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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF THE STATE OF MAJOR
IN AND FOR JAMNER COUNTY, MAJOR
GRETCHEN and HANS SUMMERS ) CASE NO.: 12-12345
Individually and as Administrators, )
Personal Representatives of the )
Estate of BRUNO SUMMERS, )
deceased, )
And as guardians for )
AMANDA and RONNIE SUMMERS; )
RONNIE SUMMERS, individually and )
DEBORAH SUMMERS, individually, )
Plaintiffs,
v.
M.C. DAVOLA )
and JANE DAVOLA, his wife; )
And the GARAGE tavern CORPORATION )
Defendant.
______________________________/
Plaintiff’s Response and Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion in
Limine
Plaintiffs, Gretchen and Hans SUMMERS, Deborah Summers (hereinafter “PLAINTIFFS”), by
and through the undersigned counsel, hereby file this Memorandum of Law in Opposition to
Defendant, M.C. DAVOLA and his wife, Jane DAVOLA’s (hereinafter “DEFENDANTS”)
Motion in Limine and state:
I. COUNTER-STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. The August 20, 2011 Incident
On August 20, 2011, after consuming alcohol provided to them at the Garage tavern
through employees of the tavern, Tom Donaldson and Mary Apple, Ed Hard and Bruno
Summers had a physical altercation. The altercation began when Ed Hard approached Bruno
Summers and his future wife, Deborah. Ed Hard had previously dated Deborah. Ed made
advances to Deborah. Bruno Summers got up to leave and told Deborah to come with him. Ed
Hard then grabbed Bruno Summers by the shoulder. Summers struck Hard in the mouth, causing
Hard to fall to the floor. Upon seeing the fight, Tom Donaldson ordered both parties to leave the
bar. Afterwards, Donaldson informed the owner of the tavern, Davola about the incident. Davola
told Donaldson to keep an eye on both Hard and Summers to try and avoid future trouble. After
the fight, Apple remembered muttering that she should not have served them (meaning Hard and
Summers).
B. The September 3, 2011 Incident
On September 3, 2011, both Ed Hard and Bruno Summers were at the Garage tavern
again. Both parties had consumed alcohol served to them by the same employees of the tavern
who served them on the August 20th incident, Tom Donaldson and Marry Apple. Bruno
Summers, at one point, went to the bathroom. Soon after, Ed Hard went to the bathroom as well
where the to subsequently met, at which point, Ed fired a gun hitting Bruno Summers in the
chest. An Ambulance was called to the scene. Bruno Summers eventually died in the hospital.
II. ARGUMENT
A. Even if a prediction from an expert witness might be unreliable, it affects only
the weight of such evidence and not its admissibility; therefore, such expert
testimony should be permitted.
Defendants argues that Dr. David Bowman’s opinions about what lay persons, Tom
Donaldson, and Mary Apple, would have believed under the circumstances are unreliable and
therefore, should not be admitted. The Plaintiffs disagree.
Major Rules of Evidence 702 dealing with testimony by experts states:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, education, may testify thereto in the form of
an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has
applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. Maj. R. Evid. 702.
“The competency of [psychiatric predictions] ha[ve] been repeatedly allowed because the
expert has the power to draw inferences from facts which a jury would not be competent to
draw.” Engdoll v. Guy, 269 Maj. 3d 26 (2003).
“Major courts allow opinion testimony concerning matters about which the juror may
have general knowledge if the expert opinion will still aid in the jury’s understanding of the facts
of the issue.” Id.
In Engdoll v. Guy, the Court of Major found that:
The fact that such predictions may be inaccurate affects the weight of such
evidence and not its admissibility. Thus, doubt about the reliability and usefulness of
these predictions can be called to the attention of the jury through opposing counsel’s
direct and cross-examination. Juries should be presented with all relevant information
regardless of the inaccuracies involved. Psychiatric opinion testimony will aid the trier of
fact in its search for the truth. Id.
Here, Defendants argue that Dr. Bowman’s opinions are unreliable and that the testimony
of Dr. Bowman does not meet prong two of the M.R.E 702., and so should be barred. As there is
no further argument as to how it does not meet the second prong, not much can be argued other
than it does meet all three prongs, the second prong included; as demonstrated below.
