianrunbusinessesandgovernmentdepartments)inthe broadercontextof acampaignof ethniccleansingandgenocide. Social and Economic Conditions Poorsocial and economicconditionsprevalentinEastTimorduringthe occupationincludingthe inter-relatedphenomenaof extreme violence andpoverty,poorcommunityhealth,andhigh unemployment,all hadnegative implicationsforeducationoutcomesduring thisperiod.Whilethere isno directevidence linkingEastTimor’sfailuresineducationduringthe occupationtoactsof violence carriedoutbythe Indonesianmilitary,there isindirectevidence suggestive of apositive 77For Saldanha’s argumentthat poor education quality was the primary factor in the inability EastTimorese educated graduates “to compete with graduates from outsidethe region when lookingfor jobs in East Timor”, see J. Saldanha, ‘The Political Economy’, pp.245-246. 78Evidence of bias in EastTimor’s labour market againstgraduates of the provincial school systemin favour of those educated elsewhere can be inferred from statisticsobtained duringthe late 1990’s showingthat rates of employment and underemployment were significantly higher for nativeTimorese than for Indonesian immigrants and that unemployment rates for EastTimorese were directly proportional to educational attainment. For unemployment and unemployment rates for nativeTimorese (Eas tor West) and immigrants for other parts of Indonesia in 1998, see Figure 6.10, Un-and underemployment among labour forcewith secondary and tertiary education in EastTimor by placeof origin,1998 in J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p. 101. For statisticssuggestinga positivecorrelation between educational attainment and unemployment rates among native EastTimorese in 1998,see Figure6.9 Percentage of the labour forcethat is un- or under-employed, 1998,East and West Timor compared in J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p. 100. Although figure 6.9 shows that unemployment and underemployment was significantly lower for tertiary graduates in comparison with vocational and academic senior secondary graduates,itshould be noted that an estimated 85 per cent of the tertiary graduates came from locations outsideof East Timor while only 25 per cent of persons with senior secondary education came from locations outsideof East Timor. See J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p. 100.
28 relationshipbetweenthese twooccurrencesthatlieswiththe disruptiontofamilystructuresthat the violence engendered.79 Here itshouldbe recognisedthatfamilydisruptionshadclearnegative implicationsforlearningoutcomesinEastTimorwhere itwas determinedinthe late 1990’s that childrenfromfemale headedhouseholdswere significantlylesslikelytoattendschool thanchildren frommale headedhouseholdscitingthe needfor boystotake up employmenttoprovide forthe familyinthe absence of a male provider.80 Crosscountryevidence alsosuggeststhatthe violence whichtookplace in East Timorduringthe occupationhad negative implicationsforitseducation performance.Accordingtothe EducationforAll Global MonitoringReport,in2011, grossenrolment ratios,primary school completionratesandratesof literacyamongstyoungpeople andadultswere all significantlylessindevelopingcountriesthathadrecentlybeenexposedtoarmedconflictthan developingcountriesthathadnot sufferedrecentexposure toarmedconflict.81 It can similarlybe reasonedthatthe extreme povertyandunderdevelopmentthatwasprevalentin East Timor duringoccupationhadnegative implicationsforlearningoutcomes.Symptomaticof povertyandunderdevelopmentinEastTimorwas low productivityinagriculture onwhichthe vast majorityof East Timorese familiesdepended.Thismeantthatsurplusfoodproductionwasoften unattainable thuslimitingthe abilityof familiestosendtheirchildrentoschool whowere forced insteadtoworkthe farmto meettheirmostbasicneedsof survival.82 Inadditiontodraggingdown ratesof school attendance andcompletion,the inabilityof familiestosendtheirchildrentoschool 79It should be noted that acts of violence includingarbitrary executions,disappearances and coerced population resettlement were deliberately aimed atthe destruction of kinship networks and tra ditional social structures which had been identified by the Indonesian military as pillarsof resistanceto the occupation.See J. Taylor,‘The Price of Freedom’, p. 136. For evidence of family disruption duringthe occupation,see the survey conducted by the International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims on 1027 people from 13 districts in EastTimor.The data indicates that 31 per cent of respondents had losta parent, 14 per cent had losta spouse, and that 22 per cent had become separated from their children in the courseof armed conflictduringthe late 1990’s.See J. Movdig, J. Pagaduan-Lopez, J. Rosenburg, ‘Torture and Trauma in PostConflictEast Timor’, The Lancet, November 18, 2000,p.1763 80Duringthe late 1990’s itwas found in East Timor that 30 per cent of boys aged 7 to 18 in the female-headed households had never attended school,compared to justabove 20 per cent of boys from male-headed ones. See J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, pp.94-95 81For cross country evidence on the relationship of armed conflictto education outcomes see the EFA Global MonitoringReport, ‘The Hidden Crisis: Armed Conflict and Education’, UNESCO, 2011,pp.132. Retrieved 27 March 2012 from http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0019/001907/190743e.pdf 82 In the late1990’s itwas found that 10% of children aged 10 and 11 years in East Timor were employed, mostly agriculture,and that half of them were combining work with schooling. Older children were found to be more commonly employed. Among those 12-14 years old,almost20 per cent were employed, and of 15 to 18 year olds almost40 per cent were employed. Conversely, fewer of the older children were ableto attend school.See J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p. 95
29 wouldhave impactednegativelyonlearningoutcomesbyreinforcingthe apathy of studentstoward education.83 Asa teamof IndonesianacademicswhovisitedEastTimorinthe late 1980’s observed: “…the poorsocio-economicsituationforcesparentstogive prioritytobasic needssothat theyneglectthe educationof theirchildren. Sometimesthe labourneedsof the familyappeartoleadparentstoencourage their childrentoworkrather thango to school and thiscreatesa lack of interest inschool.”84 It shouldalsobe notedthathighrates of povertyinEast Timor are also likelytohave impacted negativelyonlearningoutcomesbydeprivingstudentsof accesstobasic learningmaterialssuchas textbooksthat were unaffordable.Thisissupportedbythe findingthatpoorfamiliesinEastTimor duringthe occupationwere usingalmost theirentire outlayonuniformsandschool fees,while richerfamilieswereable tospendmore onbooksandequipment.85 It isinstructive thatthe poorhealthand nutritionof EastTimorese youthandchildrenduringthe occupationcontributedsignificantlytopoorlearningoutcomesgiventhe bodyof medical and empirical evidencewhichshowsthatpoorhealthandnutritionisbothdetrimental tocognitive developmentandprospectsforeducational attainment.86 Keyfindingshave included,forinstance, that malnutritionandmorbidityadverselyaffectratesof school completionandabsenteeism;that betternourishedchildrenscore more highlyontestsof arithmetic,verbal comprehensionandnon- verbal reasoning;andthatinfectiousdiseasessuchasmalariahave beenassociatedwithsignificantly reducedperformance intestsof sustainedattention.Inadditiontothis,goodhealthandadequate 83 Pedersen and Arneberg cite numerous statisticsfromEastTimor duringthe late 1990s which establish a directrelationship between attendance rates on one hand and poverty and underdevelopment on the other. For example, it was determined that only 70 per cent of children aged 7 to 18 years from families whosehead was employed in agriculturehad ever attended school,compared to 90 per cent of children of the same age group whose household head was not employed in agriculture.Furthermore, itwas determined that only 70 per cent of children between 7 and 18 years in the poorest households had ever attended school with the corresponding statisticbeing 96 per cent for the most well off. Moreover, children from poor families were being delayed in their education twice as often as their wealthier counterparts. See J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p.95-96. It is also interestingto note that from surveys conducted in East Timor duringthe 90’s, families cited economic factors as well as a shortageof interest and motivation as the primary reasons for their children either not startingschool,dropping out or quitting. See J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p.96 84See Mubyarto, Loekman Soetrisno, Hudiyanto,Edhie Djatmiko,Ita Setiawati, Agnes Mawarni, ‘East Timor: The Impact of Integration’, An Indonesian Socio-Anthropological Study,Northcote, 1991, p.40 85For the contention that high costs were poor families to usealmosttheir entire outla y on uniforms and school fees see J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p.89 86The poor health and nutrition of young people and children duringthe occupation is documented under the headingHealth Outcomes in Chapter 2, East Timor’s Health Care System, pp. 35-41
30 nutritionininfancyandearlychildhoodhave beenidentifiedascentral determinantsof long-run successineducation.87 ThissuggeststhatEast Timorese students,whogrew upduringthe occupationandwere ingood healthwhentheyattendedschool,mayhave beeninhibitedby illnessesandmalnutritionexperiencedearlierinlife.Consistentwiththese findingsandthe poor healthoutcomesthatwere documentedinEastTimorduringthe 1975 to 1999 period,are the first handobservationsof the IndonesianacademicswhovisitedEastTimorduringthe late 1980’s: “…becausehealthis being neglected there is a continuing decreasein the intakeof calories vitally needed by the body.Children becomeweakand listless and even their concentration isimpaired.They havedifficulty following their lessonsand cannotmakeprogressin their studies.” 88 It istherefore apparentthat the poorhealthof the East Timorese populationpreventedthemfrom acquiringthe benefitsfromeducationthatshouldhave beenexpected. It was previouslyarguedthatthe inabilityof EastTimor’sindigenouspopulationtogaineffective representationwithincountry’swage labourmarketreflectedtheirpoorskillsandlow education. However,the highunemploymentrate facedbythe East Timorese canalsobe interpretedasacause of the pooroutcomesthat were experiencedineducationasitprovidedasignificantdisincentive for East Timorese youthtoseekeducationinthe hope of furtheringtheiremploymentprospects.89 As Mubyarto etal explains;“studentsfeel like givingupwhentheycannotsee the connectionbetween the knowledge theyare receivingand theirprospectsforthe future.”90 Conclusion While itisapparentthat the Indonesiangovernmentmade significantinvestmentsinEastTimor’s educationsystemof increasingscale overtime andthatthese investmentsdidtranslateintoarapid expansionof the half-island’seducationatthe primary,secondaryandtertiaryeducationlevels,it was nonethelessthe case thatthe qualityof educationprovidedandthe learningoutcomesit engenderedwere poorthroughoutthe occupation.Thiswasindicatedbylow ratesof literacyand school completionaswell asbythe highratesof grade repetitionandpoorgraduate employability. 87For key findings and evidenceon the relationshipsbetween health, nutrition,cognitive development and educational performance,see Matthew C.H. Jukes, Lesley J. Drake and Donald A.P. Bundy, “School Health Nutrition and Education for All”, Centre for Agricultural Biosciences International,2008.Retrieved 13 March 2012 from http://bookshop.cabi.org/Uploads/Books/PDF/9781845933111/9781845933111.pdf 88See Mubyarto et al, ‘East Timor: The Impact of Integration’, p.40 89This interpretation was given in S. Sherlock, ‘Political Economy of the East Timor Conflict’, p. 837 90See Mubyarto et al, ‘East Timor: The Impact of Integration’, p.40
31 Althoughseveral featuresof the Indonesianruneducationsystemcanbe putforwardas explanationsforthese failuresincludingthe under-resourcingof institutions,the focusonskillsthat were incompatible withthe needsof vital economicsectorsandeverydaylife,andthe use of the educationsystemasan instrumentof social control,itshouldbe recognisedthatpoorsocial and economicconditionsprevalentinthe contextof anongoingoccupationandgenocide,alsohada devastatingeffectonlearningoutcomes.
