1. Supervisor:Martin Beck
Size:36.148
Constraints: Steering Tunisia and Egypt’s
Islamists down the narrow path to democracy
BIRGITTE VESTERMARK (221065-0698)
Studentno:428818
Universityof Southern Denmark
bives15@student.sdu.dk
Introduction:
The firstdemocraticelectionsafterthe ArabUprisingsinEgyptandTunisiaresultedinavictoryfor
moderate Islamistpartiese.g.the MuslimBrotherhood (MB) inEgyptandits sisterparty EnnahdainTunisia.
Eventhoughthe two partiesstemfromthe same ideologicalrootstheytooka verydifferentapproachto
democracyand to the “art” of beinginpower.This assignmentexamineshow the twopartieshandledtheir
electoral victoriesand whytheirdemocraticattitude wassodifferentfromone another.
The difference inattitudewasparticularlyevidentinthe approachtheytooktowritingnew constitutions,
and the eventsthatsurroundedthe constitution-writingprocessrevitalizedthe discussionof whetherIslam
was indeedcompatiblewithdemocracy.Thissubjectwillalsobe addressedhere.
Theoretical framework:
Thisassignmenttakesitspointof departure inthe inclusionmoderationtheoryoriginallydevelopedby
RobertMichels, whoinhisbookPolitical Parties(1911) offersaclassicstudyof the Social DemocraticParty
inGermany.
The theoryhas since beendevelopedfurther(Schwedler2013) to explainthe evolutionof Islamistpolitical
partiesin a numberof countrieswitha Muslimmajoritypopulation –withthe evolutionof successive
Islamistpolitical partiesinTurkeyfromthe early 1970s till the culminationin the electionvictoryof the AK
Party in2002 as a powerful example.
Moderationischaracterizedbythe AmericanprofessorJillianSchwedleras“a processof change that might
be describedasmovementalongacontinuumfromradical tomoderate wherebyamove awayfrommore
exclusionarypracticesequatestoan increase inmoderation.”(Ibid. p.3)
Accordingto the theory radical political actorswill become more moderate if theyare includedinthe
legitimate political process.That isif theyare allowedtoparticipate inafree civil society,runfor
democraticelections,holdralliesetc.(Ibid. p.4)

2. Thisis because once anextremistgrouporganizesasavote-seekingpartythe wishtoplease votersand
gainpopularitywill be strongerthantheiroriginalradical ideologyandthe groupwill thereforesooneror
laterreplace itsrevolutionaryagendawithavote-maximizingstrategy.Andevenpartiesthatdonothold
deepdemocraticconvictionshave strongincentivestocomplywithdemocraticrules(Tezcür2010, p.31).
Schwedlerpointsoutthata numberof scholarshas takenthe theoryfurthertoargue that once a party has
renouncedrevolutionandviolenceanddecidedtoplaybythe democraticrulesof the game,the vote-
seekingstrategieswill make the moderate(Islamist) partiesnotjuststicktotheirmoderate agenda - in
ordernot to scare potential votersaway - butwill continue todraw themtowardsthe centerof the political
spectruminorderto appeal to an evenbroadervoter segment(Schwedler2013, p.13).
Criticsof the inclusionmoderationtheorymainlyfocusesonwhatisknownas“the paradox of democracy,”
namelythata radical group only behaveslike theyrespectdemocraticnormsandprocesseswhileinreality
theysticksto theircore values,evenif these runcountertodemocraticnorms.(Ibid. p.5)
The neo-conservative AmericanhistorianDaniel Pipeswhoisoftencharacterizedas“Islamophobic”is
probablythe strongestacademicproponentof thisview.He considersall groups,partiesandindividuals
whoseekstoimplementIslamicreformas“Fundamentalists,”andcategoricallydefinesthemas “anti-
democratic”,“anti-moderate”,“anti-Semitic”and“anti- Western”(Pipes1995).Theywill participate in
electionsalright,butthere isnotmuchevidence thattheywill behave democraticallyonce inpower.(Ibid.)
Anothercriticof the moderationhypothesisisHillel Fradkin,alikewiseneo-conservative andaspecialiston
IslamicStudies.He notesthatthe core projectfor IslamicpartiesistobuildanIslamicstate where religion
setsstrict limitsforpolitics.He therefore questionswhetherthe Islamistsare onlyusingthe democratic
toolsto pursue theirhiddenagendaandachieve theirultimate goal of establishinganIslamicstate.
(Fradkin2012)
The critics of inclusionmoderationtheory argue thatassoonas the opportunityarises,Islamist parties will
simply high-jacks the process and abandon the democratic system that brought them to power - this is
sometimesreferredto as“one man-one-vote-one time” - an expression first coined in the early 1990’s by
US diplomat and government advisor Edward Djerejian.