As a licensed, practicing clinical psychologist, Dr. Bowman was educated (at the
University of Texas where he received his Ph.D. in Clinical Psychology), received training (was
an intern for 1 year at Western State Hospital), and has experience (19 years) as a licensed
clinical psychologist (10 of the most recent years spent as Chief Psychologist at Western State
Hospital), and with that has the knowledge and skill necessary to be deemed a qualified expert
witness capable of giving competent testimony on the matter of psychological issues; i.e.
Donaldson and Apple’s mental capacity to predict that violence would occur between Bruno
Summers and Edward Hard. The testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, and though
Defendants disagree, polling 26 people frequent customers to the tavern coupled with Dr.
Bowman’s knowledge of psychology and the facts of this case are sufficient; therefore, the first
prong is met. The second prong (emphasis added) is satisfied because, as a licensed
psychologist, Dr. Bowman knows what methods and principles are necessary to create a
psychological study and thus, come to a conclusion based on those methods. For this study, Dr.
Bowman polled 26 people, researched the facts of the case, and used his own education,
knowledge, and skill to come to a conclusion based on these reliable principles and methods that
all psychologists use. The third prong is also met due to as Dr. Bowman polled not only 26
people but 26 regular Garage tavern customers. This, in addition to Dr. Bowman’s knowledge of
the facts of the case, coupled with his own knowledge about psychology, creates a sufficient
basis to conclude that Dr. Bowman applied reliable principles and methods, many psychologists
use, to the facts of this case.
Defendants attempt to discredit the testimony through “opinions of the court and
scientific journal.” However, the scientific journals are secondary authority and thus, are
superceded by primary authority, i.e. Engdoll v. Guy. In addition, the opinions Defendants rely
on are merely the minority opinions which are trumped by their majority counter-parts.
As to the matter of Dr. Bowman’s opinions’ reliability or the existence of any bias, that
must be determined by the trier of fact, not the trier of law. As stated in Engdoll v. Guy, the jury
should be presented with all relevant information regardless of the inaccuracies involved. Also,
nowhere in the Major Rules of Evidence or the case law does it proscribe evidence being
admitted on the basis of bias.
B. The probative value of Dr. Bowman’s testimony is not substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.
“The competency of [psychiatric predictions] ha[ve] been repeatedly allowed because the
expert has the power to draw inferences from facts which a jury would not be competent to
draw.” Engdoll v. Guy, 269 Maj. 3d 26 (2003).
“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”
Maj. R. Evid. 403.
Here, the expert testimony by Dr. Bowman should be permitted as he is a licensed and
practicing clinical psychologist and is therefore, an individual who is competent and capable of
discussing the matter of Tom Donaldson and Mary Apple’s ability to predict that violence would
occur between Bruno Summers and Edward Hard; an inference from facts which a jury would
not be competent to draw on their own.
Defendants claim that Dr. Bowman’s theory is bias and that he did not have an open
mind when constructing his study, nor did he poll enough individuals. However, there is no rule
of evidence that precludes testimony due to the bias nature of it, for if there was, any testimony
by a family member or friend of a plaintiff or a defendant would be excluded. Once again, the
accuracy of a study or opinion can be and is determined by the jury and does not prevent its
admissibility. The bias of the witness is also something a jury is to take into account, not the trier
of law, and does not affect a piece of evidence’s admissibility. In addition, Defendants will have
the ability to raise of issues of bias or concerns about the study’s accuracy on cross-examination,
thus eliminating any unfair prejudice since Defendants may use their own expert testimony to
inform the jury as to the other side of the argument. Therefore, while the Court does have broad
discretion to exclude testimony, such discretion should not be used when doing so would remove
relevant evidence from the jury, especially when such evidence is not unfairly prejudicial and
which the opposing counsel is provided the opportunity to cross-examine it.
In addition, to say there is no basis to the study would be to ignore the study and the
sample size all together. There was a basis for the study. The persuasiveness and accuracy of the
study, however, should be left for the jury to determine. As the testimony satisfied all three
prongs of MRE 702, it is difficult to argue that such evidence fits within the limiting restriction
of M.R.E. 403 relevant but improper evidence rule.
