Our society has become increasingly globalized and as a result democratic. With that evaluation one would expect that a connected international community would create an environment optimized for development, growth, and success. A large majority of states, around the world, are democratic but not all are successful and some may even potentially fail. The interest of my analysis is not as to why fragile democracies may fail or why some democracies are more developed than others but rather to analyze the conditions under which a country may democratize to begin with. If we can understand the circumstances at which a nation will become democratic, we may better understand the reason why they may fail or succeed.

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Brent Hamilton
IPEC 4302.001
Professor Bunte
September 29, 2014
Writing Assignment One: Identifying Why Developing Nations Choose to Democratize
Our society has become increasingly globalized and as a result democratic. With that
evaluation one would expect that a connected international community would create an
environment optimized for development, growth, and success. A large majority of states, around
the world, are democratic but not all are successful and some may even potentially fail. The
interest of my analysis is not as to why fragile democracies may fail or why some democracies
are more developed than others but rather to analyze the conditions under which a country may
democratize to begin with. If we can understand the circumstances at which a nation will become
democratic, we may better understand the reason why they may fail or succeed. In particular, I
am going to summarize the mechanisms between income inequality and democratization
according to Boix (2003) and Ansell and Samuels (2010).
Boix first establishes an argument built upon an understanding that econometric studies
support that democracy is inextricably linked to economic development. (Boix 2003, pg. 1) Boix
provides empirical evidence to support their analysis that democratization arises when
“inequality is low” (Boix, 11&12). In other words, democratization is more likely when income
is more balanced across a population. Boix’s analysis rest --in part-- that as inequality increases,
elites are more fearful of future demands of the poorer majority. (11 & 12) Further, “when
inequality is low, the median voter will demand less redistribution.” (11) However, we cannot

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overlook another tier of Boix’s theory, capital mobility, as it will help us understand the
reasoning for certain actions as they relate to income inequality.
Capital mobility as described by Boix is a vehicle by which we can analyze and predict
the emergence of a democratic regime. (12) We are able to do this because capital mobility is an
asset that can be “either taxed or expropriated”, (12) and according to Boix, can determine a
nation’s reasoning for a demographic transition. Further, Boix explains:
As the mobility of capital increases, tax rates necessarily decline since otherwise
capital holders would have an incentive to transfer their assets abroad. Similarly,
when capital can be easily hidden from the state or when it becomes of a kind that
can be used only by its owners, the temptation to confiscate it also declines. (12)
So this out-of-sight-out-of-mind evaluation of the mobility of capital leads more favorably
towards the likelihood for democracy as “redistributive pressures from non-capital holders
decline”, (12) creating a domino effect that leads to diminishing political conflict. Boix talks
briefly on income inequality, and its effect on economic modernization. Economic
modernization implies a progression or shift from an “economy based largely on fixed assets,
such as land, to an economic system based on highly mobile capital.” (13) Additionally, we see
an accumulation of human capital which, naturally, is harder to expropriate than physical capital.
(13) Finances can easily be moved out of the country or manipulated so domestic threats toward
the sustainability of repressive regimes, according to Boix, are not credible. The largest fear Boix
says, involves the wealthy elites being forced to secumb to pressure from “future median voters”
(13) and their demands for increased taxation (on the wealthy) and higher spending in social
programs. Thus his theory suggests that when a regime holds a larger majority of the national

