A Decision Support Template for Nuclear Crisis Decision Making

1. but Similarity theory does not.
Elliott Levenson, Xizhou Hu, Bharath Inbasekeran
eleven@pitt.edu, xih47@pitt.edu, bhi2@pitt.edu
Zero Sum Game: A Decision Support Template for
Nuclear Crisis Decision-Making
Decision Support Analysis 2130
April 19, 2016

2. but Similarity theory does not.
The Decision
Maker: Lieutenant
Colonel Stanislav
Petrov, Soviet Air
Defense Command
Motivation: Avoid Nuclear War
Expert Opinion
We imagine an expert,
steeped in political
analysis, the military and
leadership. The expert
has many different
factors to consider.
Approach
Quantify Technical,
Geo-Political,
Leadership and
Training Risks.
YOU HAVE ONLY
FIVE MINUTES…TO
MAKE A
DECISION… TO
SAVE THE WORLD

3. Method: Quantification of Risk and Uncertainty
Examine Petrov’s scenario, then similar scenarios with any accompanying
data. Examine and quantify the risks of acting and not acting. Data inputs
will include the missile defense system design data, diplomatic
communiques, system operator data and data from previous false alarms
dating back to the start of the ICBM era.
Chance Input Exercise
as launch By
Military Analysts
at MACOMs
November 9,
1979: Computer
Exercise Tape
Chance Input Computer Failure June, 1980: Faulty
Computer Chip
Risk based
on Petrov's
Assessment
High 1%
Medium 1%
Low 98%
Senior Lieutenant
of Missile Defense:
Petrov’s civilian training
informed his decision
whereas military training
alone would have been
insufficient
Known Optics Issue:
Satellite at a certain
would see sunlight
reflected from clouds or
the Earth's surface. " [16]

4. but Similarity theory does not.
The Model: GeNIe
• Start with a group of
nodes and gradually
refine the Model in
GeNIe.
• Next, refine with expert
opinion nodes.
• Rearrange and modify
nodes to accurately
reflect data.
• Lower the risk values
due to the unrealistic
possibility of nuclear
war.
• GeNIe, reverse arrows
that have the effect of
adding the expert’s
opinion assessment to
the situation.

5. "History and the Current Status of the Russian Early-Warning System" Pavel Podvig Science and Global Security, 10:21–60, 2002 Copyright 2002 Taylor and Francis
http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/20734/Podvig-S&GS.pdf
"The Operational Status of the Russian Space-Based Early Warning System" Paul Podvig Science & Global Security, 1994, Volume 4, pp.363-384 1994 Gordon and Breach Science Publishers S.A USA
Technical Data
Pavel Podvig discussed at length in his
articles the technical issues with
satellites, including the one that failed.
The Soviet Union acquired the capability
to launch on warning only in 1982,
when the Soviet system of early warning
satellites was integrated into the nuclear
forces command and control
system.[16]
The Soviet Launch Detection System
System was brand new and the System
had failed Previously.
Failure to perform station-keeping
maneuvers means that a satellite is no
longer functional. – [16]
"History and the Current Status of the Russian Early-Warning
System" Pavel Podvig Science and Global Security, 10:21–60,
2002 Copyright 2002 Taylor and Francis
http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/20734/Podvig-S&GS.pdf
"The Operational Status of the Russian Space-Based Early
Warning System" Paul Podvig Science & Global Security, 1994,
Volume 4, pp.363-384 1994 Gordon and Breach Science
Publishers S.A USA

6. "History and the Current Status of the Russian Early-Warning System" Pavel Podvig Science and Global Security, 10:21–60, 2002 Copyright 2002 Taylor and Francis
http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/20734/Podvig-S&GS.pdf
"The Operational Status of the Russian Space-Based Early Warning System" Paul Podvig Science & Global Security, 1994, Volume 4, pp.363-384 1994 Gordon and Breach Science Publishers S.A USA
Geo-Political Data
Reagan Elected: Promises to put an end to
the Soviet Union
Reagan jokes about bombing the Soviet
Union.
Reagan Allies with Pope over Poland unrest.
Reagan supports Lech Walensa in Poland
Reagan sends troops to Lebanon 1982.
Reagan fires PATCO strikers. Reagan builds
up Defense

7. Senior Lieutenant Colonel of Missile
Defense
Petrov’s civilian training informed
his decision whereas military
training alone would have been
insufficient
He had only five minutes to
respond according to doctrine.
Most Critical positions in all of
Soviet Defense System - best
personnel
Ground radar data detected no
corroborative evidence, even after
five minutes
Leadership and Training Data

8. • The expert has many
different factors to consider
including:
• Poland under Martial Law
1981-1983
• KGB Andropov becomes
Chairman November 1982
• Operation Able Archer
3/1/83- Present (1983)
• SDI “Star Wars” Announced
3/23/83
• REFORGER September 1983
• KAL007 Shot Down 9/1/83
Expert Opinion
There were several major incidents that an expert can analyze,
from historical events during the cold war:
--Berlin Airlift 1948
--Hungary Intervention 1956
--Berlin Wall 1961
--Cuban Missile Crisis 1962 [8]
--Prague Spring 1968

9. • The Panel allows the User to
enter values and manipulate
the chances based on new
information.
• Software such as GeNIe with
Smile are accessed from a
Web GUI to represent and
allow a user to adjust
parameters to analyze the
decision.
• Could such a Tool help
Officers like Petrov in their
Training?
A Decision Support Tool for Nuclear Crises
On 26 September 1983, the Soviet orbital missile early warning
system (SPRN), code-named Oko, reported a single intercontinental
ballistic missile launch from the territory of the United States and a
second time erroneously reported the launch of American Minuteman
intercontinental ballistic missiles from bases on the West Coast of the
United States. [1]. These warnings were correctly identified as a false
alarm by Lieutenant Colonel Stanislav Petrov

10. Petrov relied on a “gut
feeling”, he said, but
did he really?
Was it not rather a
sound judgment based
on a number of inputs:
Technical, Geo-Political,
Leadership and
Training?
Conclusion
Military nuclear systems and nuclear defense
operators make crisis decisions frequently. They are
guided by protocols based on real-world
experience. What happens when systems fail?
Are the templates and training they follow obsolete.
Can we refine these protocols based on the most
severe incident to provide and train a useful
decision-making template?
With the advent of runaway nuclear proliferation to
rogue nations or terrorist groups, this will become
more important to nations new to nuclear defense
decision-making.
Providing such a useful tool will be very helpful