Therefore, since the testimony of Dr. Bowman’s probative value does not substantially
(emphasis added) outweigh any of the dangers listed under M.R.E. 403, the evidence should not
be excluded.
C. Engdoll v. Guy is not so different from the case at bar as to prevent proper
comparison and application of the principles present in the case.
Engdoll v. Guy sets out a two element test used to justify the admittance of opinion
testimony: First, the subject of the inference must be distinctively related to some science,
profession, or occupation beyond the knowledge of the average layman. Id. Second, the witness
must have sufficient skill, knowledge, or experience ‘in the field as to make it appear that the
opinion or inference will probably aid the trier of fact in search of the truth. Id.
Here, the Defendants argue that Engdoll v. Guy is different from the case at bar.
Defendants state, it is “…more probable for a person to believe a murderer will have a tendency
for violence then to say that workers at a bar should have known some random customers
propensity for violence on one fight.” While that may be true, such does not go to the
admissibility of the evidence, but rather merely goes to its believability, which the jury, the
finder of fact, should be left to decide. Though the expert testimony relied on in Engdoll v. Guy
was different, the general principles drawn from the case can still be applied and are applicable
to this current proceeding. One such principle is the two prong test set out in the case, which can
be applied to the current case. The first prong of the test is satisfied because the subject of the
inference is a licensed and practicing clinical psychologist and therefore, his testimony as to
Donaldson and Apple’s ability to predict that Hard and Summers would act violently towards
one another, is distinctively related to the science and profession of psychology, which as Dr.
Bowman’s occupation, provides him with information and insight beyond that of an average
layman with regards to such matters. The second prong is met and surpassed because Dr.
Bowman, as a 19-year licensed clinical psychologist with a Ph.D., has sufficient skill,
knowledge, and experience in the field of clinical psychology to have his opinion and inferences
aid the trier of fact in its search for the truth (much less make it appear as to probably do such).
Thus, the proposed testimony should be admitted as competent opinion evidence. The
prediction that Tom Donaldson and Mary Apple could have known that Ed Hard and Bruno
Summers would engage in violence towards each other is distinctively related to the study of
human behavior which Dr. Bowman is well versed in, as a clinical psychologist. Such
psychiatric opinion testimony will only aid the trier of fact in its search for the truth. The fact
that the jury may be competent to make its own predictions should not preclude admission since
such testimony may aid the jury on its understanding of the issue. “Even though psychiatric
predictions have been labeled inaccurate, other authorities suggest that the inherent inaccuracies
may be overrated. Regardless, the fact the inaccuracies may exist should not preclude such
testimony. Any inaccuracies that do exist affect the weight of the testimony and not its
admissibility. It follows that such evidence should be properly admitted.” State v. Galvin, 287
Maj. 3d 26 (2011). Therefore, though the Court may be the “gatekeeper” with regard to expert
testimony, it should not build walls to blindly prevent such evidence from reaching the ultimate
trier of fact. Because the methodology behind Dr. Bowman’s testimony is reasonable and has
been used and proven an effect method of study (polls are relied on with numerous facets of
everyday life and psychiatric evidence have been accepted in Major Courts as sufficient expert
testimony evidence), the expert testimony should be admitted for the jury to decide on its
accuracy and persuasiveness; not the trier of law or opposing counsel.
III. CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs, respectfully requests that this Court DENY Defendants’
Motion in Limine Order directing Plaintiffs, their witnesses, and attorneys to not make any
mention, oral or written, of the above referenced items at any time during the voir dire or trial of
this matter.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
WE HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of this, Plaintiff’s Response and
Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion in Limine, was served via E-mail, on
this 26th day of March, 2012, to: LAW OFFICE OF SAM GOLDBERG, 45 West 45 Street, New
York, New York.
GRIM & ASSOCIATES, P.A.