The prominentFrenchprofessorandexpertonpolitical IslamOlivierRoy disagrees.He contendsthatthe
constraintsIslamistsandevenSalafistswill face while inpowerwill notonlylimittheirsupposedhidden
agendaof establishinganIslamicState,butwill alsopushthemtowardsamore openanddemocraticway
of governance,becausethisistheironlychance tostay at the centerof political life.“Thusthe Islamists,
and eventhe Salafists,will become reluctantagentsof democratization”(Roy 2012, p.8).
Schwedlerisnotquite asoptimistic.She admitsthatdemocratization isnotagiven once a radical party has
enrolledinthe democraticpolitical game becauseamoderate partymightreverttoradical strategiesif it
finditswayto gain influence bydemocraticmeanssomehow blocked.
Much dependsonthe nature of the political environmentwhere the eventsunfold,e.g.how strongare the
oppositionandthe state institutionsinthe specificcountry,meaninghow effective are the constraints
beingplacedonthe winning(Islamist)parties. (Roy2012,Schwedler2013).

3. But alsothe specificorientationof the oppositionseemstoplayanimportantrole,andas we shall see in
the two cases of TunisiaandEgypt there isa huge difference inthisrespect.
The assignmentfurtherdrawsontransitiontheorythatdealswiththe factorsandprocessesincountries
movingfromdictatorial rule todemocracy.Thoughitcan be arguedthat notall countrieslabeled
“transitioncountries”are in factin transitiontodemocracy(Carothers2002) the theorystill contributesto
a more nuancedpicture of the causesthat leadtothe transformationandhelpstoexplainthe hugely
divergentoutcome of the transitionprocess inthe twocountries.
Because Ennahdaand MB sharesthe same ideological rootsandbackgroundandyetacted verydissimilar
once in power– especiallywhenitcomestothe processof writinga new constitution - itmakessense to
use the EnglishphilosopherJohnStuartMillsmethodof difference (describedinhismainwork A systemof
Logic from1843) inmy comparative analysisof the twopartiesinitial grapplewithpost-uprising
democracy.
The main problemwiththismethodisthe factthatit can be difficult –if not outrightimpossible –todefine
justone variable thatalone explainsthe differentoutcome inTunisiaandEgyptrespectively.More likely
there are a numberof differentfactorsrangingfromhistorical,tosocio-economic,political andothersthat
all offerspartof an explanationtothisintriguingpuzzle.Somyaimhere will be togothrough a numberof
differentvariablesthatall playedsome role forthe degree of democraticbehaviordisplayedbyEnnahda
and the MuslimBrotherhood,andpinpointthe mostlikely factorsforthe twopartiesdivergingattitude
towardsdemocracy.
Outline
Thistextfirstoutlinesthe political landscapesinEgyptandTunisiaonthe day afterthe firstfree elections
and givesashort presentationof the historyof Islamicparties andthe popularattitudetopolitical Islam in
the two countries.
Part II paintsa broadpicture of the socioeconomicconditions inEgyptandTunisiathatledto the uprisings
againstthe authoritarianregimes.
In part IIIwe take a closerlookonhow MB in Egyptand Ennahda inTunisiahandledtheirelectoral victories
– especiallywhenitcomestoinclude otherpartiesandpolitical forcesinthe processof writinganew
constitution –and analyze the reasonsfortheirdifferentapproach.
It isfair to saythat Ennahda actedina much more democraticmanner thanwasthe case for the MB. And
therefore itseemsthatthe Islamicnature of the partieswasnotthe decisive factorforwhethertheycould
embrace democracyor not.
Part I: A new Era begins - Sweepingvictory for longrepressedIslamists:
As the voteswere beingcountedafterthe firstdemocraticelectionseverinTunisia (Oct.2011) and Egypt
(Nov.2011-Jan. 2012) itturnedout thattheyhad beenanoverwhelmingsuccessforthe moderate Islamist
parties – Ennahdaand the MuslimsBrotherhoodspolitical wingThe FreedomandJustice Party(FJP) that
bothbecame legal onlyafterthe fall of the authoritarianregimesinearly2011.

4. Ennahdasecured89 of the 217 seat inthe Constitutional AssemblyinTunisiaamountingto41 % of the
seatswhile MBnettedan astonishing46% of seatsavailable.
Afteryearsof marginalization,exclusionandharshrepressionbythe authoritarianregimesthe Islamic
movementshadfinallycome outasthe leadingpolitical force inbothcountries.Hence the resultheralded
a completelynew eraforpolitical IslaminNorthAfrica.
