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HistoryPolicyPaper
Britain’s long and fragile relationship with Brussels: advice for the
Coalition
Brian Haines
Executive Summary
 The Coalition leaders have failed to refer sufficiently to history when making their
focal points for Britain’s relationship with Brussels. Lessons from the past could be
learned and parallels noted for David Cameron and Nick Clegg to be aware of.
 Cameron must prevent from making reform of the European Union (EU) his focal
foreign policy. The desire for reform over the years has continually failed, and
Cameron’s attempt shows only failure.
 The importance of Brussels for Britain’s economy must be fused with other
arguments. The British have never been pro-European, and the weakness of specific
European regions could destroy Nick Clegg’s dreamof a Continental Britain.
 The claimthat Britain without Europe will be isolated is a flawed claim. Britain has
always had strong global connections; working well with other states in areas of
defence and promotion of culture.
 When Cameron and Clegg make judgments of what the future of Europe will be, they
fail to learn the lesson of their predecessors: predictions of Europe are difficult,
embarrassing, and harmful to the parties involved.
2
Britain’s European Problem
The United Kingdom faces a pivotal point in its relationship with its European neighbours,
particularly with those who are part of the EU. The recent global financial crisis (2008-2013)
has brutally impacted many European economies; the Germans have recently had to agree
to a further aid package of 110 billion Euros for their Greek partnersi. In 2013, Spain and
Ireland kept high unemployment levels of over-15%.ii Constant images of the failure of the
European project, including widespread concerns of Eastern European migration to Britain,
shown on television and printed in newspapers, have intensified the question of Britain’s
place in the European project.
This debate has been further fuelled by Cameron’s promise that a 2015 electoral victory by
the Conservatives would mean a referendum on British participation in the EU. The Prime
Minister’s actions have clearly had a strong impact; it seems that the European question is
now a topic of discussion on every British political programme, but also has started to
appear on various genres of television, an example being the evening topical programme
The One Showiii.
The height of this Europe debate was reached in Spring 2014. Whilst Cameron failed to find
allies in German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Francois Hollande, Nick
Clegg presented his pro-Europe argument during two live debates against UKIP-leader Nigel
Farage. The Coalition’s argument on British participation in Europe has focused on three
main areas: Cameron’s promise to fight for reform of the EU, Clegg’s focus on the
importance of the EU for Britain’s economy and Clegg’s view of a Britain without Europe as
a ‘Billy no-mates’iv in the world, losing its political standing. This paper is to show that these
issues are not specific to 2014, but instead have a long standing history which the Coalition
partnership should refer back to. Supporters of the Coalition, who read this paper, and
which to avoid its future downfall, should use their influence to change the government’s
argument. The Coalition would benefit from having a similar policy to that of the Miliband
Labour Partyv: downplaying the importance of the European debate and focusing on
domestic issues.vi
Reform Promise? Not a new issue!
Along with his promise of a 2017 referendum, Cameron has promised to fight for reform of
Europe, including reform of immigration laws, the level of red tape for businesses and
liberation of British police officers from European interference.vii Cameron, however, is
likely to be doomed in this quest. Britain has often attempted to reform through changing
the minds of other European leaders. This history goes back beyond the 1973-referendum,
which is often quoted by politicians. The Coalition government neglects to remember that
the UK was late in joining the European project, due the Westminster leadership having
3
conflicting ideas with continental leaders regarding nations European and global
commitments. In 1963, French President, Charles De Gaulle, vetoed UK membership of the
Common Market (ECC) only a few months after Anglo-American cooperation on the
production of submarine nuclear weapons. Britain’s desire to keep a close relationship with
the United States, whilst in Europe, contrasting to French desires, largely influenced Britain’s
inability to join the European partnership. This failure for Britain to get its desired position in
Europe, due to French opposition, would continue for over a decade.
Even with British entry into the ECC, British governments did not end their attempt to
reform and change Europe for British personal desires. Prime Minister Edward Heath quickly
gained a reputation as an ‘awkward European’viii due to his continued reluctance to accept
ECC legislation. Heath failed to achieve his policy to establish Britain a special place in
Europe, including allowing Britain to have different conditions to the other member states.
Sir Con O’Neil (main British negotiator to the Community) said in 1973 that, ‘Indeed, Britain
had to swallow [European legislation] the lot, and swallow it now’ix. Whilst Heath reported
that ‘we [the Conservatives] are not satisfied with the European Community as it stands
today’x. The Heath Government was unable to reform Europe for Britain’s specific needs.
The continental leaders’ opposition to reform made a strong barrier for British desires.
This failure to achieve large scale reform of Europe, through the decades, has a strong
comparison to the present. A Prime Minister is again searching European Parliaments for
allies to reform Europe. The response to his search, in the words of De Gaulle, will likely be
‘non’. Once again politicians in France and Germany have different plans for Europe to those
in London. During the state visit of Hollande to Britain in January 2014, the French President
said treaty change to the EU was ‘not a priority for the time being’xi. Even with the expected
centre-right ally of Merkel, Cameron has found resistance. Coinciding with the past, the
Germans present themselves as unwilling to support complaints from London. Merkel, after
a lavish state visit in March 2014, told Cameron that she would ‘disappoint those wanting
fundamental reform’xii. Akin to the era of De Gaulle and German Chancellor Willy Brandt
(1969-1974), the near future shows no good sign for British reform of Europe.
