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Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 1
Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 2
Chapter 10
Management Control
in Decentralized Organizations
Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 3
Chapter 10 Learning Objectives
1. Define decentralization and identify its expected
benefits and costs.
2. Distinguish between responsibility centers and
decentralization.
3. Explain how the linking of rewards to responsibility-
center performance metrics affects incentives and risk.
4. Compute return on investment (ROI), economic profit,
and economic value added (EVA).
Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 4
Chapter 10 Learning Objectives
5. Compare the incentives created by income, ROI, and
economic profit (or EVA) performance measures.
6. Define transfer prices and identify their purpose.
7. State the general rule for transfer pricing and use it to
assess transfer prices based on total costs, variable costs,
and market prices.
8. Identify the factors affecting multinational transfer
prices.
9. Explain how controllability and management by
objectives (MBO) aid the implementation of management
control systems.
Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 5
Decentralization
The delegation of freedom to make
decisions is called decentralization.
The process by which decision making is
concentrated within a particular location
or group is called centralization.
Learning
Objective 1
The process by which decision making is
concentrated within a particular location
or group is called centralization.
Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 6
Costs and Benefits
Benefits of decentralization:
Lower-level managers have the best
information concerning local conditions.
It promotes management skills which,
in turn, helps ensure leadership continuity.
Managers enjoy higher status from being
independent and thus are better motivated.
Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 7
Costs and Benefits
Costs of decentralization:
Managers may make decisions that are
not in the organization’s best interests.
Managers also tend to duplicate services
that might be less expensive if centralized.
Costs of accumulating and processing
information frequently rise.
Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 8
Middle Ground
Many companies find that decentralization
works best in part of the company, while
centralization works better in other parts.
Decentralization is most successful
when an organization’s segments are
relatively independent of one another.
Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 9
Segment Autonomy
If management has decided in favor of heavy
decentralization, segment autonomy, the
delegation of decision-making power to managers
of segments of an organization, is also crucial.
For decentralization to work, autonomy must be
real, not just “lip service.” Top managers must
be willing to abide by decisions made by
segment managers in most circumstances.
Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 10
Responsibility Centers
and Decentralization
Design of a management control system should
consider two separate dimensions of control:
Responsibilities
1
Autonomy
2
Learning
Objective 2
Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 11
Responsibility Centers
and Decentralization
Profit centers Cost Centers
Will a profit center or a cost center better
solve the problems of goal congruence and
management effort?
In designing accounting control systems, top
managers must consider the system’s impact
on behavior desired by the organization.
Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 12
Responsibility Centers
and Decentralization
The management control system should
be designed to achieve the best possible
alignment between local manager decisions
and the actions central management seeks.
For example, a plant may seem to be a
“natural” cost center because the plant manager
has no influence over decisions
concerning the marketing of its products.
Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 13
Performance Metrics and
Management Controls
Learning
Objective 3
Incentives are the rewards, both
implicit and explicit, for managerial
effort and actions.
Linking rewards to responsibility-
center performance metrics affects
incentives and risk.
A performance metric is a specific
measure of management
accomplishment.
Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 14
Motivation, Performance, and Rewards
Incentives. . .
Performance-based rewards that
enhance managerial effort toward
organizational goals.
Rewards
Motivational
Criteria
Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 15
Motivation, Performance, and Rewards
You get what you measure!
Therefore, accounting measures,
which provide relatively objective
evaluations of performance,
are important.
Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 16
Performance Metrics and
Management Controls
The design of a management control system
affects the actions of managers. It specifies
how outcomes translate into unit performance
metrics and into both explicit and implicit
rewards.
Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 17
Performance Metrics and
Management Controls
Agency theory provides a model to analyze
relationships where one party (the principal)
delegates decision-making authority to another
party (the agent).
Agency theory is useful to analyze situations
where there is imperfect alignment between
the principal’s and agent’s
1) Information and
2) Objectives.
Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 18
Agency Theory, Performance,
Rewards, and Risks
Agency theory deals with contracting between
an organization and the managers that it hires
to make decisions on its behalf.
Incentive Risk
Cost of measuring
performance
Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 19
Measures of Profitability
Measures of income are readily available from
the financial reporting system at any level of
the organization for which a company can
identify revenues and expenses.
Accountants can easily customize income
measures such as income before interest and
taxes (EBIT) or earnings before interest,
taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA).
Learning
Objective 4
Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 20
Return on Investment
ROI is the product of two items:
ROI =
Income
Revenue
×
Revenue
Investment
A more comprehensive measure of profitability
that takes into account the investment
required to generate income is the return on
investment (ROI).
