A full analysis of Jervois Global including: Specifications for their 2 refineries Specifications for their 2 deposits and comparisons between them and those of their peers

1. Analysis of Jervois Global Ltd
A cobalt company with a share in an operational cobalt refinery in
Finland, a cobalt and nickel refinery in Brazil, a cobalt- copper- gold
deposit being developed in Idaho, USA and a nickel- cobalt deposit in
NSW, Australia.

2. Contents
Cobalt- The main commodity concerning Jervois:
• Slide 3: Cobalt Uses and Price
• Slide 4: Cobalt’s Role and Potential Replicability in Lithium-Ion Batteries
• Slide 5: Cobalt, the Congo and China Part 1- Corruption and Investigation
• Slide 6: Cobalt, the Congo and China Part 2- Unrest and the Chinese Reaction
Analysis of Jervois Global (ASX- JRV)
• Slide 7: Jervois (JRV) Stock Information
• Slide 8: Jervois Share Price Movement and Events
• Slide 9: Kokkola Cobalt Refinery in Finland
• Slide 10: Sao Miguel Paulista (SMP) Refinery in Brazil
• Slide 11: Mine in Development in Idaho, USA
• Slide 12: Nico Young Deposit in NSW
• Slide 13: Debt, Cash and Available Project Funding
• Slide 14: Conclusions

3. Cobalt Uses and Price
• Cobalt’s main use is in lithium ion batteries for EVs
and power storage devices which are often used in
conjunction with non-base-load green energy
solutions such as solar panels. Cobalt is also used
in alloys to increase wear, temperature and
corrosion resistance and as a catalyst in chemical
applications such as it’s function as a “drying
agent” in paints and varnishes.
• Cobalt is an expensive commodity, it’s price range
of US$22,000-95,000/t over the last 10 years is
significantly higher than other base metals such as
copper; US$4,250-10,400/t and nickel; US$8,000-
20,800/t.
• The massive price increase between 2017 and
2019 occurred along with lithium and nickel as a
result of the battery metal boom as electric
vehicles (EVs) sales increased. That battery boom
was largely a result of the Chinese government’s
subsidies on EVs which were reduced in 2019. The
current boom has been less reliant on a single
factor, it’s been a result of individuals around the
world using lithium-ion batteries to reduce their
carbon footprint.
10 Year Cobalt Price Chart (USD/t)
Cobalt Demand Realised and Projected in
Tonnes, From CRU

4. Cobalt’s Role and Potential
Replicability in Lithium-Ion Batteries
• In lithium-ion (Li-ion) battery chemistry, the cathode (or
positive part) of the battery is usually made of a
combination of nickel, cobalt, manganese and
aluminum:
• Cobalt is key for boosting energy density, safety and
battery life.
• Nickel alone would give the most energy-dense
batteries, meaning cars with longer driving range, but
it is unstable and reactive.
• Manganese and aluminum have no benefit to the
performance of a lithium-ion battery. Because they’re
much cheaper than cobalt or nickel, they’re sometimes
included to reduce costs.
• There are many initiatives to reduce the cobalt
content in batteries. Commercially scalable Li-ion
batteries with added power and energy density
provided by nickel, benefit greatly from cobalt which
provides safety. There currently are and will continue
to be low-cobalt and cobalt free Li-ion batteries, but
they’ll be inferior, and the long lasting (each charge

5. Cobalt, the Congo and China Part 1- Corruption and Investigation
Democratic Republic of the Congo (the DRC) produced 72% of
the world’s cobalt supply in 2019, it’s also home to most of the
world’s cobalt reserves. By December 2020, Chinese government
connected mining companies controlled 15/19 (79%) of the
cobalt mines in the DRC. 79% of the DRC cobalt production
represents about 57% of the world’s cobalt supply.
In December 2018, the new president of the DRC, Félix
Tshisekedi was elected to replace the previous leader; Joseph
Kabila. Since that time, information has come to light which
brings into question the legitimacy of the deals made between
Joseph Kabila and Chinese, government backed mining
companies:
• A recent leak of bank documents shows how a Chinese-
run company moved tens of millions of dollars to
former Congo President Joseph Kabila’s family
and allies. The timing of the bank transfers largely line up
with the former president allowing the Chinese
companies to take control of most of the DRC’s mines,
despite China not having fulfilled many of its
commitments to build infrastructure in the DRC.
• The documents indicate that at least US$138M of state
funds were transferred to Joseph Kabila’s family.
• An investigation has begun into the accusation that China
Molybdenum, the company that bought two cobalt mines in the
DRC, might have cheated the Congolese government out of
billions of dollars in royalty payments. The company risks being
expelled from Congo.
72%
4%
4%
3%
3%
2%
2%
2%
8%
2019 Cobalt Production (t)
Congo Russia Australia
Philippines Cuba Madagascar
PNG Canada other