Brussels? Only in for the Money
British Deputy Prime Minister Clegg (2010-2015) presented his focal argument for Britain to
remain part of Europe during the 2014 television debates against Nigel Farage. Clegg’s focal
point was financial with his claimthat ‘three million jobs depend on Britain’s membership of
the EU’xiii, and British trade depends on union with Brusselsxiv. If Clegg wants the Liberal
Democrats to succeed in the Coalition Government, he should stop placing emphasis upon
the financial aspects of the EU. He is missing a fundamental point: whether Britain sees itself
as European and wants to be part of Europe on terms other than finance. The United
Kingdom, since the origins of a European union in the 1920s, has never been in support of a
4
large European project. During a 1929 League of Nations summit French Prime Minister
Aristide Briand proposed closer cooperation between the European states. Briand even
referred to a ‘Common Market’; something which the United Kingdom was desperate to join
just-over thirty years. London quickly and loudly disclosed its protest of the idea. This
opposition, with the effects of the Great Depression and the rise of European fascism, killed
off the idea of the Common Market until after World War Two.xv
In the late 1950s Prime Minister Anthony Eden and Chancellor Harold Macmillan opposed
large scale British involvement in a European project. In 1957 they declined to sign the
Treaty of Rome, which set up the ECC, resulting in Britain’s lack of influence in European
policy for the next sixteen-years. Only with the impact of heavy financial hardship upon
Britain, resulting from WW2 and the Suez Crisis (1956), whilst the European economies
rocketed ahead, did Macmillan apply to be part of the European Club. By the early-1960s
Britain had lost $300 millionxvi in its wealth and seen a dramatic drop in the value of the
pound.
Remembrance of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s relationship with the ECC is
dominated by her 1984 budget renegotiation and her parliament speech of October 1990,
rejecting further integration between Britain and Europe. Her famous line in 1990 was ‘No,
No, No’xvii. Even into the twenty-first century, Britain was only a reluctant active partner in
Europe, seeking focally financially benefits, instead of culture and diplomacy. It has to be
remembered that Britain never joined the Euro currency like the majority of European
nations. Clegg should be wary of his financial argument for Britain’s involvement in Europe.
Only 17%xviii of twenty-first century Britons are prepared to be labelled as European. This is
in comparison to 70%xix who are prepared to be labelled as solely British. Furthermore, only
27%xx polled said they trust the European Parliament. The British, like in the past, show a
reluctance to be part of Europe.
Europe today continues to struggle in economic growth; Portugal’s economy has shrunk by
1.4% compared to British growth of 1.7%xxi. Clegg’s focus, like Macmillan’s, on the economic
benefits of some sort of relationship with Europe is only set to become weaker. At the
moment, this floundering economic argument is the only thing keeping Britain part of
Europe and the Liberal Democrats as influential.
Billy other Mates
A memorable part of the BBC Clegg-Farage Europe debate was focused on British influence
on the world stage. Clegg warned that Farage’s desire would lead to a 'Billy-no-mates
Britain’xxii; a UK left to work in isolation with no support, impairing British prestige and the
loss of London’s ‘seat at the top table’ of global capitals. Britain needs to be part of the EU
to work with Brussels, and remain a great power in the world.’xxiii
5
Clegg has failed to note the comparison between Britain’s past global position and Britain’s
2014 global position. With Britain’s entrance into the ECC in the 1970s, after De Gaulle’s
death, London still contained strong and historical connections around the world. The
‘special relationship’, forged and developed between Britain and the United States through
WW2 and the Cold War evolved during the 1980s. Thatcher and President Ronald Reagan
held the ‘extraordinary alliance’xxiv in their partnership to tackle Communism. Thatcher also
promised that, ‘Your [American] problems will be our problems and when you look for
friends we shall be there’xxv. Moreover, Britain, though expanding its decolonisation
programme, particularly during and after application for Britain’s place in the ECC,
continued to have relatively strong connections with its previous territories. Many ex-
colonies, such as Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, kept Elizabeth II as head of state and
commitment to the British-lead Commonwealth of Nations. New Zealand showed its strong
commitment to Britain during the Falklands War (1982), cutting all diplomatic relations with
Argentina. Britain, though more and more a part of Europe, never became a ‘Billy-No-
Mates’ outside of it.
There is a strong comparison between British relations of the 1970s and 1980s and present
British relations. The strong Anglo-American relationship survives. Barrack Obama in 2010
told the world that, ‘The United States and the United Kingdom enjoy a truly special
relationship’.xxvi Obama’s speech can be seen best in Britain’s fight alongside America
against terrorism, particularly in Afghanistan. Floridan Senator, Marco Rubio, reported in
2014 that the strong Anglo-American relationship would continue under a Republican
administration, ‘regardless of the road you take [regardless of being in Europe]’xxvii. Britain
still maintains influence in its old-colonies, shown best in the Duke and Duchess of
Cambridge’s 2014 tour of New Zealand and Australia. 51% of Australiansxxviii now believe
that a move towards a republic is unnecessary, in contrast to 1999 when 58%xxix were in
support of the transition to republicanism. Britain has never been alone in the world, and
would not be unaccompanied if it were to leave the EU. Instead, Britain would find it easy to
reenergize the historic and strong connections that it has always had. Clegg is at risk of
looking foolish and loosing political influence if Britain was ever to leave Brussels for good.