Political Islam in Egypt and Tunisia
The MuslimBrotherhood wasfoundedinEgyptin1928 by Hassanal-Banna.Rightfromthe start itwas a
formof resistance toall formsof Westerncolonialism –be it political,cultural economicandmilitary.Itwas
soonperceivedasa threatto Egypt’srulingelite andwasbannedin1948.
It continuedtoworkundergroundand gave up violence asapolitical tool inthe beginning of the 1970’s.
(Cammettetal.2015, p.454) And althoughMB wasnot allowedtoexistlegallyasapolitical partyuntil
Mubarak was toppledinFebruary2011 itwas toleratedasa movement.Hence itdid charityworkamong
the poorersegmentsof the Egyptiansociety,organizedassociationsof professionalsand itsmemberscould
run for parliamentasindependentcandidates.Sowhile the Egyptianregime wascrackingdownonpolitical
Islamthe Brotherhoodwasstill leftwithroomtomaneuverandthe religionassuchwasnot a target forthe
regime.
Thiswas not quite the case inTunisia.Here the repressionwentevenfurtherasthe Tunisianregime hada
verynegative attitude towardsIslaminall itsmanifestations.The country’sfirstpost-independent
presidentHabibBourghibaharbored avisionforTunisiansocietybasedonrepublicanism, secularism,
populism(Ibidp.102) andwhatis knownaslaïcté – a termusedto describe aspecial variantof secularism
that can be characterizedas outrightanti-religious.(Stepan andLinz2013, p.17)
Thisbodedbad forthe TunisianEnnahdaparty that trace its rootsto the Brotherhood-inspiredgroup
IslamicAction.Itwasfoundedasa partyin 1981 underthe name Mouvement de laTendence Islamique
that allegedlywasbehindbombingsof touristhotelsinthe 1980s.
In 1989 itchangedits name to Ennahda,wentthrougha reformprocessanddenouncedviolence.
CandidateswithtiestoEnnahdawere allowedtoparticipate asindependentsinthe electionsin1989.
(Cavatortaand Haugbølle 2013)
But thiswas justa brief exception. Inthe 1990s afterBenAli had takenoverthe presidencyinTunisiastate
repressionincreased,andEnnahdabecame the maintarget – itsleaderswere eitherkilled, jailedorexiled.
(Cammettetal.2015, p. 102).
A strikingexample of the differentattitude takenbythe Egyptianandthe TunisianregimetowardsIslam
can be seenintheirtreatmentof Islamicinstitutions.While Egyptianauthoritiesallowedthe al-Azhar
mosque inCairo – the mostimportantand influentialreligiousinstitutioninthe Arabworld – to remain
openand functioning,Tunisianauthoritieswere more repressive.
In hisdrive tominimize andultimatelyeliminate Islam’sleadingrole inthe societyanddiminishthe clergies
gripon the educational systemandthe judiciary,Bourghibaclosedthe Zeytounamosque inTunis –a

5. likewise traditional andprestigiousinstitutionsforIslamicstudiesinthe Arabworld(Cavatortaand
Haugbølle 2012, p.190).
Anotherequallystrikingdifference isthe role of womeninsociety.Immediate afterindependencein1956
a numberof chances to the Code of Personal StatusinTunisiaregardingwomen’srole insocietywere
pushedthroughtoensure genderequality.
In Egyptgenderequalitywasnot highonthe regime’sagenda,and whenin 2000 the Personal StatusLaw
was changed,aproposal to allowwomentotravel abroadwithoutthe permissionof theirhusband was
removedatthe last minute due toresistance fromconservative lawmakers. (Bernard-Maugironand
Dupret2202, p.15).
WhenBenAli assumedpowerinTunisiain1987 he continuedmanyof his predecessor’s policies –among
themthe state’scommitmenttolaïcté.Wearingthe headscarf inpubliccontinuedtobe restrictedand
religiousinstitutionswere keptundertightstate-control. (CavatortaandHaugbølle2012, p.190)
The harsh repressionof anythingreligiousandamassive crack downresultedinmanyEnnahdamembers
beingexiled.Mostof them – like otherTunisianmigrants –wenttolive inEurope (see table 1),forinstance
the party’sfoundingfatherRashidGhannoushi livedinLondon.
Thisway they got firsthandexperience of the benefitsof life inademocraticstate,where the population
decideswhoshall rule them,where the judiciaryisindependentandwhere rule of law isthe orderof the
day.No doubtthisplayedamodifyingrole of the mentalityof the Ennahdaleadershipascan be seenin
boththe partyprogram1
and inthe way Ghannouchi andTunisia’s – at that time prime ministertobe -
Hamadi Jebali inan interviewinMay2011 talks extensivelyof the political imperative of a”civil State”.