Attorney for Plaintiffs
123 Ocean Drive, Suit 456
Lauderdale by the Sea, FL 33308
Telephone: (954) 555-5555
Facsimile: (954) 555-5556
By: _C. Kevin Grim____________
C. Kevin Grim, Esq.
Fla. Bar #378902

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Adv. Trial Ad Response to Motion in Limine

  • 1. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF MAJOR IN AND FOR JAMNER COUNTY, MAJOR GRETCHEN and HANS SUMMERS ) CASE NO.: 12-12345 Individually and as Administrators, ) Personal Representatives of the ) Estate of BRUNO SUMMERS, ) deceased, ) And as guardians for ) AMANDA and RONNIE SUMMERS; ) RONNIE SUMMERS, individually and ) DEBORAH SUMMERS, individually, ) Plaintiffs, v. M.C. DAVOLA ) and JANE DAVOLA, his wife; ) And the GARAGE tavern CORPORATION ) Defendant. ______________________________/ Plaintiff’s Response and Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion in Limine Plaintiffs, Gretchen and Hans SUMMERS, Deborah Summers (hereinafter “PLAINTIFFS”), by and through the undersigned counsel, hereby file this Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant, M.C. DAVOLA and his wife, Jane DAVOLA’s (hereinafter “DEFENDANTS”) Motion in Limine and state: I. COUNTER-STATEMENT OF FACTS A. The August 20, 2011 Incident On August 20, 2011, after consuming alcohol provided to them at the Garage tavern through employees of the tavern, Tom Donaldson and Mary Apple, Ed Hard and Bruno Summers had a physical altercation. The altercation began when Ed Hard approached Bruno
  • 2. Summers and his future wife, Deborah. Ed Hard had previously dated Deborah. Ed made advances to Deborah. Bruno Summers got up to leave and told Deborah to come with him. Ed Hard then grabbed Bruno Summers by the shoulder. Summers struck Hard in the mouth, causing Hard to fall to the floor. Upon seeing the fight, Tom Donaldson ordered both parties to leave the bar. Afterwards, Donaldson informed the owner of the tavern, Davola about the incident. Davola told Donaldson to keep an eye on both Hard and Summers to try and avoid future trouble. After the fight, Apple remembered muttering that she should not have served them (meaning Hard and Summers). B. The September 3, 2011 Incident On September 3, 2011, both Ed Hard and Bruno Summers were at the Garage tavern again. Both parties had consumed alcohol served to them by the same employees of the tavern who served them on the August 20th incident, Tom Donaldson and Marry Apple. Bruno Summers, at one point, went to the bathroom. Soon after, Ed Hard went to the bathroom as well where the to subsequently met, at which point, Ed fired a gun hitting Bruno Summers in the chest. An Ambulance was called to the scene. Bruno Summers eventually died in the hospital. II. ARGUMENT A. Even if a prediction from an expert witness might be unreliable, it affects only the weight of such evidence and not its admissibility; therefore, such expert testimony should be permitted. Defendants argues that Dr. David Bowman’s opinions about what lay persons, Tom Donaldson, and Mary Apple, would have believed under the circumstances are unreliable and therefore, should not be admitted. The Plaintiffs disagree. Major Rules of Evidence 702 dealing with testimony by experts states: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, education, may testify thereto in the form of
  • 3. an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. Maj. R. Evid. 702. “The competency of [psychiatric predictions] ha[ve] been repeatedly allowed because the expert has the power to draw inferences from facts which a jury would not be competent to draw.” Engdoll v. Guy, 269 Maj. 3d 26 (2003). “Major courts allow opinion testimony concerning matters about which the juror may have general knowledge if the expert opinion will still aid in the jury’s understanding of the facts of the issue.” Id. In Engdoll v. Guy, the Court of Major found that: The fact that such predictions may be inaccurate affects the weight of such evidence and not its admissibility. Thus, doubt about the reliability and usefulness of these predictions can be called to the attention of the jury through opposing counsel’s direct and cross-examination. Juries should be presented with all relevant information regardless of the inaccuracies involved. Psychiatric opinion testimony will aid the trier of fact in its search for the truth. Id. Here, Defendants argue that Dr. Bowman’s opinions are unreliable and that the testimony of Dr. Bowman does not meet prong two of the M.R.E 702., and so should be barred. As there is no further argument as to how it does not meet the second prong, not much can be argued other than it does meet all three prongs, the second prong included; as demonstrated below. As a licensed, practicing clinical psychologist, Dr. Bowman was educated (at the University of Texas where he received his Ph.D. in Clinical Psychology), received training (was an intern for 1 year at Western State Hospital), and has experience (19 years) as a licensed clinical psychologist (10 of the most recent years spent as Chief Psychologist at Western State Hospital), and with that has the knowledge and skill necessary to be deemed a qualified expert witness capable of giving competent testimony on the matter of psychological issues; i.e. Donaldson and Apple’s mental capacity to predict that violence would occur between Bruno