Fortune-Telling of Europe
Shown with Clegg in his television debate and Cameron in various press interviews, the
Coalition leaders are guilty of trying to predict the future of the EU. Clegg reported that he
believed Europe would stay largely the samexxx, whilst Cameron fears for a future ‘United
States of Europe’ with greater powers set in Brussels.xxxi However, Britain during the last
fifty-years has earned itself a reputation for badly predicting the future of its European
partners.
6
In the late-1950s Britain turned down an invitation from Paris and Bonn to become more
involved in the negotiations for the future ECC. Russell F. Bretherton, the Under-Secretary in
the Board of Trade, reported that:
‘I don’t think the cabinet took much notice of it at the time, which was judged to be ‘merely
another elaborate paper scheme of the continentals, and nearly certain to fail’.xxxii
Instead of showing deficiency, by 1961 Europe was enjoying tariff cuts of 30%xxxiii, and as a
result, raised industrial output by more than 50%xxxiv, compared to the UK’s increase of only
20%xxxv. The UK government quickly realised the mistake it had made it predicting the future
of Europe and in ‘missing the European bus’. Britain’s failure in making these judgements
continued into the 1970s when the UK gained entrance into the ECC. By 1975 the European
boom was looking to turn into a bust; rising oil prices pushed the Community towards
recession and Brussels recorded the first ever negative rate of growth. By 1977 over five
million people were unemployed, which reached ten million by the early-1980sxxxvi.
This parallel to the past is to warn supporters of the Coalition leadership that British
governments have always been negatively surprised at the outcome of the European
Project. There is little reason why either Cameron or Clegg would be any different.
Supporters of the government should use their influence to promote a move, by the
Coalition, away from predictions of Europe’s future.
Conclusion
Advocates for the Coalition Government should use any influence they have to change the
way Cameron and Clegg are arguing for relations with Brussels. At the moment both leaders
are failing to find parallels, and to learn lessons from the past, which could help form their
governmental policies. In the area of reform, Cameron fails to acknowledge the parallel of
his predecessors in their struggle and failure to gain the same. Nick Clegg fails to see that
Britain has always had strong connections outside of Europe, whilst reluctantly agreeing to
relations with Brussels on economic terms. Both have failed to learn the hurtful lessons of
their forbearers in trying to predict the future of Europe. Avoidance of this
acknowledgement to the past will likely result in national and international embarrassment,
and possibly political defeat. A possibility is to follow the lead of the Labour Party: avoidance
of the Europe issue and greater focus upon UK domestic problems.
7
Notes
i ‘Bulgaria benefits from weakness of Greek economy’, The Guardian,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/19/bulgaria-benefits-weakness-greek-economy-aid; consulted
20 April 2014.
ii ‘ Unemployment rate falls to 11.8 per cent in March’, The Irish Times,
http://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/unemployment-rate-falls-to-11-8-per-cent-in-march-
1.1747109;consulted 20 April 2014 . ‘Spain’s economic outlook improving,says Moody’s ratings agency’,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-25226669; consulted 20 April 2014.
iii ‘The One Show’, http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b007tcw7; consulted 20 April 2014.
iv Nick Clegg & Nigel FarageEurope debate, British BroadcastingCorporation;consulted 2 April 2014
v The Sunday Politics, http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p00ly0k7; consulted 13 April 2014.
vi The Sunday Politics;consulted 13 April 2014.
vii ‘David Cameron: my seven targets for a new EU’, The Telegraph,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/eureferendum/10700610/David-Cameron-my-seven-targets-
for-a-new-EU.html; consulted 20 April 2014.
viii Giulia Bentivoglio,‘Britain,the EEC and the Special Relationship duringtheHeath Government’,
Academia.edu, p.283
ix - Giulia Bentivoglio,‘Britain,the EEC and the Special Relationship duringtheHeath Government’,
Academia.edu, p.285
x Giulia Bentivoglio,‘Britain,the EEC and the Special Relationship duringtheHeath Government’,
Academia.edu, p.285
xi ‘Cameron and Hollandediffer over reform to EU’, BBC News, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-
25972302;consulted 20 April 2014.
xii ‘Merkel dampens Dave’s EU dreams’, The Daily Mail, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
2569203/Merkel-dampens-Daves-EU-dreams-Any-reforms-limited-tells-PM-red-carpet-London-visit.html;
consulted 20 April 2014.
xiii Nick Clegg & Nigel FarageEurope debate; consulted 2 April 2014
xiv Nick Clegg & Nigel FarageEurope debate; consulted 2 April 2014
xv John Young, Britain and the World in the twentieth century (London, 1997), p. 98
xvi AnthonyGorst andLewis Johnman, The Suez Crisis (Routledge, 1997), p.144
xvii ‘ Thatcher: “No! No! No!”, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U2f8nYMCO2I; consulted 20 April 2014.