(StepanandLinz2013, p.19)
1
The party programfrom September2011states:The powerofTunisia,herprogressiveness, the protection andpermanenceofher independence,
her sovereignty, and her republicansystem; basedon theseparation betweenpowers, theindependence ofthejudiciary, democracy, (good)
governance,equality betweenits citizens,economic growth,socialdevelopmentand the adherenceto ourArab-Islamicnationalidentity (Donker
2013, p. 212)

6. Ghannoushi andthe party leadership explicitlyrejectedthe conceptof anIslamicState (Roy 2012, p.13,
Donker2013, p.212).
InsteadtheypointtoTurkey’sAKPartyas a model of a religiousmindedandconservativepartytofollow.
Thisseemstobe a positionbeingwidelysharedbythe IslamistsinTunisia.A majorityof themdonot
support“the ideaof an “IslamicState”thatdominatespolitics.“Rathertheysupportthe ideaof bringing
Islamto the state,throughdemocraticpolitical means.”(Donker2013, p.221)
For historical reasonsabigpart of the Egyptianswhowenttolive abroad – eitherbecause theymigratedor
were forcedintoexile–wentto live inthe Arabworld.More thanhalf of themwenttoeitherLibyaor
Saudi Arabia(Fig.2), whichcan in no waybe characterizedas democratic countries.Thereforethe Egyptian
Islamists- andthe populationmore generallyspeaking - were notexposedtodemocraticthinkingand
democraticpracticesinthe same way manyof their Tunisianco-Islamistswere.
Thisis clearlyreflectedinthe differentattitude towardspolitical IslamtracedinEgyptandTunisia.

7. As showninfigure Fig.3 people inTunisiagenerallyshowedlesssupportforpolitical Islamthanwasthe
case inEgypt.
Alsoworthnotingisthe indicationthatsupportforIslamismdeclineswithincreasededucational level(fig.
4).
Againwe see the overall level of supportforpoliticalIslamislowerinTunisiathaninEgyptinall three
educational categories,andthe effectisamplifiedbythe factthat the overall educational levelinTunisiais
higherthanin Egypt. (UNDP2013).
Therefore the incentive tomoderate mightbe strongerforTunisia’sIslamistpartythanforits sisterparty in
Egypt.
Part II: The socioeconomic conditionsinEgypt and Tunisia:
As otherResource PoorLabor Abundantcountries 2
inthe MENA region Egyptand Tunisiahasboth
experiencedthe ISI-phase,3
thatincreasedstate-drivenindustrializationandexpandedthe educational
system;the oil-boomeraof the 1970s, that furtherdiscouragedthe developmentof aprivate industrial
sectorand stimulatedrural tourban-migration;andthe structural economicreformandliberalization
2 The RPLA countries consistof Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia.They are characterized by huge labor
forces, high unemployment and virtually no oil production (below$250 of oil rent per capita) (Cammett et al.2015,p.
26)
3 ISI is shortfor Import Substitution Industrialization - a strategy followed by many countries in the Middle Eastand in
the wider developing world in the 1950s and 1960s.It was an attempt to create development by buildingup a
domestic industry protected by trade barriers and mainly cateringto local demands.Itworked for a whilebut ended
up creatinghuge non-competitive industries dependent on state support. (Ibid.2015)

8. periodwhere the countriesmore or(often) lessrigorouslyfollowedthe neo-liberalrecipe prescribedbythe
WashingtonConsensus,butwhichnone the lesscutbackon state jobs,and createdbigholesinthe social
safetynet (Cammettetal.2015).
Thisledto the narrowingof the regimessupportbase withmore andmore segmentsof the population
beingsidelinedinthe newpost-adjustmentpolitical settlementof the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. As a result
the governmentsresortedtoincreasedrepressionandthe Islamistmovementsgainedpopularityespecially
amongthe marginalizedmiddle class(Ibid. p.98).
Ennahdaand MB bothto some extendmanagedtofill outagapinghole inthe social safetynetleftbythe
regimeswhentheywentthroughrestructuring,andadjustmentfromthe 1980s andonwards.Thisgave
themthe opportunitytoclaimthe moral highground againstcronycapitalismandcorruptioninthe
authoritarianregimesandwonthemmuchpopularsupport. (Ibid. p441.) It alsogainedthema reputation
for goodgovernance,forbeingmore competent,trustworthyand“cleaner”thantheircompetitorsinthe
firstfree electionsafterthe uprisings –a reputationpavingtheirwaytopower(Ibid,p.452).