  • 4. Summers and Edward Hard. The testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, and though Defendants disagree, polling 26 people frequent customers to the tavern coupled with Dr. Bowman’s knowledge of psychology and the facts of this case are sufficient; therefore, the first prong is met. The second prong (emphasis added) is satisfied because, as a licensed psychologist, Dr. Bowman knows what methods and principles are necessary to create a psychological study and thus, come to a conclusion based on those methods. For this study, Dr. Bowman polled 26 people, researched the facts of the case, and used his own education, knowledge, and skill to come to a conclusion based on these reliable principles and methods that all psychologists use. The third prong is also met due to as Dr. Bowman polled not only 26 people but 26 regular Garage tavern customers. This, in addition to Dr. Bowman’s knowledge of the facts of the case, coupled with his own knowledge about psychology, creates a sufficient basis to conclude that Dr. Bowman applied reliable principles and methods, many psychologists use, to the facts of this case. Defendants attempt to discredit the testimony through “opinions of the court and scientific journal.” However, the scientific journals are secondary authority and thus, are superceded by primary authority, i.e. Engdoll v. Guy. In addition, the opinions Defendants rely on are merely the minority opinions which are trumped by their majority counter-parts. As to the matter of Dr. Bowman’s opinions’ reliability or the existence of any bias, that must be determined by the trier of fact, not the trier of law. As stated in Engdoll v. Guy, the jury should be presented with all relevant information regardless of the inaccuracies involved. Also, nowhere in the Major Rules of Evidence or the case law does it proscribe evidence being admitted on the basis of bias.
  • 5. B. The probative value of Dr. Bowman’s testimony is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. “The competency of [psychiatric predictions] ha[ve] been repeatedly allowed because the expert has the power to draw inferences from facts which a jury would not be competent to draw.” Engdoll v. Guy, 269 Maj. 3d 26 (2003). “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Maj. R. Evid. 403. Here, the expert testimony by Dr. Bowman should be permitted as he is a licensed and practicing clinical psychologist and is therefore, an individual who is competent and capable of discussing the matter of Tom Donaldson and Mary Apple’s ability to predict that violence would occur between Bruno Summers and Edward Hard; an inference from facts which a jury would not be competent to draw on their own. Defendants claim that Dr. Bowman’s theory is bias and that he did not have an open mind when constructing his study, nor did he poll enough individuals. However, there is no rule of evidence that precludes testimony due to the bias nature of it, for if there was, any testimony by a family member or friend of a plaintiff or a defendant would be excluded. Once again, the accuracy of a study or opinion can be and is determined by the jury and does not prevent its admissibility. The bias of the witness is also something a jury is to take into account, not the trier of law, and does not affect a piece of evidence’s admissibility. In addition, Defendants will have the ability to raise of issues of bias or concerns about the study’s accuracy on cross-examination, thus eliminating any unfair prejudice since Defendants may use their own expert testimony to
  • 6. inform the jury as to the other side of the argument. Therefore, while the Court does have broad discretion to exclude testimony, such discretion should not be used when doing so would remove relevant evidence from the jury, especially when such evidence is not unfairly prejudicial and which the opposing counsel is provided the opportunity to cross-examine it. In addition, to say there is no basis to the study would be to ignore the study and the sample size all together. There was a basis for the study. The persuasiveness and accuracy of the study, however, should be left for the jury to determine. As the testimony satisfied all three prongs of MRE 702, it is difficult to argue that such evidence fits within the limiting restriction of M.R.E. 403 relevant but improper evidence rule. Therefore, since the testimony of