xviii Martin Rosenbaum, Britain & Europe: The choices we face (Oxford University Press, 2001), p.16
xix Rosenbaum, Britain & Europe, p.16
xx Rosenbaum, Britain & Europe, p.16
xxi ‘British economic growth more broadly based’,The Irish Examiner,
http://www.irishexaminer.com/business/british-economic-growth-more-broadly-based-265359.html;
consulted 20 April 2014.
xxii Nick Clegg & Nigel FarageEurope debate; consulted 2 April 2014.
xxiii Nick Clegg & Nigel FarageEurope debate; consulted 2 April 2014.
xxiv David Reynolds,‘A ‘Special Relationship’? America,Britain and the International Order Sincethe Second
World War’,International Affairs, vol.62, no. 1 (1985), p.1
xxv Margaret Thatcher, Washington,26 February 1981, quoted by Coker, ‘Britain and the New World Order’,
p.408
xxviThe CNN WireStaff, 20 July 2010. Obama,Cameron blastreleaseof Lockerbie bomber. Consulted 20 April
2014.
xxvii ‘Britain’s special U.S.ties would surviveEU exit’, UK Reuters, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/12/03/uk-
britain-eu-republican-idUKBRE9B20VO20131203;consulted 21 April 2014.
8
xxviii ‘PrinceGeorge ‘the Republican Slayer’,The Daily Mail, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
2605667/Support-republic-slips-lowest-level-popularity-royals.html;consulted 20 April 2014.
xxix ‘PrinceGeorge ‘the Republican Slayer’, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2605667/Support-
republic-slips-lowest-level-popularity-royals.html;consulted 20 April 2014.
xxx Nick Clegg & Nigel FarageEurope debate; consulted 2 April 2014
xxxi ‘Cameron: my seven targets,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/eureferendum/10700610/David-Cameron-my-seven-targets-
for-a-new-EU.html; consulted 20 April 2014.
xxxii Richard Aldous and SabineLee, Harold Macmillan and Britain’s World Role (Basingstoke,1995),p.130
xxxiii Keith Perry, Britain and the European Community: made simple (London, 1984), p.7
xxxiv Keith Perry, Britain and: made simple, p.7
xxxv Keith Perry, Britain and: made simple, p.7
xxxvi Keith Perry, Britain and: made simple, p.13
9
Bibliography:
Primary Sources:
‘British economic growth more broadly based’,The Irish Examiner,
http://www.irishexaminer.com/business/british-economic-growth-more-broadly-based-265359.html;
consulted 20 April 2014.
‘Britain’s special U.S.ties would surviveEU exit’, UK Reuters, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/12/03/uk-
britain-eu-republican-idUKBRE9B20VO20131203;consulted 21 April 2014.
‘Bulgaria benefits from weakness of Greek economy’, The Guardian,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/19/bulgaria-benefits-weakness-greek-economy-aid; consulted
20 April 2014.
‘Cameron and Hollandediffer over reform to EU’, BBC News, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-
25972302;consulted 20 April 2014.
‘David Cameron: my seven targets for a new EU’, The Telegraph,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/eureferendum/10700610/David-Cameron-my-seven-targets-
for-a-new-EU.html; consulted 20 April 2014.
‘Merkel dampens Dave’s EU dreams’, The Daily Mail, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
2569203/Merkel-dampens-Daves-EU-dreams-Any-reforms-limited-tells-PM-red-carpet-London-visit.html;
consulted 20 April 2014.
Nick Clegg & Nigel FarageEurope debate, British BroadcastingCorporation;consulted 2 April 2014
‘PrinceGeorge ‘the Republican Slayer’, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2605667/Support-republic-
slips-lowest-level-popularity-royals.html;consulted 20 April 2014.
‘Spain’s economic outlook improving,says Moody’s ratings agency’, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-
25226669;consulted 20 April 2014.
‘ Thatcher: “No! No! No!”, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U2f8nYMCO2I, consulted 20 April 2014.
Thatcher Magaret, Washington,26 February 1981,quoted by Coker, ‘Britain and the New World Order’
The CNN WireStaff, 20 July 2010. Obama,Cameron blastreleaseof Lockerbie bomber. Consulted 20 April
2014.
‘The One Show’, http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b007tcw7; consulted 20 April 2014.
The Sunday Politics, http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p00ly0k7; consulted 13 April 2014.
‘ Unemployment rate falls to 11.8 per cent in March’, The Irish Times,
http://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/unemployment-rate-falls-to-11-8-per-cent-in-march-
1.1747109;consulted 20 April 2014 .
10
Secondary Sources:
Aldous Richard and Lee Sabine, Harold Macmillan and Britain’s World Role (Basingstoke,1995).
Bentivoglio Giulia,‘Britain,the EEC and the Special Relationship duringtheHeath Government’,
Academia.edu.
Gorst Anthonyand Johnman Johnman, The Suez Crisis (Routledge, 1997).
Perry Keith, Britain and the European Community: made simple (London, 1984).
Reynolds David,‘A ‘Special Relationship’? America,Britain and the International Order Sincethe Second World
War’, International Affairs, vol.62, no. 1 (1985).
