1. 1
Is the view that the Suez Crisis sounded the death knell for the British Empire now
thoroughly outdated? (2500 words)
The general consensus amongmosthistorians, rangingfromDonaldMacleanin1970 to George
Pedenin2012, isthat the SuezCrisis of 1956, on itsown,didnot mark the deathof the British
Empire.Instead, otherfactorsbeyondthe SuezWar,includingBritisheconomicsandinternational
relations,causedalongertermbreakupof Anglo-colonialism.BrianLappingpresents anargument
whichcontraststo thisconsensus, andagreesthatBritain’sattackon Egypt markedthe deathknell
for Britain’s Empire. Criticisingthe previous, consensus based,workof LordHome and Anthony
Lowe;Lappingpresentssix assertionsonwhythe Europeanpowers’colonial policies,principally
Britain’s,came toa close after1956. These six themesare Americananti-colonial pressure,Europe’s
abilitytofund colonialism,HaroldMacmillan’s(PrimeMinister1957-63) policyof the ‘special
relationship’,the growthof colonial pressure against the Europeanpowers,the developmentof
Gamal Nasser(EgyptianPresident1956-1970) as an iconof Arab liberty,andthe SovietUnion’s
(USSR) movementintothe Europeans’ dominion markets.This essayistoevaluate Lapping’s
argument,andpropose thatthe consensus case,developedbythe majorityof historians,ismore
accurate. The viewthatthe SuezCrisissoundedthe deathknellforthe BritishEmpire isnot
outdated,butsimplyinaccurate.The closure of the Suez-Canal Crisis,significantinwakingup British
politicians tothe needforfurtherdecolonisation,waspartof a longer-termprocess,spanning
between 1945 and the 1970s, inBritain’stermination of itscolonial empire.ContinuedBritish
financial weaknessandinternationalpressure,from1945, markedthe true deathknell of the British
colonial empire.
Lappingisaccurate to an extent;the closure of the SuezWar didmark a major transitioninBritish
colonialism, withanewpushfora lager rate of decolonisation. Between1957 and 1964, ‘eighteen’1
Britishcolonieswere grantedindependence,includingNigeriaandUganda; between1945 and1957
the figure hadbeen ‘seven’2
.Furthermore,sources presentadramaticmovementof political
opiniontowardsdecolonisationafterthe SuezWar.Anthony Eden(Prime Minister1955-57), in
December1956, reflected over‘whatreturnforinstance dowe getfor our armoureddivisionin
Tripoli andLibya?’,and‘We cannot contemplate keepinganarmyin Germany’3
.The man, whohad
recentlysentBritishforces toEgyptfor the protectionof Britishinterestsinthe SuezCanal,
suggested amovementfromthis previous colonial policy towardsasmallerglobal union. This
immediate post-Suezthoughtcontinued underthe Macmillanadministration;governmentpapersof
April 1957 present:
1Martin Lynn, The British Empire in the 1950s:Retreat or Revival? (Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p.48
2 William McIntyre, British Decolonisation, 1946-1997:When, Why and How did the British Empire Fall (Palgrave Macmillan,
1998), pp.1-176.
3 Eden on the Lessons ofSuez (December 1956), quotedinAnthonyGorst, The Suez Crisis (Routledge, 1997), pp. 151-152

2. 2
‘the Governmentare satisfiedthatBritaincoulddischarge heroverseasresponsibilitiesand
make an effectivecontributiontothe defenceof the free worldwitharmedforcesmuchsmall than
at the present…’4
.