6. Cobalt, the Congo and China Part 2- Unrest and the Chinese Reaction
Aside from the corruption which is believed to be responsible for the
Chinese gaining control over the DRC’s cobalt mining industry,
numerous other issues have arisen which will likely constrain
production going into the future:
• There are currently investigations underway looking into alleged
coverups of safety incidents at Chinese owned cobalt mines in the
DRC.
• Tenke Fungurume is a cobalt mine in the DRC which China
Molybdenum took over from US miner Freeport-McMoRan in 2016. In
2019, an illegal digger at Tenke Fungurume was shot dead by DRC
security forces after they were called in by China Molybdenum to
remove the trespassers, several others were injured by stray bullets.
Riots in local villages followed the violence.
• In November 2021, 2 Chinese citizens were killed by local militia at a
mine site in the DRC.
• On November 20, 2021, 5 Chinese citizens were kidnapped from a
gold mine in the DRC.
• By December 2, 2021, the Chinese government had called upon it’s
citizens to leave 3 provinces of the DRC.
If Chinese mining companies leave the DRC, it will at least temporarily
cause massive cobalt supply issues, at the same time as EV uptake is
increasing cobalt demand. If these issues continue, traders can
reasonably expect an unprecedented spike in the cobalt price.
Illegal Cobalt Mining in the DRC
Militants in the DRC

7. Jervois (JRV) Stock Information
• JRV has a long history going right back to 1999,
however they’ve recently acquired several assets
which have completely changed their business.
• JRV has no P/E or dividend yield. They are unlikely
to pay a dividend for the next few years as they
invest to expand their business. They are however
currently receiving income and aren’t just a mine
exploration/development company.
• Their current income steam comes from them
recently acquiring rights to 40% of the production
from an operational cobalt refinery in Finland.
This deal was concluded on the 1st of September
2021.
• Their next income stream will come from an
underground cobalt mine in Idaho USA is
expected to come online in Q3 of 2022.
Jervois Historic Share Price Chart:

8. Jervois Share Price Movement and Events
• At the beginning of the chart above, JRV owned just 1 large, low grade nickel-cobalt ore deposit in
NSW called Nico Young.
• Jervois has undergone many significant changes over the last 5 years, some of these include:
Merging with 2 Canadian companies and listing on the TSX and CTCQB in the USA. One of those
companies owned JRV’s current priority mining project: Idaho Cobalt Operations (ICO).
 Acquiring the Sao Miguel Paulista Nickel-Cobalt Refinery in Brazil.
Acquiring rights to 40% of the production at the Kokkola Cobalt Refinery in Finland.
• These mergers and acquisitions have diluted their original shareholders’ positions in JRV, but
provided significant diversification, in both the business area and geographical location. The 2
refinery acquisitions were well timed; completed when the cobalt price was much lower than today.
March 2018: First battery
metals boom, cobalt
climbed from US$22K/t
early 2016 to US$94K/t.
Nov 2017: JRV
updates Nico Young
resource.
July 2019: Cobalt price hits 2
year low of US$26K
June 2019: JRV merges with Canadian company
M2 Cobalt, acquiring exploration assets in
Uganda. They also list on the TSX.
April 2019: JRV completes merger
with Canadian explorer “eCobalt
Solutions” gaining the Idaho
Project August 2019: JRV commences
trading in the USA
Sep 2020: JRV
acquires Sao Miguel
Paulista nickel cobalt
refinery in Brazil.
Sep 2021: JRV
acquires rights to
40% capacity at
Kokkola cobalt
refinery in Finland.
Trend Line: +300% in 19 months