32 Chapter 2 The Failure of Pembangunan in East Timor: East Timor’s Health Care System Under Indonesian Occupation and Genocide Introduction The developmentof EastTimor’shealthcare sectormirroredthat of the educationsystemduring the occupationand genocide. Throughitssubstantial investments,the Indonesianadministration presidedoveramarkedexpansionof EastTimor’shealthcare system.Nevertheless,itisapparent that inthisperiodhealthoutcomesexperiencedbythe populationwere abysmal.Thisfailure canbe attributedfirstly,toresource misallocationswithinahealthcare systemthatwas pervadedby corruption,mismanagementandexcessive redtape leavingitunable toprovide servicesof sufficient quantityandqualitytomeetthe needsof the population;secondly,tothe deliberate use of East Timor’shealthcare systemas an instrumentof social control evidencedmostnotoriouslybyitsbirth control programmes;andthirdly,tothe poor social andeconomicconditionsthatwere prevalentin the contextof an ongoingoccupationandgenocide. Investment in the Health Care System The significantandincreasinginvestmentsmade bythe IndonesiangovernmentinEastTimor’s healthcare sector duringthe first15 yearsof the occupation,suggeststhatitsdevelopmentwas clearlya priorityforthe occupyingpower.While the healthcare sectorwasonlyallocated650 millionRupiahthroughBudgetPost16 duringthe fourthdevelopmentplan(RepelitaIV 1983/84 – 1988/89), givingitthe joint9th greatestshare at 2.5 percent inBP-16 funds,Saldanhaarguesthatit receivedsignificant additional capital throughPresidentialInstructionprojectsbringingthe total quantityof capital allocatedtowardthe healthcare sectorduringRepelitaIV intoline withstated
33 priorities.91 Duringthe 1988/89 to 1992/1993 period,the healthcare sectorreceivedsubstantially more both inabsolute termsandrelative toothersectorsthroughthe developmentbudget(i.e., income andexpenditure budget) takingan11.7 per cent of share or 15.175 billionRupiahin allocatedfunds. Among19 competingeconomicsectors,thiswasthe thirdhighestallocationof fundsaffordedfromthe developmentbudgetduringRepelitaV.92 These investmentsledtoamarkedexpansioninEastTimor’shealthcare systemduringthe first15 yearsof occupationwhere the numbersof hospitals,clinics,doctors,nursesandmidwivesinEast Timorall “rose greatly”.93 Thisisillustratedbydataintable 2.1 below anda host of other sources. Where the Portuguese hadestablishedonlyone mainhospital(the DrCarvalhoHospital) toservice the territory’sentire population,table 2.1revealsthatby1990, the Indonesianshadestablishedan additional 9hospitalsaswell as230 healthcare centres.94 Thiscoincidedwithasignificantexpansion inthe contingentof medical personal workinginEastTimor. It is estimatedthatatthe endof Portuguese rule in1974 East Timorhad justoverone hundredmedical personnel andonly2 specialists,12 to 14 doctorsand around88 to 120 nurseswere employedinthe territory.95 In 91See J. Saldanha, ‘The Political Economy’, p.162 and Table4.4 Allocation of Special Budget Post 16 by sector duringthe Fourth Development Plan in J. Saldanha, ‘The Political Economy’, p.161 92For health’s sharein East Timor’s development budget between 1988/89 and 1992/93,see J. Saldanha, ‘The Political Economy’, p.167. For the sizeof East Timor’s development budget in the 1988/89 to 1992/93 period see Table4.6 Allocation Development Budget by Sector in Income and Expenditure Budget for East Timor 1998/1989-1992/93 (Rp.000,000) in Saldanha, ‘The Political Economy’, p. 166. 93Saldanha argues thatthe convergence of these factors resulted in a significantincreasein the volume of patients usingthe health caresystem although there is no statistical evidenceto supportthis claim.See J. Saldanha,‘The Political Economy’ p.247 94Bill Nicol,‘Timor: The Stillborn Nation’, Camberwell, 1978,p. 25 95For the number of medical specialists in EastTimor atthe end of Portuguese rule,see B. Nicol, ‘Timor: The Stillborn Nation’, p.25 For the number of doctors working in EastTimor at the end of Portuguese rule, see B. Nicol,‘Timor: The Stillborn Nation’, p.25; and CAVR interview with Sue Ingram,Dili,5 August 2004 cited in ‘Chega!’ Final Report
34 contrast,table 2.1 revealsthatby1990, East Timor hada contingentof 741 medical personnel, comprising144 doctors,490 nursesand 107 midwives.ThisgrowthinEastTimor’smedical workforce duringthe first15 years of occupationiscorroboratedby othersourceswhichshow,for instance,thatin1992, 190 doctorsand dentistsaswell as660 nursesand 200 midwiveswereinthe province,placingthe overallnumberof medical staff atwell inexcessof 1,000 for that year.96 While nodata are available onthe capital investmentsmade bythe IndonesiangovernmentinEast Timor’shealthcare systemduringthe lasttenyearsof the occupation,the continuedpatternof expansioninthe healthcare systemoverthisperiodsuggeststhattheywere significant.According to the World HealthOrganisation(WHO),the numberof medical personnel workinginEastTimor had increasedsubstantiallyduringthe 1990’s to include 38 dentists,156 general practitioners,1,144 nurses,9 to 12 medical specialistsand51 nutritionistsaswell as2,376 auxiliarypersonnel bythe end of the decade.97 Itshouldalsobe notedthatthe numberof midwiveshadreached442 by 1995 and that the constructionof 11 modernhospitalsindistrictcapitalsand60 healthcare centresinthe largervillageshadtakenplace between1990 and 1999.98 This leftthe territorywithanestimated67 clinics(healthcare centres),309sub clinicsandwhatshouldhave been21 districthospitalsatthe time of Indonesia’swithdrawal.99 of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor’, Chapter 7.9 Economic and Social Rights, October 2005,p.29 For the number of nurses workingin EastTimor at the end of Portuguese rule,see interview with Sue Ingram cited in ‘Chega!’, Chapter 7.9, p.29 96Gavin W. Jones, ‘Social Policy Issues in EastTimor:Education and Health’, in East Timor: Development Challenges for the World’s Newest Nation, eds. Hal Hill and Joao M. Saldanha,2001,p.267 97For World Health Organisation estimates on the number and types of medical personnel working in East Timor prior to Indonesia’s withdrawal in 1999,seeTable 5.9: Health Care Personnel in Jon Pedersen and Marie Arneberg (editors), ‘Social and Economic Conditions in East Timor’, International ConflictResolution Program School of International and Public Affairs,Columbia University,New York, 1999,p.88. There are competing estimates on the numbers and types of medical personnel workingin EastTimor during the late 1990’s.Accordingto the 1999 Joint assessmentmission,there were 160 doctors and 1,000 nurses in East Timor prior to the escalation of violencein the late 1990’s.See Joint Assessment Mission,EastTimor- Buildinga Nation,A Framework for Reconstruction and Development, November 1999,p.1 cited in ‘Chega!’, Chapter 7.9, pp. 31. In comparison,Povey and Mercer placed the number of doctors and nurses in East Timor at 398 and 1877 respectively in 1997.See George Povey and Mary Anne Mercer, ‘East Timor in Transition: Health and Health Care’, International Journal of Health Services: Planning, Administration, 32,2002, p.612. For the same year (1997),the Indonesian department of health claims thatthere were 7 medical specialists, 134 general practitioners,383 midwives,1,124 nurses,58 dental nurses and 30 dentists in Eas t Timor totalling 1736 personnel. See BPS 1998, Timor Timur dalamanka (EastTimor in Figures) cited in Table5.9: Health Care Personnel,J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p.88. 98For the number of midwives in East Timor in 1995 see Table5.9: Health CarePersonnel, J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p.81. For the construction of hospitals and clinicsduringthe1990’s,see G. Povey and M. Mercer, ‘East Timor in Transition’,p.612 99 If it is accepted that 11 hospitalswere constructed in the 1990’s and that 10 hospitalshad already been established by 1990,then 21 hospitalswould havebeen expected to existin the provinceat the time of
35 Furtherevidence of investmentinEastTimor’shealthsystemduringthe 1990’s can be discerned fromstatisticsshowingsignificantgrowthinspecifichealthprogrammes.Forexample,statistics fromthe IndonesianNational SocioEconomicHouseholdSurvey(SUSENAS) andSP2TPProvincial Program andDistrictHealthProfile,show anexpansionof EastTimor’simmunisationprogramme duringthe 1990’s. Accordingto SUSENAS,the rate of full immunisationcoveragefor childrenunder 5 yearsof age inEast Timorincreasedfrom49 per centin 1995 to 59 percent by1998 withdata fromSP2TP revealingthatthiscoincidedwithsuccessive decreasesinthe immunisationdrop-out rate overthree years,fallingfrom16.7per centin 1995 to 12.8 per centin1996 andthento 7.7 per centin 1997.100 ExpansionwasalsoevidentinEastTimor’sfamilyplanningprogramme duringthe 1990’s duringwhichtime the numberof dedicatedclinicsoperatedbythe familyplanningboard increasedfrom78 in 1990/91 to 113 in1997/98.101 Health Outcomes Mortality Rates in East Timor 1975-1999 In spite of the significantinvestmentsthatwere made bythe IndonesiangovernmentinEastTimor’s healthcare system,the healthoutcomesexperiencedbythe populationinthisperiodwereabysmal. Thiswas indicated,firstof all,throughEastTimor’sastronomicallyhighmortalityrate.Beginningthe occupationwitha populationof lessthan700,000,102 Fretilinandthe CatholicChurchcontendthat as many as 300,000 people mayhave losttheirlivestofactorsassociatedwiththe occupationand Indonesia’s withdrawal.However, all indicationssuggestthat there were no more than 10 operational hospitalsin EastTimor at the beginningof 1999 where Jones places the number at 10 whileMorris and the 1999 Joint Assessment Mission placethe number at 8. See G. Jones, ‘Education and Health’, p.267; Kelly Morris,‘Growing Pains of EastTimor: Health of an infantnation’, The Lancet, 357, London, 2001, p.873; Joint Assessment Mission, p.1 cited in ‘Chega!’, Chapter 7.9, p.31. For the number of clinics(community health centres) and sub clinics in EastTimor atthe end of the occupation,see Joint Assessment Mission,pp.1 cited in ‘Chega!’, Chapter 7.9, p.31. For the sake of comparison,Jones places the number of clinics(community health centres) and sub-clinicsoperatingin East Timor in 1999 at 70 and 250 respectively. See G. Jones, ‘Education and Health’, p.267 100For the SUSENAS data on the rates of immunisation coveragein 1995 and 1998, see ‘Chega!’, Chapter 7.9, pp. 29. For the ST2TP data on the vaccination drop-outrates in East Timor from 1995 to 1997,see J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p.78. 101See BPS 1998,p.105 cited in J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p.76 102East Timor’s population was projected to hit 689,055 in 1975 havingincreased by 3 per cent from 649,084 in 1973 to 668,771 in 1974.For EastTimor’s population in 1974 see, G.J. Aditjondro, In the Shaddow of Mt Ramelau, ‘The Impact of the Occupation of East Timor’, Leiden: INDOC cited in Table2.1 Total Population and Historical Development, J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, Social and Economic Conditions, pp.180. East Timor’s population in 1973 was calculated by takinga simpleaverage of three estimates for the population in that year which were given in Table2.1 Total Population and Historical Development, J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, Social and Economic Conditions, p.180.
36 genocide inthe interveningperiodthroughto1999.103 Amongthese factors,itis instructive thatthe poor healthof the populationwasveryimportant. Infact,the CommissionforTruthand Reconciliationdeterminedin2005 that only18 per centof conflict-relatedfatalitiesinthe 24 years from1975 to 1999 had resulteddirectlyfromactsof violence withchronichungerandillnessbeing responsible forthe remaining82 percent of fatalities.104 East Timor’shighoverall mortalityrate canalsobe analysedintermsof more specificindicators.In termsof childmortality,the evidence isdamning. Forinstance,Taylorcitesanaverage rate of 50 to 60 per centinthe periodfrom1980 to 1986, representingnoimprovementoverlevelswhich had prevailedunderPortuguese rule.105 While the TruthandReconciliationCommissionprovidesa substantiallylowerestimateof the childmortalityrate in1980 at 24 percent,it nevertheless acknowledgesthatevenafterfallingto15.7 percent in1996, the childmortalityrate wasstill higher than inany Indonesianprovince andforthatmatter “byany standard”.106 While itisdifficultto establishanycleartrendinthe rate of infantmortalityduringthe occupationasnumeroussources presentestimates thatvaryerraticallyovertime andappearto be inconsistentwitheachother(see table 2.2 below),itshouldneverthelessbe recognisedthatthese estimateswere highbythe standardsof developingcountriesintheirrespective years.The TruthandReconciliation Commissionnotedforexample,thatEastTimor’sinfantmortalityrate wasstill “more thantriple the Indonesianaverage in1996”.107 103For Fretilin’s estimateon the number of deaths caused by the occupation and genocide see Appendix 7 in Naldo Rei, ‘Resistance: A Childhood Fighting for East Timor’, St Lucia,2007,p.327. For the Catholic Church’s estimate see Irena Cristalis,‘East Timor: A Nation’s Bitter Dawn’, London and New York, 2009,pp.116. Peter Carey estimates that 308,000 EastTimorese died in consequence of the occupation and genocide between 1975 and 1981 suggestinga higher overall figurefor mortality duringthe occupation than those put forward by even Fretilin and the Catholic Church.See Peter Carey and Steve Cox, ‘Generations of Resistance: East Timor’, London and New York, 1995,p.34. 104See the United Nations Report for the Commission of Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) cited in N. Rei, ‘Resistance’, p.327 and I.Cristalis,‘EastTimor: A Nation’s Bitter Dawn’, p.116. 105For the average child mortality ratein the period spanningfrom 1980 to 1986 see John G. Taylor, ‘East Timor: The Price of Freedom’, London and New York, 1999, p.164. For the child mortality ratein the lastyears of Portuguese rule, see The World Health Statistics Annual,1973- 76, Vol.3, UN Publications,New York, 1976 cited in J. Taylor,‘East Timor: The Priceof Freedom’, p.18 106‘Chega!’, Chapter 7.9, p.29 107These investments appear even more impotent in lightof Pedersen and Arneberg’s assertion that reductions in infantand child mortality rates duringthe 1990’s owed more to the influx of healthier transmigrantfamiliesrather than to a general improvement in the health of the population.See J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg. ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p.63-64. For the comments of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission,see ‘Chega!’, Chapter 7.9, p. 29
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D5-Thesis

  • 1. 1 Cosimo Gunaratna 220035736 Faculty of Economics, Business and Public Policy ECON498: Honours Dissertation Supervisor: Dr Alfons van der Kraan Honours Co-ordinator: Dr Mahinda Siriwardana Due Date: 15/10/2012 Word Count: 19,426 excluding footnotes and bibliography
  • 2. 2 The Failure of Pembangunan in East Timor
  • 3. 3 Acknowledgements Thisthesiswouldnothave beenpossible withoutthe effortsof anumberof people whomIwould like tothank.My supervisor,DrAlfonsvanderKraan,forhisencouragement,guidance andsupport; the honourscoordinator, Dr MahindaSiriwardana,forthe understandingandefforthe hasshownin accommodatingmylongstandingbattle withRSI; myfriend, JasonBarr,for the invaluable research skillshe hassharedwithme; andlast of all my father,RohanGunaratna, forhissupportand efforts withproofreading.