Macmillanis,further,recorded tellingthe South AfricanParliamentin1960 that a ‘windof change is
blowingthrough{Africa} the Continent’5
;‘We mustacceptitas a fact’6
,that Britain’scolonieshave
awakenedtotheirnational consciousness7
.Evidence showsthatBritain’s military spendingwas
organised todrop‘from 10 percent of Gross National Product’8
(GNP), the total value of production
and servicesby asingle nation’sresidents, inasingle yearin1957 to 7 per centin 1960’9
. A dropin
militaryspendingbyanationthat neededalarge combatantforce for control over itsoutposts,
presents agovernmentthatnolongerfound itdesirable,orefficient, tohave command overvast
distantlands.The governmentsof the late-1950sandintothe 1960s show a clearplanto make an
extensive shiftforwardsinthe decolonisationprocess. The SuezCrisisre-energizedand
strengthenedthe Britishdecolonisationprogramme.
Nonetheless,Lapping’sargumentisflawed.Hissecond assertion arguesthatNasserbecame an
example forotherMiddle-EasternandAfrican colonies onhow tobreakfromthe yoke of European
imperialism.WithEgypt’s 1956 successin keepingthe colonial powersof France and Britainat bay, it
gave nationalisticleadersthe confidence totrythe same.As a result,the colonial powersinfluence
overtheircoloniesweakened.10
Thisimpressionisnot entirely accurate,however.Britain,though
weakened inglobal influence,didmanage tokeep acolonial empire of sortstogetherfornearly
twenty-yearsafterSuez.Britainpaidandledthe Trucial OmanScouts(soldiersforkeeping orderin
the PersianGulf Sheikhdoms),andkeptmilitarybasisinBahrain,Sharjah,andOman intothe 1960s.
Likewise,Britainonly dismantledits Far-EastEmpire inthe 1970s, withLabour’s policy toaccelerate
Britishmilitary withdrawalsEastof Suez. Evenwithtermination of the Britishcolonial empire,an
empire of sortssurvivedbeyond the 1970s, withthe continueduse of the Commonwealth. As
Gordon Martel indicates,observance of the BritishEmpire’ssurvival shouldnotsolelybe of itsvast
colonies11
;insteaditshould be notedthatthere wasa transitioninBritain’sempire toa more
autonomous,andeconomicbased,relationship. Britainin2014, withElizabethIIas head,keeps its
influentposition overglobal economics; havingitssayoveran organisationwhich in2013 provided
‘15 percent’12
of the world’sGNP, andincludesnationsfromaroundthe globe.
As well as failingtoacknowledge the BritishEmpire’slong-termsurvival,Lappingfailstoappreciate
longstandingfactors thatcontributed todecolonisation, impactingmuchearlierthan1956. Lapping
assertsthat afterthe decolonisationof the late-1940s,suchas in IndiaandPalestine, the European
4‘The Sandys White Paper’ (April 1957), quotedinAnthonyGorst, The Suez Crisis (Routledge, 1997), pp. 154-155.
5 ‘Speech bythe HaroldMacmillan to the SouthAfricanParliament’ (3 February1960), quoted in Gorst, The Suez Crisis
(Routledge, 1997), p159.
6 ‘Macmillanto South AfricanParliament’, p159.
7 ‘Macmillan to SouthAfricanParliament’, p159.
8 AnthonyGorst andLewis Johnman, The Suez Crisis (Routledge, 1997), p.156
9 AnthonyGorst andLewis Johnman, The Suez p.156
10 Brian Lapping, ‘Did Suez Hasten The End Of Empire?’, ContemporaryBritish History, Vol. 1, no. 2 (1987), pp. 32-33.
11 Gordon Martel, ‘Decolonisationafter Suez:Retreat or Rationalisation?’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 46,
no.3 (2000), p.416.
12 ‘The role andfuture of the commonwealth’, Publicationandrecords,
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmfaff/writev/commonwealth/com05.htm;consulted21
March 2014.