9. Kokkola Cobalt Refinery in Finland
• On the 2nd of September 2021, JRV announced that it had acquired
rights to 40% of the refinery capacity at Kokkola from Freeport Cobalt,
this represents approximately 6,250t/year and the rights are valid
until 2093.
• Kokkola Refinery is managed by Umicore which owns the other 60% of
production and manages the refinery. Jervois’ share of production is
refined into powers and chemicals whilst Umicore makes its share into
battery precursor materials. The cost of refining JRV’s share of the
cobalt is: cost price + 5% (Umicore’s fee for operating the refinery).
• Between 2018 and 2021, the EBITDA on JRV’s share of the cobalt
production averaged to US$38M/year. In 2018 when cobalt averaged
US$36/lb, the EBITDA was US$83M. At the current cobalt price of
US$69,800/t (US$31.5/lb), they’ll likely achieve an EBITDA in the
US$60-80M range.
• JRV has long term offtake contracts for their production of cobalt
powders and chemicals. JRV also has “volume protection” agreements
in place for 70-80% of their supply of cobalt to refine until 2025.
• The price agreed upon was US$160M for the acquisition, however the
final price paid was US$192M due to a higher than expected cobalt
inventory which was included in the deal. Depending on the refinery’s
financial performance from 2022 to 2026, JRV may need to pay
Freeport an additional fee of up to US$40M.
Kokkola Refinery in Finland

10. Sao Miguel Paulista (SMP) Refinery in Brazil
• In September 2020, JRV announced that it had acquired
100% of the Sao Miguel Paulista (SMP) Nickel-Cobalt
Refinery in Brazil for US$22.5M payable in tranches.
• Under it’s previous owner, before being placed on care and
maintenance in 2016, the refinery’s capacity was
25,000t/year of nickel (for batteries) and 2,000t/year of
cobalt.
• JRV is considering 3 scenarios for the restart of the refinery,
processing 2,000-8,000t/year of cobalt and up to
10,000t/year of nickel with a pre-production CAPEX cost of
US$13.5-27M.
• The acquisition of the refinery allows for a US$200M saving
from the feasibility study on their Nico Young project in
Australia as compared to constructing the refinery locally.
• JRV also plans to process cobalt concentrate from their
Idaho Cobalt Project at SMP Refinery which will reduce
costs.
Location

11. Mine in Development in Idaho, USA
• In the above chart, JRV’s Idaho Cobalt Operation (ICO) has the highest cobalt resource grade, giving maximal exposure to the cobalt price.
0.63% copper (Cu) is slightly lower than ICO’s peers at 0.7-0.71% and ICO is the only project in the list containing gold (Au). At current prices,
approximately 75% of income would come from cobalt, 17% from copper and 8% from gold.
• In terms of “AUD /(t of ore) of valuable commodities”, ICO is the lowest on the list at AUD$534/t, it also has the lowest “nickel equivalent
grade” (despite containing no nickel) at 1.86%. In terms of “Mt nickel equivalent contained”, ICO is 4th out of 6 which isn’t very high.
• Whilst ICO will almost certainly be a profitable underground operation, it is inferior to many on the list which along with JRV having the 3rd
highest enterprise value of 5 companies, seems like bad value. However, the entire company; JRV is good value compared to it’s peers, this is
because they have 3 other high quality assets besides for ICO; 2 refineries and 1 other established ore deposit. Panoramic Resources and
Mincor by comparison only own the Savannah and Cassini deposits which are still not producing saleable commodities.
• Aside from ICO which is in the USA, the other 5 underground projects in the list are in Australia.
• ICO is currently under construction and fully funded to production which is expected in Q3 2022. The bulk feasibility study estimated that the
operating cost will be US$7.45/lb of cobalt produced (after copper and gold credits) which compares favourably to the current cobalt price of
around US$31.5/lb. It’s estimated that the mine will produce 1,915t/year of cobalt for 7 years, have an EBITDA of US$54.8M/year and EBITDA
margin of 52%.
• Before JRV took them over, eCobalt spent C$135M (Canadian) at ICO, the bulk feasibility study completed in September 2020 estimated an
additional US$78.4M was needed to bring the project to production.
Underground Projects of ASX Listed Miners Which Contain Nickel or Cobalt