  • 4. 4 Contents Cover Sheet………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 1 Title Page……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 2 Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 3 Contents ………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………. 4 Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 5 Chapter 1: East Timor’s Education System……………………………………………………………………… 15 Chapter 2: East Timor’s Health Care System……………………………………………………………………. 32 Chapter 3: East Timor’s Agriculture Sector………………………………………………………………………. 55 Conclusion……………………………………………….……………………………………………………………………… 80 Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 82
  • 5. 5 Introduction Pembangunan Duringits24 yearoccupationof East Timor from1975 to 1999, the Indonesiangovernment attemptedto“camouflage”itsgenocide of the indigenouspopulationandplunderof the half island’seconomicresourcesbehindwhatSteve Cox andPeterCareyhave describedasthe “showy conceitof development (pembangunan)”.1 AsCox andCareyhave suggested,the effortmade bythe Governmentof Indonesia(GOI) anditsministriestoextoll the virtuesof Indonesiandevelopment programmesinEast Timorwas a tactic employedtodisarmWesterncriticspre-emptingany “close…enquiry”thatcouldforce itsmajorsponsors(includingthe UnitedStates,Britainand Australia) towithdrawtheirsupportforthe occupationorevensevertieswiththe Soehartoregime.2 Thispublicrelationseffortwasbestexemplifiedbythe GOI’spublicationof tworevisionistbooks, ‘EastTimor After Integration’ and‘TheProvinceof East Timor’,whichwere bothdedicatedto provingthatthe livesof the EastTimorese hadimprovedimmeasurablyasa resultof integration withIndonesiathroughthe developmentprogrammesithadinitiated.3 1Steve Cox and Peter Carey, ‘Generations of Resistance: East Timor’, London, 1995,p.45 2Ibid, p. 45. For analyses of western complicity in and sponsorship of the occupation atvarious stages between 1975 and 1999, see for example John G. Taylor, ‘East Timor: The Price of Freedom’, London and New York, 1999 pp. xxxii-xxxv,120-123,168-182;S.Cox and P. Carey, ‘Generations of Resistance’, pp. 7-11,17-20,24-25, 29-30,43-44, 52 Matthew Jardine, ‘East Timor: Genocide in Paradise’, Tucson AZ, 1995,pp.7-15,36-50, 71; Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, ‘The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism’, The Political Economy of Human Rights, (1), Cambridge MA, 1979,pp. 130-203;Jill Jolliffe, ‘East Timor: Nationalism and Colonialism’, St Lucia,1978,pp. 4, 86,231, 248, 251,255, 295; James Dunn, ‘Timor: A People Betrayed’, Milton Qld,1983, pp. 141-164,343-384 3The Indonesian government’s consciousnessof international opinion in regards to the occupation was reflected in both publications.Here, it is noteworthy that ‘East Timor After Integration’ was published by the Department of Foreign Affairs despitethe author’s “objection to the inclusion of the question of EastTimor and its discussion in any international forum” and any “interference in matters fallingwithin the domestic jurisdiction of Indonesia”.See ‘East Timor After Integration 2nd ed.’, Department of Foreign Affairs,Republic of Indonesia,March 1984,p.84. Furthermore, in the firstchapter of ‘The Province of East Timor’, a stinging rebuke is given to the repeated “ad nauseum…fantastic accusationsand unfounded allegationsrelati ngto East Timor” by members of the IV Committee of the General Assembly. See ‘The Province of East Timor: Development in Progress’, Department of Information,Republic of Indonesia,p. 9. For a brief overview of both publications,seeM. Scott Selders, ‘Development and its Discontents: The Indonesian Government, Indonesian Opposition and the Occupation of EastTimor’, IAGS 9th Biennial Conference Buenos Aires,July 2011,p.3. Retrieved 3 Oct 2012 from http://www.genocidescholars.org/sites/default/files/document%09%5Bcurrent- page%3A1%5D/documents/IAGS%202011%20SCOTT%20Selders.pdf
  • 6. 6 Spending Thisdevelopmentrhetoricwasreflectedingovernmentspendingdatawhichshowsthatmore capital was extendedtowarddevelopmentprojectsinEastTimorthanseveral otherprovinces throughoutthe entire occupationera:Overthe 20 yearperiodfrom1974/75 to 1993/94 East Timor was allocatedmore thanRp.1.29 trillionindevelopmentcapital fromthe central governmentin Jakarta where incontrast,East NusaTenggara,West NusaTenggara,and WestPapua were each grantedlessdevelopmentcapital intotal overagreaterlengthof time.Between1969/70 and 1993/94 theirrespectiveallocationsfromthe central governmentwere Rp.857.8, 620.73 and 912.259 billion.4 Moreover,Indonesiangovernmentdatarevealsthatasignificantpercentage of the developmentcapital allocatedtowardEastTimorduringthe occupationerawentdirectlytoward projectsinthree areas(vis.,education,healthandagriculture)thatare the focusof thisstudyon account of theirwidelyrecognisedimportance forlongtermsocial andeconomicdevelopment. East Timor’sallocateddevelopmentcapital wasdistributedtowarddevelopmentprojectsinhealth, educationandagriculture throughmultiple avenueswhichwere all controlleddirectlybythe central governmentinJakartaincluding“Presidential instructionProjects”(P.I.P.’s),and“routine”and “sectoral”spendingunderthe umbrellaof the “Income andExpenditureBudget” (or“development budget”) .5 Developmentcapital wasalsoallocatedtoEastTimorthrough BudgetPost16 (BP-16) between1979 and 1988 before itwasabolishedasaseparate entityandabsorbedintothe Income and ExpenditureBudget.6 While P.I.capital wasfocusedspecificallyonrural development(i.e. agriculture),education(specificallyelementaryschools)andhealthcare,7 capital spendingthrough BP-16 and the Income and ExpenditureBudgetcentredmore onphysical infrastructure andthe 4For all spendingdata cited on EastTimor, EastNusa Tenggara, West Nusa Tenggara, and West Papua between 1969 and 1994, see Rui Gomes, East Timor’s Socio Economic Development under Indonesia:(1976-1998),Phd Thesis,London South Bank University,2002, p.18 cited in Table 1, Allocation of Funds in Five Year Development Plans (Repelita) for East Timor and Selected Provinces 1969/70-93/94 (Rp b),‘Chega! Final Report of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor’, United Nations Transitional Administration in EastTimor (UNTAET), Chapter 7.9 Economic and Social Rights,October 2005,p. 8 5See Joao Mariano de Sousa Saldanha, ‘ThePolitical Economy of East Timor Development’, Jakarta,1994, p. 154. Also refer to Table 4.3 Income and Expenditures Budget for the region of EastTimor 1976/1977 – 1992/1993 (Rp 000,000),p.160 6J. Saldanha,‘ThePolitical Economy’, p. 160,175 7Ibid., p.159
  • 7. 7 civilianbureaucracy.8 Nevertheless,itshouldbe recognisedthatduringthe 1983 to 1993 period, education,healthandagriculture all rankedhighlyamongmultiple competingsectorsbothinterms of theirrelative andabsolutesharesinall capital allocatedthroughBP-16andthe Income and Expenditure Budget.9 Evidence of Investment There isevidence tosuggestthatthisinvestmentspendingdidproduce factsonthe ground inEast Timorgiventhe expansionineducation,healthandagricultural extensionserviceswhichtookplace. Thisexpansionwasdemonstratedbyimprovementstovarious quantitative andqualitative input measuresacrossall sectors.Ineducation,forexample,thisincludedthe openingof new institutions, increasesinstudentparticipationandthe employmentof more teachersacrossthe primary, secondaryandtertiarylevels.Inhealth,thiswasmarkedbythe extensionof vaccinationcoverage, the openingof additional hospitalsandclinics,andthe employmentof more doctors,nursesand midwives.Meanwhileinagriculture, the territory’sfishingfleetwasexpanded,livecattle imports were commenced,outlaysof mechanisedequipmentwere increasedandwetrice fieldsreceived additional supportthroughthe constructionof simple irrigationnetworksandthe rehabilitationof emergencyirrigationchannels.Furthermore,the GOImade attemptstointroduce more efficient agricultural practicesreferredtoas“techniquesof massguidance”. Outcomes While thisexpansioninserviceswouldappeartolendthe GOI’sdevelopmenteffortssomedegreeof substance,the historical record stronglysuggeststhatfew,if anytangible benefitswerederivedby the indigenouspopulationasa result.Thisiswhere the rhetoricandrealityof pembangunanbegan to separate.Ineducation,scantprogresswasmade inimprovinglearningoutcomeswithindicators pertainingtoratesof literacy,numeracy,grade repetition,schoolcompletionandgraduate employabilityremainingpoorthroughoutthe 24year occupation.The healthcare systemalsofailed to deliverpositiveoutcomesforthe populationwithextremelyhighinfant,childandoverall 8Refer to Table4.4 Allocation of Special Budget Post(16) by Sector duringthe Fourth Development Plan (Rp 000,000) in J. Saldanha, ‘ThePolitical Economy’, p.161 and Table 4.6. Allocation of Development Budget by sector in Income and Expenditure Budget for EastTimor 1988/1989-1992/1993 in J.Saldanha, ‘ThePolitical Economy’, p. 166 9This will beshown in the chapters of this thesis.
  • 8. 8 mortalityrates.Similarly,infectiousdiseasesincludingTBand malariawere endemic,lifeexpectancy remainedshort,malnutritionwaswidespreadanddeepreservoirsof mental illnesspervadedthe country. In agriculture,pooroutcomeswere highlighted moststrikingly overthe course of the occupation bythe staticstructure of the East Timorese economywhichwascharacterisedbythe dominantcontributionof agriculturetoemploymentanditscomparativelyweakcontributionto GDP. Thisresultedinsevere andpervasive poverty,andadistinctlackof progressinthe developmentof secondaryindustriesapartfromthose whichhadbeenthe targetof Indonesian largessonaccount of political andsecurityconsiderations. For the vast majorityof the East Timorese population,life underoccupationmeantbeingdeprivedof access to effective healthand educationserviceswhileekingoutameagre existence insubsistence agriculture orbeingusedasvirtual slavesoncommercial plantationssothatIndonesianbureaucrats, militaryofficersandbusinessmencouldprofithandsomelyfromthe “unsustainableanddestructive extractionof [the territory’s] natural resources”.10 Resource Misallocations stemming from Corruption, Waste and Mismanagement Ultimatelyahostof factorswere responsible forcollectivelyunderminingIndonesia’sinvestmentsin education,healthandagriculture.The firstsetrelatestoresource misallocations(i.e.,the waste of resources) stemmingfrommismanagementandcorruptioninthe deliveryof education,healthand agricultural extensionprogrammes. Mismanagementwashighlightedforexample,inthe education and healthcare systems,bythe over-ridingemphasisplacedon“bricksandmortar” expansion of facilitieswhichleftinstitutions,viz.,schoolsandhospitals,under-resourced.Furthermore little attentionwasgiventothe qualityandrelevance of the servicesprovided.Inthe case of the secondaryeducationcurriculumforinstance,the developmentof vocational andtechnical skills applicable toagriculture were neglectedwhilethe developmentof clerical andadministrative skills were heavilyemphasised.Thiscame about despite agriculture beingthe dominantsectorof employmentonwhich the vastmajorityof studentsfromthe indigenouspopulationwouldgoonto dependfortheirlivelihoodsandsurvival.Incontrast,positionsinthe civilianbureaucracywere relativelyscarce andmainlyheldbyexpatriatesfromJavaandotherIndonesianprovinces.11 10For the quote, see ‘Chega!’, Chapter 7.9, p. 3. 11For elaborations and supportingevidence,see Chapter 1, The Failureof Pembangunan in Ea stTimor: East Timor’s Education System Under Indonesian Occupation,p.19-21
  • 9. 9 By outliningthe cloudedarrangementsmade betweenthe governmentagenciesmostdirectly responsible forprojectimplementationandthirdpartiesincludingsubcontractors,Saldanha sheds lightonthe corruptionthatfrequentlyaccompaniedthe deliveryof developmentprogrammes.He contendsthatit wascommon practice forprojectleaderstotake a significantcutfromproject finance forthemselvesandforsub-contractorstoabandon theirworkafterreceivinganadvance of up to 40 to 50% of the project’scapital. 12 Underfalse pretences,the subcontractorswouldoften cite excusesfornotbeingable tocomplete the projectandthenuse the fundstoindulge themselves withconsumergoodsincludingvideorecorders,refrigeratorsandaudiotapes.13 Inthe bodyof this thesismore exampleswill be givenof corruptionandmismanagementinthe deliveryof education, healthandagricultural extensionprogramsandexplanationswill be givenforhow theyundermined boththe quantityandqualityof servicesprovided. Use of Development Programs as Instruments of Plunder and Social Control The secondsetof factors responsible forthe pooroutcomesengenderedbydevelopment programmesrelates totheirunstatedfunctions,viz.,theiruse asinstrumentsof plunderandsocial control.The use of developmentprogrammesforthe purpose of social control wasmostnotoriously exemplifiedbythe coercive birthcontrol programme carriedoutthroughthe healthcare system, whichincludedaccusationsof systematicsterilisationof EastTimorese women.14 Thisemphasison social control wasalso reflectedinseveral featuresof the GOIruneducationsystemincludingthe hegemonicuse of BahasaIndonesianas the language of instructioninclassroomsandtextbooksand the indoctrinationof primaryandsecondarystudentsinthe ideologyof Pancasila.Inagriculture,the GOI’sfocus oninternal securityandthe plunderof EastTimor’snatural resourceswere best illustratedthroughitseffortstodevelopthe commercial plantationsectorandpopulation resettlementpolicieswhichformedpartof a widerprogramof economicandsocial restructuring. Usingdevelopmentprogrammestoserve the interestsof social control andinternal securityhad several negativeconsequencesfor outcomesineducation,healthandagriculture.One wasthe disaffectionandmistrustthat wasinstilled inthe indigenouspopulation.Thisbroadlydiscouraged theirparticipationandengagementwithgovernmentprogrammes,andmeantthatmanyof the 12Joao Mariano deSousa Saldanha, ‘The Political Economy of East Timor Development’, Jakarta,1994, p.165 13Ibid., p.165 14For a listof sources in which this allegation has been made allegation,seefootnote 148 in Chapter 2, The Failureof Pembangunan in East Timor: EastTimor’s Health System Under Indonesian Occupation,p.46
  • 10. 10 benefitsthatcouldhave beenderivedfromconsuminghealth,education,andagricultural extension serviceswere notrealised.Thiswasdemonstratedinrelationtothe healthcare systemforinstance, by the large numberof birthsinthe territorynotattendedbymedical professionalsonaccountof thembeingdistrustedbythe manyEastTimorese womenwhowere fearful of the birthcontrol programme.15 Anotheradverse consequenceof usingdevelopmentprogrammesforpurposesof social control and the plunderof natural resourceswasthe diversionincapital thisnecessitatedfromsociallybeneficial activities.Forexample,these opportunitycostscanbe illustratedusingthe example of the coercive birthcontrol programme.Thisprogramme placeda significantdrainoncapital fromfrontline health care serviceswhichmeantthatthe population’smostpressingneeds,whichincludedthe treatment and preventionof infectiousdiseasessuchasTB and malariathat were leadingcausesof deathand illnessinthe territory,couldnotbe adequatelyaddressed. Social and Economic Conditions in East Timor A thirdsetof factorswhichcontributedtothe failure of the GOI’sdevelopmentprogrammesto deliverbenefitsforthe populationrelatedtothe prevailingsocial andeconomicconditions. Foremostamongthemwasthe extreme violence thatmarkedthe 24 yearsof Indonesian occupation.16 Amongthe litanyof atrocitiescommittedbythe Indonesianmilitaryanditsproxies againstresistance members,suspectedsympathisersandmembersof the widerpopulationwere unlawful killings,enforceddisappearances,the use of torture andarbitrarydetention,andactsof sexual violence.17 Meanwhile collectivepunishmentwasinflictedonthe indigenouspopulationby mass conscriptionsinmilitaryoperations,resettlementprogrammesandwholesaleslaughter 15For elaborations and supportingevidenceon EastTimorese women’s distrustof the health caresystem and avoidanceof medical professionals,seeChapter 2, EastTimor’s Health CareSystem, p. 48 16In ‘Chega!’, the UN has carefully documented the various acts of violencethat occurred in EastTimor during the 24 year occupation.A cursory analysisof this report reveals that whileatrocities were committed by both sides (viz.,the Indonesian military and its proxies on one, the Falintil/CNRresistanceon the other), it was the extraordinary scaleand cruelty of the violenceof committed by the Indonesian military thatultimately inflicted harmon the civilian population as was intended. 17 For unlawful killings and enforced disappearances carried outby Indonesian security forces and their proxies againstresistancemembers and suspected sympathisers as well as randommembers of the wider population, see ‘Chega!’, Chapter 7.2 Unlawful killings and enforced disappearances.For the arbitrary detention and torture of resistancemembers, suspected sympathisers and randommembers of the population by Indonesian security forces and their proxies see ‘Chega!’, Chapter 7.4 Arbitrary detention, torture and ill-treatment. For acts of sexual violenceperpetrated by Indonesian security forces and other institutions against resistance members and suspected sympathisers as well as randommembers of the wider population includingchildren, detainees and pregnant women, see ‘Chega!’, Chapter 7.7 Sexual violence, 2005.