ThoughEgypt and Tunisiainthiswayshare the same overall developmenttraits,the socio-economicfactor
were somewhatmore favorableinTunisia.Tunisia’sindexof HumanDevelopmentin2011 was forinstance
higherthanEgypt’s(UNDP2011). Andwhenitcomesto confessional,ethnicandtribal structuresTunisia
alsohas an advantage because the countryenjoysahighdegree of homogeneitythatmightsmoothits
transitionprocess (Beck andHüser2012, p.18)
But eventhoughthismighthelpTunisiainitstransitiontodemocracyitdoesn’tseemtoexplainthe
difference indemocraticattitudedisplayedbyEnnahdaandthe Brotherhood.
Part III: The post electionperiod – with special focuson the constitutional process
In the firstpost-uprisingelectionsinTunisiaEnnahda gained89out of 217 seatson the Constituent
Assemblytranslatingto 41 percentof the seats. EventhoughEnnahdacame out as the strongestparty they
still neededcoalitionpartnerstoforma majority. Theychose toworkwithtwo center-leftpartiesCPRand
Ettakatol (markedinboldintable 1).
In Egyptthe victoryof the Brotherhoods FJP-ledalliance wasalmostidentical (see table2).Theygained
37.5 percentof the votesbutendedupcontrolling46 percentof the seats.

9. The core constituencyof Islamicpartiesisonlyestimatedtobe around20 percent(Roy2013, p.16). Sothe
impressiveelectionresultsinthe firstfree electionsmeantthatbothEnnahdaandthe MuslimBrotherhood
were able toattract votersfarbeyondtheircore constituency.
The party leadershipof Ennahdaseemedtobe aware of the factthat many Tunisiansvotedforthem
because theysawthemas a counterweighttoTunisia’sFrench-speakingeliteratherthanbecause of their
religiousaffinities, (Beck andHüser2012, p. 18). And thisprobablycontributedtotheirwillingnesstoform
a broad political coalition.
The MB on the otherhand seemedtosee theirvotersupportasa blueprintfortakingoverof the state
institutionsandin thiswayconfirmthe worries displayedby“the paradox of democracyhypothesis”:
The “Brothers” didn’teventrytoform a coalitionwithnon-Islamicparties,andtheywere outrightcriticized
for excludingtheirpolitical opponentsandfortryingto force throughtheirownagenda.(Cammett2015,
p.103)
But accordingto Roy, thisshouldcome asno surprise,asitis not unusual that partiesbeingsweptinto
powerbylandslide margins, are temptedtothinkthattheydon’tneedtobotherwiththe tediousand
complicatedprocessof forming alliances butcanhandout governmentposts astheysee fit.(Roy 2012, p.
6)
Or to put itmore directly:if aparty thinksitcan succeedwithplowingaheadonitsownthe incentivesfor
cooperationwithotherpartiesmightfade –especiallywhencrucial issueslike the contentof the
constitution,the role of the judiciaryandthe independence of monitoringinstitutionsare atstake,and
electionsare farof and hence the leadingpartyfacesnoimmediate riskof beingpunishedbythe electorate
(Schwedler2013, p.14).
To counterthe temptationtohigh-jackthe democratizationprocessandreverttoitsideological projectof
creatingan IslamicState itis therefore importantwithchecksandbalances –eitherinthe formof a strong
oppositionorstrongstate institutionsorboth- that can make sure that the leading(Islamist) partysticksto
itsmoderationanditscommitmenttothe democraticrulesof the game.(Ibid. p.4-5,Roy 2012)
Andthis goesa longwayto explainwhyEnnahdaandMB handledtheirelectoral victoriessodifferently.

10. Drafting of the constitutions
The checks andbalanceswere verymuchat work inthe draftingof the constitutioninTunisia.Itwasa
drawnout affairthan endeduptakingalmostthree yearsof longandoftenheateddiscussionsinvolving
partiesfromacross the political spectrum. Itwas supposedtohave beenconcludedone yearafterthe
electionsof the ConstituentAssemblyinOctober2011 but was postponedanumberof timestoallowfor
furtherconsultationanddiscussionamongthe political actors,anditendedwith eachof the constitutional
articlesbeingapproved separately bythe popularlyelectedparliament.
In the processEnnahda’s representativestried toplease theircore constituencybysuggestingthingsthat
appealedto theirconservativemoral norms –for instance a numberof articlesthatwouldincorporate
Shariaintothe constitutionamongthemcriminalizingblasphemy.Butinmanycasestheylaterbacktracked
and accepteda compromise. (Cammettetal. 2015, p.463)
Much fussalso eruptedwhenthe partydisplayeditstraditional view ongenderbysuggestinganarticle in
the constitutiondefiningmenandwomenashavingnotequal butso called“complementaryroles”inthe
family.The sharpbacklashfromleftist,secularandliberal partiesmade Ennahda’srepresentativeschange
theirmindsandthe party acceptedinsteadawordinginvokingfull equality.(Ibid.)