12. Nico Young Deposit in NSW
• The above chart compares the nickel-cobalt laterite deposits of ASX listed companies. Laterite is oxide ore, laterite
deposits are larger but harder to process than sulphide ore (such as that contained in the projects on slide 11).
• JRV owns the Nico Young Project which has the 2nd largest “ore resource” in the chart. Nico Young has the lowest
“nickel resource grade” and the 2nd lowest “cobalt resource grade” out of the 4 projects listed. Nico Young has the
lowest “AUD of valuable commodities /t of ore” and “nickel equivalent grade”. Nico Young has the 2nd lowest “Mt
nickel equivalent contained”.
• With an orebody which is in many ways inferior to it’s peers and the highest “enterprise value” at over 6x the next
largest and over 20x the smallest listed peer, Jervois doesn’t appear to be good value. However the listed resources are
the only assets of the other 3 companies, whereas JRV has 2 refineries (one of which is currently making money) and
the Idaho Cobalt Operation (ICO), which is due to begin production in Q3 2022.
• The true value of JRV doesn’t come from either of it’s resource deposits alone, but the ability to vertically integrate
their operations to have full control and make all of the profit from mining, concentrating the ore and finally
producing a nickel or cobalt product which is ready to be used in batteries or other industrial applications.
• The fact that their share in Kokkola Refinery is currently making money and ICO is very close to producing, provides JRV
with alternative funding sources for projects such as Nico Young, where their listed peers will need to raise large sums
of money from shareholders (diluting holdings) or take on large amounts of debt (increasing risk).
• Using feasibility studies of peers indicates that the CAPEX cost for Nico Young will be in the A$500M-A$1500M range.
Open Pit Laterite Projects of ASX Listed Miners Which Contain Cobalt

13. Debt, Cash and Available Project Funding
• Capital Raisings and share issues:
Dec 2017- 22.655M shares @ A$0.56/share, raised A$12.7M.
April 2019- 262.4M new shares issued to shareholders of eCobalt + 47M
warrants which may have been exercised, for a total of 309.4M shares.
June 2019- 63.8M shares issued at a 1-1 ratio to M2 Cobalt share holders
to acquire the company.
June 2019- 82.5M shares @ A$0.2/share, raised $16.5M.
Oct 2020- 145.7M shares @ A$0.305/share, raised A$45M.
Aug 2021- approximately 711M shares issued @ A$0.44/share for
A$313M comprising retail and institutional components.
• In order to gain capital, JRV has created 962M shares since December
2017 for A$387M, the average raising price was A$0.40/share
• In their merger and acquisition activity, JRV issued a further 373M
shares, therefore the total new shares created since December 2017
were 1,335M shares. There are currently about 1.5B JRV shares,
meaning that 89% of JRV’s shares have been created since Dec 2017.
• Debt:
July 2021- Jervois sold US$100M of bonds to fund ICO
construction. The coupon rate of the debt is 12.5%/year with
a 2% discount, indicating a 10.5%/year interest rate. The
tenor of the loan is 5 years, meaning that it needs to be repaid
by July 2026.
October 2021- Jervois “executed a committed facility
agreement with Mercuria” to borrow up to US$75M with a
maturity date of 31st of December 2024. The interest rate on
the debt is LIBOR + 5%, the current LIBOR 1 year rate is 0.46%,
indicating a 5.46% yearly interest rate. The “standby facility”
can be drawn when needed by JRV.
Available Funding:
In their September 2021 quarterly activity report, JRV had cash and equivalents of A$43M and hadn’t used their US$100M of bond
funding (A$139M at the time), giving total available funding of A$182M. Since that time, the Mercuria facility has increased that by
US$75M, giving A$288M of available funding (not taking into account their 4th quarter spending and income which haven’t been
announced).