  • 11. 11 includingseveral notoriousmassacres.18 Actsof violence were alsocarriedoutthatcontributedto famine andsickness.Theyincludedthe impositionof restrictionsonsubsistence farming,effective bans onthe performancesof ritualsandceremoniesassociatedwithtraditional agricultural practices,the deliberatepoisoningof watersupplies,andthe targetingof cropsandlivestockin aerial bombardmentsinvolvingthe use of chemical weapons.19 While the CommissionforTruthand Reconciliationdeterminedthatactsof violence were directlyresponsible foronly18 percentof the 102,800 conflict-relatedfatalitiesitestimatedinthe 24 yearoccupationperiod;itisevidentthat violence playedasignificantpartinthe remaining82 percent of conflict-relatedfatalitiesthatwere variouslyattributedtochronichungerandillness.20 One socioeconomicconditionwhichshouldbe highlightedasacontributingfactorto East Timor’s failuresineducationandhealthwasthe severityandpervasivenessof povertyinthe province.The severityof povertywas reflectedinthe coincidence of low average percapitaincomes(i.e.,GDPper capita) on the one hand,21 and highlevelsof personal andspatial incomeinequalityonthe other.22 18 Coercion was used by the Indonesian military to mobilisemasses of civiliansin military campaignssuch as Operasi Kikis (the final cleansing of 1981-192) in which at least80,000 men and boys participated in the encirclement of Fretilin defensive positions.Conscriptions of this scalehad a devastatingeffect on the population.Many of those who were conscripted in Operasi Kikis died of starvation or returned in a severely weakened state havingbeen given meagre rations and prevented from taking supplies with them. Furthermore, severe episodes of faminewere induced amongst the wider population by cripplingagricultural production through the associated loss of farmlabour.See J. Taylor, ‘The Price of Freedom’, pp.117-120 Details on the GOI’s forced resettlement program will begiven under the subsection heading‘Resettlement Policies’in Chapter 3,‘The Failureof Pembangunan in East Timor: East Timor’s AgricultureSector and Rural Economy Under Indonesian Occupation and Genocide’,pp.76-80. Notorious examples of massacres includethe Kraras villagemassacrein 1983 where “nearly all the village’s inhabitants –between 200 and 300 people - were murdered” in a “terrible actof revenge” committed by the Indonesian military in responseto the defection of a hansip unitthat had been stationed there. See S. Cox and P. Carey, ‘Generations of Resistance’, p. 31. See also J. Taylor, ‘The Price of Freedom’, p.102. Another example was the Santa Cruz massacreon the 12th of November 1991 which gained widespread publicity in the international media.Details of this massacrehavebeen corroborated by multiplesources.See for example, J. Taylor,‘The Priceof Freedom’, pp.xii-xv;S. Cox and P. Carey, ‘Generations of Resistance’,pp. 48-52;M. Jardine,‘Genocide in Paradise’,p.15-16 ; ‘Chega!’, Chapter 3: History of the Conflict,pp. 115-117 19For restrictions on subsistencefarmingand the performances of ritualsand ceremonies associated with traditional agricultural practices,seeunder the subsection heading‘Resettlement Policies’in Chapter 3, East Timor’s Agriculture Sector, p. 78. The deliberate poisoningof water supplies can beinferred from Cox and Carey’s statement that “many wells [were] poisoned…by the Indonesians”.See S. Cox and P. Carey, ‘Generations of Resistance’, p.34. For the deliberate use of chemical weapons to destroy crops and livestock, see J. Taylor,The Price of Freedom’, p. 85 20‘Chega!’, Chapter 6: The Profileof Human Rights Violations in Timor-Leste, 1974-1999,p. 3 21Several statisticsindicatethatper capita incomes remained low in EastTimor duringthe occupation.For example, in the 1983 to 1986 period, GDP per capita in EastTimor only approximated 38.3 per cent of Indonesia’s national averagemakingitthe country’s second poorest provinces comingin ahead of only Nusa Tenggara Timur. See Table5, Comparative Economic Indicators:EastTimor and Indonesia, ‘Chega!’, Chapter 7.9, pp. 10-11. In 1996 East Timor had a GDP per capita of Rp.998,000; the second lowest GDP per capita among 27 Indonesian provinces.See Table4: Per Capita Gross Regional Productby Province(1996),in ‘The Indonesian Context: Economic and Social Disadvantage of Remote Island Communities’, The United Nations Social
  • 12. 12 Meanwhile,the pervasivenessof povertyinEastTimorwasreflectedinstatisticsfromthe mid- 1990’s whichshowthat East Timor’spovertyrate was appreciablyhigherthaninanyother Indonesianprovince.In1993 forexample,EastTimor’spovertyrate (referringtothe percentage of the populationlivingbelowthe official poverty line) was36.2%,the nexthighestbeingKalimantan Barat’s at 25.05%.23 By 1996 East Timor hadthe highestpovertyrate of Indonesia’s27provincesat 31.2%, withthe nexthighestpovertybeingWestKalimantan’sat21.98%.24 While contributingtothe pooroutcomesthatwere experiencedinagricultural developmentover the course of the occupation,the prevalence of extreme povertywasalsosymptomaticof inhibited agricultural development.Here,agricultural production,whichwasconcentratedinrural areasand employedthe vastmajorityof EastTimor’sworkforce,contributedrelativelylittle toGDPoverthe course of the occupation.Incomparison, othersectorssuchas the civilianbureaucracythatwere basedinurban areaslike Dili andemployedrelatively few personnel,contributeddisproportionately Commission for Asia and the Pacific,p.12.Retrieved 7 Oct 2012 from http://www.unescap.org/ttdw/publications/tfs_pubs/pub_2017/pub_2017_ch2.pdf 22Several statisticshighlightthe presence of marked personal incomedisparities in EastTimor duringthe occupation era.For example, in 1993 EastTimor produced an inequality index scoreor Gini coefficient(where 0 = min inequality,1 = max inequality:scores vary between 0 and 1 ) of 0.339,the second highest of five Eastern Indonesian provinces which also included WestNusa Tenggara Timor, East Nusa Tenggara Timor, Malaku and Irian Jaya (WestPapua).Their respective scores in 1993 were 0.274,0.254, 0.3 and 0.37. By 1996 East Timor’s inequality index had increased to 0.363,remainingthe second highestamong the five Eastern Indonesian provinces;the indexes of West Nusa Tenggara Timor, East Nusa Tenggara Timor, Malaku and Irian Jaya (West Papua) havingrisen respectively to 0.286, 0.296, 0.269 and 0.386. See Table15.3, Gini Coefficient of Per Capita Consumption Expenditure, 1993 and 1996a, in Anne Booth, ‘Poverty, Equity and Livingstandards in East Timor’, in Hal Hill and Joao M. Saldanha (eds), ‘East Timor: Development Challenges for the World’s Newest nation’, Singapore, 2001,p. 244. Saldanha notes that personal incomeinequality in EastTimor had been even more severe duringthe late1980’s before narrowingduringthe 1990’s.In 1986,the gini ratio had been 0.43 and dropped to 0.346 in 1990.See J. Saldanha, ‘The Political Economy’, p. 197 Similarly,several statisticsareavailableto highlightthe presence of marked spatial incomedisparitiesin East Timor duringthe occupation.This includes thediscrepancies thatwere observed in rural and urban poverty rates in both the years 1993 and 1996.In the former year, East Timor’s urban poverty and rural poverty rates were 20.78% and 37.74% respectively.At 16.96%, this was the greatest disparity in urban and rural poverty rates seen for any Indonesian provincein 1993.In the latter year, EastTimor’s urban poverty and rural poverty rates were 13.6% and 33.08% respectively. At 19.43%, this was similarly the greatest disparity in urban and rural poverty rates seen for any Indonesian provincein 1996.For the difference in urban and rural poverty rates in East Timor in 1993,see Columns ‘(2)’ and ‘(4)’, Row ‘54. Timor Timur’ in Table 4. Poverty Incidenceby Province,1993-1996 (%) in ‘Poverty Measurement: the Case of Indonesia’, The United Nations Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific,p.12.Retrieved 7 Oct 2012 from http://www.unescap.org/stat/meet/povstat/pov7_ido.pdf. For the difference in urban and rural poverty rates in East Timor in 1996,see Columns ‘(3)’ and ‘(5)’, Row ‘54. Timor Timur’ in Table 4. Poverty Incidenceby Province,1993-1996 (%) in ‘Poverty Measurement’, p. 12. 23For EastTimor’s poverty rate in 1993,and other selected provinces see Table15.1, Populati on Below the Official Poverty Line, 1993 and 1996,A. Booth, ‘Poverty, Equity and Livingstandards’,p.242;For EastTimor’s poverty rate in 1993 and all other Indonesian provinces,seeColumn (6) Urban + Rural 1993,Row 54. Timor Timur in Table 4. Poverty Incidenceby Province,1993-1996 (%) in ‘Poverty Measurement’, p. 12. 24See Table 4: Per Capita Gross Regional Productby Province(1996), in ‘The Indonesian Context’, p.12.
  • 13. 13 to GDP.25 Thishighlightsthe interactioneffectsthatoccurredbetweenthe social andeconomic conditionsthathave beenoutlined(viz.,violence andpoverty)andthe pooroutcomesthatwere experiencedineducation,healthandagriculture.Forexample,itisevidentthatviolence underminedagricultural developmentandindoingsocontributedtothe poor outcomesthatwere experiencedinhealthandeducation.Similarly,itcanbe reasonedthatthe poor outcomes documentedinhealthandeducation,producedbyviolence andthe failuresthathave beenoutlined inhealthand educationprogrammes,contributedsignificantlytothe inhibitionof agricultural development. These interactioneffectswerealsonotedbythe UN CommissionforReception,Truthand ReconciliationinEastTimor: “Among theside-effectsof extremeviolations, [including] tortureand forced recruitmentwere ill-health and the disruption of education.Theskewed economicdevelopmentpromoted by theIndonesian authoritiescreated a self-perpetuating cyclein which poverty,on theone hand,and poorhealth and low educationalachievement,on the other,fed on each other.”26 Thus,rather thanviewingthe presence of adversesocial andeconomicconditionsasmitigating factors inthe poor outcomesengenderedbyhealth,educationandagricultural extension programmes,theyshouldbe viewedinsteadaspartof a widersystematicfailure bythe Indonesian government.This wasthe failure toview development holisticallyinwhichthe outcomes experiencedinanyone andall areasof development(includingviolence,poverty,andoutcomesin education,healthandagriculture),wereinter-dependent.However,giventhatdevelopment programmeswere intendedtoprovide Westernsponsorswitharationale forcontinuingtheir supportof the occupationandservedIndonesia’smore nefariouspurposesof pillage,social control and genocide,the failure of pembangunantodeliverpositiveoutcomesforEastTimor’sindigenous populationseemsperfectlyunderstandable. 25For data on the contribution of agricultureto GDP, see footnote 206 in Chapter 3, East Timor’s Agriculture Sector, p. 60 For data on agriculture’s employment share,see footnote 205 in Chapter 3, East Timor’s AgricultureSector, p. 60 For data on the contribution of the administrativesector (civilian bureaucracy) to GDP, see footnote 208 in Chapter 3, East Timor’s Agriculture Sector, pp.60-61 For data on the administrativesector’s employment share,see footnote 52 in Chapter 1, East Timor’s Education System, p. 21 26‘Chega!’, Chapter 7.9, p. 48
  • 14. 14
  • 15. 15 Chapter 1 The Failure of Pembangunan in East Timor: East Timor’s Education System Under Indonesian Occupation Introduction Duringthe periodinwhichitoccupiedEast Timor,the Indonesiangovernmentmade substantial investmentsinthe half island'seducationsystem.Whilethese investmentsdidtranslate intoarapid expansionof the educationsystem(reflectedthroughthe openingof new institutions,increasesin studentparticipationatall levelsof educationandthe employmentof more teachers),resources were broadlymisallocatedwithinsufficientemphasisplacedonthe qualityandrelevance of the educationprovided.Thiswashighlightedthroughseveralaspectsof the educationsystemincluding the under-resourcingof servicesandfacilitiesandthe emphasisplaced onthe developmentof academicskillsthatwere irrelevanttothe needsof vital economicsectorsandeverydaylife. Furthermore,several aspectsof the education systemsuggestthatitsprimaryfunctionwastoserve as an instrumentof social control ratherthanas an avenue forimpartingessential knowledgeand individualheuristics. Consequently,scantprogresswasmade inimprovinglearningoutcomesduring the occupationwithindicatorspertainingtoratesof literacy,numeracy,grade repetition,school completionandgraduate employabilityremainingpoor. Itshouldalsobe notedthatthere were several factorsrelatedtothe poorsocial and economicconditions prevalentinEastTimorduring occupationandgenocide thathad negative implicationsforlearningoutcomes.
  • 16. 16 Expenditure Throughoutthe perioditoccupiedEastTimor,Indonesiamade substantialinvestmentsinthe half island’seducationsystemof increasingscale overtime.Inthe periodspanningfromthe fiscal year 1982/83 to the fiscal year1988/89, East Timor’seducationsectorwasallocatedatotal 3.3 billion Rupiahindevelopmentcapital bythe Indonesiangovernment.27 ThiscoincidedwithIndonesia's fourthdevelopmentplan(RepelitaIV) whichranfrom1984/1985 to 1988/89 inwhichthe developmentof the East Timor’seducationsystemwasclearlyapriority,receivinga3.8 percent share in BP-16 capital;the jointfifthhighestallocationof BP-16financingamongseveralcompeting economicsectors.28 Duringthe fifthdevelopmentplanwhichranfrom1988/89 to 1992/93, the IndonesiansextendedtheireffortstodevelopEastTimor’seducationsystem,grantingit 7.2 billion Rupiahrepresentinga5.6 percentshare inthe province’sallocationof developmentbudgetfunds (the fifthhighestallocationamong 19competingsectors) inatotal of 129.7 billionRupiah.29 Bythe endof the occupation,the share of East Timor’sdevelopmentbudgetbeingspentoneducationhad risento 25 percent accordingto an analysisof the budgetfor9 districts(Kabupatens) inEastTimor conductedin1999.30 The magnitude of these outlayscanbe bettercomprehendedwhentakinginto account the level of vertical fiscal imbalancethatexistedbetweenEastTimor’srevenue raising capacitiesonthe one hand andJakarta’s spendingpoweronthe other.In1999, the contributionof 27‘Chega!’, Chapter 7.9, p.42. 28The 3.8 per cent sharein East Timor’s BP-16 capital duringthefourth development plan translated to 1 billion in a total allocation of 26.1 billion rupiah.This gavethe education sector the the 5th highestallocation of fundingthrough BP-16 among 15 designated sectors. However, becausesubstantially more(3.3 billion Rupiah) was spent in total on education over the 1982 to 1989 period with the remaining2.2 billion comingfromother sources e.g. Presidential Instruction projects,then it is probablethateducation’s sharein total development spendingon East Timor may have been higher relativeto other sectors duringthe fourth development plan. For Saldanha’s figures on education spendingduringthe fourth development plan (Repelita IV) see Table 4.4 Allocation of Special Budget Post (16) by sector duringthe Fourth Development Plan (Rp. 000,000) in Joao M.D.S. Saldanha,‘The Political Economy of East Timor Development’, Jakarta,1994, p.161. 29For education’s sharein EastTimor’s development budget between 1988/89 and 1992/93, see J. Saldanha, ‘The Political Economy’, p.167. For the sizeof East Timor’s development budget in the 1988/89 to 1992/93 period see Table 4.6 Allocation Development Budget by Sector in Income and Expenditure Budget for East Timor 1998/1989-1992/93 (Rp.000,000) in Saldanha,‘The Political Economy’, p. 166. 30Jon Pedersen and Marie Arneberg (editors), ‘Social and Economic Conditions in East Timor’, International ConflictResolution ProgramSchool of International and Public Affairs,ColumbiaUniversity,New York, 1999,p. 88
  • 17. 17 the East Timorese economytothe province’sallocatedbudgetwasonly15per centthus makingit insufficienttocoverjustthe educationbudgetforthatyear. 31 Evidence of Investment: The Expansion of East Timor’s Education System There are numerousstatisticshighlightingthe expansionof EastTimor’seducationsystematthe primaryschool level duringthe occupation.Forinstance,there was anincrease inthe numberof primaryschool teachersworkinginEastTimor between1976/77 and 1990/91, from 499 in the formeryearto 4,574 inthe latter.32 Thiswasfollowedbyanincrease duringthe 1990’s withthe estimatednumberof primaryschool teachersinEastTimor reaching6,672 by 1998. 33 Absolute levelsof studentparticipationalsoimprovedduringthe occupationwiththe numberof children enrolledrisingfrom13,501 studentsin1976/77 to 95,850 in 1990/91.34 Furthermore,itshouldbe notedthat the periodfrom1976/77 to 1990/91 saw the establishmentof anadditional 512 primary schoolsbythe Indonesiangovernmentfrom47schoolsat the start of the periodto 559 at its end. 35 In spite of thisdevelopmentandthe observationthatby1985 virtuallyeveryvillageinEastTimor had itsownprimaryschool,itis interestingtonote thatin the periodfrom1991 to 1998, the constructionof evenmore primaryschoolstookplace inthe territorywiththe numberreaching788 inthe latteryear. 36 31Ibid, pp.88. 32Calculationsbased on data taken from Table 5.34 Development of Elementary, Junior and Senior High Schools,EastTimor Schoolyear 1976/77-1990/91 in J.Saldanha,‘The Political Economy’, p. 249 33For the number of primary school teachers employed in East Timor in 1998 see ‘Chega!’ Chapter 7.9, p. 42. 34Calculationsbased on data taken from Table 5.34 Development of Elementary, Junior and Senior High Schools,EastTimor Schoolyear 1976/77-1990/91 in J.Saldanha, ‘The Political Economy’, p .249. For supportingevidence see J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p. 85. Pedersen and Arneberg put the number of pupils in primary schoolsat130,000 in 1986. 35Calculationsbased on data taken from Table 5.34 Development of Elementary, Junior and Senior High Schools,EastTimor Schoolyear 1976/77-1990/91 in J.Saldanha, ‘The Political Economy’, p.249. For supporting evidence see Republic of Indonesia,Department of Foreign Affairs, ‘East Timor: Building for the Future, 1992, pp.13-16 cited in Stephen Sherlock, ‘Political Economy of the East Timor Conflict’, Asian Survey, 36,1996, p. 836. See also ‘see UN General Assembly WorkingPaper (A/AC.109/1154), 1993 and UN General Assembly WorkingPaper (A/AC.109/1187), 1994 cited in Alberto Arenas, ‘Education and Nationalismin EastTimor’, Social Justice, 25,1998, p. 139. Whilethe Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs report places the number of primary schools established by the Indonesian government in East Timor in the period from annexation up to 1992 at579, the UN General Assembly workingpaper places the number of primary schools established by the Indonesian government from annexation through to 1993 at565. 36For the observation that by 1985 virtually every villagein EastTimor had its own primary school seeGavin W. Jones, ‘Social Policy Issues in EastTimor:Education and Health’, in East Timor: Development Challenges for the World’s Newest Nation, eds. Hal Hill and Joao M. Saldanha,2001,p.256.See also ‘Chega!’, Chapter 7.9, p.42. For the number of primary schools in EastTimor in 1998 see ‘Chega!’, Chapter 7.9, p.42.