Rosenbaum Martin, Britain & Europe: The choices we face (Oxford University Press, 2001).
Young John, Britain and the World in the twentieth century (London, 1997)

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Britain and Europe policy paper

  • 1. 1 HistoryPolicyPaper Britain’s long and fragile relationship with Brussels: advice for the Coalition Brian Haines Executive Summary  The Coalition leaders have failed to refer sufficiently to history when making their focal points for Britain’s relationship with Brussels. Lessons from the past could be learned and parallels noted for David Cameron and Nick Clegg to be aware of.  Cameron must prevent from making reform of the European Union (EU) his focal foreign policy. The desire for reform over the years has continually failed, and Cameron’s attempt shows only failure.  The importance of Brussels for Britain’s economy must be fused with other arguments. The British have never been pro-European, and the weakness of specific European regions could destroy Nick Clegg’s dreamof a Continental Britain.  The claimthat Britain without Europe will be isolated is a flawed claim. Britain has always had strong global connections; working well with other states in areas of defence and promotion of culture.  When Cameron and Clegg make judgments of what the future of Europe will be, they fail to learn the lesson of their predecessors: predictions of Europe are difficult, embarrassing, and harmful to the parties involved.
  • 2. 2 Britain’s European Problem The United Kingdom faces a pivotal point in its relationship with its European neighbours, particularly with those who are part of the EU. The recent global financial crisis (2008-2013) has brutally impacted many European economies; the Germans have recently had to agree to a further aid package of 110 billion Euros for their Greek partnersi. In 2013, Spain and Ireland kept high unemployment levels of over-15%.ii Constant images of the failure of the European project, including widespread concerns of Eastern European migration to Britain, shown on television and printed in newspapers, have intensified the question of Britain’s place in the European project. This debate has been further fuelled by Cameron’s promise that a 2015 electoral victory by the Conservatives would mean a referendum on British participation in the EU. The Prime Minister’s actions have clearly had a strong impact; it seems that the European question is now a topic of discussion on every British political programme, but also has started to appear on various genres of television, an example being the evening topical programme The One Showiii. The height of this Europe debate was reached in Spring 2014. Whilst Cameron failed to find allies in German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Francois Hollande, Nick Clegg presented his pro-Europe argument during two live debates against UKIP-leader Nigel Farage. The Coalition’s argument on British participation in Europe has focused on three main areas: Cameron’s promise to fight for reform of the EU, Clegg’s focus on the importance of the EU for Britain’s economy and Clegg’s view of a Britain without Europe as a ‘Billy no-mates’iv in the world, losing its political standing. This paper is to show that these issues are not specific to 2014, but instead have a long standing history which the Coalition partnership should refer back to. Supporters of the Coalition, who read this paper, and which to avoid its future downfall, should use their influence to change the government’s argument. The Coalition would benefit from having a similar policy to that of the Miliband Labour Partyv: downplaying the importance of the European debate and focusing on domestic issues.vi Reform Promise? Not a new issue! Along with his promise of a 2017 referendum, Cameron has promised to fight for reform of Europe, including reform of immigration laws, the level of red tape for businesses and liberation of British police officers from European interference.vii Cameron, however, is likely to be doomed in this quest. Britain has often attempted to reform through changing the minds of other European leaders. This history goes back beyond the 1973-referendum, which is often quoted by politicians. The Coalition government neglects to remember that the UK was late in joining the European project, due the Westminster leadership having
  • 3. 3 conflicting ideas with continental leaders regarding nations European and global commitments. In 1963, French President, Charles De Gaulle, vetoed UK membership of the Common Market (ECC) only a few months after Anglo-American cooperation on the production of submarine nuclear weapons. Britain’s desire to keep a close relationship with the United States, whilst in Europe, contrasting to French desires, largely influenced Britain’s inability to join the European partnership. This failure for Britain to get its desired position in Europe, due to French opposition, would continue for over a decade. Even with British entry into the ECC, British governments did not end their attempt to reform and change Europe for British personal desires. Prime Minister Edward Heath quickly gained a reputation as an ‘awkward European’viii due to his continued reluctance to accept ECC legislation. Heath failed to achieve his policy to establish Britain a special place in Europe, including allowing Britain to have different conditions to the other member states. Sir Con O’Neil (main British negotiator to the Community) said in 1973 that, ‘Indeed, Britain had to swallow [European legislation] the lot, and swallow it now’ix. Whilst Heath reported that ‘we [the Conservatives] are not satisfied with the European Community as it stands today’x. The Heath Government was unable to reform Europe for Britain’s specific needs. The continental leaders’ opposition to reform made a strong barrier for British desires. This failure to achieve large scale reform of Europe, through the decades, has a strong comparison to the present. A Prime Minister is again searching European Parliaments for allies to reform Europe. The response to his search, in the words of De Gaulle, will likely be ‘non’. Once again politicians in France and Germany have different plans for Europe to those in London. During the state visit of Hollande to Britain in January 2014, the French President said treaty change to the EU was ‘not a priority for the time being’xi. Even with the expected centre-right ally of Merkel, Cameron has found resistance. Coinciding with the past, the Germans present themselves as unwilling to support complaints from London. Merkel, after a lavish state visit in March 2014, told Cameron that she would ‘disappoint those wanting fundamental reform’xii. Akin to the era of De Gaulle and German Chancellor Willy Brandt (1969-1974), the near future shows no good sign for British reform of Europe. Brussels? Only in for the Money British Deputy Prime Minister Clegg (2010-2015) presented his focal argument for Britain to remain part of Europe during the 2014 television debates against Nigel Farage. Clegg’s focal point was financial with his claimthat ‘three million jobs depend on Britain’s membership of the EU’xiii, and British trade depends on union with Brusselsxiv. If Clegg wants the Liberal Democrats to succeed in the Coalition Government, he should stop placing emphasis upon the financial aspects of the EU. He is missing a fundamental point: whether Britain sees itself as European and wants to be part of Europe on terms other than finance. The United Kingdom, since the origins of a European union in the 1920s, has never been in support of a