Dr. Bowman’s probative value does not substantially (emphasis added) outweigh any of the dangers listed under M.R.E. 403, the evidence should not be excluded. C. Engdoll v. Guy is not so different from the case at bar as to prevent proper comparison and application of the principles present in the case. Engdoll v. Guy sets out a two element test used to justify the admittance of opinion testimony: First, the subject of the inference must be distinctively related to some science, profession, or occupation beyond the knowledge of the average layman. Id. Second, the witness must have sufficient skill, knowledge, or experience ‘in the field as to make it appear that the opinion or inference will probably aid the trier of fact in search of the truth. Id. Here, the Defendants argue that Engdoll v. Guy is different from the case at bar. Defendants state, it is “…more probable for a person to believe a murderer will have a tendency for violence then to say that workers at a bar should have known some random customers propensity for violence on one fight.” While that may be true, such does not go to the admissibility of the evidence, but rather merely goes to its believability, which the jury, the
  • 7. finder of fact, should be left to decide. Though the expert testimony relied on in Engdoll v. Guy was different, the general principles drawn from the case can still be applied and are applicable to this current proceeding. One such principle is the two prong test set out in the case, which can be applied to the current case. The first prong of the test is satisfied because the subject of the inference is a licensed and practicing clinical psychologist and therefore, his testimony as to Donaldson and Apple’s ability to predict that Hard and Summers would act violently towards one another, is distinctively related to the science and profession of psychology, which as Dr. Bowman’s occupation, provides him with information and insight beyond that of an average layman with regards to such matters. The second prong is met and surpassed because Dr. Bowman, as a 19-year licensed clinical psychologist with a Ph.D., has sufficient skill, knowledge, and experience in the field of clinical psychology to have his opinion and inferences aid the trier of fact in its search for the truth (much less make it appear as to probably do such). Thus, the proposed testimony should be admitted as competent opinion evidence. The prediction that Tom Donaldson and Mary Apple could have known that Ed Hard and Bruno Summers would engage in violence towards each other is distinctively related to the study of human behavior which Dr. Bowman is well versed in, as a clinical psychologist. Such psychiatric opinion testimony will only aid the trier of fact in its search for the truth. The fact that the jury may be competent to make its own predictions should not preclude admission since such testimony may aid the jury on its understanding of the issue. “Even though psychiatric predictions have been labeled inaccurate, other authorities suggest that the inherent inaccuracies may be overrated. Regardless, the fact the inaccuracies may exist should not preclude such testimony. Any inaccuracies that do exist affect the weight of the testimony and not its admissibility. It follows that such evidence should be properly admitted.” State v. Galvin, 287
  • 8. Maj. 3d 26 (2011). Therefore, though the Court may be the “gatekeeper” with regard to expert testimony, it should not build walls to blindly prevent such evidence from reaching the ultimate trier of fact. Because the methodology behind Dr. Bowman’s testimony is reasonable and has been used and proven an effect method of study (polls are relied on with numerous facets of everyday life and psychiatric evidence have been accepted in Major Courts as sufficient expert testimony evidence), the expert testimony should be admitted for the jury to decide on its accuracy and persuasiveness; not the trier of law or opposing counsel. III. CONCLUSION WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs, respectfully requests that this Court DENY Defendants’ Motion in Limine Order directing Plaintiffs, their witnesses, and attorneys to not make any mention, oral or written, of the above referenced items at any time during the voir dire or trial of this matter. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE WE HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of this, Plaintiff’s Response and Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion in Limine, was served via E-mail, on this 26th day of March, 2012, to: LAW OFFICE OF SAM GOLDBERG, 45 West 45 Street, New York, New York. GRIM & ASSOCIATES, P.A. Attorney for Plaintiffs 123 Ocean Drive, Suit 456 Lauderdale by the Sea, FL 33308 Telephone: (954) 555-5555 Facsimile: (954) 555-5556 By: _C. Kevin Grim____________ C. Kevin Grim, Esq. Fla. Bar #378902