  • 18. 18 At boththe juniorsecondaryandseniorsecondarylevelsof educationinEastTimor,a similarpicture of expansioninservice deliveryandaccesswasevidentthroughoutthe occupation.Intermsof staffinglevels,the numberof juniorsecondaryteachersemployedinthe province increasedfrom just10 in 1796/1977 to 1245 in 1990/91, while the numberof seniorsecondaryschoolteachers employedinEastTimorincreasedfrom18 in the fiscal year1979/80 to 967 in1990/91.37 In termsof attendance levels,the numberof juniorhighschool studentsattendinghadrisenfrom315 in 1976/77 to 31,482 in1990/91 while the numberof seniorhighschool studentsincreasedoverthe same periodfromjust64 in 1979/80 to 19,665 in 1990/91.38 By 1998, the numberof studentsin juniorsecondaryschoolshadreached32,179.39 Anotherindicationof expansionwasthe openingof newinstitutions.Where therehadbeenonly2juniorsecondaryschoolsoperatingin1976/77, there were 94 runningby1990/91.40 Similarly,the numberof seniorsecondaryschoolsoperatinginEast Timorincreasedfrom2 in 1979/1980 to 47 in 1990/91. 41 The IndonesiansalsopresidedoverarapidexpansioninEastTimor’stertiaryeducationsystem duringthe occupation.Where notertiaryeducationservicesorinstitutionshadexistedinEastTimor underPortuguese rule,the Indonesianswere the firstoccupyingpowertoestablishatertiary educationsysteminEastTimor,albeitof limitedscope. 42 The year1986 saw the inaugurationof East Timor’sfirstuniversity, TheUniversitasTimor-Timur(UNTIM),providingcoursesinagriculture 37See Table 5.34 Development of Elementary, Junior and Senior High Schools,EastTimor Schoolyear 1976/77- 1990/91 in J. Saldanha, ‘The Political Economy’, p. 249. 38Ibid, p. 249. 39‘Chega!’, Chapter 7.9, p.42 40See Table 5.34 Development of Elementary, Junior and Senior High Schools,EastTimor Schoolyear 1976/77- 1990/91 in J. Saldanha, ‘The Political Economy’, p. 249. 41Ibid, p. 249. Itshould be noted that there are other sources of evidence confirmingthe expansion of secondary school systemin East Timor. Accordingto a 1992 report from the Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs,integration with Indonesia resulted in the establishmentof an additional 88 middle/juniorsecondary schools and 38 senior secondary schools.See ‘East Timor: Building for the Future’, cited in S. Sherlock, ‘Political Economy of the East Timor Conflict’,p. 836. Furthermore, a UN working paper puts the number of senior secondary schools established by the Indonesian’s in EastTimor between 1975 and 1993 at 29 - see UN General Assembly WorkingPaper (A/AC.109/1154), 1993 and UN General Assembly WorkingPaper (A/AC.109/1187), 1994 cited in A. Arenas, ‘Education and Nationalism’,p. 139. The UN Report of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in EastTimor documents further expansions in the secondary school systemduringthe 1990’s with the numbers of lower secondary schools,academic senior secondary schools and vocational senior secondary schoolsoperatingin EastTimor reaching114,37 and 17 respectively by 1998. See ‘Chega!’, Chapter 7.9, p.42 42When EastTimor was ruled by Portugal,successful secondary school graduates had to rely on the offer of scholarships to Portuguese universities to progress into tertiary education. By all indications,thesescholarship offers could only be described as tokenistic and piecemeal. See Bill Nichol,‘Timor:The Stillborn Nation’, Camberwell, 1978,p.24. The limited scope of EastTimor’s tertiary education system in the period of Indonesian occupation was indicated by the fact that only 20 per cent of secondary school graduates in EastTimor went on to tertiary education duringthe late 1990’s compared to 40% on average in Indonesia.See J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p.86
  • 19. 19 and educationaswell associal andpolitical science.43 Althoughitsstudentsinitiallynumberedonly inthe hundreds,by1998/99 the Universityof EastTimorhad an estimated3500 students. 44 In additiontothe openingof UNTIM, 1500 scholarshipplacesatIndonesianuniversitieswere granted to East Timorese studentsin1989, and in1990, the governmental Dilipolytechnicwasestablished offering two-yearcoursesinfoursubjects;namelymachine engineering,civil engineering,electrical engineeringandaccountancy. 45 The final positive developmentinthe expansionof EastTimor’s tertiaryeducationsystemunderthe Indonesianswasthe openingof itsthirdtertiaryeducation institutionin1991.46 Resource Misallocations:Mismanagement inthe Delivery ofEducation Services One of the primaryfactorsin the poor qualityof educationservicesprovidedbythe Indonesian governmentwasthe under-resourcingof institutionsandfacilitiesowingtoa governmentpolicythat had clearlyprejudicedthe expansionof the educationsystemaheadof improvingservicesand facilities. 47 Manifestationsof thispolicyincludedclassroomsthatresembledpoorlyconstructed barrack rooms fittedwithonlybenches,blackboardsandtableswhile lackingbasicteacheraideslike charts and diagramsandamenitiesincludingaccesstoelectricity. AusterityinEastTimorese schools and universitieswasalsohighlightedbythe general absence of auxiliaryfacilitiesandessential capital includinglaboratories,photocopiers,librariesandresource booksthatwere alsopoorly maintainedinthe rare instancestheywere provided.48 Furthermore,schoolswere frequentlyunable 43 For the opening of UNTIM in 1986 see A. Arenas, ‘Education and Nationalism’,p.139 44For the number of students enrolled at UNTIM atits inception,see G. Jones ‘Education and Health’, p.257. For the number of students attending UNTIM in the late 1990’s see J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p.86. 45For the establishmentof the polytechnic see D. Sousa, O Programa de educacao na face de transicao/Education in the Transition Phase”, Strategic Development Planningfor EastTimor Conference, Melbourne, 5-9 April,1999 cited in J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p.87. For tertiary education scholarshipsseeA. Arenas, ‘Education and Nationalism’,p. 139 46J. Saldanha, ‘ThePolitical Economy’, p.245 47 This policy was reflected in education budgets from that era which showed a bias in the distribution of funds toward development rather than routine categories. Here, development expenses were aimed atproviding additional capital outlays(in terms of new school buildings,newinstitutions,extra staff etc) whereas routine or recurrent expenses were directed toward the maintenance and improvement of existingeducational facilities and services.In the late 1990’s more than 80% of the education budget was deployed under the category of development expenditures whileless than 20 per cent of the education budget was deployed under the category of routine expenses. See J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p. 88. 48For conditions insideclassrooms,and theabsence and poor maintenance of auxi liary facilities see‘Chega!’ Chapter 7.9, p. 43; D. Odling-Smee, ‘Future Planning:Language and Education in East Timor’, Darwin: East Timor International SupportCentre, 1998;cited in J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic
  • 20. 20 to supplytextsbooksineithersufficientquantityorqualitytotheirstudents.49 Another manifestationof under-resourcinginEastTimor’seducationsystemwithsignificant,adverse implicationsforeducationqualitywasthe low teachingstandard.Sourcesvariouslydescribed employeesof the provincialschool systemduringthe occupationasyoung,inexperiencedand unskilledwhile lackinginmotivationandincentives.50 These attributesreflectedthe factthata significantnumberof these teachershadjustcompletedtrainingandlackedminimumqualifications; that theywere poorlypaid;and that manyfeltalienatedfromboththe socio-culturalenvironmentin whichtheywere workingandfromthe studentstheywere teaching.51 Conditions’, p.90; and OxfamGB, ‘Para o bem de Timor’, East Timor Human Resource Development Programme Research Report, London, 1999 cited in J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p.90 49Estimates from the 1998 census confirmed deficiencies in the quantity of textbooks supplied to students at three levels of education in EastTimor. In primary school, roughly half of all students had access to a maths book whilein junior secondary school, two thirds of students had a math-book, but only half had an English book and one third a physics book.In senior secondary schools,two thirds of students had maths and English books, but only one third had physics texts.See SUSENAS 1998 cited in J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p.90. For the quality of textbooks provided see J. Saldanha, ‘The Political Economy’, p.246. This sourcenotes that the learningmaterials supplied to students were often out-dated and inappropriatewhere for instance,in several districts firstgradetextbooks were being given to the other elementary school forms. 50The significanceof lowteaching standards to poor education outcomes in East Timor is reinforced by c ross country evidence which indicates thatteacher quality and education is a more importantfactor in student achievement than teacher to pupil ratios.See Hanushek, 1995 cited in J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p. 92. For descriptions of teachers employed in the East Timorese school systemduringthe occupation,see S. Sherlock, ‘Political Economy of the EastTimor Conflict’,p. 838; and A. Arenas, ‘Education and Nationalism’,pp. 139. Low teaching standards havealso been attributed to the fact that military personnel were often used as teachers in EastTimorese schools.See ‘Secret military report,Komando Pelaksana Operasi Timor Timur’, Dili (8452). Appendix B (Intelligence) Rencana Operassi No 1/Bayu. 261,500/ 1984 cited in ‘Chega!’, Chapter 7.9, p.44. See alo R. Brahmana and U. Emanuel, “The Book of 20 Years of Development of East Timor”, Dili:Corps of the Indonesian Civil Serviceof the East Timor Province”, 1996,p.109 cited in J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p.85 51For the inexperience of teachers in EastTimor see ‘Chega!’, Chapter 7.9, pp.43. This report notes that “many…teachers were assigned to East Timor immediately after graduatingcolleges in Indonesia.” For the lack of formal qualifications held by teachers in East Timor see J. Saldanha, ‘The Political Economy’, pp.246; ‘Chega!’, Chapter 7.9, p.43; and J. Carvalho, Strategic Development Planning for East Timor; Education, Culture, Environment (un pub.), Strategic Development Planningfor East Timor Conference, Melbourne 5-9 April 1999,cited in J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p.92. Carvalho notes for instancethat in 1999,more than 90% of teachers in East Timor did not have minimum qualifications. For the low pay of teachers in East Timor see Oxfam GB, “Para o bem de Timor”, EastTimor Human Resource Development Programme Research Report, London, 1999, pp.26 cited in J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, pp.90; and ‘Chega!’, Chapter 7.9, p.43. It is noted in the latter sourcethat the low salaries granted to teachers lead to high rates of absenteeism where many would seek extra work to supplement their incomes. Reasons for teacher alienation and disengagement included the fact that many were brought in by the Indonesians formother provinces includingJava and Sulawesi.In the late 1990’s over 50 per cent of East Timor’s school teachers came from areas outsideof EastTimor, see J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, 1999, p.90. Another reason why teachers felt disengaged from the educati on system was the antipathy displayed toward them by EastTimorese students who perceived them to be functionaries
  • 21. 21 Anotherfailure of EastTimor’seducationsystemduringthe occupationwasitsoveremphasison skillsthatwere notuseful invital economicsectors(viz.,agriculture) thatthe vastmajorityof studentswouldgoonto dependfortheirlivelihoodsandsurvival.Instead,the educationsystem focusedprimarilyonthe developmentof skillsthatwere useful foremploymentin administrative capacitiesdespite the factthatthe administrative sectoremployedarelative smallpercentageof the labourforce and that the majorityof administrativepositionsinoccupiedEastTimorwere givento expatriatesfromJavaandotherIndonesianprovinces.52 Thisfocusonthe developmentof administrativeoveragriculturalandtechnical skillswasreflectedindataonthe educationsystem fromthat era: among19,000 seniorsecondaryschool students inthe late 1990’s, 77% were in academiceducation programs,whileonly23% were enrolledinvocational educationprograms. Correspondingtothe higherpercentageof studentsenrolledinacademiceducationprogramswas the greaternumberof institutionsprovidingacademiccoursesincomparisontovocational courses (Inthe late 1990’s there were 37 of the formertype and17 of the latter). It isapparentthat these vocational programswere notadequatelyaddressedtothe developmentof agricultural and technical skills,giventhatthe majorityof studentsinvocational educationwere enrolledin commercial orsecretarial courseswhileonlyone quarterof studentsundertookcourseswitha technical focus.Moreover,amongvocational institutions,there wasonlyone dedicatedagricultural school,locatedinCovalimaaccommodating300students,andonlya handful of dedicated mechanical schoolsfoundinurbancentreslike Dili.Consequentlythe educationprovidedlacked relevance toeverydaylife (impliedbythe mismatchbetweenthe skillsemphasisedbythe education systemonthe one hand, andthose requiredbythe dominantsectorsof employmentonthe other), leavingstudentsandtheirfamiliesfeelingapatheticanddisengagedfromthe educationsystem. Thisclearlyhadnegative implicationsforlearningoutcomesgiventhe vital role thatstudentand parental attitudesplayinthisregard.53 of a socially and culturally repressivestateapparatus.Several sources noted that teachers were frequent targets of violent attacks by youths. See Oxfam, 1999,Sousa,1999, OdlingSmee, 1999 cited in J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p.98 52The comparatively small percentageof the labour forceemployed in administrativecapacities was highlighted in the 1990 National Labour Survey. The survey data indicated thatwhere 83.49 per cent of East Timor’s labour force was employed in “Agriculture’, only 9.12 per cent of the work force was employed in ‘Social Services’,a proxy for the administration and defence, over the 1989/1990 period.See J. Saldanha, ‘The Political Economy, p. 259 and Table 5.39, Labour Force Accordingto Major Employment Field 1989/1990,in J. Saldanha,‘The Political Economy’, p. 261. Jones maintains thatUnder Indonesian rule,employment in professional,administrativeand clerical occupations was dominated by non -East Timorese claimingthatwhere “over 80 per cent of East Timorese worked in agricultural occupations,58 per cent of non-East Timorese males worked in professional, administrativeand clerical occupations.See G. Jones, ‘Education and Health’, p.257 53For the relativenumber of students enrolled in vocational and academic education programs duringthe late 1990’s,the proportion of students in vocational education enrolled in technical courses v’s secretarial or