  • 4. 4 large European project. During a 1929 League of Nations summit French Prime Minister Aristide Briand proposed closer cooperation between the European states. Briand even referred to a ‘Common Market’; something which the United Kingdom was desperate to join just-over thirty years. London quickly and loudly disclosed its protest of the idea. This opposition, with the effects of the Great Depression and the rise of European fascism, killed off the idea of the Common Market until after World War Two.xv In the late 1950s Prime Minister Anthony Eden and Chancellor Harold Macmillan opposed large scale British involvement in a European project. In 1957 they declined to sign the Treaty of Rome, which set up the ECC, resulting in Britain’s lack of influence in European policy for the next sixteen-years. Only with the impact of heavy financial hardship upon Britain, resulting from WW2 and the Suez Crisis (1956), whilst the European economies rocketed ahead, did Macmillan apply to be part of the European Club. By the early-1960s Britain had lost $300 millionxvi in its wealth and seen a dramatic drop in the value of the pound. Remembrance of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s relationship with the ECC is dominated by her 1984 budget renegotiation and her parliament speech of October 1990, rejecting further integration between Britain and Europe. Her famous line in 1990 was ‘No, No, No’xvii. Even into the twenty-first century, Britain was only a reluctant active partner in Europe, seeking focally financially benefits, instead of culture and diplomacy. It has to be remembered that Britain never joined the Euro currency like the majority of European nations. Clegg should be wary of his financial argument for Britain’s involvement in Europe. Only 17%xviii of twenty-first century Britons are prepared to be labelled as European. This is in comparison to 70%xix who are prepared to be labelled as solely British. Furthermore, only 27%xx polled said they trust the European Parliament. The British, like in the past, show a reluctance to be part of Europe. Europe today continues to struggle in economic growth; Portugal’s economy has shrunk by 1.4% compared to British growth of 1.7%xxi. Clegg’s focus, like Macmillan’s, on the economic benefits of some sort of relationship with Europe is only set to become weaker. At the moment, this floundering economic argument is the only thing keeping Britain part of Europe and the Liberal Democrats as influential. Billy other Mates A memorable part of the BBC Clegg-Farage Europe debate was focused on British influence on the world stage. Clegg warned that Farage’s desire would lead to a 'Billy-no-mates Britain’xxii; a UK left to work in isolation with no support, impairing British prestige and the loss of London’s ‘seat at the top table’ of global capitals. Britain needs to be part of the EU to work with Brussels, and remain a great power in the world.’xxiii
  • 5. 5 Clegg has failed to note the comparison between Britain’s past global position and Britain’s 2014 global position. With Britain’s entrance into the ECC in the 1970s, after De Gaulle’s death, London still contained strong and historical connections around the world. The ‘special relationship’, forged and developed between Britain and the United States through WW2 and the Cold War evolved during the 1980s. Thatcher and President Ronald Reagan held the ‘extraordinary alliance’xxiv in their partnership to tackle Communism. Thatcher also promised that, ‘Your [American] problems will be our problems and when you look for friends we shall be there’xxv. Moreover, Britain, though expanding its decolonisation programme, particularly during and after application for Britain’s place in the ECC, continued to have relatively strong connections with its previous territories. Many ex- colonies, such as Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, kept Elizabeth II as head of state and commitment to the British-lead Commonwealth of Nations. New Zealand showed its strong commitment to Britain during the Falklands War (1982), cutting all diplomatic relations with Argentina. Britain, though more and more a part of Europe, never became a ‘Billy-No- Mates’ outside of it. There is a strong comparison between British relations of the 1970s and 1980s and present British relations. The strong Anglo-American relationship survives. Barrack Obama in 2010 told the world that, ‘The United States and the United Kingdom enjoy a truly special relationship’.xxvi Obama’s speech can be seen best in Britain’s fight alongside America against terrorism, particularly in Afghanistan. Floridan Senator, Marco Rubio, reported in 2014 that the strong Anglo-American relationship would continue under a Republican administration, ‘regardless of the road you take [regardless of being in Europe]’xxvii. Britain still maintains influence in its old-colonies, shown best in the Duke and Duchess of Cambridge’s 2014 tour of New Zealand and Australia. 51% of Australiansxxviii now believe that a move towards a republic is unnecessary, in contrast to 1999 when 58%xxix were in support of the transition to republicanism. Britain has never been alone in the world, and would not be unaccompanied if it were to leave the EU. Instead, Britain would find it easy to reenergize the historic and strong connections that it has always had. Clegg is at risk of looking foolish and loosing political influence if Britain was ever to leave Brussels for good. Fortune-Telling of Europe Shown with Clegg in his television debate and Cameron in various press interviews, the Coalition leaders are guilty of trying to predict the future of the EU. Clegg reported that he believed Europe would stay largely the samexxx, whilst Cameron fears for a future ‘United States of Europe’ with greater powers set in Brussels.xxxi However, Britain during the last fifty-years has earned itself a reputation for badly predicting the future of its European partners.