Thisshowsthat Ennahdawas not justexposedtomoderationinfluence fromitssecularcoalitionpartners
and the opposition,butalsothatthe party – inline withwhatmoderationtheoristswouldexpect –
respondedtoitby moderatingandadaptingitsoriginal standtoone thatwas acceptable tothe coalition
partnersand the opposition.
In Egyptthe leadingpolitical force (comprisingdifferentIslamiststrands) tookamuchmore winnertakes-it-
all-approachthatledtothe secularactorsfeelingsidelinedrightfromthe start - and worriedthatthe
Islamistwoulduse theirdominantpositiontocreate aconstitutionreflectingtheirreligiousworldview.
Duringitselectoral campaignandwhile inpowerFJP indeedboth articulatedandattemptedtopush
throughmore conservative positionsonwomen’sissuesthanitsTunisiancounterpart.(Ibid. p.464).Inthe
endthe party issuednonewpoliciesonfamilylaw duringtheirshortstayinpower,buttheynevertheless
wrote a constitutionwithastrongerreligiousemphasisthanpreviousEgyptianconstitutions,andsome of
itsarticlesupheld Shariaasthe principal source of legislation.Italsoseemstopave the wayfora much
more prominentrole foral-Azharinfuture legislation, thoughthe constitution assuchisnot a blueprintfor
a theocraticstate (Albrecht2013).
The constitutional processinEgyptwasa rather hastyone,lastinglessthan11 month,and MB mainly
pushedthroughitsownagendawithlimiteddiscussionsandlittleornoattemptto include the opposition
evenwhensensitiveissueswere atstake (Cammettetal.2015, p.465).
Political checks and balances:
As shownabove Ennahdawaskeptinclose checkby the tri-partite-coalitionformedafterthe election –
somethingthatthe Brotherhooddidn’thave toworryabout.Butthe pressure onthe leadingpartyexerted
by the oppositionwasalsostrikinglydifferentinnature.

11. Where the nine successive partieswhomade ittoparliamentInTunisiawere all leftistorsecular(table 1),
the secondbiggestpartyinEgypt – al- Nour– wasof an Islamicnature (table 2).The same goesby the way
for the fifthbiggestpartyandtogetherthe Islamicpartiescontrolledamongthemmore than70% of the
parliamentaryseatsafterthe electionsinEgyptin2011-12. The Islamicleaningpartiesalsocontrolled
amongthem85 %of the seatsin the upperhouse – knownas the ShuraCouncil (Ibid. p.464).
The MuslimBrotherhoodwere inotherwordschallengedbyamore extreme opposition,thatforcedthem
to prove theircore commitmentstoa conservative religiouspolitical vision,whileEnnahdaonthe other
handwas challengedbyaleftist/secularoppositionthatconstantlydraggedthemtowardsthe political
centerand forcedthemtostay there whenforinstance Salafi groupstriedtopressure themtoadopt
religiousvalueslike separationof sexes,fullveilingforwomeninpublicandothercore conservative Islamic
social normsand practices.
So while–accordingtomoderationtheory - political groupsvyingforalarge followingwill likelypull
towardsthe political centerthe incentive tomoderate might,as Schwedlerargues,loseitsappeal if the
mainoppositioniscomingfromgroupswithmore radical views. (Schwedler2013, p.8)
If a formerradical groupgoingthrougha moderationprocesssees the biggestpolitical threat ascoming
froma fringe groupitistherefore lesslikelythat itwill continue itsdrifttowardsthe political center.And
thisisanotherpowerful explanationwhyEnnahdawasdraggedtowardscentristviewswhileMBwasn’t.
Institutionalchecksand balances
One shouldbe careful aboutcorrelatingmoderationwithdemocratizationbecause asSchwedlerargues
while “the formercanbe understoodinrelative termsthe latterentailsasubstantivesetof normsaswell
as procedures“ (Ibid. p.15).
Andwhile itcan be saidthat bothEnnahda and the MB hasmoderatedtheirbehaviorsince theygave up
violence andengagedinthe democraticgame,their attitude towardsdemocracyassuchdiffers.