  • 22. 22 Use of the Education System as an Instrument of Social Control There were several featuresof the state runeducationsystemthatrelatedtoitsuse as an instrumentof social control whichofferfurtherindicationsof pooreducationquality. Ratherthan viewingeducationasa strategicinvestmentinthe productivityof EastTimor’slabourforce andthe island’slongruneconomicviability,the Indonesiansviewededucationasa mechanismthrough whichEast Timor’syouthcould be re-socialised,assimilatedandultimately‘Indonesianized’;the objective being‘toinstil inchildren,arespectandadmirationforIndonesianpractices,beliefsand values’.54 One of the primaryfeaturesimbuedinEastTimor’seducationprogramsaimedatthe realisationof these objectives wasinstructioninthe Pancasilaideology –the supposedideological basisof Indonesiansociety.55 Thiswasachievedinprimaryandsecondaryschoolsthroughboot camp style physical educationprograms,the performanceof ritualsinvolvingthe Indonesianflag and the singingof the Indonesiannational anthem,the versingof studentsinalimitedand nationalisticnarrative of Javanese history,andthroughpromotionof the Pramuka –the state controlledscoutorganisation –thatstudentswere stronglyencouragedtoparticipate in.56 Since the educationsystem’sresourceswere principallydevotedtothe indoctrination of studentsin nationalisticpropaganda, little roomwasleftinthe curriculumforthe teachingof essentialacademic letalone technical skillsaswell aslocallyorientedcontentincluding Timorese history,geography, arts and oral literature.57 Consequently,EastTimor’sindigenouspopulationbecame disaffectedin commercial courses,and the number of mechanical and agricultural schools,seeJ. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p.86. 54 For the quotation – “to instil in children,a respectand admiration for Indonesian practices,beliefs and values”- see A. Arenas, ‘Education and Nationalism’,p. 131.It should also benoted that the Inonesians sought to instil the samevalues in adults through community education programs. See KORPRI Timor Timur, 1996, p.145 cited in ‘Chega!’, Chapter 7.9, p.45 55There is evidence to suggest that the inculcation of students in the Pancasilaideology featured in both the Catholic and privateschool systems in addition to the state school system. This comes from the fact that all schools were forced to adopt the same curriculum.See J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, pp.85. The goal of the education system to indoctrinatestudents in the Pancasilaideology was formally enshrined in Indonesian lawNo.2 1989.The specific objectives stipulated were: 1. Formation of Pancasila citizens who have a high quality and would be ableto stay independent. 2. Contribution to the development of the Indonesian community, nation and state that is materialised in a solid national resilience. 3. Increasethe People's capacity to protect the nation from the intrusion of any ideology, concept and teaching that is againstPancasila. See KORPRI Timor Timur, 1996,pp.145 (official translation) cited in ‘Chega!’, Chapter 7.9, pp.44 56 For the emphasis on physical education and the singingof patriotic songs includingtheIndonesian national anthem, see Jardine,‘Genocide in Paradise’, Tucson, 1995,pp.61-62. For the flagrituals and forced participation in thePramuka see refugee testimony cited in A. Arenas, ‘Education and Nationalism’,p. 140 57One of the UN truth and reconciliation commission's findingson education in EastTimor was that “the use of schools for propaganda and indoctrination severely interfered with the education of an entire generation of East Timorese youth. Education was used in this way as partof an integrated security approach whose overridingobjectivewas to ensure that pro-independence sentiment did not take root in a new generation. In
  • 23. 23 theirattitude towardthe provincial educationsystem, comingtoview itasan instrumentof cultural genocide.58 Reinforcedbythe perceivedirrelevance of the educationcourses,suchattitudes contributedsignificantlytothe poorlearningoutcomesthatwere characteristicof the occupation periodinrecognitionof the factthat the abilityof studentstolearnonlyextendsasfaras theirwill. Anothermechanismof social control incorporatedintothe provincialeducationsystem,intendedto facilitate the inculcationof Pancasila,washegemonicuse of BahasaIndonesianasthe language of instruction.59 Indeed,officialdocumentssuchasthe Act respectingthe National EducationSystem made it clearthat the “teaching[of] the Indonesianlanguage wastobe a core taskof the education system,bothas a meansto communicate the benefitsof integrationandasa wayof establishing control.”Consequently,the teachingof the Indonesianlanguageassumedthe highestpriorityinEast Timorese education,takingprecedence (indescendingorder) overeducationin administrative/clerical,academic,vocational andlocallyorientedcontent.Thiswasdemonstrated throughthe breakdownof textbooksprocured inclassroomsbetween1984 and 1989 which included161,560 textbooksonthe IndonesianLanguage,39,926 on Indonesiangovernmental and administrativesystems,andonly9,398 on natural historyand physics.60 While the emphasisgiven to instructioninBahasaIndonesiandidhave aprofoundeffectonthe numberof Timorese whowere able to speakthe language,the implicationsforlearningoutcomeswere broadlynegative.61 Thiswas due firstlytothe significantopportunitycoststhatwere incurredbyconstrainingthe resources available forteachingothercontent;secondly,because itmeantthatstudentswere being introducedtoformal educationinalanguage otherthantheirnative tongue;62 andthirdly,because this context, teaching children the skills thatwould enhance their prospects and enable them to fulfil their human potential was secondary.” See ‘Chega! Chapter 7.9, p.48. For the absence of local contentin East Timorese education see D. Odling-Smee, ‘Future Planning:Language and Education in EastTimor’, Darwin:East Timor International SupportCentre, 1998 cited in J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, 1999,p.94 58For EastTimorese perceptions of the education system M. Viegas,Tetun Literacy (un pub). Strategic Development Planningfor EastTimor Conference, Melbourne 5-9 April 1999,p.2 cited in J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, 1999,p.94 59From 1976 through to the mid 1990’s,Bahasa Indonesian was theonly languagespoken in Indonesian schools.However, in the later years of the occupation, Indonesian authorities permitted local languages to be taught for three hours a week. See, M. Viegas,Tetun Literacy (un pub). Strategic Development Planningfor East Timor Conference, Melbourne 5-9 April 1999 cited in J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p.93 60For the Act Respecting the National Education System and the breakdown of school books procured between 1984 and 1989 see ‘Chega!’, Chapter 7.9, pp.44-45 61The number of East Timorese ableto speak Bahasa Indonesian increased dramatically throughoutthe occupation becauseof the emphasis that was placed on teachingthe languagein the province’s formal education programs. For evidence see J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p.93. See also ‘Chega!’, Chapter 7.9, p.45 62Due to the great diversity of languages spoken in EastTimor duringthe occupation (In addition to Tetum, the Lingua Franka,there were 12 Austronesian and non-Austronesian languages encompassing35 dialects and sub-dialects),and the factthat 94% of the population did not speak Bahasa Indonesian athome (accordingto
  • 24. 24 it discouragedIndigenouscommitmenttoeducation byreinforcingnegativeperceptionsamong studentsandtheirparentsof the educationsystemasalien,irrelevant,andculturallyhostile.63 Education Outcomes In consequence of the poorqualityandirrelevance of educationthatwasprovided,the mostreliable evidence suggeststhatlearningoutcomesremainedpoorthroughoutthisperiod.One indicatorof thiswas the absence of significantimprovementinratesof functional literacyduringthe Indonesian occupationoverlevelswhichhadprevailedatthe endof Portuguese rule.Where the rate of functional literacyinthe province hadonlybeen7% inthe province in1974, accordingto the Jarkarta Post,ithad onlyreached8% by 1989 markinga 1% improvementover15 years.64 This picture of weakprogressduringthe first15 yearsof occupationisconfirmedbyJoneswhocontends that in1990, “illiteracyrateswere extremelyhigh,particularlyatagesover40 and amongwomen” withonlythe 15 to 24 yearsage groupshowinganilliteracyrate below 50per cent.65 However,the UN Truth and Reconciliationreportcitesevidence of a32% improvementacrossall demographicsin ratesof functional literacyoverthe followinghalf decade,withthe rate havingreached40% in 1995/96. 66 Despite amarkedincrease ineducationspendingduringthe fifthdevelopmentplan the 1990 census),the overwhelming majority of children were not introduced to the school environment in their mother tongue “contrary to what is recognised as optimal for learningachievements”. See J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, pp.92-93. 63This is suggested by Pedersen and Arneberg, who note that “the selection of an official languagehas more implications for the education system than for any other sector of the society” where “it is of high importance that the language is considered relevantby the population,sinceparent’s attitudes toward the school play a crucial rolein the educational achievement of a child.”See J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions in East Timor’, 1999, p.93. 64For the 7% rate of functional literacy in 1974 seeJohn G. Taylor, ‘East Timor: The Price of Freedom’, London and New York, 1999,p.34. For the 8% rate of functional literacy in 1989 seethe Jakarta Post, 5 August 1989 cited in J. Taylor, ‘East Timor: The Price of Freedom’, p.129. In comparison,Saldanhaplaced therate of functional literacy in EastTimor at 47.5% in 1990. See Table 5.47 Indicators of education and health per provincein Indonesia 1990 in J. Saldanha, ‘The Political Economy’, p.275. The discrepancy between these two estimates can likely be attributed to Saldanha’s relianceon data from the Indonesian government which had a vested interest in inflatingstatistics pertainingto aspects of social and economic development. Such distortions weremade in an effort to counteract negative perceptions of the occupation that were forming amongst members of the international community duringthe 1990’s precipitated by the increasingly frequentand well documented reports of violenceand other atrocities being committed by the Indonesian Military in EastTimor atthat time (e.g., the Santa Cruz massacreof 1991.) Pedersen and Arneberg concur that official Indonesian statisticson rates of functional literacy and numeracy were “severely inflated”. See J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p.84 65G. Jones, ‘Education and Health’, East Timor: Development Challenges, p.257 66 Rui Gomes, EastTimor's Socio-Economic Development under Indonesia:(1976-1998) ,[unpublishedPhD Thesis],South Bank University, London, 2002,p. 155 cited in ‘Chega!’, Chapter 7.9, p.43. Official Indonesian government statistics do lend some supportto Gome’s contention of a 40 per cent functional literacy rateduringthe mid-1990’s where it is claimed for instancethat 30,000 persons in East
  • 25. 25 (whichranfrom 1988/89 to 1992/93) over levelsseenduringthe fourthdevelopmentplan(between 1983/84 and1988/89), thislateststatisticlackscredibilitygiventhe previouslycitedtrendof a1% improvementover15 years.67 Evenif it were true thata 32% improvementacrossall demographics inrates of functional literacyhadbeenachievedinthe 6yearsfrom 1989/90 to 1995/96, East Timor wouldstill have hadthe worstrate of functional literacyamongstall Indonesianprovincesandall countriesinthe AsiaPacificregionduringthe mid-1990s.68 Whenan educationsystemfailstoprovide studentswiththe skillsandabilitiesnecessarytomaster subjects,passexamsandprogressintohighergrades,highratesof grade repetition canprovide furtherindicationof poorlearningoutcomes.However,becauseof anunwrittenpolicythatexisted inEast Timorduringthe 1970’s and80’s enablingstudentstomove onto the nextgrade irrespective of performance,statisticspertainingtoratesof grade repetitioninthe first15years of the occupationgive little insightintothe qualitiesof EastTimorese studentsandthe broadereducation systemduringthisperiod.Itwasonlyafterthe abolishmentof thispolicyinthe early1990’s, that it became possible tointerpretevidence of pooreducationqualityfromstatistical evidence demonstratinghighratesof grade repetition.69 Forexample,Indonesiangovernmentdatarevealed that where approximately21,000 pupilshadenteredprimaryschool in1990, only9,000 students graduatedsix yearslaterincludingrepeaterswhohadstartedpriorto1990. Thismeantthat less than 50% of school age children(aged7-18) were on track to complete their schoolingontime in 1996.70 Moreover,by1998, around 30 percent of primaryschool studentsinEast Timorwere more than twoyearsbehindscheduleproducinganage distributioncharacterisedbythe numberof pupils ingrade 1 beingfourtimesgreaterthan the numberof pupilsingrade 6. Inaddition,close to40% of seniorsecondaryschool studentswere more than2 yearsbehindscheduleinthatyear.71 Itis also Timor learned to read and write Indonesian in the scholastic year 1996/97.See Ministry of Education cited in J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’,p.87. However, “this seems likean unreasonably high figure even if itdoes includeschool children”.See J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p.87. 67See the section on expenditure in this chapter for comparativelevels of education expenditure in East Timor duringthe fourth and fifth development plans. 68 Rui Gomes, EastTimor's Socio-Economic Development under Indonesia:(1976-1998) ,[unpublishedPhD Thesis],South Bank University, London, 2002,p. 155 cited in ‘Chega!’, Chapter 7.9, p.43 69 The significanceof this data is reinforced by the fact that a high rate of failurein school exams was documented in East Timor duringthe late1990s.See OxfamGB, “Para o bem de Timor”, East Timor Human Resource Development Programme Research Report, London, 1999 cited in J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p.94. For the informal policy on gradeprogression duringthe 1980s and its abolition in the1990s,see J. Saldanha, ‘The Political Economy’, pp.245-246 70For data on repetition rates between 1990 and 1996,see Ministry of Education 1999, BPS 1996 and 1997, Provisional Government of East Timor 1996 cited in J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p.97 71 For the percentage of primary and secondary school students more than two years behind schedulein 1998 see SUSENAS, 1998 cited in J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p.97. For the