  • 6. 6 In the late-1950s Britain turned down an invitation from Paris and Bonn to become more involved in the negotiations for the future ECC. Russell F. Bretherton, the Under-Secretary in the Board of Trade, reported that: ‘I don’t think the cabinet took much notice of it at the time, which was judged to be ‘merely another elaborate paper scheme of the continentals, and nearly certain to fail’.xxxii Instead of showing deficiency, by 1961 Europe was enjoying tariff cuts of 30%xxxiii, and as a result, raised industrial output by more than 50%xxxiv, compared to the UK’s increase of only 20%xxxv. The UK government quickly realised the mistake it had made it predicting the future of Europe and in ‘missing the European bus’. Britain’s failure in making these judgements continued into the 1970s when the UK gained entrance into the ECC. By 1975 the European boom was looking to turn into a bust; rising oil prices pushed the Community towards recession and Brussels recorded the first ever negative rate of growth. By 1977 over five million people were unemployed, which reached ten million by the early-1980sxxxvi. This parallel to the past is to warn supporters of the Coalition leadership that British governments have always been negatively surprised at the outcome of the European Project. There is little reason why either Cameron or Clegg would be any different. Supporters of the government should use their influence to promote a move, by the Coalition, away from predictions of Europe’s future. Conclusion Advocates for the Coalition Government should use any influence they have to change the way Cameron and Clegg are arguing for relations with Brussels. At the moment both leaders are failing to find parallels, and to learn lessons from the past, which could help form their governmental policies. In the area of reform, Cameron fails to acknowledge the parallel of his predecessors in their struggle and failure to gain the same. Nick Clegg fails to see that Britain has always had strong connections outside of Europe, whilst reluctantly agreeing to relations with Brussels on economic terms. Both have failed to learn the hurtful lessons of their forbearers in trying to predict the future of Europe. Avoidance of this acknowledgement to the past will likely result in national and international embarrassment, and possibly political defeat. A possibility is to follow the lead of the Labour Party: avoidance of the Europe issue and greater focus upon UK domestic problems.
  • 7. 7 Notes i ‘Bulgaria benefits from weakness of Greek economy’, The Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/19/bulgaria-benefits-weakness-greek-economy-aid; consulted 20 April 2014. ii ‘ Unemployment rate falls to 11.8 per cent in March’, The Irish Times, http://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/unemployment-rate-falls-to-11-8-per-cent-in-march- 1.1747109;consulted 20 April 2014 . ‘Spain’s economic outlook improving,says Moody’s ratings agency’, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-25226669; consulted 20 April 2014. iii ‘The One Show’, http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b007tcw7; consulted 20 April 2014. iv Nick Clegg & Nigel FarageEurope debate, British BroadcastingCorporation;consulted 2 April 2014 v The Sunday Politics, http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p00ly0k7; consulted 13 April 2014. vi The Sunday Politics;consulted 13 April 2014. vii ‘David Cameron: my seven targets for a new EU’, The Telegraph, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/eureferendum/10700610/David-Cameron-my-seven-targets- for-a-new-EU.html; consulted 20 April 2014. viii Giulia Bentivoglio,‘Britain,the EEC and the Special Relationship duringtheHeath Government’, Academia.edu, p.283 ix - Giulia Bentivoglio,‘Britain,the EEC and the Special Relationship duringtheHeath Government’, Academia.edu, p.285 x Giulia Bentivoglio,‘Britain,the EEC and the Special Relationship duringtheHeath Government’, Academia.edu, p.285 xi ‘Cameron and Hollandediffer over reform to EU’, BBC News, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics- 25972302;consulted 20 April 2014. xii ‘Merkel dampens Dave’s EU dreams’, The Daily Mail, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article- 2569203/Merkel-dampens-Daves-EU-dreams-Any-reforms-limited-tells-PM-red-carpet-London-visit.html; consulted 20 April 2014. xiii Nick Clegg & Nigel FarageEurope debate; consulted 2 April 2014 xiv Nick Clegg & Nigel FarageEurope debate; consulted 2 April 2014 xv John Young, Britain and the World in the twentieth century (London, 1997), p. 98 xvi AnthonyGorst andLewis Johnman, The Suez Crisis (Routledge, 1997), p.144 xvii ‘ Thatcher: “No! No! No!”, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U2f8nYMCO2I; consulted 20 April 2014. xviii Martin Rosenbaum, Britain & Europe: The choices we face (Oxford University Press, 2001), p.16 xix Rosenbaum, Britain & Europe, p.16 xx Rosenbaum, Britain & Europe, p.16 xxi ‘British economic growth more broadly based’,The Irish Examiner, http://www.irishexaminer.com/business/british-economic-growth-more-broadly-based-265359.html; consulted 20 April 2014. xxii Nick Clegg & Nigel FarageEurope debate; consulted 2 April 2014. xxiii Nick Clegg & Nigel FarageEurope debate; consulted 2 April 2014. xxiv David Reynolds,‘A ‘Special Relationship’? America,Britain and the International Order Sincethe Second World War’,International Affairs, vol.62, no. 1 (1985), p.1 xxv Margaret Thatcher, Washington,26 February 1981, quoted by Coker, ‘Britain and the New World Order’, p.408 xxviThe CNN WireStaff, 20 July 2010. Obama,Cameron blastreleaseof Lockerbie bomber. Consulted 20 April 2014. xxvii ‘Britain’s special U.S.ties would surviveEU exit’, UK Reuters, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/12/03/uk- britain-eu-republican-idUKBRE9B20VO20131203;consulted 21 April 2014.