3. 3
powers, particularlythe British,showednoinclinationtoquittheir remainingcolonies.13
Thisessay
perceives thisviewasinaccurate.Britainwasinsupportof decolonisationof itsempire. A letterfrom
a treasuryofficial toa memberof the Colonial Office,individuals therefore whowouldhave been
aware of WinstonChurchill’s colonialpolicy,recordsthat‘evenif the moneywere forthcoming,
there are veryfewwinnersinthe Colonial Empire’14
.Thisissupportedbya1950 Colonial Office
International DepartmentPaper, the officialcolonial policyof Churchill’s Britain,whichreportsthat:
‘We believethatwhenourcoloniesachieve self-government,if notall,will choosetofollow the
recentexample of Ceylonandremaininthe Commonwealth’15
.
Additionally, OliverLyttelton, ColonialSecretary (1951-1954), informedthe House of Commons that
Churchill’sgovernmentwould help‘the Colonial territoriestoattainself-governmentwithinthe
BritishCommonwealth.’16
The early-1950sConservativegovernmentsdid notignore the issue of
decolonizationof the BritishEmpire,insteadwerereadyand opentocontinue its process.In
Addition,Lappingis inaccurate toplace somuch emphasis singularlyonthe SuezCrisis.Thisessay,
matchingto historians suchasJohn DarwinandR.F Holland, insteadarguesthatthe endof World
War Twowas the true deathknell of the BritishEmpire. Americanpressure andthe tragicBritish
economy slowlykilled imperialismoverthe nextthirtyyears. These themesare discussed inthe next
twosectionsof this essay.
The UnitedStates’ anti-colonial pressurefrom1945, throughthe fearof financial strain forcolonial
nations, markedthe deathknell of the Britishcolonial empire.AsPedenargues,the SuezCrisis
merelyconfirmedBritain’sdependence onAmerica.17
The UnitedKingdomfinished WorldWarTwo
ina financially feeble state;in1946 AmericawasrequiredtolendBritain‘$3.5 billion’18
toprevent
bankruptcy. Financial support fromThe White House toDowningStreet continuedthroughthe
decadeswith Marshall Aid(1948-50), Defence Aid(1951-57), andAmericansupportforthe stability
of the pound,famouslyin1966. Britain,due tothislarge economicdependencyto anti-colonial
America, wasprincipally apolitical‘stooge’of the UnitedStates,ratherthanan independentpower.
The UnitedStates is presentedasanti-imperialistwiththe EisenhowerDoctrine of 1957, ‘ourdesire
isa worldenvironmentof freedom,notservitude…’,19
aprinciple thatBritainandFrance contrasted
to at the time.Furtherevidence comesfromDenisHealey(Defence Secretary 1964-1970), an
individualwhowouldhave beenknowledgeable of foreignpolicies.Healeyrecorded thatAmerica,
since the 1940s, had triedto getBritainout of Asia,the Middle East,and Africa.20
The subordinate
Europeanempires, forthe mostpart,remainedalive atthe whim of Americaninclination.Thislong-
13 BrianLapping, ‘Did Suez’, pp. 31-33.
14 BritishTreasury, TreasuryDisenchantment with Colonial Development (1952), quotedin Nicholas J. White,
Decolonisation: The British Experience since 1945 (Pearson, 1999), p. 111.
15 The Official Aim of British Colonial Policy(May 1950), quotedinNicholasJ.White, Decolonisation:The British Experience
since 1945 (Pearson, 1999), p.109.
16 William McIntyre, British Decolonisation, 1946-1997:When, Why and How did the British Empire Fall (Palgrave
Macmillan, 1998), p.38.
17 G. C Peden, ‘Suez andBritain’s decline as a worldpower’, The Historical Journal, Vol. 55, no. 4 (2012), p.1073.
18 JudithMBrown, The Oxford historyof the British Empire:Volume IV; The Twentieth Century (Oxford UniversityPress,
2001) , p.332 .
19 ‘The Eisenhower Doctrine’ (5 January1957), quoted inAnthonyGorst, The Suez Crisis (Routledge, 1997), p.157.
20 TingvoldTore Peterson, ‘Crossingthe Rubicon?Britain’s withdrawal fromthe Middle East, 1964-1968:A Bibliographical
Review’, The International History Review, Vo.22, no. 2 (2000), p.339.