  • 26. 26 worthnotingthat the peculiarage structure inEast Timor’seducationsystemwaslikelytohave producededucational inefficienciesarisingfromtypicallyhigherratesof absenteeismthatare seen amongstoverage pupilswhose timemustincreasinglybe spentattendingtoworkresponsibilities. 72 Alongside highratesof grade repetition,itcanbe arguedthat low ratesof school completion provide furtherevidencethatlearningoutcomeswere poorduringthe Indonesianoccupationwhere achievingproficiencyinessential academicskills,suchasliteracyandnumeracy,requiresstudentsto complete agivenquantityof schoolingatdifferentgrade levels.73 Althoughthereare statistics showingmarkedincreasesinratesof school completionacrossthe primary,juniorsecondaryand seniorsecondarylevelsof educationinthe periodupto1991, itonce againneedstobe recognised that such statisticsare renderedmeaningless(withrespecttoanyqualitative analysisof learning outcomes) inlightof the policywhichexistedinEastTimorupto the early1990’s, enablingstudents to progressthroughthe systemirrespective of performance.74 Inspite of the aforementionedpolicy, it isneverthelessinterestingtonote thatdata fromthe Intercensal PopulationSurveyin1995 shows that of those whohad grownup entirelyunderIndonesianadministrationtothatpoint,lessthan half had completedprimaryeducationorprogressedfurther.75 Additionally,censusdatafrom1998 indicatesthat85 and 25 percent of the respective tertiaryandseniorsecondaryschool graduatesin East Timor at that time were notnatives of the province,andthat 7 per centof 15 to 19 year olds and 4 percentand 10 to 14 oldshadleftschool before completing the fourth grade.76 Inadditionto implyingpoorlearningoutcomes,itshouldbe emphasisedthatthese statistics(namelythose pertainingtocompletionratesinprimaryeducation) show thatEastTimor’seducationsystemwas relativenumbers of primary school agestudents in grades 1 and 6 in 1998 see J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p.86. Additional evidence confirmingthe high rate of the grade repetition in the East Timorese primary school systemin the late 90s is also found in the significantdisparity thatexisted between the province’s respective net primary enrolment ratio and gross primary enrolment ratio as well as the significantdifferencethat existed between Indonesia’s national netprimary enrolment ratio and East Timor’s net enrolment ratio atthe time. These findings were extrapolated from J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, pp.86-94. 72Kelly,1995 cited in J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p. 97 73It has been argued for instance,that four years of schoolingarenecessary for the acquisition and retention of functional literacy.See Mehrotra, 1998, pp.8 cited in J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p.97. 74 For statistical evidenceshowingabsoluteincreases in numbers of primary school,junior high school and senior secondary school graduates between 1976 and 1991,see Table5.34, Development of Elementary, Junior and Senior High Schools,EastTimor Schoolyear 1976/77-1990/91 in J.Saldanha, ‘ThePolitical Economy’, p.249 75For data from the 1995 Intercensal Population Survey,see Table 16.1 Educational Attainment of Population Aged 15-69 Living in Household with Head Born in East Timor, 1995 (%) in G. Jones, ‘Education and Health’, East Timor: Development Challenges, p.257 76For data on school completion rates in 1998 see SUSENAS 1998 cited in J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, pp.96-100
  • 27. 27 wastingvaluable resourcesduringthe latterpartof the occupationon the educationof students whowere leavingschool before acquiringeventhe mostbasicacademicskills. Accordingto Saldanha,the highunemploymentrate of graduatesfromthe East Timorese school systemduringthe early1990’s, providesfurtherevidenceof poorlearningoutcomeswhere graduatesof East Timorese schoolsanduniversitieswere notbeingequippedwithnecessaryskills and abilitiestocompete inthe domesticinthe domesticlabourmarket. 77 While there isample evidence fromthe lastdecade of the occupationdemonstratingabiasagainstgraduatesof the provincial school system infavourof those educatedelsewhere inskilledformal sector employment,78 itisdifficulttoattribute thisphenomenonexclusivelytothe poorqualityof the educationthatwasprovidedunderIndonesianrule.Otherfactorsneedtobe consideredincluding consciousdiscriminationagainstindigenousEastTimorese bymajoremployers(inparticular, Indonesianrunbusinessesandgovernmentdepartments)inthe broadercontextof acampaignof ethniccleansingandgenocide. Social and Economic Conditions Poorsocial and economicconditionsprevalentinEastTimorduringthe occupationincludingthe inter-relatedphenomenaof extreme violence andpoverty,poorcommunityhealth,andhigh unemployment,all hadnegative implicationsforeducationoutcomesduring thisperiod.Whilethere isno directevidence linkingEastTimor’sfailuresineducationduringthe occupationtoactsof violence carriedoutbythe Indonesianmilitary,there isindirectevidence suggestive of apositive 77For Saldanha’s argumentthat poor education quality was the primary factor in the inability EastTimorese educated graduates “to compete with graduates from outsidethe region when lookingfor jobs in East Timor”, see J. Saldanha, ‘The Political Economy’, pp.245-246. 78Evidence of bias in EastTimor’s labour market againstgraduates of the provincial school systemin favour of those educated elsewhere can be inferred from statisticsobtained duringthe late 1990’s showingthat rates of employment and underemployment were significantly higher for nativeTimorese than for Indonesian immigrants and that unemployment rates for EastTimorese were directly proportional to educational attainment. For unemployment and unemployment rates for nativeTimorese (Eas tor West) and immigrants for other parts of Indonesia in 1998, see Figure 6.10, Un-and underemployment among labour forcewith secondary and tertiary education in EastTimor by placeof origin,1998 in J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p. 101. For statisticssuggestinga positivecorrelation between educational attainment and unemployment rates among native EastTimorese in 1998,see Figure6.9 Percentage of the labour forcethat is un- or under-employed, 1998,East and West Timor compared in J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p. 100. Although figure 6.9 shows that unemployment and underemployment was significantly lower for tertiary graduates in comparison with vocational and academic senior secondary graduates,itshould be noted that an estimated 85 per cent of the tertiary graduates came from locations outsideof East Timor while only 25 per cent of persons with senior secondary education came from locations outsideof East Timor. See J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p. 100.
  • 28. 28 relationshipbetweenthese twooccurrencesthatlieswiththe disruptiontofamilystructuresthat the violence engendered.79 Here itshouldbe recognisedthatfamilydisruptionshadclearnegative implicationsforlearningoutcomesinEastTimorwhere itwas determinedinthe late 1990’s that childrenfromfemale headedhouseholdswere significantlylesslikelytoattendschool thanchildren frommale headedhouseholdscitingthe needfor boystotake up employmenttoprovide forthe familyinthe absence of a male provider.80 Crosscountryevidence alsosuggeststhatthe violence whichtookplace in East Timorduringthe occupationhad negative implicationsforitseducation performance.Accordingtothe EducationforAll Global MonitoringReport,in2011, grossenrolment ratios,primary school completionratesandratesof literacyamongstyoungpeople andadultswere all significantlylessindevelopingcountriesthathadrecentlybeenexposedtoarmedconflictthan developingcountriesthathadnot sufferedrecentexposure toarmedconflict.81 It can similarlybe reasonedthatthe extreme povertyandunderdevelopmentthatwasprevalentin East Timor duringoccupationhadnegative implicationsforlearningoutcomes.Symptomaticof povertyandunderdevelopmentinEastTimorwas low productivityinagriculture onwhichthe vast majorityof East Timorese familiesdepended.Thismeantthatsurplusfoodproductionwasoften unattainable thuslimitingthe abilityof familiestosendtheirchildrentoschool whowere forced insteadtoworkthe farmto meettheirmostbasicneedsof survival.82 Inadditiontodraggingdown ratesof school attendance andcompletion,the inabilityof familiestosendtheirchildrentoschool 79It should be noted that acts of violence includingarbitrary executions,disappearances and coerced population resettlement were deliberately aimed atthe destruction of kinship networks and tra ditional social structures which had been identified by the Indonesian military as pillarsof resistanceto the occupation.See J. Taylor,‘The Price of Freedom’, p. 136. For evidence of family disruption duringthe occupation,see the survey conducted by the International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims on 1027 people from 13 districts in EastTimor.The data indicates that 31 per cent of respondents had losta parent, 14 per cent had losta spouse, and that 22 per cent had become separated from their children in the courseof armed conflictduringthe late 1990’s.See J. Movdig, J. Pagaduan-Lopez, J. Rosenburg, ‘Torture and Trauma in PostConflictEast Timor’, The Lancet, November 18, 2000,p.1763 80Duringthe late 1990’s itwas found in East Timor that 30 per cent of boys aged 7 to 18 in the female-headed households had never attended school,compared to justabove 20 per cent of boys from male-headed ones. See J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, pp.94-95 81For cross country evidence on the relationship of armed conflictto education outcomes see the EFA Global MonitoringReport, ‘The Hidden Crisis: Armed Conflict and Education’, UNESCO, 2011,pp.132. Retrieved 27 March 2012 from http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0019/001907/190743e.pdf 82 In the late1990’s itwas found that 10% of children aged 10 and 11 years in East Timor were employed, mostly agriculture,and that half of them were combining work with schooling. Older children were found to be more commonly employed. Among those 12-14 years old,almost20 per cent were employed, and of 15 to 18 year olds almost40 per cent were employed. Conversely, fewer of the older children were ableto attend school.See J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p. 95
  • 29. 29 wouldhave impactednegativelyonlearningoutcomesbyreinforcingthe apathy of studentstoward education.83 Asa teamof IndonesianacademicswhovisitedEastTimorinthe late 1980’s observed: “…the poorsocio-economicsituationforcesparentstogive prioritytobasic needssothat theyneglectthe educationof theirchildren. Sometimesthe labourneedsof the familyappeartoleadparentstoencourage their childrentoworkrather thango to school and thiscreatesa lack of interest inschool.”84 It shouldalsobe notedthathighrates of povertyinEast Timor are also likelytohave impacted negativelyonlearningoutcomesbydeprivingstudentsof accesstobasic learningmaterialssuchas textbooksthat were unaffordable.Thisissupportedbythe findingthatpoorfamiliesinEastTimor duringthe occupationwere usingalmost theirentire outlayonuniformsandschool fees,while richerfamilieswereable tospendmore onbooksandequipment.85 It isinstructive thatthe poorhealthand nutritionof EastTimorese youthandchildrenduringthe occupationcontributedsignificantlytopoorlearningoutcomesgiventhe bodyof medical and empirical evidencewhichshowsthatpoorhealthandnutritionisbothdetrimental tocognitive developmentandprospectsforeducational attainment.86 Keyfindingshave included,forinstance, that malnutritionandmorbidityadverselyaffectratesof school completionandabsenteeism;that betternourishedchildrenscore more highlyontestsof arithmetic,verbal comprehensionandnon- verbal reasoning;andthatinfectiousdiseasessuchasmalariahave beenassociatedwithsignificantly reducedperformance intestsof sustainedattention.Inadditiontothis,goodhealthandadequate 83 Pedersen and Arneberg cite numerous statisticsfromEastTimor duringthe late 1990s which establish a directrelationship between attendance rates on one hand and poverty and underdevelopment on the other. For example, it was determined that only 70 per cent of children aged 7 to 18 years from families whosehead was employed in agriculturehad ever attended school,compared to 90 per cent of children of the same age group whose household head was not employed in agriculture.Furthermore, itwas determined that only 70 per cent of children between 7 and 18 years in the poorest households had ever attended school with the corresponding statisticbeing 96 per cent for the most well off. Moreover, children from poor families were being delayed in their education twice as often as their wealthier counterparts. See J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p.95-96. It is also interestingto note that from surveys conducted in East Timor duringthe 90’s, families cited economic factors as well as a shortageof interest and motivation as the primary reasons for their children either not startingschool,dropping out or quitting. See J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p.96 84See Mubyarto, Loekman Soetrisno, Hudiyanto,Edhie Djatmiko,Ita Setiawati, Agnes Mawarni, ‘East Timor: The Impact of Integration’, An Indonesian Socio-Anthropological Study,Northcote, 1991, p.40 85For the contention that high costs were poor families to usealmosttheir entire outla y on uniforms and school fees see J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p.89 86The poor health and nutrition of young people and children duringthe occupation is documented under the headingHealth Outcomes in Chapter 2, East Timor’s Health Care System, pp. 35-41
  • 30. 30 nutritionininfancyandearlychildhoodhave beenidentifiedascentral determinantsof long-run successineducation.87 ThissuggeststhatEast Timorese students,whogrew upduringthe occupationandwere ingood healthwhentheyattendedschool,mayhave beeninhibitedby illnessesandmalnutritionexperiencedearlierinlife.Consistentwiththese findingsandthe poor healthoutcomesthatwere documentedinEastTimorduringthe 1975 to 1999 period,are the first handobservationsof the IndonesianacademicswhovisitedEastTimorduringthe late 1980’s: “…becausehealthis being neglected there is a continuing decreasein the intakeof calories vitally needed by the body.Children becomeweakand listless and even their concentration isimpaired.They havedifficulty following their lessonsand cannotmakeprogressin their studies.” 88 It istherefore apparentthat the poorhealthof the East Timorese populationpreventedthemfrom acquiringthe benefitsfromeducationthatshouldhave beenexpected. It was previouslyarguedthatthe inabilityof EastTimor’sindigenouspopulationtogaineffective representationwithincountry’swage labourmarketreflectedtheirpoorskillsandlow education. However,the highunemploymentrate facedbythe East Timorese canalsobe interpretedasacause of the pooroutcomesthat were experiencedineducationasitprovidedasignificantdisincentive for East Timorese youthtoseekeducationinthe hope of furtheringtheiremploymentprospects.89 As Mubyarto etal explains;“studentsfeel like givingupwhentheycannotsee the connectionbetween the knowledge theyare receivingand theirprospectsforthe future.”90 Conclusion While itisapparentthat the Indonesiangovernmentmade significantinvestmentsinEastTimor’s educationsystemof increasingscale overtime andthatthese investmentsdidtranslateintoarapid expansionof the half-island’seducationatthe primary,secondaryandtertiaryeducationlevels,it was nonethelessthe case thatthe qualityof educationprovidedandthe learningoutcomesit engenderedwere poorthroughoutthe occupation.Thiswasindicatedbylow ratesof literacyand school completionaswell asbythe highratesof grade repetitionandpoorgraduate employability. 87For key findings and evidenceon the relationshipsbetween health, nutrition,cognitive development and educational performance,see Matthew C.H. Jukes, Lesley J. Drake and Donald A.P. Bundy, “School Health Nutrition and Education for All”, Centre for Agricultural Biosciences International,2008.Retrieved 13 March 2012 from http://bookshop.cabi.org/Uploads/Books/PDF/9781845933111/9781845933111.pdf 88See Mubyarto et al, ‘East Timor: The Impact of Integration’, p.40 89This interpretation was given in S. Sherlock, ‘Political Economy of the East Timor Conflict’, p. 837 90See Mubyarto et al, ‘East Timor: The Impact of Integration’, p.40
  • 31. 31 Althoughseveral featuresof the Indonesianruneducationsystemcanbe putforwardas explanationsforthese failuresincludingthe under-resourcingof institutions,the focusonskillsthat were incompatible withthe needsof vital economicsectorsandeverydaylife,andthe use of the educationsystemasan instrumentof social control,itshouldbe recognisedthatpoorsocial and economicconditionsprevalentinthe contextof anongoingoccupationandgenocide,alsohada devastatingeffectonlearningoutcomes.