From the early1980s the leadersof Ennahdawithincreasing strengthvoicedthe ideathatdemocracywas
not justacceptable butoutrightnecessary.Thischange of view openedthe doorforcooperationwiththe
secularliberalsandpaved the wayfortheirjointeffort againstBenAli.(Stepan andLinz2013, p. 23)
Thiscooperationtookona more structuredformwithregularmeetingsbetweenthemasearlyaseight
yearsbefore the fall of BenAli,anditledto a political societybeingcreatedalongsidethe civil society - in
contrast to Egyptwhichhad a more creative civil societybutlackedapolitical one.(Ibid.)
No suchcooperationexistedinEgyptwhere fourmonthsafterthe fall of PresidentHosni Mubarakthe
MuslimBrothersandthe secularliberals –whowere the mainsocial groupsto oppose the formerEgyptian
strongman– hadn’tevenmetone single timetodiscussdemocraticgoverningalternativestothe ousted
dictator.(Ibid.)
Thisis a veryimportantdifference:forwhile –as Stepan andLinz argues- a civil societymightbe able to
bringdownan authoritarianregime ittakesapolitical societytoconstructa democracy,because onlya
political societyisable tobuildbridgesbetweendifferentactorsthatenablesthemtocraft“the rulesof the
game”for a democraticalternative tothe authoritarianpolitical regime (Ibid.)

12. The MB also provedunwillingtoundergoathoroughand genuine processof ideological andorganizational
transformationanddidnotdemocratize the wayEnnahdadid.Andthe MB overall appearedless
preoccupiedwiththe democratictransformationof societythantheywere withgainingcontrol overthe
existingstate institutions,whichtheycouldthenbegintoIslamize (El-Sherif.2014).
The political institutionswere alsosomehow weakerinEgyptthaninTunisia. InTunisiathere wasa broad
consensusonthe rulesof the game andthe timeframe (eventhoughitwasrepeatedlyextended)forthe
ConstituentAssemblytowrite anewconstitution.
In Egyptthe situationwasmuchmore influx. Afterstrongpressure fromMB’s newlyformed Freedomand
Justice Partyand the Salafistsitwasdecidedtoholdparliamentaryelectionsbeforeaconstitutionwas
writtenandthat waythe Islamistpartiessecuredforthemselvesadominatingrole overthe 100 member
ConstituentAssemblythatwaselectedby the government.
Thisledto the secularparticipantsboycottingthe process –up to 22 liberal andleftistmembersof the
Assemblysimplyoptedout. The same wentforthe representativesof Egypt’sChristianminority.
Andeventhoughthe political forces hadagreedon twoprinciplestoguide the writingof the constitution –
namelythatthe writingprocessshouldbe broad-basedandinclusive andthatthe powerof the president
shouldbe limited - inthe endthe authorsabandonedbothprinciples(Albrecht 2013).
Probablyaggravatingthe situationwasthe factthat boththe parliamentandthe constituencyassembly
had been declarednull andvoidbyEgypt’scourts inthe springof 2012. The military hadalsodrainedthe
presidencyof powerpriortothe presidential elections thatbroughtthe MuslimBrotherhoodscandidate
MohammedMorsi to powerinJune 2012. But Morsi managedto turnthe situationaroundandinthe
absence of a parliament he acquiredall legislativepowerinthe country (Fradkin2012).
Througha numberof decreesissuedbyMorsi fromJulytoNovember2012 he reinstatedthe parliament
and mandateditto write the constitutioninsteadof the ConstituentAssembly(BBC2012).
Andjusta daysbefore the constituentassemblyconsistingalmost entirelyof MBand Salafistsissuedits
draft constitution,Morsi issuedadecree grantinghimself the powertoissue anydecisionorlaw withno
authorityinthe countrybeingable torevoke it.(Sabry2012)
At the same time Morsi alsostipulatedthatno authoritycoulddissolve the existingShuraCouncil (the
remainingUpperHouse of Parliament)orthe ConstituentAssembly.Therebyhe effectivelyblockedthe
judiciarythatwasabout to issue verdictsthatwere widelyexpectedtodeclare the dissolutionof both
assemblies (Sabry2012).
The MB in otherwordscontrolledalmostall the powercentersinEgypt,andhadmanagedto amputate the
judiciarysothe oppositionhadmuchlessmeanstoreigninthe Islamists, thanhadtheircounterpartsin
Tunisiaandtherefore the MB’sincentivestomoderate,andcooperate wasnotas strongas Ennahda’s.
Conclusion:
As showninpart I the authoritarianregimesinEgyptandTunisiabothcrackeddownon political Islamist
partiesbutwhile the Egyptianauthorityallowedthe MuslimBrotherhoodtofunctionasamovementand

13. didn’tinfringe onthe religiousinstitutionsinthe country,the Tunisianregimetookamuch harsherstand.