4. 4
termservitude of Britain toAmericaispresentedin the successful 1953 OperationAjax; the planof
Anglo-American intelligence servicesto influence Iranian politicsby havingMohammadMosaddegh
(IranianPrime Minister1952-1953) dismissedfromoffice.Nonetheless,whenthe Britishwishedto
undertake similartacticswith Nasserin1956, the UnitedStatesdismissedBritishimperialistic
requirements;DwightEisenhoweradvisedEdenthatdiplomaticmeasuresshouldbe undertaken
before anyactiontook place.21
WhenEurope dismissedAmericaninfluence,asdidthe Dutch when
tryingto keeptheirFar-EastEmpire22
,butmore importantlywithEdeninEgypt,Americawasable to
regaincontrol withthe contractionof financial support.The large strainonthe Britisheconomy,due
to the Americanresponse toSuez, causedanetlossto British reservesof the sumof ‘$300
million’23
byDecember1956. Britain,atthe same time, wasforcedto remove itstroopsfromEgypt.
There is significance;shownperfectlyin 1956’s Punch, that Britaincan be treatedas a ‘naughty
school child’24
,forced toretreatfromEgyptianterritory.Punch analogized thiswithBritainbeing
forcedto write lines forthe Americaninfluenced UnitedNations. Atthe same time asBritain’s
retreatfromEgypt, the USSR was able tokeepholdof itsempire throughthe suppressionof the
HungarianRevolution.The difference betweenBritain’sandthe USSR’s position caneasilybe seenin
the second’sindependence fromthe UnitedStates. Thoughnotbeingimmediately killedoff,the
large lossof Britishindependenceinregardstoforeignpolicywasthe deathknell of Anglo-
colonialism. The viewthatthe SuezCrisissoundedthe deathknell forthe BritishEmpire isnot
outdatedbutthoroughlywrong.The SuezCrisiswassimplypartof longtermthemesfrom1945,
includingBritishdependence toanti-colonialAmerica,which truly markedthe true deathof the
Britishcolonial empire.
So far thisessayhasevaluated andlargely rejectedthe argument of Lapping, thatthe SuezCrisis,
exclusively,soundedthe deathknell of the Britishcolonial empire.Instead,thisessay proposes that
Americananti-colonial pressure from1945, throughfinancial power,markedthe true deathknell of
empire.Fromthispoint,thisessayistopropose the secondlong-termtheme of Britishimperialism’s
end:DowningStreet’s longstandingeconomicfailurepost-1945.Contrastingsomewhat toJudith
Brown’spoint25
, there seems three focal periods of Britishdecolonisation:The Attlee government,
the Macmillangovernment andconclusion withthe 1964-1976 governments.Itis significantthatat
all these pointsBritainfacedconsiderableeconomichardship.The first wasmarkedwith American
economicsalvation,andadrop in BritishGNPto one-fifthof the UnitedStates’.The second was
markedwiththe memoryof Britain’s1956 economicsuffering due toAmerica;contemporary belief
was thatabout ‘$300 million26
hadbeenlost,alongwithadecrease inthe value of the pound. The
thirdis markedwith Britain’sdipto‘twelfth’27
inglobal GrossDomesticProduction(valueof the
total goodsand servicesproduced,andkept,by asingle nation,inasingle year);in1950 Britainhad
21 ‘Eisenhower warns Edenagainst use of force’ (31 July1956), quotedinAnthonyGorst, The Suez Crisis (Routledge, 1997),
pp.65-66.
22 JudithMBrown, The Oxford historyof the British Empire, p.332.
23 AnthonyGorst andLewis Johnman, The Suez, p.144
24 ‘Punch’s view of the UN and the Suez Crisis’ (November, 1956), quoted in AnthonyGorst, The Suez Crisis (Routledge,
1997), p. 124
25 JudithMBrown, The Oxford, p.330
26‘MacmillanReveals the Economic Positionto the Cabinet’ (20 November 1956), quoted in AnthonyGorst, The Suez Crisis
(Routledge, 1997), P.140.