  • 32. 32 Chapter 2 The Failure of Pembangunan in East Timor: East Timor’s Health Care System Under Indonesian Occupation and Genocide Introduction The developmentof EastTimor’shealthcare sectormirroredthat of the educationsystemduring the occupationand genocide. Throughitssubstantial investments,the Indonesianadministration presidedoveramarkedexpansionof EastTimor’shealthcare system.Nevertheless,itisapparent that inthisperiodhealthoutcomesexperiencedbythe populationwere abysmal.Thisfailure canbe attributedfirstly,toresource misallocationswithinahealthcare systemthatwas pervadedby corruption,mismanagementandexcessive redtape leavingitunable toprovide servicesof sufficient quantityandqualitytomeetthe needsof the population;secondly,tothe deliberate use of East Timor’shealthcare systemas an instrumentof social control evidencedmostnotoriouslybyitsbirth control programmes;andthirdly,tothe poor social andeconomicconditionsthatwere prevalentin the contextof an ongoingoccupationandgenocide. Investment in the Health Care System The significantandincreasinginvestmentsmade bythe IndonesiangovernmentinEastTimor’s healthcare sector duringthe first15 yearsof the occupation,suggeststhatitsdevelopmentwas clearlya priorityforthe occupyingpower.While the healthcare sectorwasonlyallocated650 millionRupiahthroughBudgetPost16 duringthe fourthdevelopmentplan(RepelitaIV 1983/84 – 1988/89), givingitthe joint9th greatestshare at 2.5 percent inBP-16 funds,Saldanhaarguesthatit receivedsignificant additional capital throughPresidentialInstructionprojectsbringingthe total quantityof capital allocatedtowardthe healthcare sectorduringRepelitaIV intoline withstated
  • 33. 33 priorities.91 Duringthe 1988/89 to 1992/1993 period,the healthcare sectorreceivedsubstantially more both inabsolute termsandrelative toothersectorsthroughthe developmentbudget(i.e., income andexpenditure budget) takingan11.7 per cent of share or 15.175 billionRupiahin allocatedfunds. Among19 competingeconomicsectors,thiswasthe thirdhighestallocationof fundsaffordedfromthe developmentbudgetduringRepelitaV.92 These investmentsledtoamarkedexpansioninEastTimor’shealthcare systemduringthe first15 yearsof occupationwhere the numbersof hospitals,clinics,doctors,nursesandmidwivesinEast Timorall “rose greatly”.93 Thisisillustratedbydataintable 2.1 below anda host of other sources. Where the Portuguese hadestablishedonlyone mainhospital(the DrCarvalhoHospital) toservice the territory’sentire population,table 2.1revealsthatby1990, the Indonesianshadestablishedan additional 9hospitalsaswell as230 healthcare centres.94 Thiscoincidedwithasignificantexpansion inthe contingentof medical personal workinginEastTimor. It is estimatedthatatthe endof Portuguese rule in1974 East Timorhad justoverone hundredmedical personnel andonly2 specialists,12 to 14 doctorsand around88 to 120 nurseswere employedinthe territory.95 In 91See J. Saldanha, ‘The Political Economy’, p.162 and Table4.4 Allocation of Special Budget Post 16 by sector duringthe Fourth Development Plan in J. Saldanha, ‘The Political Economy’, p.161 92For health’s sharein East Timor’s development budget between 1988/89 and 1992/93,see J. Saldanha, ‘The Political Economy’, p.167. For the sizeof East Timor’s development budget in the 1988/89 to 1992/93 period see Table4.6 Allocation Development Budget by Sector in Income and Expenditure Budget for East Timor 1998/1989-1992/93 (Rp.000,000) in Saldanha, ‘The Political Economy’, p. 166. 93Saldanha argues thatthe convergence of these factors resulted in a significantincreasein the volume of patients usingthe health caresystem although there is no statistical evidenceto supportthis claim.See J. Saldanha,‘The Political Economy’ p.247 94Bill Nicol,‘Timor: The Stillborn Nation’, Camberwell, 1978,p. 25 95For the number of medical specialists in EastTimor atthe end of Portuguese rule,see B. Nicol, ‘Timor: The Stillborn Nation’, p.25 For the number of doctors working in EastTimor at the end of Portuguese rule, see B. Nicol,‘Timor: The Stillborn Nation’, p.25; and CAVR interview with Sue Ingram,Dili,5 August 2004 cited in ‘Chega!’ Final Report
  • 34. 34 contrast,table 2.1 revealsthatby1990, East Timor hada contingentof 741 medical personnel, comprising144 doctors,490 nursesand 107 midwives.ThisgrowthinEastTimor’smedical workforce duringthe first15 years of occupationiscorroboratedby othersourceswhichshow,for instance,thatin1992, 190 doctorsand dentistsaswell as660 nursesand 200 midwiveswereinthe province,placingthe overallnumberof medical staff atwell inexcessof 1,000 for that year.96 While nodata are available onthe capital investmentsmade bythe IndonesiangovernmentinEast Timor’shealthcare systemduringthe lasttenyearsof the occupation,the continuedpatternof expansioninthe healthcare systemoverthisperiodsuggeststhattheywere significant.According to the World HealthOrganisation(WHO),the numberof medical personnel workinginEastTimor had increasedsubstantiallyduringthe 1990’s to include 38 dentists,156 general practitioners,1,144 nurses,9 to 12 medical specialistsand51 nutritionistsaswell as2,376 auxiliarypersonnel bythe end of the decade.97 Itshouldalsobe notedthatthe numberof midwiveshadreached442 by 1995 and that the constructionof 11 modernhospitalsindistrictcapitalsand60 healthcare centresinthe largervillageshadtakenplace between1990 and 1999.98 This leftthe territorywithanestimated67 clinics(healthcare centres),309sub clinicsandwhatshouldhave been21 districthospitalsatthe time of Indonesia’swithdrawal.99 of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor’, Chapter 7.9 Economic and Social Rights, October 2005,p.29 For the number of nurses workingin EastTimor at the end of Portuguese rule,see interview with Sue Ingram cited in ‘Chega!’, Chapter 7.9, p.29 96Gavin W. Jones, ‘Social Policy Issues in EastTimor:Education and Health’, in East Timor: Development Challenges for the World’s Newest Nation, eds. Hal Hill and Joao M. Saldanha,2001,p.267 97For World Health Organisation estimates on the number and types of medical personnel working in East Timor prior to Indonesia’s withdrawal in 1999,seeTable 5.9: Health Care Personnel in Jon Pedersen and Marie Arneberg (editors), ‘Social and Economic Conditions in East Timor’, International ConflictResolution Program School of International and Public Affairs,Columbia University,New York, 1999,p.88. There are competing estimates on the numbers and types of medical personnel workingin EastTimor during the late 1990’s.Accordingto the 1999 Joint assessmentmission,there were 160 doctors and 1,000 nurses in East Timor prior to the escalation of violencein the late 1990’s.See Joint Assessment Mission,EastTimor- Buildinga Nation,A Framework for Reconstruction and Development, November 1999,p.1 cited in ‘Chega!’, Chapter 7.9, pp. 31. In comparison,Povey and Mercer placed the number of doctors and nurses in East Timor at 398 and 1877 respectively in 1997.See George Povey and Mary Anne Mercer, ‘East Timor in Transition: Health and Health Care’, International Journal of Health Services: Planning, Administration, 32,2002, p.612. For the same year (1997),the Indonesian department of health claims thatthere were 7 medical specialists, 134 general practitioners,383 midwives,1,124 nurses,58 dental nurses and 30 dentists in Eas t Timor totalling 1736 personnel. See BPS 1998, Timor Timur dalamanka (EastTimor in Figures) cited in Table5.9: Health Care Personnel,J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p.88. 98For the number of midwives in East Timor in 1995 see Table5.9: Health CarePersonnel, J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p.81. For the construction of hospitals and clinicsduringthe1990’s,see G. Povey and M. Mercer, ‘East Timor in Transition’,p.612 99 If it is accepted that 11 hospitalswere constructed in the 1990’s and that 10 hospitalshad already been established by 1990,then 21 hospitalswould havebeen expected to existin the provinceat the time of
  • 35. 35 Furtherevidence of investmentinEastTimor’shealthsystemduringthe 1990’s can be discerned fromstatisticsshowingsignificantgrowthinspecifichealthprogrammes.Forexample,statistics fromthe IndonesianNational SocioEconomicHouseholdSurvey(SUSENAS) andSP2TPProvincial Program andDistrictHealthProfile,show anexpansionof EastTimor’simmunisationprogramme duringthe 1990’s. Accordingto SUSENAS,the rate of full immunisationcoveragefor childrenunder 5 yearsof age inEast Timorincreasedfrom49 per centin 1995 to 59 percent by1998 withdata fromSP2TP revealingthatthiscoincidedwithsuccessive decreasesinthe immunisationdrop-out rate overthree years,fallingfrom16.7per centin 1995 to 12.8 per centin1996 andthento 7.7 per centin 1997.100 ExpansionwasalsoevidentinEastTimor’sfamilyplanningprogramme duringthe 1990’s duringwhichtime the numberof dedicatedclinicsoperatedbythe familyplanningboard increasedfrom78 in 1990/91 to 113 in1997/98.101 Health Outcomes Mortality Rates in East Timor 1975-1999 In spite of the significantinvestmentsthatwere made bythe IndonesiangovernmentinEastTimor’s healthcare system,the healthoutcomesexperiencedbythe populationinthisperiodwereabysmal. Thiswas indicated,firstof all,throughEastTimor’sastronomicallyhighmortalityrate.Beginningthe occupationwitha populationof lessthan700,000,102 Fretilinandthe CatholicChurchcontendthat as many as 300,000 people mayhave losttheirlivestofactorsassociatedwiththe occupationand Indonesia’s withdrawal.However, all indicationssuggestthat there were no more than 10 operational hospitalsin EastTimor at the beginningof 1999 where Jones places the number at 10 whileMorris and the 1999 Joint Assessment Mission placethe number at 8. See G. Jones, ‘Education and Health’, p.267; Kelly Morris,‘Growing Pains of EastTimor: Health of an infantnation’, The Lancet, 357, London, 2001, p.873; Joint Assessment Mission, p.1 cited in ‘Chega!’, Chapter 7.9, p.31. For the number of clinics(community health centres) and sub clinics in EastTimor atthe end of the occupation,see Joint Assessment Mission,pp.1 cited in ‘Chega!’, Chapter 7.9, p.31. For the sake of comparison,Jones places the number of clinics(community health centres) and sub-clinicsoperatingin East Timor in 1999 at 70 and 250 respectively. See G. Jones, ‘Education and Health’, p.267 100For the SUSENAS data on the rates of immunisation coveragein 1995 and 1998, see ‘Chega!’, Chapter 7.9, pp. 29. For the ST2TP data on the vaccination drop-outrates in East Timor from 1995 to 1997,see J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p.78. 101See BPS 1998,p.105 cited in J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p.76 102East Timor’s population was projected to hit 689,055 in 1975 havingincreased by 3 per cent from 649,084 in 1973 to 668,771 in 1974.For EastTimor’s population in 1974 see, G.J. Aditjondro, In the Shaddow of Mt Ramelau, ‘The Impact of the Occupation of East Timor’, Leiden: INDOC cited in Table2.1 Total Population and Historical Development, J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, Social and Economic Conditions, pp.180. East Timor’s population in 1973 was calculated by takinga simpleaverage of three estimates for the population in that year which were given in Table2.1 Total Population and Historical Development, J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg, Social and Economic Conditions, p.180.
  • 36. 36 genocide inthe interveningperiodthroughto1999.103 Amongthese factors,itis instructive thatthe poor healthof the populationwasveryimportant. Infact,the CommissionforTruthand Reconciliationdeterminedin2005 that only18 per centof conflict-relatedfatalitiesinthe 24 years from1975 to 1999 had resulteddirectlyfromactsof violence withchronichungerandillnessbeing responsible forthe remaining82 percent of fatalities.104 East Timor’shighoverall mortalityrate canalsobe analysedintermsof more specificindicators.In termsof childmortality,the evidence isdamning. Forinstance,Taylorcitesanaverage rate of 50 to 60 per centinthe periodfrom1980 to 1986, representingnoimprovementoverlevelswhich had prevailedunderPortuguese rule.105 While the TruthandReconciliationCommissionprovidesa substantiallylowerestimateof the childmortalityrate in1980 at 24 percent,it nevertheless acknowledgesthatevenafterfallingto15.7 percent in1996, the childmortalityrate wasstill higher than inany Indonesianprovince andforthatmatter “byany standard”.106 While itisdifficultto establishanycleartrendinthe rate of infantmortalityduringthe occupationasnumeroussources presentestimates thatvaryerraticallyovertime andappearto be inconsistentwitheachother(see table 2.2 below),itshouldneverthelessbe recognisedthatthese estimateswere highbythe standardsof developingcountriesintheirrespective years.The TruthandReconciliation Commissionnotedforexample,thatEastTimor’sinfantmortalityrate wasstill “more thantriple the Indonesianaverage in1996”.107 103For Fretilin’s estimateon the number of deaths caused by the occupation and genocide see Appendix 7 in Naldo Rei, ‘Resistance: A Childhood Fighting for East Timor’, St Lucia,2007,p.327. For the Catholic Church’s estimate see Irena Cristalis,‘East Timor: A Nation’s Bitter Dawn’, London and New York, 2009,pp.116. Peter Carey estimates that 308,000 EastTimorese died in consequence of the occupation and genocide between 1975 and 1981 suggestinga higher overall figurefor mortality duringthe occupation than those put forward by even Fretilin and the Catholic Church.See Peter Carey and Steve Cox, ‘Generations of Resistance: East Timor’, London and New York, 1995,p.34. 104See the United Nations Report for the Commission of Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) cited in N. Rei, ‘Resistance’, p.327 and I.Cristalis,‘EastTimor: A Nation’s Bitter Dawn’, p.116. 105For the average child mortality ratein the period spanningfrom 1980 to 1986 see John G. Taylor, ‘East Timor: The Price of Freedom’, London and New York, 1999, p.164. For the child mortality ratein the lastyears of Portuguese rule, see The World Health Statistics Annual,1973- 76, Vol.3, UN Publications,New York, 1976 cited in J. Taylor,‘East Timor: The Priceof Freedom’, p.18 106‘Chega!’, Chapter 7.9, p.29 107These investments appear even more impotent in lightof Pedersen and Arneberg’s assertion that reductions in infantand child mortality rates duringthe 1990’s owed more to the influx of healthier transmigrantfamiliesrather than to a general improvement in the health of the population.See J. Pedersen and M. Arneberg. ‘Social and Economic Conditions’, p.63-64. For the comments of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission,see ‘Chega!’, Chapter 7.9, p. 29