Return on
sales AND
Capital
turnover
Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 21
Valuation of Assets
Should values be based on gross book value
(original cost) or net book value (original
cost less accumulated depreciation).
Practice is overwhelmingly in favor of using
net book value based on historical cost.
Most companies use net book value in
calculating their investment base.
Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 22
Valuation of Assets
Asset values: beginning, ending, or average
If investment does not change throughout
the year, it will not matter whether assets
are measured at the beginning, the end,
or average for the year.
If investment changes throughout the year,
we should measure invested capital
as an average for the period.
Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 23
Valuation of Assets
Because income is a flow of resources over
a period of time, and a company should
measure the effect of the flow on the
average amount invested.
The most accurate measures of average
investment take into account the amount
invested month-by-month, or even
day-by-day.
Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 24
Capital charge is the cost of capital
multiplied by the amount of investment.
Economic Profit (Residual Income)
RI tells you how much a company’s
after-tax operating income exceeds
what it is paying for capital.
RI is defined as after-tax net operating
income less a capital charge.
Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 25
Economic Value Added
Economic value added (EVA) =
adjusted NOPAT – (weighted average cost of
capital × adjusted average invested capital)
Net operating profit after-tax (NOPAT)
is income before interest expense but
after tax.
Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 26
Incentives from Income,
ROI, or Economic Profit
Why do some companies prefer
economic profit (or EVA) to ROI?
ROI can motivate segment managers to make
investment decisions that are not in the best
interests of the company as a whole.
Economic profit (or EVA) motivate managers to
invest only in projects earning more than the
cost of capital because only those projects
increase the division’s economic profit.
Learning
Objective 5
Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 27
Invested Capital
To apply either ROI or residual income,
both income and invested capital
must be measured and defined.
 Total assets
 Total assets employed
 Total assets less current liabilities
 Stockholders’ equity
Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 28
Transfer Prices
The price that one segment charges another
segment of the same organization for a
product or service is a transfer price.
Learning
Objective 6
When one segment of a company produces
and sells an item to another segment,
a transfer price is required.
The transfer price is revenue to the producing
company and cost to the acquiring segment.
Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 29
Purpose of Transfer Pricing
Transfer prices should guide managers
to make the best possible decisions
regarding whether to buy or sell products
inside or outside of the company.
A company wants profitability metrics that
reward the segment manager for decisions
that increase both a segment’s profitability
and the profitability of the entire company.
Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 30
General Rule
Transfer price = Outlay cost + Opportunity cost
Outlay costs require a cash disbursement.
They are essentially the additional amount the
producing segment must pay to produce the
product or service.
Opportunity cost is the contribution to profit
that the producing segment forgoes by
transferring the item internally.
Learning
Objective 7
Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 31
Transfer-Pricing Systems
Popular transfer-pricing systems:
1. Market-based transfer prices
2. Cost-based transfer prices
a. Variable cost
b. Full cost (possibly plus profit)
3. Negotiated transfer prices
Transfer-pricing systems have multiple
goals. The general rule provides a good
benchmark by which to judge transfer
pricing systems.
Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 32
Market-Based Transfer Prices
If there is a competitive market for the product
or service being transferred internally, using
the market price as a transfer price will
generally lead to goal congruence . . .
. . . because the market price equals the
variable cost plus opportunity cost.
If a market price exists, use it.
Sometimes market prices are not always
available for items transferred internally.
Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 33
Market-Based Transfer Prices -
Drawbacks
Cost-based transfer prices are
easy to understand and use.
When market prices don’t exist, companies
resort to cost-based transfer prices.
Cost-based transfer prices lead to
dysfunctional decisions - decisions in
conflict with the company’s goals.
Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 34
Full-Cost Pricing
This transfer pricing system includes not only
variable cost but also an allocation of fixed
costs (and, if included, the profit mark-up.)
It is implicitly assumed that the allocation
is a good approximation of the opportunity cost.
Dysfunctional decisions arise with full-cost
transfer prices when the selling segment has
opportunity costs that differ significantly from
the allocation of fixed costs and profit.
Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 35
Variable-Cost Pricing
This transfer pricing system is
most appropriate when the
selling division forgoes no
opportunity when it transfers
the item internally.
Variable-cost transfer prices cause
dysfunctional decisions when the
selling segment has significant
opportunity costs.
Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 36
Negotiated Transfer Prices
Companies heavily committed to segment
autonomy often allow managers
to negotiate transfer prices.