NotonlydidBourghibaand hissuccessorBenAli outlaw andpersecute Ennahda’smembertheyalsotried
to eradicate Islamicinstitutionsandthe clergy’sinfluence oversocietyassuch.Thiscauseda much more
negative perceptionamongTunisianstopoliticalIslamthanwasthe case in Egypt.
The sharedeconomicexperience withISIandthe followingadjustment-periodcreatedhighunemployment
and cronycapitalismwhichpavedthe wayforthe Islamicpartiestowinthe firstfree electionsintheir
countryas shown in part II.
But as we have seeninpart III inclusionwill notalwaysleadtomoderation andthe continuousdrift
towardsthe political center,assome moderationtheoristsprofess,isnota given. Hadthat beenthe case
the outcome of the post-electionconstitutionswritingprocesswouldn’thave differedsomuchinTunisia
and Egypt.
On the otherhand “the paradox of democracy”-argumentthatIslamistsonce inpowerwillfollow their
hiddenagendaandcreate an Islamicstate wasalsoeffectivelyprovedwrongbyEnnahda. Whatcan be said
isthat inclusionwillleadtomoderation,butnotnecessarilytodemocratization.Andthe constraining
factors, a partyis exposedto,seemtobe of outmostimportance fora successful democratization.
As we have seenthe constraintsbeingplacedonEnnahdawasmuchmore forceful thatthe onesMB was
exposedto.
Notonlywas Ennahdapart of a tri-partite coalitiongovernmentwithtwosecularparties,theywerealso
underconstantpressure froma parliamentdominatedbysecularforcesthatchallengedthemtotone
downtheirIslamistideologyinordertoobtaincompromises.
Likewise the political societycreatedbythe Tunisianoppositionoveralongperiodhadestablisheda
mutual understandingbetweenIslamistsandsecularsonthe rulesof the game for a democraticalternative
to the authoritarianregime of BenAli (StepanandLinz2013, p.24).
These constraintscombinedwiththe constraintsdisplayedbyasocietywitha generallymore cautious
approach to religioninpoliticsprovedstrongenoughbothtokeepEnnahdaona moderate course and
helpedthemsticktotheirdemocraticpre-uprisingcommitments,which wasultimatelyunderlinedwhen
Ennahdaacceptedelectoral defeatinthe subsequentelectionandhandedoverpowertothe winning
party.
In Egyptthe MuslimBrotherhoodfeltstrongenoughtobullyitswaythrough.Theydidn’thave to
moderate,andhence theydidn’t(El-Sherif 2014).Insteaditsaw itspopularsupportas a tokenthat
legitimizeditstotal dominationof the political process.
MB hadn’tgone througha yearlongprocessof reformanddemocratizationashadEnnahda andthe main
oppositionwasalsonotdraggingthemtowardsthe centerbutrather challengingthemfromthe fringe and
thusthe checksand balancesinplace todrag themtowardsmoderationwasnotas evidentasinTunisia.
At the same time the political institutionsinEgyptwere weak.There wasnotawell establishedpolitical
society,the mutual mistrustbetweenthe Islamistsandthe secularwere neverovercome andthe
constitutional processledtoa total polarizationof the political landscapeculminatinginMorsi’spower

14. grab rightbefore the constitutionwasputtoa popularreferendum.Thismarkedanotherflaw in the checks
and balancesthatcouldotherwise have keptMBon the democratictrack.
As Ennahdaand MB are both Islamicpartieswithasimilarideological backgroundandyetwithavery
differentdemocraticattitudeitseemsfairtoconclude thatitis notthe Islamicnature of the partiesassuch
that determinedtheirapproachtodemocracybutrather because the constraintsplacedonEnnahdawas
much strongerthanthe onesMB was exposedto.
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Tables and Figures:
Fig.1Createdby authoron statisticsfromMigrationPolicyCenter,studyconductedbyEuropeanUniversity
Institute andRobertSchumanCenterforadvancedStudies.June 2013.(seenhere:
http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/docs/migration_profiles/Tunisia.pdf.)
Fig.2. Createdby authoron statisticsfromMigrationpolicyCenter,EuropeanUniversityInstitute and
RobertSchumanCenterforadvancedStudies.June 2013. (seenhere:
http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/docs/migration_profiles/Egypt.pdf.)
Fig.3 WVS,Wave 6, 2010-2014 (takenfromCammett etal.2014 p. 445).
Fig.4 WVS,Wave 6, 2010-2014 (takenfromCammett etal.2014 p. 447).
Table 1: Createdbyauthoron informationfromthe Tunisiannewswebsite:Tunisia-Live.net.
Table 2: Createdbyauthoron informationfromEgyptianmedia:Ahram-Online,Al-Masryal-Youmandal-
Ahram.