14. Conclusions:
Upside:
• JRV is a very diversified company with a clear focus on cobalt and nickel. They have projects in Australia, the USA,
Brazil and Finland giving significant geographical diversification. Their projects are also varied, with 2 refineries, a
small-scale underground sulphide mine and a large scale, large pre-production CAPEX nickel-cobalt laterite project.
• JRV has some current income from the rights to 40% production of Kokkola Refinery, as well as additional near-term
income sources from the Idaho Cobalt Operation, expected to enter production Q3 2022 and the SMP Refinery in
Brazil which requires minimal capital and time to refurbish.
• Development of their Nico Young Deposit which can be expected to cost A$500M-A$1,500M is much more likely to be
possible given the various sources of funding JRV now has and is currently bringing online.
• Access to approximately A$288M will fund their current development objectives.
• JRV’s current and near-term operations are heavily leveraged to the cobalt price which currently has significant upside
due to geopolitical events.
• Downside:
• Although they haven’t spent their borrowings yet, JRV have issued US$100M at a coupon rate of 10.5% after discount,
that’s a significant amount of interest to pay each year. Their standby facility of US$75M at LIBOR + 5% is a much
lower interest rate and therefore poses less risk.
• The Kokkola Refinery has “volume protection” agreements in place for 70-80% of their supply of cobalt to refine until
2025, however until they bring their mines online, becoming undersupplied from mined sources of cobalt is a
possibility which would hurt their bottom line. After refurbishment, the same scenario is a possibility at their SMP
Refinery in Brazil. At full production, ICO in the USA is expected to provide 1,915t/year of cobalt in concentrate, just
under their minimum capacity at the SMP Refinery and less than ½ of their share of Kokkola Refinery’s capacity.
Because of this, until their Nico Young mine is operational, JRV’s refineries will largely rely on external cobalt supplies.
• Their mining projects aren’t the best among their peers, meaning that in a cobalt price crash, they’d likely run into
some problems. However, with the current market conditions, a cobalt price crash seems very unlikely.

15. Appendix:
• Slide 3:
https://tradingeconomics.com/commodity/cobalt
https://www.mining.com/web/graphic-shortages-flagged-for-ev-materials-lithium-and-cobalt/cobalt-demand-by-end-use/
• Slide 4:
https://cen.acs.org/energy/energy-storage-/Lithium-ion-batteries-cobalt-free/98/i29
https://electrek.co/2016/11/01/breakdown-raw-materials-tesla-batteries-possible-bottleneck/
https://www.greencarcongress.com/2010/01/bcg-20100108.html
• Slides 5 and 6:
https://www.nsenergybusiness.com/features/top-cobalt-producing-countries/
https://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/market-insights/latest-news/metals/120120-chinese-dominance-of-drc-mining-sector-increases-economic-
dependence-mines-chamber
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/20/world/china-congo-cobalt.html
https://www.voanews.com/a/two-chinese-nationals-killed-others-kidnapped-in-eastern-congo---army/6328048.html
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2021-11-28/africa-s-biggest-data-leak-reveals-china-money-role-in-kabila-s-congo-looting
https://www.mining.com/chinese-embassy-calls-upon-citizens-to-leave-three-provinces-in-the-drc/
https://news.yahoo.com/woman-killed-dr-congo-illegal-mining-crackdown-111034047.html
https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/china-calls-citizens-leave-eastern-congo-attacks-81485883
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2018_Democratic_Republic_of_the_Congo_general_election
https://www.indiablooms.com/world-details/SA/30657/congo-pressure-mounts-between-chinese-cobalt-mine-workers-and-their-chinese-
bosses.html

16. • Slides 7 and 8:
https://www.google.com/search?q=asx+jrv&oq=asx+jrv&aqs=chrome.0.69i59j0i131i433i512l3j69i65l3j69i60.1605j0j4&so
urceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8&shem=ssmd
• Slide 9:
https://www.miningweekly.com/article/jervois-to-buy-finland-cobalt-refining-business-for-160m-2021-07-27
https://recyclinginternational.com/non-ferrous-metals/cobalt-umicore/26272/
https://www.mining-journal.com/m-amp-a/news/1376945/umicore-completes-ususd203-million-kokkola-acquisition
• Slide 10:
https://cdn-api.markitdigital.com/apiman-gateway/ASX/asx-research/1.0/file/2924-02286607-
3A551269?access_token=83ff96335c2d45a094df02a206a39ff4
• Slide 11 and 12:
The charts were taken from the following excel spreadsheet:
which was compiled using announcements to the ASX for the relevant companies.
• Slide 13:
The dates discussed were taken from ASX announcements and compiled with links in the word document:
• Slide 14
Is a summary of the other slides, further discussion and links to more documents are available in the Word document
above.