  • 8. 8 xxviii ‘PrinceGeorge ‘the Republican Slayer’,The Daily Mail, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article- 2605667/Support-republic-slips-lowest-level-popularity-royals.html;consulted 20 April 2014. xxix ‘PrinceGeorge ‘the Republican Slayer’, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2605667/Support- republic-slips-lowest-level-popularity-royals.html;consulted 20 April 2014. xxx Nick Clegg & Nigel FarageEurope debate; consulted 2 April 2014 xxxi ‘Cameron: my seven targets, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/eureferendum/10700610/David-Cameron-my-seven-targets- for-a-new-EU.html; consulted 20 April 2014. xxxii Richard Aldous and SabineLee, Harold Macmillan and Britain’s World Role (Basingstoke,1995),p.130 xxxiii Keith Perry, Britain and the European Community: made simple (London, 1984), p.7 xxxiv Keith Perry, Britain and: made simple, p.7 xxxv Keith Perry, Britain and: made simple, p.7 xxxvi Keith Perry, Britain and: made simple, p.13
  • 9. 9 Bibliography: Primary Sources: ‘British economic growth more broadly based’,The Irish Examiner, http://www.irishexaminer.com/business/british-economic-growth-more-broadly-based-265359.html; consulted 20 April 2014. ‘Britain’s special U.S.ties would surviveEU exit’, UK Reuters, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/12/03/uk- britain-eu-republican-idUKBRE9B20VO20131203;consulted 21 April 2014. ‘Bulgaria benefits from weakness of Greek economy’, The Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/19/bulgaria-benefits-weakness-greek-economy-aid; consulted 20 April 2014. ‘Cameron and Hollandediffer over reform to EU’, BBC News, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics- 25972302;consulted 20 April 2014. ‘David Cameron: my seven targets for a new EU’, The Telegraph, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/eureferendum/10700610/David-Cameron-my-seven-targets- for-a-new-EU.html; consulted 20 April 2014. ‘Merkel dampens Dave’s EU dreams’, The Daily Mail, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article- 2569203/Merkel-dampens-Daves-EU-dreams-Any-reforms-limited-tells-PM-red-carpet-London-visit.html; consulted 20 April 2014. Nick Clegg & Nigel FarageEurope debate, British BroadcastingCorporation;consulted 2 April 2014 ‘PrinceGeorge ‘the Republican Slayer’, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2605667/Support-republic- slips-lowest-level-popularity-royals.html;consulted 20 April 2014. ‘Spain’s economic outlook improving,says Moody’s ratings agency’, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business- 25226669;consulted 20 April 2014. ‘ Thatcher: “No! No! No!”, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U2f8nYMCO2I, consulted 20 April 2014. Thatcher Magaret, Washington,26 February 1981,quoted by Coker, ‘Britain and the New World Order’ The CNN WireStaff, 20 July 2010. Obama,Cameron blastreleaseof Lockerbie bomber. Consulted 20 April 2014. ‘The One Show’, http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b007tcw7; consulted 20 April 2014. The Sunday Politics, http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p00ly0k7; consulted 13 April 2014. ‘ Unemployment rate falls to 11.8 per cent in March’, The Irish Times, http://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/unemployment-rate-falls-to-11-8-per-cent-in-march- 1.1747109;consulted 20 April 2014 .
  • 10. 10 Secondary Sources: Aldous Richard and Lee Sabine, Harold Macmillan and Britain’s World Role (Basingstoke,1995). Bentivoglio Giulia,‘Britain,the EEC and the Special Relationship duringtheHeath Government’, Academia.edu. Gorst Anthonyand Johnman Johnman, The Suez Crisis (Routledge, 1997). Perry Keith, Britain and the European Community: made simple (London, 1984). Reynolds David,‘A ‘Special Relationship’? America,Britain and the International Order Sincethe Second World War’, International Affairs, vol.62, no. 1 (1985). Rosenbaum Martin, Britain & Europe: The choices we face (Oxford University Press, 2001). Young John, Britain and the World in the twentieth century (London, 1997)