Critics of negotiated prices focus on the
time and effort spent negotiating, an activity
that adds nothing directly to the profits
of the company.
Open negotiation allows the managers to
make optimal decisions.
Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 37
Multinational Transfer Pricing
Multinational companies use transfer
pricing to minimize their worldwide
taxes, duties, and tariffs.
Divisions in a high-income-tax-rate country
produce components for another division in a
low-income-tax-rate country. A low transfer
price would allow the company to recognize
most of the profit in the low-income-tax-rate
country, thereby minimizing taxes.
Learning
Objective 8
Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 38
Multinational Transfer Pricing Example
U.S. multinationals must follow an Internal
Revenue Code rule specifying that transfers
be priced at “arm’s-length” market values,
or at the price one division would pay another
if they were independent companies.
Tax authorities also recognize the incentive
to set transfer prices to minimize taxes and
import duties. Therefore, most countries
have restrictions on allowable transfer prices.
Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 39
Multinational Transfer Pricing Example
A high-end running shoe produced by an Irish
Nike division with a 12% income tax rate.
It is transferred to a division in
Germany with a 40% income tax rate.
An import duty equal to 20% of the
price of the item is imposed by Germany.
Full unit cost is $100, and variable cost is
$60 (either transfer price could be chosen).
Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 40
Multinational Transfer Pricing Example
Income of the Irish division is $40 higher:
12% × $40 = ($4.80) higher taxes
Income of the German division is $40 lower:
40% × $40 = $16 lower taxes
Import duty paid by German division:
20% × $40 = ($8)
Net savings = $3.20
Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 41
Management by Objectives
MBO describes the joint formulation by
a manager and his or her superior of a
set of goals and plans for achieving
the goals for a forthcoming period.
The manager’s performance is then
evaluated in relation to these
agreed-upon budgeted objectives.
Learning
Objective 9
Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 42
Budgets, Performance Targets, and Ethics
Many of the troublesome motivational
effects of performance evaluation
systems can be minimized by
the astute use of budgets.
The desirability of tailoring a budget
to particular managers cannot
be overemphasized.
Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 43
Budgets, Performance Targets, and Ethics
Using budgets as performance
targets also has its danger.
Companies that make meeting
a budget too important can
motivate unethical behavior.
Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 44
All rights reserved. No part of this publication
may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system,
or transmitted, in any form or by any means,
electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording,
or otherwise, without the prior written permission
of the publisher. Printed in the United States of
America.

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horngren_ima16_stppt10.ppt

  • 1. Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 1
  • 2. Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 2 Chapter 10 Management Control in Decentralized Organizations
  • 3. Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 3 Chapter 10 Learning Objectives 1. Define decentralization and identify its expected benefits and costs. 2. Distinguish between responsibility centers and decentralization. 3. Explain how the linking of rewards to responsibility- center performance metrics affects incentives and risk. 4. Compute return on investment (ROI), economic profit, and economic value added (EVA).
  • 4. Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 4 Chapter 10 Learning Objectives 5. Compare the incentives created by income, ROI, and economic profit (or EVA) performance measures. 6. Define transfer prices and identify their purpose. 7. State the general rule for transfer pricing and use it to assess transfer prices based on total costs, variable costs, and market prices. 8. Identify the factors affecting multinational transfer prices. 9. Explain how controllability and management by objectives (MBO) aid the implementation of management control systems.
  • 5. Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 5 Decentralization The delegation of freedom to make decisions is called decentralization. The process by which decision making is concentrated within a particular location or group is called centralization. Learning Objective 1 The process by which decision making is concentrated within a particular location or group is called centralization.
  • 6. Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 6 Costs and Benefits Benefits of decentralization: Lower-level managers have the best information concerning local conditions. It promotes management skills which, in turn, helps ensure leadership continuity. Managers enjoy higher status from being independent and thus are better motivated.
  • 7. Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 7 Costs and Benefits Costs of decentralization: Managers may make decisions that are not in the organization’s best interests. Managers also tend to duplicate services that might be less expensive if centralized. Costs of accumulating and processing information frequently rise.
  • 8. Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 8 Middle Ground Many companies find that decentralization works best in part of the company, while centralization works better in other parts. Decentralization is most successful when an organization’s segments are relatively independent of one another.
  • 9. Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 9 Segment Autonomy If management has decided in favor of heavy decentralization, segment autonomy, the delegation of decision-making power to managers of segments of an organization, is also crucial. For decentralization to work, autonomy must be real, not just “lip service.” Top managers must be willing to abide by decisions made by segment managers in most circumstances.