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income over the other, minority, group and cannot maintain authority over them, to protect their
assets, the best alternative, in regards to the “cost of toleration”, (11) under a democratic regime,
exceeds the cost at which they feel secure under an authoritative, political actors will favor
democracy. In other words, when the costs associated with repressing the minority and less
wealthy citizens exceed the costs of giving up some of their power, they will opt for a democracy
so that they can sustain the wealth they have accrued rather than risk losing it all fighting to
retain the current state. “Whenever all sides have no incentive to pursue an exclusionary strategy,
democracy is established. If any of them prefers to pursue an authoritarian path, political
violence and ultimately a dictatorship prevail”. (8)
Ansell and Samuels (2010), have a different approach to explaining how income
inequality can lead to democratization. Unlike Boix, Ansell and Samuels state that regime
change doesn’t come from autocratic elites’ fear that the poor would expropriate their assets but
rather “a function of politically disenfranchised yet rising economic groups’ struggle to obtain
credible commitments against expropriation of their income and assets by the autocratic
governing elite.” (Ansell and Samuels 2010, pg. 2) Their view is contrary or opposing to the
redistributionist approach, like Boix’s hypothesis, that suggest political transitions are primarly a
function of intra-elite conflict rather than a function of a small but monolithic elite’s fear of the
impoverished multitudes. (2) Ansell and Samuels continue further stating:
The more equal the distribution of land, the greater the number of freeholders who
fear both taxation and expropriation of their land or money by an autocratic elite. Thus
they demand a more representative political system that protects their property rights. (3)
They determine that in terms of income inequality, democratization will be more likely to
emerge when newly wealthy economic groups accumulate a steadily increasing share of the

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national income. Thus under these conditions, democratization will be associated with higher,
not lower, income inequality (3) Essentially, when a once politically disenfranchised group
grows wealthier, its incentives to demand at least partial democracy grow because it has,
naturally, become more fearful from autocratic expropriation because they now have the
resources to credibly threaten autocratic stability. (14) “Land equality combined with income
inequality is precisely the scenario that gives rise to greater demands for credible commitments
on the part of the state… as ever larger groups of citizens come to hold assets, the will seek
insurance against expropriation or violation of contracts.” (27 & 28) We are able to easily
distinguish the causal mechanism, according to Ansell and Samuels, as being a process that
begins with a group gaining momentum and wealth who then require their newly acquired assets
be protected and thus favor a democratic regime.
I now wish to take a moment and evaluate and compare the causal mechanism of both
Boix and Ansell and Simmons and why I believe one to be more relevant and convincing than
the other. Boix’s thesis can be articulated as such: political regime change is driven by autocratic
elites’ evaluation of their expected losses from redistribution of income through taxes and social
programs; this supply-side development theory is a direct result of an increase in income
equality. Boix believes that the reason for democratizing lies in the hands of the wealthy as they
have the most options at their disposal to protect their assets while also maintaining power over
the community. Ansell and Samuels’ thesis can be summarized as a previously disenfranchised
group’s journey to obtain protection against potential abuses from the incumbent elites. This
simply is opposite of Boix’s belief and can be attributed to an increase in income inequality. “
Aggregate country wealth does not drive democratization. Rather, the distribution of the fruits of
development matters. Equality of landholding plus inequality of income leads to democracy.”

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(Ansell and Samuels, pg. 27) In a document published on the National Endowment for
Democracy website, September 12, 2003, the NED President, Carl Gershman, wrote “The
second characteristic [of economic growth] is that the variables constitute forms of collective
action at the level of government – the enforcement of contracts, the protection of political and
property rights, and the collection of taxes that can be used for public services. Such actions
constitute important components of democratic governance, which explains why developing
societies have so much to gain by establishing democratic systems.” (NDE 2003) This
organization, whose prowess is to support freedom around the world, bases its organization on
the spread of democracy has a foundation and ideology that reflect the work of Ansell and
Samuels and the causal relationship they describe. The demand-side evaluation, in my opinion,
best models the reasoning behind why developing nations choice to democratize.

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Works Cited
Ansell, Ben and David J Samuels. 2010. “Inequality and Democratization:
A Contractarian Approach.” Comparative Political Studies 43(12):1543–1574.
Boix, C. 2003. Democracy and Redistribution. Cambridge University Press.
Gershman, Carl. 12 September 2003. “Why the Developing World Needs and Wants
Democracy” The National Endowment for Democracy. Web.
http://www.ned.org/about/board/meet-our-president/archived-remarks-and-presentations/091203