27 DavidSanders, Losing an Empire, Finding a Role: British Foreign Policy Since 1945 (Palgrave Macmillan, 1990), p. 117.

5. 5
ranked‘seventh’28
. Britain’s1964 overall deficitalso reached ‘£400 millionperannum;the deficits
for 1955-1960 had reacheda maximumof £250 million’29
.Moreover,indocumentsrelatingtothe
after-effectsonBritainfrom Suezthere islittle reference toBritishforeignrelationsorprestige.
Instead,the dominanttheme iseconomicbased.Eden inDecember1956 wrote that‘we must
ensure ourfinancial and economicindependence’30
;continuously suggestingwaysthatBritaincould
save money31
.Macmillanalsoreferred tothe priorityof financialstability inhisNeedforEconomics
speech32
,andDenisHealey(SecretaryforState 1964-1970) isnotedin hisdeterminationtoreduce
the defence ‘budgettobelow £1,850 million33
.Thiswould requirecuttingbetween ‘£250 million
and £400 millionbyhalvingourexpenditure Eastof Suez’34
.Evidentlythere isapowerful link
betweenBritain’scontinuedandintensified economicdeterioration withthe continuationand
intensification of itsdecolonisationprogramme. The SuezCrisis,onitsown,didnotmark the death
knell of the Britishcolonial empire.Instead,Britisheconomicdecline, withAmericananti-colonial
pressure between1945 and the 1970s markedthe deathknell of the colonial empire.
Thisessayhas examinedwhetherthe historiographical view,presentedbyhistorians suchas
Lapping,thatthe SuezCrisismarkedthe deathknell forthe BritishEmpire isvalid andrelevant.This
essay’sargumentwassetinthree sections.The firstexaminedthe significance of the SuezCrisis,and
arguedthat Lappingisinaccurate to place so much emphasisonthis single event.The Britishcolonial
empire survivedwellbeyondSuez,lastingforalmosttwenty-yearsafterBritain’sretreatfromEgypt.
Lappingfailstoplace enoughrecognitiontothe decolonizationprocesspre-1956,insteadmaking
assumptionssolelyonthe periodaroundMacmillan’s timeinoffice.Lapping’sargumentisnot
outdated,butinaccurate;mosthistorians, examplesbeingDarwinandDavidSanders,writing at
similarperiods, were partof a consensusthat Britain’scolonial adventure wasajourneybeyond
1956. The SuezWar’s consequencesforBritishdecolonisationweremerelypartof long-term
themes. The endof WorldWar Twomarkedthe true deathknell of the Britishcolonial empire.
Britain’s submissionto anti-colonialAmerica,alongwith the continuation andintensification of
financial problems,meantthe nearimpossibilityof durable occupationof copiousforeignterritories
by Britishforces. The mid-1970s markedthe culminationof these problems,andthe Britishdecision
to finallycomplete itsdecolonizationjourney. Nonetheless,anempire of economics,alongwith
greateremancipationof nations,throughthe Commonwealth,hassurvivedtothe present.
28 DavidSanders, Losing an, p. 117.
29 AnthonyGorst andLewis Johnman, The Suez, p.161.
30 ‘Eden on the Lessons of Suez’, p.151.
31 ‘Eden on the Lessons of Suez’, p.151.
32 Macmillan Reveals the Economic Position to the Cabinet (20 November 1956), quotedinAnthonyGorst, The Suez Crisis
(Routledge, 1997), p153.
33 ‘The Labour Government andDefence Commitments’ (22 October 1966), quoted in AnthonyGorst, The Suez Crisis
(Routledge, 1997), p. 162.
34 ‘The Labour Government andDefence Commitments’, p.162.

6. 6
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7. 7
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8. 8