  • 10. Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 10 Responsibility Centers and Decentralization Design of a management control system should consider two separate dimensions of control: Responsibilities 1 Autonomy 2 Learning Objective 2
  • 11. Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 11 Responsibility Centers and Decentralization Profit centers Cost Centers Will a profit center or a cost center better solve the problems of goal congruence and management effort? In designing accounting control systems, top managers must consider the system’s impact on behavior desired by the organization.
  • 12. Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 12 Responsibility Centers and Decentralization The management control system should be designed to achieve the best possible alignment between local manager decisions and the actions central management seeks. For example, a plant may seem to be a “natural” cost center because the plant manager has no influence over decisions concerning the marketing of its products.
  • 13. Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 13 Performance Metrics and Management Controls Learning Objective 3 Incentives are the rewards, both implicit and explicit, for managerial effort and actions. Linking rewards to responsibility- center performance metrics affects incentives and risk. A performance metric is a specific measure of management accomplishment.
  • 14. Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 14 Motivation, Performance, and Rewards Incentives. . . Performance-based rewards that enhance managerial effort toward organizational goals. Rewards Motivational Criteria
  • 15. Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 15 Motivation, Performance, and Rewards You get what you measure! Therefore, accounting measures, which provide relatively objective evaluations of performance, are important.
  • 16. Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 16 Performance Metrics and Management Controls The design of a management control system affects the actions of managers. It specifies how outcomes translate into unit performance metrics and into both explicit and implicit rewards.
  • 17. Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 17 Performance Metrics and Management Controls Agency theory provides a model to analyze relationships where one party (the principal) delegates decision-making authority to another party (the agent). Agency theory is useful to analyze situations where there is imperfect alignment between the principal’s and agent’s 1) Information and 2) Objectives.
  • 18. Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 18 Agency Theory, Performance, Rewards, and Risks Agency theory deals with contracting between an organization and the managers that it hires to make decisions on its behalf. Incentive Risk Cost of measuring performance
  • 19. Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 19 Measures of Profitability Measures of income are readily available from the financial reporting system at any level of the organization for which a company can identify revenues and expenses. Accountants can easily customize income measures such as income before interest and taxes (EBIT) or earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA). Learning Objective 4
  • 20. Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 20 Return on Investment ROI is the product of two items: ROI = Income Revenue × Revenue Investment A more comprehensive measure of profitability that takes into account the investment required to generate income is the return on investment (ROI). Return on sales AND Capital turnover
  • 21. Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 21 Valuation of Assets Should values be based on gross book value (original cost) or net book value (original cost less accumulated depreciation). Practice is overwhelmingly in favor of using net book value based on historical cost. Most companies use net book value in calculating their investment base.
  • 22. Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 22 Valuation of Assets Asset values: beginning, ending, or average If investment does not change throughout the year, it will not matter whether assets are measured at the beginning, the end, or average for the year. If investment changes throughout the year, we should measure invested capital as an average for the period.
  • 23. Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 23 Valuation of Assets Because income is a flow of resources over a period of time, and a company should measure the effect of the flow on the average amount invested. The most accurate measures of average investment take into account the amount invested month-by-month, or even day-by-day.
  • 24. Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 24 Capital charge is the cost of capital multiplied by the amount of investment. Economic Profit (Residual Income) RI tells you how much a company’s after-tax operating income exceeds what it is paying for capital. RI is defined as after-tax net operating income less a capital charge.
  • 25. Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 25 Economic Value Added Economic value added (EVA) = adjusted NOPAT – (weighted average cost of capital × adjusted average invested capital) Net operating profit after-tax (NOPAT) is income before interest expense but after tax.
  • 26. Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 26 Incentives from Income, ROI, or Economic Profit Why do some companies prefer economic profit (or EVA) to ROI? ROI can motivate segment managers to make investment decisions that are not in the best interests of the company as a whole. Economic profit (or EVA) motivate managers to invest only in projects earning more than the cost of capital because only those projects increase the division’s economic profit. Learning Objective 5
  • 27. Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 27 Invested Capital To apply either ROI or residual income, both income and invested capital must be measured and defined.  Total assets  Total assets employed  Total assets less current liabilities  Stockholders’ equity
  • 28. Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 28 Transfer Prices The price that one segment charges another segment of the same organization for a product or service is a transfer price. Learning Objective 6 When one segment of a company produces and sells an item to another segment, a transfer price is required. The transfer price is revenue to the producing company and cost to the acquiring segment.
  • 29. Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 29 Purpose of Transfer Pricing Transfer prices should guide managers to make the best possible decisions regarding whether to buy or sell products inside or outside of the company. A company wants profitability metrics that reward the segment manager for decisions that increase both a segment’s profitability and the profitability of the entire company.
  • 30. Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 30 General Rule Transfer price = Outlay cost + Opportunity cost Outlay costs require a cash disbursement. They are essentially the additional amount the producing segment must pay to produce the product or service. Opportunity cost is the contribution to profit that the producing segment forgoes by transferring the item internally. Learning Objective 7
  • 31. Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 31 Transfer-Pricing Systems Popular transfer-pricing systems: 1. Market-based transfer prices 2. Cost-based transfer prices a. Variable cost b. Full cost (possibly plus profit) 3. Negotiated transfer prices Transfer-pricing systems have multiple goals. The general rule provides a good benchmark by which to judge transfer pricing systems.
  • 32. Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 32 Market-Based Transfer Prices If there is a competitive market for the product or service being transferred internally, using the market price as a transfer price will generally lead to goal congruence . . . . . . because the market price equals the variable cost plus opportunity cost. If a market price exists, use it. Sometimes market prices are not always available for items transferred internally.
  • 33. Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 33 Market-Based Transfer Prices - Drawbacks Cost-based transfer prices are easy to understand and use. When market prices don’t exist, companies resort to cost-based transfer prices. Cost-based transfer prices lead to dysfunctional decisions - decisions in conflict with the company’s goals.
  • 34. Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 34 Full-Cost Pricing This transfer pricing system includes not only variable cost but also an allocation of fixed costs (and, if included, the profit mark-up.) It is implicitly assumed that the allocation is a good approximation of the opportunity cost. Dysfunctional decisions arise with full-cost transfer prices when the selling segment has opportunity costs that differ significantly from the allocation of fixed costs and profit.
  • 35. Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 35 Variable-Cost Pricing This transfer pricing system is most appropriate when the selling division forgoes no opportunity when it transfers the item internally. Variable-cost transfer prices cause dysfunctional decisions when the selling segment has significant opportunity costs.
  • 36. Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 36 Negotiated Transfer Prices Companies heavily committed to segment autonomy often allow managers to negotiate transfer prices. Critics of negotiated prices focus on the time and effort spent negotiating, an activity that adds nothing directly to the profits of the company. Open negotiation allows the managers to make optimal decisions.
  • 37. Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 37 Multinational Transfer Pricing Multinational companies use transfer pricing to minimize their worldwide taxes, duties, and tariffs. Divisions in a high-income-tax-rate country produce components for another division in a low-income-tax-rate country. A low transfer price would allow the company to recognize most of the profit in the low-income-tax-rate country, thereby minimizing taxes. Learning Objective 8
  • 38. Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 38 Multinational Transfer Pricing Example U.S. multinationals must follow an Internal Revenue Code rule specifying that transfers be priced at “arm’s-length” market values, or at the price one division would pay another if they were independent companies. Tax authorities also recognize the incentive to set transfer prices to minimize taxes and import duties. Therefore, most countries have restrictions on allowable transfer prices.
  • 39. Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 39 Multinational Transfer Pricing Example A high-end running shoe produced by an Irish Nike division with a 12% income tax rate. It is transferred to a division in Germany with a 40% income tax rate. An import duty equal to 20% of the price of the item is imposed by Germany. Full unit cost is $100, and variable cost is $60 (either transfer price could be chosen).
  • 40. Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 40 Multinational Transfer Pricing Example Income of the Irish division is $40 higher: 12% × $40 = ($4.80) higher taxes Income of the German division is $40 lower: 40% × $40 = $16 lower taxes Import duty paid by German division: 20% × $40 = ($8) Net savings = $3.20
  • 41. Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 41 Management by Objectives MBO describes the joint formulation by a manager and his or her superior of a set of goals and plans for achieving the goals for a forthcoming period. The manager’s performance is then evaluated in relation to these agreed-upon budgeted objectives. Learning Objective 9
  • 42. Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 42 Budgets, Performance Targets, and Ethics Many of the troublesome motivational effects of performance evaluation systems can be minimized by the astute use of budgets. The desirability of tailoring a budget to particular managers cannot be overemphasized.
  • 43. Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 43 Budgets, Performance Targets, and Ethics Using budgets as performance targets also has its danger. Companies that make meeting a budget too important can motivate unethical behavior.
  • 44. Copyright © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10 - 44 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher. Printed in the United States of America.